ROYONG VS.

OBLENA
AC No. 376 April 30, 1963
En Banc, Barrera

FACTS:
• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar
and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and found
out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and respondent
seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor General
made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his
application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of living
adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the 18 year old
Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court render
judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous
cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:
Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

RATIO:
The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character
is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been
admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify
that as ground for disbarment.
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in
this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the
Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.
As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to
show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from
the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known.
Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people
who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a person of good
moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is
clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
Royong v Oblena

Facts:

Complainant Josefina Royong charged Atty. Ariston J. Oblena, member of the Philippine
Bar with rape. Based from the report of the Solicitor General, the complainant was raped after
lunch when her mother left her alone. The respondent entered, when behind her, covered her
mouth with one hand and dragged her to the bedroom. She tried to resist, but resulted to her
receiving hard blows on the thigh with his fist and threats to kill her and her family. After the
sexual intercourse, he threatened her not to tell her foster father, otherwise, he would kill her and
all the members of her family. This resulted to her pregnancy. Eventually, she gave birth to the
child. The respondent, however, allege he did not rape her since he was at the Commission of
Civil Service at the time of the commission of the crime. He also admitted that he had an illicit
relationship with the complainant for one year when he stopped since it was discovered by her
foster parents. In order to avoid a criminal liability of seduction, he limited himself to kissing and
embracing her and sucking her tongue before she became 18 years of age. Based from the
findings, The Solicitor general concluded that there was carnal knowledge of the complainant
and it was consensual.

In view of his findings, even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape, he was still
guilty of other misconduct. He was living an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles at the same time
maintaining illicit relationship with Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus making him unworthy
of public confidence

After the hearing, the investigators submitted the report with the finding that:

1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit
relationship with the complainant, committing immoral acts which rendered him free
from criminal liability;
2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabitating with a married
woman even after he became a lawyer;
3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the bar
examination, due to the immorality of cohabitating with his common-law wife, Briccia
Angeles, a married woman. He is recommended to be disbarred or suspended for one
year.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty Ariston Oblena should be disbarred or suspended on the grounds of his
moral character?

Held:

The open cohabitation with Briccia, a married woman, is a sufficient ground for disbarment. The
respondent’s misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand is that even if he
admittedly committed fornification, this is no ground for disbarment, is not controlling.
Fornification, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances justify positive
action by the court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of law. The reason why he
continued relationship with Angeles was to finish law school and stayed with her after being
admitted to the bar due to his sense of propriety and Christian charity.

One’s approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral Character is not a
subjective term, but which correspondents to objective reality. Moral Character is what a person
really is, and not what he or people think of him. The standard of personal and profession
integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such
conduct as merely enabled them to escape penalties of criminal law. Good Moral Character
includes at least common honesty.

Respondent did not possess a good moral character at the time of his applied for his admission
to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and even if people knew him to have
status. It did not render him a person of good moral character. He is therefore disbarred .

IN RE ATTY. RUFILLO BUCANA

July 6, 1976

FACTS

Atty. Bucana notarized an Agreement executed by the spouses Gonzales Baltazar and Luisa
Sorongon wherein the spouses agreed that:
 In case any one of them will remarry both parties offer no objection and waive all
civil and criminal actions against them.
 Agreement was entered into for the purpose of agreement to allow each and every
one of them to remarry without objection or reservation.

The court, acting upon the letter of Mrs. Angela Baltazar, Barangay Captain of Victories,
Dumangas, Iloilo, required Atty. Bucana to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt
with for having notarized such agreement, which is contrary to law because it sanctions an illicit
and immoral purpose.

Atty. Bucana admitted that he notarized the document and that the agreement is “immoral
and against public policy” but in mitigation he asserted that:
 The document was prepared by his clerk without his previous knowledge
 When the document was presented for him for signature after it was signed by the
parties, he vehemently refused to sign it and informed the parties that the document
was immoral
 He placed the said document on his table among his files and more than a week
later, he asked his clerk where the document was for the purpose of destroying it, but
to his surprise, he found that the same was notarized by him as per his file copies in
the office
 He dispatched his clerk to get the copy from the parties but they could not be found
in their respective residences
 He must have inadvertently notarized the same in view of the numerous documents
on his table and at that time he was emotionally disturbed as his father (now
deceased) was then seriously ill.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Bucana exercised the requisite care required by law in the exercise of his
duties as a notary public when he notarized the agreement between the spouses Baltazar (NO)

REASONING
The Agreement is contrary to law, morals and good customs. Marriage is an inviolable social
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested for it is the
foundation of the family and of society without which there could be neither civilization nor
progress.

