UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019

CRIMINAL LAW Volvik as charges d’affaires is diplomatic, he is vested

with blanket diplomatic immunity from criminal suit
(Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003).
BOOK I
Is the crime of technical malversation, punished
FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
under the RPC, mala in se?
What are the basic maxims in criminal law?
The crime of technical malversation, punished under
Article 220 of the RPC, was held to be a crime that is
1. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (There is
malum prohibitum. The law punishes the act of diverting
no crime when there is no law punishing the
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a
same) – No matter how wrongful, evil or bad the
particular public purpose for another public purpose. The
act is, if there is no law defining the act, the same
prohibited act is not inherently immoral, but becomes a
is not considered a crime.
criminal offense because positive law forbids its
commission on considerations of public policy, order, and
2. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (The act
convenience. Therefore, good faith and lack of criminal
cannot be criminal where the mind is not
intent are not valid defenses (Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No.
criminal) – This is true to a felony characterized
192330, November 14, 2012).
by dolo, but not to a felony resulting from culpa.
Is the crime of plunder mala prohibita or mala in se?
3. Doctrine of Pro Reo – Whenever a penal law is
to be construed or applied and the law admits of
It is mala in se, although punishable under special law,
two interpretations, one lenient to the offender
because it is inherently evil, being included among the
and one strict to the offender, that interpretation
heinous crimes punishable with reclusion perpetua to
which is lenient or favorable to the offender will
death and its constitutive crimes are mala in se, such as
be adopted.
malversation of public funds, bribery and monopolies
and combinations (Joseph Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
4. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus (An
No. 148560, Nov. 2, 2001).
act done by me against my will is not my act)
– Whenever a person is under a compulsion of
The Philippine consul asked his secretary to work
irresistible force or uncontrollable fear to do an
overtime because they were finishing some
act against his will, in which that act produces a
important repatriation papers in the embassy. The
crime or offense, such person is exempted in any
said consul asked his secretary to give him a cup of
criminal liability arising from said act.
coffee. The consul asked the secretary to join him.
When the said secretary went to the restroom, the
What is the interplay between the doctrine of Pro Reo
said consul placed something in the coffee of the
and Article 48 (Penalty for complex crimes) of the
secretary. The secretary felt dizzy and lost
RPC? (BAR 2010)
consciousness. The consul then raped her inside his
own office. The said secretary wants to file a case
Following the Doctrine of Pro Reo, crimes under Art. 48 of
against the consul. Where shall the secretary file the
the RPC are complexed and punished with a single
case? Is the said consul liable under Philippine laws?
penalty (that prescribed for the most serious crime and
to be imposed in its maximum period). The rationale
The secretary shall file the case in the Philippines.
being, that the accused who commits two crimes with a
Although the crime committed, which is rape, is not in
single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity
any way connected with the performance of his official
than when the crimes are committed by different acts and
function, since it was committed inside the Philippine
several criminal resolutions (People v. Comadre, G.R. No.
embassy, Philippine laws will apply. The Philippine
153559, June 8, 2004).
embassy is considered as an extension of the Philippine
sovereignty. So even if the crimes committed is not in any
Charges d’affaires Volvik of Latvia suffers from a
way connected with the performance of their functions,
psychotic disorder after he was almost assassinated
but the crime is committed inside the Philippine embassy,
in his previous assignment. One day, while shopping
Philippine laws will still apply.
in a mall, he saw a group of shoppers whom he
thought were the assassins who were out to kill him.
Q: On November 18, 2008, a team consisting of Police
He asked for the gun of his escort and shot ten (10)
Officers, responded to a telephone call received by
people and wounded five (5) others before he was
their desk officer-on-duty that there was a man firing
subdued. The wounded persons required more than
a gun at the back of the PLDT Building in Pantal
thirty (30) days of medical treatment. What crime or
District, Dagupan City. Upon arrival thereat, the
crimes, if any, did he commit? (BAR 2016)
police officers saw two (2) men walking, later
identified as Peralta and his companion, Larry
Volvik committed five frustrated murders for the
Calimlim, holding a gun and a knife respectively.
unwounded victims and five frustrated murders for the
Peralta vigorously denied having a firearm with him,
wounded victims. Treachery is present since the sudden
much less illegally discharging the same. Also that
attack rendered the victims defenseless. The nature of the
there was no reason for the police officers to arrest
weapon used in attacking the victims and extent of the
him without a warrant and consequently conduct a
wounds sustained by the five victims showed intent to
search incidental thereto. Is Peralta guilty of illegal
kill. His psychotic condition is not an exempting
possession of firearms and ammunitions under RA
circumstance of insanity in the absence of showing that
8294?
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
accordance with the cognition test. However, he is
immune from criminal prosecution. Since the position of

1
 CRIMINAL LAW
A: Peralta is guilty of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under RA 8294. It is well to emphasize that
the offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum punished by special law and, in order that
one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is
sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to
possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the
same, even if such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent. (Joselito Peralta Y Zareno V.
People, Gr 221991, August 30, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe
case)
Q: Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, Rodolfo, and
Rex uniformly alleged that they heard either from a
radio advertisement or a friend about an
employment opportunity in East Timor linked to
Racho. On separate dates, they went to meet with
Racho . They were then asked to provide documents,
fill out bio-data forms, and pay placement fees, which
they did. They then left the Philippines on different
dates and stayed in East Timor while waiting for their
working visas. However, two to three months passed
and yet no working visas were issued despite Racho's
promises. Thus, they went back to the Philippines,
and after failing to find Racho, filed their complaints.
Can Racho be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa?
A: Racho can be convicted for both illegal recruitment
and estafa. The same pieces of evidence that establish
liability for illegal recruitment in large scale confirm
culpability for Estafa. It is well-established in
jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The
reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the
first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative.
(People v. Erlinda Racho y Somera, GR 227505, October 2,
2017, Perlas-Bernabe case)
Three cardinal features or main characteristics of
Philippine criminal law (BAR 1998)
1. Generality
GR: Penal laws and those of public security and safety
shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of
international law and to treaty stipulations. (Article 14,
Civil Code of the Philippines) (BAR 2015)
XPNs:
a. Treaty stipulations and international
agreements, e.g. RP-US Visiting Forces Accord.
b. Laws of Preferential Application, e.g. RA 75
penalizes acts which would impair the proper
observance by the Republic and its inhabitants of
the immunities, rights, and privileges of duly-
accredited foreign diplomatic representatives in
the Philippines. (BAR 2014)
c. The principles of public international law.
d. Members of the Congress are not liable for libel
or slander in connection with any speech
delivered on the floor of the house during a
regular or special session (1987 Constitution, Art.
IV, Sec. 11).
2. Territoriality
2
GR: The penal laws of the country have force and
effect only within its territory. (BAR 1994)
Q: The prosecution alleged that in the evening of
August 14, 2012, Christopher Calderon was about to
go inside the public market in Marilao, Bulacan when
a passenger arrived and wanted to ride his tricycle,
made up of a Racal motorcycle with plate number
7539IJ and a sidecar. Casanas volunteered to drive
Calderon's tricycle for the passenger, to which
Calderon obliged. However, Casanas no longer
returned the tricycle, prompting Calderon to report
the incident to police authorities. A few days later, the
Valenzuela Police Station received a report that a
suspected stolen motorcycle was being sold in
Karuhatan, Valenzuela City. When PO2 Arañas and
PO1 De Leon responded to the report, they saw
Casanas standing beside what turned out to be the
subject motorcycle. The police officers asked for
proof of ownership of the motorcycle, but Casanas
could not provide any. PO1 De Leon then frisked
Casanas and found a knife in the latter's possession.
Thereafter, they brought Casanas, the subject
motorcycle, and the knife to the police station. The
police officers discovered that the subject motorcycle
was registered under Calderon's name. Whether or
not the RTC¬-Valenzuela had jurisdiction over the
case.
A: The RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. In criminal
cases, venue is jurisdictional in that a court cannot
exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an
offense committed outside its limited territory. In this
relation, Sections 10 and 15 (a), Rule 110 of the 2000
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, also state that the
venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases shall be placed
either where the offense was committed or where any of
its essential ingredients took place.
In this case, the Information alleges that Casanas
committed the crime of Carnapping within the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTC-Valenzuela. However, such
allegation in the Information was belied by the evidence
presented by the prosecution, particularly, Calderon's
own statements in the Sinumpaang Salaysay that the
crime of Carnapping, including all the elements thereof,
did not occur in Valenzuela City, but in Marilao, Bulacan.
While the Court noted that Casanas was indeed arrested
in Valenzuela City while in the possession of the subject
motorcycle, the same is of no moment, not only because
such is not an element of the crime, but more importantly,
at that point in time, the crime had long been
consummated. (Joshua Casanas Y Cabantac Vs. People, G.R.
No. 223833, December 11, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
3. Prospectivity/Irretrospectivity
GR: Acts or omissions classified as crimes will be
scrutinized in accordance with the relevant penal
laws if these are committed after the effectivity of
those penal laws.
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
NOTE: Lex Prospicit, Non Respicit means the law
looks forward, never backward.
XPN: Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same (RPC, Art. 22).
XPNs to the XPN: The new law cannot be given
retroactive effect even if favorable to the accused:
a. When the new law is expressly made
inapplicable to pending actions or existing
causes of actions (Tavera v. Valdez, G.R. No. 922,
November 8, 1902).
b. When the offender is a habitual delinquent as
defined in Rule 5 in Art. 62 of RPC (RPC, Art. 22).
Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another marriage
with Connie in Singapore. Thereafter, Abe and Connie
returned to the Philippines and lived as husband and
wife in the hometown of Abe in Calamba, Laguna.
What crime if any can Abe be prosecuted? (BAR 1994)
A: Abe, together with Connie, may be prosecuted for
concubinage under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code for
having cohabited as husband and wife.
NOTE: Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy since the
bigamous marriage was contracted or solemnized in
Singapore, hence, such violation is not one of those where
the Revised Penal Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be
applied extraterritorially. The general rule on
territoriality of criminal law governs the situation.
Q: The Philippine consul asked his secretary to work
overtime because they were finishing some
important repatriation papers in the embassy. The
said consul asked his secretary to give him a cup of
coffee. The consul asked the secretary to join him.
When the said secretary went to the restroom, the
said consul placed something in the coffee of the
secretary. The secretary felt dizzy and lost
consciousness. The consul then raped her inside his
own office. The said secretary wants to file a case
against the consul. Where shall the secretary file the
case? Is the said consul liable under Philippine laws?
A: The secretary shall file the case in the Philippines.
Although the crime committed, which is rape, is not in
any way connected with the performance of his official
function, since it was committed inside the Philippine
embassy, Philippine laws will apply. The Philippine
embassy is considered as an extension of the Philippine
sovereignty. So even if the crimes committed is not in any
way connected with the performance of their functions,
but the crime is committed inside the Philippine embassy,
Philippine laws will still apply.
THREE SITUATIONS WHEREIN A PERSON BECOMES
CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR THE RESULTING FELONY
ALTHOUGH DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH HE
INTENDED
3
What are the causes which may produce a result
different from that which the offender intended?
1. Mistake in identity (error in personae) – The
offender intends the injury on one person but the harm
fell on another. In this situation the intended victim was
not at the scene of the crime.
Example: A, wanting to kill B, killed C instead. (BAR
2003, 2015)
NOTE: There are only two persons involved: the
actual but unintended victim, and the offender.
2. Mistake in blow (aberratio ictus) – A person directed
the blow at an intended victim, but because of poor aim,
that blow landed on somebody else. In aberratio ictus, the
intended victim and the actual victim are both at the
scene of the crime.
Example: A, shot at B, but because of lack of precision,
hit C instead. (BAR 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2015)
NOTE: There are three persons involved: the
offender, the intended victim, and the actual victim.
3. Injurious consequences are greater than that
intended (praeter intentionem) – The injury is on the
intended victim but the resulting consequence is so grave
a wrong than what was intended. It is essential that there
is a notable disparity between the means employed or the
act of the offender and the felony which resulted.
This means that the resulting felony cannot be foreseen
from the acts of the offender. (A, without intent to kill,
struck the victim on the back, causing the victim to fall
down and hit his head on the pavement.)
NOTE: Praeter intentionem is a mitigating
circumstance particularly covered by paragraph 3 of
Art. 13.
The three enumerated situations are always the result of
an intentional felony or dolo. These situations do not
arise out of criminal negligence.
Buenamer committed robbery inside a passenger FX
by threatening to shoot the passengers if they do not
give their wallets and cellphones. Bunamer was
successful in taking the things of the passengers. One
of the passengers, Tan, chased Buenamer who
boarded a passenger jeepney in order to escape.
Buenamer boxed Tan when he held on the handle bar
of the jeepney causing him to lose his grip and fall
from the jeepney and thereafter was ran over by the
rear tire of said jeepney and died.
Buenamer contends that he should be given the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong. Is Buenamer entitled for the
mitigating circumstance?
No. This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the
intention of the offender at the particular moment when
the offender executes or commits the criminal act. This
mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a
notable disparity between the means employed by the
accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime
committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon
 CRIMINAL LAW
used, the mode of attack employed, and the injury
sustained by the victim. (People v. Buenamer, G.R. No.
206227, August 31, 2016)
What is proximate cause?
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred
(People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011).
As a rule, the offender is criminally liable for all the
consequences of his felonious act, although not intended,
if the felonious act is the proximate cause of the felony.
What are the requisites of proximate cause?
1. The direct, natural, and logical cause;
2. Produces the injury or damage;
3. Unbroken by any efficient intervening cause; and
4. Without which the result would not have occurred.
Luis Cruz was deeply hurt when his offer of love was
rejected by his girlfriend Marivella one afternoon
when he visited her. When he left her house, he
walked as if he was sleepwalking so much so that a
teenage snatcher was able to grab his cell phone and
flee without being chased by Luis. He went to the LRT
station, he boarded one of the coaches bound for
Baclaran. While seated, he happened to read a
newspaper left on the seat and noticed that the
headlines were about the sinking of the Super Ferry
while on its way to Cebu. He went over the list of
missing passengers who were presumed dead and
came across the name of his grandfather who had
raised him from childhood after he was orphaned. He
was shocked and his mind went blank for a few
minutes, after which he ran amuck and, using his
balisong, started stabbing at the passengers who then
scampered away, with three of them jumping out of
the train and landing on the road below. All the three
passengers died later of their injuries at the hospital.
Is Luis liable for the death of the three passengers
who jumped out of the moving train? State your
reasons.
Yes, Luis is liable for their deaths because he was
committing a felony when he started stabbing at the
passengers and such wrongful act was the proximate
cause of said passengers' jumping out of the train; hence
their deaths. Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
any person committing a felony shall incur criminal
liability although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended. In this case, the death of the three
passengers was the direct, natural and logical
consequence of Luis' felonious act which created an
immediate sense of danger in the minds of said
passengers who tried to avoid or escape from it by
jumping out of the train (People v. Arpa, 27 SCRA 1O37;
U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 497).
Q: DIONESIO, SR. was driving his motorcycle with his
2 minor children. He was ascending on the curving
part of the road on their proper lane when on the
opposite direction of the same lane, a Land Cruiser
was descending. DIONESIO, SR. blew the horn of his
motorcycle to signal the ROGELIO, driver of the Land
Cruiser, to return to its proper lane, but the latter
failed to do so. To avoid collision, DIONESIO, SR.
4
swerved to the other side of the road, but the Land
Cruiser also suddenly swerved towards the direction
and collided with the motorcycle. As a result,
DIONESIO, SR. was pinned beneath the Land Cruiser
while the two children were thrown over the hood of
the Land Cruiser. DIONESIO, SR. and his children
were brought to a hospital where DIONESIO, SR. died
and the two children remained in the hospital for
more than one month. Is ROGELIO guilty of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property?
A: ROGELIO’s act of driving very fast on the wrong side of
the road while approaching the curve was the proximate
cause of the collision resulting to the death of DIONESIO,
SR. and serious physical injuries of the two children.
Notably, the incident occurred in a road with a curve
sloping upwards. The very fact of speeding under the
circumstances of the case indicates an imprudent
behavior. (Rogelio J. Gonzaga vs. People, G.R. No. 195671,
January 21, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
What is an impossible crime? Can there be an
impossible crime of adultery? (BAR 2015)
An impossible crime is an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means (Art. 4
par. 2).
There is no impossible crime of adultery since this is a
crime against chastity, and not against person or
property, as required by Art. 4 par. 2 of the RPC.
Charlie hated his classmate, Brad, because the latter
was assiduously courting Lily, Charlie’s girlfriend.
Charlie went to a veterinarian and asked for some
poison on the pretext that it would be used to kill a
very sick, old dog. Actually, Charlie intended to use
the poison on Brad. The veterinarian mistakenly
gave Charlie a non-toxic powder which, when mixed
with Brad’s food, did not kill Brad. Did Charlie
commit any crime? If so, what and why? If not, why
not? (BAR 2009)
Charlie committed an impossible crime of murder. His act
of mixing the non-toxic powder with Brad‟s food, done
with intent to kill, would have constituted murder which
is a crime against persons, had it not been for the
employment of a means which, unknown to him, is
ineffectual (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC).
Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by Enrique, the
tricycle driver paid by her parents to bring and fetch
her to and from school. Enrique wrote a ransom note
demanding P500, 000.00 from Carla's parents in
exchange for Carla's freedom. Enrique sent the
ransom note by mail. However, before the ransom
note was received by Carla's parents, Enrique's
hideout was discovered by the police. Carla was
rescued while Enrique was arrested and
incarcerated. Considering that the ransom note was
not received by Carla's parents, the investigating
prosecutor merely filed a case of "Impossible Crime
to Commit Kidnapping" against Enrique. Is the
prosecutor correct? If he is not correct, can he instead
file a case of grave coercion? (BAR 2014)
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
The crime committed by Enrique is kidnapping for
ransom. Even before the ransom note was received, the
crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had
already been committed. The act cannot be considered an
impossible crime because there was no inherent
improbability of its accomplishment or the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means. The delivery of the
ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not
extinguish the offense, which had already been
consummated when Enrique deprived Carla of her
liberty. The sending of the ransom note would have had
the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under
the last paragraph of Art. 267 (People v. Tan, G.R. No.
95322, March 1, 1993).
Furthermore, kidnapping is a crime against liberty. In an
impossible crime, it is important that the accused
committed an act that would have been a crime against
person or property.
The prosecutor cannot file a case of grave coercion
instead. As discussed above, the crime committed by
Enrique is kidnapping for ransom.
STAGES OF EXECUTION
Q: Jefferson was simply fetching water when Kevin
suddenly hit him on the nape of his neck. Jefferson
complained about this to his landlady, Kevin’s sister,
but the latter simply told him to forgive his brother.
Two hours later, when he resumed fetching water,
Kevin suddenly stabbed Jefferson on the left part of
his face and chest. He was found bleeding by his son-
in-law and was rushed to the hospital. According to
the medical report submitted, the chest wound he
sustained was fatal and could have caused Jefferson’s
death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
What crime is committed by Kevin?
A: Kevin is liable for frustrated homicide. The essential
element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent
of the offender to kill the victim immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to
kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only
through external manifestations.
In this case, Kevin wielded and used a knife in assaulting
Jefferson. There is also no doubt that the wound on
Jefferson’s chest would have been sufficient to result to
his death if it were not for the timely medical intervention
(De Guzman, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 178512, November 26,
2014).
COMPLEX CRIMES AND COMPOSITE CRIMES
Mayor Tawan-Tawan, together with his security
escorts, went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on
board a yellow pick-up service vehicle. At around
3:00 p.m. of the same day, Nelmida, together with his
other co-accused, surreptitiously waited for the
vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-Tawan. The
moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle passed by
the aforesaid waiting shed, Nelmida and their co-
accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle
using high-powered firearms killing two security
escorts while injuring others. Nelmida and his co-
accused were charged with double murder with
multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
5
murder. Are Nelmida and his other co-accused guilty
of the said complex crime?
No. The killing and wounding of the victims were not the
result of a single discharge of firearms by Nelmida and his
co-accused. To note, Nelmida and his co-accused opened
fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor
Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security
escorts died while five (5) of them were wounded and
injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in
different parts of their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be
gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims.
Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of
the victims. As held in People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611
(1999), each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of
their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment
at different persons constitute distinct and individual
acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime (People v.
Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500 September 11, 2012).
Q: A group of navy personnel went to a canteen to
have some drinks. At around 10:00 in the evening,
they transferred to a videoke bar, “Aquarius”, where
they continued their drinking session. Shortly
thereafter, a heated argument ensued between
Bacosa and Punzalan. To avoid further trouble, the
other navy personnel tried to pacify the two and
decided to leave “Aquarius” and return to their camp.
Soon after the navy personnel passed the sentry gate,
a maroon Nissan van was rushing and zigzagging the
road towards the group of navy personnel. Punzalan
was recognized as the driver. The van sped away
towards the camp and suddenly swerved to the right
hitting the group of the walking navy personnel. Two
of the navy personnel were dead while the others
sustained serious injuries in their body. What is the
criminal liability of Punzalan?
A: Punzalan is guilty of the complex crime of murder with
attempted murder. When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in
its maximum period. Punzalan was animated by a single
purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a
single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the
right side of the road and ramming through the navy
personnel. The crimes of murder and attempted murder
are both grave felonies as the law attaches an afflictive
penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to
death) for murder while attempted murder is punished
by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty (People v.
Punzalan, G.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012).
Q: Hinlo, Senido, and three others were drinking.
Senido informed the others of the plan to rob the
house of spouses Freddie and Judy Clavel. The
following day, they entered the house of the Spouses
and took certain personal properties. Meanwhile,
Freddie Clavel woke up to go to the bathroom which
was outside the bedroom. Senido who was outside
the bedroom assaulted Freddie. Hinlo approached
the two and stabbed Freddie in the abdomen with
knife which caused the latter’s death. All the accused
left and left behind part of they took in a railroad
behind the property. Are the accused guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide?
A: Yes. They are guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide penalized under Article 294(1).
The elements for the crime of robbery with homicide are:
 CRIMINAL LAW
(a) taking of personal property with the use of violence
or intimidation; (b) the property belongs to another; (c)
the taking is with intent to gain; and (4) by reason or on
occasion of the robbery, homicide was committed. The
intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but
the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery.
In the case at bar, the accused were all armed with knives
when they broke into the house of Spouses Clavel, took
certain personal properties, and, in the course thereof,
stabbed Freddie, resulting to his death. Considering that
conspiracy was established, when a homicide takes place
by reason or on occasion of the robbery, all those who
took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there
was endeavor to prevent the killing. (People vs. Jay Hinlo
“Inday Kabang” Et Al., G.R. No. 212151, February 18, 2015,
J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME
VIS-À-VIS COMPLEX CRIME
SPECIAL COMPLEX COMPLEX CRIME
CRIME
It is the law which The law merely states
specifies for the crimes two or more grave or less
that should be combined. grave felonies or an
offense is necessary to
commit the other.
The law provides for a The penalty to be
single penalty. imposed will be the most
serious crime in its
maximum period.
A light felony committed A light felony committed
in the commission of the would constitute a him. The malefactors then took the bag containing
crime is absorbed. separate and distinct
charge.
CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL
Two kinds of conspiracy
1. Conspiracy as a crime – The mere conspiracy is the
crime itself. This is only true when the law expressly
punishes the mere conspiracy, otherwise, the
conspiracy does not bring about the commission of
the crime because conspiracy is not an overt act but
a mere preparatory act.
Examples: Conspiracy to commit treason,
conspiracy to commit rebellion, conspiracy to
commit acts like sale, importation and distribution of
drugs, conspiracy to commit access devise fraud,
conspiracy to commit terrorism
2. Conspiracy as a basis of incurring criminal
liability – When the conspiracy is only a basis of
incurring criminal liability, there must be an overt act
done before the co-conspirators become criminally
liable. (BAR 1996, 1997, 1998, 2003, 2005)
GR: As long as he appeared in the scene of the crime,
he is liable as a co-conspirator.
XPNs:
1. If he is a mastermind, he does not have to be
in the scene of the crime to be co-
conspirator.
6
2. If he performs an overt act in the
performance of the conspiracy, even if it is
not in the scene of the crime per se like the
driver of a get-away car who planned the
crime as well, or the man who pressed the
button of a remote control bomb and the
bomb exploded a few streets away.
Differentiate wheel conspiracy and chain conspiracy
(BAR 2016)
A “wheel conspiracy” occurs when there is a single
person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two
or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke
typically interacts with the hub rather than with another
spoke. In the even that the spoke shares a common
purpose to succeed, there is a single conspiracy.
However, in the instances when each spoke is
unconcerned with the success of the other spokes, there
are multiple conspiracies.
A “chain conspiracy”, on the other hand, exists when
there is successive communication and cooperation in
much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965, February 26,
2002).
Q: Sy, together with his security guards, was on his
way to collect cash deposits from his clients when a
car overtook his car. The car’s occupants then fired at
him and his companions. Another car chased and
sideswiped his car, with its passengers also firing at
the cash and immediately fled. The malefactors were
charged with robbery with homicide and the court
ruled that conspiracy exist even without direct proof
to that effect. Was there a conspiracy?
A: Yes. Direct proof is not essential to establish
conspiracy as it may be inferred from the collective acts
of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime. It can be presumed from and proven by acts of
the accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint
purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests. in this case, the events surrounding the
commission of the crime would readily establish
conspiracy among the accused-appellants in committing
robbery with homicide. (People vs. Lamsen, G.R. No.
198338, February 20, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: One night, after escorting his guests outside the
house, Allen noticed that garbage was placed in front
of his house. Allen, addressing nobody in particular,
complained of the garbage. Jeff and Kevin, thinking
that Allen was addressing his complaint to them,
were angered and started throwing stones at him.
Allen rushed inside his house to wash his bloody face
and to arm himself with a piece of wood. However,
before he was able to retaliate, he was hit by a shovel
by Joriemon. Joseph and Jose held Allen, rendering
him helpless, while Jeff and Kevin stabbed him in the
abdomen with a knife. Allen lost consciousness and
was confined in the hospital for nine days. Assuming
that that they were convicted for frustrated murder,
what is the extent of the criminal liability of Jeff,
Kevin, Joriemon, Jose and Joseph?
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
A: They are liable as co-conspirators. Conspiracy
presupposes unity of purpose and unity of action towards
the realization of an unlawful objective among the
accused. Its existence can be inferred from the individual
acts of the accused which, if taken as a whole, are in fact
related and indicative of a concurrence of sentiment. The
chain of events leading to the commission of the crime
adequately established a conspiracy among them. Jeff and
Kevin delivered the initial attack on Allen by stoning him.
Afterwards, Joriemon struck him with a shovel, and,
finally, Joseph and Jose held him so that the others can
stab Allen (Ibañez et al. v. People, G.R. No. 190798, January
27, 2016).
Q: A Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and an
ambulance driven by Morilla were caught by the
police in a checkpoint with a sack of shabu inside the
two vehicles. The Starex van which was ahead of the
ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by
the police officers. However, the ambulance driven
by Morilla was stopped by police officers and further
examination revealed the sacks inside the van
contained shabu. Morilla told the police officers that
he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade
them to let him pass. This discovery prompted the
operatives to chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra in
which sacks containing shabu was also discovered. Is
there conspiracy established between Morilla and
Mayor Mitra?
A: Yes, there is conspiracy. In conspiracy, it need not be
shown that the parties actually came together and agreed
in express terms to enter into and pursue a common v of
the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they
are parts of some complete whole. In this case, the totality
of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that
Morilla conspired with Mayor Mitra in a common desire
to transport the dangerous drugs (People v. Morilla,
G.R.No.189833, February 5, 2014).
How is conspiracy proven?
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven
as the crime itself. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of
the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the
same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense. It is not
necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the
details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an
illegal objective is to be carried out. The rule is that
conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in
concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the common
design to kill the victim. (People v. Villalba, G.R. No.
207629, October 22, 2014).
Legal effects of implied conspiracy (BAR 1998, 2003)
1. Not all those who are present at the scene will be
considered as conspirators;
2. Only those who participated by criminal acts in the
commission of the crime will be considered as co-
conspirators; and
3. Mere acquiescence to or approval of the commission
of the crime, without any act of criminal
participation, shall not render one criminally liable
as co-conspirator.
7
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Pedro is married to Tessie. Juan is the first cousin of
Tessie, while in the market, Pedro saw a man
stabbing Juan. Seeing the attack on Juan, Pedro
picked up a spade nearby and hit the attacker on his
head which caused the latter’s death. Can Pedro be
absolved of the killing on the ground that it is in
defense of a relative? Explain. (BAR 2016)
No. The relatives of the accused for purpose of defense of
relative under Art. 11(2) of the RPC are his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or
adopted brothers or sister, or of his relatives by affinity
in the same degrees, and those by consanguinity within
the fourth civil degree. Relative by affinity within the
same degree includes the ascendant, descendant, brother
or sister of the spouse of the accused. In this case, Juan is
not the ascendant, descendant, brother or sister of Tessie,
the spouse of Pedro. Relative by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree includes first cousin. But in this case,
Juan is the cousin of Pedro by affinity but not by
consanguinity. Juan, therefore, is not a relative of Pedro
for purpose of applying the provision on defense of
relative.
May the justifying circumstance of self-defense be
invoked at the same time with the exempting
circumstance of accident?
No. Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting
circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to
kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to
defend oneself from imminent danger (Pomoy v. People,
G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004).
In Toledo vs. People, the Supreme Court held that, there is
no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of
criminal law. Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate
and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel
an unlawful aggression of another with the use of
reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He
is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. The
defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and
irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the
law. From necessity, and limited by it, proceeds the right
of self-defense. The right begins when necessity does, and
ends where it ends (Toledo v. People, 439 SCRA 94, G.R. No.
158057 September 24, 2004).
Dion and Talia were spouses. Dion always came home
drunk since he lost his job a couple of months ago.
Talia had gotten used to the verbal abuse from Dion.
One night, in addition to the usual verbal abuse, Dion
beat up Talia. The next morning, Dion saw the injury
that he had inflicted upon Talia and promised her
that he would stop drinking and never beat her again.
However, Dion did not make good on his promise.
Just after one week, he started drinking again. Talia
once more endured the usual verbal abuse. Afraid
that he might beat her up again, Talia stabbed Dion
with a kitchen knife while he was passed out from
imbibing too much alcohol. Talia was charged with
the crime of parricide. (BAR 2015)
 CRIMINAL LAW
a. May Talia invoke the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome to free herself from criminal liability?
Explain.
No, a single act of battery or physical harm committed by
Dion against Talia resulting to the physical and
psychological or emotional distress on her part is not
sufficient to avail of the benefit of the justifying
circumstance of “Battered Woman Syndrome”. The
defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if
the woman with a marital relationship with the victim is
subjected to cumulative abuse or battery involving the
infliction of physical harm resulting to physical and
psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition. In sum, there must be
“at least two battering episodes” between the accused
and her intimate partner and such final episode produced
in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an
imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life
(People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
b. Will your answer be the same, assuming that
Talia killed Dion after being beaten up a second
time? Explain.
No. Talia can now invoke the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome to free herself from criminal liability for killing
her husband since she suffered physical and emotional
distress arising from cumulative abuse or battery. Under
Section 26 of R.A.9262, victim survivors of Battered
Woman Syndrome do not incur any criminal or civil
liability despite the absence of the requisites of self-
defense.
Rogelio Delos Reyes—along with Roderick Licayan
and Roberto Lara—were charged with the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom. In his defense, Delos Reyes
argued that he was merely passing by at the crime
scene when one of the co-accused pointed a gun at
him and forced him to guard the victims, hence he is
entitled to the exempting circumstance of
compulsion due to irresistible force. Is the exempting
circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force
present?
No. A person invoking the exempting circumstance of
compulsion due to irresistible force admits in effect the
commission of a punishable act, and must therefore
prove the exempting circumstance by clear and
convincing evidence. Specifically: He must show that the
irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that
acted not only without will but also against his will. The
compulsion must be of such character as to leave the
accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending; and it must be of such a nature
as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act is not done. It is hard to
believe that a person who accidentally discovers kidnap
victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to
guard said victims (People v. Licayan, et al., G.R. No.
203961, July 29, 2015).
May disregard of age and sex be appreciated in
Robbery with Homicide which is a crime against
property?
No. With respect to disregard of age and sex, the same
may be appreciated only in crimes against persons or
8
honor. It is not correct to consider this aggravating
circumstance in crimes against property. Besides,
robbery with homicide is principally a crime against
property and not against persons. Homicide is a mere
incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose
and object of the criminal (People v. Hernandez, G.R. No.
139697, June 15, 2004).
Q: X, while descending from a curved path, collided
with a motorcycle, thereby killing Y, one of its
passengers, and causing serious physical injuries to
the two other victims. The body of Y was loaded into
the vehicle of X but the latter’s engine would not
start; thus, the body was loaded in a different vehicle.
The jack of X was used to extricate the body of Y from
being pinned under the vehicle of X. X, in his defense,
claimed that it was not his fault that the tricycle
swerved in his direction. X was charged with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Homicide with Double
Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to Property
under Article 365 in relation to Article 263 of the RPC
“with the aggravating circumstance that accused
failed to lend on the spot to the injured party such
help that was in his hands to give”. Should the court
appreciate the alleged aggravating circumstance?
A: No. The aggravating circumstance “that accused failed
to lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was
in his hands to give” should not be appreciated. Verily, it
is the inexcusable lack of precaution or the conscious
indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
supplies the criminal intent in Article 365. The limiting
element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC,
which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the
offender who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured
parties such help as may be in his hands to give”,
according to case law, (a) is dependent on the means in
the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of
assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the
incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate
proof. X was able to supply the help according to the
extent of his capabilities (Gonzaga v. People, G.R. No.
195671, January 21, 2015).
Q: Roger, the leader of a crime syndicate in Malate,
Manila, demanded the payment by Antonio, the
owner of a motel in that area, of P10, 000 a month as
“protection money". With the monthly payments,
Roger assured that the syndicate would provide
protection to Antonio, his business, and his
employees. Should Antonio refuse, Roger warned
that the motel owner would either be killed or his
establishment would be destroyed. Antonio refused
to pay the protection money. Days later, at around
3:00 in the morning, Mauro, a member of the criminal
syndicate, arrived at Antonio's home and hurled a
grenade into an open window of the bedroom where
Antonio, his wife, and their three year-old daughter
were sleeping. All three of them were killed instantly
when the grenade exploded.
State, with reasons, the crime or crimes that had been
committed as well as the aggravating circumstances,
if any, attendant thereto. (BAR 2008)
A: By demanding "protection money" under threat and
intimidation that the businessman (Antonio) would be
killed or his establishment destroyed if he would refuse
to pay the protection money, the crime of grave threats is
committed by Roger, the leader of the crime syndicate.
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019

