G.R. No.

131457, November 17, 1998, 298 SCRA 678

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA
BACKGROUND OF THE CASE: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision
converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-industrial/institutional area. Because of
this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and
even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the
farmers. Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically motivated”, “win-win” resolution on
November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.

FACTS: This pertains to the 2 separate motions for reconsideration filed by respondents and the
applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of the SC’s April 24, 1998 Decision nullifying the so-called
"win-win" Resolution dated November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-
C-6424, and denying the applicants' Motion For Leave To Intervene. In the past decision, the SC struck
down as void the act of the Office of the President (OP) in reopening the case in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424
through the issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution which substantially modified its
March 29, 1996 Decision that had long become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the resolution is valid? YES
HELD: It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise in
their field are binding and conclusive on the Court,iii considering that the Office of the President is
presumed to be most competent in matters falling within its domain.
The interest of justice is invoked by movants. We are aware of that famous adage of the late
President Ramon Magsaysay that "those who have less in life should have more in law." Our affirmation
of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is precisely pro-poor considering that more of the
impoverished of society will be benefited by the agro-economical development of the disputed land
which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to undertake. To our
mind, the OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the eventual benefit of the many, not just of the few.
This is clearly shown from the development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners.
2nd ISSUE: WON the applicants' motion for intervention must be granted
HELD: NO.
Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own directly or collectively the land
they till belongs to the farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless, and in the case of other
farmworkers, the latter are entitled "to receive a just share of the fruits" of the land. The pertinent
portion of the aforecited constitutional provision mandates:
"Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the
right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the
lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof.
x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
Commenting on the above-quoted provision, the eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, declares that under the agrarian reform program the
equitable distribution of the land is a right given to landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the
land they till, while the other or seasonal farmworkers are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of
the land.iii Being merely seasonal farmerworkers without a right to own, the applicants' motion for
intervention must necessarily fail as they have no legal or actual and substantial interest over the
subject land.

3rd ISSUE: Whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)

HELD: Local Government Units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use. It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP
Decision was declared final and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners,
namely, the province of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management
and Development Corporations, and all others who should be benefited by the said decision. The issue
here is not a question of technicality but that of substance and merit. Whether the Sangguniang Bayan
of Sumilao has the legal authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, the March 29,
1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed the issue. Converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. Procedural lapses in
the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-industrial purposes cannot be
allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the
management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160 is
clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local
governments units autonomy in their local affairs including the power to convert portions of their
agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain
their fullest development as self-reliant communities.

NOTE(ito ruling sa past cases): But even if we tackle the other issues which the movants describe as
"substantial," namely: (1) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility; (2) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3)
whether the land is tenanted, and if not, whether the applicants for intervention are qualified to
become beneficiaries thereof; and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority
to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, to our mind, the March 29, 1996 OP Decision has
thoroughly and properly disposed of the aforementioned issues. We quote the pertinent portions of the
said Decision:
To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would
open great opportunities for employment and bring real development in the area towards a
sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand, distributing the land to
would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none) does not guarantee
such benefits.
"Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with
irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is
true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the
 property (as a right of way) to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion
thereof. the land itself, subject of the instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for
several years, planted with pineapple by the Philippine-Packing Corporation.
"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by
NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992.
Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly pointed out that under Section 8 R.A.
No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition
until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National
Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the land Bank of the
Philippines, both in Butuan City, to desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering
petitioner's land.
"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already
contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300
hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 100 hectares in the nearby
Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received
'just compensation' up to this time.
"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible compensation package
arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries
to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated.
"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property
for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting
autonomy to local government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more
simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for
any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units
autonomy in their affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their
fullest development as self-reliant communities.

SPOUSES SOCRATES PILAPIL and ROSARIO PILAPIL, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF CEBU, BRANCH 17, and SPOUSES GORGONIO COLOMIDA and GLORIA COLOMIDA,
respondents. (November 26, 1992)

FACTS:The Pilapil Spouses own a 6,598 square meter parcel of land situated in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan,
Cebu. The land formerly belonged to Marcelo Pilapil, the grandfather of petitioner Socrates Pilapil.

Private respondents (Colomidas), who are residents of Mandaue City, purchased from Esteria vda. de
Ceniza and the heirs of Leoncio Ceniza a parcel of land, also located at Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu.
This parcel of land was found to contain only 6,448 square meters. The Colomidas claim that they had
acquired from Sesenando Longkit a road right of way which leads towards the National Road; this road
right of way, however, ends at that portion of the property of the Pilapils where a camino vecinal exists
all the way to the said National Road. The Colomidas "tried to improve the road of "camino vecinal", for
the convenience of the public," but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them with "bodily harm from
making said improvement." The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. The Colomidas
filed against the Pilapils a petition for injunction and damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. On the other hand, the
Pilapils filed against the Colomidas an action for damages in the MTC Liloan-Compostela, Cebu. The RTC
ruled in favour of the Colomidas. The CA affirmed the same.

