G.R. No.

211120

MEDELARNALDO B. BELEN, Petitioner vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondent

February 13, 2017

FACTS:

On March 12, 2004, petitioner, then a practicing lawyer and now a former Judge, filed
a criminal complaint for estafa against his uncle, Nezer D. Belen, Sr. before the Office
of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of San Pablo City, which was docketed as LS. No. 04-
312 and assigned to then Assistant City Prosecutor (ACP) Ma. Victoria Sufiega-
Lagman for preliminary investigation. With the submission of the parties' and their
respective witnesses' affidavits, the case was submitted for resolution.

ACP Suñega-Lagman first learned of the existence of the Omnibus Motion from
Michael Belen, the son of Nezer who is the respondent in the estafa complaint. She
was also informed about the motion by Joey Flores, one of the staff of the OCP of San
Pablo City. She then asked the receiving section for a copy of the said motion, and
requested a photocopy of it for her own reference.

On September 20, 2004, ACP Suñega-Lagman filed against petitioner a criminal

complaint for libel on the basis of the allegations in the Omnibus Motion (for
Reconsideration & Disqualify). The complaint was docketed as LS. No. 04-931 before
the OCP of San Pablo City.

Since ACP Suñega-Lagman was then a member of its office, the OCP of San Pablo
City voluntarily inhibited itself from conducting the preliminary investigation of the libel
complaint and forwarded all its records to the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor.

On December 6, 2004, State Prosecutor Baculi rendered a Resolution finding probable

cause to file a libel case against petitioner. On December 8, 2004, he filed an
Information charging petitioner with the crime of libel.

After trial, the trial court found petitioner guilty of libel. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
trial court's decision. On the claimed lack of publication, the CA pointed out that the
defamatory matter was made known to third persons because prosecution witnesses
Flores and Enseo, who are the staff in the OCP of San Pablo City, were able to read
the Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner, as well as Michael, son and representative of
Nezer in the estafa case then being investigated by ACP Suñega-Lagman, was
furnished copy of the motion. Anent the applicability of the rule on absolutely privileged
communication, the CA ruled in the negative because the subject statements were
unnecessary or irrelevant in determining whether the dismissal of the estafa case filed
by petitioner against Nezer was proper, and they were defamatory remarks on the
personality, reputation and mental fitness of ACP Suñega-Lagman.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the element of publication is absent and that petitioner cannot be found
is guilty of libel.

RULING:
No. Publication in libel means making the defamatory matter, after it has been written,
known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. A
communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed alone cannot injure
his reputation though it may wound his self-esteem, for a man's reputation is not the
good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in which other hold him. In the same
vein, a defamatory letter contained in a closed envelope addressed to another
constitutes sufficient publication if the offender parted with its possession in such a
way that it can be read by person other than the offended party. If a sender of a libelous
communication knows or has good reasons to believe that it will be intercepted before
reaching the person defamed, there is sufficient publication. The publication of a libel,
however, should not be presumed from the fact that the immediate control thereof is
parted with unless it appears that there is reasonable probability that it is hereby
exposed to be read or seen by third persons.

In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third persons, but
only complied with the law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done,
petitioner conceded that the defamatory statements in it were made known to
someone other than the person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that the
motion was contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect that
persons other than the one defamed would be able to read the defamatory statements
in it, precisely because they were filed with the OCP of San Pablo City and copy
furnished to Nezer, the respondent in the estafa complaint, and the Office of the
Secretary of Justice in Manila. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such
motion is not a mere private communication, but forms part of public record when filed
with the government office. Inasmuch as one is disputably presumed to intend the
natural and probable consequence of his act, petitioner cannot brush aside the logical
outcome of the filing and service of his Omnibus Motion.