was merely accidental. Treachery as a qualifying

For killing the businessman, his wife and three year-old
daughter, the complex crime of multiple murder was
committed by Mauro, a member of the same crime
syndicate. The killing is qualified by the use of an
explosive (hand grenade). The treachery attending the
killing shall be separately appreciated as another
aggravating circumstance aside from the use of explosive
as the qualifying circumstance.
Other aggravating circumstances which may
appreciated are:
circumstance must be deliberately sought to ensure the
safety of the accused from the defensive acts of the victim.
A finding of the existence of treachery should be based on
“clear and convincing evidence.” Such evidence must be
as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. In this case, no
evidence was presented to show that petitioner
consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method,
or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage (Cirera v.
People, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014).
be
What are special aggravating circumstances?

1. Dwelling, because the killings were committed in the
home of the victims who had not given any
provocation;
2. Nocturnity, considering that the offenders carried
out the killing at around 3:00 AM, indicative of a
deliberate choice of nighttime for the commission of
the crime;
3. Treachery, under Art. 14, par. 16, RPC, mentioned
above, considering that victims were all asleep when
killed; and
4. The offense was committed by a person who belongs
to an organized/syndicated crime group.
Should the aggravating circumstance of dwelling be
considered if the assailant was outside the house and
the victim was inside?
The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be
taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the
shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For
this circumstance to be considered it is not necessary that
the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of
the victim to commit the offense; it is enough that the
victim was attacked inside his own house, although the
assailant may have devised means to perpetrate the
assault. (People v. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017)
Is abuse of superior strength present as an
aggravating circumstance when it is shown that two
accused attack a lone victim?
Special aggravating circumstances are those which arise
under special conditions to increase the penalty for the
offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot
increase the penalty to the next higher degree. They must
always be alleged and charged in the information, and
must be proves during the trial in order to be
appreciated. Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance (People v. De Leon, G.R. No.
179943, June 26, 2009, citing Palaganas v. People).
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
Q: A asked B to kill C because of a grave injustice done
to A by C. A promised B a reward. B was willing to kill
C, not so much because of the reward promised to
him but because he also had his own long-standing
grudge against C, who had wronged him in the past. If
C is killed by B, would A be liable as a principal by
inducement?
A: No. A would not be liable as a principal by inducement
because the reward he promised B is not the sole
impelling reason which made B to kill C. To bring about
criminal liability of a co-principal, the inducement made
by the inducer must be the sole consideration which
caused the person induced to commit the crime and
without which the crime would not have been committed.
The facts of the case indicate that B, the killer supposedly
induced by A, had his own reason to kill C out of a long
standing grudge.

No. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there
is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and
the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission
of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who
attacked the victim does not per se establish that the
crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the
aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish
that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or
that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.
To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the
means of defense available to the person attacked. The
appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends
on the age, size, and strength of the parties (Fantastico v.
Malicse, Sr., G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015).
For treachery to be appreciated, is it enough to show
that the attack against the intended victim was
unexpected?
No. The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole
basis of a finding of treachery even if the attack was
intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position
Q: Laylay convinced AAA to accompany her at a wake
at Parañaque City. Before proceeding to the wake,
Laylay and AAA went to Bulungan Fish Port along the
coastal road to ask for some fish. When they reached
the fish port, they proceeded to a Kubuhan, Laylay
suddenly pulled AAA inside a room where a man
known by the name "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw
"Speed" give money to Laylay and heard "Speed" tell
Laylay to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, "Speed"
wielded a knife, tied AAA's hands, and raped her. Is
Laylay guilty for the crime of rape as principal by
indispensable cooperation?
A: No, Laylay is not a principal by indispensable
cooperation. To be a principal by indispensable
cooperation, one must participate in the criminal
resolution, a conspiracy, or unity in criminal purpose and
cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have
been accomplished. The act of Laylay in convincing AAA
to go with her until Laylay received money from “Speed”
who raped AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of
rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered
the latter’s services in exchange for money and AAA could
still have been raped (People v. Dulay, G.R. No. 193854,
September 24, 2012).

9
 CRIMINAL LAW

OFFENDERS

REITERACION RECIDIVISM HABITUAL DELIQUENCY QUASI-RECIDIVISM

Within a period of 10 years

It is necessary that from the date of release or Felony was committed after
It is enough that a
the offender shall last conviction of the crimes having been convicted by final
final judgment has
have served out covered, he is found guilty of judgment of an offense, before
been rendered in
his sentence for any of said crimes a third beginning to serve sentence or
the first offense.
the first offense. time or oftener. while serving the same.

The previous and

subsequent Requires that the
Crimes covered are serious First and subsequent
offenses must not offenses be
or less serious physical conviction may or may not be
be embraced by included in the
injuries, robbery, theft, estafa embraced by the same title of
the same Title of same Title of the
and falsification. the RPC.
the RPC. Code.

Not always
Always
aggravating; Shall be punished by the
aggravating; It
discretion of the Shall suffer additional maximum period of the
increases the
court to penalty. penalty prescribed by law for
penalty to its
appreciate. the new felony.
maximum period.
First crime for which the
Limited to serious or less offender is serving sentence
Includes offenses Felonies under RPC serious physical injuries, need not be a crime under the
under special law. only. robbery, theft, estafa and RPC but the second crime must
falsification. be one under the RPC.

Special aggravating
Extraordinary aggravating circumstance which may be
A generic A generic
circumstance which cannot offset by special privileged
aggravating aggravating
be offset by a mitigating mitigating circumstances not
circumstance. circumstance.
circumstance. by ordinary mitigating
circumstances.

PENALTIES a. Simple rape – the prescribed penalty is reclusion

Reclusion perpetua v. Life imprisonment perpetua
(BAR 1994, 2001, 2009) b. Qualified rape – the prescribed penalty is death

RECLUSION PERPETUA LIFE IMPRISONMENT The crime committed is simple rape, and the penalty
is reclusion perpetua. There are two mitigating
Pertains to the penalty Pertains to the penalty circumstances. Can you appreciate the two mitigating
imposed for violation of imposed for violation of circumstances, to appreciate the special mitigating
the RPC special laws circumstance, for purposes of making the penalty one
It has fixed duration It has no fixed duration degree lower?
It carries with it It does not carry with it
accessory penalties accessory penalty No, because the special mitigating circumstance
consisting of two mitigating circumstances is found
RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF INDIVISIBLE under Art. 64. There is no special circumstance in Art. 63
PENALTIES (ART. 63, RPC) of the RPC.

Second rule: The law prescribes two (2) indivisible

What are the indivisible penalties?
penalties
1. Reclusion perpetua
There is only one prescribed penalty consisting of two (2)
2. Death
indivisible penalties, that is reclusion perpetua to death
3. Reclusion perpetua to death (Campanilla, 2017).
for the following crimes under the RPC:
First rule: The law prescribes a single indivisible
1. parricide (Art. 246);
penalty
2. murder (Art. 248);
3. kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Art. 267);
Whatever may be the nature or number of aggravating or
4. rape with the use of a deadly weapon (Art. 266-B par.
mitigating circumstance that may have attended the
2);
commission of the crime, the court shall apply the
5. rape by two or more persons (Art. 266-B par. 2);
prescribed penalty.
6. when by reason or on occasion of rape, the victim
becomes insane (Art. 266-B par. 3);
e.g.

10
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
7. when rape is attempted and homicide is committed
(Art. 266-B par. 4);
8. robbery with homicide (Art. 295 par. 1);
9. robbery with rape with the use of a deadly weapon,
or by two or more persons (Art. 295 par. 2).
NOTE: Destructive arson under PD 1613 is also
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
When the penalty is composed of two (2) indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed:
a. When there is only one aggravating
circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
imposed.
b. When there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
imposed.
c. When there is a mitigating circumstance and no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be imposed.
d. If there are both mitigating and aggravating
circumstances present, offset one another, then
apply the rules.
The crime committed is parricide, the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. There are two mitigating
circumstances. Can you appreciate the two mitigating
circumstances as special mitigating circumstance for
purposes of graduating the penalty from reclusion
perpetua to death, to reclusion temporal?
No. In People v. Takbobo (G.R. No. 102984, June 30, 1993),
it was held that when there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance but the
imposable penalties are indivisible in nature, the court
cannot proceed by analogy with the provisions of
paragraph 5 of Article 64 and impose the penalty lower
by one degree. The rule applicable in is found in Article
63, and not in Article 64, of the RPC.
The crime committed is parricide. There are three
(3) aggravating circumstances and two (2) mitigating
11
circumstances. What is the proper imposable
penalty?
Applying the off-set rule, only one aggravating
circumstance will remain. Thus, the greater penalty
which is death is the proper imposable penalty. However,
because of RA 9346, the penalty will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
The crime is parricide. There are two (2) aggravating
circumstance and two (2) mitigating circumstance.
What is the proper imposable penalty?
Applying the off-set rule, no modifying circumstance will
remain. Since there is neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty which is reclusion
perpetua is the proper imposable penalty.
RULES FOR THE APPLICATION OF DIVISIBLE
PENALTIES (ART. 64, RPC)
What are the divisible penalties?
1. Penalty composed of three (3) periods;
2. Penalty not composed of three (3) periods;
3. Complex penalty;
4. Penalty without a specific legal form (Campanilla,
2017).
1. PENALTY COMPOSED OF THREE (3) PERIODS
When the penalty is composed of three (3) periods, the
following rules shall be observed:
a. When there is neither aggravating and no mitigating,
the penalty in its medium period shall be imposed.
b. When there is only a mitigating circumstance, the
penalty in its minimum period shall be imposed.
c. When there is only an aggravating circumstance, the
penalty in its maximum period shall be imposed.
 CRIMINAL LAW

TABLE SHOWING THE DURATION OF DIVISIBLE PENALTIES AND THE TIME INCLUDED IN EACH OF THEIR
PERIODS

Penalties Time included in the Time included in its Time included in its Time included in
penalty in its minimum period medium period its maximum
entirety

Reclusion temporal From 12 years and 1 From 12 years and 1 From 14 years, 8 From 17 years, 4
day to 20 years. day to 14 years and 8 months and 1 day to months and 1 day to
months. 17 years and 4 20 years.
months.

a. Prision mayor From 6 years and 1 From 6 years and 1 day From 8 years and 1 From 10 years and 1
b. Absolute day to 12 years. to 8 years. day to 10 years. day to 12 years.
disqualification
c. Special temporary
disqualification
a. Prision From 6 months and 1 From 6 months and 1 From 2 years, 4 From 4 years, 2
correccional day to 6 years. day to 2 years and 4 months and 1 day to 4 months and 1 day to
b. Suspension months. years and 2 months. 6 years.
c. Destierro

Arresto mayor From 1 month and 1 From 1 month to 2 From 2 months and 1 From 4 months and
day to 6 months. months. day to 4 months. 1 day to 6 months.

Arresto menor From 1 to 30 days. From 1 to 10 days. From 11 to 20 days. From 21 to 30 days.

The crime committed is homicide, the penalty is
reclusion temporal. The accused is a minor.
a. What is the proper imposable penalty?
Prision mayor because minority is a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
b. Suppose there is an aggravating circumstance
which is disguise?
Prision mayor in its maximum period.
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law. Further,
since there is other mitigating or aggravating, the penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is prision correccional in its medium
period.
g. Suppose there are three mitigating circumstances.
Will you consider these three mitigating
circumstances as a special mitigating circumstance
for the purpose of reducing prision mayor to prision
correccional?

c. Suppose there are two aggravating circumstances.
Will you consider the two aggravating circumstances
for purposes of upgrading the penalty of prision
mayor to reclusion temporal?
No. In the case of People v. Manlolo (G.R. No. L-40778,
January 26, 1989), the Supreme Court, citing Art. 64 par.
6 of the RPC, held that whatever may be the number and
nature of the aggravating circumstances, the courts shall
not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law
in its maximum period.
d. Suppose there is neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance?
Prision mayor in its medium period.
e. Suppose there is one mitigating circumstance
which is confession?
The two mitigating circumstances will be appreciated as
special mitigating circumstance for purposes of reducing
prision mayor to prision correccional. Since there is one
remaining mitigating circumstance, the proper period is
minimum period. Thus, the proper imposable penalty is
prision correccional in its minimum period.
h. Suppose there are four mitigating circumstances.
Will you appreciate the special mitigating
circumstance twice?
No. The special mitigating circumstance will be
appreciated only once, even if there are four mitigating
circumstances. It will be appreciated for the purpose of
reducing prision mayor to prision correccional.
Considering the two remaining mitigating circumstances,
it will be used to apply the penalty in its minimum period.
Thus, the proper imposable penalty is prision
correccional in its minimum period.

Prision mayor in its minimum period.
f. Suppose there are two mitigating circumstance
which are confession and voluntary surrender?
The two mitigating circumstance will be considered as a
special mitigating circumstance for graduating the
penalty. Under Art. 64 par. 5 of the RPC, when two or
more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
i. Suppose there is a combination of the modifying
circumstances?
Apply first the offset rule then consider the remaining
modifying circumstances.
If after applying the offset rule, there is still a remaining
of one or two or three aggravating circumstances, then
you will apply the penalty in its maximum period.

