Transpo Case Digests Passengers

SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr.
|2018-2019|
III. TRANSPORTATION OF PASSENGERS
Cases Doctrine
I. Extraordinary Diligence
Nocum vs Laguna Tayabas Issue: Whether or not appellant failed to exercise due diligence.
Appellee Herminio Nocun who No.

was a passenger in appellant's Article 1733 is not as unbending as His Honor has held, for it reasonably qualifies the
Bus No. 120 then making a trip extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers
within the barrio of Dita, transported by them to be "according to all the circumstances of each case." In fact,
Municipality of Bay, Laguna, Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common carrier is bound to carry the
was injured as a consequence of passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
the explosion of firecrackers, diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
contained in a box, loaded in
said bus and declared to its
Fairness demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers,
conductor as containing clothes
and miscellaneous items by a allowance must be given to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of
co-passenger. The findings of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed
fact of the trial court are not that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his
assailed. The appeal is purely co-passengers, not to speak of his own.
on legal questions.
Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is
entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the
innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case
at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a passenger's
baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional
boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed.
Withal, what must be importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the
fundamental sacred rights of the particular passenger herein involved, but the constant
threat any contrary ruling would pose on the right of privacy of all passengers of all
common carriers, considering how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse for
mischief and abuse. Of course, when there are sufficient indications that the
representations of the passenger regarding the nature of his baggage may not be true, in
the interest of the common safety of all, the assistance of the police authorities may be
solicited, not necessarily to force the passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the
needed investigation consistent with the rules of propriety and, above all, the
constitutional rights of the passenger.
Mecenas vs IAC Issue: Whether or not Negros Navigation and Capt. Santisteban were grossly negligent.
On April 1980, the MT Yes.

"Tacloban City," a barge-
type oil tanker owned by the Captain was playing mahjong.
Philippine National Oil
Company (PNOC) and The behaviour of the captain of the "Don Juan" in tills instance-playing mahjong "before
operated by the PNOC and up to the time of collision constitutes behaviour that is simply unacceptable on the
Shipping and Transport part of the master of a vessel to whose hands the lives and welfare of at least seven
Corporation (PNOC hundred fifty (750) passengers had been entrusted. Whether or not Capt. Santisteban was
Shipping), having unloaded "off-duty" or "on-duty" at or around the time of actual collision is quite immaterial; there
its cargo of petroleum is, both realistically speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as "off-duty"
products, left Amlan, Negros hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a common carrier upon whom the law
Occidental, and headed imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence.
towards Bataan. At about
1:00 o'clock in the afternoon Don Juan was overloaded.
of that same day, the M/V
"Don Juan," an interisland The report of the Philippine Coast Guard (Exhibit "10") stated that the "Don Juan" had
vessel, owned and operated been "officially cleared with 878 passengers on board when she sailed from the port of
by the Negros Navigation Manila on April 22, 1980 at about 1:00 p.m." This head-count of the passengers "did not
Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr. |2018-2019|
Co., Inc. (Negros include the 126 crew members, children below three (3) years old and two (2) half-paying
Navigation) left Manila passengers" which had been counted as one adult passenger. 17 Thus, the total number of
bound for Bacolod with persons on board the "Don Juan" on that ill-starred night of 22 April 1 980 was 1,004, or
seven hundred fifty (750) 140 persons more than the maximum lumber that could be safely carried by the "Don
passengers listed in its Juan," per its own Certificate of Inspection.
manifest, and a complete set
of officers and crew The grossness of the negligence of the "Don Juan" is underscored when one
members. considers the foregoing circumstances in the context of the following facts:
On the evening of that same Firstly, the "Don Juan" was more than twice as fast as the "Tacloban City." The "Don
day, 22 April 1980, at about Juan's" top speed was 17 knots; while that of the "Tacloban City" was 6.3. knots.
10:30 o'clock, the "Tacloban
City" and the "Don Juan" Secondly, the "Don Juan" carried the full complement of officers and crew members
collided at the Talbas Strait specified for a passenger vessel of her class.
near Maestra de Ocampo
Island in the vicinity of the Thirdly, the "Don Juan" was equipped with radar which was functioning that night.
island of Mindoro. When the
collision occurred, the sea Fourthly, the "Don Juan's" officer on-watch had sighted the "Tacloban City" on his radar
was calm, the weather fair screen while the latter was still four (4) nautical miles away. Visual confirmation of radar
and visibility good. As a contact was established by the "Don Juan" while the "Tacloban City" was still 2.7 miles
result of this collision, the away.
M/V "Don Juan" sank and
hundreds of its passengers In the total set of circumstances which existed in the instant case, the "Don Juan," had it
perished. Among the ill-fated taken seriously its duty of extraordinary diligence, could have easily avoided the collision
passengers were the parents with the "Tacloban City," Indeed, the "Don Juan" might well have avoided the collision
of petitioners, the spouses even if it had exercised ordinary diligence merely.
Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia
Mecenas, whose bodies were
never found despite intensive
search by petitioners.
Negros Navigation vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of gross neglect.
In April of 1980, private Yes.

respondent Ramon Miranda
purchased from the Negros Stare decisis et non quieta movere.
Navigation Co., Inc. four
special cabin tickets for his In finding petitioner guilty of negligence and in failing to exercise the extraordinary
wife, daughter, son and niece diligence required of it in the carriage of passengers, both the trial court and the appellate
who were going to Bacolod court relied on the findings of this Court in Mecenas v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
City to attend a family which case was brought for the death of other passengers.
reunion. The tickets were for
M/V Don Juan, leaving Adherence to the Mecenas case is dictated by this Courts policy of maintaining stability in
Manila at 1:00 p.m. on April jurisprudence in accordance with the legal maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere
22, 1980. (Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.) Where, as in this case,
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by parties similarly
At about 10:30 in the situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
evening of April 22, 1980, decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
the Don Juan collided off the
Tablas Strait in Mindoro, In Woulfe v. Associated Realties Corporation, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
with the M/T Tacloban City, that where substantially similar cases to the pending case were presented and applicable
an oil tanker owned by the principles declared in prior decisions, the court was bound by the principle of stare
Philippine National Oil decisis. Similarly, in State ex rel. Tollinger v. Gill, it was held that under the doctrine of
Company (PNOC) and the stare decisis a ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to the original proceeding
PNOC Shipping and and not bound by the judgment under the res judicata doctrine. The Philadelphia court
Transport Corporation expressed itself in this wise:
(PNOC/STC). As a result,
the M/V Don Juan sank. Stare decisis simply declares that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
Several of her passengers case should be applied to those which follow, if the facts are substantially the same, even
perished in the sea tragedy. though the parties may be different.

The bodies of some of the

victims were found and Thus, in J. M. Tuason v. Mariano, supra, this Court relied on its rulings in other cases
brought to shore, but the four involving different parties in sustaining the validity of a land title on the principle of stare
members of private decisis et non quieta movere.
respondents families were
never found.
Issue: Whether or not KAL committed a breach of carriage when it prevented Lapuz from
Korean Airlines vs CA boarding the aircraft.
In 1980, Juanito C. Lapuz, an Yes.

automotive electrician, was
contracted for employment The status of Lapuz as standby passenger was changed to that of a confirmed passenger
in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for when his name was entered in the passenger manifest of KAL for its Flight No. KE 903.
a period of one year through His clearance through immigration and customs clearly shows that he had indeed been
Pan Pacific Overseas confirmed as a passenger of KAL in that flight. KAL thus committed a breach of the
Recruiting Services, Inc. contract of carriage between them when it failed to bring Lapuz to his destination.
Lapuz was supposed to leave
on November 8, 1980, via This Court has held that a contract to transport passengers is different in kind and degree
Korean Airlines. Initially, he from any other contractual relation. 3 The business of the carrier is mainly with the
was "wait-listed," which traveling public. It invites people to avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it
meant that he could only be offers. The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty.
accommodated if any of the Passengers have the right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect,
confirmed passengers failed courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
to show up at the airport misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. 4 So it is
before departure. When two that any discourteous conduct on the part of these employees toward a passenger gives the
of such passengers did not latter an action for damages against the carrier.
appear, Lapuz and another
person by the name of Perico The breach of contract was aggravated in this case when, instead of courteously informing
were given the two Lapuz of his being a "wait-listed" passenger, a KAL officer rudely shouted "Down!
unclaimed seats. Down!" while pointing at him, thus causing him embarrassment and public humiliation.
According to Lapuz, he was KAL argues that "the evidence of confirmation of a chance passenger status is not through
allowed to check in with one the entry of the name of a chance passenger in the passenger manifest nor the clearance
suitcase and one shoulder from the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, because they are merely means of
bag at the check-in counter facilitating the boarding of a chance passenger in case his status is confirmed." We are not
of KAL. He passed through persuaded.
the customs and immigration
sections for routine check-up The evidence presented by Lapuz shows that he had indeed checked in at the departure
and was cleared for departure counter, passed through customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus and proceeded
as Passenger No. 157 of to the ramp of KAL's aircraft. In fact, his baggage had already been loaded in KAL's
KAL Flight No. KE 903. aircraft, to be flown with him to Jeddah. The contract of carriage between him and KAL
However, when he was at the had already been perfected when he was summarily and insolently prevented from
third or fourth rung of the boarding the aircraft.
stairs, a KAL officer pointed
to him and shouted "Down!
Down!" He was thus barred
from taking the flight. When
he later asked for another
booking, his ticket was
canceled by KAL.
Consequently, he was unable
to report for his work in
Saudi Arabia within the
stipulated 2-week period and
so lost his employment.
KAL, on the other hand,

alleged that on November 8,
1980, Pan Pacific Recruiting
Services Inc. coordinated
with KAL for the departure
of 30 contract workers, of

whom only 21 were

confirmed and 9 were wait-
listed passengers. The agent
of Pan Pacific, Jimmie
Joseph, after being informed
that there was a possibility of
having one or two seats
becoming available, gave
priority to Perico, who was
one of the supervisors of the
hiring company in Saudi
Arabia. The other seat was
won through lottery by
Lapuz. However, only one
seat became available and so,
pursuant to the earlier
agreement that Perico was to
be given priority, he alone
was allowed to board.
PAL vs CA GR. No. 120262 Issues: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of bad faith.
On October 23, 1988, private Yes.

respondent Pantejo, then City
Fiscal of Surigao City, “It must be emphasized that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind
boarded a PAL plane in and degree from any other contractual relation, and this is because of the relation which
Manila and disembarked in an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling public. It
Cebu City where he was invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
supposed to take his carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
connecting flight to Surigao malfeasance of the carriers employees naturally could give ground for an action for
City. However, due to damages.”
typhoon Osang, the
connecting flight to Surigao Assuming arguendo that the airline passengers have no vested right to these amenities in
City was cancelled. case a flight is cancelled due to force majeure, what makes petitioner liable for damages
in this particular case and under the facts obtaining herein is its blatant refusal to accord
To accommodate the needs of the so-called amenities equally to all its stranded passengers who were bound for Surigao
its stranded passengers, PAL City. No compelling or justifying reason was advanced for such discriminatory and
initially gave out cash prejudicial conduct.
assistance of P100.00 and,
the next day, P200.00, for More importantly, it has been sufficiently established that it is petitioners standard
their expected stay of two company policy, whenever a flight has been cancelled, to extend to its hapless passengers
days in Cebu. Respondent cash assistance or to provide them accommodations in hotels with which it has existing
Pantejo requested instead that tie-ups. In fact, petitioners Mactan Airport Manager for departure services, Oscar Jereza,
he be billeted in a hotel at admitted that PAL has an existing arrangement with hotels to accommodate stranded
PALs expense because he did passengers, and that the hotel bills of Ernesto Gonzales were reimbursed obviously
nothave cash with him at that pursuant to that policy.
time, but PAL refused. Thus,
respondent Pantejo was Also, two witnesses presented by respondent, Teresita Azarcon and Nerie Bol, testified
forced to seek and accept the that sometime in November, 1988, when their flight from Cebu to Surigao was cancelled,
generosity of a co-passenger, they were billeted at Rajah Hotel for two nights and three days at the expense of PAL.
an engineer named Andoni This was never denied by PAL.
Dumlao, and he shared a
room with the latter at Sky Further, Ernesto Gonzales, the aforementioned co-passenger of respondent on that fateful