It is not amiss to state that generally, the requirement of publication of defamatory

matters is not satisfied by a communication of such matters to an agent of the defamed
person. In this case, however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of
the Omnibus Motion was furnished to and read by Michael, the son and representative
of respondent Nezer in the estafa complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the
defamed person, ACP Suñega-Lagman. Petitioner then argues that there is no
publication as to Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, who had
read the contents of the Omnibus Motion. In support thereof, he cites the settled rule
that "when a public officer, in the discharge of his or her official duties, sends a
communication to another officer or to a body of officers, who have a duty to perform
with respect to the subject matter of the communication, such communication does
not amount to publication."15 Petitioner's argument is untenable. As mere members
of the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City, Flores and Enseo cannot be
said to have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of his motion, which
is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his Estafa complaint and to disqualify
ACP Suñega-Lagman from the preliminary investigation of the case. Their legal duty
pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the motions filed with the OCP
of San Pablo City to the proper recipients.

[ G.R. No. 212904, November 22, 2017 ]

YOLANDA VILLANUEVA-ONG, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE,

RESPONDENT.

Facts

On December 4, 2012, Juan Ponce Enrile (respondent) filed a civil Complaint[4] for
damages against Yolanda Villanueva-Ong (petitioner) for libel before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 118, in Civil Case No. R-PSY-12-12031-CV.
The pertinent portions of the complaint are as follows:
2.1 On 16 October 2012, a libelous article entitled "Like father like Son?" was
published in page 16, Opinion Section of the Philippine Star. The article was authored
by [petitioner].

2.2 The article characterizes [respondent] as a liar, fraud, and manipulator. It accuses
[respondent] of attempting to "revise history" with a devious purpose of enticing the
electorate to support his only son, Juan Castañer Ponce Enrile, Jr., (popularly known
as Jack Enrile), an incumbent Congressman in the province of Cagayan and a
candidate in the upcoming senatorial elections. [Petitioner], instead of giving fair
comments on [respondent] as public official, deliberately focuses on attacking his
character with false and defamatory accusations and intrigues affecting his family and
personal life.

The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss which argued that petitioner's counterclaims
are actually permissive, and hence should have complied with the requirements of an
initiatory pleading, specifically the payment of docket fees and certification against
forum shopping. Respondent prayed for dismissal of petitioner's counterclaims for her
failure to comply with such requirements.

Meanwhile, petitioner opposed respondent's motion arguing that her counterclaims

are both compulsory in nature, since both counterclaims arose from the filing of
respondent's complaint.

The RTC, in its Order[ dated April 26, 2013, gave petitioner 15 days from receipt of
the said order, to pay the appropriate docket fees, otherwise, such counterclaims shall
be dismissed. Despite petitioner's motion for reconsideration,the RTC stood its
ground, and affirmed its ruling in the Order dated July 22, 2013.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA but it was denied.

Issue

Are petitioner's counterclaims compulsory or permissive in nature?

RULING:

Petition has been granted.

The nature and kinds of counterclaims are well-explained m jurisprudence. In Alba, Jr.
v. Malapajo,[16] the Court explained:

[C]ounterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing
party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts
of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Such a counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount
and the nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court,
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim or even
where there is such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim
or it requires for adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the court
acquire jurisdiction. A compulsory counterclaim is barred if not set up in the same
action.[17]

"A counterclaim is permtsstve if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily connected
with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. It is essentially an independent
claim that may be filed separately in another case."[18]
Determination of the nature of counterclaim is relevant for purposes of compliance to
the requirements of initiatory pleadings. In order for the court to acquire jurisdiction,
permissive counterclaims require payment of docket fees, while compulsory
counterclaims do not.[19]

Jurisprudence has laid down tests in order to determine the nature of a counterclaim,
to wit:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same? (b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants' claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiffs' claim as well as the defendants' counterclaim? and (d) Is there any
logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim[?] x x x [A positive answer to
all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory].[20]

In this case, the complaint filed by respondent for damages arose from the alleged
malicious publication written by petitioner, hence central to the resolution of the case
is petitioner's malice, or specifically that the libelous statement must be shown to have
been written or published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless
disregard of whether they are false or not.[21]

Meanwhile, petitioner's counterclaim presupposes bad faith or malice on the part of

respondent in instituting the complaint for damages. In the allegations supporting her
counterclaims, it was alleged that respondent's complaint was filed merely to harass
or humiliate her.