12
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
If after applying the offset rule, no modifying
circumstance remain, then you will apply the penalty in
its medium period.
If after applying the offset rule, one mitigating
circumstance remains, then you will apply the penalty in
its minimum period.
j. Suppose there are three mitigating circumstances
and one aggravating circumstance. Applying the
offset rule, there are two mitigating circumstances
remaining. Can you appreciate those as a special
mitigating circumstance?
No. Because to appreciate the special mitigating
circumstance, it is important that there are two or more
mitigating circumstance and no aggravating
circumstance (Art. 64, par. 5, RPC). Once you apply the
offset rule, you cannot appreciate the special mitigating
circumstance because the application of the offset rule
presupposes that there is an aggravating circumstance.
2. PENALTY NOT COMPOSED OF THREE (3) PERIODS
(ART. 65, RPC)
Example: The prescribed penalty is prision mayor in its
medium period to maximum period.
How do you compute for its minimum, medium, and
maximum period?
First rule: Divide the time included in the duration of
the prescribed penalty into three (3) equal portions.
Prision mayor in its medium period to maximum period is
8 years and 1 day to 12 years.
In computing, you delete the one (1) day. What will be left
is 8 years and 12 years. Then you subtract 8 years from
12 years, that is 4 years.
Then, divide the 4 years into three (3) equal portions. So,
it will be 1 year and 4 months for each period.
Second rule: Form the period out of the three (3)
equal portions.
8 years + 1 year and 4 months = 9 years and 4 months
9 years and 4 months + 1 year and 4 months = 10 years
and 8 months
10 years and 8 months + 1 year and 4 months = 12 years
Prision mayor in its medium period to maximum period
Minimum period: 8 years and 1 day to 9 years and 4
months
Medium period: 9 years and 4 months and 1 day to 10
years and 8 months
Maximum period: 10 years and 8 months and 1 day to
12 years
3. COMPLEX PENALTY (ART. 77 PAR. 1, RPC)
13
Example: The prescribed penalty for treason committed
by a resident alien under Art. 114 of the RPC is reclusion
temporal to death penalty.
Minimum period: reclusion temporal (the lightest
component
Medium period: reclusion perpetua
Maximum period: death
Suppose there is mitigating circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its minimum period, that is reclusion
temporal.
Suppose there is no modifying circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its medium period, that is reclusion
perpetua.
Suppose there is aggravating circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its maximum period, that is death.
Another example: The crime committed is robbery. The
prescribed penalty is prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Minimum period: prision correccional in its maximum
period (the lightest component)
Medium period: prision mayor in its minimum period
Maximum period: prision mayor in its medium period
Suppose there is mitigating circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its minimum period, prision
correccional in its maximum period.
Suppose there is no modifying circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its medium period, that is prision
mayor in its minimum period.
Suppose there is aggravating circumstance?
Apply the penalty in its maximum period, that is prision
mayor in its medium period.
Another example: The crime committed is sexual abuse
under Sec. 5 of RA 7610. The prescribed penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
Minimum period: reclusion temporal in its medium
period (the lightest component)
Medium period: reclusion temporal in its maximum
period
Maximum period: reclusion perpetua
4. PENALTY WITHOUT A SPECIFIC LEGAL FORM
Example: The crime committed is intentional mutilation.
The prescribed penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua.
First rule: Form the maximum period out of the most
severe component
Maximum period: reclusion perpetua
 CRIMINAL LAW
Second rule: Divide the lightest component into two
(2) equal portions
Reclusion temporal is 12 years and 1 day to 20 years.
In computing, you delete the one (1) day. What will be left
is 12 years and 20 years. Then you subtract 12 years from
20 years, that is 8 years.
Then, divide the 8 years into two (2) equal portions. So, it
will be 4 years for each period.
Third rule: Form the minimum period and medium
period out of the two (2) equal portions
12 years + 4 years = 16 years
16 years + 4 years = 20 years
Minimum period: 12 years and 1 day to 16 years
Medium period: 16 years and 1 day to 20 years
Maximum period: reclusion perpetua
3. APPLICABILITY OR NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW
Explain the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law (ISL). (BAR 2016)
The court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate
sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum of which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law
(special law), the court shall sentence th2e accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not ne less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same (Sec. 1, ISL, Act No. 4103 as
amended by Act No, 4225)
The court must, instead of a single fixed penalty, except
where the imposable penalty is one (1) year or less,
determine two penalties, referred to in the ISL as the
“maximum” and “minimum” terms.
If the ISL is applicable, the convict will be sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence that consists of a minimum
term and a maximum term. The moment the convict
serves the minimum term, he may be considered for
parole.
If the ISL is not applicable, the convict will be sentenced
to a straight penalty, which is the imposable penalty in
accordance with the RPC.
When is the ISL not applicable?
The ISL does not apply to:
1. Persons convicted of offenses punished with death
penalty or life imprisonment;
NOTE: Reclusion perpetua either as a prescribed or
graduated penalty is included because of RA 9346
which prohibits death penalty. ISL is not applicable
because it is an indivisible penalty and when
14
reclusion perpetua is imposed, the convict is not
eligible for parole.
2. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to
commit treason;
3. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition, or espionage;
4. Those convicted of piracy;
5. Habiqual delinquents;
NOTE: Recidivists are entitiled to avail the ISL.
6. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or
evaded sentence;
NOTE: When the accused escaped from jail while
his case was on appeal, he is not entitled to the
benefits of ISL
7. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon
granted to them by the Chief Executive;
8. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does
not exceed one (1) year;
9. Those who upon the approval of the law
(Dec. 5, 1933), had been sentenced to final judgment;
and
10. Those sentenced to the penalty of destierro or
suspension
NOTE: Included are those sentenced
disqualification or fine because these penalties
are not prison sentence.
What are the rules in imposing a penalty under the
indeterminate sentence law? (BAR 1999, 2005, 2009,
2010, 2013)
When penalty is imposed by RPC:
1. The Maximum Term – is that which in view of the
attending circumstances could be properly
imposed under the RPC.
2. The Minimum Term – is within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC.
Prescribed penalty is what the penalty is without
looking at the circumstances. As opposed to imposed
penalty which takes into account the circumstances.
When penalty is imposed by Special Penal Law (BAR
1994):
1. Maximum Term – must not exceed the maximum
term fixed by said law.
2. Minimum Term – must not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (BAR
2003)
Example:
The penalty is prision correccional in its minimum
period and there is confession
a. The judge fixed the penalty to 6 months and 1 day.
The ISL is not applicable because it does not exceed
one year. So the convict should serve a straight
penalty of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.
b. The judge fixed the penalty to 1 year and 1 day. The
ISL is applicable because it exceeded one year. Since
the ISL is applicable, you make the 1 year and 1 day
as the maximum term. Then you compute for the
minimum term. The penalty one degree lower to
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
prision correccional is arresto mayor which is 1
month and 1 day to 6 months – that is the range of
the minimum term.
Q: Pinlac was found guilty for violating Section 5(b),
Article III of RA No. 7610, a special law. However, the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals applied
the Indeterminate Sentence Law in fixing the penalty
to be imposed on the accused. Is Indeterminate
Sentence Law applicable to convictions for violation
of a special law?
A: YES. Notwithstanding the fact that RA 7610 is a special
law, the petitioner in this case may enjoy the benefits of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The ACT No. 4103, as
amended, otherwise known as Indeterminate Sentence
Law provided in Section 1 that: “xxx if the offense is
punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said
law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum
term prescribed by the same.” (Pinlac vs. People, G.R. No.
197458, November 11, 2015)
Q: Randy was prosecuted for forcible abduction
attended by the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism. After trial, the court held that the
prosecutor was able to prove the charge.
Nonetheless, it appreciated in favor of Randy, on the
basis of the defense's evidence, the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender,
uncontrollable fear, and provocation. Under Art. 342
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for
forcible abduction is reclusion temporal. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what penalty
should be imposed on Randy? (BAR 2018)
A: Since he was found guilty of Forcible Abduction with
one aggravating circumstances of recidivism, this
aggravating circumstance is off-set by one of the three
mitigating circumstances; so the penalty to be imposed is
still Reclusion Temporal (Art. 342, RPC) but because
there are two (2) more mitigating circumstances left and
the penalty is divisible, in determining the maximum
term, we have to reduce to Prision Mayor and because
there is no more mitigating and aggravating
circumstances to be considered, the maximum term shall
be prision mayor in its medium period that is eight (8)
years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. The minimum,
term shall be any range within, that is from six (6) years
and one (1) day to six (8) years.
Thus Randy will suffer as Minimum term any penalty
ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day, and the
maximum term will be, any range from eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years of Prision Mayor.
Q: Bruno was charged with homicide for killing the
75-year old owner of his rooming house. The
prosecution proved that Bruno stabbed the owner
causing his death, and that the killing happened at 10
in the evening in the house where the victim and
Bruno lived. Bruno, on the other hand, successfully
proved that he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities; that he pleaded guilty to the crime
charged; that it was the victim who first attacked and
did so without any provocation on his (Bruno's) part,
but he prevailed because he managed to draw his
knife with which he stabbed the victim. The penalty
for homicide is reclusion temporal. Assuming a
15
judgment of conviction and after considering the
attendant circumstances, what penalty should the
judge impose? (BAR 2013)
A: Bruno should be sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence penalty of arresto mayor in any of its period
as minimum to prision correccional in its medium
period as maximum. Bruno was entitled to the
privileged mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-
defense and the presence of at least two ordinary
mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender and plea
of guilt) without any aggravating circumstance under Art.
69 and 64(5) of the RPC respectively, which lowers the
prescribed penalty for homicide which is reclusion
temporal to prision correccional.
Further Explanation
In this kind of question, the Bar examiner wants you to
determine whether there was self-defense or not. The
problem provides that the defense was able to prove that
it was the man who first attacked Bruno; therefore, there
was unlawful aggression. But there was no provocation
coming from Bruno, therefore, there was a lack of
sufficient provocation. So two elements of self-defense
are present.
How about the 3rd element of self-defense, reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
the attack, is this present?
The 3rd element of self-defense is absent because based
on the facts proven by Bruno, although it was the man
who attacked Bruno first, he prevailed upon the man
because he made use of a knife and stabbed the man.
While the man attacked Bruno by means of his fist, it is
not reasonably necessary for Bruno to make use of a knife
in killing the man. So what we have is an incomplete self-
defense.
Under paragraph 1 of Article 13, in case of incomplete
self-defense, if aside from unlawful aggression, another
element is present but not all, we have a privileged
mitigating circumstance. Therefore, this incomplete self-
defense shall be treated as a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
The prosecution was able to prove that the man is 75
years old. Would you consider the aggravating
circumstance of disrespect of age?
No. Even if Bruno killed the said 75 year-old man, there
was no showing in the problem that he disrespected the
age of the man.
Would you consider nighttime as an aggravating
circumstance?
No. Even if the problem says that the crime was
committed at 10 in the evening, it did not say whether the
house was lighted or not. There was also no showing that
the offender deliberately sought nighttime to commit the
crime.
Would you consider dwelling?
No. In the said dwelling both Bruno and the victim are
residing. It cannot be said that when Bruno killed the
man, he disrespected the dwelling of the said man.
Therefore, we have no aggravating circumstance present.
 CRIMINAL LAW
Take note that Bruno was able to prove voluntary
surrender, voluntary plea of guilt, and then we have an
incomplete self-defense — a privileged mitigating
circumstance.
Applying these conclusions, we have two (2) ordinary
mitigating circumstances with one (1) privileged
mitigating circumstance and with no aggravating
circumstance.
How do we compute the penalty?
1. Consider first the Privileged Mitigating Circumstance.
Whenever there is a privileged mitigating
circumstance present, apply it first before computing
the penalty. In this example, since we have
incomplete self-defense, you have to lower the
penalty by one degree because it is a privileged
mitigating circumstance. Thus, it will become prision
mayor.
2. Consider the Ordinary Mitigating Circumstance.
So now, there are two ordinary mitigating
circumstances with no aggravating circumstance.
Article 64 provides that when there are two
mitigating with no aggravating, lower the penalty by
one degree. Therefore, if you lower it by one degree,
it is now prision correccional.
Note: The penalty can be lowered only once no
matter how many the mitigating circumstances are
except for the attendance of a Privileged Mitigating
Circumstance, in which case, it must be considered.
3. Determine the Maximum Sentence after considering
all mitigating, and aggravating circumstances, if any.
You have already applied everything so it will
become prision correccional in its medium period.
Note: It is in its medium period because when the
penalty does not provide for period, it is
automatically in its medium period save for those
penalties which are indivisible.
4. Determine the minimum term of the sentence.
You go one degree lower and that is arresto mayor.
Therefore, arresto mayor in its medium period (or any
period in the discretion of the court) is the minimum
term of the sentence.
Macky, a security guard, arrived home late one night
after rendering overtime. He was shocked to see Joy,
his wife, and Ken, his best friend, in the act of having
sexual intercourse. Macky pulled out his service gun
and shot and killed Ken. The court found that Ken
died under exceptional circumstances and
exonerated Macky of murder but sentenced him to
destierro, conformably with Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. The court also ordered Macky to
pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim in the amount
of P50,000. While serving his sentence, Macky
entered the prohibited area and had a pot session
with Ivy (Joy’s sister). Is Macky entitled to an
indeterminate sentence in case he is found guilty of
16
the use of prohibited substances? Explain your
answer. (BAR 2007)
No, Macky is not entitled to the benefit of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended) for
having evaded the sentence which banished or placed
him on destierrro. Sec. 2 of the said law expressly
provides that the law shall not apply to those who shall
have "evaded sentence".
Alternative Answer: No, because the penalty for use of any
dangerous drug by a first offender is not imprisonment
but rehabilitation in a government center for a minimum
period of six (6) months (Sec. 15, R.A. 9165). The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the
penalty is imprisonment not exceeding one year.
An agonizing and protracted trial having come to a
close, the judge found A guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide and imposed on him a straight
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor. The public prosecutor objected to the
sentence on the ground that the proper penalty
should have been TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal. The defense counsel
chimed in, contending that application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law should lead to the
imposition of a straight penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional only. Who of
the three is on the right track? (BAR 2010)
None of the contentions is correct because the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A. 4103, as amended) has
not been followed.
The imposition of penalty for the crime of homicide,
which is penalized by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year and is divisible, is covered by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. The said law is requires that the sentence
in this case should reflect a minimum term for purposes
of parole, and a maximum term fixing the limit of the
imprisonment. Imposing a straight penalty is incorrect
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY
Subsidiary personal liability is to be suffered by the
convict who has no property with which to meet the fine,
at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the
highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines
at the time of the rendition of judgment of conviction by
the trial court (Art. 39, as amended by R.A. 10159 approved
on April 10, 2012).
Is subsidiary penalty an accessory penalty?
A subsidiary penalty is not an accessory penalty. It is thus
required that it be specifically imposed by the court in its
judgment. It is a penalty imposed upon the accused and
served by him in lieu of the fine which he fails to pay on
account of insolvency. The accused cannot be made to
undergo subsidiary imprisonment unless the judgment
expressly so provides.
Section 1, Republic Act No. 10159
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision
correctional or arresto and fine, he shall remain
under confinement until his fine referred in the
preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term
of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019

more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day NOTE: Probation only affects the criminal aspect of the
shall be counted against the prisoner. case and has no bearing on his civil liability
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine,
the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six
Who are disqualified to avail the benefits of the
months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for
probation law? (BAR 2004)
a grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed
fifteen days, if for a fight felony.
1. Sentenced to serve a maximum term of
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than
imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
prision correctional, no subsidiary imprisonment
2. Convicted of any crime against the national security;
shall be imposed upon the culprit.
(Sec. 9, RA 10707)
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed
3. Who have previously been convicted by final
by confinement in a penal institution, but such
judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of
penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the
more than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a
period of time established in the preceding rules,
fine of more than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00);
shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as
(Sec. 9, RA 10707)
those of which the principal penalty consists.
4. Who have been once on probation under the
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict
provision of this Decree;
may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall
5. Who are already serving sentence at the time the
not relieve him from the fine in case his financial
substantive provisions of this Decree became
circumstances should improve."
applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof;
6. If he appeals the judgment or conviction (however see
Note: When the penalty prescribed for the offense is
Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13,
imprisonment, it is the penalty actually imposed by the
2011); or
Court, not the penalty provided for by the Code, which
XPN A child in conflict with the law can appeal
should be the basis in the determination whether or not
anytime
subsidiary penalty should be imposed.
7. If he is convicted of violation of Election Offenses
8. If he is convicted of Drug Trafficking or Drug Pushing
THREE-FOLD RULE
(Sec. 24 R.A. 9165)
What are the three systems of imposition of penalties
NOTE: In multiple prison terms, those imposed against
in case two or more penalties are imposed on one and
the accused found guilty of several offenses should not be
the same accused?
added up, and their sum total should not be
determinative of his disqualification from probation
1. Material accumulation system - no limitation
since the law uses the word “maximum” not “total” term
whatever. All the penalties for all violations were
of imprisonment (Francisco v. CA, et. Al, G.R. No. 108747,
imposed even if they reached beyond the natural
April 6, 1995).
span of human life.
Q: Arnel Colinares was found guilty of frustrated
2. Juridical accumulation system - limited to not more
homicide by the RTC. On appeal, CA affirmed. On
than the three-fold length of time corresponding to
petition for review, SC ruled that he was only guilty of
the most severe and in no case exceed 40 years.
attempted homicide, in which the penalty is
“probationable”. Is Colinares now entitled to apply
3. Absorption system - the lesser penalties are absorbed
for probation upon remand of the case to the lower
by the graver penalties. It is observed in the
court, even after he has perfected his appeal to a
imposition of the penalty in complex crimes,
previous conviction (frustrated homicide) which was
continuing crimes, and special complex crimes like
not “probationable”?
robbery with homicide, etc.
A: Yes. The probation law as amended provides that, “xxx
What is the Three-Fold Rule?
No application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the
Three-fold rule means that the maximum duration of a
judgment of conviction: Provided, That when a judgment
convict’s sentence shall not be more than three times the
of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is
length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified
penalties imposed upon him but in no case exceed 40
through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the
years.
defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation
based on the modified decision before such decision
NOTE: All the penalties, even if by different courts at
becomes final.” The application for probation based on
different times, cannot exceed three-fold to most severe
the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court
penalty.
where the judgment of conviction imposing a non-
probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court
PROBATION LAW
where such case has since been re-raffled. In a case
(AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 10707)
involving several defendants where some have taken
further appeal, the other defendants may apply for
Probation
probation by submitting a written application and
attaching thereto a certified true copy of the judgment of
It is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction.
conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions
imposed by the court and to the supervision of a The trial court shall, upon receipt of the application filed,
probation officer. suspend the execution of the sentence imposed in the
judgment.

17
 CRIMINAL LAW

Extinguishes criminal Does not extinguish

This notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of liability. criminal liability;
probation should he seek a review of the modified decision merely suspends the
which already imposes a probationable penalty. execution of the
sentence.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes Includes any crime Exercised individually
a term of imprisonment or a fine only. The filing of the and is exercised by the trial court.
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to individually by the
appeal. President.
Merely looks forward It promotes the
An order granting or denying probation shall not be and relieves the correction and
appealable.’’ (R.A. 10707 Section 1, amending Section 4 of offender from the rehabilitation of an
PD No. 968, Approved last November 26, 2015) consequences of an offender by providing
offense of which he him with individualized
Alternative Answer: What is clear is that, had the RTC has been convicted. treatment; provides an
done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct opportunity for the
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he reformation of a
would have had the right to apply for probation. Arnel did penitent offender which
not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him might be less probable if
to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between he were to serve a
appeal and probation. While it is true that probation is a prison sentence; and
mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right to prevent the commission
such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is of offenses.
the right to apply for that privilege. If the Court allows Does not work for the Those who have not
him to apply for probation because of the lowered restoration of the right served their sentence by
penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide whether to hold public office, or reason of the grant of
or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into the right of suffrage, probation which should
account the full circumstances of his case (Colinares v. unless such rights are not be equated with
People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011). expressly restored by service of sentence,
means of pardon. should not likewise be
Q: Meno was convicted by final judgment of the crime disqualified from
of arbitrary detention and was sentenced to suffer running for a local
imprisonment by the RTC. On that ground, Bena filed elective office because
a petition to disqualify Meno from running for the two (2)-year period
Punong Baranggay. Meno argued that he was already of ineligibility under Sec.
granted probation, which effectively restores him all 40(a) of the Local
the civil rights including the right to vote and be Government Code does
voted for in the elections. The COMELEC En Banc not even begin to run
disqualified Meno citing Sec. 40(a) of the Local (Moreno v. Comelec, G.R.
Government Code. Meno argues that the No. 168550, August 10,
disqualification under the Local Government Code 2006).
applies only to those who have served their sentence Exercised when the Must be exercised
and not to probationers because the latter do not person is already within the period for
serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law convicted. perfecting an appeal.
should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Being a private act by Being a grant by the trial
Government Code. Is Meno disqualified from running
the president, it must court; it follows that the
for public office?
be pleaded and proved trial court also has the
by the person power to order its
A: No, Meno is not disqualified from running for public
pardoned. revocation in a proper
office. During the period of probation, the probationer is
case and under proper
not disqualified from running for a public office because
circumstances.
the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is
put on hold for the duration of the probation. Does not alter the fact Does not alter the fact
that the accused is a that the accused is a
The period within which a person is under probation recidivist as it recidivist as it provides
cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. produces only the only for an opportunity
Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the extinction of the of reformation to the
grant of probation suspends the execution of the personal effects of the penitent offender.
sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer penalty.
does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the Does not extinguish Does not extinguish the
court but is merely required to comply with all the the civil liability of the civil liability of the
conditions prescribed in the probation order. The offender. offender.
Probation Law should be construed as an exception to the
Local Government Code (Moreno v. Comelec, G.R. No. EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
168550, August 10, 2006).
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
PARDON VIS-À-VIS PROBATION
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
PARDON PROBATION penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability

18
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment;
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the
penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided
in Article 344 of the RPC.
Criminal Liability is Partially Extinguished:
1. By conditional pardon
2. By commutation of the sentence
3. By final discharge of probation
4. By parole
5. By good conduct
Q: On July 23, 2014, Renato, Gariguez, Jr., and Larido
(accused-appellants) are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide. The accused-appellants
collectively moved for reconsideration. The Court
denied such motion with finality in its Resolution
dated September 24, 2014. However, before the
finality of its resolution, the Court received a letter
from the Bureau of Corrections dated September 16,
2014 informing them of the death of one of the
accused-appellants in this case, Renato, on June 10,
2014. Is Renato Dionaldo y Ebron criminally liable of
special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom
with Homicide?
A: No, Dianaldo’s liability is extinguished by his death. As
provided under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of
the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. Consequently, Renato's death on June 10, 2014
renders the Court's July 23, 2014 Resolution irrelevant
and ineffectual as to him, and is therefore set aside.
Accordingly, the criminal case against Renato is
dismissed. (People V. Armando Dionaldo Y Ebron, GR No.
207949, September 9, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: Agent Peralta of the PDEA-CAR received
information regarding the illegal drug selling
activities of Toukyo. The PDEA-CAR sent a buy-bust
team to entrap Toukyo. After Toukyo showed Agent
Peralta the brick of marijuana, Agent Peralta
executed the pre-arranged signal, leading to
Toukyo's arrest. In a letter, Director General Atty.
Benjamin C. De Los Santos of the Bureau of
Corrections informed the Court that Toukyo had
already died on October 15, 2014, attaching thereto a
Certification issued by the Bureau's Officer-in-Charge
for its Rehabilitation Operations Division, as well as
the Death Report issued by the Medical Officer. Is
TOUKYO’s criminal liability extinguished?
A: TOUKYO’s criminal liability is extinguished. Death of
the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability
directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore.". Upon Toukyo's death pending appeal of his
19
conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
Notably, there is no civil liability that arose from this case,
there being no private complainant to begin with. (People
Vs. Toukyo, G.R. No. 225593, March 20, 2017, J. Perlas
Bernabe)
Q: Accused-appellant Porferio Culas was held by the
CA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Statutory Rape. However, before an Entry of
Judgment could be issued in the instant case, the
Court received a Letter from the Bureau of
Corrections informing the Court of accused-
appellant's death as evidenced by the Certificate of
Death. Is CULAS’ criminal liability extinguished by
reason of his death?
A: CULAS’ criminal liability is extinguished. His death
prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal case against him. Article 89 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability
is totally extinguished by the death of the accused.
Criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal action. (Culas Vs. People, G.R. No. 211166, June 5,
2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
Q: Agapito Dimaala was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder for the treacherous
killing of Rodrigo Marasigan. Aggrieved, he filed a
Notice of Appeal but later on filed a Motion to
Withdraw Appeal with Prayer for Immediate
Issuance of Entry of Judgment, which the Court
granted. However, before an Entry of Judgment was
effected, the court received a letter from the Bureau
of Corrections informing it that accused-appellant
had died on August 23, 2016 at the New Bilibid Prison
Hospital.
A: Upon Dimaala’s death pending appeal of his
conviction, his criminal liability is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
Paragraph 1, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of
the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment. As such, the criminal cases against him should
be dismissed and declared closed and terminated. (People
V. Agapito Dimaala Y Arela, G.R. No. 225054, July 17, 2017,
J. Perlas-Bernabe)
PRESCRIPTION OF CRIMES
Q: One fateful night in January 1990, while 5-year old
Albert was urinating at the back of their house, he
heard a strange noise coming from the kitchen of
their neighbor and playmate, Ara. When he peeped
inside, he saw Mina, Ara’s stepmother, very angry and
strangling the 5-year old Ara to death. Albert saw
Mina carry the dead body of Ara, place it inside the
trunk of the car and drive away. The dead body of Ara
was never found. Mina spread the news in the
neighborhood that Ara went to live with her
grandparents in Ormoc City. For fear of his life, Albert
did not tell anyone, even his parents and relatives,
about what he witnessed. Twenty and a half (20 & ½)
years after the incident, and right after his
 CRIMINAL LAW
graduation in Criminology, Albert reported the crime
to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes
in 20 years. Can the State still prosecute Mina for the
death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 and 1/2 years?
(BAR 2000)
A: Yes, the State can still prosecute Mina for the death of
Ara despite the lapse of 20 and ½ years. Under Article 91,
RPC, the period of prescription commences to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. In the case at bar,
the commission of the crime was known only to Albert,
who was not the offended party nor an authority or an
agent of an authority. It was discovered by the NBI
authorities only when Albert revealed to them the
commission of the crime. Hence, the period of
prescription of 20 years for homicide commenced to run
only from the time Albert revealed the same to the NBI
authorities.
Q: A killed his wife and buried her in the backyard. He
immediately went into hiding in the mountains.
Three years later, the bones of A’s wife were
discovered by X, the gardener. Since X had a standing
warrant of arrest, he hid the bones in an old clay jar
and kept quiet about it. After two years, Z, the
caretaker, found the bones and reported the matter
to the police. After 15 years of hiding, A left the
country but returned 3 years later to take care of his
ailing sibling. Six years thereafter, he was charged
with parricide, but he raised the defense of
prescription.
a. Under the Revised Penal Code, when does the
period of prescription of a crime commence to
run?
b. When is it interrupted?
c. Is A’s defense tenable? Explain. (BAR 2010)
A:
a. Under Art. 91 of the RPC, the period of prescription
commence to run upon discovery of the crime by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agent.
b. It is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information corresponding to the offense commited
with the prosecutor except in cases falling under the
Rules on Summary Procedure (must be filed with the
court) and when filed with the Punong Barangay.
(interruption should not exceed 60 days)
c. No, parricide prescribes in 20 years. The period of
prescription started only when Z reported the matter
to the police, which is equivalent to 10 years of hiding
from the time of reporting to Z. The period of three
years shall not be counted since he is absent from the
Philippines. The filing of the charge 6 years
thereafter is well within the prescriptive period.
Q: Goyena filed with the City Prosecutor a complaint
for slight physical injuries against Bautista. After
conducting the preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor issued a recommendation for the filing of
information against Bautista. Such recommendation
was approved by the City Prosecutor but the date of
such approval cannot be found in the records. The
Information was, however, filed with the MeTC
of Manila only on June 20, 2000. Bautista sought the
dismissal of the case against him on the ground of the
60-day period of prescription from the date of the
commission of the crime. Has the crime prescribed?
20
A: No, the crime has not prescribed. It is a settled rule that
the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s office
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. The
Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in
the filing the Information but such mistake or negligence
should not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and
the offended party. As held in People vs. Olarte, it is unjust
to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his
part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite
complaint (People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, April 27,
2007).
Q: On June 30, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman
filed two informations charging Disini in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials
and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act (R.A. No. 3019) in the year 1974 to 1986 for
offering, promising or giving gifts and presents to
Ferdinand Marcos. Disini filed a motion to quash the
informations on August 2, 2004 alleging that the
criminal actions had been extinguished by
prescription, and that the informations did not
conform to the prescribed form. The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion to quash and as well as the motion
for reconsideration that followed afterward. Disini
commenced a special civil action for certiorari once
again alleging the prescription of the charges in the
information. Is Disini’s contention correct?
A: No, the offenses charged in the information have not
yet prescribed. In resolving the issue of prescription, the
following must be considered, namely: (1) the period of
prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time when
the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time
when the prescriptive period is interrupted. The crime of
corruption of public officials is punished by a penalty of
prision mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a
fine not less than three times the value of the gift and
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code states that the period
of prescription for this species of corruption is 15 years
from the date of the discovery of the crime. The
prescriptive period for violation of R.A. No. 3019, as
stated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 3326, is 10 years from the
day of the commission or date of discovery by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents. Therefore,
the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject
herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992
after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation.
When the complaint was filed in 1997, only five years
have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
(Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24, September
11, 2013)
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
BOOK II
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
Note: Crimes against National Security and the Law of
Nations are exceptions to the principle of territoriality
under Art. 2, par. 5 of the RPC (one can be held criminally
liable even if those crimes were committed outside the
Philippine jurisdiction).
How may treason be proved? Explain.
The two ways of proving treason are: (1) by the
testimony of at least two witnesses to the same overt act
(two-witness rule); and (2) confession of guilt made in
open court.
The first mode of proving treason is by testimony of at
least two witnesses to the same overt act. There must be
two witnesses that must corroborate each other as to the
overt act performed by the offender. Therefore, Treason
cannot be proven by mere circumstantial evidence. The
law requires that there must be direct evidence.
The second mode of proving treason is by the confession
of guilt made in open court. The confession of guilt must
be judicial confession of guilt made by the accused in
open court. Extrajudicial confession of guilt will not
suffice to bring a conviction in the crime of treason.
In a time wherein the Philippines is involved in a war
with another country, the offender XXX Filipino
citizens, commandeered women for the enemy
troops? Are they liable for treason?
No, the act of commandeering women to the enemies
does not constitute a treasonable act. This act of
commandeering women to the enemies to satisfy the lust
of the enemies is not a treasonable act because whatever
benefits it would give to the enemy in their prosecution
of war would have been trivial imperceptible and
unintentional. (People v. Perez, G.R. No. L-856, April 18,
1949).
NOTE: In treason, the adherence to the enemies by giving
them aid or comfort must materially advance the interest
of the enemy in the conduct of war.
PIRACY VIS-À-VIS MUTINY
PIRACY MUTINY
Offenders are strangers Offenders are
to the vessel. Hence, members of the
offenders are neither complement or the
passengers nor crew passengers of the
members. vessel.
Done with animo Against the authority
furandi/intent to steal of the commander of
and with the intention of the ship.
universal hostility.
Intent to gain is an Intent to gain is
element of piracy. immaterial.
Attack from the outside. Attack from the inside.
A, B, and C hijacked a plane bound to Malaysia. In the
course of the hijack, D, a passenger was shot and
killed. The court charged and convicted them for the
violation of Anti-Hijacking Law and murder. Is the
court correct?
21
No. The charge should only be RA No. 6235 or violation of
Anti-Hijacking Law. A, B and C should not be charged with
a separate crime of murder because the act of killing a
passenger or complement in a violation of RA No. 6235
will only bring about a higher penalty. Murder should not
be charged separately.
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE
STATE
Crimes against the fundamental laws of the state may
only be committed by public officers, except Art. 133
Offending the religious feelings which may be committed
by a private individual.
HOWEVER, not all public officers may commit such
crimes. In arbitrary detention and delay in the delivery of
detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, the
public officers must be charged with the task of arresting
or detaining a person.
In violation of domicile, the public officer must have the
task of serving search warrant or seizure order.
What are the three ways of committing arbitrary
detention? (BAR 2006)
1. By detaining or locking up a person without any legal
cause or ground thereof purposely to restrain his
liberty;
2. By delaying delivery to the proper judicial authority
of a person lawfully arrested without a warrant; and
3. By delaying release of a prisoner whose release has
been ordered by competent authority.
Is there an arbitrary detention even if the offended
party were not kept in an enclosure?
Yes. There is arbitrary detention even if the victims were
not kept in an enclosure. The prevailing jurisprudence on
kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of
the victim’s liberty need not involve any physical
restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the
mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the
extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own
actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of
the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and
purposes, detained against his will (Astorga v. People, G.R.
No. 154130, October 1, 2003).
TRUE OR FALSE. A policeman who, without a judicial
order, enters a private house over the owner’s
opposition is guilty of trespass to dwelling (BAR
2009).
False. The crime committed by the policeman in this case
is violation of domicile because the official duties of a
policeman carry with it an authority to make searches
and seizure upon judicial order. He is therefore acting
under color of his official authority.
Q: Policemen Conde, Avenido, Degran, Rufano, and
Balolot, thinking that Galvantes was armed with a
gun, pointed their firearms at him and asked for his
gun. Conde went near Galvantes’ jeep and conducted
search without a search warrant. After a while they
saw the super .38 pistol under the floor mat of the
jeep. Galvante, then, filed complaints before the
Ombudsman. One of the criminal complaint he filed
 CRIMINAL LAW