View Hotel with the promise flight, testified that based on his previous experience hotel accommodations were extended
to pay his share of the by PAL to its stranded passengers either in Magellan or Rajah Hotels, or even in Cebu
expenses upon reaching Plaza. Thus, we view as impressed with dubiety PALs present attempt to represent such
Surigao. emergency assistance as being merely ex gratia and not ex debito.
On October 25, 1988 when

the flight for Surigao was
resumed, respondent Pantejo
came to know that the hotel
expenses of his co-
passengers, one
Superintendent Ernesto
Gonzales and a certain Mrs.
Gloria Rocha, an auditor of
the Philippine National
Bank, were reimbursed by
PAL.
Calalas vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise due diligence.
On August 23, 1989, private Yes.

respondent Eliza Jujeurche
G. Sunga, then a college In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
freshman at the Siliman once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
University, took a passenger extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
jeepney owned and operated
by petitioner Vicente First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
Calalas. As the jeepney was portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
filled to capacity of about 24 facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No.
passengers, she was given 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed
the door at the rear end of seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law.
the vehicle.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
On the way to Poblacion to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
Sibulan, Negros Occidental, overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
the jeepney stopped to let a Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
passenger off. Sunga gave Calrky
way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
doing so, an Isuzu truck "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
bumped the left rear portion injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
of the jeepney. As a result, because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
she was injured. She ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it
sustained a fracture of her was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. Petitioner should have foreseen the
tibia. Her confinement in the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
hospital lasted from August
23 to September 7, 1989. Note:
Her attending physician, The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
certified she would remain actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
on a cast for a period of three person where there is no relation between him and another par ty. In such a case, the
months and would have to obligation is created by law itself.
ambulate in crutches during
said period.

Pilapil vs CA Issues: Whether it is the duty of the common carrier to insure passenger against all risks.
Whether or not respondent is presumed to be negligent in this case.
Petitioner Jose Pilapil, a
paying passenger, boarded No.
respondent-defendant's bus
bearing at San Nicolas, Iriga While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
City on 16 September 1971 transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it does
at about 6:00 P.M. While not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
said bus was in due course
negotiating the distance Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and
between Iriga City and Naga precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care
City, upon reaching the and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with
vicinity of the cemetery of due regard to all the circumstances.
the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, on the way Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the part
to Naga City, an unidentified of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for the
man, a bystander along said time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former, because the
national highway, hurled a presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, however, the
stone at the left side of the same is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised extraordinary diligence
bus, which hit petitioner as required by law in the performance of its contractual obligation, or that the injury
above his left eye. Private suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous event.
respondent's personnel lost
no time in bringing the No.
petitioner to the provincial
hospital in Naga City where First, the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable
he was confined and treated. presumption. Where, as in the instant case, the injury sustained by the petitioner was in
no way due to any defect in the means of transport or in the method of transporting or to
Considering that the sight of the negligent or willful acts of private respondent's employees, and therefore involving no
his left eye was impaired, issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe and suitable cars as well as competent
petitioner was taken to Dr. employees, with the injury arising wholly from causes created by strangers over which the
Malabanan of Iriga City carrier had no control or even knowledge or could not have prevented, the presumption is
where he was treated for rebutted and the carrier is not and ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would
another week. Since there make the common carrier the insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
was no improvement in his Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
left eye's vision, petitioner account of the wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common
went to V. Luna Hospital, carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could
Quezon City where he was have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
treated by Dr. Capulong.
Despite the treatment Clearly under the above provision, a tort committed by a stranger which causes injury to a
accorded to him by Dr. passenger does not accord the latter a cause of action against the carrier. The negligence
Capulong, petitioner lost for which a common carrier is held responsible is the negligent omission by the carrier's
partially his left eye's vision employees to prevent the tort from being committed when the same could have been
and sustained a permanent foreseen and prevented by them.
scar above the left eye.
Fortune Express vs CA Issues: Whether or not petitioner committed a breach on the contract of carriage.
Whether or not the case of Pilapil vs CA is applicable.
On November 22, 1989, Whether or not the seizure of the bus was caused by force majuere.
three armed Maranaos who
pretended to be passengers, Yes.
seized a bus of petitioner at Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is responsible for injuries
Linamon, Lanao del Norte suffered by a passenger on account of wilfull acts of other passengers, if the employees of
while on its way to Iligan the common carrier could have prevented the act through the exercise of the diligence of a
City. Among the passengers good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that because of the negligence of
of the bus was Atty. petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made
Caorong. The leader of the possible.
Maranaos, identified as one
Bashier Mananggolo, Despite warning by the Philippine Constabulary at Cagayan de Oro that the Maranaos
ordered the driver, were planning to take revenge on the petitioner by burning some of its buses and the
Godofredo Cabatuan, to stop assurance of petitioner's operation manager, Diosdado Bravo, that the necessary

the bus on the side of the precautions would be taken, petitioner did nothing to protect the safety of its passengers.
highway. Mananggolo then
shot Cabatuan on the arm, Had petitioner and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see that the
which caused him to slump malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the circumstances, simple
on the steering wheel. The precautionary measures to protect the safety of passengers, such as frisking passengers
one of the companions of and inspecting their baggages, preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal
Mananggolo started pouring detectors, before allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the
gasoline inside the bus. passenger's constitutional rights. As this Court amended in Gacal v. Philippine Air Lines,
Mananggolo then ordered the Inc., 6 a common carrier can be held liable for failing to prevent a hijacking by frisking
passenger to get off the bus. passengers and inspecting their baggages.
The passengers, including
Atty. Caorong, stepped out No.
of the bus and went behind It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the prensent case. Art.
the bushes. 1755 of the Civil Code provides that "a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
However, Atty. Caorong cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."
returned to the bus to retrieve
something from the overhead Thus, we held in Pilapil and De Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent
rack. at that time, one of the in failing to take special precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which
armed men was pouring could not be foreseen, such as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present
gasoline on the head of the case, this factor of unforeseeability (the second requisite for an event to be considered
driver. Cabatuan, who had force majeure) is lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that
meantime regained the Maranaos were planning to burn some of petitioner's buses and the assurance of
consciousness, heard Atty. petitioner's operation manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be
Caorong pleading with the taken, nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
armed men to spare the
driver. During this exchange No.
between Atty. Caorong and The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous
the assailants, Cabatuan event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.
climbed out of the left
window of the bus and Note:
crawled to the canal on the Atty. Caorong was not guilty of contributory negligence. The armed men actually allowed
opposite side of the highway. Atty. Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently angered them was his
He heard shots from inside attempt to help the driver of the bus by pleading for his life. He was playing the role of
the bus. Atty. Caorong was the good Samaritan. Certainly, this act cannot considered an act of negligence, let alone
hit. Then the bus was set on recklessness.
fire. Some of the passengers
were able to pull Atty.
Caorong out of the burning
bus and rush him to the
hospital, but he died.
A. Last Clear Chance Doctrine
Philippine Rabbit vs IAC Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance applies.
On December 24, 1966,
No.
Catalina Pascua, Caridad We reiterate that "[t]he principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application
Pascua, Adelaida Estomo, et in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
al. boarded the jeepney where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
driven by Tranquilino
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
Manalo at Dau, Mabalacat, its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence." This was
Pampanga bound for Our ruling in Anuran, et al. v. Buño et al. Thus, the respondent court erred in applying
Carmen, Rosales, said doctrine.
Pangasinan to spend
Christmas at their respective
Note:
homes. Their contract with
Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
Manalo was for them to pay
“The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the
P24.00 for the trip. After a negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it
brief stopover at Moncada, is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
Tarlac for refreshment, the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but
jeepney proceeded towards
failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. Stated differently,

Carmen, Rosales, the rule is that the antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude recovery of
Pangasinan. damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance
to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.”
Upon reaching barrio (Greenstar Express vs Universal Robina Corp, not cited in this case.)
Sinayoan, San Manuel,
Tarlac, the right rear wheel
of the jeepney was detached,
so it was running in an
unbalanced position. Manalo
stepped on the brake, as a
result of which, the jeepney
which was then running on
the eastern lane (its right of
way) made a U-turn,
invading and eventually
stopping on the western lane
of the road in such a manner
that the jeepney's front faced
the south (from where it
came). The jeepney
practically occupied and
blocked the greater portion
of the western lane.
Almost at the time when the

jeepney made a sudden U-
turn and encroached on the
western lane of the highway
as claimed by Rabbit and
delos Reyes, or after
stopping for a couple of
minutes as claimed by
Mangune, Carreon and
Manalo, the Phillippine
Rabbit bus bumped from
behind the right rear portion
of the jeepney. Three
passengers of the jeepney
(Catalina Pascua, Erlinda
Meriales and Adelaida
Estomo) died while the other
jeepney passengers sustained
physical injuries. What could
have been a festive
Christmas turned out to be
tragic.

Bustmante vs CA. Issue: Whether or not respondent court correctly applied the doctrine of Last Clear Chance.
On April 20, 1983, a No.

collision occurred between a
gravel and sand truck, and a The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The doctrine, stated
Mazda passenger bus along broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the
the national road at negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable
Calibuyo, Tanza, Cavite. The care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
front left side portion notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance
(barandilla) of the body of means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril,
the truck sideswiped the left and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As the doctrine is usually
side wall of the passenger stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
bus, ripping off the said wall notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
from the driver's seat to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.
last rear seat.
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a
Due to the impact, several negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself
passengers of the bus were in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities, should have
thrown out and died as a been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later
result of the injuries they than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident.
sustained.
In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, et
Immediately before the al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the Court citing the landmark decision held in
collision, the cargo truck and the case of Anuran, et al. v. Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the principle of "last
the passenger bus were clear chance" applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It
approaching each other, does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
coming from the opposite contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
directions of the highway. jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
While the truck was still negligence."
about 30 meters away,
Susulin, the bus driver, saw Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended into the field of
the front wheels of the joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable to the injured
vehicle wiggling. He also person by reason of his discovery of the latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between
observed that the truck was defendants concurrently negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot
heading towards his lane. defend by pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could have
Not minding this avoided the injury."
circumstance due to his
belief that the driver of the All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an
truck was merely joking, error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as between the defendants, since
Susulin shifted from fourth the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a
to third gear in order to give suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of
more power and speed to the the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and
bus, which was ascending driver of the cargo truck from liability.
the inclined part of the road,
in order to overtake or pass a
Kubota hand tractor being
pushed by a person along the
shoulder of the highway.
While the bus was in the
process of overtaking or
passing the hand tractor and
the truck was approaching
the bus, the two vehicles
sideswiped each other at
each other's left side. After
the impact, the truck skidded
towards the other side of the
road and landed on a nearby
residential lot, hitting a
coconut tree and felling it."