ISSUE: WON the Municipality of Liloan has a camino vicinal (byroad in English) in sitio Bahak of barangay
Poblacion, and if it does, whether such road traverses the property of the Pilapils of only passes along its
side?

HELD: YES. It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal
is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere with such a right.
Thus, even if We are to agree with both the trial court and public respondent that Longakit and Pepito
were telling the truth, the decision of the Municipality of Liloan with respect to the said camino vecinal
in sitio Bahak must prevail. It is thus pointless to concentrate on the testimonies of both witnesses since
the same have, for all intents and purposes, become irrelevant.

The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares,
fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said provinces,
cities or municipalities. They are governed by the same principles as property of public dominion of the
same character. Under the applicable law in this case, the LGC, the Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative
body of the municipality, had the power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
subject to the provisions of existing laws, and to provide for the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of municipal streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places,
regulate the use thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or encroachments on
them as provided by Section 10, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I.

A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant, therefore, to the above
powers of a local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a)
prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other
things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any
municipal road. In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan, approved
the Urban Land Use Plan; this plan was duly signed by the Municipal Mayor. By doing so, the said
legislative body determined, among others, the location of the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak.

What invested the zoning map with legal effect was neither the authority of the person who ordered its
preparation nor the authority of the person who actually prepared it, but its approval by the
Sangguniang Bayan. Furthermore, with or without the order of the Mayor or Sangguniang Bayan,
Engineer Jordan, as the then Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, had the authority to
prepare the plan and admit it to the Sangguniang Bayan for approval. Among his functions under the
governing law at the time was to formulate an integrated economic, social, physical and other
development objectives and policies for the consideration and approval of the sangguniang bayan and
the municipal mayor, and prepare municipal comprehensive plans and other development planning
document. Thus, even if he had not been instructed by anyone to prepare the map, he could
nevertheless, on his own initiative and by virtue of his functions, make one. The trial court and public
respondent then failed to appreciate the role and function of a Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator.

As further declared by Engineer Jordan, this camino vecinal in sitio Bahak "passes the side of the land of
Socrates Pilapil. This is the proposed road leading to the national highway." The Colomidas presented no
rebuttal witness to show that by the approval of the zoning map by the Sangguniang Bayan, they were
effectively deprived of access to the national highway from their property. Of course, they may argue
that the zoning map was prepared for and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan after the filing of their
petition in Civil Case No. R-20732. Be that as it may, this preparation and approval, clearly a supervening
event, was relied upon, introduced in evidence without objection on the part of the Colomidas and
evaluated by the trial court. In short, the latter allowed the issue raised by the supervening event to be
tried. There was nothing procedurally objectionable to this. Such supervening fact, duly proved to be an
official act of the Municipality of Liloan, binds not only the Pilapils and the Colomidas, but also the
general public. The solemn declarations of old people like Sesenando Longakit and Florentino Pepito
cannot overturn the decision of the Municipality of Liloan.

CABRERA v CA

FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158, providing as follows:

RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to close the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of
this province to traffic effective October 31, 1969, and to give to the owners of the properties
traversed by the new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office
from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties.

RESOLVED FURTHER, that the Honorable Provincial Governor be, as he is hereby authorized to
sign for and in behalf of the province of Catanduanes, the pertinent Deed of Exchange and or
other documents pertaining thereto;

Pursuant thereto, Deeds of Exchange were executed under which the Province of Catanduanes
conveyed to Bagadiong, Alcala, Latorre, Tolentino, Alejandro, Vargas, and Reyes portions of the closed
road in exchange for their own respective properties, on which was subsequently laid a new concrete
road leading to the Capitol Building.

In 1978, part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner's house was planted to
vegetables in 1977 by Alejandro. Peña, who had bought Vargas's share, also in the same part of the
road, converted it into a piggery farm. Learning about Resolution 158, the petitioner filed a complaint
for "Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and
Documents with Damages." He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the
Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He
contended that Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was the closure of
the northern portion of the said road. The judge sustained the authority of the provincial board to enact
Resolution No. 158 under existing law.
Appeal was taken to the respondent court, which found that the road was a public road and not a trail
but just the same also upheld Resolution 158. It held that pursuant to RA 5185, municipal authorities
can close, subject to the approval or direction of the Provincial Board, thoroughfares under Section 2246
of the RAC. Although in this case the road was not closed by the municipality of Catanduanes but by the
provincial board of Catanduanes, the closure, nevertheless, is valid since it was ordered by the
approving authority itself. However, while it could do so, the provincial government of Catanduanes
could close the road only if the persons prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section 2246 of the RAC
being very explicit on this.