was warrantless search, would the complaint
proper?
A: No. The complaint for warrantless search charges no
criminal offense. The conduct of a warrantless search is
not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the RPC or
any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only
two forms of searches which are search warrants
maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained under Art. 129, and searching domicile
without witnesses under Art. 130.
Galvante did not allege any of the elements of the
foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he
accused Conde, Avenido, Degran, Rufano, Balolot of
conducting a search on his vehicle without being armed
with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is
not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC. The
remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search
conducted on his vehicle is civil in nature under Article
32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil
Code (Galvante v. Casimiro, G.R. No. 162808, April 22,
2008).
What are the prohibited acts constituting violation of
domicile?
1. Entering any dwelling against the will of the owner
thereof;
2. Searching papers or effects found therein without
previous consent of such owner; and
3. Refusing to leave the premises having
surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and after
being required to leave the same.
belongs to the Clemente family, of which they are
partisans. Are the accused guilty of the crime under
Art. 133?
A: No, Art. 133 of the RPC punishes acts “notoriously
offensive to the feelings of the faithful.” The construction
of a fence, even though irritating and vexatious to those
present, is not an act as can be designated as “notoriously
offensive to the faithful.”In this case, the accused were
acquitted of a violation of Art. 133 of the RPC but they
were found guilty of a violation of Art. 287 of the RPC for
the circumstances showed that their acts were done in
such a way as to vex and annoy the parties who had
gathered to celebrate the “pabasa” (People v. Reyes, et al.,
G.R. No. L-40577, August 23, 1934).
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
What is the theory of absorption in rebellion?
Whenever in the course of committing rebellion, murder,
homicide, arson, physical injuries, other common crimes
are committed, and these common crimes are
furtherance to, incident to, in connection with rebellion,
they are considered as absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
Only one charge of rebellion should be charged against
the offender.

Q: While a “pabasa” was going on at a municipality in

the Province of Tarlac, Reyes and his company
arrived at the place, carrying bolos and crowbars,
and started to construct a barbed wire fence in front
of the chapel. The chairman of the committee in
charge of the “pabasa” persuaded them to refrain
from said acts. A verbal altercation then ensued. The
people attending the “pabasa” left the place hurriedly
in confusion and the “pabasa” was discontinued until
after investigation. Reyes and his company, in their
defense claim that the land where the chapel is built

BASIS REBELLION (ART. 133) TERRORISM (RA 9372) COUP D’ ETAT (ART. 133-A)

National security and

Crime Against Public order Public order
law of nations
Overthrow the Unlawful demand
Diminish inherent powers of the
Purpose government (political against the government
state (political crime)
crime) (need not be political)
Through predicate
crimes and by Need not be through force and
How committed Through violence widespread and violence, can be by threat,
extraordinary panic and intimidation, strategy or stealth
fear
Number of people Multitude of people Can be singly or a lot Can be singly or a lot

Public officers only; unless

Offenders Private or public officers Private or public officers
private individuals conspire

Yes, absorbs predicate

Generally, yes. Murder, Yes, but must be related to
crimes like rebellion,
Ability to absorb rape, robbery absorbed. political purpose. Rape not
coup d’etat, murder. Use
common crimes Use of loose firearms absorbed. Use of loose firearms
of loose firearms
absorbed. absorbed.
absorbed.

22
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
Conspiracy and Conspiracy and proposal Only conspiracy is
proposal punished
Inciting Inciting punished Not punished
All continuing crime
Accomplices are
Accomplices No accomplices
Q: As a result of the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, Elias
Lovedioro was charged with and subsequently found
guilty of the crime of murder. On appeal, Lovedioro
claims that he should have been charged with the
crime of rebellion, not murder as, being a member of
the NPA, he killed Lucilo as a means to or in
furtherance of subversive ends. The Solicitor
General, opposing appellant’s claim, avers that it is
only when the defense had conclusively proven that
the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman
was for "political and subversive ends" will the
judgement of rebellion be proper. Between the
appellant and the Solicitor General, who is correct?
A: The Solicitor General is correct. It is not enough that
the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose
and overt acts are essential components of the crime.
With either of these elements wanting, the crime of
rebellion legally does not exist. If no political motive is
established and proved, the accused should be convicted
of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of
rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere
membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice
(People v. Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, November 29, 1995).
Q: Appellant, with about twenty armed men and Huk
Commander Torio, raided and attacked the house of
Punzalan, his political adversary and incumbent
Mayor of Tiaong, Quezon, with automatic weapons,
hand grenades, and bottles filled with gasoline. The
raid resulted not only in destruction of Punzalan’s
house and that of others but also in the death and
injuries to a number of civilians. The CFI found
appellant guilty of the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murder, among others. Was the lower
court correct?
A: No. The accused is guilty of sedition, multiple murder
and physical injuries, among others. The purpose of the
raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking
up arms was not exactly against the Government and for
the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of
the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did
not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local
Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of
force, intimidation, etc. one object, to wit, to inflict an act
of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public
official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of Tiaong.
Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to
constitute sedition (People v. Umali, et. al., G.R. No. L-5803,
November 29, 1954).
Q: As the town president failed to pay their salaries,
the accused, accompanied by four armed men, went
to the house of the former and compelled him by
force to leave and go to the Presidencia. The accused
kept the town president there confined until the
relatives of the latter had raised enough money to
pay what was due the accused and the armed men as
salaries. What crime did the accused commit?
Conspiracy and proposal
punished punished
Not punished
No accomplices
punished
A: The facts constitute the crime of direct assault. There
is no public uprising when the accused, accompanied by
armed men, compelled by force the town president to go
with them to proceed to the municipal building and
detained him there. By reason of detaining the town
president, the accused inflicted upon a public officer an
act of hate or revenge. This is one of the objects of
sedition, which is essentially what the accused intended
to attain (U.S. v. Dirain, G.R. No. 1948, May 5, 1905).
Q: A, a lady professor was giving an examination. She
noticed B, one of the students, cheating. She called the
student’s attention and confiscated his examination
booklet, causing embarrassment to him. The
following day, while the class was going on, the
student, B, approached A and without any warning,
slapped her. B would have inflicted further injuries
on A had not C, another student, come to A’s rescue
and prevented B from continuing attack. B turned his
ire on C and punched the latter. What crime or
crimes, if any, did B commit? Why? (BAR 2002)
A: B committed two (2) counts of direct assault: one for
slapping the professor, A, who was then conducting
classes and thus in the exercise of her authority; and
another one for the violence on the student C, who came
to the aid of the said professor.
By express provision of Article 152, teachers and
professors of public and duly authorized private schools,
colleges and university in the in the actual performance
of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance are deemed person-in-authority for
purpose of the crime of direct assault and of resistance
and disobedience. And any person who comes to the aid
of the person in authority shall be deemed an agent of a
person in authority. Accordingly, the attack on C is, in the
eyes of law, an attack on an agent of a person in authority,
not just the attack on the student.
Who are deemed to be persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority?
Persons in authority are those directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of
some court or government corporation, board, or
commission. Barrio captains and barangay chairmen are
also deemed persons in authority.
Agents of persons in authority are persons who by
direct provision of law or by election or by appointment
by competent authority, are charged with maintenance of
public order, the protection and security of life and
property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman,
barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of
persons in authority.
In applying the provisions of Arts. 148 and 151 of the
RPC, teachers, professors and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual
performance of their professional duties or on the
23
 CRIMINAL LAW
occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons
in authority.
Sydeco, the cook and the waitress in his restaurant
were on the way home when they were signalled to
stop by Police Officers who asked Sydeco to open the
vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle
search. When Sydeco opened the vehicle window, he
insisted on a plain view search, obviously irked by
this remark, one of the policemen told him he was
drunk, pointing to three empty beer bottles in the
trunk of the vehicle. The Officers then pulled Sydeco
out of the vehicle and brought him to the Ospital ng
Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical
certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey
Balucating depicting Sydeco as positive of alcoholic
breath, although no alcohol breath examination was
conducted. Sydeco was detained and released only in
the afternoon of the following day when he was
allowed to undergo actual medical examination
where the resulting medical certificate indicated that
he has sustained physical injuries but negative for
alcohol breath. Is Sydeco criminally liable for any
crime?
No. It is fairly clear that what triggered the
confrontational stand-off between the Police Officers, on
one hand, and Sydeco on the other, was the latter’s refusal
to get off of the vehicle for a body and vehicle search
juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only.
Sydeco’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as
resisting a lawful order. He may have sounded boorish or
spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make
him a criminal.
It remains to stress that he has not, when flagged down,
committed a crime or performed an overt act warranting
a reasonable inference of criminal activity.
The two key elements of resistance and serious
disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1)
That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the
offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously
disobeys such person or his agent. There can be no
quibble that the officer and his apprehending team are
persons in authority or agents of a person in authority
manning a legal checkpoint. But surely Sydeco’s act of
exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches to
be conducted in the middle of the night cannot, in context,
be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful
order in contemplation of Art. 151 (Sydeco v. People, G.R.
No. 202692, November 12, 2014).
Q: Manny killed his wife under exceptional
circumstances and was sentenced by RTC Dagupan of
destierro during which he was not allowed to enter
Dagupan City. While serving sentence, Manny went to
Dagupan City to visit his mother. Later, he was
arrested in Manila. Did Manny commit any crime?
(1998 BAR)
A: Yes, Manny committed the crime of evasion of service
of sentence when he went to Dagupan City, which he was
prohibited from entering under his sentence of destierro.
A sentence imposing the penalty of destierro is evaded
when the convict enters any of the place/places he is
prohibited from entering under the sentence or come
within the prohibited radius. Although destierro does not
24
involve imprisonment, it is nonetheless a deprivation of
liberty.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
In falsification of public documents, is it necessary
that there be the idea of gain or intent to injure a
third person?
No. In falsification of public or official documents, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
truth as therein solemnly proclaimed (Galeos v. People,
G.R. Nos. 174730-37, February 9, 2011).
Q: Aniceta owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
V-16641. When Aniceta passed away, one of her
surviving heirs, Teresita, went to the former's house
to look for the owner's duplicate title of the subject
property, but the same was allegedly nowhere to be
found. Accordingly, Teresita executed an affidavit of
loss, which was annotated on the title on file with the
Registry of Deeds (RD). Teresita also filed a petition
for the issuance of second owner's duplicate copy.
The said petition, however, was dismissed on the
basis of the opposition of Lamsen, who claimed that
the original copy of the owner's duplicate title could
not have been lost because it was with him.
Meanwhile, the RD informed Teresita that somebody
requested for the registration of a deed of sale
involving the subject property. Thus, she proceeded
to the RD but was informed that the requesting party
had withdrawn all the papers; hence, she asked for
the Book of the RD to photocopy the withdrawal
aforementioned. Thereafter, she went to the Notarial
Section of Manila to get a certified true copy of the
subject deed but was given a mere photocopy thereof.
She then submitted the photocopy of the deed to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Upon
examination, the document examiner confirmed that
the deed was indeed falsified. Is Lamsen guilty of
falsification of public documents under Article 172
(1) of the RPC?
A: Lamsen is not guilty of falsification of public
documents under Article 172 (1) of the RPC. The fact of
forgery can only be established by a comparison between
the alleged forged signature and the authentic and
genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized to have been forged. The document examiner
testified during cross-examination that the questioned
signatures were not written by one and the same person.
The Court, however, found this declaration unreliable
and inconclusive, as the document examiner found that
no definite conclusion can be rendered because the
documents submitted by the prosecution were mere
photocopies of the original. Since mere photocopies of the
subject deed were used to examine the questioned and
standard signatures of spouses Aniceta and Nestor, no
valid comparison can be had between them, thereby
rendering the document examiner’s declaration
inconclusive to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against Lamsen. (Hilario Lamsen Vs.
People, G.R. No. 227069, November 22, 2017, J. Perlas-
Bernabe case)
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
Q: Kathleen L. Siy instructed her secretary, Marissa
Bautista, to withdraw via ATM the amount of
P38,000.00 from her Metrobank and Bank of the
Philippine Islands bank accounts. However, Bautista
was not able to make such withdrawal as the ATM
was offline so she took it from the petty cash
custodian of UMC instead, but she forgot to inform Siy
where she got the money. UMC Finance Manager
Violeta Q. Dizon-Lacanilao informed Siy that as per
the Petty Cash Replenishment Report prepared by
UMC Petty Cash Custodian Manansala, she allegedly
made a cash advance in the amount of P38,000.00
which remained unliquidated. It was only then that
Siy found out what Bautista had done, and she
immediately rectified the situation by issuing two (2)
checks to reimburse UMC's petty cash account.
Lacanilao instructed Manansala to revise the subject
report by deleting the entry relating to Siy's alleged
cash advance, to which Manansala acceded.
Thereafter, Lacanilao instructed Manansala to
retrieve the subject report, re-insert the entry
relating to Siy's alleged cash advance therein, reprint
the same on a scratch paper, and repeatedly fold the
paper to make it look old. On the basis of the
reprinted subject document, Siy was
administratively charged for using office funds for
personal use. Siy was terminated from her job and
Lacanilao succeeded the former. Is Manansala guilty
for the crime of Falsification of Private Documents?
A: Yes. Manansala is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the aforesaid crime, considering that: (a) as UMC's Petty
Cash Custodian, she is legally obligated to disclose only
truthful statements in the documents she prepares in
connection with her work, such as the subject report; (b)
she knew all along that Siy never made any cash advance
nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use; (c)
despite such knowledge, she still proceeded in revising
the subject report by inserting therein a statement that
Siy made such a cash advance; and (d) she caused great
prejudice to Siy as the latter was terminated from her job
on account of the falsified report that she prepared.
(Adina B. Manansala V. People, GR No. 215424, December
09, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
NOTE: In falsification of private document, intent to
cause damage to a third person is material.
A counterfeited the signature of B but what he
entered in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of B
are all true. Since there was no damage to the
government, did he commit a crime?
Yes. In falsification of a public document, it is immaterial
whether or not the contents set forth therein were false.
What is important is the fact that the signature of another
was counterfeited. In a crime of falsification of a public
document, the principal thing punished is the violation of
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed. Thus, intent to gain or injure is
immaterial. Even more so, the gain or damage is not
necessary (Caubang v. People, G.R. No. L-62634 June 26,
1992).
Can falsification be committed by omission?
Yes. In the case of People v. Dizon, an assistant
bookkeeper who, having bought several articles for
which he signed several chits, intentionally did not record
25
in his personal account most of the said chits and
destroyed them so that he could avoid paying the amount
thereof was held guilty of falsification by omission.
Is there a complex crime of estafa through
falsification of a private document?
None. The fraudulent gain obtained through deceit in
estafa, in the commission of which a private document
was falsified is nothing more or less than the very damage
caused by the falsification of such document.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
X, an 11 year-old girl, had sexual intercourse with her
18 year-old boyfriend Y. They performed the act in a
secluded vacant lot. Unknown to them, there was a
roving policeman at that time. Hence, they were
arrested. What crime did they commit?
The sexual intercourse with the girl constitutes statutory
rape. Though the act was carried out in a public place,
criminal liability for grave scandal cannot be incurred.
NOTE: For grave scandal to apply, the highly scandalous
conduct should not fall within any other article of the
RPC. Thus, this article provides for a crime of last resort.
CRIMES COMMITTED
BY PUBLIC OFFICERS
Define malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance.
(BAR 2016)
MALFEASANCE MISFEASANCE NONFEASANCE
Performance of Improper Omission of
some act which performance some act which
ought not to be of some act ought to be
done. which might performed.
be lawfully
done.
Q: Gen. Nazareno as Chief and Chairman of PNP
channeled the PNP funds to the PNP Service Store
System (SSS) through "Funded RIVs" for an alleged
“ghost” purchase of combat, clothing and equipment
valued at ₱8 million. The RIV’s were released without
the approval of the NAPOLCOM and DBM. They
caused it to appear that there were purchases of
gears when in fact, there were none. Thereafter,
Lihayhay and Vinluan certified that the items were
delivered, properly inspected and accepted, and
subsequently distributed to the end- users. Are
Lihayhay and Vinluan conspirators in the violation of
violation of Section 3(e) of the "Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act?”
A: Yes. Having affixed their signatures on the disputed
documents despite the glaring defects found therein,
petitioners were properly found to have acted with
evident bad faith in approving the "ghost" purchases in
the amount of ₱8,000,000.00. To note, their concerted
actions, when taken together, demonstrate a common
design which altogether justifies the finding of
conspiracy.
By virtue of the duty given to them by law as well as by
rules and regulations, Lihayhay and Vinluan had the
 CRIMINAL LAW
responsibility to examine each voucher to ascertain
whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and
disburse the cash advance. (Vinluan vs. People of The
Philippines, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013, J. Perlas-
Bernabe case)
Q: Governor A was given the amount of PIO million by
the Department of Agriculture for the purpose of
buying seedlings to be distributed to the farmers.
Supposedly intending to modernize the farming
industry in his province, Governor A bought farm
equipment through direct purchase from XY
Enterprise, owned by his kumpare B, the alleged
exclusive distributor of the said equipment. Upon
inquiry, the Ombudsman discovered that B has a
pending patent application for the said farm
equipment. Moreover, the equipment purchased
turned out to be overpriced. What crime or crimes, if
any, were committed by Governor A? (BAR 2016)
A: Governor A committed the crimes of: (1) technical
malversation; and (2) violations of Sections 3(e) and (g)
of RA 3019.
Governor A committed technical malversation under Art.
220 of the RPC. The amount of P10M granted by the
Department of Agriculture to Governor A, an accountable
public officer, is specificially appropriated for the
purpose of buying seedlings to be distributed to the
farmers. Instead, Governor A applied the amount to
aquire modern farm equipment through direct purchase
from XY Enterprise owned by his kumpare. The law
punishes the act of diverting public funds earmarked by
law or ordinance for a specific public purpose to another
public purpose; hence, the liability for technical
malversation.
Governor A can also be held liable for violation of Section
3(e) of RA 3019. All the elements are present. “Through
manifest partiality” in favoring his kumpare, Governor A
did not hold a public bidding and directly purchased the
farm equipment from his kumpare. Further, Governor A’
actions caused undue injury to the government as well as
the farmers who were deprived of the seedlings. His acts
likewise gave his kumpare, a private party, the
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, to the
exclusion of other interested suppliers.
The act by Governor A is also a violation of Section 3(g) of
RA 3019 for entering a contract on behalf of the
government which is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same.
Q: The public prosecutor has to render his resolution
on a case filed before their office. While the
investigating public prosecutor was already drafting
his resolution, the respondent in the said case
arrived. A close door talk took place between the two
wherein the respondent offered the public
prosecutor P2M in exchange for the dismissal of the
case filed against the respondent. The public
prosecutor accepted the P2M. Later, by reason of the
bribe money given to him, the prosecutor issued a
resolution dismissing the said case for lack of
probable cause.
a) What crime/crimes is/are committed by the public
prosecutor?
26
The public prosecutor is liable for direct bribery under
Article 210. First, he is a public officer. Second, the said
public prosecutor accepted a bribe money in the amount
of P2M in connection with the performance of a criminal
act which has a connection with his official function.
Hence, he is liable for Direct Bribery.
The public prosecutor is also liable for Dereliction of Duty
in the Prosecution of Offenses under Art. 208. By reason
of the P2M given to him by the respondent, the public
prosecutor actually rendered the said resolution
dismissing the case despite his knowledge that the
offender had actually committed the crime. He is a public
officer who has the duty to prosecute and he knows the
commission of the crime, yet he did not cause the
prosecution of the offender. He did so with malice and
deliberate intent to favor the violator of the law because
of the bribe money given to him. So in this case the public
prosecutor is liable for two crimes: (1) Direct Bribery and
(2) Dereliction of Duty in the Prosecution of Offenses.
b) Without direct bribery, dereliction of duty in the
prosecution of offenses will not be committed. Are
you going to complex these crimes considering that
one is a necessary means to commit the other?
No. Art. 210 prohibit the complexity of crimes. Under Art.
210, the liability of direct bribery shall be in addition to
the liability attaching to the public officer for the
commission of the crime agreed upon.
Q: X a police officer, was conducting a patrol in an
area when he noticed a man hiding behind a mango
tree. He saw that the man was intently looking at the
house across the street. When the gate of the house
opened just as when a car was about to leave the
house, the man immediately boarded his motorcycle,
went near the said gate and thereafter repeatedly
shot the driver of the car which resulted to the instant
death of the latter. The man in the motorcycle got
away. The police officer chased him and was able to
arrest him. However, the man in the motorcycle said,
“If you allow me to leave, I’ll give you P500, 000.00.”
The police officer accepted the money and allowed
him to leave. What crime if any is committed by the
said police officer?
A: The police officer is liable for qualified bribery under
Art. 211-A. The police officer is a public officer in charge
with the enforcement of the law and he resisted to arrest
a person who has committed a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua and/or death. The police officer did
not arrest the said man because of the P500, 000.00 given
to him.
Q: X has been appointed as the new head of LTO.
During his first day in office, Y visited him. Y talked to
X and after their exchange of pleasantries, the visitor
left. When Y left, he also left a small gift box on top of
the table of X containing a key to a new car and a note
that the car is in the parking space at the basement of
the building. X went to the basement and used the car.
Is X liable for any crime?
A: X is liable for indirect bribery under Art. 211 because
he is a public officer and he accepts a gift by reason of his
office. Y, the visitor, does not require him to do anything;
it was merely given to him because he was newly
appointed as the LTO Chief. His acceptance brings about
the consummation of indirect bribery.
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
NOTE: There is no attempted or frustrated indirect
bribey because it is committed by accepting gifts offered
to the public officer by reason of his office.
In the abovementioned cases, what is/are the
criminal liability of the person giving the bribe?
They are liable for corruption of public officials under Art.
212. It is committed by any person who shall have made
the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents in the
consummation of direct or indirect bribery.
NOTE: The offender is the giver of gifts or offeror of
promise. The public officer sought to be bribed is not
criminally liable, unless he accepts the gift or consents to
the offer of the offender.
Q: Don Gabito, a philanthropist, offered to fund
several projects of the Mayor. He opened an account
in the Mayor’s name and regularly deposited various
amounts ranging from P500,000.00 to P1 Million.
From this account, the Mayor withdrew and used the
money for constructing feeder roads, barangay
clinics, repairing schools and for all other municipal
projects. It was subsequently discovered that Don
Gabito was actually a jueteng operator and the
amounts he deposited were proceeds from his
jueteng operations. What crime/s were committed?
Who are criminally liable? Explain. (BAR 2005)
A: Don Gabito is liable for Corruption of Public Officials
under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code for having
given the amounts that were deposited in an account
which he opened in the Mayor’s name for no reason but
the public position or office held by the Mayor;
The Mayor is liable for Indirect Bribery for accepting such
money deposited in his account by using them when they
were given to him for no other reason except for his
public position as a Mayor and Violation of Rep. Act 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees) and for receiving such gift from
someone who may be affected by the functions of his
office.
Q: Accused Hernandez served a Mission Order
against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. There
were complaints against Aoyagi for being suspected
as a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an
overstaying alien. To prove his innocence, Aoyagi
gave his passport to Hernandez as guarantee for his
appearance at a BID hearing. In a meeting outside the
BID Office, accused Hernandez allegedly demanded 1
million pesos for the return of Aoyagi’s passport.
Because of such demand, an entrapment operation
was made. In a meeting to return Aoyagi’s passport,
Hernandez immediately left after the payment was
made to his co-accused. Is the act of direct bribery
committed even though his act of returning the
passport is not a crime?
A: Yes. The second kind of direct bribery was committed
by the accused. Accused was convicted under the second
kind of direct bribery, which contained the following
elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who
received the gifts or presents personally or through
another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not
constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise
of official duties. First, there is no question that the
27
offense was committed by a public officer. Hernandez
extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of
the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring a
visa. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff,
which Acejas received for the group. Third, the money
was given in consideration of the return of the passport,
an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the
confiscation and the return of the passport were made in
the exercise of official duties. (Acejas III v. People, G.R. No.
156643, June 27, 2007).
Q: Torres was the principal of a high school. The
school’s collection and disbursing officer prepared 3
checks representing the teachers’ and employees’
salaries and other compensation for the months of
January to March, 1994 in the total amount of
P196,654.54. Torres signed the three (3) checks and
encashed them. However, he never returned to the
school to deliver the money and contends that a
group of armed men took the encashed checks from
him. The RTC convicted Torres of the crime of
malversation of public funds. He appealed his case.
May Torres be properly convicted based on the
information which clearly charged him with
intentional malversation and not malversation
through negligence, which was the actual nature of
malversation for which he was convicted by the RTC?
A: Yes. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must
either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while
the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not
preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence
of negligence because both are equally punishable under
Article 217 of the RPC. Even when the Information
charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation
through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence
ultimately proves the mode of commission of the offense.
The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from mode proved, the same
offense of malversation is involved and conviction
thereof is proper (Torres v. People, G.R. No. 175074,
August 31, 2011).
Q: Major Cantos was assigned to supervise the
disbursement of funds for the PSG personnel and to
perform other finance duties. He placed the money in
a duffel bag and kept it inside the steel cabinet in his
office. One day, he inspected the steel cabinet and
discovered that the duffel bag which contained the
money was missing. He was found liable by the RTC
for malversation. Major Cantos contends that he
could not be liable for malversation for mere failure
to produce the funds does not necessarily mean that
he misappropriated the same. Is he liable for
malversation of public funds?
A: Yes. The presumption in Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, states that the failure of a public
officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by
any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that
he has put such missing fund or property to personal use.
The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if
petitioner is able to present adequate evidence that can
nullify any likelihood that he put the funds or property to
personal use, then that presumption would be at an end
 CRIMINAL LAW
and the prima facie case is effectively negated. In this
case, however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima
facie evidence of guilt (Cantos v. People, G.R. No. 184908,
July 3, 2013).
Q: Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of Masinloc,
Zambales. On January 10, 1994, she received, as
municipal treasurer, from the Department of Public
Works and Highways, the amount of P100,000.00
known as the fund for construction, rehabilitation,
betterment, and improvement (CRBI) for the
concreting of Barangay Phanix Road located in
Masinloc, Zambales, a project undertaken on
proposal of the Barangay Captain. Informed that the
fund was already exhausted while the concreting of
Barangay Phanix Road remained unfinished, a
representative of the Commission on Audit
conducted a spot audit of Elizabeth who failed to
account for the P100,000.00 CRBI fund. Elizabeth,
who was charged with malversation of public funds,
was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of that charge
but was nevertheless convicted, in the same criminal
case, for illegal use of public funds. On appeal,
Elizabeth argued that her conviction was erroneous
as she applied the amount of P50,000.00 for a public
purpose without violating any law or ordinance
appro-priating the said amount for any specific
purpose. The absence of such law or ordinance was,
in fact, established. Is the contention of Elizabeth
legally tenable? Explain. (BAR 1996)
A: Elizabeth’s contention that her conviction for illegal
use of public funds (technical malversation) was
erroneous, is legally tenable because she was charged for
malversation of public funds under Art. 217 of the
Revised Penal Code but was convicted for illegal use of
public funds which is defined and punished under Art.
220 of said Code. A public officer charged with
malversation may not be validly convicted of illegal use
of public funds (technical malversation) because the
latter crime is not necessarily included nor does it
necessarily include the crime of malversation. From the
facts, there is no showing that there is a law or ordinance
appropriating the amount to a specific public purpose.
As a matter of fact, the problem categorically states that,
“the absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact,
established." So, procedurally and substantially, the
Sandiganbayan’s decision suffers from serious infirmity.
Q: COA Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan examined the
year-end reports involving the municipal officials of
Alfonso Lista, Ifugao and during the course of her
examination, she came across a disbursement
voucher for P101,736.00 prepared for Lumauig, a
former mayor of the municipality, as cash advance
for the payment of freight and other cargo charges for
12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to
the municipality. Despite the full efforts of COA,
letters informing him of the unliquidated cash
advance were not sent because of the address of the
same cannot be obtained. Lumauig admitted having
obtained the cash advance of P101,736.00 during his
incumbency as municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista,
Ifugao. This amount was intended for the payment of
freight and insurance coverage of 12 units of
motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the
City of Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he
was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He
claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or
28
liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles
were already turned over to the municipality. Can
Lumauig be held liable for the crime of failure of
accountable officer to render account?
A: Yes, Lumauig can be held liable with the crime of
failure of accountable officer to render account under Art.
218. To be liable for such crime, the following requisites
must be present: (1) that the offender is a public officer,
whether in the service or separated therefrom; (2) that
he must be an accountable officer for public funds or
property; (3) that he is required by law or regulation to
render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a
provincial auditor; and (4) that he fails to do so for a
period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered. The law does not state that there must first be
a demand for an officer to be held liable. Therefore, he is
liable to such crime (People v. Lumauig, G.R. No. 166680,
July 7, 2014).
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
What are the essential elements of parricide as to
relationship?
The relationship of the offender with the victim must
be:
1. Legitimate, except in the case of parent and child;
2. In the direct line; and
3. By blood, except in the case of a legitimate spouse.
Q: Edward Benito was eating corn at a sari-sari store
in a nearby establishment when he heard a
commotion. Then he saw his cousin, Elner Aro,
already sprawled on the ground. While in that
position, Wacoy proceeded to kick Aro’s stomach
twice as he was on the ground, and thereafter Quibac
punched Aro’s stomach as he tried to stand up. As a
result, Aro collapsed and was taken to the hospital.
Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from “blunt
abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum” and
was set for an operaton. However, during the
operation, Aro suffered a cardiac arrest and lapsed
into a coma after being revived. Due to financial
constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against
the doctor’s orders, and eventually died. Whether or
not Wacoy and Quibac is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide?
A: Yes, Wacoy and Quibac is guilty of the crime of
Homicide and not of Death Caused in a Tumultuous
Affray. The elements of Homicide are the following: a
person was killed; the accused killed him without any
justifying circumstance; the accused had the intention to
kill, which is presumed; and the killing was not attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by
that of Parricide or Infanticide.
Wacoy and Quibac were dentified as the ones who
assaulted Aro, hence Aro’s death cannot be said to have
been caused in a tumultuous affray. There is a crime of
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray when, while several
persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused
and tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray
someone is killed, and that it cannot be ascertained who
actually killed the deceased. Furthermore, it is well-
settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act
of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal
violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences thereof. (Guillermo
Wacoy Y Bitol v. People, GR No. 213792, June 22, 2015, J.
Perlas-Bernabe case)
Explain and illustrate the stages of execution of the
crime of homicide, taking into account the nature of
the offense, the essential element of each of the stages
of execution and the manner of committing such
intentional felony as distinguished from felony
committed through reckless imprudence. (BAR
2012)
Elements of the crime
Homicide as an intentional felony has three stages,
attempted, frustrated and consummated.
In whatever stages homicide is committed, intent to kill
must be established for being an indispensible element
thereof. However, if the victim died as a consequence of
wounds caused by an act committed with malice, intent
to kill is conclusively presumed and the crime committed
is consummated homicide. Because of this conclusive
presumption, lack of intent to kill is not a defense in
consummated homicide.
NOTE: In consummated homicide, the accused may prove
lack of intent to kill for purpose of appreciating the
mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem.
But if the victim did not die as a consequence of wounds
caused by an act committed with malice, intent to kill
must be established beyond reasonable doubt. If intent to
kill is proven, the crime committed is frustrated or
attempted homicide. If intent to kill is not proven, the
crime committed is physical injuries. Thus, lack of intent
to kill is a defense in attempted or frustrated
homicide.
Murder vis-a-vis Homicide
Q: CASAS, with RON-RON, went to a taho factory in San
Juan City looking for a certain JESUS. Failing to find
JESUS, he took out his knife and stuck it in a pail used
in making taho. ELIGIO confronted CASAS and the two
had a fistfight. In the course of the fight, CASAS
stabbed ELIGIO twice while the latter was trying to
flee. During the pursuit of ELIGIO, CASAS stabbed
JOEL who was trying to help ELIGIO using a bamboo
pole, which caused JOEL’s death. Thereafter, CASAS
was able to overtake ELIGIO and again stabbed the
latter. CASAS was charged with Murder and
Frustrated Murder, but the RTC and CA convicted him
of Murder and Attempted Homicide and treachery
was appreciated for the former crime. Are the lower
courts correct?
A: The lower courts were correct in ruling that CASAS
was guilty of Attempted Homicide, but not for the
Murder. Instead, CASAS should be guilty only of homicide
because the qualifying circumstance of Treachery is not
present. Among the qualifying circumstances under
Article 248 is treachery and to appreciate treachery, it
must be shown that: (a) the means of execution employed
gives the victim no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (b) the methods of execution were
29
deliberately or consciously adopted. Should it appear that
the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and,
instead of fleeing from it he met it and was killed as a
result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery
cannot be appreciated.
JOEL, seeing that CASAS had stabbed ELIGIO, wanted to
help the latter by using a bamboo pole, but slipped and
fell. JOEL was fully aware of the danger posed in assisting
ELIGIO. He knew that CASAS was armed with a knife and
had just used the same on ELIGIO. JOEL elected to
intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. It
is rather obvious that JOEL was aware of the danger to his
life. Further, acting in the heat of the moment, it does not
appear that CASAS deliberately adopted the means in
order to ensure that JOEL had no opportunity to defend
himself. (People vs. Benjamin Cases Y Vintulan, G.R. No.
212565, February 25, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Nature of the crime
If the offender with intent to kill attempted to inflict or
inflicted non-mortal wounds upon the victim, he already
directly commenced an overt act to commit homicide.
Hence, the crime committed is attempted homicide if he
failed to inflict mortal wounds upon the victim by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. If the offender with intent to kill
inflicted mortal wounds upon the victim, he already
performed all acts of execution which would produce the
homicide as a consequence.
If death is not produced despite the mortal character of
the wounds due to causes independent of the will of the
offender, the crime committed is frustrated homicide.
If death is produced, the crime committed is
consummated homicide. In this situation, all the
elements necessary for execution and accomplishment of
homicide are present if the victim dies due to the wounds
inflicted by the offender with the intent to kill.
Cite five (5) factors in ascertaining intent to kill.
1. Means used by the malefactors;
2. Nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by
the victim;
3. Conduct of the malefactors before, during, or
immediately after the killing of the victim;
4. Circumstances under which the crime was
committed;
5. Motive of the offender; and
6. Words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries
on the victim (De Guzman, Jr. v. People, G.R. No.
178512 November 26, 2014)
 CRIMINAL LAW
Q: On his way to buy a lotto ticket, a policeman
suddenly found himself surrounded by four men. One
of them wrestled the police officer to the ground and
disarmed him while the other three companions who
were armed with a hunting knife, an ice pick, and a
balisong, repeatedly stabbed him. The policeman
died as a result of the multiple stab wounds inflicted
by his assailants. What crime or crimes were
committed? Discuss fully. (BAR 1995)
A: All the assailants are liable for the crime of murder,
qualified by treachery, (which absorbed abuse of
superior strength) as the attack was sudden and
unexpected and the victim was totally defenseless.
Conspiracy is obvious from the concerted acts of the
assailants. Direct assault would not complex the crime, as
there is no showing that the assailants knew that the
victim was a policeman; even if there was knowledge, the
fact is that he was not in the performance of his official
duties, and therefore there is no direct assault.
Note: The suddenness of the attack would not, by itself,
suffice to support a finding of treachery. However, where
proof obtains that the victim was completely deprived of
a real chance to defend himself against the attack, as in
the instant case, thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery ought to and should be
appreciated. Verily, what is decisive is that the attack was
executed in a manner that the victim was rendered
defenseless and unable to retaliate (People of the
Philippines v. Soriano, G.R. No. 216063, June 5, 2017).
Dagami concealed Bugna’s body and the fact that he
killed him by setting Bugna’s house on fire. What
crime or crimes did Dagami commit?
A. Murder, the arson being absorbed already
B. Separate crimes of murder and arson
C. Arson, the homicide being absorbed already
D. Arson with murder as a compound crime
NOTE: The crimes are separated because there were two
distinct crimes committed. First is the killing and second
is the burning of the house to conceal the evidence.
Q: A, B and C are members of SFC Fraternity. While
eating in a seaside restaurant, they were attacked by
X, Y and Z members of a rival fraternity. A rumble
ensued in which the above-named members of the
two fraternities assaulted each other in confused and
tumultuous manner resulting in the death of A. As it
cannot be ascertained who actually killed A, the
members of the two fraternities took part in the
rumble and were charged for death caused in a
tumultuous affray. Will the charge prosper? (2010
BAR)
A: No, the charge of death caused in a tumultuous affray
will not prosper. In death caused by tumultuous affray
under Art. 251 of the RPC, it is essential that the persons
involved did not compose groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other
reciprocally. In this case, there is no tumultuous affray
since the participants in the rumble belong to organized
fraternity.
State the effects of the reclassification of rape into a
crime against person (BAR 1993)
30
1. The procedural requirement of consent of the
offended party to file the case is no longer needed
because this is now a public crime, unlike when it was
still classified as a crime against chastity; and
2. There is now an impossible crime of rape because
impossible crimes can only be committed against
persons or property.
Note: Resistance is not an element of rape, and the
absence thereof will never be tantamount to consent on
the part of the victim. Besides, in rape committed by a
relative, such as a father, as in this case, moral influence
or ascendancy takes the place of violence (People vs.
Bandoquillo, G.R. No. 218913, February 07, 2018).
A rape victim has no burden to prove that she did all
within her power to resist the force or intimidation
employed upon her. As long as the force or intimidation
present, whether it was more or less irresistible is beside
the point. Though a man puts no hand on a woman, yet if
by the use of mental and moral coercion and intimidation,
the accused so overpowers her mind out of fear that as a
result she dared not resist the dastardly act inflicted on
her person, accused is guilty of the crime imputed to him
(People of the Philippines v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 213390,
March 15, 2017).
Q: Iris was 16 years old when Gil, a pastor, met her in
a garage to eat with him. Because of her fear to get
reprimanded by Gil, she followed the latter’s request.
Iris felt dizzy so Gil assisted the former to her room.
Gil started kissing Iris which prompted her to
scream. Consequently, Gil covered Iris’ mouth with a
pillow and soon after, he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. Gil was charged by Iris’
grandfather with rape. In his defense, Gil claimed that
Iris and him were sweethearts.
A: In defense, records show that Gil never denied any of
the above-stated sexual encounters, but merely
maintained the he and Iris were sweethearts. Mere denial
cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness.
Further, the sweetheart theory does not, by and of itself,
negate the commission of rape. Finally, the fact that Iris
was a minor during the foregoing incidents casts serious
doubt on the efficacy of the consent purportedly given by
her. (Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, G.R. No. 182130,
June 19, 2013, , J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: AJ, a medical student, was a boarder in the house
of Mr. and Mrs. M who had a good-looking 25-year old
retarded daughter with the mental age of an 11-year
old girl. One day when the couple were out, Perlita,
the retarded daughter, entered AJ’s room, came near
him and started kissing him. He tried to avoid her.
But she persisted. They had sexual intercourse. This
was repeated every time Perlita’s parents were out
until Perlita got pregnant. Mr. and Mrs. M filed a
complaint of rape against AJ who claimed that it was
Perlita who seduced him that Perlita was intelligent,
clearly understood what she was doing, and that
since Perlita was already 25 years old and did not
herself filed the complaint, her parents had no
personality to file the complaint for rape. How would
you resolve the case? (1987 BAR)
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
A: The contention of AJ cannot be sustained. Sexual
intercourse with Perlita, who is a mental retardate,
although 25 years old but with a mental age of 11 years
old girl is rape. She is the same class as a woman deprived
of reason or otherwise unconscious. Since she is suffering
from an incapacity, being incompetent on account of her
mental age, the parents have the right to file the
complaint for rape.
Note: The crime of rape is committed when the offended
party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious.
Physical force, threat or intimidation is not necessary, for
the simple reason that an unconscious and extremely
intoxicated woman, cannot freely and voluntarily give
her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse (People vs.
Caga, G.R. No. 206878, August 8, 2016).
Q: XXX (then a 10 year-old boy) requested his mother
to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa.
Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative and
textmate of XXX. After dinner, XXX’s mother told
Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was
late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living
room floor. It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke
as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and
something inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde
"fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the
sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her
what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde
played with his sexual organ. XXX’s mother armed
herself with a knife for self-defense when she
confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he
remained silent. She asked him to leave. Is Ricalde
guilty of the crime of rape?
A: Yes, all the elements of rape is present in the case at
bar. Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is
also known as "instrument or object rape," "gender-free
rape," or "homosexual rape." Any person who, under any
of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,
shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of
another person. The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person’s genital or anal orifice’’ (Ricalde v.
People, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015).
Q: AAA was on her way home when ARGUTA and
CAHIPE, with the use of a bladed weapon, threatened
her, dragged her in a cottage where the two bound
AAA’s hands and feet and raped the latter. Thereafter,
the two left AAA in the cottage. After one hour,
CAHIPE returned and dragged AAA into a store where
he again raped AAA. ARGUTA and CAHIPE are
charged and convicted of Simple Rape. Are the two
accused guilty of Simple Rape under Article 266-A?
A: No. ARGUTA and CAHIPE are not liable for Simple Rape
under Article 266-A of the RPC, but of Qualified Rape
under the old rape law provision (Article 335). Under
Article 335, whenever the crime of rape is committed
with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When either of these two are present, the crime will be
Qualified Rape necessitating the imposition of the higher
penalty. If one is present, the remaining circumstance, if
also attendant, is not a generic aggravating circumstance
for either is not considered as generic aggravating
31
circumstance under Article 14 of the RPC which
enumerates the aggravating circumstances.
ARGUTA and CAHIPE threatened AAA with a bladed
instrument and tied her up before having carnal
knowledge of her without her consent. Force or
intimidation need not be irresistible as long as the
accused’s objective is accomplished. The act of holding a
bladed instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of
force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim
with the same is sufficient to bring her into submission,
and the fact the two persons committed the act, they are
guilty of Qualified Rape (People vs. Arguta, G.R. No.
213216, April 20, 2015, J. Perlas-Bernabe)
Q: AAA, a 67-year-old woman, was fast asleep when
Bill covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife
and told her not to scream because he will have
sexual intercourse with her. Thereafter, he removed
AAA’s underwear. However, his penis was not yet
erected so he toyed with AAA’s sexual organ by
licking it. He then made his way up and tried to suck
AAA’s tongue. Once done, Bill held his penis and
inserted it to AAA’s vagina. In his defense, bill argued
that during the entire alleged incident AAA never
reacted at all. Is Bill guilty of rape?
A: Yes, Bill is guilty of rape. AAA was already 67 years of
age when she was raped in the dark by Bill who was
armed with a knife, a woman of such advanced age could
only recoil in fear and succumb into submission. In any
case, with such shocking and horrifying experience, it
would not be reasonable to impose upon AAA any
standard form of reaction. Different people react
differently to a given situation involving a startling
occurrence (People v. Jastiva, G.R. No. 199268, February
12, 2014).
Q: One night while AAA was sleeping, XXX hugged her
and kissed her nape and neck. He then undressed
AAA and went on top of her and held her hands.
Afterwards, he parted AAA’s legs and then tried to
insert his penis into her vagina. XXX’s penis touched
AAA’s vagina but he stopped as soon as AAA’s cry got
louder. He then threatened AAA not to disclose the
incident. What crime is committed?
A: XXX is guilty of attempted rape. Without showing of
such carnal knowledge, XXX is guilty only of attempted
rape. Mere touching cannot be considered as slight
penetration. Since XXX did not succeed in inserting his
penis in AAA’s female organ he cannot be convicted of
consummated rape. Slightest penile penetration is
necessary (People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5,
2012).
 CRIMINAL LAW
CRIMES AGAINST
PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY
Anniban and Lerio are neighbors. Lerio entered the
house of Anniban, laid down beside the infant child of
Anniban and began chatting with her. Lerio then told
Anniban that she would take the infant outside to
bask him under the morning sun but the latter
refused. A few minutes later, Anniban realized that
Lerio and her child were no longer in the house. After
searching, Anniban found her infant child, Lerio’s
boyfriend, and Lerio on board a vessel. Lerio,
together with co-accused were charged with
Kidnapping of a Minor. Are they liable as charged?
Yes. The following are the elements of kidnapping under
Art. 267, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code:
1. The offender is a private individual;
2. He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other
manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty;
3. The act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
4. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female
or a public officer.
Q: Norada and Seva made a plan to kidnap Ray Truck.
On the appointed day, Accused Villanueva fetched
Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck in the house of Pacil in
Valladolid but only Reggie Pacil came. Ray Truck
remained in the house of Reggie Pacil in Valladolid.
The non-appearance of Ray Truck made them change
their plan. They decided to just kidnap Reggie Pacil
as they were convinced that Rey Truck will pay
ransom for his release. However no ransom was
made and they have killed Pacil. Is there kidnapping?
A: None, The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the
actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his
liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of
time." The totality of the prosecution's evidence failed to
sufficiently establish the offense of kidnapping in this
case. There was no concrete evidence whatsoever to
establish, or from which it can be inferred that accused
and his cohorts intended to actually deprive the victim of
his liberty for some time and for some purpose. There
was also no evidence that they have thoroughly planned
the kidnapping of the victim. There was lack of motive to
resort in kidnapping the victim for they were bent to
kidnap his friend Truck (People vs. Norada, et. Al., G.R. No.
218958, December 13, 2017).
Sexy boarded a taxi on her way home from a party.
Because she was already tipsy, she fell asleep. Pogi,
the taxi driver, decided to take advantage of the
situation and drove Sexy to a deserted place where he
raped her for a period of two (2) weeks. What crime
did Pogi commit? (BAR 2014)
Pogi committed the special complex crime of Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention with Rape.
All the elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention are present. Pogi, a private individual,
kidnapped and detained Sexy by bringing her to a
deserted place. Said detention is illegal and is serious
32
because it lasted for more than 3 days and the victim is a
female.
The special complex crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention with Rape resulted because Sexy, the
victim of the kidnapping and detention, was raped as a
consequence of the detention. (Article 267, last par., RPC)
Since it is a special complex crime, regardless of the
number of times the victim had been raped, there is only
one single indivisible offense of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention with Rape.
NOTE: There is no complex crime of kidnapping with
attempted rape. There is also no complex crime of illegal
detention with rape.
While walking alone on her way home from a party,
Mildred was seized at gun point by Felipe and taken
on board a tricycle to a house some distance away.
Felipe was with Julio, Roldan, and Lucio, who drove
the tricycle.
At the house, Felipe, Julio, and Roldan succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with Mildred against her
will and under the threat of Felipe's gun. Lucio was
not around when the sexual assaults took place as he
left after bringing his colleagues and Mildred to their
destination, but he returned everyday to bring food
and the news in town about Mildred's disappearance.
For five days, Felipe, Julio and Roldan kept Mildred in
the house and took turns in sexually assaulting her.
On the 6th day, Mildred managed to escape; she
proceeded immediately to the nearest police station
and narrated her ordeal.
What crime/s did Felipe, Julio, Roldan, and Lucio
commit and what was their degree of participation?
(BAR 2013)
Felipe, Julio, Roldan and Lucio are all liable for the special
complex crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention with Rape. It was sufficiently proved that the 4
accused kidnapped Mildred and held her in detention for
5 days and carnally abused her. Since it is a special
complex crime, no matter how many times the victim had
been raped, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping
and serious illegal detention with rape. The composite
acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense with only
one penalty. It is illegal detention and not forcible
abduction since it was evident that the intent was to
detain the victim.
As to the degree of their participation, Felipe, Julio,
Roldan and Lucio are all liable as principals. There was
implied conspiracy as they acted toward a single criminal
design or purpose(People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No.
186417, July 27, 2011). Although Lucio was not around
when the sexual assaults took place, there is complicity
on his part as he was the one who drove the tricycle at the
time the victim was seized and he returned everyday to
bring food and news to his conspirators.
Paz Masipag worked as a housemaid and yaya of the
one-week old son of the spouses Martin and Pops
Kuripot. When Paz learned that her 70 year-old
mother was seriously ill, she asked Martin for a cash
advance of P1,000.00 but Martin refused. One
morning, Paz gagged the mouth of Martin’s son with
stockings; placed the child in a box; sealed it with
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
masking tape and placed the box in the attic. Later in
the afternoon, she demanded P5,000.00 as ransom
for the release of his son. Martin did not pay the
ransom. Subsequently, Paz disappeared. After a
couple of days, Martin discovered the box in the attic
with his child already dead. According to the autopsy
report, the child died of asphyxiation barely three
minutes after the box was sealed. What crime or
crimes did Paz commit? Explain. (BAR 2005)
Paz committed the special complex crime of kidnapping
with homicide under Art. 267, RFC as amended by R.A.
7659. Under the law, any person who shall detain another
or in any manner deprive him of liberty and the victim
dies as a consequence is liable for kidnapping with
homicide and shall be penalized with the maximum
penalty. In this case, notwithstanding the fact that the
one-week old child was merely kept in the attic of his
house, gagged with stockings and placed in a box sealed
with tape, the deprivation of liberty and the intention to
kill becomes apparent. Though it may appear that the
means employed by Paz was attended by treachery
(killing of an infant), nevertheless, a separate charge of
murder will not be proper in view of the amendment.
Here, the term "homicide" is used in its generic sense and
covers all forms of killing whether in the nature of
murder or otherwise. It is of no moment that the evidence
shows the death of the child took place three minutes
after the box was sealed and the demand for the ransom
took place in the afternoon. The intention is controlling
here, that is, ransom was demanded.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Can there be a crime of robbery with attempted rape?
The crime cannot be a complex crime of robbery with
attempted rape under Article 48, because a robbery
cannot be a necessary means to commit attempted rape;
nor attempted rape, to commit robbery (People v.
Cariaga, C.A., 54 O.G. 4307).
What is the criminal liability of a person who, on the
occasion of a robbery, kills a bystander by accident?
The person is liable for robbery with homicide because
the Revised Penal Code punishes the crimes as only one
indivisible offense when a killing, whether intentional or
accidental, was committed by reason or on occasion of a
robbery (Art. 294[1], RPC; People v. Mabasa, 65 Phil. 568
[1938]).
What is essential for a conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide?
What is for the prosecution to establish the offender’s
intent to take personal property before the killing,
regardless of the time when the homicide is actually
carried out. In cases when the prosecution failed to
conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be
convicted of robbery with homicide (People v. Chavez, G.R.
No. 207950, September 22, 2014).
Conspiracy in Robbery with Homicide
Q: Fernandez opened the gate of Anna Leizel Trading
without first checking who was knocking outside
thereby allowing Paris and his companions to freely
enter the premises. Thereafter, Paris and his
33
companions purposely proceeded directly to the
room occupied by the victim Salvador. Paris and his
companions did not harm Fernandez despite the
latter having already recognized or seen their faces,
instead, they went looking for Salvador who was then
asleep and killed him. Fernandez directed Paris and
his companions to the office of Anna. Fernandez did
not offer any resistance nor attempted to help
Salvador. Fernandez did not do anything after seeing
Paris and his companions leave Anna's office
carrying a bag, interestingly, he waited for more than
three hours before informing his employers about
the incident. Is Fernandez guilty of Robbery with
Homicide?
A: YES. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act
of all. Thus, "when homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as
principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide although they did not actually take part in
the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored
to prevent the same." In the present case, both Fernandez
and Paris were co-conspirator who are guilty of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide (People
vs. Paris, G.R. No. 218130, February 14, 2018)
Clepto went alone to a high-end busy shop and
decided to take one of the smaller purses without
paying for it. Overcame by conscience, she decided to
leave her own purse in place of the one she took. Her
act was discovered and Clepto was charged with theft.
She claimed that there was no theft, as the store
suffered no injury or prejudice because she had left a
purse in place of the one she took. Comment on her
defense. (BAR 2014)
The defense of Clepto has no merit. Theft is already
consummated from the moment Clepto took possession
of one of the smaller purses inside a high-end shop,
without paying for it. She took the personal property of
another, with intent to gain, without the consent of the
latter. Damage or injury to the owner is not an element of
theft, hence, even if she left her purse in lieu of the purse
she took, theft is still committed.
When is the crime of theft qualified?
1. If theft is committed by a domestic servant;
2. If the theft is committed with grave abuse of
confidence;
NOTE: If the offense is to be qualified by abuse of
confidence, the abuse must be grave, like an accused
who was offered food and allowed to sleep in the
house of the complainant out of the latter’s pity and
charity, but stole the latter’s money in his house
when he left the place.
3. If the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter
or large cattle;
4. If the property stolen consist of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation;
5. If the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or
fishery; or
6. If property is taken on the occasion of fire,
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
 CRIMINAL LAW
Madam X, a bank teller, received from depositor
Madam Y, a check payable to cash in the amount of P1
million, to be deposited to the account of Madam Y.
Because the check was not a crossed check, Madam X
credited the amount to the account of her good
friend, Madam W, by accomplishing a deposit slip.
Seven (7) days after, Madam X contacted her good
friend, Madam W and told her that the amount of P1
million was wrongfully credited to Madam W, thus,
Madam X urged Madam W to withdraw the amount of
P1 million from her account and to turn over the
same to MadamX. As a dutiful friend, Madam W
readily acceded. She was gifted by Madam X with an
expensive Hermes bag after the withdrawal of the
amount. What crime/s, if any, did Madam X and
Madam W commit? Explain. (BAR 2014)
Madam X committed the crime of Qualified Theft under
Article 310, RPC. When Madam X, a bank teller, received
the check payable to cash in the amount of P1million for
deposit to the account of Madam Y, what was transferred
to her was merely the physical or material possession
thereof. Hence, her subsequent misappropriation of the
amount shall constitute theft, qualified by grave abuse of
confidence. There is grave abuse of confidence because
the relationship of guardianship, dependence, and
vigilance between the depositor and the bank created a
high degree of confidence between them which Madam X,
as the bank teller representing the bank, abused.
What does fraud and deceit in the crime of estafa
mean?
In Alcantara v. CA, the Court, citing People v. Balasa,
explained the meaning of fraud and deceit, viz.:
Fraud in its general sense is deemed to comprise anything
calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust, or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to
another, or by which an undue and unconscientious
advantage is taken of another. It is a generic term
embracing all multifarious means which human
ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one
individual to secure an advantage over another by false
suggestions or by suppression of truth and includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any unfair way
by which another is cheated.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact
whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive
another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury
(Lateo v. People, G.R. No. 161651, June 8, 2011).
Separate charges for estafa and illegal recruitment
It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No.
8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut that: In
this jurisdiction, it is settled that the offense of illegal
recruitment is malumprohibitum where the criminal
intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of
the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
34
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction
for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal
Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment
under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of
the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale,
and vice versa (People v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 173792, August
31, 2011).
Q: Solina met with several people and gave the
impression that she had the capability to facilitate
applications for employment as factory workers in
Japan in lieu of a fee amounting to Php20, 000.00.
These people believed Solina paid the said amount,
however no such promise materialized and the
money taken as a fee was never returned. Is Solina
guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
as well as estafa under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the
RPC?
A: Yes, Solina is guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment
in large scale as well as estafa under Article 315 par. 2 (a)
of the RPC. It is settled that a person may be charged and
convicted separately of illegal recruitment under R.A.
8042 and estafa under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC.
In this case all the elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are present: (1) the offender
has no valid license or authority required by law to
enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and
placement of workers; (2) the offender undertakes any of
the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and
placement” under Article 13 (b) 14 of the Labor Code, or
any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of the said Code (now Section 6 of R.A. 8042); and (3)
the offender committed the same against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group.
Likewise Solina is also liable for estafa under Article 315
(2) (a) of the RPC when she defrauded the private
complainants into believing that she had the authority
and capability to facilitate applications for employment
as factory workers in Japan in lieu of a fee amounting to
Php20, 000.00 in which the complainants complied with
resulting to their own damage and prejudiced when such
promise for employment never materialized (People v.
Solina, G.R. No. 196784, January 13, 2016).
Q: Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, Rodolfo, and
Rex uniformly alleged that they heard either from a
radio advertisement or a friend about an
employment opportunity in East Timor linked to
Racho. On separate dates, they went to meet with
Racho . They were then asked to provide documents,
fill out bio-data forms, and pay placement fees, which
they did. They then left the Philippines on different
dates and stayed in East Timor while waiting for their
working visas. However, two to three months passed
and yet no working visas were issued despite Racho's
promises. Thus, they went back to the Philippines,
and after failing to find Racho, filed their complaints.
Can Racho be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment in large scale and estafa?
A: Racho can be convicted for both illegal recruitment
and estafa. The same pieces of evidence that establish
liability for illegal recruitment in large scale confirm
culpability for Estafa. It is well-established in
jurisprudence that a person may be charged and
convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019

reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the
first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary
for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative.
(People v. Racho, GR 227505, October 2, 2017, J. Perlas-
Bernabe case)
Q: Sato, through fraudulent misrepresentations, was
able to secure the signature and thumbmark of
Manolita Gonzales on a Special Power of Attorney
where his daughter is made attorney-in-fact and sold
four valuable pieces of land in Tagaytay City. Estafa
under Art 315 (3) was filed against him in the RTC.
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information
claiming that under Art 332, his relationship with
Manolita Gonzales, his mother-in-law, was an
exempting circumstance. Is Sato exempted from
criminal liability under Art 332 for the complex
crime of estafathrough falsification of public
documents?
A: No, Sato is not exempted from criminal liability under
Art 332 for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. The absolutory cause
under Art 332 is meant to address only simple crime of
theft, swindling, and malicious mischief. When the
offender resorts to an act that breaches the public
interest in the integrity of public documents as to violate
the property rights of a family member, he is removed
from the protective mantle of the absolutory cause under
Art 332 (Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales v. People,
G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
a tricycle and pulled AAA towards the tricycle. She
tried shouting but Cayanan covered her mouth.
Cayanan brought AAA to a dress shop to change her
clothes since she was in her school uniform, and later
to a Jollibee outlet. Afterwards, he brought her to his
sister’s house and raped her inside a bedroom. AAA
told her mother and brother of the incident and she
was shown to be suffering from depressive symptoms
and presence of sexual abuse. Cayanan interposed
the sweetheart defense and presented two love
letters supposedly written by AAA. The RTC and CA
convicted Cayanan of Forcible Abduction with
Qualified Rape. Is Cayanan guilty for the crime of
forcible abduction with qualified rape?
A: No, Cayanan should only be liable for qualified rape.
Forcible abduction is absorbed in the crime of rape if the
real objective of the accused is to rape the victim. In this
case, circumstances show that AAA’s abduction was with
the purpose of raping her (People v. Cayanan, G.R. No.
200080, July 18, 2014).
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
Q: A contracted a second marriage while having a
subsistent and valid first marriage. The first
marriage was declared void ab initio. Subsequently, A
was charged with the crime of Bigamy. A contends that
the information on Bigamy must be quashed on the
ground that there was a declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage prior to the filing of the action. Is
the contention of A correct?

CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY A: No, the contention of A is wrong. It has been clarified
in the Family Code and has been held in a number of cases
ELEMENTS OF ELEMENTS OF that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a
ADULTERY CONCUBINAGE valid subsequent marriage can be contracted. What
makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
1. To convict a woman 1. Man must be married; contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
for adultery, it is subsistence of a valid marriage. xxx Well settled is the
necessary: 2. He committed any of rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender
a. That she is a the following acts: upon the commission of the offense and from that instant,
married woman; a. Keeping a liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by
and mistress in the law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
b. That she unites conjugal information is material only for determining prescription
in sexual dwelling; (People v. Odtuhan, G.R. No. 191566, July 17, 2013).
intercourse with b. Having sexual
a man not her intercourse, Q: Vitangcol married Alice Eduardo and begot 3
husband. under scandalous children. After some time Alice began hearing rumors
circumstances, that her husband was previously married to another
2. To convict a man for with a woman woman named Gina Gaerlan. Such marriage was
adultery, it is who is not his supported by a marriage contract registered with the
necessary: wife; or NSO. This prompted Alice to file a criminal complaint
a. That he had c. Cohabiting with for bigamy against Vitangcol. In his defense,
actual her in any other Vitangcol alleges that he already revealed to Alice
intercourse with place. that he had a “fake marriage” with his college
a married girlfriend Gina and that there is a Certification from
woman; and 3. As regards the the Office of the Civil Registrar that there is no record
b. That he commits woman, she must of the marriage license issued to Vitangcol and his
the act with the know him to be first wife Gina which makes his first marriage as void.
knowledge that married. Is Vitangcol liable of the crime of bigamy?
said woman is
married. A: Yes, Vitangcol is liable of the crime of bigamy. Bigamy
consists of the following elements: (1) that the offender
NOTE: Adultery as to the has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage had
male sexual partner of not yet been legally dissolved or in case his or her spouse
the married woman. is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a
Q: AAA was about to enter the school campus with her second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second
friend when Cayanan, her brother-in-law, arrived on or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites

35
 CRIMINAL LAW
for validity. In this case, all the elements of bigamy are
present, since Vitangcol was still legally married to Gina
when he married Alice. His defense of Certification from
the Office of the Civil Registrar implying that there is no
record of the marriage license issued to Vitangcol and his
first wife Gina will not lie since marriages are not
dissolved through mere certifications by the civil
registrar. Hence, Vitangcol is still considered to be legally
married to Gina when he married Alice and is not
exculpated from the bigamy charged (Vitangcol v. People,
G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016).
Q: Maine was validly married to Liko on June 1, 2015.
Liko, however, died a month after the celebration of
their marriage. Three months after the death of her
husband, Maine found another love of her life in the
name of Darney. They eventually fell in love with
each other. Darney married Maine on October 3,
2015. Is Maine liable for any crime?
A: No. R.A. 10655 (March 13, 2015) decriminalized the
act of premature marriage. Article 1 of the said law
provides that “without prejudice to the provisions of the
Family Code on paternity and filiation, Article 351 of Act
No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal Code,
punishing the crime of premature marriage committed
by a woman, is hereby repealed.”
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
True or false. In the crime of libel, truth is an absolute
defense. (BAR 2010)
False. Article 361 of the RPC provides that proof of truth
shall be admissible in libel cases only if the same imputes
a crime or is made against a public officer with respect to
facts related to the discharge of their official duties, and
moreover must have been published with good motives
and for justifiable ends. Hence, "truth" as a defense, on its
own, is not enough.
Q: X was charged with the crime of libel. In his
defense he contended that he should not be liable for
the crime of libel because there is no malice in fact
proven by the prosecution since he is merely a
responding urban poor leader acting as counsel,
defending a member of an association under threat of
ejectment from her dwelling place, and thus should
be considered as privileged communication. X also
contends that there is no proper publication since the
libelous remarks were only made in a private
correspondence. Are the contentions of X correct?
A: X is criminally liable of the crime of libel. When the
imputation is defamatory, the prosecution need not
prove malice on the part of X (malice in fact) for the law
already presumes that his imputation is malicious
(malice in law). There is publication when that same
letter was furnished to all those concerned. A written
letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as
privileged when it is published and circulated among the
public (Buatisv. People, G.R. No. 142509, March 24, 2006).
Q: Alexis filed an action for damages arising from
libel and defamation against Alejandro on account of
a published letter containing the following:
This is to notify you and your staff that one ALEXIS
"DODONG" C. ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not vested with
any authority to liaison or transact any business with
36
any department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise,
that has bearing or relation with my office, mandates
or functions. x xx.
Noteworthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr.
Alexis “Dodong” C. Almendras, a reknown blackmailer,
is a bitter rival in the just concluded election of 1995
who ran against the wishes of my father, the late
Congressman Alejandro D. Almendras, Sr. He has
caused pain to the family when he filed cases against
us, his brothers and sisters, and worst, against his own
mother.
I deemed that his act of transacting business that
affects my person and official functions is malicious in
purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan
of harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic
and evil objectives. May I therefore request the
assistance of your office in circulating the above
information to concerned officials and secretariat
employees of the House of Representatives. x xx
Alejandro in his defense insists that he has the legal,
moral, or social duty to make the communication, or
at least, had an interest to protect, being then a
Congressman duty-bound to insulate his office and
his constituents from the dubious and mistrustful
pursuits of his elder brother. Moreover, the letters
were also not meant to be circulated or published.
They were sent merely to warn the individuals of
respondent’s nefarious activities, and made in good
faith and without any actual malice. Is Alejandro
guilty of Libel?
A: Yes. Under Article 354, every defamatory imputation
is presumed to be malicious, even if true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception
to the rule, the presumption of malice is done away with
when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged
communication.
In order to qualify as privileged communication under
Article 354, Number 1, the following requisites must
concur:
1. The person who made the communication had a
legal, moral, or social duty to make the
communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to
whom it is made;
2. The communication is addressed to an officer or a
board, or superior, having some interest or duty in
the matter, and who has the power to furnish the
protection sought; and
3. The statements in the communication are made in
good faith and without malice.
Alejandro’s contention that he has the legal, moral or
social duty to make the communication cannot be
countenanced because he failed to communicate the
statements only to the person or persons who have some
interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the
power to furnish the protection sought by the author of
the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter
cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and
circulated among the public.
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
What is reckless imprudence?
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019

which imposes the penalty next higher in degree upon the

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without offender who “fails to lend on the spot to the injured
malice, doing or falling to do an act from which material parties such help as may be in his hands to give.”,
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of according to case law, (a) is dependent on the means in
precaution on the part of the person performing of failing the hands of the offender, i.e., the type and degree of
to perform such act, taking into consideration his assistance that he/she, at the time and place of the
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, incident, is capable of giving; and (b) requires adequate
physical condition and other circumstances regarding proof. X was able to supply the help according to the
persons, time and place. extent of capabilities (Gonzaga v. People, G.R. No. 195671,
January 21, 2015).
What is simple imprudence?
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution
displayed in cases in which the damage impending to be
ANTI-HAZING LAW
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
Q: On February 5, 2017, Rho Rio Fraternity held
Q: Y while alighting from his vehicle was hit by X with
initiation rites. Present were: (i) Redmont, the Lord
his car. This caused Y to be thrown four meters away
Chancellor and head of the fraternity; (ii) ten (10)
from his jeepney. X was charged with frustrated
members, one (1) of whom was Ric, and (iii) five (5)
murder and convicted in the RTC of frustrated
neophytes, one (1) of whom was Ronald. Absent
homicide. Upon appeal in the CA, the crime was
were: (i) Rollie, the fraternity's Vice Chancellor and
modified to reckless imprudence resulting in serious
who actually planned the initiation; and (ii) Ronnie,
physical injuries. X contends that he is not liable for
the owner of the house where the initiation was
such crime because he lacked criminal intent; that he
conducted.
was not negligent in driving his pick-up truck; and
that the CA should have appreciated voluntary
Due to the severe beating suffered by Ronald on that
surrender as a mitigating circumstance in his favor.
occasion, he lost consciousness and was brought to
Is X’s contention correct?
the nearest hospital by Redmont and Ric. However,
Ronald was declared dead on arrival at the hospital.
A: The contention of X is wrong. To constitute the offense
of reckless driving, the act must be something more than
During the investigation of the case, it was found out
a mere negligence in the operation of the motor vehicle,
that, although Ronald really wanted to join the
but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
fraternity because his father is also a member of the
required. The fact that Y’s body was thrown four (4)
same fraternity, it was his best friend Ric who
meters away from his jeep showed that X was driving his
ultimately convinced him to join the fraternity and,
pick-up at a fast speed when he overtook the jeep of Y.
as a prerequisite thereto, undergo initiation. It was
also shown that Redmont and Ric did not actually
The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
participate in the beating of the neophytes (hazing).
cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article
The two (2) either merely watched the hazing or
365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the
helped in preparing food.
imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed
And, lastly, two (2) days prior thereto, Ronnie texted
in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code (Mariano v. People,
Rollie that the fraternity may use his house as the
G.R. No. 178145, July 7, 2014).
venue for the planned initiation.
Q: X, while descending from a curved path, collided
Aside from those who actually participated in the
with a motorcycle, killing Y, one of its passengers, and
hazing, Redmont, Rollie, Ric, and Ronnie were
causing serious physical injuries to the two other
criminally charged for the hazing of Ronald that
victims. The body of Y was loaded to the vehicle of X
resulted in the latter's death.
but the latter’s engine would not start; thus the body
was loaded in a different vehicle. The jack of X was
A. Are the four criminally liable? (BAR 2018)
used to extricate the body of Y from being pinned
under the vehicle of X. X, in his defense, claimed that
Yes. Redmont’s presence during the hazing is prima facie
it was not his fault that the tricycle swerved in his
evidence of participation therein as principal, unless he
direction. X was charged with Reckless Imprudence
prevented the commission of the hazing that caused
Resulting to Homicide with Double Serious Physical
physical harm to Ronald.
Injuries and Damage to Property under Article 365 in
relation to Article 263 of the RPC “with the
Ric is also liable criminally, because as member of the
aggravating circumstance that accused failed to lend
Fraternity who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the
on the spot to the injured party such help that was in
initiation by inducing the victim to be present thereat is
his hands to give”. Should the court appreciate the
liable as principal. He is penalized, not because of any
alleged aggravating circumstance?
participation in the infliction of harm to the victim but
due to his indispensable cooperation in the crime by
A: No. The aggravating circumstance “that accused failed
successfully inducing or convincing the victim to undergo
to lend on the spot to the injured party such help that was
the hazing.
in his hands to give” should not be appreciated. Verily, it
is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious
Rollie as Vice Chancellor of Rho Rio Fraternity, who
indifference to the consequences of the conduct which
actually planned the initiation though not present when
supplies the criminal intent in Article 365. The limiting
the acts of hazing were committed, is liable as principal.
element in the last paragraph of Article 365 of the RPC,

37
 CRIMINAL LAW
Ronnie the owner of the place where hazing was
conducted is liable as accomplice, because he has actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein and failed to
take any action to prevent occurrence of the same (Dungo
& Sibal, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209464, July
1, 2015)
B. Can all those criminally charged be
exonerated upon proof that Ronald, knowing
the risks, voluntarily submitted himself to
the initiation? Will the absence of proof that
the accused intended to kill the victim affect
their liability?
No. Under Section 12 of R.A. No. 11053, or the “Anti-
Hazing Law of 2018,” the defense that the recruit,
neophyte, or applicant consented to being subjected to
hazing shall not be available to persons prosecuted under
this Act.” It is likewise stated that any person charged
under said law shall not be entitled to the mitigating
circumstance that there was no intention to commit so
grave a wrong.
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS
DRUGS ACT
Tiburcio asked Anastacio to join their group for a
“session.” Thinking that it was for a mahjong session,
Anastacio agreed. Upon reaching Tiburcio’s house,
Anastacio discovered that it was actually a shabu
session. At that precise time, the place was raided by
the police, and Anastacio was among those arrested.
What crime can Anastacio be charged with, if any?
Explain your answer. (BAR 2007)
Anastacio may not be charged of any crime. Sec. 7 of
Republic Act No. 9165 on the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs of 2002 punishes employees and visitors of a den,
dive or resort where dangerous drugs are used in any
form. But for a visitor of such place to commit the crime,
it is a requisite that he “is aware of the nature of the place
as such and shall knowingly visit the same.” These
requisites are absent in the facts given.
Who are subject to confirmatory drug test under
Section 15 of R.A. 9165?
A person apprehended or arrested who are to be subject
of confirmatory drug test cannot literally mean any
person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The
phrase must be read in context and understood in
consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15 comprehends
persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of the law. In this case, the accused
appellant was arrested in the alleged act of extortion,
hence, the drug test conducted to him despite his
objection is rendered illegal and is therefore
inadmissible. Since the drug test was the only basis for his
conviction, the Court ordered the acquittal of the accused
(Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014).
Is coordination with the PDEA an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out
a buy-bust operation?
Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable
requirement before police authorities may carry out a
buy-bust operation. While it is true that Republic Act No.
9165 requires the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs to
maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug
38
related matters," the provision does not make PDEA’s
participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust
operation. A buy-bust operation is just a form of an in
flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully
resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No.
9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not
invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA
(People v. Balaquiot, G.R. No. 206366, August 13, 2014).
Estipona Jr. was charged with violation of Sec. 11 of
RA 9165. On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to
Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining
Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea
and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of
Sec. 12 of RA 9165, with a penalty of rehabilitation in
view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his
possession being a first-time offender. Prosecution
moved for the denial of the motion arguing that it if
prohibited by express provision of Sec. 23, RA 9165.
May Estipona, Jr. plead guilty for a lesser offense?
Yes. The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now the Supreme Court’s exclusive
domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments. The other branches trespass
upon this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders
that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the
procedural rules promulgated by the Court.
Plea bargaining is rule of procedure. In this jurisdiction,
plea bargaining has been defined as "a process whereby
the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation common in
plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is that
both the prosecution and the defense make concessions
to avoid potential losses. Considering the presence of
mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining
neither create a right nor take away a vested right.
Instead, it operates as a means to implement an existing
right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing
rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard
or infraction of them.
Sec. 23 of RA 9165 prohibiting plea bargaining in drug
related cases is unconstitutional (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R.
No. 226679, August 15, 2017).
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
What is the "chain of custody" requirement in drug
offenses? (BAR 2016)
To establish the chain of custody, the prosecution must
show the movement of the dangerous drugs from its
confiscation up to its presentation in court. The following
links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-
bust situation are:
1. The seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
2. The turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
3. The turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
4. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
What is the primary purpose of establishing the chain
of custody?
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement
ensures the integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or
surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects:
1. The nature of the substances or items seized;
2. The quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items
seized;
3. The relation of the substances or items seized to the
incident allegedly causing their seizure; and
4. The relation of the substances or items seized to the
person/s alleged to have been in possession of or
peddling them.
Compliance with this requirement forecloses
opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering
of evidence in any manner.
By failing to establish identity of corpus delicti indicates
a failure to establish an element of the offense of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. It follows that this
noncompliance suffices as a ground for acquittal.
NOTE: Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides that the
apprehending team shall, among others, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical
inventory and take photographs of the seized items in the
presence of the accused or the person from whom such
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a
representative from the media or the Department of
Justice, and any elected public official. (People vs Jugo, GR
231792, January 29, 2018, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: Police Officers formed a buy-bust team headed to
the house of Ano where P02 Ayad knocked on the
door and upon seeing Ano, whispered that he “wants
to score” worth P200.00. Ano replied that he has
drugs with him and gave P02 Ayad a transparent
plastic sachet, while the latter simultaneously
handed the marked money as payment. As Ano
placed the money inside his pocket, PO2 Ayad
introduced himself as a policeman, causing Ano to
flee. Fortunately, PO2 Ayad caught Ano and asked
him to empty his pockets which produced the two (2)
39
P100.00 bills. Due to the commotion caused by Ano’s
relatives who were preventing his arrest, the team
moved at a distance of around 100 meters from the
place of arrest, marked the confiscated sachet, and
completed the inventory thereat. Barangay Captain
Leo S. Buenviaje (Brgy. Captain Buenviaje) witnessed
and signed the Inventory of Seized/ Confiscated
Items, photographs were also taken in the presence
of Ano, PO2 Ayad, and PO1 Acuin. Can Ano be charged
for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs while the records
are glaringly silent as to the presence of the required
witnesses, namely, the representatives from the
media and the DOJ?
A: Ano could not be charged for Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs. To reiterate, Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, requires
the presence of the following witnesses during the
conduct of inventory and photography of the seized
items: (a) the accused or the person/s from whom such
items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel; (b) any elected public official;
and (c) a representative from the media and the DOJ. In
their absence, the prosecution must provide a credible
explanation justifying the non-compliance with the rule;
otherwise, the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165
(and now, the amended Section 21, Article II of RA 9165)
would not apply. Here, no such explanation was proffered
by the prosecution to justify the procedural lapse. It then
follows that there are unjustified gaps in the chain of
custody of the items seized from Ano, thereby militating
against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which
resultantly warrants his acquittal. (People Vs. Nestor Ano
Y Del Remedios, G.R. No. 230070, March 14, 2018, J. Perlas-
Bernabe case)
Q: On July 23, 2011, the buy-bust team proceeded to
the target area to conduct and entrapment operation
on Ceralde. Shortly after, Ceralde arrived and handed
three (3) plastic sachets of suspected marijuana
leaves to the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Yanes, who, in turn,
gave Ceralde the marked money. PO3 Delos Santos
conducted a body search on Ceralde and found
another plastic sachet of marijuana in his pants. PO3
Delos Santos immediately marked all four (4) plastic
sachets at the place of arrest and in the presence of
Ceralde, and subsequently, brought the latter,
together with the marked money and the confiscated
plastic sachets, to the police station for further
investigation and proper documentation. Thereat,
PO3 Pedro Vinluan, received the confiscated plastic
sachets from PO3 Delos Santos and prepared the
request for laboratory examination. At around 12
o'clock noon of the same day, PO3 Delos Santos
delivered the request for laboratory examination,
together with the seized items, to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta
City, where they were tested positive for the presence
of marijuana. Afterwards, the seized drugs were
submitted to Records and Evidence Custodian
Mercedita Velasco (REC Velasco) for safekeeping
until such time that they were presented to the court
 CRIMINAL LAW
as evidence. Ceralde denied the charges against him
but opted not to present any evidence during trial,
invoking his constitutional right of presumption of
innocence. Is the chain of custody required under
Section 21 of RA 9165 was fully complied with?
A: Chain of custody rule was not substantially complied
with. The Court finds that deviations from the prescribed
chain of custody rule were unjustified, thereby putting
into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the
items purportedly seized from Ceralde. An examination
of the records reveals that while the prosecution was able
to show that the seized items were properly marked by
PO3 Delos Santos immediately upon their confiscation at
the place of the arrest and in the presence of Ceralde, the
same was not done in the presence of any elected public
official and a representative from the DOJ and the media.
In an attempt to justify such absence, PO3 Delos Santos
claims that the instant buy-bust operation is a
"confidential matter" which requires them "not to tell
other person about it," cannot be given credence, as the
law mandates their presence to ensure the proper chain
of custody and to avoid the possibility of switching,
planting, or contamination of evidence. Since the
prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by
RA 10640, as well as its IRR, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the items purportedly seized from Ceralde were
already compromised. Perforce, Ceralde's acquittal is in
order. (People V. John Paul Ceralde Y Ramos, Gr 228894,
August 7, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
An examination of the records reveals that although
the requisite inventory and photography of the
seized items were conducted in the presence of
Geronimo and an elected public official, the same was
not done in the presence of the representatives from
the DOJ and the media. Moreover, records reveal that
the said inventory and photography of the seized items
were not done at the place of arrest but at the office of the
apprehending officers in Barangay Pinyahan, Quezon
City.the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed
by the police officers, unacknowledged and unexplained
by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been
compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in
Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to the
conviction of illegal drug suspects. As such, since the
prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-
compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended by
RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Geronimo's acquittal is
perforce in order. (People V. Jonas Geronimo Y Pinlac, Gr
225500, September 11, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: A tip was received from an informant that
Mamangon was selling illegal drugs along the
railroad track in Tondo, Manila. The buy-bust team
went to the target area. Upon arriving thereat, the
40
informant, together with PO3 Guzman, approached
Mamangon and ordered P300.00 worth of shabu.
Subsequently, Mamangon handed over one plastic
sachet containing shabu to PO3 Guzman, who
simultaneously paid using the marked money.
Shortly after, Mamangon was apprehended. PO3
Guzman then recovered the marked money from
Mamangon and ordered him to empty his pockets,
which purportedly contained another plastic sachet
of shabu. After securing the additional plastic sachet,
PO3 Guzman marked it alongside the other seized
item in the presence of Mamangon. Thereafter, the
team went to the barangay hall but immediately left
since no one was around. The team then proceeded to
another police station, where PO3 Guzman turned
over Mamangon, as well as the seized items, to PO2
Dela Cruz. PO2 Dela Cruz then conducted the
requisite inventory, while PO3 Guzman took
photographs of the confiscated items in the presence
of Mamangon and the other arresting officers. After
conducting the inventory, PO2 Dela Cruz prepared
the request for laboratory examination, which was
submitted together with the seized items to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination. Accordingly, they
were received and examined by Forensic Chemist
Reyes, who confirmed that they
contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride. Is
Mamangon guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs?
A: Mamangon is not guilty of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The prosecution has to
show an unbroken chain of custody over the dangerous
drugs so as to obviate any unnecessary doubts on the
identity of the dangerous drugs on account of switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence. However, in
this case, the police officers committed unjustified
deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule. The
records reveal that while the requisite inventory and
photography of the confiscated drugs were
conducted in the presence of Mamangon and the
other apprehending officers, the same were not done
in the presence of an elected public official and any
representative from the DOJ and the media. To make
matters worse, the prosecution did not proffer a plausible
explanation - apart from their unsubstantiated claim that
"no one is around" the barangay hall when they arrived -
in order for the saving clause to apply. Thus, considering
the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165, the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs
are seriously put into question. (People Vs. Philip
Mamangon Y Espiritu, G.R. No. 229102, January 29, 2018, J.
Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: A tip was received that Calibod was selling shabu
along the railroad tracks in Barangay Parian,
Calamba City, Laguna. Upon seeing Calibod, PO2
Oruga approached him and said, "To, pakuha ako ng
piso." PO2 Oruga handed over the buy-bust money to
Calibod, who, in turn, gave him one (1) plastic sachet
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
of shabu. After receiving the sachet, PO2 Oruga
introduced himself as a police officer, arrested
Calibod, and retrieved the buy-bust money from him,
prompting the buy-bust team to approach the scene.
PO2 Oruga then marked the seized sachet with his
initials, "GAO." After the marking, PO2 Oruga
immediately brought Calibod, the buy-bust money,
and confiscated sachet, to the crime laboratory at
Camp Vicente Lim. After examination, Forensic
Chemical Officer Huelgas confirmed that the sachet
contained methamphetamine hydrochloride, and
that Calibod's hands tested positive for ultra-violet
powder. Is Calibod guilty of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165?
A: Calibod is not guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
under R.A. 9165. There were unjustified gaps in the
prescribed chain of custody of the dangerous drugs
allegedly seized from Calibod. The prosecution was not
able to establish whether or not the requisite inventory
and photography were properly conducted by the police
officers. PO2 Oruga, in his testimony, did not state if the
marking was done within the view of Calibod, an elected
public official, and a representative from the DOJ or
media. He likewise did not mention whether the said
witnesses were present during the buy-bust operation or
immediately thereafter. Furthermore, there was no
showing that the confiscated shabu was initially turned
over to an investigating officer for further investigation.
Additionally, the prosecution was silent as to how the
specimen shabu was subsequently received at the crime
laboratory, considering that PO2 Oruga did not state if he
submitted the same directly to FCO Huelgas. No details
were given as to the identity of the person who received
the specimen shabu on behalf of the crime laboratory, as
well as how it was handled, preserved, and managed
before FCO Huelgas conducted an examination thereon.
(People Vs. Niño Calibod Y Henobeso, G.R. No. 230230,
November 20, 2017, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: A certain “Ipyang”, who was later identified as
Crispian, was peddling illegal drugs in Dumaguete
City (Taclobo). The buy-bust team, together with the
informant, proceeded to the target area in Barangay
Motong. When the accused arrived, Derek
immediately asked the informant how much shabu
he would be buying, to which the informant replied
that it was Police Officer I Harry Dumaguit (PO1
Dumaguit), the designated poseur-buyer, who
wanted to purchase P500.00 worth of shabu. Crispian
then pulled out one (1) sachet of shabu and gave it to
PO1 Dumaguit, who, in turn, handed over the P500.00
buy-bust money. After examining the sachet of shabu,
PO1 Dumaguit declared his authority as a police
officer, prompting Crispian to run away. However,
the other police operatives rushed towards the
accused and arrested them. A body search was then
conducted, and ten (10) additional sachets of
suspected shabu were recovered from Crispian’s
possession. In addition, instead of marking the drugs
upon seizure, the team decided to execute the subject
41
warrant and went to the house of Crispian. Can
Crispian be charged for Illegal and Illegal Possession
of Dangerous Drugs when the marking of the
dangerous drugs and other related items were not
done in the presence of the violator?
A: Crispin could not be charged for Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.
The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking
of the dangerous drugs or related items. Marking, which
is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by
the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his
initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be
made in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon arrest.The importance of the prompt
marking cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers
of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking
as reference. The importance of the prompt marking
cannot be denied, because succeeding handlers of
dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as
reference. Also, the marking operates to set apart as
evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other
material from the moment they are confiscated until they
are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings,
thereby forestalling switching, planting or contamination
of evidence. In short, the marking immediately upon
confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or
related items is indispensable in the preservation of their
integrity and evidentiary value.” (People Vs. Crispian
Merced Lumaya, G.R. No. 231983, March 07, 2018, J. Perlas-
Bernabe case)
Q: An informant tipped the police that a certain
individual known as alias "Popoy" was selling shabu.
A buy-bust operation was conducted. They
proceeded to the target area where they saw
Macapundag, who was then identified by the
informant as "Popoy." P03 Ardedon handed the three
(3) marked ₱l00.00 bills to Macapundag and gave one
plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance to P03 Ardedon. P03 Ardedon gave the
signal as the back-up officers rushed to the scene. P03
Ardedon marked the plastic sachet he purchased
from Macapundag, while SPO 1 Victoriano marked
the other three (3) recovered from his pocket.
Macapundag prayed for his acquittal in view of the
police officers' non-compliance with Section 21 of RA
9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR). Particularly, he claims that they did not make
any inventory and failed to take pictures of the
confiscated drugs along with him at the scene of his
arrest. There was also no justification given as to why
they failed to comply with these requirements of law.
Should Macapundag’s conviction be held even though
there was allegedly a defect in following the chain of
custody rule set forth in Sec 21, Article II of RA 9165?
A: Macapundag should be acquitted. The prosecution's
witnesses failed to state whether the police officers
inventoried and photographed the seized sachets in the
presence of Macapundag or his representative. In fact, the
 CRIMINAL LAW
prosecution did not even offer any inventory of the seized
items or photographs thereof as evidence. In this relation,
it is observed that the Evidence Acknowledgement
Receipt and the Affidavit of Attestation, which form part
of the evidence of the prosecution, likewise failed to
disclose that the seized items were actually inventoried
or photographed in accordance with the parameters
provided by Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR.
The plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by
the police officers militate against a finding of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had
been compromised. It has been repeated in jurisprudence
that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of
substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an
impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.
(People Vs. Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017,
J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
May the defense of non-compliance to chain of
custody rule be raised for the first time on appeal?
When an accused raises the issue of non-compliance by
the police officers with Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. 9165
particularly the lack of physical inventory of the seized
specimen and the non-taking of photograph thereof on
appeal after the CA rendered a decision, the Court must
uphold his conviction. Cabrera should have raised the
said issue before the trial court. Truly, objection to
evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
When a party desires the court to reject the evidence
offered, he must so state in the form of an objection.
Without such objection, he cannot raise the question for
the first time on appeal (People v. Cabrera, G.R. No.
190175, November 12, 2014).
Is the delay in the turn-over of the dangerous drugs
to the PNP Crime Laboratory decisive in the
prosecution for violation of dangerous drugs act?
Yes. When there was delay in the turn-over of the corpus
delicti to the PNP Crime Laboratory as it was alleged that
the date the illegal sachet was seized falls on a Friday and
therefore the PNP Crime Laboratory was closed, it
appears that said date falls on a Wednesday, not on a
Friday, conviction must be immediately set aside. It must
be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions involving
illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the
necessity of proving with moral certainty that they are
the same seized items (People v. Sumili, G.R. No. 212160,
February 4, 2015).
Is the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs
case essential for the conviction of an accused?
No. The presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs
case is not essential for the conviction nor is it
indispensable for a successful prosecution because his
testimony would be merely corroborative and
cumulative. The informant’s testimony is not needed if
the sale of the illegal drug has been adequately proven by
the prosecution (People v. Amansec, 662 SCRA 574,
December 14, 2011).
42
Based on an information from an informant, a buy-
bust operation was constituted. The police officers
occupied different positions in order to observe their
informant who was also the poseur buyer. The
transaction between the informant and accused
Andaya was made and thereafter, the prearranged
signal signifying consummation of the transaction
was given. The police officers approached the two
and arrested them. The accused was charged with
illegal sale of drugs but he contends that the non-
presentation during the trial of the confidential
informant who was the poseur buyer was adverse to
the prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Is the presentation
of informant necessary in the prosecution for illegal
sale of dangerous drugs?
As a rule, it is not necessary for the State to present the
informant during the trial for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. However, in this case, the confidential informant
was not a police officer but he was designated to be the
poseur buyer himself. The State did not present the
confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to
describe how exactly the transaction between him and
Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue
against failure to present the confidential
informant/poseur-buyer except that none of the
members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the
transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer
due to their being positioned at a distance at the moment
of the supposed transaction. The presentation of the
confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution
in those instances could be excused because there were
poseur buyers who directly incriminated the accused. In
this case, however, it was different, because the poseur
buyer and the confidential informant were one and the
same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State
did not credibly incriminate Andaya (People v. Andaya,
G.R. No. 183700, October 13, 2014).
Is the non-presentation of the forensic chemist in
illegal drugs case a sufficient cause for acquittal?
NO. The failure of the prosecution to present the forensic
chemist to testify on how the seized items were handled
and taken into custody is not fatal to the admissibility of
the seized drugs and its paraphernalia. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized drugs (People vs. Galicia,
G.R. No. 218402, February 14, 2018).
Section 29 of R.A. 9165, The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, specifically punishes the act of
planting dangerous drugs. Section 29 provides that any
person who is found guilty of “planting” any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical,
regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty
of death.
Section 3(cc), R.A. 9165 defines planting of evidence as
the willful act of any person of maliciously and
surreptitiously inserting, placing, adding or attaching,
directly or indirectly, through any overt or covert act,
whatever quantity of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical in the
person, house, effects or in the immediate vicinity of an
innocent individual for the purpose of implicating,
incriminating or imputing the commission of any
violation of R.A. 9165.
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
Two vehicles were suspected to be used for
transportation of dangerous drugs. The Starex van
driven by Mayor Mitra was able to pass the
checkpoint, however, the ambulance driven by
Morilla was stopped for it was noticed that there
were several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry,
Morilla said that the sacks contained narra wooden
tiles. But the police officers requested for further
inspection where it was noticed that white crystalline
granules were scattered on the floor. At the request
of the police officers to open the sacks, Morilla said
that he was with Mayor Mitra to let him pass. Upon
inspection, the contents of the sacks turned out to be
sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. It
was also found that the van driven by Mayor Mitra
contains the same. Accused was charged with illegal
transport of dangerous drugs. Morilla contends that
his mere act of driving a vehicle containing
dangerous drugs is not sufficient to convict him. Is his
contention meritorious?
No. Mere act of driving is sufficient to convict Morilla of
the crime charge. “Transport”, as used under the
Dangerous Drugs Act, means “to carry or convey from one
place to another.” It was well-established during trial that
Morilla was driving the ambulance following the lead of
Mayor Mitra, who was driving a Starex vangoing to
Manila. The very act of transporting methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is malum prohibitum since it is
punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of
transportation of the sacks containing dangerous drugs
need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent,
motive or knowledge (People v. Morilla, G.R. No. 189833,
February 5, 2014).
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian
clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance
operations. While they were in front of a sari-sari
store, accused Laylo approached them and asked,
“Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?” PO1 Reyes replied,
“Bakit mayroon ka ba?” Laylo then brought out two
plastic bags containing shabu and told the police
officers, “Dos (P200.00) ang isa.” Upon hearing this,
the police officers introduced themselves as cops.
PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo. A laboratory
examination was conducted which found the
recovered items positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug. Is there a
crime committed even though the sale of illegal drugs
was not consummated?
Yes. The crime committed was attempted illegal sale of
drugs punishable under Section 26(b) of R.A. 9165.The
elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of
drugs are – first, identity of the buyer and seller; second,
the object, and the consideration; and third, the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment. The policemen were
the poseur-buyers and the appellant was the seller. The
substance contained in the plastic sachets which were
found to be positive for shabu as the object, and the
consideration, which is P200.00 for each sachet, was
made known by the appellant. However, the sale was
interrupted when the poseur-buyers introduced
themselves to the appellant; hence, the crime was not
consummated. The appellant already commenced by
overt acts the commission of the intended crime by
showing the substance to both of the policemen but did
not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce such crime by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. Such cause
43
or accident is when the policemen introduced themselves
and the sale was immediately aborted. Hence, appellant
is guilty of attempted sale of dangerous drugs (People v.
Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011).
ANTI-GRAFT AND
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
Cite an example of an act which constitute as graft
and corrupt practices and state the elements
constituting the crime.
Sec. 3 (e) Causing any undue injury to any part including
the government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
The elements are as follows:
1. The said offender is public officer who performs
official, administrative or judicial functions
2. That said official acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence
3. The said official caused any undue injury to any
party, including the government, or gave any private
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in
the discharge of his official functions.
How many crimes are mentioned in this example?
There are two (2) crimes mentioned. The SC said that the
law used the disjunctive word “or”, hence two crimes are
mentioned under Section 3(e) — (1) Causing any undue
injury to any party (2) Giving any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
Q: Gen. Nazareno as Chief and Chairman of PNP
channeled the PNP funds to the PNP Service Store
System (SSS) through "Funded RIVs" for an alleged
“ghost” purchase of combat, clothing and equipment
valued at ₱8 million. The RIV’s were released without
the approval of the NAPOLCOM and DBM. They
caused it to appear that there were purchases of
gears when in fact, there were none. Thereafter,
Lihayhay and Vinluan certified that the items were
delivered, properly inspected and accepted, and
subsequently distributed to the end- users. Are
Lihayhay and Vinluan guilty of a violation of Section
3(e) of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?”
A: Yes. All elements of the crime charged is present. Both
petitioners were public officers discharging
administrative functions at the time material to this case.
As to the second element, records show that Vinluan, in
his capacity as Chairman of the Inspection and
Acceptance Committee, signed the 16 certificates of
acceptance, inventory, and delivery of articles from the
PNP SSS despite its incompleteness or lack of material
dates, while Lihaylihay certified to the correctness of the
Inspection Report Forms even if no such deliveries were
made. As to the third element, petitioners’ participation
in facilitating the payment of non-existent CCIE items
resulted to an ₱8,000,000.00 loss on the part of the
government. (Vinluan vs. People of The Philippines, G.R.
No. 191219, July 31, 2013, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: Atty. David Loste, President of the Eastern Samar
Chapter of the IBP sent a letter to the Office of the
 CRIMINAL LAW
Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the
alleged transfer of then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an
accused in a criminal case for murder, from the
provincial jail of Eastern Samar to the residence of
then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. The NBI filed a
Report recommending the filing of criminal charges
against Governor Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended). It was alleged that the
detention prisoner Mayor Adalim was released from
jail and allowed to stay at Ambil’s residence for a
period of 85 days, without any court order
authorizing such transfer. Thus, Ambil in the
performance of his official functions, had given
unwarranted benefits and advantages to detainee
Mayor Francisco Adalim to the prejudice of the
government. Ambil admitted the allegations in the
information. They argued, however, that Adalim’s
transfer was justified considering the imminent
threats upon his person and the dangers posed by his
detention at the provincial jail. This threat was that
of Akyatan's gesture of raising a closed fist at Adalim.
Can Ambil Jr. be held liable?
A: Yes. Without a court order, Ambil and Apelado
transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other
than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much
more comfortable quarters, provided better
nourishment, was free to move about the house and
watch television. Ambil readily extended these benefits
to Adalim on the mere representation of his lawyers that
the mayor's life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail (Ambil Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
175457, July 6, 2011).
Q: An administrative case and a violation of R.A. 3019
was filed against a public officer. Insofar as the
violation of RA 3019 is concerned, the public officer
was placed under preventive suspension for 90 days.
And then thereafter, the Office of the Ombudsman
placed him again under preventive suspension on
account of the administrative case. The public officer
contended that since he has already been placed
under preventive suspension in the RA 3019 case, he
can no longer be placed under preventive suspension
in the administrative case. Is the contention of the
public officer correct?
A: No. It is clear that criminal and administrative cases
are distinct from each other. The settled rule is that
criminal and civil cases are altogether different from
administrative matters, such that the first two will not
inevitably govern or affect the third and vice versa. Verily,
administrative cases may proceed independently of
criminal proceedings. Criminal actions will not preclude
administrative proceedings, and vice-versa, insofar as the
application of the law on preventive suspension is
concerned (Villaseor v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 180700,
March 4, 2008).
Q: May a public officer charged under Section 3(b) of
Republic Act No. 3019 [“directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present, share,
percentage or benefit, for himself of for any other
person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official
capacity has to intervene under the law”] also be
simultaneously or successively charged with direct
44
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code?
Explain. (BAR 2010)
A: Yes, a public officer charged under Sec. 3 (b) of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) may also be
charged simultaneously or successively for the crime of
direct bribery under Art. 210 of the Revised Penal Code
because two crimes are essentially different and are
penalized under distinct legal philosophies. Violation of
Sec. (b) of RA 3019 is a malum prohibitum, the crime
under Art. 210 of the Code is a malum in se. There is no
double jeopardy if a person is charged simultaneously or
successively for violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 and the
Revised Penal Code (Merendillo v. People, G.R. Nos.
142369-70, April 13, 2007).
Q: During the audit report conducted by the COA
Regional Office it was found out that the accused
herein, Venancio Nava, succeeded in persuading
seven (7) school division superintendents to use the
allotment for the purchase of Science Laboratory
Tools and Devices (SLTD) for the calendar year 1990.
However, the said money was supposed to be used for
the improvement of the school facilities, and it is
required that in buying school materials, it must
undergo an effective public bidding. Nava persuaded
his school division superintendents to ignore the
circular requiring public bidding as allegedly, time
was of the essence in making the purchases and if not
done before the calendar year 1990, the funds
allotted will revert back to the general fund.
Furthermore, COA found out that the contract that
was entered into by Nava sellers exceeded the
prevailing market price ranging from 56% to 1,175%
based on the mathematical computation done by the
COA audit team. The loss of the government was said
to be in the amount of PHP 380,013.60. Nava was
charged therefore with the violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 3019 for entering on behalf of the
government in any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or
not the pubic officer profited or will profit thereby. Is
the suit vested with merit?
A: Yes, the suit is with merit. In order to be liable for such,
the following elements must be present: (i) the accused is
a public officer; (ii) the public officer entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
(iii) the contract or transaction was grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. In this
case, Nava is a public officer, who approved the
transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby
suffered a substantial loss (Nava v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 160211, August 28, 2006).
Q: The Mayor of an LGU, along with several local
government officials through their official duties,
purchased on various occasions, through personal
canvass, from ZARO Trading, a total of 142,612 pieces
of "walis ting-ting” at either P25 per piece or P15 per
piece. The said purchases were made without the
required public bidding, and were overpriced. Can
the local government officials be held liable for
entering a contract which is disadvantageous to the
government on account of failure to conduct public
bidding, and alleged overpricing based on the
unsigned quotation from a walis ting-ting supplier
alone?
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
A: No. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject
contracts would be grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government if characterized by
an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and
manifest disadvantage to the government was not
sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing
was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. In
finding that the walis ting-ting purchase contracts were
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA's
finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the
special audit team's report. Notably, however, the
evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price
quotation from the walis ting-ting suppliers of Parañaque
City. Effectively, the prosecution was unable to
demonstrate the requisite burden of proof, in order to
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of
petitioners (Caunan v. People, G.R. No. 182001-04,
September 2, 2009).
Dr. Chow, a government doctor, failed to submit his
Daily Time Record (DTR) from January to March
2000 and did not get approval of his sick leave
application for April because of evidence that he was
actually moonlighting elsewhere. Thus, the medical
Director caused the withholding of his salary for the
periods in question until he submitted his DTRs in
May 2000. Can Dr. Chow prosecute the medical
director for causing him undue injury in violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act?
A. Yes, since the medical Director acted with evident
bad faith.
B. No, since the medical director has full discretion in
releasing the salary of government doctors.
C. Yes, since his salary was withheld without prior
hearing.
D. No, since Dr. Chow brought it upon himself, having
failed to submit the required DTRs.
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR
CHILDREN ACT
What are the three phases of the "Battered Woman
Syndrome"?
The three (3) phases of the "Battered Woman Syndrome"
are: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving, or non-
violent phase (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January
15, 2004).
Q: Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were married.
Barely six years into the marriage, Go-Tan filed a
Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order (TPO) against Tan and her parents-
in-law before the RTC. She alleged that Tan, in
conspiracy with her parents-in-law, were causing
verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her.
Can the parents-in-law be considered as conspirators
and be included in the petition for issuance of a TPO?
A: Yes. While Section 3 of R.A. 9262 provides that the
offender must be related or connected to the victim by
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the RPC (Go-Tan v. Tan, G.R.
No. 168852, September 30, 2008).
45
Q: Del Socorro and Van Wilsem got married in 1990
in Holland. They were blessed with a son. However,
in 1995, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. Van Wilsem made a promise to provide
monthly support for their son. Del Socorro and their
son went back to the Philippines. Since the arrival of
Del Socorro and their son to the Philippines, Van
Wilsem never gave support to their son.
Consequently, Van Wilsem came to the Philippines
and remarried. All of the parties are presently living
in Cebu City. Thereafter, Del Socorro sent a letter
demanding support to Van Wilsem. Is Van Wilsem
liable under R.A. 9262?
A: Yes, Van Wilsem may be made liable under Section 5(e)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262. The deprivation or denial of
financial support to the child is considered an act of
violence against women and children (Del Socorro v. Van
Wilsem, G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014).
NOTE: In Republic v. Yahon (G.R. No. 201043, June 16,
2014), the trial court directed Armed Forces Of The
Philippines Finance Center to automatically deduct a
percentage from the retirement benefits of S/Sgt. Charles
Yahon, and to give the same directly to his wife Daisy
Yahon as spousal support in accordance of the permanent
protection order issued for his violation of the Anti-
Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Despite the provision of exemption of funds provided in
P.D. No. 1638, the Court held that Sec. 8(g) of R.A. 9262,
being a later enactment, should be construed as laying
down an exception to the general rule that retirement
benefits are exempt from execution.
Q: AAA had a romantic relationship with MELGAR,
which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate
child. MELGAR freely acknowledged the paternity of
BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar
turned sour as the latter had an affair with a younger
woman. When BBB was just about one year old,
MELGAR stopped giving support, prompting AAA to
file a case for support, which was eventually granted.
This notwithstanding, MELGAR still refused to give
support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
constrained to file the instant criminal case against
MELGAR. Is MELGAR liable for violation of Section
5(e) of RA 9262?
A: YES. MELGAR is liable for the violation of Section 5(e)
of RA 9262 for his refusal to provide support to his child.
RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e., husband, former husband, or any person
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom the woman has a common child, or against her
child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in, inter alia, economic abuse. As may be gathered
from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the
deprivation of support of a common child of the man-
accused and the woman-victim, whether such common
child is legitimate or not. (Melgar Vs. People, GR No.
223477, February 14, 2018, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
Q: AAA had a romantic relationship with MELGAR,
which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate
child. MELGAR freely acknowledged the paternity of
 CRIMINAL LAW
BBB. However, AAA's relationship with MELGAR
turned sour as the latter had an affair with a younger
woman. When BBB was just about one year old,
MELGAR stopped giving support, prompting AAA to
file a case for support, which was eventually granted.
This notwithstanding, MELGAR still refused to give
support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
constrained to file the instant criminal case against
MELGAR. Is MELGAR liable for violation of Section
5(i) of RA 9262?
A: NO. MELGAR is not liable for violation of Section 5(i) of
RA 9262 since it cannot be proven that his deprivation of
support caused mental and emotional anguish. In this
case, while the prosecution had established that MELGAR
indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence
was presented to show that such deprivation caused
either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish.
Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,
punishes the act of "causing mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or denial of access to the
woman's child/children." (Melgar Vs. People, GR No.
223477, February 14, 2018, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT
Bongalon was charged for the crime of child abuse
under Sec. 10 (a) of R.A. 7610. Bongalon allegedly
physically abused and/or maltreated Jayson (12
years old) with his palm hitting the latter at his back
and by slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and
uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family. On
his part, Bongalon denied having physically abused
or maltreated Jayson but only confronted him when
the latter threw stones at her daughters, calling them
as “Kimi” and for burning one of his daughter’s hair.
Did Bongalon acts amounted to child abuse under
R.A. 7610?
No. When Bongalon struck and slapped Jayson, he did not
do so with the intention to debase the child’s “intrinsic
worth and dignity” or to humiliate or embarrass him.
Rather, Bongalon did so at the spur of the moment and in
anger which only indicated his being overwhelmed by his
fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor
daughter. Not every instance of laying of hands on a child
constitutes the crime of child abuse under Republic Act
No. 7610. The Court explained that a person can only be
punished for child abuse when there’s an intention to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of the child as a human being (People v. Bongalon,
G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013).
NOTE: The elements of the offense of child abuse are:
a. minority of the victim;
b. acts complained of are prejudicial to the
development of the child-victim; and
c. the said acts are covered by the pertinent provisions
of R.A. No. 7610 and P.D. No. 603 (Sanchez v. People,
G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009).
Q: Iris was 16 years old when Gil, a pastor, met her in
a garage to eat with him. Because of her fear to get
reprimanded by Gil, she followed the latter’s request.
46
Iris felt dizzy so Gil assisted the former to her room.
Gil started kissing Iris which prompted her to
scream. Consequently, Gil covered Iris’ mouth with a
pillow and soon after, he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her. Gil was charged by Iris’
grandfather with rape and child abuse. Can Gil be
charged with both crimes?
A: No. If the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section
5(b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the
offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same
act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to
criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape
cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of
RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the Revised Penal Code (on
complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code
(such as rape) cannot be complexed with an offense
penalized by a special law. (People v. Pangilinan)
While the Court also finds that probable cause exists for
the crime of Child Abuse against Gil for the rape incidents
in view of the substantial identity of its elements with
that of Rape, he cannot be charged for both. Since there
are standing charges against Gil, respectively on account
of the same occurrences and so as not to violate his right
against double jeopardy, the Court finds it proper to
dismiss the charges of Rape against Gil considering the
subsisting charges of Child Abuse. (Iris Kristine Balois
Alberto vs. CA, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013, J. Perlas-
Bernabe case)
Q: Mabunot (accused) and Shiva (victim) were
classmates. Mabunot, under the influence of alcohol,
entered the classroom and strangled, boxed, and
twisted the arms of his classmates. Mabunot boxed
Shiva leaving a fractured rib. Mabunot avers that Sec.
10(a), Art VI, RA 7610 only penalizes acts of child
abuse which are not covered by the RPC and insists
that the acts complained of should fall under Art 265
(Slight Physical Injuries) which imposes a lighter
penalty. Is the single and unintended act of boxing
Shiva while Mabunot was engaged in a fist fight with
another falls within the definition of child abuse
under RA 7610?
A: Yes. the single and unintended act of boxing Shiva
while Mabunot was engaged in a fist fight with another
falls within the definition of child abuse under RA 7610
as RA 7610 is intended to “provide special protection to
children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation and discrimination and other conditions,
prejudicial to their development.” Child abuse referee to
the infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty,
or neglect, sexual abuse or exploitation of a child. Physical
injury includes but it is not limited to lacerations,
fractured bones, internal injuries or other bodily hard
suffered by the child. Shiva was only 14 years old when
she received the blow which fractured her rib. being a
child, she is under the protective mantle of RA 7610,
which punishes the maltreatment of a child, whether the
same is habitual or not. Moreover, the IRR of RA 7610
refers the fractured bones as falling within the coverage
of physical injuries, which may be inflicted to a child,
rendering the accused liable for RA 7610. (Jester Mabunot
vs People of the Philippines, GR 204659, Sept. 19, 2016)
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
Q: AAA, 14 year old boy, went to a beach resort
together with Pinlac to attend a fraternity initiation
rites. After succumbing to Pinlac’s persuasion to
drink alcohol and smoke marijuana, AAA lost control
of himself and while in a daze, stupor, or near total
unconsciousness, Pinlac isolated AAA from his
companions and other fraternity recruits, forcibly
disrobed AAA, and performed oral sex on him by
sucking his penis until he ejaculated. Is Pinlac liable
for violation of RA 7610?
A: Yes, Pinlac is liable for violation of RA 7610. The State
had satisfactorily established the following elements
constitutive of the offense charged: "(1) the accused
commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse;
and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age." In this case AAA was 14 years old when he
was subjected to sexual abuse. Pinlac’s act in disrobing
the minor AAA, who was then under the influence of
illegal drugs and liquor after he was made to take them
by Pinlac, and thereafter, sucking AAA's penis, is clearly a
lascivious conduct performed by Pinlac on AAA. (Nicanor
Pinlac vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197458,
November 11, 2015)
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT
What are Status Offenses?
Status offenses refer to offenses which discriminate only
against a child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty
for committing similar acts. These shall include curfew
violations; truancy, parental disobedience and the like
(Sec. 4[r], RA 9344).
Michael was 17 years old when he was charged for
violation of Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 (illegal sale of
prohibited drug). By the time he was convicted and
sentenced, he was already 21 years old. The court
sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and a fine of P500,000. Michael applied for
probation but his application was denied because the
probation law does not apply to drug offenders under
R.A. 9165. Michael then sought the suspension of his
sentence under R.A. 9344 or the Juvenile Justice and
Youth Welfare Code. Can Michael avail of the
suspension of his sentence provided under this law?
(BAR 2013)
The benefits of a suspended sentence can no longer apply
to Michael. The suspension of sentence lasts only until as
provided for by the law, the offender reaches the
maximum age and thus, could no longer be considered a
child for purposes of applying R.A. 9344. However, he
shall be entitled to the right of restoration, rehabilitation
and reintegration in accordance with the law to give him
the chance to live a normal life and become a productive
member of the community. Accordingly, Michael may be
confined in an agricultural camp and other training
facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344 (People
v. Sarcia, GR No. 169641, September 10, 2009).
Can the provisions of R.A. 9344 be given retroactive
application?
47
Yes. Under Sec 68 of R.A. 9344, persons who are already
convicted or are serving sentence but who were minors
at the time of the commission of the crime, shall be given
retroactive application of the law.
Does Sec. 38 of R.A. 9344 providing for a suspended
sentence apply even to child in conflict with the law
who has committed a heinous crime?
Yes, according to the SC, such provision of R.A. 9344 does
not distinguish as to the nature of the crime committed
by the offender, therefore, taking into consideration the
rule in Statutory Construction, that when the law does
not distinguish, neither should the court distinguish
(People v. Sarcia G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009).
NOTE: The ruling in People v. Sarcia was reiterated
inPeople v. Mantalaba where the SC held that while
Section 38 of R.A. 9344 provides that suspension of
sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict
with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. In finding
the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for
violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, the RTC imposed the
penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98
of the same law. A violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165
merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death;
however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the
offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be
reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the
penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the
technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the
Revised Penal Code (People v. Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227
July 20, 2011).
HUMAN SECURITY ACT OF 2007
A bus full of children from the province went to
Manila to have an excursion. Before the children
were able to alight from the bus, here comes X in full
battle gear, with all kinds of guns and ammunitions
and at gunpoint, he told the conductor to open the
bus. X hostaged the children. Thereafter, X posted
cartolinas on the glass windows of the bus. These
cartolinas contained his demands to the government.
Later after 12 hours of negotiation, X gave in and so X
was arrested and was charged based on a valid
complaint with violation of R.A. 9372. He was
however acquitted. Can the State still prosecute X for
the crime of serious illegal detention and for
violation of R.A. 10591 for having in his possession
various unlicensed firearms?
No. Because under Sec 49 of R.A.9372, it is provided that
when a person has been prosecuted under a provision of
R.A.9372, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense
or felony which is necessarily included in the offense
charged under R.A.9372.
ANTI-TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ACT
Loko advertised on the internet that he was looking
for commercial models for a TV advertisement.
 CRIMINAL LAW
Ganda, a 16-year-old beauty, applied for the project.
Loko offered her a contract, which Ganda signed. She
was asked to report to an address which turned out
to be a high-end brothel. Ganda became one of its
most featured attractions. What is Loko’s liability, if
any? What effect would Ganda’s minority have on
Loko’s liability? (BAR 2014)
Loko is liable of the crime of Trafficking in Persons under
R.A.9208. He recruited, offered and hired Ganda by
means of fraud or deception for the purpose of
exploitation or prostitution. By means of deceit, i.e., in the
guise of making her a commercial model, Loko recruited
Ganda for the purpose of prostitution.
Ganda’s minority is a qualifying circumstance. Under
Section 6, R.A.9208, when the trafficked person is a child,
the crime committed is Qualified Trafficking in Persons,
penalized by life imprisonment.
ANTI-FENCING LAW
True or False. In a prosecution for fencing under P.D.
1612, it is a complete defense for the accused to prove
that he had no knowledge that the goods or articles
found in his possession had been the subject of
robbery. (BAR 2000)
False. Fencing is committed if the accused “should have
known” that the goods or articles had been the subject of
theft or robbery. Mere possession of the stolen goods
gives rise to the prima facie presumption of fencing.
Arlene is engaged in the buy and sell of used
garments, more popularly known as"ukay-
ukay." Among the items found by the police in a raid
of her store in Baguio City were brand-new Louie
Feraud blazers. Arlene was charged with "fencing."
Will the charge prosper? Why or why not? (BAR
2010)
No, a charge of “fencing” will not prosper. “Fencing” is
committed when a person, with intent to gain for himself
or for another, deals in any manner with an article of
value which he knows or should be known to him to have
been derived from proceeds of theft or robbery (Sec.2, PD
1612). Thus, for a charge of fencing to prosper, it must
first be established that a theft or robbery of the article
subject of the alleged “fencing” has been committed- a
fact which is a wanting in this case.
It should be noted that the suspect is engaged in the buy
and sell of used garments, which are in the nature of
personal property. In civil law, possession of personal or
movable property carries with it a’ prima facie
presumption of ownership. The presumption of “fencing”
arises only when the article or item involved is the
subject of a robbery or thievery (Sec. 5, PD 1612).
Q: Tan is engaged in transporting Coca-Cola products.
He instructed his truck driver (Lopez) and helper
(Lariosa), to deliver 210 cases of Coca-Cola products
worth P52,476.00 to Demins Store. However, Tan
discovered his truck driver and helper delivered the
subject items to Cahulogan's store. Tan went to and
informed Cahulogan that the delivery to his store was
a mistake and that he was pulling out the subject
items. However, Cahulogan refused, claiming that he
bought the same from Lariosa for P50,000.00, but
48
could not present any receipt evidencing such
transaction. Tan negotiated with petitioner to
instead deliver to him P20,000.00 worth of empty
bottles with cases, as evidenced by their Agreement
dated January 18, 2011. Cahulogan was charged with
“fencing.” Will the charged prosper?
A: Yes, Cahulogan should be charged for Fencing. All the
elements of the crime of Fencing were present. It was
shown that: (a) Lariosa sold to petitioner the subject
items without authority and consent from his employer,
Tan, for his own personal gain, and abusing the trust and
confidence reposed upon him as a truck helper; (b)
petitioner bought the subject items from Lariosa and was
in possession of the same; (c) under the circumstances,
petitioner should have been forewarned that the subject
items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with
Lariosa did not have any accompanying delivery and
official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that
such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to
common practice among dealers of soft drinks; and (d)
Cahulogan's intent to gain was made evident by the fact
that he bought the subject items for just P50,000.00,
lower than their value in the amount of P52,476.00.
(Ireneo Cahulogan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21,
2018, J. Perlas-Bernabe case)
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW
Who are the persons liable under B.P. 22?
1. Any person who makes or draws and issues any
check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of
such check in full upon its presentment, which check
is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment; or
2. Having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee
bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a
credit to cover the full amount of the check if
presented within a period of 90 days from the date
appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored
by the drawee bank.
B.P. 22 VIS-À-VIS ESTAFA
B.P. 22 ESTAFA
Malum prohibitum. Malum in se.
Crime against public Crime against
interest. property.
Deceit is not required. Deceit is an element.
Punishes the making or The act constituting
drawing of any check the offense is
that is subsequently postdating or issuing
dishonored, whether a check in payment of
issued in payment of an an obligation when
obligation or to merely the offender has no
guarantee an obligation. funds in the bank or
his funds deposited
therein were not
 UST LAW PRE-WEEK NOTES 2019
It is the issuance of a sufficient to cover the
check, not the non- amount of the check.
payment of obligation
which is punished.
Violated if check is issued Not violated if check
in payment of a pre- is issued in payment
existing obligation. of a pre-existing
obligation.
Damage is not required. Damage is required.
Drawer is given 5 Drawer is given 3
banking days to make days to make
arrangements of arrangements for
payment after receipt of payment after receipt
notice of dishonor. of notice of dishonor.
Q: A and B agreed to meet at the latter’s house to
discuss B’s financial problems. On his way, one of A’s
car tires blew up. Before A left the meeting, he asked
B to lend him money to buy a new spare tire. B had
temporarily exhausted his bank deposits leaving a
zero balance. Anticipating, however a replenishment
of his account soon, B issued a postdated check with
which A negotiated for the new tire. When presented,
the check bounced for lack of funds. The tire company
filed a criminal case against A and B. What would be
the criminal liability, if any, of each of the two
accused? Explain. (BAR 2003)
A: A, who negotiated the unfunded check of B in buying a
new tire for his car, may only be prosecuted for estafa if
he was aware at the time of such negotiation that the
check has no sufficient funds in the drawee bank;
otherwise, he is not criminally liable.
B, who accommodated A with his check, may
nevertheless be prosecuted under B.P. 22 for having
issued the check, knowing at the time of issuance that he
has no funds in the bank and that A will negotiate it to buy
a new tire, i.e. for value. B may not be prosecuted for
estafa because the facts indicate that he is not actuated by
intent to defraud in issuing the check negotiated.
Obviously, B issued the postdated check only to help A.
Criminal intent or dolo is absent.
Q: Campos obtained a loan from FWCC. In return, she
issued post-dated checks to FWCC as security for the
loan. Fourteen of these checks were dishonored
when presented to the bank. FWCC filed cases for
violation of B.P. 22. After her arraignment, she did
not attend any of her hearings hence, she was tried in
absentia. She was held guilty for violation of B.P.22.
She claims she did not receive any notice of dishonor.
Further, she made subsequent arrangements for
payments of the obligation to FWCC, which is
tantamount to good faith. Is Campos liable for B.P.22?
A: Yes, Campos is liable for B.P.22. Sec. 2 of B.P.22 creates
a presumption of insufficiency of funds. When she made
subsequent arrangements for payments of the obligation
to FWCC, this statement was a confirmation that she
actually received the required notice of dishonor from
FWCC (Campos v. People & FWCC, G.R. No 187401,
September 17, 2014).
Q: Castor used the checks given to him by Lim as
payment for the delivery of printing materials, but
later asked Lim to “stop payment” as the printing
materials were delivered too late. Later, Badiee sent
two demand letters to Lim and subsequently filed a
complaint against Lim before the Office of the
Prosecutor for violation of B.P.22. After one month
49
from receipt of the demand letters and after
receiving the subpoena, Lim issued a replacement
check, and Badiee was able to encash the said
replacement check. Six months after the payment of
the bounced checks, two Informations were filed
against Lim for violation of B.P.22. Is he liable for
violation of B.P.22?
A: No, the fact that the issuer of the check had already
paid the value of the dishonored check after having
received the subpoena, should have forestalled the filing
of the Information in court (Lim v. People, G.R. No. 190834,
November 26, 2014).
NOTE: The Supreme Court issued SC Administrative
Circular No. 13-2001 which clarified the application of
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 concerning the
penalty for violation of B.P. 22.
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular
No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference
in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg.
22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the
possibility of imprisonment for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the
law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a
rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the
circumstances of both the offense and the offender
clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact
without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone
should be considered as the more appropriate penalty.
Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone
rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty,
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed
a hindrance.
It is, therefore, understood that:
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of
B.P. Blg. 22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound
discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the
imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests
of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to
the imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be
unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on
subsidiary imprisonment.”
ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT, AS AMENDED
Is there a special complex crime of carnapping with
homicide?
 CRIMINAL LAW

Yes. The change of the phrase "in the commission of the

carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof", this amendment
clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1
to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last
clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the
prosecution has to prove the essential requisites of
carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim,
and more importantly, it must show that the original
criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the
killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission
of the carnapping or on theoccasion thereof"
Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not
proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would
cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if
proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal
Code. In other words, to prove the special complex
crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be
proof not only of the essential elements of
carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal
design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated
in the course of the commission of the carnapping or
on the occasion thereof. (People vs Macaranas, GR
226846, June 21, 2017)
A is the driver of B’s Mercedes Benz car. When B was
on a trip to Paris, A used the car for a joy ride with C
whome he is courting. Unfortunately, A met an
accident. Upon his return, B came to know about the
unauthorized use of the car and sued A for qualified
theft. B alleged that A took and used the car with
intent to gain as he derived some benefit or
satisfaction from its use. On the other hand, A argued
that he has no intent of making himself the owner of
the car as he in fact returned it to the garage after the
joy ride. What crime or crimes, if any, were
committed? (BAR 2016)
The crime committed by A is carnapping. The unlawful
taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the Anti-
Carnapping Law, and not by the provisions on qualified
theft or robbery. The concept of carnapping is the same
as that of robbery and theft.
The laws on arson in force today are P.D. 1613 and Article
320 as amended of the Revised Penal Code. Consequently,
simple arson is governed by P.D. 1613 while destructive
arson is governed by the Revised Penal Code.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from
Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness
of the criminal offender.
Q: Macabando was found on the road holding a lead
pipe and breaking bottles. That same night, a fire
broke out in Macabando’s house. Those living nearby
tried to call for help and stop the fire but were
prevented by the owner of the house who stood
outside his house and fired several gun shots in the
air. He also threatened to kill anyone who would try
to put out the fire. In the process, other residential
homes were also destroyed. The Bureau of Fire
Protection conducted an investigation and the
results revealed that the fire was intentionally
started in the Macabando’s home. The Regional Trial
Court found Macabando guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of destructive arson, punishable under Article
320 of the RPC. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment in
toto. Macabando contends that the crime committed
is only simple arson. Is he correct?
A: Yes, Macabando is correct. Simple arson contemplates
the malicious burning of public and private structures,
regardless of size not punished under destructive arson.
In this case, he burned his own house and other
residential homes.
There are two elements required for simple arson: first,
there is intentional burning; and second, what is
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling. The Court held that both elements were
sufficiently proven in court. All property destroyed in the
fire were his own house and several other inhabited
homes. Based on the facts, the burning was clearly
intentional (People v. Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31,
2013).

In this case, A took the car without the consent of B with

intent to temporarily deprive him of the car. Although the
taking was “temporary” or for a “joy ride”, the Supreme
Court in People v. Bustinera sustains as the better view
that which holds that when a person, either with the
object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive,
or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a vehicle
belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he
is guilty of theft because by taking possession of the
personal property belonging to another and using it, his
intent to gain is evident since he derives therefrom utility,
satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure.

NOTE: To sustain a conviction for highway robbery, the

prosecution must prove that the accused were organized
for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately.
If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is
only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four
armed men (People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 104461, February
23, 1996; Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 79543,
October 16, 1996).

ARSON UNDER THE RPC

IN RELATION TO ANTI-ARSON LAW

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