The contract, in substance, purports to formulate an agreement between the husband and the
wife to take unto himself a concubine and the wife to live in adulterous relations with another
man, without opposition from either one, and what is more, it induces each party to commit
bigamy. This is not only immoral but in effect abets the commission of a crime. A notary public,
by virtue of the nature of his office, is required to exercise his duties with due care and with due
regard to the provisions of existing law.

Panganiban vs. Borromeo: “It is for the notary to inform himself of the facts to which he intends
to certify and to take part in no illegal enterprise. The notary public is usually a person who has
been admitted to the practice of law, and as such, in the commingling of his duties notary and
lawyer, must be held responsible for both. We are led to hold that a member of the bar who
performs an act as a notary public of a disgraceful or immoral character may be held to
account by the court even to the extent of disbarment."

DISPOSITIVE: Rufillo Bucana is guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended from the office of
notary public for a period of 6 months, with the admonition that a repetition of the same or a
similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

RODRIGO E. TAPAY and J. RUSTIA, Complainants, versus ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY.
JANUS T. JARDER, Respondents.

A.C. No. 9604

March 20 20!3

Attorney; a lawyer shall not assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

FACTS:

Rodrigo Tapay and Anthony Rustia, both employees of the Sugar Regulatory Administration
received an Order from the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas requiring them to file a counter-
affidavit to a complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public document, and graft
and corrupt practices filed against them by Nehimias Divinagracia, Jr., a co-employee. The
Complaint was allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by Atty. Charlie L. Bancolo. When
Atty. Bancolo and Rustia accidentally chanced upon each other, the latter informed Atty.
Bancolo of the case filed against them. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia
since he had yet to meet Divinagracia and declared that the signature in the Complaint was
not his. Thus, Atty. Bancolo signed an affidavit denying the said signature. This affidavit was used
by Tapay and Rustia in filing a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying the signature
of Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia, denying the same, presented as evidence an affidavit by
Richard A. Cordero, the legal assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office
accepted Divinagracia’s case and that the Complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman
was signed by the office secretary per Atty. Bancolo’s instructions. The case was then dismissed.
Tapay and Rustia then later filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines a complaint to disbar
Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder, Atty. Bancolo’s law partner. The complainants alleged that not
only were respondents engaging in unprofessional and unethical practices, they were also
involved in falsification of documents used to harass and persecute innocent people. In their
Answer, respondents admitted that due to some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings be signed in his name by the secretary of the law office. After investigation, Atty. Lolita
A. Quisumbing, the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP,
submitted her Report. Atty. Quisumbing found that Atty. Bancolo violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility while Atty. Jarder violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
same Code, and recommended that Atty. Bancolo be suspended for two years from the
practice of law and Atty. Jarder be admonished for his failure to exercise certain responsibilities
in their law firm.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Bancolo is guilty of violating Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD:

YES. Atty. Bancolo admitted that the Complaint he filed for a former client before the Office of
the Ombudsman was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office. He likewise
categorically stated that because of some minor lapses, the communications and pleadings
filed against Tapay and Rustia were signed by his secretary, albeit with his tolerance. Clearly, he
violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which provides:

CANON 9 – A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED

PRACTICE OF LAW.

Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Embido vs. Pe, Jr.

Bersamin, J.

Canon 7 Rule 7.03:

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should be, whether in public or in private life, behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of
the profession.