Such allegations are founded on the theory of malicious prosecution. Traditionally, the
term malicious prosecution has been associated with unfounded criminal actions,
jurisprudence has also recognized malicious prosecution to include baseless civil suits
intended to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the absence of a cause of action
or probable cause.[22]

In this case, while it can be conceded that petitioner can validly interpose a claim
based on malicious prosecution, the question still remains as to the nature of her
counterclaim, and the consequent obligation to comply with the requirements of
initiatory pleadings.

We find that petitioners claims are compulsory, and hence should be resolved along
with the civil complaint filed by respondent, without the necessity of complying with the
requirements for initiatory pleadings.

Indeed, a perfunctory reading of respondent's allegations in support of her

counterclaims refers to incidental facts or issues related to her counterclaim against
petitioner. She alleges that respondent unduly singled her out, and is actually violating
her legal and constitutional rights.
However, stripped of the aforesaid niceties, it is at once apparent that petitioner
essentially argues that respondent's suit is unfounded and is merely instituted to
harass and vex her.

A counterclaim purely for damages and attorneys fees by reason of the unfounded suit
filed by the respondent, has long been settled as falling under the classification of
compulsory counterclaim and it must be pleaded in the same action, otherwise, it is
barred.[23] In Lafarge Cement Phil. Inc. v. Continental Cement Corp.[24] citing Tiu Po,
et al. v. Hon. Bautista, et al.,[25] this Court ruled that counterclaims seeking moral,
actual and exemplary damages and attorneys fees against the respondent on account
of their malicious and unfounded complaint was compulsory.[26]

In this case, the counterclaims, set up by petitioner arises from the filing of
respondent's complaint. "The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case that it
is incapable of proceeding independently."We find that the evidence supporting
respondent's cause that malice attended in the publication of the article would
necessarily negate petitioner's counterclaim for damages premised on the malicious
and baseless suit filed by respondent.

G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010

HILARIO P. SORIANO, Petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP),

PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C.BUAN, and STATE PROSECUTOR ALBERTO R.
FONACIER, Respondents

Facts:

Soriano was charged for estafa through falsification of commercial documents for
allegedly securing a loan of 48 million in the name of two (2) persons when in fact
these individuals did not make any loan in the bank, nor did the bank's officers
approved or had any information about the said loan. The state prosecutor conducted
a Preliminary Investigation on the basis of letters sent by the officers of Special
Investigation of BSP together with 5 affidavits and filed two (2) separate information
against Soriano for estafa through falsification of commercial documents and violation
of DORSI law.

Soriano moved for the quashal of the two (2) informations based on the ground:

1. that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged, for the letter
transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ constituted the complaint and was defective
for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, such as statment of address of the petitioner and oath of
subscription and the signatories were not authorized persons to file the
complaint; and
2. that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, for the commission of estafa
uner par. 1(b) of Art. 315 of the RPC is inherently incompatible with the violation
of DORSI law (Sec. 83 or RA 337 as amended by PD 1795), and therefore a
person cannot be charged of both offenses.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint filed complied with the mandatory requirements of law.

Whether or not the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy in an order
denying a Motion to Quash.

Ruling:

Yes, the letters transmitted were not intended to be the complaint but merely
transmitted for preliminary investigation. The affidavits and not the letter transmitting
them initiated the preliminary investigation and therefore is the complaint which
substantially complied with the manadory requirements of law.

No. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present special defenses he had invoked in his motion
to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law.

ELIZALDE S. CO v. LUDOLFO P. MUÑOZ,

GR No. 181986, 2013-12-04
Facts:

The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner,
Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews with radio stations in Legaspi City. Muñoz, a
contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy
businessman, was... behind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made the following
statements:
(a)

Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance
of warrant of arrest against Muñoz in connection with the perjury case;
(b)
Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the Masarawag-San
Francisco dredging project, and;
(c)
Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the
project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not comply with.

Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal
informations for libel before the RTC.[6] Notably, Co did not waive, institute or reserve
his right to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz's libelous... remarks against
him.[7]

Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of

public duty.
In fact, he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous
dredging project. Although the Ombudsman dismissed the cases,... Muñoz claimed
that the dismissal did not disprove the truth of his statements.

He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters... of public interest and
are, thus, privileged. Applying the rules on privileged communication to libel suits, the
prosecution has the burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz
claimed, it failed to do.

RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution
established the elements of libel.

In light of the Ombudsman's dismissal of Muñoz' charges against Co, the RTC also
held that Muñoz' statements were baseless accusations which are not protected as
privileged... communication.

In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count
of libel as moral damages, P1,200,000.00 for expenses paid for legal services, and
P297,699.00 for litigation expense.[11] Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.

he CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest
and Muñoz' statements were protected as privileged communication under the first
paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC.

As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public
interest.[14] Hence, the CA... reversed the RTC decision and acquitted Muñoz of the
libel charges due to the prosecution's failure to establish the existence of actual malice.

In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal
aspect of the libel suits because that would violate Muñoz' right against double
jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court

(ROC), which states that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action.
He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with
or separately from the criminal action.[15] He also claims that the civil liability of an
accused may be appealed in case of acquittal.[16]
The Respondent's Arguments

Since Co did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising from the
offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the... present petition
to enforce the civil liability.
Issues:
whether a private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to
enforce the accused's civil liability; and... whether the respondent is liable for damages
arising from the libelous remarks despite his acquittal.
Ruling:
We do not find the petition meritorious.

The private party may appeal the judgment of acquittal insofar as he seeks to enforce
the accused's civil liability.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action.
However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from... which
the civil liability may arise did not exist.

In Ching v. Nicdao and CA,[28] the Court ruled that an appeal is the proper remedy
that a party whether the accused or the offended party may avail with respect to the
judgment:
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the
civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved
party,... the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on
the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

From the foregoing, petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party,
may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao's acquittal
by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did
not... reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior
to the criminal action.

To reiterate, the extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the
extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with or separately from the
criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is... a
finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which
the liability may arise exists.

Jurisprudence has enumerated three instances when, notwithstanding the accused's

acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability ex... delicto: (a) if the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the
court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the... crime of which the accused
is acquitted.
The respondent is not civilly liable because no libel was committed.
The CA has acquitted Muñoz of libel because his statement is a privileged
communication. In libel, the existence of malice is essential as it is an element of the
crime.

The law presumes that every imputation is malicious;[31] this... is referred to as malice
in law. The presumption relieves the prosecution of the burden of proving that the
imputations were made with malice. This presumption is rebutted if the accused
proved that the imputation is true and published with good intention and... justifiable
motive.

There are few circumstances wherein malice in law is inapplicable. For instance,
Article 354 of the RPC further states that malice is not presumed when:

(1)... a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral or social duty;[33] and

(2)... a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other... act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged. The legal
conclusion was arrived at from the fact that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of
the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Muñoz' statements were
fair... comments.

Consequently, malice is no longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of
proving that Muñoz acted with malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed
in this respect.

In light of the privileged nature of Muñoz' statements and the failure of the prosecution
to prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was committed by Muñoz. Without the
crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co that can be pursued in the
present... petition. There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists.

[ AC. No. 10565, Sep 07, 2016 ]

PROSECUTOR RHODNA A. BACATAN v. ATTY. MERARI D. DADULA

Facts

Between September and October 2007, the following cases were raffled to
complainant for preliminary investigation: (1) a complaint for libel (I.S. No. 4760) filed
by Rev. Jose Bailey Bernaldez against Dr. Carlito Impas, Sr.; and (2) a complaint for
falsification (I.S. No. 4999-J) filed by Dr. Carlito Impas, Jr. against Rev. Jose Bailey
Bernaldez. Respondent was the counsel of Carlito Impas, Jr.[3] Complainant found
probable cause for libel and recommended its filing in court, while the complaint for
falsification was recommended for dismissal for lack of probable cause.[4] Both
recommendations were approved by the City Prosecutor.[5]

Respondent filed a Motion to Determine Probable Cause With Motion to Hold in

Abeyance Trial With Motion to Defer Issuance of Warrant and Motion to Defer Posting
of Reduced Bail Bond[6] in the libel case. In her pleadings, respondent accused
complainant of manifest partiality and bias against her client when complainant: 1)
summarily ruled that the publication of the letter was libelous but miserably failed to
point out, in her Resolution, which portion constituted libel; 2) denied the motion for
reconsideration with dispatch in an undated Order; 3) "sat" on the falsification case for
she did not resolve it with dispatch unlike what she did in this libel case;[7] 4) did not
send a copy of the resolution in the libel case to the accused; 5) dismissed the
falsification case even if mere was clear admission from the accused in the case that
it was his signature; and 6) lodged the information in the libel case within the period to
appeal the undated Order.[8] Respondent perceived an obvious disparity in her
treatment of these two cases and further noticing the swiftness of her (Prosecutor
Bacatan) Resolution and Order in this libel case which is utterly adverse against the
accused despite the glaring fact that no probable cause exists to hold him for libel.[9]
Respondent then concluded that "[a]ll these adverse actions of prosecutor Bacatan
against herein accused impels him to one inevitable conclusion: the prosecutor must
have been bribed."[10]

In her Comment,[11] complainant denied the charges of undue haste on the libel case
and undue delay on the falsification case. According to her, the two cases were raffled
on different dates and received by her office on separate dates. Adopting a first-in-
first-out policy, the libel case, which was raffled first was resolved earlier than the
falsification case. Moreover, she did not sit on the falsification case or act with undue
haste in the libel case, but merely followed the procedure in resolving cases at the
Cebu City Prosecutor's Office.In her Rejoinderrespondent claimed that complainant's
undue haste and grave irregularity in handling the case is evident from the Resolution
and Information which she prepared and signed on the same day, November 20, 2007.
On October 13, 2008, the IBP required respondent to file her Answer.

In her Answer, respondent insisted that complainant follow the regular procedure. She
reiterated the arguments raised in her motion to determine probable cause and in her
Rejoinder. She also invoked as an affirmative defense the Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23 of Cebu City (RTC), granting the motion to determine probable cause
for the libel case, dated August 26, 2008.[18] She also presented as evidence the RTC
Decision[19] dated June 29, 2012 acquitting Dr. Impas, Jr. from the charge of libel.[20]
Pending the results of the investigation of this Complaint, respondent also filed on
December 20, 2010, a Complaint for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No.
3019 and a Petition for Disbarment and Imposition of Appropriate Disciplinary Actions
before the Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas and the IBP, respectively. The
petition contained the same allegations made on the motion to determine probable
cause and in the Rejoinder, but no new issues were raised against the complainant.

IBP Investigating Commissioner Hector B. Almeyda (Commissioner Almeyda), in his

Report and Recommendation,[22] stated that it is the practice of the National
Prosecution Service that where the resolution is one finding probable cause for the
filing of a case, the investigating prosecutor already prepares the corresponding
information to facilitate the movement of the case, should the reviewing officers affirm
the finding of probable cause. The similarity of dates of the resolution that has yet to
be affirmed with the information is inconsequential and hardly gives room to question
the regularity of the process.[23]