B. Accomodation Passenger
Issues: Whether or not respondent is required to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Lara vs Valencia Whether or not respondent failed to exercise ordinary diligence.
The deceased was an
No.
inspector of the Bureau of As accommodation passengers or invited guests, defendant as owner and driver of the
Forestry stationed in Davao pick-up owes to them merely the duty to exercise reasonable care so that they may be
The defendant is engaged in transported safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule is established by the weight of
the business of exporting authority that the owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to
logs from his lumber exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not unreasonably to expose him to danger
concession in Cotabato. Lara and injury by increasing the hazard of travel.
went to said concession upon
instructions of his chief to This rule, as frequently stated by the courts, is that an owner of an automobile owes a
classify the logs of defendant guest the duty to exercise ordinary or reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Since one
which were about to be riding in an automobile is no less a guest because he asked for the privilege of doing so,
loaded on a ship. The work the same obligation of care is imposed upon the driver as in the case of one expressly
Lara of lasted for six days invited to ride"Defendant, therefore, is only required to observe ordinary care, and is not
during which he contracted in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required of a common carrier by our
malaria fever. In the morning law.
of January 9, 1954, Lara who
then in a hurry to return to
No.
Davao asked defendant if he
could take him in his pick-up There is nothing to indicate that defendant has acted with negligence or without taking the
as there was then no other precaution that an ordinary prudent man would have taken under similar circumstances. It
means of transportation, to should be noted that defendant was not in duty bound to take the deceased in his own
which defendant agreed. The pick-up to Davao because from Parang to Cotabato there was a line of transportation that
pick-up left Parang bound regularly makes trips for the public, and if defendant agreed to take the deceased in his
for Davao taking along six own car, it was only to accommodate him considering his feverish condition and his
passengers, including Lara. request that he be so accommodated.
Upon reaching barrio It should also be noted that the passengers who rode in the pick-up of defendant took their
Catidtuan, Lara accidentally respective seats therein at their own choice and not upon indication of defendant with the
fell from the pick-up and as a particularity that defendant invited the deceased to sit with him in the front seat but which
result he suffered serious invitation the deceased declined. The reason for this can only be attributed to his desire to
injuries. Valencia stopped be at the back so that he could sit on a bag and travel in a reclining position because such
the pick-up to see what was more convenient for him due to his feverish condition. All the circumstances
happened to Lara. He sought therefore clearly indicate that defendant had done what a reasonable prudent man would
the help of the residents of have done under the circumstances.
that place and applied water
to Lara but to no avail. They There is every reason to believe that the unfortunate happening was only due to an
brought Lara to the nearest unforeseen accident by the fact that at the time the deceased was half asleep and must
place where they could find a have fallen from the pick-up when it ran into some stones causing it to jerk considering
doctor and not having found that the road was then bumpy, rough and full of stones.
any they took him to St.
Joseph's Clinic of
Kidapawan. But when Lara

arrived he was already dead.
C. Not An Insurer Against All Risks
Necessito vs Paras Issue: Whether or not the carrier is liable for the manufacturing defect of the steering
knuckle, and whether the evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier exercised the
On January 28, 1964, diligence required by law.
Severina Garces and her one-
year old son, Precillano
No.
Necesito, carrying
It is clear that the carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. His liability rests upon
vegetables, boarded the bus negligence, his failure to exercise the "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires,
of Philippine Rabbit Bus and by Art. 1756, in case of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the burden of
Lines at Agno, Pangasinan. satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence required.
The passenger truck, driven
by Francisco Bandonell, then In American law, the rule on the liability of carriers for defects of equipment is thus
proceeded on its regular run expressed: "The preponderance of authority is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is
from Agno to Manila. After entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an
passing Mangatarem,
appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have
Pangasinan truck entered a been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the
wooden bridge, but the front circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the
wheels swerved to the right; necessary tests.
the driver lost control, and
after wrecking the bridge's For the purposes of this doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the agent
wooden rails, the truck fell or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of constructing the appliance.
on its right side into a creek According to this theory, the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier
where water was breast deep.
from liability"
The mother, Severina
Garces, was drowned; the The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has neither choice nor
son, Precillano Necesito, was control over the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and appliances in use by
injured, suffering abrasions
the carrier.
and fracture of the left
femur. He was brought to the In the case now before us, the record is to the effect that the only test applied to the
Provincial Hospital at steering knuckle in question was a purely visual inspection every thirty days, to see if any
Dagupan, where the fracture
cracks developed. It nowhere appears that either the manufacturer or the carrier at any
was set but with fragments time tested the steering knuckle to ascertain whether its strength was up to standard, or
one centimeter out of line. that it had no hidden flaws would impair that strength. And yet the carrier must have been
The money, wrist watch and aware of the critical importance of the knuckle's resistance; that its failure or breakage
cargo of vegetables were
would result in loss of balance and steering control of the bus, with disastrous effects
lost. upon the passengers. No argument is required to establish that a visual inspection could
not directly determine whether the resistance of this critically important part was not
impaired. We are satisfied that the periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle as
practiced by the carrier's agents did not measure up to the required legal standard of
"utmost diligence of very cautious persons" — "as far as human care and foresight can
provide.‖

Japan Airlines vs CA Issue: Whether JAL, as a common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and
meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have reached their final destination,
On June 13, 1991, private even if the delay were caused by "force majeure."
respondent Jose Miranda
boarded JAL flight No. JL No.
001 in San Francisco,
California bound for Manila. We have consistently ruled that a contract to transport passengers is quite different in
Likewise, on the same day kind, and degree from any other contractual relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a
private respondents Enrique relationship imbued with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to live
Agana et al. left Los up to the exacting standards of care and diligence renders it liable for any damages that
Angeles, California for may be sustained by its passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers are
Manila via JAL flight No. JL absolutely responsible for all injuries or damages even if the same were caused by a
061. As an incentive for fortuitous event. To rule otherwise would render the defense of "force majeure," as an
travelling on the said airline, exception from any liability, illusory and ineffective.
both flights were to make an
overnight stopover at Narita, Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation
Japan, at the airlines' because of "force majeure," the general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages
expense. for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to
Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the
Upon arrival at Narita, Japan form of hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to
on June 14, 1991, private JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of respondents for their
respondents were billeted at unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
Hotel Nikko Narita for the
night. The next day, private Admittedly, to be stranded for almost a week in a foreign land was an exasperating
respondents went to the experience for the private respondents, but their predicament was not due to the fault or
airport to take their flight to negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL,
Manila. However, due to the in the absence of bad faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded
Mt. Pinatubo eruption, passengers by reason of a fortuitous event is too much of a burden to assume.
unrelenting ashfall blanketed
NAIA rendering it Furthermore, it has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the
inaccessible to airline traffic. mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather conditions or extreme climatic changes
Hence, private respondents' are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger
trip to Manila was cancelled must assume or expect. After all, common carriers are not the insurer of all risks.
indefinitely.
To accommodate the needs

of its stranded passengers,
JAL rebooked all the
Manila-bound passengers on
flight No. 741 due to depart
on June 16, 1991 and also
paid for the hotel expenses
for their unexpected
overnight stay. On June 16,
1991, much to the dismay of
the private respondents, their
long anticipated flight to
Manila was again cancelled
due to NAIA's indefinite
closure. At this point, JAL
informed the private
respondents that it would no
longer defray their hotel and
accommodation expense
during their stay in Narita.
Since NAIA was only

reopened to airline traffic on
June 22, 1991, private
respondents were forced to
pay for their

accommodations and meal

expenses from their personal
funds from June 16 to June
21, 1991.
Yobido vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be liable despite the principle that a common
carrier is not an insurer of all risks.
On April 26, 1988, spouses
Tito and Leny Tumboy and Yes.
their minor children named
Ardee and Jasmin, boarded
at Mangagoy, Surigao del As a rule, when a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks incidental to the
Sur, a Yobido Liner bus mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its
bound for Davao City. Along passengers and is not bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and without
Picop Road in Km. 17, Sta. injury. However, when a passenger is injured or dies while travelling, the law presumes
Maria, Agusan del Sur, the that the common carrier is negligent. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
left front tire of the bus
exploded. The bus fell into a Art. 1756. In case of death or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
ravine around three (3) feet have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
from the road and struck a extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
tree. The incident resulted in
the death of 28-year-old Tito Article 1755 provides that (a) common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as
Tumboy and physical far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
injuries to other passengers. persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. Accordingly, in culpa contractual,
once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
On November 21, 1988, a acted negligently. This disputable presumption may only be overcome by evidence that
complaint for breach of the carrier had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733, 1755 and
contract of carriage, 1756 of the Civil Code or that the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous
damages and attorneys fees event. Consequently, the court need not make an express finding of fault or negligence on
was filed by Leny and her the part of the carrier to hold it responsible for damages sought by the passenger.
children against Alberta
Yobido, the owner of the
bus, and Cresencio Yobido,
its driver, before the
Regional Trial Court of
Davao City. When the
defendants therein filed their
answer to the complaint,
they raised the affirmative
defense of caso fortuito.

2. Duration of Responsibility
Jesus Vds. De Nueca vs MRC Issue: Whether or not Nueca was a passenger.
At 3 p.m. on Dec. 22,

No.
1958, Fermin Nueca
brought 7 sacks of palay to A passenger is one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract,
Manila Railroad Co. express or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of the fare, or that which is
(MRC) at its station in
accepted as an equivalent. The relation of passenger and carrier commences when
Barrio del Rosario, one puts himself in the care of the carrier, or directly under its control, with the
Camarines Sur, to be bona fide intention of becoming a passenger, and is accepted as such by the carrier
shipped to the municipality – as where he makes a contract for trasportation and presents himself at the proper
of Libmanan of the same
place and in a proper manner to be transported.
province. He paid P 0.70
as freight charge and was Even disregarding the matter of tickets, and assuming Nueca intended to be a
issued Way Bill No. passenger, he was never accepted as such by MRC as he did not present himself at
56515. The cargo was
the proper place and in a proper manner to be transported.
loaded on the freight
wagon of Train 537.
Passengers boarded the
train and shunting
operations started to hook
a wagon thereto. Before the
train reached the turnoff
switch, its passenger coach
fell on its side some 40 m
from the station. The
wagon pinned Nueca,
killing him instantly.
Dangwa vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent.
On May 13, 1985, private Yes.

respondents filed a complaint
for damages against Evidently, the incident took place due to the gross negligence of the appellee-driver in
petitioners for the death of prematurely stepping on the accelerator and in not waiting for the passenger to first secure
Pedrito Cudiamat as a result his seat especially so when we take into account that the platform of the bus was at the
of a vehicular accident which time slippery and wet because of a drizzle.
occurred on March 25, 1985
at Marivic, Sapid, The foregoing testimonies show that the place of the accident and the place where one of
Mankayan, Benguet. Among the passengers alighted were both between Bunkhouses 53 and 54, hence the finding of
others, it was alleged that on the Court of Appeals that the bus was at full stop when the victim boarded the same is
said date, while petitioner correct. They further confirm the conclusion that the victim fell from the platform of the
Theodore M. Lardizabal was bus when it suddenly accelerated forward and was run over by the rear right tires of the
driving a passenger bus vehicle, as shown by the physical evidence on where he was thereafter found in relation to
belonging to petitioner the bus when it stopped. Under such circumstances, it cannot be said that the deceased
corporation in a reckless and was guilty of negligence.
imprudent manner and
without due regard to traffic The contention of petitioners that the driver and the conductor had no knowledge that the
rules and regulations and victim would ride on the bus, since the latter had supposedly not manifested his intention
safety to persons and to board the same, does not merit consideration. When the bus is not in motion there is no
property, it ran over its necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his intention to board. A
passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders.
However, instead of bringing
Pedrito immediately to the It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including common carriers by railroad
nearest hospital, the said train, streetcar, or motorbus, to stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in
driver, in utter bad faith and order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for
without regard to the welfare injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden starting up or jerking
of the victim, first brought of their conveyances while they are doing so.
his other passengers and
cargo to their respective Further, even assuming that the bus was moving, the act of the victim in boarding the

destinations before banging same cannot be considered negligent under the circumstances. As clearly explained in the
said victim to the Lepanto testimony of the aforestated witness for petitioners, Virginia Abalos, th bus had "just
Hospital where he expired. started" and "was still in slow motion" at the point where the victim had boarded and was
on its platform.
On the other hand,
petitioners alleged that they It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one attempt to board a train or
had observed and continued streetcar which is moving slowly. The fact that passengers board and alight from slowly
to observe the extraordinary moving vehicle is a matter of common experience both the driver and conductor in this
diligence required in the case could not have been unaware of such an ordinary practice.
operation of the
transportation company and The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of the bus, is already
the supervision of the considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection pertaining to such a
employees. contractual relation. Hence, it has been held that the duty which the carrier passengers
owes to its patrons extends to persons boarding cars as well as to those alighting
therefrom.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the driver and the conductor failed to bring the
gravely injured victim immediately to the hospital for medical treatment is a patent and
incontrovertible proof of their negligence. It defies understanding and can even be
stigmatized as callous indifference. The evidence shows that after the accident the bus
could have forthwith turned at Bunk 56 and thence to the hospital, but its driver instead
opted to first proceed to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger to alight and to deliver a
refrigerator, despite the serious condition of the victim.
La Mallorca vs CA Issue: Whether or not private respondent Mariano Beltran and family were still
considered passengers after alighting the bus owned by petitioner.
On December 20, 1953,
plaintiffs, husband and wife, Yes.
together with their minor
daughters, namely, Milagros, It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease
13 years old, Raquel, about at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the
4½ years old, and Fe, over 2 carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a reasonable
years old, boarded a bus time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a
owned and operated by the reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
defendant, at San Fernando, circumstances.
Pampanga, bound for Anao,
Pampanga. Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along the station platform is
considered still a passenger. So also, where a passenger has alighted at his destination and
The bus reached Anao is proceeding by the usual way to leave the company's premises, but before actually doing
whereat it stopped to allow so is halted by the report that his brother, a fellow passenger, has been shot, and he in
the passengers including good faith and without intent of engaging in the difficulty, returns to relieve his brother,
plaintiif and his family to get he is deemed reasonably and necessarily delayed and thus continues to be a passenger
off. Mariano Beltran, then entitled as such to the protection of the railroad and company and its agents.
carrying some of their
baggages, was the first to get In the present case, the father returned to the bus to get one of his baggages which was not
down the bus, followed by unloaded when they alighted from the bus. Raquel, the child that she was, must have
his wife and his children. followed the father. However, although the father was still on the running board of the
Afterwards, he returned to bus awaiting for the conductor to hand him the bag or bayong, the bus started to run, so
the bus to get his other that even he (the father) had to jump down from the moving vehicle. It was at this
bayong, which he had left instance that the child, who must be near the bus, was run over and killed. In the
behind, but in so doing, his circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier's agent had exercised the "utmost
daughter Raquel followed diligence" of a "very cautions person" required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be
him, unnoticed by her father. observed by a common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely its
While said Mariano Beltran passengers. In the first place, the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not
was on the running board of put off the engine.

the bus waiting for the

conductor to hand him his Secondly, he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the signal to
bayong which he left under go and while the latter was still unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano
one of its seats near the door, Beltran and family. The presence of said passengers near the bus was not unreasonable
the bus, suddenly started and they are, therefore, to be considered still as passengers of the carrier, entitled to the
moving forward, evidently to protection under their contract of carriage.
resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that Note:
the conductor has not given But even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already terminated, herein
the driver the customary petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of its driver, as ruled by the Court of
signal to start. Then the bus Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
stopped.
Sensing that the bus was

again in motion, Mariano
Beltran immediately jumped
from the running board
without getting his bayong
from the conductor. At that
time, he saw people
beginning to gather around
the body of a child lying
prostrate on the ground, her
skull crushed, and without
life. The child was none
other than his daughter
Raquel, who was run over by
the bus.
Aboitiz vs CA Issue: Whether or not Anacleto Viana was still a passenger of petitioner when the
accident happened.
On May 11, 1975, Anacleto
Viana boarded the vessel Yes.
M/V Antonia, owned by
defendant, at the port at San That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of
Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the case, such as the kind of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the
bound for Manila, having place, and so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se
purchased a ticket. On May without taking into account such other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the
12, 1975, said vessel arrived cited case of La Mallorca there was no appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein
at Pier 4, North Harbor, to leave the carrier's premises whereas in the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had
Manila, and the passengers elapsed before the victim met the accident. The primary factor to be considered is the
therein disembarked, a existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or near the
gangplank having been petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a justifiable cause.
provided connecting the side
of the vessel to the pier. It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper,
Instead of using said the passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship
gangplank Anacleto Viana than other common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes
disembarked on the third and the number of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a
deck which was on the level bigger volume of both as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus.
with the pier. After said Consequently, a ship passenger will need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to
vessel had landed, the disembark from the vessel and claim his baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get
Pioneer Stevedoring off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very short period of time.
Corporation took over the
exclusive control of the Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of comparing the
cargoes loaded on said vessel period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La Mallorca is
pursuant to the inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine enunciated
Memorandum of Agreement therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto Viana
dated July 26, 1975 (Exh. '2') was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim
between the third party was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's
defendant Pioneer vessel. As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to
Stevedoring Corporation and their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

defendant Aboitiz Shipping

Corporation. It is not definitely shown that one (1) hour prior to the incident, the victim had already
disembarked from the vessel. Petitioner failed to prove this. What is clear to us is that at
The crane owned by the third the time the victim was taking his cargoes, the vessel had already docked an hour earlier.
party defendant and operated In consonance with common shipping procedure as to the minimum time of one (1) hour
by its crane operator Alejo allowed for the passengers to disembark, it may be presumed that the victim had just
Figueroa was placed gotten off the vessel when he went to retrieve his baggage.
alongside the vessel and one
(1) hour after the passengers Yet, even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's
of said vessel had premises was not without cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible
disembarked, it started only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly standard procedure in the
operation by unloading the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time.
cargoes from said vessel. Consequently, under the foregoing circumstances, the victim Anacleto Viana is still
While the crane was being deemed a passenger of said carrier at the time of his tragic death.
operated, Anacleto Viana
who had already
disembarked from said
vessel obviously
remembering that some of
his cargoes were still loaded
in the vessel, went back to
the vessel, and it was while
he was pointing to the crew
of the said vessel to the place
where his cargoes were
loaded that the crane hit him,
pinning him between the side
of the vessel and the crane.
He was thereafter brought to
the hospital where he later
expired three (3) days
thereafter.
Mallari vs CA Issue: Whether or not the death of Reyes was due to the failure of petitioner to exercise
due diligence.
On 14 October 1987, the
passenger jeepney driven by Yes.
petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.
collided with the delivery The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking
van of respondent Bulletin another vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and
Publishing Corp. along the not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or
National Highway in rounding a curve, there is special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and
Barangay San Pablo, the driver does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying upon having time
Bataan. Petitioner Mallari Jr. to turn to the right if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.
testified that he went to the
left lane of the highway and In the instant case, by his own admission, petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the
overtook a Fiera which had BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite direction and failing to consider
stopped on the right lane. the speed thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning mindlessly
Before he passed by the occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in the
Fiera, he saw the van of highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel
respondent BULLETIN Reyes, a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger
coming from the opposite jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a
direction. It was driven by lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil
one Felix Angeles. The Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
sketch of the accident vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
showed that the collision regulation. As found by the appellate court, petitioners failed to present satisfactory
occurred after Mallari Jr. evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
overtook the Fiera while
negotiating a curve in the
highway. The points of
collision were the left rear

portion of the passenger

jeepney and the left front
side of the delivery van of
BULLETIN. The impact
caused the jeepney to turn
around and fall on its left
side resulting in injuries to
its passengers one of whom
was Israel Reyes who
eventually died due to the
gravity of his injuries.
LRTA et al. vs Navidad Issue: Whether or not LRTA should be held liable for Nicanor’s death.
On 14 October 1993, about Yes.

half an hour past seven
o’clock in the evening, The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
Nicanor Navidad, then very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common
drunk, entered the EDSA carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the
LRT station after purchasing trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in
a "token.‖ While Navidad pursuance to the contract of carriage.
was standing on the platform
near the LRT tracks, Junelito The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
Escartin, the security guard passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or
assigned to the area (b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
approached Navidad. A common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could have prevented
misunderstanding or an or stopped the act or omission.
altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
a fist fight. No evidence, negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still
however, was adduced to establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts
indicate how the fight started upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.
or who, between the two, In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred,
delivered the first blow or which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption
how Navidad later fell on the would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must
LRT tracks. At the exact be proved.
moment that Navidad fell, an
LRT train, operated by The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
petitioner Rodolfo Roman, indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
was coming in. Navidad was exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
struck by the moving train, commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
and he was killed employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
instantaneously. undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities
under the contract of carriage.
On 08 December 1994, the
widow of Nicanor, herein
respondent Marjorie
Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint
for damages against Junelito
Escartin, Rodolfo Roman,
the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro
Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. LRTA
and Roman filed a
counterclaim against

Navidad and a cross-claim

against Escartin and Prudent.
Prudent, in its answer,
denied liability and averred
that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and
supervision of its security
guards.
3. Presumption of Negligence
Pestao vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner successfully overcome the presumption of negligence.
It appears from the records
No.
that at around 2:00 oclock
[o]n the afternoon of August
Eyewitness Ignacio Neis Neis testified that as the two vehicles approached the junction,
9, 1986, Ananias Sumayang the victim raised his left arm to signal that he was turning left to Tabagon, but that the
was riding a motorcycle latter and his companion were thrown off the motorcycle after it was bumped by the
along the national highway overspeeding bus.
in Ilihan, Tabagon, Cebu.
Riding with him was his These contentions have already been passed upon by the trial and the appellate courts. We
friend Manuel Romagos. As find no cogent reason to reverse or modify their factual findings. The CA agreed with the
they came upon a junction trial court that the vehicular collision was caused by Pestaos negligence when he
where the highway
attempted to overtake the motorcycle. As a professional driver operating a public
connected with the road transport bus, he should have anticipated that overtaking at a junction was a perilous
leading to Tabagon, they maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.
were hit by a passenger bus
driven by [Petitioner]
Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are conclusive and binding on
Gregorio Pestao and owned this Court. Petitioners failed to demonstrate that this case falls under any of the
by [Petitioner] Metro Cebu recognized exceptions to this rule. Indeed, the issue of negligence is basically factual and,
Autobus Corporation (Metro in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of damages.
Cebu, for brevity), which
had tried to overtake them, Petitioners aver that the CA was wrong in attributing the accident to a faulty speedometer
sending the motorcycle and and in implying that the accident could have been avoided had this instrument been
its passengers hurtling upon properly functioning.
the pavement. Both Ananias
Sumayang and Manuel This contention has no factual basis. Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
Romagos were rushed to the owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an
hospital in Sogod, where injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is
Sumayang was pronounced
presumed to be negligent either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee.
dead on arrival. Romagos This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer
was transferred to the Cebu exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the
Doctors Hospital, but he supervision of its employee.
succumbed to his injuries the
day after. The CA said that allowing Pestao to ply his route with a defective speedometer showed
laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its business and in the supervision of
its employees. The negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver, not in
that which directly caused the accident. The fact that Pestao was able to use a bus with a
faulty speedometer shows that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees
and in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its business with the
diligence required by law.

Ludo vs CA Issue: Whether or not private respondent failed to overcome presumption of negligence.
Petitioner Ludo & Luym Yes.

Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in copra Our review of the records constrains us to conclude that indeed MV Miguela rammed and
processing with plant and damaged petitioners fender pile cluster. Naval and Espina witnessed the incident, saw the
business offices in Cebu impact and heard cracking sounds thereafter. The trial court found them credible. We
City. Private Respondent respect this observation of the trial court, for in the appreciation of testimonial evidence
Gabisan Shipping Lines was and attribution of values to the declaration of witnesses, it is the trial judge who had the
the registered owner and chance to observe the witnesses and was in a position to determine if the witnesses are
operator of the motor vessel telling the truth or not. Further, private respondents witnesses, Olasiman and Gabisan,
MV Miguela, while the other acknowledged that Naval was at the pier waving a handkerchief to direct them to their
private respondent, Anselmo berthing place.
Olasiman, was its captain.
Res Ipsa Loquitor Doctrine applies.
Petitioner owns and operates
a private wharf used by In our view, all the requisites for recourse to this doctrine exist. First, MV Miguela was
vessels for loading and under the exclusive control of its officers and crew. Petitioner did not have direct
unloading of copra and other evidence on what transpired within as the officers and crew maneuvered the vessel to its
processed products. Among berthing place. We note the Court of Appeals finding that Naval and Espina were not
its wharfs facilities are knowledgeable on the vessels maneuverings, and could not testify on the negligence of
fender pile clusters for the officers and crew. Second, aside from the testimony that MV Miguela rammed the
docking and mooring. cluster pile, private respondent did not show persuasively other possible causes of the
damage.
On May 21, 1990, at around
1:30 P.M., while MV Applying now the above, there exists a presumption of negligence against private
Miguela was docking at respondents which we opine the latter failed to overcome. Additionally, petitioner
petitioners wharf, it rammed presented tangible proof that demonstrated private respondents negligence. As testified by
and destroyed a fender pile Capt. Olasiman, from command of slow ahead to stop engine, the vessel will still travel
cluster. Petitioner demanded 100 meters before it finally stops. However, he ordered stop engine when the vessel was
damages from private only 50 meters from the pier. Further, he testified that before the vessel is put to slow
respondents. The latter astern, the engine has to be restarted. However, Olasiman can not estimate how long it
refused. Hence, petitioner takes before the engine goes to slow astern after the engine is restarted. From these
filed a complaint for declarations, the conclusion is that it was already too late when the captain ordered
damages before the Regional reverse. By then, the vessel was only 4 meters from the pier, and thus rammed it.
Trial Court of Cebu.
Respondent companys negligence consists in allowing incompetent crew to man its
vessel. As shown also by petitioner, both Captain Olasiman and Chief Mate Gabisan did
not have a formal training in marine navigation. The former was a mere elementary
graduate while the latter is a high school graduate. Their experience in navigation was
only as a watchman and a quartermaster, respectively.
Note:
Res Ipsa Loquitor:
―Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the
defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if
those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.‖
(Batiquin vs CA)
The doctrine recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct
proof and allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. This is
invoked when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.

Philippine Rabbit vs IAC Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent.
No.
On the presumption that drivers who bump the rear of another vehicle guilty and the cause
of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence, the respondent court said (p. 49,
Rollo):
. . . the jeepney had already executed a complete turnabout and at the time of impact was
already facing the western side of the road. Thus the jeepney assumed a new frontal
position vis a vis, the bus, and the bus assumed a new role of defensive driving. The spirit
behind the presumption of guilt on one who bumps the rear end of another vehicle is for
the driver following a vehicle to be at all times prepared of a pending accident should the
driver in front suddenly come to a full stop, or change its course either through change of
mind of the front driver, mechanical trouble, or to avoid an accident. The rear vehicle is
given the responsibility of avoiding a collision with the front vehicle for it is the rear
vehicle who has full control of the situation as it is in a position to observe the vehicle in
front of it.
The above discussion would have been correct were it not for the undisputed fact that the
U-turn made by the jeepney was abrupt (Exhibit "K," Pascua). The jeepney, which was
then traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a straight, skid mark of approximately 35
meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp angle, making a skid mark of approximately 15
meters from the eastern shoulder to the point of impact (Exhibit "K" Pascua). Hence,
delos Reyes could not have anticipated the sudden U-turn executed by Manalo. The
respondent court did not realize that the presumption was rebutted by this piece of
evidence.
With regard to the substantial factor test, it was the opinion of the respondent court that
(p. 52, Rollo):
. . . It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should
have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent
him from being liable (Restatement, Torts, 2d). Here, We find defendant bus running at a
fast speed when the accident occurred and did not even make the slightest effort to avoid
the accident, . . . . The bus driver's conduct is thus a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to the passengers of the jeepney, not only because he was driving fast and did not
even attempt to avoid the mishap but also because it was the bus which was the physical
force which brought about the injury and death to the passengers of the jeepney.
The speed of the bus was calculated by respondent court as follows (pp. 54-55, Rollo):
According to the record of the case, the bus departed from Laoag, Ilocos Norte, at 4:00
o'clock A.M. and the accident took place at approximately around 12:30 P.M., after
travelling roughly for 8 hours and 30 minutes. Deduct from this the actual stopover time
of two Hours (computed from the testimony of the driver that he made three 40-minute
stop-overs), We will have an actual travelling time of 6 hours and 30 minutes.
Under the circumstances, We calculate that the Laoag-Tarlac route (365 kms.) driving at
an average of 56 km. per hour would take 6 hours and 30 minutes. Therefore, the average
speed of the bus, give and take 10 minutes, from the point of impact on the highway with
excellent visibility factor would be 80 to 90 kms. per hour, as this is the place where buses
would make up for lost time in traversing busy city streets.
Still, We are not convinced. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed
when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour, assuming
such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways. We
cannot even fault delos Reyes for not having avoided the collision. As aforestated, the
jeepney left a skid mark of about 45 meters, measured from the time its right rear wheel
was detached up to the point of collision. Delos Reyes must have noticed the perilous

condition of the jeepney from the time its right rear wheel was detached or some 90
meters away, considering that the road was straight and points 200 meters north and south
of the point of collision, visible and unobstructed. Delos Reyes admitted that he was
running more or less 50 kilometers per hour at the time of the accident. Using this speed,
delos Reyes covered the distance of 45 meters in 3.24 seconds. If We adopt the speed of
80 kilometers per hour, delos Reyes would have covered that distance in only 2.025
seconds. Verily, he had little time to react to the situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid
the collision is to ask too much from him. Aside from the time element involved, there
were no options available to him.
Juntilla vs Fontanar Issue: Whether or not respondent was negligent.
The facts established after Yes.

trial show that the plaintiff
was a passenger of the public In the case at bar, there are specific acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. The
utility jeepney bearing plate records show that the passenger jeepney turned turtle and jumped into a ditch
No. PUJ-71-7 on the course immediately after its right rear tire exploded. The evidence shows that the passenger
of the trip from Danao City jeepney was running at a very fast speed before the accident. We agree with the
to Cebu City. The jeepney observation of the petitioner that a public utility jeep running at a regular and safe speed
was driven by defendant will not jump into a ditch when its right rear tire blows up. There is also evidence to show
Berfol Camoro. It was that the passenger jeepney was overloaded at the time of the accident. The petitioner
registered under the stated that there were three (3) passengers in the front seat and fourteen (14) passengers in
franchise of defendant the rear.
Clemente Fontanar but was
actually owned by defendant While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the
Fernando Banzon. When the tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous
jeepney reached Mandaue event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road
City, the right rear tire conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any
exploded causing the vehicle conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been
to turn turtle. In the process, caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney
the plaintiff who was sitting was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
at the front seat was thrown
out of the vehicle. Upon In the case at bar, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not
landing on the ground, the independent of the human will.
plaintiff momentarily lost
consciousness. When he Note:
came to his senses, he found
that he had a lacerated In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso fortuito presents the
wound on his right palm. following essential characteristics:
Aside from this, he suffered (1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor
injuries on his left arm, right to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
thigh and on his back. (Exh. (2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it
"D"). Because of his shock can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
and injuries, he went back to (3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
Danao City but on the way, obligation in a normal manner. And
he discovered that his (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
"Omega" wrist watch was injury resulting to the creditor.
lost. Upon his arrival in (Lasam vs Smith)
Danao City, he immediately
entered the Danao City
Hospital to attend to his
injuries, and also requested
his father-in-law to proceed
immediately to the place of
the accident and look for the

watch. In spite of the efforts

of his father-in-law, the wrist
watch, which he bought for P
852.70 (Exh. "B") could no
longer be found.
Bayasen vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner Bayasen was not negligent and therefore entitled to
acquittal.
The records show that the
petitioner was charged in Yes.
December 1963 by the
Provincial Fiscal of It is clear from the last part of the Testimony of the witness, Dolores Balcita, that there
Mountain Province of the was no conversation between the passengers in the jeep that could have distracted the
crime of Homicide Thru attention of the accused while driving the jeep. As to the condition of the jeep itself, the
Reckless Imprudence. same witness testified that she "did not notice anything wrong" with it from the time they
On the morning of August drove from Sagada to Ambasing, and from there to the place where the jeep fell off the
15, 1963, Saturnino Bayasen, road. Regarding the road, she said that it was fair enough to drive on, but that it was moist
the Rural Health Physician in or wet, and the weather was fair, too. As to whether the accused-petitioner was under the
Sagada, Mountain Province, influence of liquor at the time of the accident, she testified that he was not. the light of
went to barrio Ambasing to the testimony of Dolores Balcita, the eyewitness of the accident presented by the
visit a patient. Two nurses prosecution, there is absolutely no evidence on record to show that the accused was
from the Saint Theodore's negligent in driving his jeep.
Hospital in Sagada, viz.,
Elena Awichen and Dolores The petitioner testified that before reaching the portion of the road where the jeep fell he
Balcita, rode with him in the noticed that the rear wheel skidded, while driving from 8 to 10 kilometers per hour; that
jeep assigned for the use of as a precautionary measure, he directed the jeep towards the side of the mountain, along
the Rural Health Unit as they the side of the mountain, but not touching the mountain; that while doing so, the late
had requested for a ride to Elena Awichen suddenly held the steering wheel and he felt that her foot stepped on his
Ambasing. Later, at right foot which was pressed then on the accelerator; and that immediately after, the jeep
Ambasing, the girls, who suddenly swerved to the right and went off.
wanted to gather flowers,
again asked if they could ride Furthermore , the statement of Dolores Balcita that the accused was driving at moderate
with him up to a certain speed and not "an unreasonable ,speed' is bolstered by the testimony, of Pablo Lizardo.
place on the way to barrio then mayor of Sagada, Mountain Province, who found the jeep at second gear when he
Suyo which he intended to examined it not long after the incident. Such fact shows that the accused-petitioner could
visit anyway. Dr. Bayasen not have been driving the jeep at a fast rate of speed.
again allowed them to ride,
Elena sitting herself between It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels
him and Dolores. On the of the jeep and not the "unreasonable speed" of the petitioner because there is no evidence
way, at barrio Langtiw, the on record to prove or support the finding that the petitioner was driving a at "an
jeep went over a precipice unreasonable speed".
About 8 feet below the road,
it was blocked by a pine tree. It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the
The three were thrown out of instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means
the jeep. Elena was found partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily
lying in a creek further implying negligence. It may occur without fault.
below. Among other injuries,
she suffered a skull fracture No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the
which caused her death. moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left
hand side of the road, parallel to the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted
to play safe and avoid the embankment.

Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner- driver who skidded
could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the
petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. The negligence of
the petitioner not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime charged has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.
Cervantes vs CA Issue: Whether or not the PAL agents in Los Angeles and San Francisco were negligent in
confirming and thereby changing the compromise agreement.
On March 27, 1989, the
private respondent, Yes, but only simple negligence.
Philippines Air Lines, Inc.
(PAL), issued to the herein In awarding moral damages for breach of contract of carriage, the breach must be wanton
petitioner, Nicholas and deliberately injurious or the one responsible acted fraudulently or with malice or bad
Cervantes (Cervantes), a faith. Petitioner knew there was a strong possibility that he could not use the subject
round trip plane ticket for ticket, so much so that he bought a back-up ticket to ensure his departure. Should there be
Manila-Honolulu-Los a finding of bad faith, we are of the opinion that it should be on the petitioner. What the
Angeles-Honolulu-Manila, employees of PAL did was one of simple negligence. No injury resulted on the part of
which ticket expressly petitioner because he had a back-up ticket should PAL refuse to accommodate him with
provided an expiry of date of the use of subject ticket.
one year from issuance, i.e.,
until March 27, 1990. The Note:
issuance of the said plane
ticket was in compliance The ticket constitute the contract between the parties. It is axiomatic that when the terms
with a Compromise are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, contracts are to
Agreement entered into be interpreted according to their literal meaning.
between the contending (Lufthansa vs CA)
parties in two previous suits,
docketed as Civil Case Nos.
3392 and 3451 before the
Regional Trial Court in
Surigao City.
On March 23, 1990, four

days before the expiry date
of subject ticket, the
petitioner used it. Upon his
arrival in Los Angeles on the
same day, he immediately
booked his Los Angeles-
Manila return ticket with the
PAL office, and it was
confirmed for the April 2,
1990 flight.
Upon learning that the same

PAL plane would make a
stop-over in San Francisco,
and considering that he
would be there on April 2,
1990, petitioner made
arrangements with PAL for

him to board the flight in San

Francisco instead of
boarding in Los Angeles.
On April 2, 1990, when the

petitioner checked in at the
PAL counter in San
Francisco, he was not
allowed to board. The PAL
personnel concerned marked
the following notation on his
ticket: TICKET NOT
ACCEPTED DUE
EXPIRATION OF
VALIDITY.
Calalas vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent.
Yes.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No.
4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed
seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that
to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by
Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded
ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it
was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. Petitioner should have foreseen the
danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
Note:
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in
actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another par ty. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself.

A. Nefligence or Intentional Assault by Carrier’s Employee
Gillaco vs Manila Railroad Issue: Whether or not Manila Railroad should be liable for the death cause by its
employee.
That at about 7:30 a.m., on
the morning of April 1, 1946,
No.
Lieut. Tomas Gillaco,
husband of the plaintiff, was Art. 1105 (Old Civil Code):
a passenger in the early
morning train of the Manila "No one shall be liable for events which could not be foreseen or which, even if foreseen,
Railroad Company from were inevitable, with the exception of the cases in which the law expressly provides
Calamba, Laguna to Manila; otherwise and those in which the obligation itself imposes such liability."
That when the train reached The act of guard Devesa in shooting passenger Gillaco (because of a personal grudge
the Paco Railroad station, nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforeseeable by
Emilio Devesa, a train guard the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no means to ascertain or anticipate that the two
of the Manila Railroad
would meet, nor could it reasonably foresee every personal rancor that might exist
Company assigned in the between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual
Manila-San Fernando, La passengers riding in its trains. The shooting in question was therefore "caso fortuito"
Union Line, happened to be within the definition of article 105 of the old Civil Code, being both unforeseeable and
in said station waiting for the
inevitable under the given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the
same train which would take resulting breach of appellant's contract of safe carriage with the late Tomas Gillaco was
him to Tutuban Station, excused thereby.
where he was going to report
for duty;
No doubt that a common carrier is held to a very high degree of care and diligence in the
protection of its passengers; but, considering the vast and complex activities of modern
That Emilio Devesa had a rail transportation, to require of appellant that it should guard against all possible
long standing personal misunderstanding between each and every one of its employees and every passenger that
grudge against Tomas
might chance to ride in its conveyances at any time, strikes us as demanding diligence
Gillaco, same dating back beyond what human care and foresight can provide.
during the Japanese
occupation; Another very important consideration that must be borne in mind is that, when the
crime took place, the guard Devesa had no duties to discharge in connection with the
That because of this personal transportation of the deceased from Calamba to Manila. The stipulation of facts is clear
grudge, Devesa shot Gillaco that when Devesa shot and killed Gillaco, Devesa was assigned to guard the Manila-San
with the carbine furnished to Fernando (La Union) trains, and he was at Paco Station awaiting transportation to
him by the Manila Railroad
Tutuban, the starting point of the train that he was engaged to guard. In fact, his tour of
Company for his use as such duty was to start at 9:00 a.m., two hours after the commission of the crime. Devesa was
train guard, upon seeing him therefore under no obligation to safeguard the passenger of the Calamba-Manila train,
inside the train coach; where the deceased was riding; and the killing of Gillaco was not done in line of duty.
The position of Devesa at the time was that of another would be passenger, a stranger
That Tomas Gillaco died as a also awaiting transportation, and not that of an employee assigned to discharge any of
result of the would which he the duties that the Railroad had assumed by its contract with the deceased. As a result,
sustained from the shot fired Devesa's assault cannot be deemed in law a breach of Gillaco's contract of
by Devesa.
transportation by a servant or employee of the carrier.
It is also undisputed that
Devesa was convicted with
homicide by final judgment
of the Court of Appeals.

Maranan vs Perez Issue: Whether or not respondent should be liable for Coraecha’s death.
Rogelio Corachea, on Yes.

October 18, 1960, was a Unlike the Gillaco case, the killing of the passenger here took place in the course of duty
passenger in a taxicab owned of the guilty employee and when the employee was acting within the scope of his duties.
and operated by Pascual
Perez when he was stabbed Moreover, the Gillaco case was decided under the provisions of the Civil Code of 1889
and killed by the driver, which, unlike the present Civil Code, did not impose upon common carriers absolute
Simeon Valenzuela. liability for the safety of passengers against wilful assaults or negligent acts committed by
their employees. The death of the passenger in the Gillaco case was truly a fortuitous
Valenzuela was prosecuted event which exempted the carrier from liability. It is true that Art. 1105 of the old Civil
for homicide in the Court of Code on fortuitous events has been substantially reproduced in Art. 1174 of the Civil
First Instance of Batangas. Code of the Philippines but both articles clearly remove from their exempting effect the
Found guilty, he was case where the law expressly provides for liability in spite of the occurrence of force
sentenced to suffer majeure. And herein significantly lies the statutory difference between the old and present
imprisonment and to Civil Codes, in the backdrop of the factual situation before Us, which further accounts for
indemnify the heirs of the a different result in the Gillaco case. Unlike the old Civil Code, the new Civil Code of the
deceased in the sum of Philippines expressly makes the common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed
P6,000. Appeal from said by its employees upon its passengers, by the wording of Art. 1759 which categorically
conviction was taken to the states that:
Court of Appeals.
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
On December 6 1961, while negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
appeal was pending in the acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
Court of Appeals, Antonia carriers.
Maranan, Rogelio's mother,
filed an action in the Court The Civil Code provisions on the subject of Common Carriers1 are new and were taken
of First Instance of Batangas from Anglo-American Law. There, the basis of the carrier's liability for assaults on
to recover damages from passengers committed by its drivers rests either on
Perez and Valenzuela for the (1) the doctrine of respondeat superior or
death of her son. Defendants (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
asserted that the deceased
was killed in self-defense, Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the
since he first assaulted the employee is within the scope of his authority and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be
driver by stabbing him from within the course of employment only.
behind. Defendant Perez
further claimed that the death Under the second view, upheld by the majority and also by the later cases, it is enough
was a caso fortuito for which that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the
the carrier was not liable. carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's
orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute in the sense that it practically secures the
passengers from assaults committed by its own employees.
As can be gleaned from Art. 1759, the Civil Code of the Philippines evidently follows the
rule based on the second view. At least three very cogent reasons underlie this rule. As
explained in Texas Midland R.R. v. Monroe, 110 Tex. 97, 216 S.W. 388, 389-390, and
Haver v. Central Railroad Co., 43 LRA 84, 85:
(1) the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish its passenger that full
measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed by
the law, inter alia from violence and insults at the hands of strangers and other passengers,
but above all, from the acts of the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's
safety; (2) said liability of the carrier for the servant's violation of duty to passengers, is
the result of the formers confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his contract
to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of protecting the passenger
with the utmost care prescribed by law; and
(3) as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the risk of wrongful
acts or negligence of the carrier's employees against passengers, since it, and not the
passengers, has power to select and remove them.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar
employees with due regard not only to their technical competence and physical
ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns
of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude.

B. Passenger’s Duty to Observe Diligence to Avoid Injury; Contributory Negligence
Issue: Whether or not there was contributory negligence on the part of the deceased.
PNR vs CA
Yes.
The facts show that on
September 10, 1972, at about
9:00 o'clock in the evening,
Winifredo Tupang, husband
of plaintiff Rosario Tupang,
boarded 'Train No. 516 of
The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train boarded by the
appellant at Libmanan,
deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had
Camarines Sur, as a paying
no choice but to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train. It is likewise
passenger bound for Manila.
undisputed that the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge
Due to some mechanical
which was under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by
defect, the train stopped at
other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge.
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for
repairs, taking some two
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to
hours before the train could
observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its
resume its trip to Manila.
passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
Unfortunately, upon passing
obligation under the contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court,
Iyam Bridge at Lucena,
the petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear and
Quezon, Winifredo Tupang
convincing evidence.
fell off the train resulting in
his death.The train did not
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it
stop despite the alarm raised
appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence. Since he opted to
by the other passengers that
sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and
somebody fell from the train.
tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off
Instead, the train conductor
from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the PNR from
Perfecto Abrazado, called
liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages.
the station agent at
By the same token, the award of exemplary damages must be set aside. Exemplary
Candelaria, Quezon, and
damages may be allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
requested for verification of
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. There being no evidence of fraud, malice or
the information. Police
bad faith on the part of petitioner, the grant of exemplary damages should be discarded.
authorities of Lucena City
were dispatched to the Iyam
Bridge where they found the
lifeless body of Winifredo
Tupang.
As shown by the autopsy

report, Winifredo Tupang
died of cardio-respiratory
failure due to massive
cerebral hemorrhage due to
traumatic injury [Exhibits B

and C, Folder of
Exhibits],Tupang was later
buried in the public cemetery
of Lucena City by the local
police authorities.
Isaac vs Al Ammen Trans Issue: Whether or not petitioner Isaac is guilty of contributory negligence.
A. L. Ammen Transportation Yes.

Co., Inc., hereinafter referred
to as defendant, is a A circumstances which miliates against the stand of appellant is the fact borne out by the
corporation engaged in the evidence that when he boarded the bus in question, he seated himself on the left side
business of transporting thereof resting his left arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside the window,
passengers by land for this being his position in the bus when the collision took place. It is for this reason that the
compensation in the Bicol collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from the body of appellant thus doing
provinces and one of the him a great damage. It is therefore apparent that appellant is guilty of contributory
lines it operates is the one negligence. Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with a portion thereof
connecting Legaspi City, protruding outside, perhaps the injury would have been avoided as is the case with the
Albay with Naga City, other passenger. It is to be noted that appellant was the only victim of the collision.
Camarines Sur. One of the
buses which defendant was It is true that such contributory negligence cannot relieve appellee of its liability but will
operating is Bus No. 31. On only entitle it to a reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article 1762, new Civil
May 31, 1951, plaintiff Code), but this is a circumstance which further militates against the position taken by
Cesar Isaac boarded said bus appellant in this case.
as a passenger paying the
required fare from Ligao, It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily
Albay bound for Pili, or inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any other part of his body through
Camarines Sur, but before the window of a moving car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer surface of the
reaching his destination, the car, so as to come in contact with objects or obstacles near the track, and that no recovery
bus collided with a motor can be had for an injury which but for such negligence would not have been sustained.
vehicle of the pick-up type (10 C. J. 1139)
coming from the opposite
direction, as a result of Plaintiff, (passenger) while riding on an interurban car, to flick the ashes, from his cigar,
which plaintiff's left arm was thrust his hand over the guard rail a sufficient distance beyond the side line of the car to
completely severed and the bring it in contact with the trunk of a tree standing beside the track; the force of the blow
severed portion fell inside breaking his wrist. Held, that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
the bus. Plaintiff was rushed (Malakia vs. Rhode Island Co., 89 A., 337.)
to a hospital in Iriga,
Camarines Sur where he was
given blood transfusion to
save his life. After four days,
he was transferred to another
hospital in Tabaco, Albay,
where he under went
treatment for three months.
He was moved later to the
Orthopedic Hospital where
he was operated on and
stayed there for another two
months. For these services,
he incurred expenses

amounting to P623.40,
excluding medical fees
which were paid by
defendant.
C. Injury to Passenger Due to Acts of Co- Passenger or Stranger
Bachelor Express vs CA Issues: Whether or not the running amuck of the pasdenger was the proximate cause of
the death of Beter and Rautraut.
On August 1, 1980, Bus No. Whether or not such will totally exempt petitioner from liability.
800 owned by Bachelor
Express, Inc. and driven by
Yes.
Cresencio Rivera was the
situs of a stampede which The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it
resulted in the death of triggered off a commotion and panic among the passengers such that the passengers
passengers Ornominio Beter started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by
and Narcisa Rautraut.
passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the
passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is within the context of force
The evidence shows that the majeure.
bus came from Davao City
on its way to Cagayan de
Oro City passing Butuan
No.
City; that while at Tabon-
Tabon, Butuan City, the bus However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of force
picked up a passenger; that
majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common
about fifteen (15) minutes carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such
later, a passenger at the rear accident.
portion suddenly stabbed a
PC soldier which caused
In the light of the foregoing, the negligence of the common carrier, through its employees,
commotion and panic among consisted of the lack of extraordinary diligence required of common carriers, in exercising
the passengers; that when the vigilance and utmost care of the safety of its passengers, exemplified by the driver's
bus stopped, passengers belated stop and the reckless opening of the doors of the bus while the same was
Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
travelling at an appreciably fast speed.
Rautraut were found lying
down the road, the former At the same time, the common carrier itself acknowledged, through its administrative
already dead as a result of officer, Benjamin Granada, that the bus was commissioned to travel and take on
head injuries and the latter
passengers and the public at large, while equipped with only a solitary door for a bus its
also suffering from severe size and loading capacity, in contravention of rules and regulations provided for under the
injuries which caused her Land Transportation and Traffic Code (RA 4136 as amended.)
death later. The passenger
assailant alighted from the
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not
bus and ran toward the immediately stop the bus at the height of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full
bushes but was killed by the stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus
police. Thereafter, the heirs was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already
of Ornominio Beter and
fallen off the bus; and the bus was not properly equipped with doors in accordance with
Narcisa Rautraut, private law-it is clear that the petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of fault and
respondents herein (Ricardo negligence found in the law governing common carriers.
Beter and Sergia Beter are
the parents of Ornominio
The petitioners' argument that the petitioners "are not insurers of their passengers"
while Teofilo Rautraut and deserves no merit in view of the failure of the petitioners to prove that the deaths of the
Zoetera [should be Zotera] two passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of the

Rautraut are the parents of petitioners to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the passengers to their
Narcisa) filed a complaint destinations as warranted by law.
for "sum of money" against
Bachelor Express, Inc. its Note:
alleged owner Samson Yasay Escriche defines caso fortuito as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither
and the driver Rivera. be foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks, conflagrations, lightning,
compulsion, insurrections, destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other
occurrences of a similar nature.
A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics:

(1) The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will.
(2) It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid.
(3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. And
(4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the
injury resulting to the creditor.
Fortune Express vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner is relieved from liability on account of force majuere.
No.
The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous
event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable.
In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, we held that to be considered as force majeure, it is

necessary that:
(1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will;
(2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
obligation in a normal manner; and
(4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor
from being excused from liability.
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for
its failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it
was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was
foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling
applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the
Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives
and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable
and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liability.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals and De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes
force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a common carrier is not
liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries
caused by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman
v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that a common carrier is not responsible for goods lost
as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present case. Art.
1755 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, we held in Pilapil and De
Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special
precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such

as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor of
unforeseeablility (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is
lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos
were planning to burn some of petitioners buses and the assurance of petitioners
operations manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken,
nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
Manila Railroad vs Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be relieved from liability on the ground that
Ballesteros Abello was not its employee.
Private respondents here, No.

plaintiffs below, were
passengers on petitioner's In rejecting petitioner's contention that the negligence of Marcial Nocum could not be
bus, the driver of which was imputed to it and relieved it from liability, the trial court found that Dionisio Abello "was
Jose Anastacio. In likewise reckless when he was driving the bus at the rate of from 40 to 50 kilometers per
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, hour on a bumpy road at the moment of the collision."
Anastacio stopped the bus
and got off to replace a Another defense put up by petitioner is that since Abello was not its employee it should
defective spark plug. While not be held responsible for his acts. This defense was correctly overruled by the trial
he was thus engaged, one court, considering the provisions of Article 1763 of the Civil Code and section 48 (b) of
Dionisio Abello, an auditor the Motor Vehicle Law, which respectively provide as follows:
assigned to defendant
company by the General Art. 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on
Auditing Office, took the account of the wilfull acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
wheel and told the driver to common carrier's employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
sit somewhere else. With family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
Abello driving, the bus
proceeded on its way, from Sec. 48(b). No professional chauffeur shall permit any unlicensed person to drive the
time to time stopping to pick motor vehicle under his control, or permit a person, sitting beside him or in any other part
up passengers. Anastacio of the car, to interfere with him in the operation of the motor vehicle, by allowing said
tried twice to take the wheel person to take hold of the steering wheel, or in any other manner take part in the
back but Abello would not manipulation or control of the car.
relinquish it. Then, in the
language of the trial court,
"while the bus was
negotiating between Km.
posts 328 and 329 (in
Isabela) a freight truck ...
driven by Marcial Nocum ...
bound for Manila, was also
negotiating the same place;
when these two vehicles
were about to meet at the
bend of the road Marcial
Nocum, in trying to evade
several holes on the right
lane, where his truck was
running, swerved his truck
towards the middle part of
the road and in so doing, the
left front fender and left side
of the freight truck smashed

the left side of the bus

resulting in extensive
damages to the body of the
bus and injuries to seventeen
of its passengers, ...
including the plaintiffs
herein."
Smith Bell vs Borja Issue: Whether or not the explosion should be attributed to ITTC.
It appears that on September No.

23, 1987, Smith Bell [herein
petitioner] filed a written We are not persuaded. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the fire and the explosion had
request with the Bureau of originated from petitioners vessel. Said the trial court:
Customs for the attendance
of the latters inspection team The attempts of [Petitioner] Smith Bell to shift the blame on x x x ITTC were all for
on vessel M/T King Family naught. First, the testimony of its alleged eyewitness was stricken off the record for his
which was due to arrive at failure to appear for cross-examination (p. 361, Record). Second, the documents offered
the port of Manila on to prove that the fire originated from barge ITTC-101 were all denied admission by the
September 24, 1987. [c]ourt for being, in effect, hearsay (pp. 335 and 362). x x x Thus, there is nothing in the
record to support [petitioners] contention that the fire and explosion originated from barge
Said vessel contained 750 ITTC-101.
metric tons of alkyl benzene
and methyl methacrylate We find no cogent reason to overturn these factual findings. Nothing is more settled in
monomer. jurisprudence than that this Court is bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
when these are supported by substantial evidence and are not under any of the exceptions
On the same day, in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals; more so, when such findings affirm those of the trial
Supervising Customs court. Verily, this Court reviews only issues of law.
Inspector Manuel Ma. D.
Nalgan instructed Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another. It is the failure to
[Respondent Catalino Borja] observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances justly
to board said vessel and demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. Petitioners vessel was carrying
perform his duties as chemical cargo -- alkyl benzene and methyl methacrylate monomer. While knowing that
inspector upon the vessels their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to
arrival until its departure. At take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Petitioner was, therefore,
that time, [Borja] was a negligent.
customs inspector of the
Bureau of Customs receiving The three elements of quasi delict are: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or
a salary of P31,188.25 per negligence of the defendant, and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault
annum. or negligence of the defendant and the damages inflicted on the plaintiff. All these
elements were established in this case. Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous
"At about 11 oclock in the chemicals, petitioner was negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in
morning on September 24, transporting the cargo.
1987, while M/T King
Family was unloading As a result of the fire and the explosion during the unloading of the chemicals from
chemicals unto two (2) petitioners vessel, Respondent Borja suffered the following damage: and injuries: (1)
barges [--] ITTC 101 and chemical burns of the face and arms; (2) inhalation of fumes from burning chemicals; (3)
CLC-1002 [--] owned by exposure to the elements [while] floating in sea water for about three (3) hours; (4)
[Respondent] ITTC, a homonymous hemianopsia or blurring of the right eye [which was of] possible toxic
sudden explosion occurred origin; and (5) [c]erebral infract with neo-vascularization, left occipital region with right
setting the vessels afire. sided headache and the blurring of vision of right eye.[17]
Upon hearing the explosion,
[Borja], who was at that time Hence, the owner or the person in possession and control of a vessel and the vessel are

inside the cabin preparing liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons and property by reason of
reports, ran outside to check negligent management or navigation. Report (Exh. 10) dated October 21, 1987 submitted
what happened. Again, by the Admiral Surveyors and Adjusters, Inc., showed that no part of M/T King Family
another explosion was heard. sustained any sharp or violent damage that would otherwise be observed if indeed an
explosion had occurred on it. On the other hand, the fact that the vessel sustained cracks
Seeing the fire and fearing on its shell plating was noted in two Survey Reports from Greutzman Divers Underwater
for his life, [Borja] hurriedly Specialist, dated October 6, 1987 (Exh. 11), and during the underwater inspection on the
jumped over board to save sunken barge ITTC-101.
himself. However, the
[water] [was] likewise on
fire due mainly to the spilled
chemicals. Despite the
tremendous heat, [Borja]
swam his way for one (1)
hour until he was rescued by
the people living in the
squatters area and sent to San
Juan De Dios Hospital.
After weeks of intensive care

at the hospital, his attending
physician diagnosed [Borja]
to be permanently disabled
due to the incident. [Borja]
made demands against Smith
Bell and ITTC for the
damages caused by the
explosion. However, both
denied liabilities and
attributed to each other
negligence.
4. Limited Liability and Defenses
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be exempt from liability because of force majuere.
Yobido vs CA
No.
In view of the foregoing, petitioners' contention that they should be exempt from liability
because the tire blowout was no more than a fortuitous event that could not have been
foreseen, must fail. A fortuitous event is possessed of the following characteristics:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligations, must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it
can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
(d) the obliger must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
resulting to the creditor.
As Article 1174 provides, no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which
could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there
must be an entire exclusion of human agency from the cause of injury or loss.
Under the circumstances of this case, the explosion of the new tire may not be considered
a fortuitous event. There are human factors involved in the situation. The fact that the tire
was new did not imply that it was entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was
properly mounted on the vehicle. Neither may the fact that the tire bought and used in the
vehicle is of a brand name noted for quality, resulting in the conclusion that it could not
explode within five days' use. Be that as it may, it is settled that an accident caused either
by defects in the automobile or through the negligence of its driver is not a caso fortuito
that would exempt the carrier from liability for damages.

Moreover, a common carrier may not be absolved from liability in case of force majeure
or fortuitous event alone. The common carrier must still prove that it was not negligent in
causing the death or injury resulting from an accident. This Court has had occasion to
state:
While it may be true that the tire that blew-up was still good because the grooves of the
tire were still visible, this fact alone does not make the explosion of the tire a fortuitous
event. No evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road
conditions or that precautions were taken by the jeepney driver to compensate for any
conditions liable to cause accidents. The sudden blowing-up, therefore, could have been
caused by too much air pressure injected into the tire coupled by the fact that the jeepney
was overloaded and speeding at the time of the accident.
It is interesting to note that petitioners proved through the bus conductor, Salce, that the
bus was running at "60-50" kilometers per hour only or within the prescribed lawful speed
limit. However, they failed to rebut the testimony of Leny Tumboy that the bus was
running so fast that she cautioned the driver to slow down. These contradictory facts
must, therefore, be resolved in favor of liability in view of the presumption of negligence
of the carrier in the law. Coupled with this is the established condition of the road —
rough, winding and wet due to the rain. It was incumbent upon the defense to establish
that it took precautionary measures considering partially dangerous condition of the road.
As stated above, proof that the tire was new and of good quality is not sufficient proof
that it was not negligent. Petitioners should have shown that it undertook extraordinary
diligence in the care of its carrier, such as conducting daily routinary check-ups of the
vehicle's parts.
Bayasen vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner should not belianle since the cause of the accident was
the skidding of the vehicle.
Yes.
It is obvious that the proximate cause of the tragedy was the skidding of the rear wheels
of the jeep and not the "unreasonable speed" of the petitioner because there is no evidence
on record to prove or support the finding that the petitioner was driving a at "an
unreasonable speed".
It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the
instant case, without fault on account of the manner of handling the car. Skidding means
partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily
implying negligence. It may occur without fault.
No negligence as a matter of law can, therefore, be charged to the petitioner. In fact, the
moment he felt that the rear wheels of the jeep skidded, he promptly drove it to the left
hand side of the road, parallel to the slope of the mountain, because as he said, he wanted
to play safe and avoid the embankment.
Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner- driver who skidded
could not be regarded as negligent, the skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the
petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course. The negligence of
the petitioner not having been sufficiently established, his guilt of the crime charged has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to acquittal.

Gatchalian vs Delim Issue: Whether or not respondent can escape liability because of the waiver allegedly
made by petitioner.
At noon time on 11 July
1973, petitioner Reynalda No.
Gatchalian boarded, as a
paying passenger, A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and
respondent's "Thames" mini unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right
bus at a point in San or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a
Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, person when the terms thereof do not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon
bound for Bauang, of the a right vested in such person.
same province. On the way,
while the bus was running The degree of explicitness which this Court has required in purported waivers is
along the highway in Barrio illustrated in Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express Transit (supra), where the Court in
Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a reading and rejecting a purported waiver said:
snapping sound" was
suddenly heard at one part of . . . It appears that before their transfer to the Leyte Provincial Hospital, appellees were
the bus and, shortly asked to sign as, in fact, they signed the document Exhibit I wherein they stated that "in
thereafter, the vehicle consideration of the expenses which said operator has incurred in properly giving us the
bumped a cement flower pot proper medical treatment, we hereby manifest our desire to waive any and all claims
on the side of the road, went against the operator of the Samar Express Transit."
off the road, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. Several xxx xxx xxx
passengers, including
petitioner Gatchalian, were Even a cursory examination of the document mentioned above will readily show that
injured. They were promptly appellees did not actually waive their right to claim damages from appellant for the latter's
taken to Bethany Hospital at failure to comply with their contract of carriage. All that said document proves is that they
San Fernando, La Union, for expressed a "desire" to make the waiver — which obviously is not the same as making an
medical treatment. Upon actual waiver of their right. A waiver of the kind invoked by appellant must be clear and
medical examination, unequivocal (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of July 8, 1887) — which is not the
petitioner was found to have case of the one relied upon in this appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
sustained physical injuries on
the leg, arm and forehead, If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Susaya, we would have to conclude that the
specifically described as terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in
follows: lacerated wound, "clear and unequivocal" terms.
forehead; abrasion, elbow,
left; abrasion, knee, left; Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner
abrasion, lateral surface, leg, Gatchalian need to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the
left. effects of the vehicular accident, having been in the hospital for only three days, when the
purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was presented to her for signing; that
On 14 July 1973, while while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers
injured. passengers were who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to
confined in the hospital, Mrs. read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears
Adela Delim, wife of substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit
respondent, visited them and (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she signed and whether she actually
later paid for their intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.
hospitalization and medical
expenses. She also gave Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries
petitioner P12.00 with which sustained by passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise
to pay her transportation extraordinary diligence, we must construe any such purported waiver most strictly against
expense in going home from the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must not be contrary to law,
the hospital. However, morals, public policy or good customs. To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to
before Mrs. Delim left, she claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those exhibited in
had the injured passengers, this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence
including petitioner, sign an exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard
already prepared Joint unenforceable. We believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
Affidavit which stated,
among other things:
―That we are no longer

interested to file a complaint,
criminal or civil against the

said driver and owner of the

said Thames, because it was
an accident and the said
driver and owner of the said
Thames have gone to the
extent of helping us to be
treated upon our injuries.‖
Fortune Express vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner is relieved from liability on account of force majuere.
No.
The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous
event which would exempt petitioner from liabilty.
Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an occurrence which could not be
foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable.
In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, we held that to be considered as force majeure, it is

necessary that:
(1) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will;
(2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(3) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the
(4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the
creditor. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would prevent the obligor
from being excused from liability.
Thus, in Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the common carrier was liable for
its failure to take the necessary precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it
was warned, resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was
foreseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not fulfilled. This ruling
applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the
Maranaos were going to attack its buses, petitioner took no steps to safeguard the lives
and properties of its passengers. The seizure of the bus of the petitioner was foreseeable
and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt petitioner from liability.
Petitioner invokes the ruling in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals and De Guzman v. Court of
Appeals in support of its contention that the seizure of its bus by the assailants constitutes
force majeure. In Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a common carrier is not
liable for failing to install window grills on its buses to protect passengers from injuries
caused by rocks hurled at the bus by lawless elements. On the other hand, in De Guzman
v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that a common carrier is not responsible for goods lost
as a result of a robbery which is attended by grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force.
It is clear that the cases of Pilapil and De Guzman do not apply to the present case. Art.
1755 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers as
far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
person, with due regard for all the circumstances. Thus, we held in Pilapil and De
Guzman that the respondents therein were not negligent in failing to take special
precautions against threats to the safety of passengers which could not be foreseen, such
as tortious or criminal acts of third persons. In the present case, this factor of
unforeseeablility (the second requisite for an event to be considered force majeure) is
lacking. As already stated, despite the report of PC agent Generalao that the Maranaos

were planning to burn some of petitioners buses and the assurance of petitioners
operations manager (Diosdado Bravo) that the necessary precautions would be taken,
nothing was really done by petitioner to protect the safety of passengers.
Singson vs CA Issue: Whether or not Cathay Pacific should be held liable because of the negligence of its
agent?
On 24 May 1988 CARLOS
SINGSON and his cousin Yes.
Crescentino Tiongson
bought from Cathay Pacific CATHAY undoubtedly committed a breach of contract when it refused to confirm
Airways, Ltd. (CATHAY), petitioner's flight reservation back to the Philippines on account of his missing flight
at its Metro Manila ticket coupon. Its contention that there was no contract of carriage that was breached because
outlet two (2) open-dated, petitioner's ticket was open-dated is untenable. To begin with, the round trip ticket issued
identically routed, round trip by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete written contract by and between
plane tickets for the purpose the carrier and the passenger. It has all the elements of a complete written contract, to wit:
of spending their vacation in
the United States. Each ticket (a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed
consisted of six (6) flight to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hongkong
coupons corresponding to back to the Philippines, and the carrier's acceptance to bring him to his destination and
this itinerary: flight coupon then back home;
no. 1 - Manila to Hongkong; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket;
flight coupon no. 2 - and,
Hongkong to San Francisco; (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to
flight coupon no. 3 - San the place of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket.6 In fact, the contract
Francisco to Los Angeles; of carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with
flight coupon no. 4 - Los its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles.
Angeles back to San
Francisco; flight coupon no. Only the performance of the other half of the contract — which was to transport the
5 - San Francisco to passenger back to the Philippines — was left to be done. Moreover, Timothy Remedios,
Hongkong; and, finally, CATHAY's reservation and ticketing agent, unequivocally testified that petitioner indeed
flight coupon no. 6 - had reservations booked for travel —
Hongkong to Manila. The
procedure was that at the Clearly therefore petitioner was not a mere "chance passenger with no superior right to be
start of each leg of the trip a boarded on a specific flight," as erroneously claimed by CATHAY and sustained by the
flight coupon corresponding appellate court.
to the particular sector of the
travel would be removed Interestingly, it appears that CATHAY was responsible for the loss of the ticket. One of
from the ticket booklet so two (2) things may be surmised from the circumstances of this case: first, US Air
that at the end of the trip no (CATHAY's agent) had mistakenly detached the San Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon
more coupon would be left in thinking that it was the San Francisco-Los Angeles portion; or, second, petitioner's
the ticket booklet. booklet of tickets did not from issuance include a San Francisco-Hongkong flight coupon.
On 6 June 1988 CARLOS In either case, the loss of the coupon was attributed to the negligence of CATHAY's
SINGSON and Crescentino agents and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's return flight on
Tiongson left Manila on 1 July 1988. It virtually prevented petitioner from demanding the fulfillment of the
board CATHAYs Flight No. carrier's obligations under the contract.
902. They arrived safely in
Los Angeles and after Had CATHAY's agents been diligent in double checking the coupons they were supposed
staying there for about three to detach from the passengers' tickets, there would have been no reason for CATHAY not

(3) weeks they decided to to confirm petitioner's booking as exemplified in the case of his cousin and flight
return to the Philippines. On companion Tiongson whose ticket booklet was found to be in order. Hence, to hold that
30 June 1988 they arranged no contractual breach was committed by CATHAY and totally absolve it from any
for their return flight at liability would in effect put a premium on the negligence of its agent, contrary to the
CATHAYs Los Angeles policy of the law requiring common carriers to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Office and chose 1 July
1988, a Friday, for their
departure. While Tiongson
easily got a booking for the
flight, SINGSON was not as
lucky. It was discovered that
his ticket booklet did not
have flight coupon no. 5
corresponding to the San
Francisco-Hongkong leg of
the trip. Instead, what was in
his ticket was flight coupon
no. 3 - San Francisco to Los
Angeles - which was
supposed to have been used
and removed from the ticket
booklet. It was not until 6
July 1988 that CATHAY
was finally able to arrange
for his return flight to
Manila.

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SBU Transportation Law Case Doctrines|Mario Trinchera Jr.

III. TRANSPORTATION OF PASSENGERS

Appellee Herminio Nocun who No.

On April 1980, the MT Yes.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Negros Navigation vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of gross neglect.

In April of 1980, private Yes.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

The bodies of some of the

In 1980, Juanito C. Lapuz, an Yes.

KAL, on the other hand,

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

whom only 21 were

On October 23, 1988, private Yes.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

On October 25, 1988 when

Calalas vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner failed to exercise due diligence.

On August 23, 1989, private Yes.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

A. Last Clear Chance Doctrine

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Almost at the time when the

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

On April 20, 1983, a No.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

arrived he was already dead.

C. Not An Insurer Against All Risks

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

To accommodate the needs

Since NAIA was only

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

accommodations and meal

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

At 3 p.m. on Dec. 22,

Dangwa vs CA Issue: Whether or not petitioner was negligent.

On May 13, 1985, private Yes.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

the bus waiting for the

Sensing that the bus was

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

defendant Aboitiz Shipping

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

portion of the passenger

On 14 October 1993, about Yes.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Navidad and a cross-claim

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Petitioner Ludo & Luym Yes.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Philippine Rabbit vs IAC Issue: Whether or not petitioner is negligent.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

Juntilla vs Fontanar Issue: Whether or not respondent was negligent.

The facts established after Yes.

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

watch. In spite of the efforts

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

On March 23, 1990, four

Upon learning that the same

Caveat Lector: Read at your own risk. AGDV

him to board the flight in San

On April 2, 1990, when the