Facts:
The Clerk of Court received a communication from the Solicitor of the United Kingdom
requesting a copy of a decision penned by Judge Penuela (Special Proceeding Case No. 084 In
the Matter of the Declaration of the Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna). Upon receiving another
request letter, Judge Penuela instructed the clerk to retrieve the records of the case. It was
discovered that the RTC had no record of Special Proceeding No. 084 with a Shirley Quiyo as
petitioner, as found in the request of the Solicitor. It showed a different case instead (In the
Matter of the Declaration of the Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria), with a one named
Serena Catin Austria as petitioner. The Solicitor sent a machine copy of the purported decision
and subsequently, it was shown that the same was a falsified court document. Investigation was
conducted by the NBI. Dy Quioyo, the brother of Shirley Quioyo stated in his affidavit that it was
respondent who facilitated the issuance of the falsified decision for a fee of Php 60,000. This was
also corroborated by Shirley’s sister. The NBI recommended to the Ombudsman that respondent
be prosecuted for falsification of public document. It also recommended before the Court
Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against respondent. Respondent
denied his participation in the falsification. To his defense, respondent argued that it was Dy
Quioyo who had the falsified document made in Recto.

The IBP found respondent guilty of serious misconduct and violations of the Attorney’s Oath and
Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension for 6 years. The case was
then brought to the Supreme Court in accordance with the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether respondent’s acts constitute sufficient grounds for his disbarment.

Held:
The Court affirmed the findings of the IBP Board of Governors and found respondent guilty of
grave misconduct for having authored a court decision in a non-existent court proceeding.
Canon 7 provides that “A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should be, whether in public or in private life, behave in scandalous
manner to the discredit of the profession.”

Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can
justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension. Respondent’s deliberate falsification of the court
decision was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. By making a
mockery of the administration of justice in this country, he became unworthy of continuing as a
member of the Bar. The practice of the legal profession is always a privilege that the Court
extends only to the deserving, and that the Court may withdraw or deny the privilege to those
who fail to observe and respect the Lawyer’s Oath and the canons of ethical conduct.
Respondent Pe was found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of Code of
Professional Responsibility. Disbarred.

A.C. No. 9401, October 22, 2013

JOCELYN DE LEON v. ATTY. TYRONE PEDRENA

Facts: Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney of Parañaque City. Jocelyn De Leon is a single
mother of two minor children. Atty. Pedreña is the counsel of Jocelyn De Leon on the case for
support for the two minor children.

Records show, as established by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, on January 30, 2006 after
asking about the status of the case Atty. Pedreña told Jocelyn De Leon then to ride with him
and he would just drop Jocelyn by the jeepney station, she refused to ride with him but Atty.
Pedreña persistently told her to get in the car, and so she acceded to his request so as not to
offend him. Inside the car Atty. Pedreña rubbed the Jocelyn’s right leg with his hand; tried to
insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his
crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private part. Jocelyn thereafter tried at all cost to
unlock the car’s door and told him categorically that she was getting off the car. Instead he
accelerated a bit more but sensing her insistence to get off, he stopped the car, and allowed
her to get off.

Jocelyn de Leon then filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña.

IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended for his disbarment, the IBP Board of Governors
however modified the penalty to three-month suspension from practice of law. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration by Atty. Pedreña which the Board denied, they increased the penalty to six
months. Thereafter transmitted records and resolution to the Court for approval.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Pedreña is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Ruling: Yes, Atty. Pedreña is guilty. The Supreme Court adopted the findings and conclusions of
the Investigating Commissioner. Yet, the Court consider the recommended penalty of
suspension for six months not commensurate with the gravity of the offensive acts committed.

Given the circumstances in which Atty. Pedreña committed them, his acts were not merely
offensive and undesirable but repulsive, disgraceful and grossly immoral. In this regard, it bears
stressing that immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency.

Therefore, the Court took into consideration judicial precedents on gross immoral conduct
bearing on sexual matters. The Court consider the acts committed by Atty. Pedreña to be not of
the same degree as the acts committed by the respondent lawyer in Calub v. Suller, among
other cases whereby the respondent lawyer was disbarred for raping his neighbor’s wife. Unlike
in Barrientos where there was deceit and in Delos Reyes where there were threats and taking
advantage of a lawyer’s position, Atty. Pedreña did not employ any scheme to satiate his lust,
but, instead, he desisted upon the first signs of the De Leon’s firm refusal to give in to his
advances.

In view of these considerations, according to the Court penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for two years is fitting and just.