1st ISSUE: WON there is a road closure? (petitioner claims that it’s not an order for closure but an
authority to barter or exchange it with private properties)

HELD: The Court cannot understand how the petitioner can seriously argue that there is no order of
closure when it is there in the resolution, in black and white. Resolution 158 clearly says that it is
"hereby resolved to close the old road."

In the case of Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, the Court held the closure of a city street
as within the powers of the city council under the Revised Charter of Cebu City. It sustained the
subsequent sale of the land as being in accordance not only with the charter but also with Article 422 of
the Civil Code, which provides: "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, the power of the City Council of Baguio City to close city streets
and withdraw them from public use was also assailed. This Court said: Such power to vacate a street or
alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts,
absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So
the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.

While it is true that the above cases dealt with city councils and not the provincial board, there is no
reason for not applying the doctrine announced therein to the provincial board in connection with the
closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining such roads for the
comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from
the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of
provincial roads.

2nd ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to damages?

HELD: NO. The petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred, such as it is, is
the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. This is not a case
where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled to just compensation. The construction of
the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. As the trial judge acutely observed,
whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered "pales in significance compared to the greater
convenience the new road, which is wide and concrete, straight to the veterans fountain and down to
the pier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the new road adds beauty and color not only to
the town of Virac but also to the whole province of Catanduanes." For the enjoyment of those benefits,
every individual in the province, including the petitioner, must be prepared to give his share.

[G.R. No. L-44178. August 21, 1987.]

RICARDO CRUZ, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: The private respondents instituted a class suit before the CFI Manila in behalf of the vendors and
regular stall holders in Padre Rada Market for annulment with preliminary injunction against the then
Manila Mayor Villegas, petitioner Cruz, and other persons. The complaint prayed, among others, that
the defendant City Mayor’s decision to withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market be declared null
and void.

Petitioner Cruz states that he and his business associates have been the owners and operators of the
Padre Rada Market at Tondo, Manila for more than 25 years. The market was authorized to be operated
as a public market of the City of Manila by virtue of Resolution No. 230. The management of said
market represented by petitioner Cruz wrote Mayor Villegas that the management was withdrawing 3/4
of the area of the market "from the direct supervision and control of the City Treasurer’s Office effective
on June 15, 1970, and from said date the withdrawn portion shall cease to function and operate as a
public market." The respondent-vendors, who were likewise notified of such withdrawal, protested such
move.

Mayor Villegas allowed the withdrawal in the light of the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the right
of the operators of the Elcano Market to withdraw their property from its use as a public market stating,
among others, that approval for the withdrawal by the City of Manila is not even necessary.

The CFI rendered a decision declaring among others the decision of the mayor to withdraw Padre Rada
Market as a public market as valid. On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the lower court’s decision. Hence, this is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals declaring that the Padre Rada Market remains a public market under government supervision
and control and that the private respondent-vendors be maintained in the premises.

ISSUE: WON the City Mayor may validly withdraw Padre Rada Market as a public market.

HELD: NO. By the very nature of a market, * its location, opening, operations, and closure must be
regulated by government. It is not a question of the petitioner’s right to run his market as he pleases but
what agency or office should supervise its operations.

The Mayor had no legal authority to, by himself, allow the petitioner to withdraw the major portion of
Padre Rada Market from its use as a public market, thereby also withdrawing it from the city’s constant
supervision. The establishment and maintenance of public markets is by law among the legislative
powers of the City of Manila. Since the operation of Padre Rada Market was authorized by a municipal
board resolution and approved by the City Mayor, as provided by law, it follows that a withdrawal of the
whole or any portion from use as a public market must be subject to the same joint action of the Board
and the Mayor. The Mayor of Manila, by himself, cannot provide for the opening, operations, and
closure of a public market.
Moreover, Sec. 1, III (2) of Republic Act No. 6039, amending the Revised Charter of the City of Manila,
provides: "‘City-owned and operated public markets shall not be disposed of, closed . . . or transferred
until all vendors therein shall have been relocated or transferred by the city government at its expenses
to another temporary or new public market.’"

The petitioner alleges otherwise, stating that said provision is not applicable to the Padre Rada Market,
it being a privately-owned and privately-operated public market under the control and supervision of
the City of Manila. The fact that all privately-owned public markets are under government supervision
and control do not make them city-operated public markets. There is no question that the Padre Rada
Market is a public market as it was authorized to operate and it operates as such.

A market is a "public market" when it is dedicated to the service of the general public and is operated
under government control and supervision as a public utility, whether it be owned by the government or
any instrumentality thereof or by any private individual. It is a settled doctrine that a "public market may
be the object of individual ownership or lease, subject to municipal supervision and control." (43 C.J.
394). Thus, if a market has been permitted to operate under government license for service to the
general public, it is a "public market" whether the building that houses it or the land upon which it is
built is of private or public ownership. The Padre Rada Market is, therefore, a public market which
happens to be privately-owned and privately operated.

CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC. vs. HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES

FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development Plan.
Subsequently City Council of Cebu passed a resolution authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land
through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the
highest bidder and through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein
petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800. By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the
petitioner filed an application with the CFI Cebu to have its title to the land registered.

The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the
property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the
public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to
registration by any private individual. The trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's
application for registration of title.

For the resolution of this case, the petitioner poses the following questions:

1st ISSUE: Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34,
give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned? and

HELD: The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides:

Section 31. Legislative Powers. Any provision of law and executive order to the contrary
notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers:
 xxx xxx xxx

(34) ...; to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property
thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for
which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.

From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or
street. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, where the power of the city Council of Baguio City to close
city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public use was similarly assailed, this court said:

These are acts well within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it
would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or not a certain
property is still necessary for public use.Such power to vacate a street or alley is
discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by
the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public
trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally
will not invalidate the vacation ordinance.

2nd ISSUE: Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City
of Cebu which may be the object of a common contract?

HELD: Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which
can be the object of an ordinary contract.

Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and unequivocal terms,
states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."

Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the
petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.

MUYOT v DE LA FUENTE

FACTS: Appelants contructed booths on the the sidewalk of the Plaza Sta. Cruz. When they were
instructed to remove the same, appellants claimed that they had obtained permit from the present of
the City of Manila, to connect booths Nos. 1 and 2, along the premises in question, and for the use of
spaces where the booths were constructed, they had paid and continued paying the corresponding
rentals. The booths in question served as fruit stands for their owners and often, if not always, blocked
the fire passage of pedestrians who had to take the plaza itself which used to be clogged with vehicular
traffic.
ISSUE: WON the City of Manila could lease a portion of a public sidewalk on Plaza Sta. Cruz

HELD: NO, it being beyond the commerce of man. Granting the claim that it was leased to them as true,
one should not entertain any doubt that such permit was not legal, because the City of Manila does not
have any power or authority at all to lease a portion of a public sidewalk. The sidewalk in question,
forming part of the public plaza of Sta. Cruz, could not be a proper subject matter of the contract, as it
was not within the commerce of man (Article 1347, new Civil Code, and article 1271, old Civil Code). Any
contract entered into by the City of Manila in connection with the sidewalk, is ipso facto null and ultra
vires. The sidewalk in question was intended for and was used by the public, in going from one place to
another. "The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the public,
and the sidewalks and crossings for the pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for
other purpose as provided by ordinance or regulation; ..." (Sec. 1119, Revised Ordinances of the City of
Manila.)

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE vs. HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO. (March 31, 1915)

FACTS: The provincial fiscal of Cavite, representing the same, filed a complaint against the defendants
(Rojas and her husband Siuko) alleging that the plaintiff municipal corporation had exclusive right,
control and administration over the streets, lanes, plazas, and public places of the municipality of Cavite
and that the defendants, through a lease from the municipality, occupy a parcel of land which forms
part of the Soledad public plaza belonging to the municipality of Cavite.

The defendant had already constructed a house thereon. The defendants refused to vacate the said land
because they had acquired the right of possession to it and further alleged that the lease agreement
provided that they can only be ordered to vacate the said property if the municipality needed it for
decoration or public use. The trial court held that the municipality had no legal claim to the property.
This case was appealed through bill of exceptions.

ISSUE: WON the lease agreement between the parties was valid?

HELD: NO.

According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises
the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and
public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces."

The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite could not
withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the
defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said plaza or public place to the defendant for private use
the plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract
over a thing of which it could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.

The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside he commerce of man may
be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of this commerce.
Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract whereby the municipality of Cavite leased to Hilaria
Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force or effect, because it is contrary to
the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a contract. On the hyphotesis that the said lease is
null and void in accordance with the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code, the defendant must
restore and deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite,
which in its turn must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have received from her in the
nature of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased. For the same reasons as have
been set forth, and as said contract is null and void in its origin, it can produce no effect and
consequently the defendant is not entitled to claim that the plaintiff municipality indemnity her for the
damages she may suffer by the removal of her house from the said land.

Hence, the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza called Soledad, and as the lease
of said parcel of land is null and void, the defendant is ordered to vacate it and release the land in
question within thirty days. There is no ground for the indemnity sought in the nature of damages, but
the municipality must in its turn to the defendant the rentals collected.