Commissioner Almeyda found that respondent failed to abide by the bounds of

courtesy, fairness and candor as provided in Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She "had overstepped the bounds of fair play and have drawn herself
to the maelstrom of misconduct by dangerously and recklessly including in her
pleadings a completely and irrelevant allegation concerning complainant's character
that did not enter into the equation as a factor in the determination of whether probable
cause existed in the matter tasked by the processes to be resolved by
complainant."[24] Commissioner Almeyda observed however, that respondent was, "a
comparatively new member of the profession," and reminded her "to be a bit more
circumspect in her choice of words in championing the cause of her client."[25] The
Commissioner recommended that respondent be "strongly reprimanded, with warning
that a similar or any other future infraction of the Code of Professional Responsibility
shall be dealt with more severely."[26]

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2013-
216,[27] adopting and approving Commissioner Almeyda's Report and
Recommendation.
Ruling

The Court concurs with the finding of the IBP but takes exception to the recommended
penalty to be imposed, which is light in relation to the circumstances presented in this
case.

Membership in the bar imposes upon lawyers certain obligations to one another,
including the observance of honourable, candid and courteous dealings with other
lawyers,[28] as well as maintaining fidelity to known and recognized customs and
practices of the bar that make the practice of law a profession.[29]

The unfavourable resolutions against her client prompted respondent to hurl

accusations of irregularity and bribery against complainant. Strongly worded
statements by a lawyer against opposing counsel, if justified by the records, may not
justify disciplinary actions against the former.[30] But such is not the case here.
Respondent's tirades against complainant have proven to be baseless.
As found by the IBP, that the dates of the finding of probable cause and that of the
filing of the information are the same, is explained by the prevailing practice in the
National Prosecution Service: an information is prepared together with the resolution
finding probable cause to facilitate the movement of the case.[31] Respondent could
have easily verified this practice before she resorted to condemning complainant and
her actions. Respondent failed to substantiate her bare allegations and sweeping
conclusion of irregularity and charge of bribery, basing her charges purely on her flimsy
gut feeling. It is unethical for a lawyer to accuse another lawyer wantonly and
maliciously of a serious misconduct in the absence of a reasonable cause.[32]

Further, the attack on the character of the complainant is also completely unnecessary
in the motion for determination of probable cause on the libel case. Contrary to
respondent's contention, her misconduct is not cured nor justified by the eventual
acquittal of her client.
We note the IBP's observation that during the times material to the case, respondent
was considerably new to the profession,[33] and must have been overzealous in
protecting the cause of her client, even akin to overenthusiasm. Members of the Bar
must be reminded that "enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the
one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must
be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for the proper
place of courts in our system of government."[34]

In earlier cases, we meted the penalty of fine for a lawyer's use of intemperate
language. Saberon v. Larong[35] declared a lawyer guilty of simple misconduct and
imposed upon him a P2,000.00 fine for referring to a party's pleadings as "a series of
blackmail suits" even if the latter were well within their rights to file cases against the
clients of the lawyer.[36] We ruled that while a lawyer is entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language.[37] Although lawyers are allowed a latitude of pertinent remark or
comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold and for the felicity of their
clients, they should not trench beyond the bounds of relevancy and propriety in making
such remark or comment.[38] In Ng v. Alar,[39] we modified the IBP's recommended
penalty of reprimand to a fine of P5,000.00, after finding that "[s]ubmitting pleadings
containing countless insults and diatribes against the [National Labor Relations
Commission] and attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly measures
to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer."[40] The lawyer also filed disbarment
cases against his opposing counsels for the latter's alleged filing of multiple actions
based on the same cause of action, interference in the normal course of judicial
proceeding, and instigating the filing of the disbarment complaint against him. Notably,
the IBP dismissed the disbarment charges against opposing counsels. We ruled that
the lawyer clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
for "his actions erode the public's perception of the legal profession."

We find that respondent violated Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

While zeal or enthusiasm in championing a client's cause is desirable, unprofessional
conduct stemming from such zeal or enthusiasm is disfavoured. When without proof
nor enough basis on record, respondent swiftly concluded, based only on gut feeling,
that the complainant has been bribed or had acted for a valuable consideration, her
conduct has overstepped the bounds of courtesy, fairness and candor.

We find respondent Atty. Merari D. Dadula GUILTY of violation of Canon 8 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares vs. Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra

A.C. No. 11394. December 1, 2016

Facts
This instant administative case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against
respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical
Group, Inc. (BMGI), a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws 2
and engaged in the specialized field of cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand,
respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio (Norcio ), who filed
criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her
buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account insulting and
verbally abusing complainant. The complaint further alleged that respondent posted
remarks on his Facebook account that were intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's
medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300 employees for
no fair or justifiable cause. His posts include the following excerpts:

Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss
My Client’s Ass, Belo. Senator Adel Tamano, don’t kiss Belo’s ass. Guys and girls,
nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to Kick some ass!!! I will launch a
national campaign against Plastic Politicians -No guns, No goons, No gold -IN GUTS
I TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcio’s Big Bang on Friday -
You will go down in Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK
QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS, BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A.
TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles �� (September 22 at
11:18pm)

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her
office receptionist in Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga.
Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng Payola ang kaso … si Imelda Marcos
nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si Belo pa kaya?
(September 15 at 12:08pm

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may ‘extra-legal’ budget yon. Kaya
Lang, bistado ko na kung sino-sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka
bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha (August 9 at 10:31pm)

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BA TCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NYO AKO

KUNG MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NI BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just
[want] to know how much she hates me, ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into
tens of millions …. (September 15 at 3:57pm) xxx xxx xxx
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed
to inspire public hatred, destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics,
as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million from her as evident from his demand
letter dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint for disbarment
against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as
CBD Case No. 09-2551.

In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his
constitutionally-guaranteed right to privacy, asserting that the posts quoted by
complainant were private remarks on his private account on Facebook, meant to be
shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part. He also
averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and
contended that the complaint was filed to derail the criminal cases that his client,
Norcio, had filed against complainant. He denied that the remarks were vulgar and
obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against complainant.
He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent
the demand letter as a requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as
well as the civil case for damages against her. Finally, respondent pointed out that
complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair comment.

Issues:

1. Whether respondent can validly invoke his right to privacy.

2. Whether respondent can validlyn invoke freedom of speech.

Ruling:
Respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks
about complainant and BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he
invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were "private remarks" on his "private
account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when complainant
accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
The defense is untenable. Before, can have an expectation of privacy in his or her
online social networking activity -in this case, Facebook -it is first necessary that said
user manifests the intention to keep certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other
words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the
user's invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting
complainant, which posts respondent insists were set to private view. However, the
latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any of the privacy tools or features of
Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its privacy to a
select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that
the subject posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his
circle of friends, respondent's statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.

Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were
limited to or viewable by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same -or
other digital content that he uploads or publishes on his Facebook profile -will be
safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the following:

1. Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users
the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way";
2. A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;
3. The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
4. A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are
not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her
own Facebook friends.

Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee
absolute protection from the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's
circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or
her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter
is Face book friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a
person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post
or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at "Friends."
Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of violation of right to privacy
is negated.

As to the second issue, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression,
like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute. As such, the constitutional right of
freedom of expression may not be availed of to broadcast lies or half-truths, insult
others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were
ostensibly made with malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant
and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng
Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she has been bribing
people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch
the name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed
criminal negligence upon complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant
disfigured ( "binaboy ") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI a "Frankenstein Factory," and
calling out a boycott of BMGI's services -all these despite the pendency of the criminal
cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened
complainant with conviction for criminal negligence and estafa -which is contrary to
one's obligation "to act with justice."

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his
act of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the
subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following
provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 8.01 -A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 -A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,

respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he
must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm,
and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming
of an officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults
and maligning complainant's and BMGI' s reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage
who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is
the cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against
complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be
administratively sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of
violation of Rules 7.03, 8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective
upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely