QUIMIGING vs.

ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795 July 31, 2970

FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City
and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to
have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her
consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a
consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages
and attorney’s fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on
the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the
intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable
since the original complaint averred no cause of action”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, the CFI erred in dismissing Carmen’s complaint.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be
accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed
in Article 742.

Lower court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates
article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his
wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is entitled
to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao.
 DE JESUS VS. SYQUIA, 58 SCRA 866
April 10, 2011

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by
the defendant’s brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and
an unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said
barber shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a
consequence, Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonia’s pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931,
he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be
given to the child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia
reminding her to eat on time for her and “junior’s” sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera
to attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila
where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy,
defendant suddenly departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia
Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to
Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession
of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a
consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael
Loanco.

HELD:

The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters
are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement
is that the writing shall be indubitable.

“The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status
of a natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to
admit the status”.
Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia
Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law.
Furthermore, there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to
recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment
as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per
month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the
order as to the amount of pension.

56 PHIL. 712

Estate of Mota v. Concepcion

Case No. 42 G.R. No. L-34581 (March 31, 1932)

FACTS:
In 1919, Lazaro Mota and Salvador Serra entered into a partnership to construct several kilometers
of railroad in Occidental Negros. In 1920, Serra transferred his half interest to Concepcion and
Whitaker. In December of the same year, Mota also sold his half to the same purchaser. On the
last sale, only part of the price was paid, so Concepcion and Whitaker mortgaged to Mota the
railroad. Mota registered the contract as an unregistered real property.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a mortgage over an unregistered property is valid.
2. Whether or not enforcement of mortgage is fatal to right of rescission.

HELD:
1. According to Standard Oil Co. vs. Castro, Sec. 194 of the Administrative Code clearly
recognizes the validity of such a contract between the contracting parties.
2. The election to enforce the contract of mortgage is fatal to the right of rescission. Serra
foreclosed the mortgage given to him to secure the unpaid portion of the selling price of the
railway.