EDGARDO AREOLA, vs. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA

FACTS: Edgardo D. Areola a.k.a. Muhammad Khadafy filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza, from the Public Attorney’s Office for violation of her attorney’s oath
of office, deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court, and for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Areola stated that he was filing the complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan Seronda, Aaron
Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez. He alleged that on October 23,
2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited the Antipolo City Jail and called all
detainees with pending cases before the RTC, Branch 73, Antipolo City where she was assigned,
to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty. Mendoza stated the following during
her speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang
pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal Banqui; at kayong
mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si
Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is giving improper advice to her clients in violation of Rule
1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING: The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made
irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a lawyer shall not counsel or abet
activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07
states that "a lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness."

Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our legal system.
Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or factors
according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s careless remark is uncalled for.

In spite of the foregoing, the Court deems the penalty of suspension for two months as excessive
and not commensurate to Atty. Mendoza’s infraction. Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer,
being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction, should be imposed with great caution and
only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member
of the bar is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof. The Court notes that when
Atty. Mendoza made the remark "Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon", she was not compelled by bad faith or malice. While her remark
was inappropriate and unbecoming, her comment is not disparaging and reproachful so as to
cause dishonor and disgrace to the Judiciary.

In several administrative cases, the Court has refrained from imposing the actual penalties in the
presence of mitigating factors. Factors such as the respondent’s length of service, the
respondent’s acknowledgement of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations, respondent’s advanced age,
among other things, have had varying significance in the Court’s determination of the
imposable penalty. The Court takes note of Atty. Mendoza’s lack of ill-motive in the present case
and her being a PAO lawyer as her main source of livelihood. Furthermore, the complaint filed
by Areola is clearly baseless and the only reason why this was ever given consideration was due
to Atty. Mendoza’s own admission. For these reasons, the Court deems it just to modify and
reduce the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the Court finds Atty. Maria Vilma Mendoza GUILTY of giving improper advice to her
clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
accordingly meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Navarro vs Solidum

A.C. No. 9872 – Legal Ethics – Duty of Lawyer to Account for Client’s Money Canon 16 applies
sans lawyer-client relationship

In April 2006, Hilda Presbitero engaged the services of Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. to help her in
the quieting of her title over a parcel of land. Presbitero paid Solidum P50,000.00 as acceptance
fee. In May 2006, Ma. Theresa Yulo, daughter of Presbitero also engaged the services of Solidum
for the registration of a parcel of land. Yulo however asked the help of her sister, Natividad
Navarro, to finance the case. Hence, Navarro gave Solidum Php200,000.00 for the registration
expenses. Meanwhile, Solidum in May and June 2006, obtained a total of Php2 million from
Navarro.

The loan was covered by two Memorandum of Agreement (MOAs). The MOA was
prepared by Solidum. The MOA stated that the monthly interest shall be 10%. Solidum also
borrowed Php 1 million from Presbitero during the same period. He again drafted a MOA
containing the same terms and conditions as with Navarro. As additional security for the loan,
Solidum mortgaged his 263-hectare land for P1 million in favor of Presbitero. Nothing happened
in the quieting of title case field by Presbitero since Solidum did nothing after receiving the
acceptance fee. In the land registration case of Yulo financed by Navarro, Navarro later found
out that the land was already registered to someone else. Navarro claims that she should not
have financed the case if only Solidum advised her of the status of the land. Anent the loans,
Solidum failed to pay them. Instead, he questioned the terms of the loans as he claimed that the
interest rate of said loans at 10% is unconscionable. Navarro and Presbitero later filed an
administrative case against Solidum.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ivan Solidum, Jr. should be disbarred.

HELD: Yes. Although Solidum acted in his private capacity when he obtained a total of Php3
million from Navarro and Presbitero, he may still be disciplined for misconduct committed either
in his private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court. In this case, such act displayed by Solidum merited his
disbarment. Solidum is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his
professional capacity with respect to his client, Presbitero, and in his private capacity with
respect to Navarro. Both Presbitero and Navarro allowed Splidum to draft the terms of the loan
agreements. Solidum drafted the MOAs knowing that the interest rates were exorbitant. Later,
using his knowledge of the law, he assailed the validity of the same MOAs he prepared. In the
case of Navarro, who financed the Yulo case, Solidum also violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession. This is notwithstanding the fact that
Navarro is not actually his client in the Yulo case but was only the financier of the Yulo case. In
Presbitero’s case, since Presbitero is his client, Solidum also violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not borrow money from his client
unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Even though Solidum secured the loan with a mortgage and a MOA, Presbitero’s
interest was not fully protected because the property Solidum mortgaged was overvalued. He
claimed that his 263-hectare land was worth P1 million but in fact Solidum sold it later for only
P150,000.00. Clearly, Presbitero was disadvantaged by Solidum’s ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation. He took advantage of his knowledge of the law as
well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client. Solidum was disbarred by the
Supreme Court.

NAVARRO & PRESBITERO VS. ATTY. SOLIDUM (2014)

A.C. No. 9872

FACTS: Hilda S. Presbitero and Natividad P. Navarro filed a disbarment case against Atty. Ivan M.
Solidum, Jr.
Presbitero and her other daughter, Ma. Theresa P. Yulo, engaged in the services of
Solidum for each of their own cases concerning land. Yulo, pursuant to her land registration
case, convinced Navarro to finance the expenses. Navarro paid Php200,000 for the registration
expenses, but later learned that the property was already registered in the name of one
Teodoro Yulo.
Meanwhile, Solidum obtained two loans of Php1,000,000.00 from Navarro and one loan
of Php1,000,000.00 to finance his sugar trading business, securing them with postdated checks
and drafting a MOA in each.
Solidum was able to pay complainants a total of Php900,000.00. Thereafter, he failed to
pay either the principal amount or the interest thereon. The checks issued by Solidum to the
complainants could no longer be negotiated because the accounts against which they were
drawn were already closed. When complainants called Solidum’s attention, he promised to pay
the agreed interest for September and October 2006 but asked for a reduction of the interest for
the succeeding months.

Complainants alleged that Solidum induced them to grant him loans by offering very
high interest rates. He also prepared and signed the checks which turned out to be drawn
against his son’s accounts. Complainants further alleged that respondent deceived them
regarding the identity and value of the property he mortgaged because he showed them a
different property from that which he owned. Presbitero further alleged that respondent
mortgaged his 263-square-meter property to her for Php1,000,000.00 but he later sold it for only
Php150,000.00.
The IBP-CBD found that respondent was guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing the following acts:
(1) signing drawn checks against the account of his son as if they were from his own
account;
(2) misrepresenting to Navarro the identity of the lot he mortgaged to her;
(3) misrepresenting to Presbitero the true value of the 263-square-meter lot he mortgaged to
her;
(4) conspiring with Yulo to obtain the loans from complainants;
(5) agreeing or promising to pay 10% interest on his loans although he knew that it was
exorbitant; and
 (6) failing to pay his loans because the checks he issued were dishonored as the accounts
were already closed.

ISSUE: Whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Respondent violated at least four provisions: Rule 1.01, Canon 16, Rule 16.01, and Rule
16.04 of the CPR. Solidum was disbarred from the practice of law.

Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Respondent agreed to pay a high interest rate on his loan from the complainants. He drafted
the MOA. Yet, when he could no longer pay his loan, he sought to nullify the same MOA he
drafted on the ground that the interest rate was unconscionable. It was also established that
respondent mortgaged a 263-square-meter property to Presbitero for P1,000,000.00, but he later
sold the property for only P150,000.00, showing that he deceived his client as to the real value of
the mortgaged property. Respondent’s allegation that the sale was eventually rescinded did
not distract from the fact that he did not apprise Presbitero as to the real value of the property.
Respondent failed to refute that the checks he issued to his client Presbitero and to Navarro
belonged to his son, Ivan Garcia Solidum III whose name is similar to his name. He only claimed
that complainants knew that he could no longer open a current bank account, and that they
even suggested that his wife or son issue the checks for him. However, we are inclined to agree
with the IBP-CBD’s finding that he made complainants believe that the account belonged to
him. In fact, respondent signed in the presence of Navarro the first batch of checks he issued to
Navarro. Respondent sent the second batch of checks to Navarro and the third batch of
checks to Presbitero through a messenger, and complainants believed that the checks
belonged to accounts in respondent’s name.

CANON 16. - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from
the client.
Respondent had been negligent in properly accounting for the money he received from his
client, Presbitero. Indeed, his failure to return the excess money in his possession gives rise to the
presumption that he has misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation
of the trust reposed in him by, the client.

Rule 16.04. - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses
in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
While respondent’s loan from Presbitero was secured by a MOA, postdated checks and real
estate mortgage, it turned out that respondent misrepresented the value of the property he
mortgaged and that the checks he issued were not drawn from his account but from that of his
son. Respondent eventually questioned the terms of the MOA that he himself prepared on the
ground that the interest rate imposed on his loan was unconscionable. Finally, the checks issued
by respondent to Presbitero were dishonored because the accounts were already closed. The
interest of his client, Presbitero, as lender in this case, was not fully protected. Respondent
violated Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which presumes that the client is
disadvantaged by the lawyer’s ability to use all the legal maneuverings to renege on his
obligation.6 In his dealings with his client Presbitero, respondent took advantage of his
knowledge of the law as well as the trust and confidence reposed in him by his client.

Respondent failed to live up to the high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing
required of him as a member of the legal profession. Instead, respondent employed his
knowledge and skill of the law and took advantage of his client to secure undue gains for
himself that warrants his removal from the practice of law.

Is conduct under Rule 1.01 confined to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties? No. A
lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.

TITLE: FIGUEROA V. BARRANCO JR.

(S.B.C. 519, July 31, 1997)

TOPIC: Grounds for gross immorality warranting permanent exclusion from the legal profession.

DOCTRINE:

The Supreme Court ruled that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
permanent exclusion of herein respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital
sexual relations with the complainant and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral character
on his part but the same does not constitute gross immoral conduct. To justify suspension or
disbarment, the act complained of must not only be immoral but grossly immoral. Additionally,
even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has
been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor. Henceforth, the
Court hereby dismissed the instant petition and herein respondent should be allowed to take his
lawyer’s oath.

---------------------------------------------------------------

Nature of Case:
Administrative complaint.

Brief:
This is an administrative complaint filed by Patricia Figueroa way back in 1971, against
respondent Simeon Barranco Jr., a successful bar candidate in the 1970 Bar examination,
praying thereto that herein respondent be denied admission to the legal profession. In her
petition, complainant averred that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out
of wedlock was born to them and that respondent failed to fulfill his promise to marry her after
he passes the bar examinations. Hence, complainant charged him of gross immorality.

Facts:

Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco were town-mates and teen sweethearts. Their intimacy
yielded to a child Simeon. Subsequently, Simeon first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and Simeon allegedly made
more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage.

Patricia learned that Simeon married another woman. Meanwhile, Simeon successfully passed
the 1970 bar examinations. But before he could
take his oath, Patricia filed a petition to disqualify Simeon to take the Lawyer’s Oath on the
ground of gross immoral conduct.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the act of Simeon in engaging in premarital relations with Patricia and making
promises to marry her constitute gross immoral conduct?

Rationale/Held:

The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute gross immoral conduct warranting a permanent
exclusion of Simeon from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the
same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension
or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral.

A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is wilful, flagrant, or
shameless act, which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.

We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a sacred
and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

Supreme Court Ruling:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.

Ui v. Bonifacio
A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000
Petitioner: Leslie Ui
Respondent: Atty. Iris Bonifacio
Facts of the case:

Leslie Ui filed an administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio on grounds of
immoral conduct. Atty. Bonifacio allegedly is having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband
of Leslie Ui, whom they begot two children. According to petitioner, Carlos Ui admitted to him
about the relationship between them and Atty. Bonifacio. This led Leslie Ui to confront said
respondent to stop their illicit affair but of to no avail. According however to respondent, she is a
victim in the situation. When respondent met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a
bachelor but with children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in
Amoy, China. M oreover, the two got married in Hawaii, USA therefore legalizing their
relationship. When respondent knew of the real status of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship.
Respondent further claims that she and Carlos Ui never lived together as the latter lived with his
children to allow them to gradually accept the situation. Respondent however presented a
misrepresented copy of her marriage contract.

Issue:

Did the respondent conduct herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred
from the practice of law?

Held:

NO. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the
practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can
be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the
dictates of legal ethics. If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then
the continued possession of good moral character is also requisite for retaining membership in
the legal profession.

Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral
character. A lawyer may be disbarred for “grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude”. A member of the bar should have moral
integrity in addition to professional probity.

Circumstances existed which should have aroused respondent’s suspicion that something was
amiss in her relationship with Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. Respondent was
imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with
Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be
considered as an immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the
moral norms of society and to opinion of good and respectable member of the community.
Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be grossly immoral,
that is it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.
A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating
the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil
status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession.