RULE 122 - APPEAL
and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent Logronio to
1) G.R. No. L-32409 February 27, 1971
BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E.
SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE VIVENCIO M. RUIZ,
MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE
LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA, NICANOR
ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN
DOE, Respondents.
San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Crispin V . Bautista, Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez and
Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
with prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines,
and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to
declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by
respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order respondents to
desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents,
papers and effects seized by virtue thereof, as well as from
enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged
by petitioners to have been made on the basis of the said
documents, papers and effects, and to order the return of the
latter to petitioners. We gave due course to the petition but did
not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.
The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a
search warrant against petitioners for violation of Section 46(a) of
the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208
and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon,
one of herein respondents, to make and file the application for
search warrant which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970,
respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent Arturo
Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They
brought with them the following papers: respondent Vera’s
aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant
already filled up but still unsigned by respondent De Leon; an
affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent
De Leon; a deposition in printed form of respondent Logronio
already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed;
and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by
respondent Judge.
At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by
means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take
the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the
session had adjourned, respondent Judge was informed that the
depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon
request of respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes;
take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to
be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for
search warrant and respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and
accordingly issued.
Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday,
the BIR agents served the search warrant petitioners at the
offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
Petitioners’ lawyers protested the search on the ground that no
formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the
warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search
which yielded six boxes of documents.
On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal praying that the search warrant be
quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant
be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to
pay petitioners, jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s
fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor
General, filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court,
presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29, 1970, an
order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant.
In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970, the Bureau of Internal
Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the
total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the
documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.
The petition should be granted for the following
reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the
complainant and his witness.
The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and
of the Revised Rules of Court are:
"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1,
Constitution.)
"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice
of the peace after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of
the peace must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." (Rule
126, Revised Rules of Court.)
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution,
and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court,
should be conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The
phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional provision,
was introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the
draft submitted by the Sub-Committee of Seven. The following
discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings
of the Philippine Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757)
is enlightening:
"SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos
al grano.
En los casos de una necesidad de actuar inmediatamente para
que no se frusten los fines de la justicia mediante el registro
inmediato y la incautacion del cuerpo del delito, no cree Su
Señoria que causaria cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado
en su enmienda en tal forma que podria frustrar los fines de la
justicia o si Su Señoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos
con el fin de compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos
del individuo en su persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.
"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico
que Su Señoria pregunta por la siguiente razon: el que solicita un
mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese
escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del Juez sin que alguien vaya el
juez a presentar ese escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa
persona que presenta el registro puede ser el mismo
denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento
de registro. Ahora toda la enmienda en esos casos consiste en
que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra solamente a
sea peticion sino que el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si
tiene testigos tambin examiner a los testigos.
"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion
de ese denunciante por escrito siempre requeriria algun tiempo?.
"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por
otro lado minimizamos en todo lo posible las vejaciones injustas
con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro.
Creo que entre dos males debemos escoger. el menor.
x x x Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.
"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this
amendment is because we are incorporating in our constitution
something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge
could issue a search warrant, he must be under the obligation to
examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any
witness, the witnesses that he may produce . . ."
The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4,
Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for it requires the judge,
before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath
or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce . . ."
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence
or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1,
par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants
except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether or
not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment
after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be
delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted
by respondent Judge of the complainant (respondent De Leon)
and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the
complainant’s application for search warrant and the witness’
printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before
respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for
determining whether or not there was probable cause against
herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have
attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the
proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken. At
this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The
transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-76, April 1, 1970, Annex
J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court
below shows that per instruction of respondent Judge, Mr.
Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the
depositions of the complainant and his witness, and that
stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that
time respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After
respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy Clerk
Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and
witness Logronio went to respondent Judge’s chamber and
informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions.
Respondent Judge then requested the stenographer to read to
him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales
testified as follows:
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the
Honorable Judge requested or instructed them, requested Mr.
Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will
be found to be false and without legal basis, he can be charged
criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio
whether he affirms the facts contained in his deposition and the
affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.
"Q And thereafter?
"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.
"Q Who is this he?
"A The Honorable Judge.
"Q The deposition or the affidavit?
"A The affidavit, Your Honor."
The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which
led to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus
limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to
a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to
administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This
cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the
one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the
Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the
judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of
the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses that the question of how much time would be
consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the
Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings
quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to
respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with
the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that manner
respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the complainant and his witness, and to propound
initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account
of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were
important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important
question of whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific
offense.
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec.
46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all
other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73,
208 and 209." The question is: Was the said search warrant
issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by
Sec. 3, Rule 126?

To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely
the provisions of the Tax Code referred to above. Thus we find
the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by
corporations.
Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.
Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax
returns and for rendering false and fraudulent returns.
Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to
make a return or to supply the information required under the Tax
Code.
Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks,
compounds, or manufactures any article subject to a specific tax,
without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or
abets in the conduct of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or
illicit manufacture of any article subject to specific tax . . .," and
provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or
association, the official and/or employee who caused the
violation shall be responsible.
Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales,
business, or gross value of output removed, or to pay the tax due
thereon.
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four
distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of
Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns),
which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53
(withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation
of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the
fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of
receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually
removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced
in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II
(Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V
(Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al.,
L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not applicable,
because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for
violation of only one code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue
Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because it was
precisely on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred
sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on
January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by
inserting therein the phrase "in connection with one specific
offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense," in what is now Sec. 3, Rule
126. Thus we said in Stonehill:
"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules
of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.’"
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to
be seized.
The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are
described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this manner:
"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals,
columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers
ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks
and securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale;
telex and coded messages; business communications,
accounting and business records; checks and check stubs;
records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."
The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1,
of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things
to be seized.
In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, said:
"The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application
for the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and
seized, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.’
"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or
illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their
nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described
— as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants."
While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant nevertheless tends
to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is
so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of
petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its
business inoperative.
In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896,
this Court had occasion to explain the purpose of the
requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the
place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:
". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec.
97) specifically require that a search warrant should particularly
describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the
things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly
described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the
end that ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be made,
— that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct
interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by
American authorities."
The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be
defeated under the search warrant issued in this case.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things
to be seized when the description therein is as specific as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384);
or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of
law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when
the things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec.
2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court). The herein search warrant
does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles
desired to be seized have any direct relation to an offense
committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence,
other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the
articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy
merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description
contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned,
at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data
regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and
securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages
and communications, checks, bank deposits and withdrawals,
records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the
warrant.
Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because
petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of
respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is
without merit. In the first place, when the questions raised before
this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in
and passed upon by the court below, the filing of a motion for
reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in
this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et
Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the rule requiring the
filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a
writ of certiorari can be entertained was never intended to be
applied without considering the circumstances. (Matutina v.
Buslon, Et Al., 109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the
essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by
respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against
petitioner corporation, On account of which immediate and more
direct action becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et
Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly, the rule does not apply where, as in
this case, the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due
process taints the proceeding against them in the court below not
only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v. Court of
Appeals, Et Al., supra.)
It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not
entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizures.
Again, we find no merit in the contention.
"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion
that an officer of a corporation which is charged with a violation of
a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress
passed in the exercise of its constitutional powers, cannot refuse
to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not
wish to be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled
to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against unreasonable
searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an
association of individuals under an assumed name and with a
distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it
waives no constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Its
property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be
proceeded against by due process of law, and is protected,
under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ."
(Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)
"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it
was thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, the
ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and
papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search
and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might
have been achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber
Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385, 64 L.
ed. 319.)
In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly
recognized the right of a corporation to object against
unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:
"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have
no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities,
separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners,
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of
each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold
therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a
seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful
search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of
by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly
object to the use in evidence against them of the documents,
papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be
invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in
their individual capacity . . ."library
In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations
in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched
and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the
corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose
rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that
score, petitioner corporation here stands on a different footing
from the corporations in Stonehill.
The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not
entirely — as claimed by petitioners — at least partly — as in
effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents
seized by virtue of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the
fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half
months after the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a
strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis
for the assessments. Those assessments should therefore not
be enforced.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly,
Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is
declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined
from enforcing the said search warrant; the documents, papers
and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to
petitioners; and respondent officials the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined
from enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the
present petition, as well as other assessments based on the
documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant
herein nullified, and from using the same against petitioners in
any criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando,
Teehankee and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs with Mr. Justice Barredo.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur.
I agree with the ruling that the search warrants in question
violates the specific injunction of Section 3, Rule 126 that "No
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
There is no question in my mind that, as very clearly pointed out
by Mr. Justice Villamor, the phrase "for violation of Section 46 (a)
of the National Internal Revenue Code in relation to all other
pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208
and 209" refers to more than one specific offense, considering
that the violation of Section 53 which refers to withholding of
income taxes at the sources, Section 208 which punishes pursuit
of business or occupation without payment of the corresponding
specific or privilege taxes, and Section 209 which penalizes
failure to make a return of receipts sales, business or gross value
output actually removed or to pay the taxes thereon in
connection with Title V on Privilege Taxes on Business and
Occupation can hardly be absorbed in a charge of alleged
violation of Section 46(a), which merely requires the filing of
income tax returns by corporations, so as to constitute with it a
single offense. I perceive here the danger that the result of the
search applied for may be used as basis not only for a charge of
violating Section 46(a) but also and separately of Section 53, 208
and 209. Of course, it is to be admitted that Sections 72 and 73,
also mentioned in the application, are really directly related to
Section 46(a) because Section 72 provides for surcharges for
failure to render, returns and for rendering false and fraudulent
returns and Section 73 refers to the penalty for failure to file
returns or to pay the corresponding tax. Taken together, they
constitute one single offense penalized under Section 73. I am
not and cannot be in favor of any scheme which amounts to an
indirect means of achieving that which not allowed to be done
directly. By merely saying that a party is being charged with
violation of one section of the code in relation to a number of
other sections thereof which in truth have no clear or direct
bearing with the first is to me condemnable because it is no less
than a shotgun device which trenches on the basic liberties
intended to be protected by the unequivocal limitations imposed
by the Constitution and the Rules of Court on the privilege to
secure a search warrant with the aggravating circumstance of
being coupled with an attempt to mislead the judge before whom
the application for its issuance is presented.

I cannot close this brief concurrence without expressing my

vehement disapproval of the action taken by respondent internal
revenue authorities in using the documents and papers secured
during the search, the legality of which was pending resolution by
the court, as basis of an assessment, no matter how highly
motivated such action might have been. This smacks of lack of
respect, if not contempt for the court and is certainly intolerable.
At the very least, it appears as an attempt to render the court
proceedings moot and academic, and dealing as this case does
with constitutionally protected rights which are part and parcel of
the basic concepts of individual liberty and democracy, the
government agents should have been the first ones to refrain
from trying to make a farce of these court proceedings. Indeed, it
is to be regretted that the government agents and the court have
acted irregularly, for it is highly doubtful if it would be consistent
with the sacredness of the rights herein found to have been
violated to permit the filing of another application which complies
with the constitutional requirements above discussed and the
making of another search upon the return of the papers and
documents now in their illegal possession. This could be an
instance wherein taxes properly due the State will probably
remain unassessed and unpaid only because the ones in charge
of the execution of the laws did not know how to respect basic
constitutional rights and liberties.
2) G.R. No. L-28642 April 30, 1976
MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of La Union, and SGT. ERNESTO
LUMANG, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court is confronted anew in this certiorari proceeding with
the claim that a search warrant issued without complying with the
requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court should
have been nullified, but was not in the challenged order of
respondent Judge Javier Pabalan. More specifically, it was the
failure of the application for the search warrant as well as the
search warrant itself to specify the specific offense, to examine
the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of respondent
Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched
and the things to be seized, that were singled out to justify the
assertion of illegality. When required to answer, respondent
Judge did not bother to refute specifically the allegations of the
petition for certiorari, but merely contented himself with inviting
attention to the challenged order as well as the resolutions
denying the motion for reconsideration and with the statement
that he "has no particular prayer to ask the Supreme Court," an
assertion thereafter repeated in the second paragraph of his
two-paragraph answer that he "has no request to make in this
particular case leaving the issues entirely to the discretion of the
Supreme Court." The tone of diffidence, almost of apology, is
easy to understand. It is difficult to resist the thought that
respondent Judge failed to pay heed to authoritative decisions of
this Court. The most cursory perusal of the application for search
warrant by respondent Lumang and the search warrant
itself, yields no other conclusion. Respondent Judge ignored
what the Constitution requires on two points, the existence of a
probable cause and the particular description of the things to be
seized. The limitation as to the specific offense as mandated by
the Rules of Court was not observed either. Even on the
assumption then that he could not
relevant According to the former: "A search warrant shall not
issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. No search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." Section 4
provides: "The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him." be held chargeable with
knowledge of the leading Stonehill decision, announced barely
twenty days before the search warrant in question was issued,
still from Alverez v. Court of First Instance the first to be decided
under the 1935 Constitution, promulgated in 1937, to Oca v.
Marquez, that came out in 1965, this Court had adhered firmly to
the view that for a search warrant to escape the imputation of
being unreasonable, there should be strict conformity with the
requirements of the Constitution and the applicable procedural
rules. The finding then should have been against the validity of
the search warrant. Nonetheless, insofar as such order limited
itself to requiring the return solely of the liquor, the pack of
playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of
Streptomycin, all of which may be considered as personal effects
of petitioners, with the rest of the goods taken falling under the
category of things forbidden by law and therefore need not be
restored, it can be sustained. So we rule.
In the opening paragraph of the application for search warrant,
respondent Ernesto I. Lumang admitted that "he has been
informed" and therefore was of the belief that petitioners Maria
Castro and Co Ling, whose place of residence was not even
indicated, although subsequently mention was made of their
being at Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession
narcotics and other contraband." There is a claim that he had
verified the report and that therefore he had "reasons to believe
that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and other
contraband. The application was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal
Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine Constabulary. Again,
mention was merely made of their information about narcotics
and other contraband being kept by petitioners. They did allege
therein that they conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could
come out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for
almost ten years conducting such traffic and that after verification,
he was not registered in the Immigration Office. Then, on the
very same day, July 10, 1967, the search warrant was issued for
illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. Again, there was
reference to the possession by petitioners of such forbidden
goods. As to the complete and detailed description of the
properties to be seized, the search warrant merely mentioned
illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse
and premises of petitioners. In the resolution upholding the
validity of the search warrant, respondent Judge did state the
following: "On July 10, 1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of the PC,
with a long service behind, appeared in chamber before the
Presiding Judge of Branch I of this Court. With him were Sgt.
Molina and Cpl. Apilado both of the PC Command of La Union.
The three submitted to the Presiding Judge in chamber an
application for search warrant which is Exhibit I in this case and a
joint affidavit supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt.
Lumang said, testifying regarding this incident, those appearing
were asked, although not in writing and not recorded, some
questions by the Presiding Judge regarding their request of the
search warrant on the knowledge of Molina and Apilado on the
facts stated on the application and on the joint affidavit. The
inquiry was brief. The barrio to be searched was handwritten in
ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But
this correction was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil
and Maria Cristina are adjoining barrios. After the routine taking
of their oath and examination questions and answers, the
Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application for search
warrant, the joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search
warrant which is Exhibit C."
As set forth at the outset, failure to abide by both the Constitution
and the procedural law in terms of the existence of a probable
cause, a particular description of the property to be seized and
the requirement that there be only one specific offense, is quite
manifest.
1. This excerpt from the epochal opinion of former Chief Justice
Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno is highly relevant: "Two points
must be stressed in connection with — this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these
requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a
'violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.' In other
words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications.
The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the
judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of
competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy,
of the highest order, to convict anybody of a 'violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code)
and Revised Penal Code,' — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate provision of
said laws or codes." That same approach is reflected in the two
subsequent cases of Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz and Asian
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera. It bears repeating, as
was emphasized in Stonehill v. Diokno, that the averments as to
the alleged commission of the offenses imputed to petitioner
were abstract. As admitted in the challenged order, the inquiry
was brief. Subsequently, reference was made to "the routine
taking of [their oath] and examination questions and
answers ..." Nor can such perfunctory manner in which
respondent Judge conducted the required "examination under
oath" be justified merely because respondent Lumang was "a
Sergeant of the PC, with a long service behind [him]." Moreover,
contrary to the Rules of Court, he did not even bother to take the
depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them to the
record. There was thus a manifest and palpable violation of the
constitutional standard as to the quantum of proof to show the
existence of probable cause, as so clearly enunciated in
Stonehill.
2. Then again, the Constitution requires, for the validity of a
search warrant, that there be a particular description of "the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." As was
admitted by the judge in the challenged resolution, there was a
mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which was set
forth in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact
it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such inaccuracy
by saying that they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the
premises to be searched, it may be admitted that the deficiency
in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation.
Nonetheless, and again in line with Stonehill v. Diokno, the
Constitution is quite explicit that there be a particular description
of the things to be seized. That requisite was not complied with in
this case. That would explain why the searching party felt it had a
free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods,
including personal effects, which respondent Judge himself
would have them return. What was aptly characterized as a
"major objective" of this constitutional provision, the elimination of
general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed
anew that this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that
this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and
therefore must be strictly complied with. To quote from the
landmark American decision of Boyd v. United States: "It is the
duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the
citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. Their
motto should be obsta principis."
3. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic
procedural requisite that a search warrant "shall not issue but
upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense." Here reference was made to "an illegal traffic of
narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term covering
all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to
applicable statutes. Necessarily then, more than one offense
could arise from the activity designated as illegal traffic of
narcotics and contraband. As a matter of fact, in the challenged
order, reference was made to at least three charges having been
filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal Revenue Code,
its Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession of
opium. It would seem that once again what was correctly pointed
out by Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno as
unjustified and unwarranted finds application. Nor can there be
any plausibility to the possible excuse, to repeat what was said
before, that the Stonehill opinion having been rendered only
twenty days previous to the issuance of the search warrant,
respondent Judge could not be held chargeable with a
knowledge thereof, considering that as far back as July 30, 1965,
two years earlier, in Oca v. Marquez, this Court, through the
then Justice J. P. Bengzon, enunciated: "The decision herein has
applied the provisions of th Old Rules of Court since this case
arose under said Rules. Attention of the Bench and Bar is
however called to the fact that effective January 1, 1964 the
issuance of search warrants is governed by Section 3, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Court which among other things requires
that a search warrant must be in connection with one specific
offense."
4. As was made clear at the outset, though, the illegality of the
search warrant does not call for the return of the things seized,
the possession of which is prohibited by law. This is the
established doctrine in this jurisdiction. As far back as Uy Kheytin
v. Villareal, a 1920 decision, it was held: "That although in the
issuance of the search warrant in question the judge did not
comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders No.
58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium. and
its paraphernalia which were found and seized under said
warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated
because of such omission of the judge." Among the authorities
cited is Cooley: "'Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed
to search for stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been
smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for
implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or
Prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for obscene books
and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for powder or other
explosive and dangerous material so kept as to endanger the
public safety.'" So, also, in Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda, handed
down in 1940, Justice Laurel, speaking for this Court, stated: "If it
be true, furthermore, without, however, deciding the point, that as
alleged by the respondents the articles in question constitute
the corpus delicti of the Usury Law, their return to the petitioners
cannot be ordered." Magoncia v. Palacios, promulgated in 1948,
reiterated such a doctrine. Thus: "En el asunto de Uy
Kheytin contra Villareal (42 Jur. Fil. 935), los recurrentes pidieron
la devolucion del opio de que se incautaron los constabularies al
registrar su casa armados con un mandamiento de registro
expedido sin cumplir las disposiciones de los articulos 96 y 98 de
la Orden General No. 58; sostenian que los requisites exigidos
por dichos articulos no se habian cumplido, y por tanto, el
mandamiento de registro era ilegal, como si no existiera; que al
registro se ha hecho sin mandamiento de registro debidamente
expedido. Este Tribunal denego la peticion, declarando que la
irregularidad de la expedicion del mandamiento de registro ne
era suficiente causa para ordenar la devolucion del opio. El Hon.
Juez recurrido no abuso de su discrecion al denegar la
devolucion al acusado del paltik, 42 municiones y una granada
de mano, tampoco abuso de su sana discrecion al denegar la
peticion del acusado de que se prohiba al Fiscal Provincial y al
Jefe de Policia de Asingan, Pangasinan a presentar tales efectos
como prueba en la vista."
5. This decision leaves open the question of the legality of any
possible use that may be made by the prosecuting authorities of
the articles seized under an invalid search warrant. Here, again,
the Yee Sue Koy opinion of Justice Laurel is illuminating,
especially in view of the inadmissibility of evidence illegally
seized under the present Constitution At this stage, the question
does not have to be faced. The words of Justice Laurel follow:
"While we reiterate the rule that the seizure of books and
documents by means of a search warrant ' for the purpose of
using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in
whose possession they were found is unconstitutional because it
makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a
violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion
of an accused to testify against himself ..., the said rule has no
applicable force in the present case. ... In the application for the
issuance of the search warrant in question, it was alleged that the
articles seized were 'being used by it (Sam Sing & Co.) in
connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of
interest in violation of the Usury Law,' and it is now suggested
(memoranda of respondents) that the only object of the agents of
the Anti-Usury Board in keeping the articles is to prevent the
petitioners from employing them as a means of further violations
of the Usury Law. In this state of the record, without deciding the
question whether the petitioners will in fact use the articles in
question, if returned, for illegal purposes, we are not prepared to
order the return prayed for by the petitioners. (Cf. People v.
Rubio, 57 Phil. 384, 394-395.)"

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of

September 12, 1967 denying the motion of petitioners to annul
the search warrant as well as the resolutions of October 26, 1967
and January 29, 1968 denying the motions for reconsiderations
are reversed, the decision of this Court being that the search
warrant in question is tainted by illegality for being violative both
of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. It is likewise the
decision of this Court that notwithstanding the illegality of such
search warrant, the challenged order of respondent Judge can
be sustained only insofar as it would limit the return of the articles
seized to the liquor, the pack of playing cards, the bottle of
distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such
search warrant. No costs.

Barred, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.

3) G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI
SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA SERVICES,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY,
THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET
AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo,
Augusto Sanchez, Joker P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene
Saguisag for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the
validity of two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982
by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which
the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City,
and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon
City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We
Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and
other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of
the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the
"We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents, "particularly the Chief Legal
Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge Advocate
General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute
or successors" be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as
evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other
accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al.
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were
required to answer the petition. The plea for preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing on June
28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor
General in behalf of respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while
opposing petitioners' prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case
until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the
aforementioned articles. ..." With this manifestation, the prayer
for preliminary prohibitory injunction was rendered moot and
academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the
ground that petitioners had come to this Court without having
previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before
respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before impugning the
validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a
motion to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. But
this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the
constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest
generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan
dailies. The existence of this special circumstance justifies this
Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules. In the
words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C.
Vda. de Ordoveza v. Raymundo, "it is always in the power of the
court [Supreme Court] to suspend its rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of
laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said
search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant
petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or
after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either
has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for
the delay in the filing of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer,
p. 3, Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on
June 16, 1983, more than half a year after the petitioners'
premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If
they had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was
because they tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events
of the past eleven fill years had taught them that everything in
this country, from release of public funds to release of detained
persons from custody, has become a matter of executive
benevolence or largesse
Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of
persons close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a
letter to President Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet
asking the return at least of the printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been sent, through Col. Balbino V.
Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal Officer of the Presidential
Security Command, they were further encouraged to hope that
the latter would yield the desired results.
After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided
to come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to
our judicial system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them
for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts
exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption
that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the
seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against
them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. had used and marked as evidence some of the
seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872, he is now
estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.
We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents
lawfully belong to petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do
whatever he pleases with them, within legal bounds. The fact that
he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in any way
affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in
this petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners
to nullify the search warrants in question.
1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to
conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court . This objection, however, may properly be considered
moot and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during
the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed
been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his
witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to
search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the
execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on
the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one
place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping
and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of
Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of subversion penalized under
P.D. 885 as amended and he is keeping and concealing the
same at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error.
Precisely, two search warrants were applied for and issued
because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct
premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent
judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same
place. Besides, the addresses of the places sought to be
searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it
was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed
the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by
reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. The
fact is that the place for which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was
applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening paragraph
of the said warrant. Obviously this is the same place that
respondent judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82
[b].
In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the
premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been
held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place
intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be
especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose
affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the
judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in
the affidavit, And it has also been said that the executing officer
may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an
ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched."
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the
fact that although the warrants were directed against Jose
Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-petitioners Jose
Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services,
Inc. were seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the
personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant,
to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may
be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal
property:
[a] Property subject of the offense;
[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of
the offense; and
[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of
committing an offense.
The above rule does not require that the property to be seized
should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant
is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. In fact, under
subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of the
properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily,
stolen property must be owned by one other than the person in
whose possession it may be at the time of the search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient
that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control
or possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to have in relation to the articles
and property seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real
properties were seized under the disputed warrants. Under
Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in
a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet
the needs of the said industry or works" are considered
immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo where this
legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed
by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when
placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only
a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the
owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the
land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This
being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted
to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure
under a search warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent
judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence
Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied
by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security
Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the
premises prior to the filing of the application for the search
warrants on December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned
documents could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly
issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause
for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive
material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere
generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col.
Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in
his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy
the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have
done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable
cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro
M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, "that the evidence gathered
and collated by our unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-described were
used and are continuously being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective of, illegal
organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement, Movement for
Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement."
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, ... after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce; the Constitution requires no less than personal
knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
In Alvarez v. Court of First Instance, this Court ruled that "the
oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the
personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because
the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not
the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of
the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." As couched, the
quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before respondent
judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this
Court in Alvarez case.
Another factor which makes the search warrants under
consideration constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the
nature of general warrants. The search warrants describe the
articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
(equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables,
communications/recording equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used and/or connected in the printing of
the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and all documents
communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to the "WE
FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the
subversive organization known as Movement for Free Philippines,
Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;
4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;
and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas the search warrant which
authorized the search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards,
receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and other written
instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general.
In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in
connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have
been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which
authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used
to violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the
statute dealing with the crime of conspiracy]" was held to be a
general warrant, and therefore invalid. The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a
notable chapter in English history: the era of disaccord between
the Tudor Government and the English Press, when "Officers of
the Crown were given roving commissions to search where they
pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent
both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical
episode would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our
government to suppress any newspaper or publication that
speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business
and printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search and seizure, these
premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that
the printing and publication of said newspapers were
discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship
abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing
machines on the ground that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as amended, which
authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any person,
natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance
with implementing rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful however, if
sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence of
any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the
Minister of National Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it
was reported that no less than President Marcos himself denied
the request of the military authorities to sequester the property
seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:
The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors
for sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing
presses, according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.
On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We
Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the
equipment and all materials in the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court.
That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been
sequestered is further confirmed by the reply of then Foreign
Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983
of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President
Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. In this
reply dated February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing
facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a]
and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982
are hereby declared null and void and are accordingly set aside.
The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the return of the
seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized
thereunder are hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente
and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring
I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice
Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own reasons for
holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the
petition are utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of
press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross
violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3,
Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs.
Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points
mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To
satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must
be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice.
In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been
alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being
used as instruments and means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There
is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the
words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy
of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree
without reference to any determinate provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both
search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and
take possession, among other things, of the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other
publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.
The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets,
leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make
them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the
warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are
obnoxious to the Constitution.
In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE
FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been
published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the
same content but against which no action has been taken.
Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized
pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all
of the items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.
Teehankee, J., concur.
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring
I am glad to give my concurrence to the ponencia of Mr. Justice
Escolin At the same time I wish to state my own reasons for
holding that the search warrants which are the subject of the
petition are utterly void.
The action against "WE FORUM" was a naked suppression of
press freedom for the search warrants were issued in gross
violation of the Constitution.
The Constitutional requirement which is expressed in Section 3,
Article IV, stresses two points, namely: "(1) that no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized." (Stonehill vs.
Diokno, 126 Phil. 738, 747: 20 SCRA 383 [1967].)
Any search warrant is conducted in disregard of the points
mentioned above will result in wiping "out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it
would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers." (Ibid, p. 748.)
The two search warrants were issued without probable cause. To
satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must
be alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice.
In the case at bar nothing specifically subversive has been
alleged; stated only is the claim that certain objects were being
used as instruments and means of committing the offense of
subversion punishable under P.D. No. 885, as amended. There
is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. I n the
words of Chief Justice C Concepcion, " It would be legal heresy
of the highest order, to convict anybody" of violating the decree
without reference to any determinate provision thereof.
The search warrants are also void for lack of particularity. Both
search warrants authorize Col. Rolando Abadilla to seize and
take possession, among other things, of the following:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books and other
publication to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.

The obvious question is: Why were the documents, pamphlets,

leaflets, books, etc. subversive? What did they contain to make
them subversive? There is nothing in the applications nor in the
warrants which answers the questions. I must, therefore,
conclude that the warrants are general warrants which are
obnoxious to the Constitution.

In point of fact, there was nothing subversive published in the WE

FORUM just as there is nothing subversive which has been
published in MALAYA which has replaced the former and has the
same content but against which no action has been taken.

Conformably with existing jurisprudence everything seized

pursuant to the warrants should be returned to the owners and all
of the items are subject to the exclusionary rule of evidence.

Teehankee, J., concur.

4) G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J.
BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director,
National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS
PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL
VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES;
JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of
Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and
Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine
C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua
for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the
margin — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors —
several judges — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges
— issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants
against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they
were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the
persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take
possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds
or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the
means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and
void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court —
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants
were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5)
the documents, papers and cash money seized were not
delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of
in accordance with law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners
filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their
agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases
already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision
be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the
respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys
seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, (1) that the
contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the
effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein
petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the
aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated
June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the
corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction
was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the
alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two
(2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found
and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein
have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested
warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the
simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the
interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the
legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may
not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the
documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. Indeed,
it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers
belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized
and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of
the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights
have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could
not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property
had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been
disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the
Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference
to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F.
501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful
search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants
but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . .
(A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d.
786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the
residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of
June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously
issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein
Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2)
important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the
search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the
answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against
petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are
in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the
seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In
this connection, the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein
named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our
criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to
convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," — as alleged in the aforementioned applications —
without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to
wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by
the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the
so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what
would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in
connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court
deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules
of Court by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules
of Court that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with
this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for
the contested search warrants was compounded by the
description therein made of the effects to be searched for and
seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of
records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners
herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all
records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations,
whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1),
Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches
and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation,
however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position
was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal
should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable
has blundered," upon the theory that the constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for
damages against the searching officer, against the party who
procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those
assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure,
and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up
this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is
true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
that wrong be repressed.
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court
had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and,
so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in
subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court. After
reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp
vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional
documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable
state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by
it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that
very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by
that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them
by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal
Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks
rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties,
so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its
conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time
that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to
the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal
officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the
evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly
adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded
operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible
of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its
protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in
extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it
was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion
doctrine — an essential part of the right to privacy — be also
insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the
evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of
the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty
in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive
to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to
destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the
liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right
to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude
invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in
origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty
promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to
like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process
Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of
any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself,
chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on
reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which
the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than
that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the
letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish
probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party
against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason
why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the
fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such
competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find
that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the
issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence
of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who
secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable
searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in
power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not
possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually — but, understandably
— finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the
possibility of securing their conviction, is watered down by the
pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had
been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege
that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and
Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included
among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences
of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J.
Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the
records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the
corporations above referred to include personal belongings of
said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive
possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States.
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their
alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned
records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature
thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended
petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words,
said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in
said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion
for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain
either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with
the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of
said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of
the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or
conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it
necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave
the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado
case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for
the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void;
that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with
the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that
the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned
residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby,
denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs
prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other
effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
It is SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:
From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and from the import of the deliberations of the Court
on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of
Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore
proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1 of
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of
the said search warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People,
80 Phil. 1, should be, and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the
petitioners are expressly declared null and void the searches and
seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the
documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is
made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings
satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move
for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized
in the places other than the three residences adverted to above,
the opinion written by the Chief
Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the
such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the
searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized
in the immediately preceding paragraph (numbered 5) with which
I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly
declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at
places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In
my view even the exacerbating passions and prejudices
inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from
forthrightly laying down the law not only for this case but as well
for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket
and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and
indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let
us assume in gratia argumente, have no legal standing to ask for
the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any
manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the
search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners
possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain
void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the
Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant
of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or
illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that,
upon the pleadings submitted to this Court the petitioners have
the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and
return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized
from places other than their family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was
derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial
construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision,
our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal
courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for
the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects
which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and
effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or
possession — actual or constructive — of premises searched
gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where
the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant
are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily
show that, excepting three, all were directed against the
petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were
named personally, followed by the designation, "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three
warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three
warrants were also the same "office/house/warehouse/premises"
declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in
all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners
and/or "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular
corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of April 2,
1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were
actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned
by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners
to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them
standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones
vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960) (narcotics stored in
the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and
corporate papers of corporation of which the defendant was
president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951)
(narcotics seized in an apartment not belonging to the
defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th Cir.
1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to
the defendant); Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683
(10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by nor in
exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on
December 12, 1966), it was held that under the constitutional
provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person
places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his
automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the
fundamental nature and scope of Fourth Amendment protection.
What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies
upon when he places himself or his property within a
constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some
thing in his filing cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he
has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth
Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel
room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers
in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman.
Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the
years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in
which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been
appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring countless
others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose
factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be
applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966).
See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93 (November
13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the
records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to
move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These
proprietary and leasehold interests have been sufficiently set
forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be
recounted here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid
rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all the premises
searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy
Club; Premises 2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street);
maintained personal offices within the corporate offices (IBMC,
USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or
had paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored
(Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and individually, or through their
respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the
corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in
most, if not all, of the premises searched therefore independently
gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of
the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court
delineated the nature and extent of the interest in the searched
premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard
of the then prevailing circuit court decisions, the Supreme Court
said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the
lower courts. We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily
and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the
common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by
distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area
from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common
law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31,
carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305.
Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee,"
"guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States,
354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the
premises searched must own the property seized in order to
have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several
corporations from whose apartment the corporate records were
seized successfully moved for their return. In United States vs.
Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943),
the corporation's president successfully moved for the return and
suppression is to him of both personal and corporate documents
seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property,
"either his own or the corporation's was entitled to protection
against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were
unreasonable and unlawful. The motion for the return of seized
article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should
be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in
either the place searched or the articles seize had the necessary
standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice
Robert Jackson joined by Justice Felix Frankfurter, advanced the
view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree he
is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the
official view of the U.S. Supreme Court and was articulated
in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years later,
in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S.
Supreme Court went a step further. Jones was a mere guest in
the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless
declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The
concept of "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure"
was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where
the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant
organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the
return and suppression of corporate property. Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The court
conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent
grounds: First — he had a sufficient interest in the property
seized, and second — he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal
inspector had unlawfully searched the corporation' premises and
had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking
to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one
as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure." It
tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from
objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the
corporation's books and records merely because the appellant
did not show ownership or possession of the books and records
or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . .
(Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d
680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962). In Villano, police officers seized two
notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of employment;
the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that
several employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The
Court held that the employee had a protected interest and that
there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villano considered also the fact that the search
and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant. Henzel vs.
United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F.
2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his
files in storage and went to Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to quash as
unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces
tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The Government
contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books
and papers were physically in the possession of the custodian,
and because the subpoena was directed against the custodian.
The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and
unrelinquished personal rights in the books and papers as not to
enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a
third-party naked possessor to produce and deliver
them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir.
1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily
directed against said person gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United
States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.).
The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and
papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the
time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in
turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country
and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his
(Dunn's) "control and management." The papers turned out to be
private, personal and business papers together with corporate
books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which
Birrell did not even claim ownership. (All of these type records
were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search in
Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though
Birrell did not own the premises where the records were stored,
he had "standing" to move for the return of all the papers and
properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs.
U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870,
Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs.
U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in
question were directed solely and exclusively against Birrell. The
only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law
was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as
having been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one Lowell
M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned:
"United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as
the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the
extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a
personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should
order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers
and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether
from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or
places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in
their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show
that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and
other places were personal and private papers and effects
belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers
and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and
seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were
unlawfully seized, be it their family residences offices,
warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually
or constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the
sworn applications filed in securing the void search warrants and
(b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under
such categorization or grouping, the determination of which
unlawfully seized papers, documents and things
are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate
papers will have to be left to the lower courts which issued the
void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression
and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited,
the petitioners likewise have clear legal standing to move for the
suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or
General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically
mentioned in the void search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases
cited in my disquisition were criminal prosecutions, the great
clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases
not criminal in origin or nature.

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership,

gives standing to move to suppress. Such was the rule even
before Jones. (p. 199)

If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of

the records stored with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any
interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v. United
States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432
U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).

The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for

reargument; the United States did not appeal from this decision.
The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of
the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and
corporate papers were seized from premises not petitioners'
family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the
petitioners. Still both types of documents were suppressed
in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the
petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer
than in Birrell.

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing
of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed
5) G.R. No. L-31757 October 29, 1982
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PIO MARCOS, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City and Benguet Province and YU CUA SIO, owner
and Manager, Suntory Grocery, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Yolando R. Busmente for private respondent.
RELOVA, J.:
Petitioner, through the Solicitor General, filed this petition to
review on certiorari the order dated October 13, 1969 of
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet Province, declaring the issuance by the City Court of
Search Warrant No. 459, as contrary to law and ordering the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents and any person in
possession of the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant
to deliver and return the same to Yu Cua Sio, owner and/or
manager of the Suntory Grocery.
On June 15, 1969, NBI Supervising Agent Jose Vicente filed an
application for the issuance of a search warrant with the City
Court of Baguio City which provides, among others, the following:
That he has been reliably informed and verily believes that the
owner and/or manager of the Suntory Grocery, of 36 Rajah
Soliman St., Baguio City has in his possession and control stocks
of San Miguel Gin, product of the La Tondeña, Inc., Manila,
which is adulterated, bearing fake auxiliary stamps, and using
crown caps not produced by the company, which is in violation of
the provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal
Code.
... and therefore has reason enough to believe that a search
warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned to take
possession and control and bring it to this Court said stock, as
evidence in the above case under investigation.
City Judge Patricio Perez of Baguio City, acting on the aforesaid
application issued on June 15, 1967, Search Warrant No. 459,
under the following terms:
Whereas, after examination under oath of Supervising Agent,
NBI Jose Vicente and Cesar de Leon, both of the NBI Regional
Office, at Dagupan City, this Court finds that there is probable
cause to believe that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory
Grocery, located at No. 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City, is in
possession such stock of La Tondena product, San Miguel Gin,
which is adulterated, bearing auxiliary stamps which is tampered
and possession of falsified or fake crown caps, which is now
under investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation, in
this City.
Therefore, you are hereby commanded during the day only to
make an immediate search on the premises of the store and/or
grocery owned by the Manager and/or proprietor of the Suntory
Grocery which is located in No. 36 Rajah Soliman, of this City
and if you should find the same to bring it forthwith before me in
the City Court of Baguio to be dealt with as the law directs.
Armed with said search warrant, the NBI agents, on June 19,
1967, searched the premises of the Suntory Grocery located at
36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City, owned and managed by
private respondent Yu Cua Sio. During the search conducted in
the presence of private respondent and his wife, the NBI agents
seized the following articles which were properly inventoried and
receipted:
(1) One (1) bundle consisting of rubber siphon, trainer and
funnel;
(2) One (1) galvanized tank, 15" in diameter, 2 feet in height;
(3) One (1) mounted crown cap sealer with accessories;
(4) Six (6) cases of San Miguel Gin, round bottles, fined with
suspected adulterated Gin and bearing BIR stamps dated 6 April
1967;
(5) Two(2)cases of San Miguel Gin empty bottles;
(6) One (1) case containing ten (10) San Miguel Gin (adulterated)
and 14 empty bottles, without stamps;
(7) One (1) bundle consisting of two (2) bottles believed to be
containing genuine San Miguel Gin which was marked as
standard; and
(8) One (1) paper bag containing 122 auxiliary stamps dated 6
April 1967, without perforation and bearing successive serial
numbers starting from 43,000,000.
Private respondent Yu Cua Sio filed a motion to quash Search
Warrant No. 459 with the City Court of Baguio. In an Order dated
February 3, 1969, the inferior court ordered the NBI agents who
seized and confiscated the various articles from the store of Yu
Cua Sio to return the same immediately to him.
On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, reversed
the decision of the City Court and sustained the validity of the
questioned search warrant. However, upon motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondent Yu Cua Sio,
respondent Judge, on October 13, 1969, reconsidered his
decision and declared the issuance of Search Warrant No. 459
as contrary to law and, forthwith, ordered the NBI agents to
deliver and return the articles seized by virtue of the search
warrant to private respondent Yu Cua Sio.
The only legal issue posed for resolution in this case is the
validity of Search Warrant No. 459 issued by City Judge Patricio
Perez of Baguio City which respondent Judge declared as null
and void in his order dated October 13, 1969 on the grounds that
(1) the same was issued "for more than one specific offense in
violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court which
states 'no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense' "; and, (2) that the search warrant was issued to fish for
evidence.
Petitioner claims that the lower court erred (1) when it held that
the questioned search warrant violates the provisions of Section
3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court; (2) in holding that the
search warrant in question was issued to fish for evidence; and
(3) in declaring Search Warrant No. 459 as contrary to law and in
ordering the return of the articles seized by virtue of said search
warrant to respondent Yu Cua Sio.
We find merit in the petition. The search warrant issued by the
City Court did not mention any specific offense deemed to have
been violated by respondent Yu Cua Sio. It is in the application
filed by the NBI agents which states that the owner and/or
manager of the Suntory Grocery has in his possession and
control stocks of San Miguel Gin which are adulterated and
therefore, violative of the provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of
the Revised Penal Code. These articles of the Revised Penal
Code are entitled: "Substituting and Altering Trademarks,
Tradenames, or Service marks" and "Unfair Competition and
Fraudulent Registration of Trademark and Tradename,"
respectively. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "the
specific acts defining said offenses and mentioned in said articles
are closely allied to each other that in a sense, the punishable
acts defined in one of them can be considered as including, or
necessarily included in the other."

There is no merit also in the pronouncement by respondent

Judge that the search warrant was issued to fish for evidence just
because the application for search warrant states that its purpose
is "to take possession and control of the articles to be used as
evidence in the above case under investigation."

The search warrant as issued mentions that respondent has in

his possession and control stocks of La Tondeña product which
are adulterated, with fake auxiliary stamps, and are using crown
caps which are not produced by the company. The articles
seized in the premises of respondent Yu Cua Sio show that he
was in possession of these articles mentioned in the application
for search warrant and in the search warrant itself. Possession of
said fake stamps is illegal and the same should not be returned
to respondent Yu Cua Sio.

ACCORDINGLY, the order of respondent Judge, dated October

13, 1969, is SET ASIDE, and private respondent Yu Cua Sio is
hereby ordered to return the articles seized if they had been
delivered to him by the NBI agents.

SO ORDERED.
6) G.R. No. 50720 March 26, 1984
SORIANO MATA, Petitioner, v. HON. JOSEPHINE K. BAYONA,
in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the City Court of
Ormoc, BERNARDO GOLES and REYNALDO
MAYOTE, Respondents.
Valeriano R. Ocubillo for Petitioner.
The Solicitor General for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SEIZURE; REQUISITES
FOR ISSUANCE OF SEARCH WARRANT. — Under the
Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce." More emphatic and detailed is the implementing rule of
the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which
provides that the judge must before issuing the warrant
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits
presented to him.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENCY OF AFFIDAVITS OF
COMPLAINANT AND HIS WITNESSES IN THE CASE AT BAR.
— Before issuing a search warrant, the examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written
deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the
probable cause, and to hold liable for perjury the person giving it
if it will be found later that his declarations are false. Mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO "DEPOSITION IN WRITING" ATTACHED
TO RECORDS OF CASE IN CASE AT BAR. — The judge’s
insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has
become dubious by petitioner’s claim that at the particular time
when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the
issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded
the same from the lower court since they were not attached to the
records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint
affidavit of the complainants. Before he filed his motion to quash
the search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, he
was furnished, upon his request, certified true copies of the said
affidavits by the Clerk of Court but which certified true copies do
not bear any certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims
that his xerox copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset
of this case does not show also the certification of respondent
judge. This doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent
Judge’s own admission, while insisting that she did examine
thoroughly the applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of
Mayote and Goles because to have done so would be to hold a
judicial proceeding which will be open and public", such that,
according to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just
disappear and move his illegal operations somewhere else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the
defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition
in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable
disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEPOSITIONS, HOW TAKEN. — The
searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search
warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon
the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish
a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific
offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said
answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not
be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers.
Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not
merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required
information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in
writing.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; MUST BE STRICTLY COMPLIED WITH;
CASE AT BAR. — Nothing can justify the issuance of the search
warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. Thus, in issuing
a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the
requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. In
the case at bar, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the
failure of the Judge to conform with essential requisites of taking
the depositions in writing and attaching them to record, rendering
the search warrant invalid.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALTHOUGH ILLEGAL, THINGS SEIZED
CANNOT BE RETURNED; CASE AT BAR. — While the search
warrant is illegal, the return of the things seized cannot be
ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan (70 SCRA 478), it was held that the
illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return of the
things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
DECISION
DE CASTRO, J.:
The validity of the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
(not reappointed) is challenged by petitioner for its alleged failure
to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.
Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by
respondent Judge was based merely on the application for
search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which
were wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the
Clerk of Court of respondent Judge. Furthermore, there was
allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the
necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant
to the records of Criminal Case No. 4298-CC wherein petitioner
is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took
and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets
known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned."
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could
be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers
connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry
respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court." The Judge then
handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the
records.
This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search
warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and
invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The motion was denied by respondent Judge on
March 1, 1979, stating that the court has made a thorough
investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles
and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of
352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a
certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents
relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to
the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that
the rule does not specify when these documents are to be
attached to the records. 2 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to this Court,
with the instant petition, praying, among others, that this Court
declare the search warrant to be invalid and all the articles
confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in
the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.
We hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being
violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of
Rule 126 which provides that the judge must before issuing the
warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to
attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in
order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the
existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable
for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his
declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them
to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants
under oath has become dubious by petitioner’s claim that at the
particular time when he examined all the relevant papers
connected with the issuance of the questioned search warrant,
after he demanded the same from the lower court since they
were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification
at the back of the joint affidavit of the complainants. As stated
earlier, before he filed his motion to quash the search warrant
and for the return of the articles seized, he was furnished, upon
his request, certified true copies of the said affidavits by the Clerk
of Court but which certified true copies do not bear any
certification at the back. Petitioner likewise claims that his xerox
copy of the said joint affidavit obtained at the outset of this case
does not show also the certification of respondent judge. This
doubt becomes more confirmed by respondent Judge’s own
admission, while insisting that she did examine thoroughly the
applicants, that "she did not take the deposition of Mayote and
Goles because to have done so would be to hold a judicial
proceeding which will be open and public", 3 such that, according
to her, the persons subject of the intended raid will just disappear
and move his illegal operations somewhere else.
Could it be that the certification was made belatedly to cure the
defect of the warrant? Be that as it may, there was no "deposition
in writing" attached to the records of the case in palpable
disregard of the statutory prohibition heretofore quoted.
Respondent Judge impresses this Court that the urgency to stop
the illegal gambling that lures every man, woman and child, and
even the lowliest laborer who could hardly make both ends meet
justifies her action. She claims that in order to abate the
proliferation of this illegal "masiao" lottery, she thought it more
prudent not to conduct the taking of deposition which is done
usually and publicly in the court room.
Two points must be made clear. The term "depositions" is
sometimes used in a broad sense to describe any written
statement verified by oath; but in its more technical and
appropriate sense the meaning of the word is limited to written
testimony of a witness given in the course of a judicial
proceeding in advance of the trial or hearing upon oral
examination. 4 A deposition is the testimony of a witness, put or
taken in writing, under oath or affirmation before a commissioner,
examiner or other judicial officer, in answer to interlocutory and
cross interlocutory, and usually subscribed by the witnesses. The
searching questions propounded to the applicants of the search
warrant and his witnesses must depend to a large extent upon
the discretion of the Judge just as long as the answers establish
a reasonable ground to believe the commission of a specific
offense and that the applicant is one authorized by law, and said
answers particularly describe with certainty the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. The
examination or investigation which must be under oath may not
be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy of his chambers.
Far more important is that the examination or investigation is not
merely routinary but one that is thorough and elicit the required
information. To repeat, it must be under oath and must be in
writing.
The other point is that nothing can justify the issuance of the
search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might
be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera:
"It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of
greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness
than the right of personal security, and that involves the
exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from
inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and
seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional
rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government."
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply
with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory
provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the
individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No
presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify it.
While We hold that the search warrant is illegal, the return of the
things seized cannot be ordered. In Castro v. Pabalan, 9 it was
held that the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the
return of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of
March 1, 1979 denying the motion to annul the search warrant as
well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the motion for
reconsideration are hereby reversed, the search warrant, being
declared herein as illegal. Notwithstanding such illegality, the
things seized under such warrant, such as stock of "masiao"
tickets; "masiao" issue tickets; bet money; control pad or
"masiao" numbers; stamping pad with rubber stamp marked
Ormoc City Jai-Alai," cannot be returned as sought by petitioner.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
7) G.R. No. L-8474 September 30, 1955
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
PEDRO DE LA PEÑA, OSMUNDO RAMOS and HON. RAMON
SAN JOSE, respondents.
Jose G. Lucban, Special Prosecutor, Solicitor General Ambrosio
Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime de los Angeles and
Solicitor Meliton G. Soliman for petitioner.
Enrique Javier and Federico Roy for respondent Osmundo
Ramos.
Leodegario Alba for the other respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside certain resolutions of
the Court of First Instance of Manila. However, considering the
allegations and the ultimate purpose of the petition, the same will
be regarded as one for mandamus, in accordance with the
doctrine laid down in Guzman vs. Lichauco (42 Phil. 291)
and People vs. Concepcion (55 Phil. 485, 492).
Respondents, Pedro de la Peña and Osmundo Ramos, are
accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 24746 to 24755 and 24824 to
24833 (20 cases) of said court, of illegal procurement of search
warrants, in violation of Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code. In
the information filed in case No. 24750—the language of which is
analogous to that of the information filed in the other nineteen (19)
cases, except as regards the names and addresses of the
respective complaining witnesses—it is averred:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1951, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the accused Pedro de la Peña, being then the Chief
of Special Investigating Team, and the accused Osmundo
Ramos being then an agent, of the Military Intelligence Service
G-2, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and therefore public
officers or employees, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, and pursuant to a common intent,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procure a
search warrant without a just cause, by then and there applying
for the same and filing a deposition of witness in support of the
application for search warrant before the Court of First Instance,
this City; and that by reason and on account of said application
and deposition the said accused succeeded in procuring from the
said court a search warrant against Ty Kong Tek of 142 V. Mapa
St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, where a search was actually made or
caused to be made by the said accused, both knowing fully well
that the statements and allegations contained in the said
application as well as in the said deposition were false. (Record,
p. 4.)
At the joint hearing of said twenty (20) cases, before Branch IV of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided over by
respondent Judge, Honorable Ramon San Jose, the prosecution
placed on the witness stand, the offended party in said case No.
24750, namely, Ty Kong Tek, who testified that, while he was in
his house at 142 V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, on March 1,
1951, at about 2:00 a.m., Pedro de la Peña, one of the
respondents herein, and one of the defendants therein, came,
accompanied by several persons, including two Chinese named
Koa San and Tan Tek; that De la Peña and his companions, who
were provided with a search warrant, searched the house, stating
that they were looking for firearms and U. S. dollars, none of
which were found in the premises; that they found, however, two
(2) books of account of Ty Kong Tek for the years 1948 and 1949;
that at 6:00 a.m., De la Peña took Ty Kong Tek for investigation
to Camp Murphy, where he was urged to confess that he had
been engaged in the exchange business and had been handling
U. S. dollars, which the witness refused to admit; and that, later,
in the afternoon, De la Peña arrested the son and a nephew of
the witness. At this juncture, the prosecution inquired whether he
knew why his son and nephew were arrested, but, the defense
objected thereto upon the ground that the question referred to an
act subsequent to the issuance of the aforementioned search
warrant and, hence, immaterial to the issue. Although the
prosecution explained that it sought to establish the motive of De
la Peña in securing the search warrant, respondent Judge
sustained the objection. Thereupon, the prosecution asked Ty
Kong Tek whether he knew whether or not his abovementioned
son and nephew had anything to do with the reason for the
search made, in their house, by the party headed by De la Peña.
The defense objected to the question upon the same ground,
and the court sustained the objection.
Ty Kong Tek further stated, on the witness stand, that De la Peña
investigated him six (6) times at Camp Murphy; that, during the
investigation, De la Peña told Ty Kong Tek that, unless he
admitted that he had dealt in U. S. dollars and engaged in the
exchange of money, said respondent would arrest the son and
nephew of the witness, as they were in fact detained by De la
Peña in the afternoon of March 1, 1951; that, thereafter, one of
the members of the party led by De la Peña, who made a search
in complainant's house, namely, Koa San, approached the
witness and told him that he, his son and his (witness') nephew
would be released if he (Ty Kong Tek) gave him (Koa San) and
De la Peña the sum of P20,000. On motion of the defense
respondent Judge ordered the last statement of Ty Kong Tek
stricken from the record.
Ty Kong Tek, likewise, declared that Koa San was sometimes
present during the investigation of the former in Camp Murphy;
that after the first investigation of Ty Kong Tek by De la Peña, the
former was sent to his quarters in said camp; and that Koa San
came to see Ty Kong Tek and talked to him. This statement was,
also, ordered stricken out, on the motion of the defense.
Moreover, the latter made of record its general objection to all
questions relative to events which occurred subsequently to the
issuance of the search warrant aforementioned. Although the
prosecution explained that it was trying to prove the unlawful
motive with which the search warrant had allegedly been
obtained, respondent Judge hold that "anything that happened
after that (issuance of the search warrant) will be immaterial" (p.
28, t. s. n.) Thereupon, on motion of the herein petitioner, Jose G.
Lucban, Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
who, as Special Prosecutor, handled the case for the
Government, in collaboration with Assistant City Fiscal,
Guillermo Dacumos, respondent Judge suspended the hearing,
in order that the prosecution could bring the matter to this Court,
for determination of the propriety of introducing evidence of acts
performed by the accused after the issuance of the search
warrant in question. Hence, the present case.
Respondents herein maintain that the alleged illegal procurement
of the aforementioned search warrant may be established only
by proof of acts either preceding, or coetaneous with, the
commission of offense charged, not by acts performed
subsequently thereto. Upon the other hand, petitioner herein
contends that the motive of the accused may be established by
posterior acts, such as, for instance, an attempt to extort money
as a condition precedent to the release of the complainant.
It is clear to our mind that said attempt to extort money, even if
effected after the issuance of the search warrant, but prior to the
release of the complainant, is relevant to the question whether or
not said was illegally procured, owing to the obvious tendency of
the aforementioned circumstance, if proven, to establish that the
accused was prompted by the desire to get money from said
complainant. The relevancy would be more patent if a similar
attempt has been made in the other nineteen (19) cases or in
some of them. It is, likewise, apparent that evidence of the intent
of the party who obtained said warrant or warrants is not only
relevant, but very material, where the accused are charged with
having "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously procured" said
process, "pursuant to a common intent," as alleged in the Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it
information filed in the cases under consideration. necessary to make a correct judgment. (Emphasis supplied.) 1âwphïl.nêt

Respondents insist, however, that: 1âwphïl.nêt
. . . Our Supreme Court, in the case of People vs. Sy Juco, 64
Phil. 667, ruled that—malicious procurement of a search warrant
under Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by a
public officer who procures search warrant without just
cause, and that such cause consist of such facts and
circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant and not
to facts subsequent (Emphasis ours). (Respondent's
memorandum, p. 2)
This statement is misleading. The accused in the Sy Juco case,
cited by respondents, was not charged with illegal procurement
of a search warrant. The main issues in the said case was the
validity of a search warrant based upon affidavits showing, on the
face thereof, that the statements therein contained were hearsay.
Inasmuch as the prosecution was entitled to introduce the
evidence in question and respondent Judge was, consequently,
"under obligation by reason of his office" to admit said evidence,
"and in refusing to do so . . . he failed to perform his judicial
duty"—in the language used by this Court in the case of People
vs. Concepcion (supra)—it follows that said respondent Judge
should be, as he is hereby, ordered—in line with the rule laid
down in said case—to allow petitioner herein to prove the motive
of the accused in obtaining the search warrant in question, even
if the evidence therefor should refer to acts posterior to the
issuance of said process, and that the resolutions of the lower
court sustaining the objections to the questions above referred to,
propounded by petitioner herein, and directing that portions of
the testimony of Ty Kong Tek be stricken from the record, should
be, as said orders are hereby, reversed and set aside, with costs
against respondents, Pedro de la Peña and Osmundo Ramos.
1âwphïl.nêt

This Court answered the question in the negative. Referring to

the need of a probable cause, as a condition essential to the It is SO ORDERED.
issuance of a valid search warrant, we declared:

. . . It has likewise been held by this court that by probable

cause are meant such facts and circumstances antecedent to the
issuance of the warrant, that are in themselves sufficient to
induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuance
thereof. (64 Phil., 667, 674)

The words "facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance

of the warrant" had no relation whatsoever with, and were not
meant to qualify, the evidence admissible to prove the illegal
procurement of a search warrant, in violation of Article 129 of the
Revised Penal Code, which was not in issue in the case. Said
expression merely referred to the norm that should guide
a Judge in determining whether or not the process should be
ordered issued. It is not concerned, either with the liability of the
person procuring the warrant, or with the competency of the
evidence to establish his guilt.

In this connection, it may not be amiss to stress, once more, the

need of adhering to the policy enunciated in the case of Prats &
Co. vs. Phoenix Insurance Co. (52 Phil., 807, 816-817) from
which we quote:

In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is

most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts
where trivial objections to the admission of proof are received
with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful
objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of
the questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it
is impossible for a judge of first instance, in the early stages of
the development of the proof, to know with any certainty whether
testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication of
bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the
court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the
statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be connected
later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the
battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may
possibly fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a
fair and logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake
is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme
Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly
unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the
case for a new trial—a step which the Court is always very loath
to take. On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of
first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either
litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and
it is its duty upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the
relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this
course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme
8) G.R. No. L-22585 December 18, 1967
NICANOR. B. PAGKALINAWAN, Supervising Agent, National
Bureau of Investigation, East Visayan District Office Cebu
City, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch II, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Cebu City,
and NORBERTO L. DAYRIT, respondents.
Fernando and Evangelista for petitioner.
Jayme, Rodriguez and Sosmeña for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
This decision deals with the specific question on whether a court
of first instance of one district in a replevin proceeding may
ignore a search warrant issued by another court of first instance.
In brief, this petition presents this situation: Respondent Judge,
the Hon. Amador E. Gomez acting on a complaint for replevin
filed by the other respondent Norberto L. Dayrit directed
petitioner, Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan, a supervising agent of the
National Bureau of Investigation to turn over to the Sheriff of
Cebu City an automobile which was seized under a search
warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila, the Hon.
Guillermo Santos presiding, as a subject of the offense of theft or
as stolen property. Did respondent Judge act in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion?
What happened next after such seizure in accordance with the
search warrant issued on February 4, 1964, at Manila was set
forth in the petition. Thus: "That on February 7, 1964, respondent
Norberto L. Dayrit filed a complaint for Replevin in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu, which was docketed as Civil Case No.
R-8284 and assigned to Branch II presided by respondent
Honorable Judge Amador E. Gomez, against the herein
petitioner, Nicanor Pagkalinawan, Supervising Agent, National
Bureau of Investigation, Cebu City, [and two members of the]
Manila Police Department for the recovery of possession of the
aforementioned car alleging that it is wrongfully detained by the
herein petitioner . . .; that on February 8, 1964 the respondent
Judge acting on said complaint issued an order directing the
Sheriff of Cebu City or any proper officer of the court, to take the
aforementioned car into his custody and said order was
implemented by the Clerk of Court by issuing on the same date a
writ of replevin; . . . that on same date, February 8, 1964 the
petitioner after said writ of replevin was served on him
manifested that he could not possibly comply with said order to
deliver the aforementioned car to the sheriff because he was
holding the same in 'custodia legis' for the Court of First Instance
of Manila, Branch II, the court that issued the search warrant
under which the said car was seized and held in custody; . . . that
on February 12, 1964, the respondent Judge, acting on the
'urgent motion to require defendant Nicanor B. Pagkalinawan,
Supervising Agent, National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu City,
to explain why he persists in refusing to deliver the car in
question to the sheriff', which motion was vigorously opposed
during the hearing by the petitioner, issued an order directing the
petitioner . . . 'to immediately comply with the order of the court
and to turn over to the sheriff the car in question upon receipt of a
copy of this order' with the warning that, otherwise, 'this court
visits on [him] the full harshness of its coercive power' and under
this circumstance the petitioner on the same date, February 12,
1964, was compelled to part with the custody of the said car to
the Provincial Sheriff of Cebu who took over the possession of
the same and who in turn immediately gave it or turned it over to
respondent Norberto L. Dayrit; . . . that the delivery of the car to
the Provincial Sheriff who in turn delivered it to the respondent
Norberto L. Dayrit by virtue of the said order of the respondent
Judge, would place the petitioner in imminent danger of being
declared in Contempt of the Manila Court of First Instance that
issued the search warrant because he cannot now comply with
the recent order of the said court dated February 10, 1964
regarding the proper disposition of said car; . . . that petitioner on
February 14, 1964 filed an 'urgent motion for reconsideration of
the order dated February 12, 1964 and setting aside the writ of
replevin dated February 8, 1964,' but respondent Judge after
hearing on said motion on February 15, 1964, denied the same in
its order dated February 20, 1964. . . ."
It was then alleged by petitioner that the aforesaid orders issued
by the respondent Judge compelling him to deliver such car to
the Sheriff so that it could be turned over to the other respondent,
after it was explained that it was being held in custodia legis for
the Manila Court of First Instance, having been properly seized in
pursuance of a search warrant issued by it, were made without or
in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; that
said orders moreover would likewise "nullify the purpose and
defeat the force and validity of the search warrant issued by the
Court of First Instance, a competent court of equal category;" and
"would then cause confusion in the enforcement and
implementation of lawful orders issued by other courts thereby
causing embarrassment in the proper administration of
justice; . . . ."
The prayer was for respondent Judge being declared as having
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in thus proceeding in the replevin action and that
pending the final hearing and determination of this petition, an
order of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued directing the
respondent Judge to order the return of said car to petitioner,
desisting and refraining until further orders of this Court from
acting on the matter.
On March 18, 1964, this Court issued a resolution ordering
respondents to file an answer to the petition and likewise issued
a preliminary mandatory injunction without bond as prayed for. itc-alf
In the answer of respondent Dayrit, there was in effect an
admission of the facts as alleged by petitioner. Respondent
Dayrit would however impugn the actuations of petitioner, who, it
was alleged "instead of protecting rights of the citizens of this
country used the powers of his office in arrogating unto himself
the interpretation of the law which only the courts are vested
thereof and the alleged contempt charge which petitioner asserts
under this paragraph is not only nugatory and illegal but entirely
imaginary for the reason that the [search warrant] mentioned in
the [Petition] is based on fraud and deceit. . . ." The special
defenses appearing in the answer further stressed not only the
fact of the car that was seized under the search warrant as
different from that referred to in the case pending in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, but also the fact of respondent being the
true and lawful owner thereof.There was thus a denial of the
allegations that respondent Judge in issuing the orders
complained of, acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, for the truth of the matter, according to
respondent, was that "the car in question is not subject of a
criminal case before a Court of First Instance of Manila, more
specifically before Hon. Judge Guillermo Santos," who issued the
search warrant, or in any other court, respondent Dayrit further
stating that he was not an accused "in any case where said car is
allegedly stolen property. . . ."
More specifically in so far as the assertion of the jurisdiction of
respondent Judge on the suit for replevin affecting the validity of
the search warrant issued, it was alleged in the answer "That
respondent Dayrit denies the allegations contained in paragraph
10 of the [petition] with respect to the fact that the [orders] of
co-respondent Judge Amador E. Gomez would nullify and defeat
the force and validity of the [search warrant] for [its] issuance . . .
cannot prevent respondent Judge Amador E. Gomez to issue an
order of replevin as provided by Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules
of Court; . . ."
Petitioner is entitled to the remedy prayed for; the writ must be
granted. It would be to ignore a principle to which this Court has
been firmly committed if under the circumstances disclosed,
respondent Judge would be sustained. The moment a court of
first instance has been informed through the filing of an
appropriate pleading that a search warrant has been issued by
another court of first instance, it cannot, even if the literal
language of the Rules of Court yield a contrary impression which
in this case demonstrated the good faith of respondent Judge for
acting as he did, require a sheriff or any proper officer of the
Court to take the property subject of the replevin action if
theretofore it came into the custody of another public officer by
virtue of a search warrant. Only the court of first instance that
issued such a search warrant may order its release. Any other itc-alf
view would be subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly
adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and
consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may
otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted
to interfere with each other's lawful orders.
Only the other day, in Tuason & Co. v. Hon. Guillermo E.
Torres, this Court reaffirmed such a principle, when speaking
through Justice Bengzon, it held that only the particular branch of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City "can annul its own
decision. . . ." The opinion continues: "It is settled that the
jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First
Instance belongs solely to the very same branch which rendered
the judgment." As aptly stated, any other branch "even it be in the
same judicial district" that would attempt to do so "either excess
its jurisdiction", or "acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction, . . . ." As set forth in the above Tuason
decision: "In either case, certiorari and prohibition would be
proper to prevent the attempting branch of the court from
proceeding to nullify a final decision rendered by a co-equal and
coordinate branch." In this case then, certiorari is likewise an
appropriate remedy when respondent Judge disregarded a
search warrant issued by another court of first instance.
possession of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue,
sought their return. This Court did not oblige; mandamus did not
lie, as "the one having the legal custody thereof is the Court of
First Instance of Rizal which had ordered their seizure and which
is the only one authorized by law to return them to their owner." It
is worth noting that while the then Justice Laurel dissent his
opinion being in effect that the remedy should be granted he
admitted that where property is seized under color of judicial
process and brought under the control of the court, [it was]
placed beyond the reach of replevin or other independent or
plenary remedy, . . . ." Again, while the above ruling is not
squarely on all fours, still the governing principle does not seem
to be in doubt. The remedy for questioning the validity of a search
warrant may be sought in the Court of First Instance that issued it,
not in the gala of another Judge, and as admitted in the
dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel, not through replevin.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, and the mandatory
preliminary injunction issued made permanent. With costs
against respondent Dayrit.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
itc-alf

In Cabigao v. del Rosario, which was a petition to restrain

respondent Judge from interfering with execution of a judgment
rendered by another court of first instance, this Court, speaking
through Justice Ostrand stated: "Firstly, it is settled by an
overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to
interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant
the relief sought by injunction."

In Philippine National Bank v. Javellana, which was a petition

for certiorari, seeking to set aside a writ of preliminary injunction
issued by respondent Judge enjoining the Provincial Sheriff from
proceeding with the sale of a property attached to satisfy a
judgment by another court of first instance, the above doctrine
was reiterated, followed with the affirmation that such "ruling in
the Cabigao case is decisive on the issue before us."

While the instant proceeding does not deal with the annulment of
a judgment previously issued, the principle therein announced
calls for application here. Otherwise court of first instance would
be allowed to pass on the validity of a search warrant, issued by
another court of first instance. This is to preclude an undesirable
situation from arising, one, which if, permitted, as above pointed
out, would be fraught with undesirable consequences, as already
indicated, for the bench, no less than for the litigants. To such an
itc-alf

eventuality, this Court cannot give its sanction.

Moreover, while not authoritative, this case being one of first

impression, the doctrine announced in Molo v. Yatco, which
denied an original petition filed with this Court for mandamus is
persuasive. There the petitioner alleging that by virtue of a
search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal for
an alleged violation of the Usury Law, certain documents
belonging to him were seized and thereafter kept in the
9) G.R. No. L-69401
RIZAL ALIH, NASIM ALIH, AISAN ALIH, MIJAL ALIH, OMAR
ALIH, EDRIS MUKSAN, MULSIDI WARADIL, BILLY ASMAD
RAMSID ASALI, BANDING USMAN, ANGGANG HADANI,
WARMIKHAN HAPA, GABRAL JIKIRI, ALLAN TAN,
MUJAHIRIN MARAJUKI, KENNEDY GONZALES, URDUJA
ALIH, MERLA ALIH, and NURAISA ALIH VDA DE
FEROLINO, petitioners,
vs.
MAJOR GENERAL DELFIN C. CASTRO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS COMMANDER SOUTHCOM AND REGIONAL UNIFIED
COMMAND, REGION IX, ZAMBOANGA CITY, COLONEL
ERNESTO CALUPIG, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDING
OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)
AND INTERNAL DEFENSE COMMAND, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS IdC MAJOR ARNOLD BLANCO IN HIS
CAPACITY AS COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE PHILIPPINE
MARINES AND 1ST LIEUTENANT DARWIN GUERRA IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ACTS SUPERVISOR, INTERNAL DEFENSE
COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
required by the Bill of Rights. This is confirmed by the said report
and in fact admitted by the respondents, "but with avoidance.
Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force
at the time of the incident in question, provided as follows:
Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It was also declared in Article IV, Section 4(2) that-
Sec. 4(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
THE
proceeding.

The respondents, while admitting the absence of the required

CRUZ, J.:
On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more than two hundred
Philippine marines and elements of the home defense forces
raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez
street, Zamboanga City, in search of loose firearms, ammunition
and other explosives.
The military operation was commonly known and dreaded as a
"zona," which was not unlike the feared practice of
the kempeitai during the Japanese Occupation of rounding up
the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a
hooded informer, and executing them outright (although the last
part is not included in the modern refinement).
The initial reaction of the people inside the compound was to
resist the invasion with a burst of gunfire. No one was hurt as
presumably the purpose was merely to warn the intruders and
deter them from entering. Unfortunately, as might be expected in
incidents like this, the situation aggravated soon enough. The
soldiers returned fire and a bloody shoot-out ensued, resulting in
a number of casualties.
The besieged compound surrendered the following morning, and
sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed,
paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The
military also inventoried and confiscated nine M16 rifles, one
M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition
found in the premises.
On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to this Court in a
petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction
and restraining order. Their purpose was to recover the articles
seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence
against them, and to challenge their finger-printing,
photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of their right
against self-incrimination.
The Court, treating the petition as an injunction suit with a prayer
for the return of the articles alleged to have been illegally seized,
referred it for hearing to Judge Omar U. Amin of the regional trial
court, Zamboanga City. After receiving the testimonial and
documentary evidence of the parties, he submitted the report and
recommendations on which this opinion is based.
The petitioners demand the return of the arms and ammunition
on the ground that they were taken without a search warrant as
such warrant, sought to justify their act on the ground that they
were acting under superior orders. There was also the
suggestion that the measure was necessary because of the
aggravation of the peace and order problem generated by the
assassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco.
Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution.
The fact that the petitioners were suspected of the Climaco killing
did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took.
As eloquently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Ex parte
Milligan:
The Constitution is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and
in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times and under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by
the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended
during any of the great exigencies of government.
The precarious state of lawlessness in Zamboanga City at the
time in question certainly did not excuse the non-observance of
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and
seizures. There was no state of hostilities in the area to justify,
assuming it could, the repressions committed therein against the
petitioners.
It is so easy to say that the petitioners were outlaws and
deserved the arbitrary treatment they received to take them into
custody; but that is a criminal argument. It is also fallacious. Its
obvious flaw lies in the conclusion that the petitioners were
unquestionably guilty on the strength alone of unsubstantiated
reports that they were stockpiling weapons.
The record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted
criminals or fugitives from justice. At the time of the "zona," they
were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact
even been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were
presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily pronounced by
the military.
Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they
were guilty, they would not have been any less entitled to the
protection of the Constitution, which covers both the innocent
and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution
coddles criminals. What it does simply signify is that, lacking the
shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution,
to protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary
punishment. Every person is entitled to due process. It is no
exaggeration that the basest criminal, ranged against the rest of articles, however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to
the people who would condemn him outright, is still, under the Bill such appropriate disposition as the corresponding courts may
of Rights, a majority of one. decide.

If the respondents did not actually disdain the Constitution when
they made their illegal raid, they certainly gave every appearance
of doing so. This is truly regrettable for it was incumbent on them,
especially during those tense and tindery times, to encourage
rather than undermine respect for the law, which it was their duty
to uphold.
In acting as they did, they also defied the precept that "civilian
authority is at all times supreme over the military" so clearly
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution. In the instant case, the
respondents simply by-passed the civil courts, which had the
authority to determine whether or not there was probable cause
to search the petitioner's premises. Instead, they proceeded to
make the raid without a search warrant on their own
unauthorized determination of the petitioner's guilt.
The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid
because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the
petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search
warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the
weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they
could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a
preventive measure. There was absolutely no reason at all why
they should disregard the orderly processes required by the
Constitution and instead insist on arbitrarily forcing their way into
the petitioner's premises with all the menace of a military
invasion.
Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the
search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it
was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law
enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any
house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground
that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well
delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
The objection to the photographing, fingerprinting and
paraffin-testing of the petitioners deserves slight comment. The
prohibition against self-incrimination applies to testimonial
compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United
States, "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him,
not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be
material."
The fearful days of hamleting salvaging, "zona" and other
dreaded operations should remain in the past, banished with the
secret marshals and their covert license to kill without trial. We
must be done with lawlessness in the name of law enforcement.
Those who are supposed to uphold the law must not be the first
to violate it. As Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee stressed in his
concurring opinion in Lacanilao v. De Leon, "It is time that the
martial law regime's legacy of the law of force be discarded and
that there be a return to the force and rule of law."
All of us must exert efforts to make our country truly free and
democratic, where every individual is entitled to the full protection
of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights can stand as a stolid
sentinel for all, the innocent as well as the guilty, including the
basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on
November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the
articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence
against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said
articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the
criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

When the respondents could have easily obtained a search

warrant from any of the TEN civil courts then open and
functioning in Zamboanga City, they instead simply barged into
the beleaguered premises on the verbal order of their superior
officers. One cannot just force his way into any man's house on
the illegal orders of a superior, however lofty his rank. Indeed,
even the humblest hovel is protected from official intrusion
because of the ancient rule, revered in all free regimes, that a
man's house is his castle.

It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may enter; the rain
may enter. But the King of England may not enter. All the forces
of the Crown dare not cross the threshold of the ruined
tenement.

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of
Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being
committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no
allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it
may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b),
the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of
the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People v.
Burgos.

If follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was

violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition
taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in
any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are
"fruits of the poisonous tree. As Judge Learned Hand observed,
"Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong
be repressed. Pending determination of the legality of such
10) G.R. No. 50025 August 21, 1980
ALFONSO YU and SOLEDAD YU, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE REYNALDO P. HONRADO, Presiding Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXV-Pasig,
MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, Detective CARLOS C.
NUESTRO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
For adjudication in this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
case is the possession of about forty-two metric tons of scrap
engine blocks (valued at more than forty thousand pesos), part of
a stock which Marcelo Steel Corporation sold to an alleged
swindler and which scrap iron was allegedly purchased in good
faith by the Yu spouses from the swindler but retrieved from the
purchasers by Marcelo Steel Corporation by means of a search
warrant.
The record shows that on June 27, 1978, Detective Carlos C.
Nuestro of the police department of Makati, Metro Manila filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch XXV an
application for a search warrant, entitled "People vs. Alfonso Yu,
Proprietor, Soledad Junk Shop, 171-173 Maria Clara Street,
Corner 8th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan, Metro Manila.
In that application, Nuestro alleged that he "has been informed
and verily believes that Alfonso Yu" was in possession of "about
55 metric tons of unstripped assorted cast iron engine blocks
embezzled" and that he "has verified the report and found (it) to
be a fact" (p. 41, Rollo).
In his testimony before respondent, Judge Nuestro declared that
he had personal knowledge that Alfonso Yu kept the said engine
blocks, which were "embezzled"; that the said goods were
purchased by Carlito Refuerzo on June 10, 1978 from Marcelo
Steel Corporation; that Refuerzo paid for the goods with a check
in the sum of P61,808.25, which check was dishonored for
insufficient funds; that Refuerzo sold the engine blocks on June
12, 1978 to the Soledad Junk Shop and that Refuerzo was later
apprehended and detained in the municipal jail of Makati (pp. 5-8
and 44-47, Rollo).
On that same day, June 27, or after the taking of Nuestro's
testimony, respondent Judge issued a search warrant,
commanding any peace officer to search the premises of the
Soledad Junk Shop, to seize therefrom "55 metric tons of
unstripped assorted cast iron engine blocks" and bring them to
the court "to be dealt with as the law directs" (pp. 43, 47-48,
Rollo).
Nuestro and four policemen implemented the search warrant on
the following day, June 28. They seized from the Soledad Junk
Shop 42.8 metric tons of engine blocks, which were loaded in six
trucks and brought for safekeeping to the premises of Marcelo
Steel Corporation, Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila with the
understanding that they were in custodia legis (pp- 102-107,
Rollo).
On July 12, 1978, the spouses Alfonso Yu and Soledad Yu filed
with respondent Judge a motion to set aside the search warrant
and for the return of the engine blocks. Marcelo Steel
Corporation opposed the motion.
After hearing, respondent Judge denied the motion in his order of
November 9, 1978. The Yus' motion for the reconsideration of
that order was also denied. On March 1, 1979, they filed in this
Court the instant petition.
Parallel to or contemporaneously with the search warrant
proceeding was the complaint for estafa filed by Marcelo Steel
Corporation against Refuerzo, Soledad Yu and Refuerzo's
confederates in the office of the provincial fiscal of Rizal (I.S. No.
78-6734).
Assistant Fiscal Ricardo S. Sumaway in a resolution dated
October 22, 1979 in the case of Marcelo Steel Corporation vs.
Refuerzo, et al., found that Refuerzo, Ernesto Dumlao, Jose Alla
and two other persons named Larry and Boy defrauded Marcelo
Steel Corporation in the sum of P95,434.50 as the value of
90,890 kilos of scrap materials delivered to Refuerzo which were
not paid for and that the Soledad Junk Shop paid Refuerzo
P44,000 for 50,000 kilos of scrap materials (p. 306310, Rollo).
Fiscal Sumaway found that Soledad Yu was not a co-conspirator
of Refuerzo and that she was an innocent purchaser for value (p.
309, Rollo).
The fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal an
information for estafa also dated October 22, 1979 charging
Refuerzo, Dumlao, and Alla with having obtained through false
pretenses from Marcelo Steel Corporation 90,890 kilos of scrap
cast iron engine blocks valued at P95,434.50 (Criminal Case No.
32394, p. 311, Rollo).
However, because the accused in that case have not been
arrested, the trial court in its order of April 30, 1980 temporarily
archived the case. Thus, there is no movement in that case. On
the other hand, it is imperative that a resolution be rendered as to
the conflicting claims of the Yu spouses and Marcelo Steel
Corporation with respect to the scrap engine blocks.
Considering the present situation of the parties and the absence
of any final judgment in the estafa case as to the civil liability of
the accused to make restitution, we hold that the Yu spouses are
entitled to retain possession of the scrap engine blocks.
This case is governed by the ruling in Chua Hai vs. Kapunan, Jr.;
etc. and Ong Shu 104 Phil. 110 "that the acquirer and possessor
in good faith of a chattel or movable property is entitled to be
respected and protected in his possession, as if he were the true
owner thereof, until a competent court rules otherwise".
It was further ruled in the Chua Hai case that "the filing of an
information charging that the chattel was illegally obtained
through estafa from its true owner by the transferor of the bona
fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the possession of the
chattel against the win of the possessor".
In the Chua Hai case, it appears that Roberto Soto purchased on
January 31, 1956 for P6,137.70 from Ong Shu's hardware store
700 sheets of corrugated galvanized iron and 249 pieces of
round iron bar. Soto issued a bouncing check in payment for the
GI sheets.
He sold in Pangasinan 165 GI sheets of which 100 were sold to
Chua Hai. Soto was charged with estafa in the Court of First
Instance of Manila. In that case, Ong Shu the seller and
complainant, filed a petition asking that the 700 GI sheets, which
were deposited with the Manila Police Department, be returned
to him.
Chua Hai opposed the petition as to the 100 GI sheets. The trial
court ordered the return of the GI sheets to Ong Shu on condition
that, as to the 100 sheets, he should post in favor of Chua Hai a
bond for twice the value of the 100 GI sheets.
This Court reversed that order because "the possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title"
and "every possessor has a right to be respected in his WHEREFORE, respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation is ordered
possession" (Arts. 539 and 559, Civil Code). to return and deliver to the Yu spouses within ten days from
notice of the entry of judgment in this case the 42.8 tons of scrap
The instant case is similar to the Chua Hai case. The Yu spouses engine blocks in question. No costs.
bought the scrap engine blocks in good faith for 44,000 from the
alleged swindler without any notice that the same were obtained SO ORDERED.
under false pretenses or by means of a bouncing check. The
purchase by the Yu spouses of the scrap engine blocks from
Refuerzo, doing business under the tradename C. C. Varried
Corporation, was covered by a sales invoice and seemed to have
been made in the ordinary course of business (p. 223, Rollo).

Marcelo Steel Corporation contends that it recovered the scrap

engine blocks by means of a valid warrant. The Yu spouses
counter that the search warrant was void because it was issued
without probable cause on the basis of Nuestro's hearsay
testimony.

We hold that the search warrant was lawfully issued. Respondent

Judge complied with the requirements for its issuance as
prescribed in section 3, Article IV of the Constitution and in
sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

While Nuestro's knowledge of the alleged estafa was initially

hearsay, yet his comprehensive investigation of the case
enabled him to have direct knowledge of the sale made by Pablo
Tiangco of Marcelo Steel Corporation to Refuerzo and the sale
made by Refuerzo and his confederates to the Yu spouses.

Nuestro's testimony was a sufficient justification for an examining

magistrate to conclude that the scrap engine blocks were the
subject of estafa. That conclusion was confirmed by the filing of
the information for estafa.

But from the fact that the search warrant was validly issued, it
does not follow that Marcelo Steel Corporation is entitled to retain
the same. There is as yet no decree of restitution in the criminal
case entitling Marcelo Steel Corporation to recover the scrap iron
from the third person who bought it in good faith and for value.

Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the

restitution of the thing itself must be made whenever possible
"even though it be found in the possession of a third person who
has acquired it by lawful means, saving to the latter his action
against the proper person who may be liable to him". However,
there is no restitution in case "the thing has been acquired by the
third person in the manner and under the requirements which, by
law, bar an action for its recovery.

Hence, in the absence of any adjudication as to the civil liability,

there is no legal basis for allowing Marcelo Steel Corporation to
recover possession of the scrap engine blocks. Indeed, there is
cogency in the view of Justice Felix in his concurring opinion in
the Chua Hai case that restitution should not be required in a
case where the offended party voluntarily delivered the thing to
the offender-purchaser in the expectation of being paid the price
and where, thereafter, the offender sold the thing to an innocent
third party. That situation should be distinguished from the cases
of theft and robbery where the offended party was involuntarily
deprived of his property (104 Phil. 110, 120).

The case may be viewed from another angle. Since Marcelo

Steel Corporation and the Yu spouses acted in good faith, the
question is which of them should suffer the loss occasioned by
the acts of the alleged swindler?

The answer is found in the rule, enunciated by Justice Holmes

in Eliason vs. Wilborn, 281 U.S. 457 (applied here by analogy),
that, "as between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer
the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who made it
possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss".
11) G.R. No. L-45358 January 29, 1937
NARCISO ALVAREZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TAYABAS and THE
ANTI-USURY BOARD, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Adolfo N. Feliciano for respondents Anti-Usury Board.
No appearance for other respondent.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The petitioner asks that the warrant of June 3, 1936, issued by
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, ordering the search of his
house and the seizure, at any time of the day or night, of certain
accounting books, documents and papers belonging to him in his
residence situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the
order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury
Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set
aside, and prays that all the articles in question be returned to
him.
On the date above-mentioned, the chief of the secret service of
the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to
Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David then presiding over the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, an affidavit alleging that according to
reliable information, the petitioner kept in his house in Infanta,
Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a
money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of
the law. In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the
secret service stated that his answers to the questions were
correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear
to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts
but upon the information received by him from a reliable person.
Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the
warrant which is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the
search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night,
the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and
the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law. With said warrant, several agents of the
Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner's store and residence at
seven o'clock on the night of June 4, 1936, and seized and took
possession of the following articles: internal revenue licenses for
the years 1933 to 1936, one ledger, two journals, two cashbooks,
nine order books, four notebooks, four checks stubs, two
memorandums, three bankbooks, two contracts, four stubs,
forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories, two
bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one
bundle of stubs of purchases of copra, two packages of
correspondence, one receipt book belonging to Luis Fernandez,
fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers many documents
and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504 chits,
promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation. The search for and a seizure of
said articles were made with the opposition of the petitioner who
stated his protest below the inventories on the ground that the
agents seized even the originals of the documents. As the
articles had not been brought immediately to the judge who
issued the search warrant, the petitioner, through his attorney,
filed a motion on June 8, 1936, praying that the agent Emilio L.
Siongco, or any other agent, be ordered immediately to deposit
all the seized articles in the office of the clerk of court and that
said agent be declared guilty of contempt for having disobeyed
the order of the court. On said date the court issued an order
directing Emilio L. Siongco to deposit all the articles seized within
twenty-four hours from the receipt of notice thereof and giving
him a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt of court. On June 10th,
Attorney Arsenio Rodriguez, representing the Anti-Usury Board,
filed a motion praying that the order of the 8th of said month be
set aside and that the Anti-Usury Board be authorized to retain
the articles seized for a period of thirty (30) days for the
necessary investigation. The attorney for the petitioner, on June
20th, filed another motion alleging that, notwithstanding the order
of the 8th of said month, the officials of the Anti-Usury Board had
failed to deposit the articles seized by them and praying that a
search warrant be issued, that the sheriff be ordered to take all
the articles into his custody and deposit of the Anti-Usury Board
be punished for contempt of court. Said attorney, on June 24th,
filed an ex parte petition alleging that while agent Emilio L.
Siongco had deposited some documents and papers in the office
of the clerk of court, he had so far failed to file an inventory duly
verified by oath of all the documents seized by him, to return the
search warrant together with the affidavit it presented in support
thereof, or to present the report of the proceedings taken by him;
and prayed that said agent be directed to filed the documents in
question immediately. On the 25th of said month the court issued
an order requiring agent Emilio L. Siongco forthwith to file the
search warrant and the affidavit in the court, together with the
proceedings taken by him, and to present an inventory duly
verified by oath of all the articles seized. On July 2d of said year,
the attorney for the petitioner filed another petition alleging that
the search warrant issue was illegal and that it had nit yet been
returned to date together with the proceedings taken in
connection therewith, and praying that said warrant be cancelled,
that an order be issued directing the return of all the articles
seized to the petitioner, that the agent who seized them be
declared guilty of contempt of court, and that charges be filed
against him for abuse of authority. On September 10, 1936, the
court issued an order holding: that the search warrant was
obtained and issued in accordance with the law, that it had been
duly complied with and, consequently, should not be cancelled,
and that agent Emilio L. Siongco did not commit any contempt of
court and must, therefore, be exonerated, and ordering the chief
of the Anti-Usury Board in Manila to show case, if any, within the
unextendible period of two (2) days from the date of notice of said
order, why all the articles seized appearing in the inventory,
Exhibit 1, should not be returned to the petitioner. The assistant
chief of the Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice filed a
motion praying, for the reasons stated therein, that the articles
seized be ordered retained for the purpose of conducting an
investigation of the violation of the Anti-Usury Law committed by
the petitioner. In view of the opposition of the attorney for the
petitioner, the court, on September 25th, issued an order
requiring the Anti-Usury Board to specify the time needed by it to
examine the documents and papers seized and which of them
should be retained, granting it a period of five (5) days for said
purpose. On the 30th of said month the assistant chief of the
Anti-Usury Board filed a motion praying that he be granted ten
(10) days to comply with the order of September 25th and that
the clerk of court be ordered to return to him all the documents
and papers together with the inventory thereof. The court, in an
order of October 2d of said year, granted him the additional
period of ten(10) days and ordered the clerk of court to send him
a copy of the inventory. On October 10th, said official again filed
another motion alleging that he needed sixty (60) days to
examine the documents and papers seized, which are
designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 1016, 23,
25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45, and
praying that he be granted said period of sixty (60) days. In an
order of October 16th, the court granted him the period of sixty
(60) days to investigate said nineteen (19) documents. The
petitioner alleges, and it is not denied by the respondents, that
these nineteen (19)documents continue in the possession of the
court, the rest having been returned to said petitioner.
I. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of
the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a
justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property and bring it before the court
(section 95, General Orders. No. 58, as amended by section 6 of
Act No. 2886). Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than
the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of
his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and
scrutiny of others (In re Pacific Railways Commission, 32 Fed.,
241; Interstate Commerce Commission vs Brimson, 38 Law. ed.,
1047; Broyd vs. U. S., 29 Law. ed., 746; Caroll vs. U. S., 69 Law.
ed., 543, 549). While the power to search and seize is necessary
to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law
enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights or citizen,
for the enforcement of no statue is of sufficient importance to
justify indifference to the basis principles of government
(People vs. Elias, 147 N. E., 472).
II. As the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his
constitutional right is one of the highest duties and privileges of
the court, these constitutional guaranties should be given a
liberal construction or a strict construction in favor of the
individual, to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual
depreciation on, the rights secured by them(State vs. Custer
County, 198 Pac., 362; State vs. McDaniel, 231 Pac., 965; 237
Pac., 373). Since the proceeding is a drastic one, it is the general
rule that statutes authorizing searches and seizure or search
warrants must be strictly construed (Rose vs. St. Clair, 28 Fed.,
[2d], 189; Leonard vs. U. S., 6 Fed. [2d], 353; Perry vs. U. S. 14
Fed. [2d],88; Cofer vs. State, 118 So., 613).
III. The petitioner claims that the search warrant issued by the
court is illegal because it has been based upon the affidavit of
agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had
no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a
basis for the issuance of the warrant but that he had knowledge
thereof through mere information secured from a person whom
he considered reliable. To the question "What are your reason for
applying for this search warrant", appearing in the affidavit, the
agent answered: "It has been reported to me by a person whom I
consider to be reliable that there are being kept in said premises,
books, documents, receipts, lists, chits, and other papers used
by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender,
charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law" and in
attesting the truth of his statements contained in the affidavit, the
said agent states that he found them to be correct and true to the
best of his knowledge and belief.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution, relative to
the bill of rights, provides that "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place top be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." Section 97 of General Orders,
No. 58 provides that "A search warrant shall not issue except for
probable cause and upon application supported by oath
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person
or thing to be seized." It will be noted that both provisions require
that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a
search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon
an application supported by oath of the applicant ands the
witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath
includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he
is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully;
and it is sometimes defined asan outward pledge given by the
person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an
immediate sense of his responsibility to God (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary; State vs. Jackson, 137 N. W., 1034; In re Sage, 24
Oh. Cir. Ct. [N. S.], 7; Pumphery vs. State, 122 N. W., 19;
Priest vs. State, 6 N. W., 468; State vs. Jones, 154 Pac., 378;
Atwood vs. State, 111 So., 865). The oath required must refer to
the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the
existence of probable cause (U. S. vs. Tureaud, 20 Fed., 621; U.
S. vs. Michalski, 265 Fed., 8349; U. S. vs. Pitotto, 267 Fed., 603;
U. S. vs. Lai Chew, 298 Fed., 652). The true test of sufficiency of
an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it
has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused
(State vs. Roosevelt Country 20th Jud. Dis. Ct., 244 Pac., 280;
State vs. Quartier, 236 Pac., 746).
It will likewise be noted that section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of
the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizure.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are a menace against
which the constitutional guarantee afford full protection. The term
"unreasonable search and seizure" is not defined in the
Constitution or in General Orders No. 58, and it is said to have no
fixed, absolute or unchangeable meaning, although the term has
been defined in general language. All illegal searches and
seizure are unreasonable while lawful ones are reasonable.
What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure
in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable
from a consideration of the circumstances involved, including the
purpose of the search, the presence or absence or probable
cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made,
the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles
procured (Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. U. S. 75 Law. ed., 374;
Peru vs. U. S., 4 Fed., [2d], 881;U. S. vs. Vatune, 292 Fed., 497;
Angelo vs. U. S. 70 Law, ed., 145; Lambert vs. U. S. 282 Fed.,
413; U. S. vs. Bateman, 278 Fed., 231; Mason vs. Rollins, 16
Fed. Cas. [No. 9252], 2 Biss., 99).
In view of the foregoing and under the above-cited authorities, it
appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of
the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason
of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is
hereby held that the search warrant in question and the
subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers
are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which
the petitioner was subjected.
IV. Another ground alleged by the petitioner in asking that the
search warrant be declared illegal and cancelled is that it was not
supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the
applicant. In other words, it is contended that the search warrant
cannot be issued unless it be supported by affidavits made by the
applicant and the witnesses to be presented necessity by him.
Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides
that no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Section 98 of General Orders, No. 58 provides that the judge or
justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine under oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
depositions in writing. It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach
the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the
application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by
agent Mariano G. Almeda and that he did not require nor take the
deposition of any other witness. Neither the Constitution nor
General Orders. No. 58 provides that it is of imperative necessity
to take the deposition of the witnesses to be presented by the
applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter.
The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions
is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the
applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the
agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the
facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the
judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to
warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of
the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his
personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is
satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or
more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the fact is
necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is
likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the
agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
V. The petitioner alleged as another ground for the declaration of
the illegality of the search warrant and the cancellation thereof,
the fact that it authorized its execution at night. Section 101 of
General Orders, No. 58 authorizes that the search be made at
night when it is positively asserted in the affidavits that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched.
As we have declared the affidavits insufficient and the warrant
issued exclusively upon it illegal, our conclusion is that the
contention is equally well founded and that the search could not
legally be made at night.
VI. One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in support of his
contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an
adequate description of the books and documents to be seized.
Section 1, paragraphs 3, of Article III of the Constitution, and
section 97 of General Orders, No. 58 provide that the affidavit to
be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining
whether probable cause exist and whether the warrant should be
issued, must contain a particular description of the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized. These provisions
are mandatory and must be strictly complied with (Munch vs. U.
S., 24 Fed. [2d], 518; U. S. vs. Boyd, 1 Fed. [2d], 1019; U.
S. vs. Carlson, 292 Fed., 463; U. S. vs. Borkowski, 268 Fed., 408;
In re Tri-State Coal & Coke Co., 253 Fed., 605;
People vs. Mayen, 188 Cal., 237; People vs. Kahn, 256 Ill. App.,
4125); but where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather generally, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no
warrant could issue (People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 284;
People vs. Kahn, supra). The only description of the articles
given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that
there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts,
lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in
violation of the law." Taking into consideration the nature of the
article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and
detailed description could have been given, particularly because
it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof.
The description so made substantially complies with the legal
provisions because the officer of the law who executed the
warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify
the articles, which he did.
VII. The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his
claim that the search warrant was obtained illegally, is that the
articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might
provide itself with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or
cases which might be filed against him for violation of the
Anti-usury Law. At the hearing of the incidents of the case raised
before the court it clearly appeared that the books and
documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury
Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of the
articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the
criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of
books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the
purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the
person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional
because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent
to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the
compulsion of an accused to testify against himself (Uy
Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil,, 886; Brady vs. U. S., 266 U. S.,
620; Temperani vs. U. S., 299 Fed., 365; U. S. vs. Madden, 297
Fed., 679; Boyd vs. U. S.,116 U. S., 116; Caroll vs. U. S., 267 U.
S., 132). Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the
documents in question were seized for the purpose of using them
as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or
proceedings for violation against him, we hold that the search
warrant issued is illegal and that the documents should be
returned to him.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner
cannot now question the validity of the search warrant or the
proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because
he has waived his constitutional rights in proposing a
compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the
purpose of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings. We
are of the opinion that there was no such waiver, first, because
the petitioner has emphatically denied the offer of compromise
and, second, because if there was a compromise it reffered but
to the institution of criminal proceedings fro violation of the
Anti-Usury Law. The waiver would have been a good defense for
the respondents had the petitioner voluntarily consented to the
search and seizure of the articles in question, but such was not
the case because the petitioner protested from the beginning and
stated his protest in writing in the insufficient inventory furnished
him by the agents.
Said board alleges as another defense that the remedy sought
by the petitioner does not lie because he can appeal from the
orders which prejudiced him and are the subject matter of his
petition. Section 222 of the Code of Civil Procedure in fact
provides that mandamus will not issue when there is another
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
We are of the opinion, however, that an appeal from said orders
would have to lapse before he recovers possession of the
documents and before the rights, of which he has been
unlawfully deprived, are restored to him (Fajardo vs. Llorente, 6
Phil., 426; Manotoc vs. McMicking and Trinidad, 10 Phil., 119;
Cruz Herrera de Lukban vs. McMicking, 14 Phil., 641;
Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456).
Summarizing the foregoing conclusions, we hold:
1. That the provisions of the Constitution and General Orders, No.
58, relative to search and seizure, should be given a liberal
construction in favor of the individual in order to maintain the
constitutional guaranties whole and in their full force;
2. That since the provisions in question are drastic in their form
and fundamentally restrict the enjoyment of the ownership,
possession and use of the personal property of the individual,
they should be strictly construed;
3. That the search and seizure made are illegal for the following
reasons: (a) Because the warrant was based solely upon the
affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the
facts of probable cause, and (b) because the warrant was issued
for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be
used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against
the petitioner, for violation of the Anti-Usury Law;
4. That as the warrant had been issued unreasonably, and as it
does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in
the possession of the petitioner and in the place indicated,
neither could the search and seizure be made at night;
5. That although it is not mandatory to present affidavits of
witnesses to corroborate the applicant or a complainant in cases
where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts, when the
applicant's or complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely
hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of other
witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause
exists;
6. That a detailed description of the person and place to be
searched and the articles to be seized is necessary, but whereby,
by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must
be rather general, but is not required that a technical description
be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue;

7. That the petitioner did not waive his constitutional rights

because the offer of compromise or settlement attributed to him,
does not mean, if so made, that he voluntarily tolerated the
search and seizure; and

8. That an appeal from the orders questioned by the petitioner, if

taken by him, would not be an effective, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, and, consequently, the
petition for mandamus filed by him, lies.

For the foregoing considerations, the search warrant and the

seizure of June 3, 1936, and the orders of the respondent court
authorizing the relation of the books and documents, are
declared illegal and are set aside, and it is ordered that the judge
presiding over the Court of First Instance of Tayabas direct the
immediate return to the petitioner of the nineteen (19) documents
designated on pages 1 to 4 of the inventory by Nos. 5, 10, 16, 23,
25,26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

My views on the fundamental questions involved in this case are

fully set forth in my dissenting opinion filed in People vs.
Rubio (57 Phil., 384, 395). I am gratified to see that, in the main,
those views have now prevailed. I therefore concur in the
decision of the court herein.

LAUREL, J., concurring:

I subscribe to the views expressed in the foregoing carefully

prepared opinion, with the reservation now to be stated. To my
mind, the search warrant in this case does not satisfy the
constitutional requirement regarding the particularity of the
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized" (par. 3, sec. 1, Art. III, Constitution of the
Philippines). Reference to "books, documents, receipts, lists,
chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as money-lender, charging usurious rates of interest in
violation of the law" in the search warrant is so general, loose
and vague as to confer unlimited discretion upon the officer
serving the warrant to choose and determine for himself just what
are the "books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers" used by the petitioner in connection with his alleged
activities as money-lender. The evident purpose and intent of the
constitutional requirement is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures
may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed (Uy
Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil., 886).
12) G.R. No. L-44335 July 30, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
KAGUI MALASUGUI, defendant-appellant.
Manuel Jose for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
At about 5:30 o'clock in the morning of March 5, 1935, Tan Why,
a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, was found lying on
the ground, with several wounds in the head, on a path leading to
the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato, and situated within the property of
another Chinese named Yu Enching Sero. Tan Why received a
wound on the upper part of his forehead, which necessarily
proved fatal because it fractured his skull. He died as a result of
this wound shortly afterward in the Cotabato Hospital where he
had been brought by an agent of authority with the aid of some
laborers who had gone to the scene of the crime.
The death of Tan Why was imputed to the herein accused who
was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. He was
convicted of said crime and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, to
return the sum of P150 to the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company,
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Tan Why in the sum
of P1,000, with costs. The accused appealed therefrom and
assigns five errors as committed by the lower court, which may
be briefly summarized as follows:
(1) In not having granted him a period of twenty-four hours to
prepare his defense;
(2) In having denied his petition for the return of the articles taken
from him during the search of his person, without the
corresponding judicial warrant;
(3) In having admitted Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, L and L-1, as
evidence in the case;
(4) In having denied his petition to dismiss for lack evidence, filed
immediately after the fiscal had finished presenting his evidence;
and
(5) In having found him guilty of robbery with homicide, instead of
acquitting him.
When Tan Why was found on the morning in question, he was
still alive and able to answer laconically "Kagui", when Moro
Alamada, was among the first to approach him, asked who had
attacked him. The appellant was known by this name in Cotabato,
whereupon Lieutenant A. Jacaria of the Constabulary ordered his
immediate arrest. The accused was arrested shortly after eight
o'clock in the morning of the same day, and after he had been
brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, who had already been informed,
that he had just redeemed two pairs of bracelets from some
pawnshops of Cotabato and that he carried money, said
lieutenant asked him for the bracelets and he then voluntarily and
without protest produced what now appear in the record as
Exhibit A. He was later searched, without opposition or protest on
his part, and it was discovered that he also had the pocketbook
(Exhibit B), containing P92 in bills (Exhibit C), Tan Why's
identification card and a memorandum of amounts with some
Chinese characters (Exhibit D). In one of the pockets of his pants
was found some change, making the total amount of money
found in his possession P92.68.
Tan Why, the deceased, carried the pocketbook, Exhibit B, as he
did on former occasions, a few hours before his body was found
in the condition and under the circumstances above stated.
Before he left his home between 4.30 and 5 o'clock that morning,
he had it full of bills because he was, as usual, on his way to
purchase palay in Carcar as part of his work. The memorandum
of amounts, Exhibit D, found in the pocketbook, Exhibit B, is in
Tan Why's handwriting; and in the afternoon before his death he
was given by Kaw Tin of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company
the sum of P150 to be invested in the purchase of palay, in
addition to the P80 that remained of the amount previously
delivered to him.
The appellant had to be searched after he had voluntarily
produced the bracelets Exhibit A and placed them on Lieutenant
Jacaria's table, because, upon being asked if he had any thing,
he tremblingly answered in the negative.
The foregoing facts are inferred from the testimony of the
government witnesses Alamada, Chua Sian, Kaw Tin, Yap Sea,
Lieutenant Jacaria, and Police Sergeant Urangut.
Alamada testified that the deceased, shortly before he died,
Kagui as his aggressor, and the appellant was known by this
name in Cotabato. He also testified that on the morning in
question, he saw the appellant, with a club in his hand, pass by
the house where he and the deceased lived. The club, Exhibit M,
then with bloodstains, was found near the place where Tan Why
was wounded.
Chua Sian, an employee of the deceased, identified the
pocketbook Exhibit B saying that it was the same that the
deceased used to carry whenever he went to make purchases;
that it was usually kept in a box at Tan Why's store; that the
deceased in truth carried it when he left his store on the morning
of March 5, 1935, to purchase palay, and that it was then full of
bills.
Kaw Tin, cashier of the Mindanao Rice Industrial Company, in
turn, testified that on the night before the crime, he gave the
deceased, at the latter's request the sum of P150 to purchase
palay, inasmuch as he was a buyer of said commodity for the
company in Cotabato.
About four meters from the place where Tan Why's body was
found, there was a coconut tree with two dangling leaves, as if
they were so arranged intentionally to hide anybody who might
post himself near the trunk. At the very place where the tips of
the leaves touched the ground, there were footprints presumably
of somebody who had posted who had posted himself there in
ambush, without being seen: the fresh footprints exactly the
same size as the appellant's foot; and the said bloodstained club
was found very near the place. Such was the testimony of
Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Eusebio de los Santos who
inspected the scene of the crime, particularly the latter who did
so early in the morning and took said measurements with the aid
of Exhibit E which is a part of a reed-grass leaf.
The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and
Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and through intimidation taken
from him the bracelets (Exhibit A), the pocketbook (Exhibit B) and
all the money which he carried (Exhibit C); and that, but for the
printing thereon, the identification card found in the pocketbook
then was blank and there was no memorandum of the kind of
Exhibit D, in Tan Why's handwriting, inside the pocketbook,
thereby, insinuating that it was Lieutenant Jacaria who typed or
caused to be typewritten on the card Tan Why's name and
personal data and who placed Exhibit D in the pocketbook. There
is nothing of record to corroborate the appellant's imputation to
said two officers; and it is unbelievable that they so acted
because they were induced by no other motive than to comply
with their duties as agents of authority. The appellant permitted
them to search his person and to take from him the articles in
question to be used as evidence against him in due time; at least,
he neither made any objection nor even muttered a bit of protest.
Consequently, his contention that he was subjected to the rigor
of an unreasonable search to dispossess him of his effects
without judicial warrant, and that the court should have ordered
their return to him when he so formally requested before the trial,
is unfounded. When one voluntarily submits to a search or
consents to have it made of his person or premises, he is
precluded from later complaining thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., vol. I page 631.) The right to be secure from
unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such
waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. On the other
hand, the appellant was then charged with the crime, imputed to
him by Tan Why before the latter's death, of having assaulted the
"deceased; that he was then also known to be carrying much
money; and that a few moments before he was brought to
Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after the assault on Tan Why, he
was able to redeem two pairs of bracelets from two persons to
whom he had pledge them several months before. These are
circumstances which undoubtedly warranted his arrest without a
previous judicial warrant, only upon a verbal order from said
officer to Sergeant Urangut, or of the latter's own will, inasmuch
as he had direct knowledge of the aggression committed on the
person of Tan Why, his violent death, the revelation made by Tan
Why before his death naming the appellant as the author of the
of the aggression, and the other circumstances already stated.
This is so because under the law, members of Insular Police or
Constabulary as well as those of the municipal police and of
chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and even of townships
(secs. 848, 2463, 2564, 2165 and 2383 of the Revised
Administrative Code) may make arrests without judicial warrant,
not only when a crime is committed or about to be committed in
their presence but also when there is reason to believe or
sufficient ground to suspect that one has been committed and
that it was committed by the person arrested by them. (U.
S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472; U. S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516;
U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U. S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853.)
An arrest made under said circumstances is not unlawful but
perfectly justified; and the agent of authority who makes the
arrest does not violate the provisions of article 269 of the Revised
Penal Code which defines and punishes unlawful arrest, nor
infringe the constitutional precept relative to the inviolability of
one's right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search and seizures; as either provision of
law permits, like the above cited sections of the Revised
Administrative Code, the making of arrests without judicial
warrant, when there exist reasonable motives therefor so that the
person arrested may be brought to the corresponding authority.
In fact such was the appellant's state and circumstances when
he was searched and his alleged effects (Exhibits A, B, C and D
with Tan Why's identification card) were taken from him and,
such being the case, it was proper, perfectly lawful, prudent and
even necessary, in order to avoid any possible "surprise or
aggression from the appellant, in the search to be made and the
effects in question seized by the persons concerned, to be
presented, as they were in truth presented to the competent
authority. Section 105 of General Orders, No. 58 reads:
A person charged with a crime may be marched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the crime.
Article III, section 1, paragraph (3), of our Constitution is identical
in all respects to the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States; and said constitutional precept has been
interpreted as not prohibiting arrests, searches and seizures
without judicial warrant, but only those that are unreasonable.
In United States vs. Snyder (278 Fed., 650), it was said:
The Fourth Amendment, providing that "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable search and seizures shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized," contains no
prohibition of arrest, search, or seizure without a warrant, but
only against "unreasonable" searches and seizures.
When the search of the person detained or arrested and the
seizure of the effects found in his possession are incidental to an
arrest made in conformity with the law, they cannot be
considered unreasonable, much less unlawful.(Weeks vs. United
States, 232 U. S., 652, citing favorably 1 Bishop, Crim. Proc., sec.
211; Wharton, Crim. Pl. & Pr., 8th ed., sec. 60; Dillon vs. O'Brien,
16 Cox, C. C., 245, Ir. L. R. 20 C. L., 300; Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12
Phil., 439; United States vs. Welsh, 247 Fed., 239; United
States vs. Kraus, 270 Fed., 578, 582, par. 7; Garske vs. United
States, 1 Fed. [2d], 620; King vs. United States, 1 Fed. [2d], 931.)
In this last case it was said:
In these circumstances of search and seizure of defendant
engaged in the commission of a felony, and of which the officers
had reliable information and cause to believe, there is nothing
unreasonable within the import of that term in the Fourth
Amendment. After the amendment, as before it, the law
necessarily sanctions arrest, search, and seizure of persons
engaged in commission of a crime, or reasonably believed to
have committed a felony, without any paper warrant. This case is
so plain that it suffices to say so.
Anent an identical question, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in
United States vs. Snyder, supra, said:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of
criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances.
The appellant contends that the lower court did not grant him
even twenty-four hours to prepare his defense, thereby denying
him the right afforded to every accused by section 30 of General
Orders, No. 58. We have carefully examined the record and
found nothing to convince us that said court had in truth refused
to grant him time for said purpose. To be entitled to said time as a
matter of right, the interested party must expressly ask for it,
inasmuch as the law so prescribes. The truth, however, is that
the appellant not only did not ask for it but, after his petition for
the return of his effects to him had been denied, he forthwith
asked, through his counsel, to be arraigned and to proceed with
the trial.
The appellant likewise contends that there was error in the
admission of the evidence Exhibits A, B, C, and D, alleging that
they had been taken from him through force and intimidation. The
record shows that before proceeding with the trial in the lower
court, the appellant asked for the return of said effects (Exhibits A,
B, C, and D) to him on the ground that they were unlawfully taken
away from him. Leaving aside the foregoing considerations, his
testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract
that of the government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria and
Sergeant Urangut, who testified that when Lieutenant Jacaria
asked him what other things he carried, after having voluntarily
placed the two pairs of bracelets, Exhibit A, on the table, and
Sergeant Urangut felt his body, he did not show the least
opposition. It follows, therefore, that the lower court committed no
error in accepting as evidence Exhibits A, B, C and D, not only
because the appellant did not object to the taking thereof from
him when searched, but also because the effects found in his
possession of a person detained or arrested are perfectly
admissible as evidence against him, if they constitute the corpus
delicti or are pertinent or relevant thereto. (Adams vs. New York,
192 U.S., 585; 24 Sup. Ct., 372; 48 Law. ed., 575;
Weeks vs. United States, supra; People vs. Mayen, 205 Pac.,
435.) It is certainly repugnant to maintain the opposite view
because it would amount to authorizing the return to the accused
of the means of conviction seized from him, notwithstanding their
being eloquent proofs of crime, for him to conceal, destroy or
otherwise dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.

The appellant attempted to prove that the money found in his

possession had been given to him, on different occasions, by the
witnesses who testified in his favor, as Kagui Guialal, Kagui
Patak, Kakim, Akun or Amay Indo. Kagui Guialal, in truth,
testified that he had given the accused P90, two days before the
latter's arrest; Kagui Patak, P45, on two occasions, one month,
and two weeks, respectively, also prior to his arrest; and Kakim
and Akun or Amay Indo, P22.50 and P20, seven and five days,
respectively, before the day of the crime. These four witnesses
are all relatives of the appellant; and if it were true that the latter
had enough money several days prior to the aggression and
death of Tan Why, the natural thing to assume is that he would
have not redeemed the two bracelets Exhibit A, precisely on the
very morning in question. Furthermore, their testimony did not
destroy the unexplained finding in the appellant's possession, of
the deceased Tan Why's pocketbook, containing much money,
and the latter's personal papers. In the absence of an
explanation of how one has come into the possession of stolen
effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed,
he must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression
and death of said person and of the robbery committed on him
(U.S. vs. Merin, 2 Phil., 88; U.S. vs. Divino, 18 Phil., 425).

The facts which we consider as having been fully established in

view of the foregoing considerations, constitute the crime of
robbery with homicide defined and punished with reclusion
perpetua to death in article 249, subsection 1, of the Revised
Penal Code. Inasmuch as no aggravating circumstance had
been proven and the penalty imposed by the lower court is in
accordance with law, taking into consideration the rules
prescribed in article 63 of said Code, the appealed judgment is
hereby affirmed, except that part thereof containing a
pronouncement in favor of the Mindanao Rice Industrial
Company, a strange party to the case, which should be entirely
eliminated; and it is ordered that Exhibits B (pocketbook), C
(money), D (memorandum of amounts) and Tan Why's
identification card be delivered to the latter's heirs, with costs
against the appellant. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Recto, and

Laurel, JJ., concur.
13) G.R. No. L-27968 December 3, 1975
JOSE G. LOPEZ and TOMAS VELASCO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS
OF DAVAO, CHAIRMAN OF THE ASAC, ACTING DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CITY FISCAL OF
DAVAO, SENIOR NBI AGENT OF DAVAO, EARL REYNOLDS,
AND/OR ANY OF THEIR AUTHORIZED
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
A. Romero for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant
Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M.
Amores for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court, understandably and appropriately in the decision of
cases coming before it, is called upon to act with due care to
avoid putting obstacles to the governmental policy "to minimize, if
not to do away entirely, with the evil and corruption that
smuggling brings in its wake ..." Nonetheless, the steps taken by
administrative authorities to implement such a laudable objective
must not be repugnant to nor in conflict with constitutional rights.
To be more specific, when the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure is invoked, there is a need to scrutinize the
facts rigorously to preclude any infringement thereof. In this
special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus which
arose from the seizures made by the Collector of Customs of
Davao of 1,480 sacks of copra and 86 sacks of coffee from the
M/V motor vessel Jolo Lema, our decision of November 29, 1974
in Nasiad v. Court of Tax Appeals made clear that there was no
failure to comply with the requirements of the law in effecting the
same. The seizure was therefore declared lawful by the Court of
Tax Appeals, and its decision was affirmed by us. The only
question left then is whether the search conducted by a party
headed by respondent Earl Reynolds, Senior NBI Agent of
Davao, without the search warrant for the hotel room of petitioner
Tomas Velasco, who entered into a contract with the other
petitioner, Jose G. Lopez, the awardee of such Philippine
Reparations Commission vessel, for its operation and use
ostensibly for fishing, is violative of such constitutional
provision. The defense interposed by respondents is that there
was consent. A careful scrutiny of the pleadings reveals that such
indeed was the case. We find for respondents and dismiss the
action.
The relevant facts as found in the aforesaid Nasiad decision read
as follows: "As noted in the appealed decision, the issue
submitted "for resolution is the legality of the seizure made by the
Collector of Customs of Davao of the 1,408 sacks of copra and
86 sacks of coffee allegedly owned by the petitioners." Then
came this portion: "Petitioners claim that the 1,408 sacks of
copra and 86 sacks of coffee in question were purchased in
Kiamba, Lumatin, and Lumasal, all in the province of Cotabato,
from a certain Osmeña Juanday. Petitioners contend that,
inasmuch as the said goods were not imported and of foreign
origin, they are not legally subject to seizure and forfeiture. They
likewise contend that the forfeiture made by the Collector of
Customs of Davao was invalid because the said forfeiture was
based on documents and papers which were illegally seized by
agents of the Government through violence and intimidation.
Respondent denies petitioners' claim. He contends that the
evidence is sufficient to hold that the goods in question came
from Indonesia and subsequently brought to the Philippines in
violation of our laws and, therefore, subject to forfeiture; and that
the Indonesian documents and papers allegedly secured illegally
by the combined team of NBI, PC and RASAC agents stationed
in Davao, were in fact lawfully and validly secured by them.
Consequently, said documents and papers are admissible in
evidence in the forfeiture proceedings instituted administratively
by the Collector of Customs of Davao." It was then set forth: "The
voluminous [evidence] of record clearly show that M/V [Jolo
Lema] had been under strict surveillance by the combined team
of agents of the NBI, PC, RASAC, and City Police of Davao prior
to its apprehension at a private wharf in Batjak, Sasa, Davao City;
that the said M/V [Jolo Lema] was skippered (sic) by Capt.
Aquilino Pantinople and chartered by Mr. Tomas Velasco; during
the period from the latter part of August to September 18, 1966,
the said vessel was in Indonesian waters where it loaded copra
and coffee beans from Taruna, Pitta and Mangenito, all of
Indonesia ... ; that in its trip to Indonesia it brought various
merchandise from the Philippines which were exchanged and/or
bartered for copra and coffee beans and subsequently taken to
Davao City ...; and that said vessel passed Marore, Indonesia on
September 18, 1966 on its way to Tahuna, Indonesia ... before
proceeding to Davao City where it was apprehended on
September 19, 1966." Then came the reference to the evidence
and the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties, being
appraised by respondent Court, which did not find any ground to
discredit the finding of respondent Collector of Customs. As
therein pointed out: "The evidence does not show any plausible
motive for respondent's witnesses to falsify the truth because
they represent different agencies of the government. From all
appearances, they have no personal interest whatsoever over
the goods subject of the forfeiture proceedings. Besides,
petitioners have not adduced any evidence showing that they
were enemies of the witnesses for the government. In short, no
iota of evidence was ever presented by the petitioners to destroy
the integrity of the government witnesses and to cast a cloud of
doubt on their testimonies." Also: "The decision of the Collector
of Customs of Davao shows that a petitioner herein and at the
same time one of the claimants of the confiscated copra and
coffee beans, Mr. Ernesto Lozada, is the Officer-in-Charge of the
vessel M/V Jolo Lema. It is not surprising, therefore, that the
members of his crew repudiated their sworn statements given to
government agents." Then, lastly: "Moreover, petitioners failed to
explain satisfactorily, much less refute the vital testimony of
Fiscal Mariano Umali of the Department of Justice, Manila that
the various Indonesian documents ... duly authenticated by the
Indonesian Consulate in Manila, show in clear detail that the
vessel M/V Jolo Lema was in Indonesia during the period from
the latter part of August to September 18, 1966, and that it
loaded copra and coffee beans therein before the said vessel
returned to Davao City on September 19, 1966. Petitioners'
failure to successfully dispute or destroy said testimony by
competent and reliable evidence strongly indicates that the copra
and coffee beans in question were imported from Indonesia." "
On the question of the search of the hotel room, the petition
alleged that at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of September
19, 1966, when the vessel was searched, a combined team of
Constabulary and Regional Anti-Smuggling Center operatives
headed by NBI agent Earl Reynolds raided the hotel room then
being rented by petitioner Tomas Velasco without any search
warrant and in the absence at the time of such petitioner Tomas
Velasco or the presence of any other person, except one Teofila
Ibañez, a mere manicurist of Davao City by occupation and
"forcibly opened luggages and boxes from which only several
documents and papers were found, then seized, confiscated and
took away the same." There was this refutation of such allegation
in the answer presented by respondents, represented by the then
Solicitor General, 9 now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo:
"(a) After Captain Pantinople informed the team that petitioner
Tomas Velasco, the charterer of the vessel, had other
documents showing that vessel came from Indonesia carrying
smuggled copra and coffee, some members of the team
proceeded to the room of petitioner Velasco at the Skyroom
Hotel in Davao City, to ask for said documents; (b) Although
petitioner Velasco was not inside the hotel room, respondent
Reynolds, after identifying himself as a police officer and after
explaining his purpose, was allowed to enter the room by Mrs.
Tomas Velasco who subsequently volunteered to open the
suitcases and baggages of petitioner Velasco and delivered the
documents and things contained therein to respondent
Reynolds; ... (c) The said police team did not search the room;
neither did the members thereof forcibly open the luggages and
boxes nor seized and confiscated the documents and things
contained therein, since that was not necessary because ... Mrs.
Tomas Velasco voluntarily opened the baggages and suitcases
and gave their contents of documents and things to respondent
Reynolds. Such fact is also established by the joint affidavit of PC
Lt. Romeo Arceño, Angel Huertas, Gregorio Esperancilla,
Wilfredo G. Agcaoili, Patricio Barnes and Lucero Cordero, a joint
sworn statement of Antonio Bonotan, Vicente Dubria, Alberto
Morgady and Virgilio Humol; and another affidavit of Pio Raganit
and Winifredo Calamba, ... "
Thus, as noted at the outset, petitioners are not entitled to the
remedies prayed for.
1. There has been marked receptivity on the part of this Court to
claims based on the protection of the search and seizure clause
of the Constitution, whenever properly invoked. So it was made
clear from the leading case of Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance. It has been thus since then. Such was the case
likewise under previous organic acts. There is this succinct
restatement of what is embraced in the guarantee in the latest
case of Lim v. Ponce de Leon, with Justice Martin as ponente:
"There can be no question that without the proper search warrant,
no public official has the right to enter the premises of another
without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure." It
does not admit of doubt therefore that a search or seizure cannot
be stigmatized as unreasonable and thus offensive to the
Constitution if consent be shown. Such a view is implicit
in People v. Malasugui. For this immunity from unwarranted
intrusion is a personal right which may be waived either
expressly or impliedly.
The crucial question then is whether in this instance there was
consent on the part of the person who was the occupant of the
hotel room then rented by petitioner Velasco. It cannot be
contended that such premises would be outside the
constitutional protection of a guarantee intended to protect one's
privacy. It stands to reason that in such a place, the insistence on
being free from any unwelcome intrusion is likely to be more
marked. Was there, however, consent sufficient in law to
dispense with the warrant? Respondents, as previously noted,
contend that there was such consent. They so alleged in their
answer. Their memorandum would stress it further in these
words: "Here the wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, upon being
informed of the purpose of the search by the officers, invited
them to enter and search the hotel room and even voluntarily
gave the documents and things requested by said officers. This
fact could be gleaned from the following records of the two
seizure cases involving the vessel M/V Jolo Lema and its cargo
of Indonesian copra and coffee: (a) On September 19, 1966,
Teofila Ibañez, wife of petitioner Tomas Velasco, issued a written
statement which states that — "... I have voluntarily and freely
allowed my husband's and my personal belongings to be
searched and freely gave the following items." ... (b) On the same
date, she issued another certification which reads in part, viz.: "...
That I have voluntarily turned over for safekeeping and
verification the following."... (c) Also on the same date, she
issued still another certification which reads partially, thus:"... that
I have freely and voluntarily allowed the search of my and my
husband's personal belongings and turn-over to the NBI of the
following items."... (d) On October 13, 1966 the Davao City
Police Department issued a certification to the effect that the
petitioner Tomas Velasco never filed any "report for robbery or
other offenses ... against any member of the NBI or the PC
during the period from September 19, 1966 to the
present,"... ." Their memorandum likewise included as an annex
an affidavit from Benjamin Doronal Y. Yañez, the assistant
manager of the Skyroom Hotel. It was worded thus: "That on
September 19, 1966 at around 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, a joint NBI, PC and Davao City Police Commando
Team conducted a search on Room 220 of the Skyroom Hotel
occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Tomas Velasco; That before said
search was conducted, [Teofila Ibañez], the actual occupant of
the room at the time, voluntarily consented to the request of Atty.
[Earl Reynolds] and Lt.[Romeo Arceño], to search their room
(Rm. 220) after the latter introduced themselves by showing their
respective identifications cards; That during said search, upon
the request of Atty. [Reynolds] and Lt.[Arceño], [Teofila Ibañez]
voluntarily opened her handbag which was found to contain a .45
caliber pistol and likewise voluntarily opened the maletas which
were found to contain several papers and documents; That
receipts were duly issued to [Teofila Ibañez] which accounted for
everything taken from their room (Rm. No. 220) during the search,
including said .45 caliber pistol, papers and documents and that
nothing was lost; That [Teofila Ibañez] signed the receipts and
received copies thereof; That [Teofila Ibañez] and I were present
when the said search was being conducted; That said search
was conducted in a peaceful and orderly
manner ... ."
There was an attempt on the part of petitioners to counteract the
force of the above recital by an affidavit of one Corazon Y.
Velasco, who stated that she is the legal wife of petitioner
Tomas Velasco, and another by such petitioner
himself reiterating such a fact and that the person who was
present at his hotel room was one Teofila Ibañez, "a manicurist
by occupation ." Their effort appurtenant thereto is doomed to
failure. If such indeed were the case, then it is much more easily
understandable why that person, Teofila Ibañez, who could be
aptly described as the wrong person at the wrong place and at
the wrong time, would have signified her consent readily and
immediately. Under the circumstances, that was the most
prudent course of action. It would save her and even petitioner
Velasco himself from any gossip or innuendo. Nor could the
officers of the law be blamed if they would act on the
appearances. There was a person inside who from all indications
was ready to accede to their request. Even common courtesy
alone would have precluded them from inquiring too closely as to
why she was there. Under all the circumstances, therefore, it can
readily be concluded that there was consent sufficient in law to
dispense with the need for a search warrant. The petition cannot,
therefore, prevail.
2. It was set forth at the outset that the state policy of minimizing,
if not doing away entirely with the festering sore of smuggling
must be carried out with due respect for constitutional rights. It is
a truism in law that a desirable end cannot be attained by illegal
means. Whenever there is a showing therefore that the
safeguards of the fundamental law are disregarded, more
specifically the guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure, then judicial redress is appropriate. To repeat, such is
not the case here. Moreover, it may likewise be added that as
previously mentioned in Nasiad v. Court of Tax
Appeals, involving the very same occurrence, the only difference
being that the petitioners there were the importers of the
smuggled goods, this Court had affirmed the validity of the
seizure proceeding. No injustice can therefore be claimed by
petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus is dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
14) G.R. No. L-27360 February 28, 1968
HON. RICARDO G. PAPA, as Chief of Police of Manila; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, as Commissioner of Customs;
PEDRO PACIS, as Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila;
and MARTIN ALAGAO, as Patrolman of the Manila Police
Department, petitioners,
vs.
REMEDIOS MAGO and HILARION U. JARENCIO, as
Presiding Judge of Branch 23, Court of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners.
Juan T. David for respondents.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an original action for prohibition and certiorari, with
preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of
Manila; Juan once Enrile, Commissioner of Customs; Pedro
Pacis, Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila; and Martin
Alagao, a patrolman of the Manila Police Department, against
Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of
Branch 23 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, praying for the
annulment of the order issued by respondent Judge in Civil Case
No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of
March 7, 1967, which authorized the release under bond of
certain goods which were seized and held by petitioners in
connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code,
but which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago, and to
prohibit respondent Judge from further proceeding in any manner
whatsoever in said Civil Case No. 67496. Pending the
determination of this case this Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the respondent Judge from executing,
enforcing and/or implementing the questioned order in Civil Case
No. 67496 and from proceeding with said case.
Petitioner Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of
the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information
received on November 3, 1966 to the effect that a certain
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and
undervalued, would be released the following day from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and
upon orders of petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila
and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted
surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks
left gate No. 1 at about 4:30 in the afternoon of November 4,
1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the
trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila.
The load of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and
the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police.
Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods
and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of
Duties Collected in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the
Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of
the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B.
Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
"for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. 67496, alleging, among others, that
Remedios Mago was the owner of the goods seized, having
purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando,
Pampanga; that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin Lanopa
to transport, the goods from said place to her residence at 1657
Laon Laan St., Sampaloc, Manila; that the goods were seized by
members of the Manila Police Department without search
warrant issued by a competent court; that anila Chief of Police
Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios Mago
that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be
not examined; that then Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino
had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because
the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of
the Commissioner of Customs; that the goods, even assuming
them to have been misdeclared and, undervalued, were not
subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs
Code because Remedios Mago had bought them from another
person without knowledge that they were imported illegally; that
the bales had not yet been opened, although Chief of Police
Papa had arranged with the Commissioner of Customs regarding
the disposition of the goods, and that unless restrained their
constitutional rights would be violated and they would truly suffer
irreparable injury. Hence, Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa
prayed for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining
the above-named police and customs authorities, or their agents,
from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ
of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well
as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their
favor.
On November 10, 1966, respondent Judge Hilarion Jarencio
issued an order ex parte restraining the respondents in Civil
Case No. 67496 — now petitioners in the instant case before this
Court — from opening the nine bales in question, and at the
same time set the hearing of the petition for preliminary injunction
on November 16, 1966. However, when the restraining order was
received by herein petitioners, some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the
presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an
assistant city fiscal and a representative of herein respondent
Remedios Mago.
Under date of November 15, 1966, Remedios Mago filed an
amended petition in Civil Case No. 67496, including as party
defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of
Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department.
Herein petitioners (defendants below) filed, on November 24,
1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the
seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of their
other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses,
to wit: that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction
to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Court of Tax Appeals; that, assuming that the court had
jurisdiction over the case, the petition stated no cause of action in
view of the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the
administrative remedies provided for in the Tariff and Customs
Code; that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over
the goods because the full duties and charges thereon had not
been paid; that the members of the Manila Police Department
had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not
unreasonable; and the persons deputized under Section 2203 (c)
of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and
arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the
said Code. In opposing the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, herein petitioners averred in the court below that the
writ could not be granted for the reason that Remedios Mago was
not entitled to the main reliefs she prayed for; that the release of
the goods, which were subject to seizure proceedings under the
Tariff and Customs Code, would deprive the Bureau of Customs
of the authority to forfeit them; and that Remedios Mago and
Valentin Lanopa would not suffer irreparable injury. Herein
petitioners prayed the court below for the lifting of the restraining
order, for the denial of the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, and for the dismissal of the case.
At the hearing on December 9, 1966, the lower Court, with the
conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods
be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the
representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of
Customs, and the Anti-Smuggling Center of the Manila Police
Department. On December 13, 1966, the above-named persons
filed a "Compliance" itemizing the contents of the nine bales.
Herein respondent Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed
an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since the
inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of
prohibited importation, the same should be released as per
agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate
bond that may be determined by the court. Herein petitioners
filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court had no
jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact
that the court had no jurisdiction over the case, and that most of
the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not declared and
were, therefore, subject to forfeiture. A supplemental opposition
was filed by herein petitioners on January 19, 1967, alleging that
on January 12, 1967 seizure proceedings against the goods had
been instituted by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila,
and the determination of all questions affecting the disposal of
property proceeded against in seizure and forfeiture proceedings
should thereby be left to the Collector of Customs. On January
30, 1967, herein petitioners filed a manifestation that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges due on the goods
amounted to P95,772.00. On February 2, 1967, herein
respondent Remedios Mago filed an urgent manifestation and
reiteration of the motion for the release under bond of the goods.
On March 7, 1967, the respondent Judge issued an order
releasing the goods to herein respondent Remedios Mago upon
her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00, and on March
13, 1967, said respondent filed the corresponding bond.
On March 13, 1967, herein petitioner Ricardo Papa, on his own
behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court
releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila
Police Department had been directed by the Collector of
Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending
termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for
reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, herein petitioners
filed the present action for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction before this Court. In their petition
petitioners alleged, among others, that the respondent Judge
acted without jurisdiction in ordering the release to respondent
Remedios Mago of the disputed goods, for the following reasons:
(1) the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by respondent
Judge, had no jurisdiction over the case; (2) respondent
Remedios Mago had no cause of action in Civil Case No. 67496
of the Court of First Instance of Manila due to her failure to
exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial
intervention; (3) the Government was not estopped by the
negligent and/or illegal acts of its agent in not collecting the
correct taxes; and (4) the bond fixed by respondent Judge for the
release of the goods was grossly insufficient.
In due time, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for
prohibition and certiorari in this case. In their answer,
respondents alleged, among others: (1) that it was within the
jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to
hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the
questioned order of March 7, 1967, because said Civil Case No.
67496 was instituted long before seizure, and identification
proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were
instituted by the Collector of Customs; (2) that petitioners could
no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding
duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the
customs premises and were no longer within the control of the
Bureau of Customs; (3) that respondent Remedios Mago was
purchaser in good faith of the goods in question so that those
goods can not be the subject of seizure and forfeiture
proceedings; (4) that the seizure of the goods was affected by
members of the Manila Police Department at a place outside
control of jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs and affected
without any search warrant or a warrant of seizure and detention;
(5) that the warrant of seizure and detention subsequently issued
by the Collector of Customs is illegal and unconstitutional, it not
being issued by a judge; (6) that the seizing officers have no
authority to seize the goods in question because they are not
articles of prohibited importation; (7) that petitioners are estopped
to institute the present action because they had agreed before
the respondent Judge that they would not interpose any objection
to the release of the goods under bond to answer for whatever
duties and taxes the said goods may still be liable; and (8) that
the bond for the release of the goods was sufficient.
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the
respondent Judge had acted with jurisdiction in issuing the order
of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction,
among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from
imported articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and
penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to
prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the
customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws. The goods in
question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal
Entry".As long as the importation has not been terminated the
imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the
payment of the duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles,
or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit for
withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties,
taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in
the aforesaid "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry" with the manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor
Generalwherein it is stated that the estimated duties, taxes and
other charges on the goods subject of this case amounted to
P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the
Bureau of Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had
not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on
which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement
and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the
"compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon
examination and inventory, shows that the quantity of the goods
was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties
thereon. For example, Annex B (the statement and receipts of
duties collected) states that there were 40 pieces of ladies'
sweaters, whereas Annex H (the inventory contained in the
"compliance") states that in bale No. 1 alone there were 42
dozens and 1 piece of ladies' sweaters of assorted colors; in
Annex B, only 100 pieces of watch bands were assessed, but in
Annex H, there were in bale No. 2, 209 dozens and 5 pieces of
men's metal watch bands (white) and 120 dozens of men's metal
watch band (gold color), and in bale No. 7, 320 dozens of men's
metal watch bands (gold color); in Annex B, 20 dozens only of
men's handkerchief were declared, but in Annex H it appears that
there were 224 dozens of said goods in bale No. 2, 120 dozens
in bale No. 6, 380 dozens in bale No. 7, 220 dozens in bale No. 8,
and another 200 dozens in bale No. 9. The articles contained in
the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture
under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the
Tariff and Customs Code. And this Court has held that
merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law,
is subject to forfeiture,and that goods released contrary to law
are subject to seizure and forfeiture.
Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question
had been brought out of the customs area the Bureau of
Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same, nevertheless, when
said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4,
1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under
directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had
been formally deputized by the Commissioner of Customs,the
Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the
goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes
upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all
imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges
have not been paid or secured to be paid, and to dispose of the
same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were
under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs
at the time the petition for mandamus, docketed as Civil Case No.
67496, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila,
therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if
the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the
purposes of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings had not yet
been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The ruling in the case of "Alberto de Joya, et al. v. Hon. Gregorio
Lantin, et al.," G.R. No. L-24037, decided by this Court on April
27, 1967, is squarely applicable to the instant case. In the De
Joya case, it appears that Francindy Commercial of Manila
bought from Ernerose Commercial of Cebu City 90 bales of
assorted textiles and rags, valued at P117,731.00, which had
been imported and entered thru the port of Cebu. Ernerose
Commercial shipped the goods to Manila on board an inter-island
vessel. When the goods where about to leave the customs
premises in Manila, on October 6, 1964, the customs authorities
held them for further verification, and upon examination the
goods were found to be different from the declaration in the cargo
manifest of the carrying vessel. Francindy Commercial
subsequently demanded from the customs authorities the
release of the goods, asserting that it is a purchaser in good faith
of those goods; that a local purchaser was involved so the
Bureau of Customs had no right to examine the goods; and that
the goods came from a coastwise port. On October 26, 1964,
Francindy Commercial filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for mandamus against the Commissioner of
Customs and the Collector of Customs of the port of Manila to
compel said customs authorities to release the goods.
Francindy Commercial alleged in its petition for mandamus that
the Bureau of Customs had no jurisdiction over the goods
because the same were not imported to the port of Manila; that it
was not liable for duties and taxes because the transaction was
not an original importation; that the goods were not in the hands
of the importer nor subject to importer's control, nor were the
goods imported contrary to law with its (Francindy Commercial's)
knowledge; and that the importation had been terminated. On
November 12, 1964, the Collector of Customs of Manila issued a
warrant of seizure and identification against the goods. On
December 3, 1964, the Commissioner of Customs and the
Collector of Customs, as respondents in the mandamus case,
filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, and in view of the pending
seizure and forfeiture proceedings. The Court of First Instance
held resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance pending
decision on the merits. On December 14, 1964, the Court of First
Instance of Manila issued a preventive and mandatory injunction,
on prayer by Francindy Commercial, upon a bond of P20,000.00.
The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs
sought the lifting of the preliminary and mandatory injunction, and
the resolution of their motion to dismiss. The Court of First
Instance of Manila, however, on January 12, 1965, ordered them
to comply with the preliminary and mandatory injunction, upon
the filing by Francindy Commercial of an additional bond of
P50,000.00. Said customs authorities thereupon filed with this
Court, on January 14, 1965, a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction. In resolving the question
raised in that case, this Court held:
This petition raises two related issues: first, has the Customs
bureau jurisdiction to seize the goods and institute forfeiture
proceedings against them? and (2) has the Court of First
Instance jurisdiction to entertain the petition for mandamus to
compel the Customs authorities to release the goods?
Francindy Commercial contends that since the petition in the
Court of first Instance was filed (on October 26, 1964) ahead of
the issuance of the Customs warrant of seizure and forfeiture (on
November 12, 1964),the Customs bureau should yield the
jurisdiction of the said court.
The record shows, however, that the goods in question were
actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e., before Francindy
Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the
Customs bureau was to verify whether or not Custom duties and
taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23,
1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were
found to have been released regularly from the Cebu Port
(Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released
irregularly from Customs custody, these are subject to seizure
under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA
1957).
The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among
others to collect revenues from imported articles, fines and
penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs;
and to enforce tariff and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act
1957).
The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of
Cebu. Should they be found to have been released irregularly
from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure
and forfeiture, the proceedings for which comes within the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic Act
1937.
Said proceeding should be followed; the owner of the goods may
set up defenses therein (Pacis v. Averia, L-22526, Nov. 20, 1966.)
From the decision of the Commissioner of Customs appeal lies to
the Court of Tax Appeals, as provided in Sec. 2402 of Republic
Act 1937 and Sec. 11 of Republic Act, 1125. To permit recourse
to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported
goods would in effect render ineffective the power of the
Customs authorities under the Tariff and Customs Code and
deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive appellate
jurisdictions. As this Court has ruled in Pacis v. Averia, supra,
Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure and
forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs
and the Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature,
while the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance is a general legislation, not to mention that the former
are later enactments, the Court of First Instance should yield to
the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
It is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs
acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment
the goods are actually in its possession or control, even if no
warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture
proceedings. In the present case, the Bureau of Customs
actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and
so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction
over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff
and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts. Much
less then would the Court of First Instance of Manila have
jurisdiction over the goods in question after the Collector of
Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. And so, it cannot be said, as respondents
contend, that the issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to
divest the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. The court presided by respondent Judge did
not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in question when the
petition for mandamus was filed before it, and so there was no
need of divesting it of jurisdiction. Not having acquired jurisdiction
over the goods, it follows that the Court of First Instance of
Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March
7, 1967 releasing said goods.
Respondents also aver that petitioner Martin Alagao, an officer of
the Manila Police Department, could not seize the goods in
question without a search warrant. This contention cannot be
sustained. The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G.
Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of
Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and
arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of
any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same
may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under
customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any
box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he
had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of
dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law;
and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such
article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that
petitioner Ricardo G. Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could
lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question.
The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand
assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure,
and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This
was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao
who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks
loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina
Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the
interception of the cargo.
Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had
authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued
by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not
require said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes
persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on
board, or to stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said
cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides
that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only
upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." It is
our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the
search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority
under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a
search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Our conclusion finds support in the case of Carroll v. United
States, 39 A.L.R., 790, 799, wherein the court, considering a
legal provision similar to Section 2211 of the Philippine Tariff and
Customs Code, said as follows:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th
Amendment, we find in the first Congress, and in the following
second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the
necessity for a search warrant between goods subject to
forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house of similar place,
and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a
movable vessel, where readily they could be put out of reach of a
search warrant. . . .
Again, by the 2d section of the Act of March 3, 1815 (3 Stat. at
L.231, 232, chap. 94), it was made lawful for customs officers not
only to board and search vessels within their own and adjoining
districts, but also to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast
or person on which or whom they should suspect there was
merchandise which was subject to duty, or had been introduced
into the United States in any manner contrary to law, whether by
the person in charge of the vehicle or beast or otherwise, and if
they should find any goods, wares, or merchandise thereon,
which they had probably cause to believe had been so unlawfully
brought into the country, to seize and secure the same, and the
vehicle or beast as well, for trial and forfeiture. This Act was
renewed April 27, 1816 (3 Sta. at L. 315, chap. 100), for a year
and expired. The Act of February 28, 1865, revived § 2 of the Act
of 1815, above described, chap. 67, 13 Stat. at L. 441. The
substance of this section was re-enacted in the 3d section of the
Act of July 18, 1866, chap. 201, 14 Stat. at L. 178, and was
thereafter embodied in the Revised Statutes as § 3061, Comp.
Stat. § 5763, 2 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1161. Neither § 3061
nor any of its earlier counterparts has ever been attacked as
unconstitutional. Indeed, that section was referred to and treated
as operative by this court in Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S.
215, 219, 27 L. ed. 540, 541, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 503. . . .
In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his
companion policemen did not have to make any search before
they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original
petition, and amended petition, in the court below Remedios
Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that there was a
search. All that they complained of was,
That while the trucks were on their way, they
were intercepted without any search warrant near the Agrifina
Circle and taken to the Manila Police Department, where they
were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect
that no search warrant would be needed under the
circumstances obtaining in the instant case. Thus, it has been
held that:
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in
respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a
search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. (47 Am. Jur., pp.
513-514, citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 69 L. ed.,
543, 45 S. Ct., 280, 39 A.L.R., 790; People v. Case, 320 Mich.,
379, 190 N.W., 389, 27 A.L.R., 686.)
In the case of People v. Case (320 Mich., 379, 190 N.W., 389, 27
A.L.R., 686), the question raised by defendant's counsel was
whether an automobile truck or an automobile could be searched
without search warrant or other process and the goods therein
seized used afterwards as evidence in a trial for violation of the
prohibition laws of the State. Same counsel contended the
negative, urging the constitutional provision forbidding
unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court said:
. . . Neither our state nor the Federal Constitution directly
prohibits search and seizure without a warrant, as is sometimes
asserted. Only "unreasonable" search and seizure is
forbidden. . . .
. . . The question whether a seizure or a search is unreasonable
in the language of the Constitution is a judicial and not a
legislative question; but in determining whether a seizure is or is
not unreasonable, all of the circumstances under which it is made
must be looked to.
The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle of recent
development, which has multiplied by quantity production and
taken possession of our highways in battalions until the slower,
animal-drawn vehicles, with their easily noted individuality, are
rare. Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in
immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling
express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a
disguising means of silent approach and swift escape unknown
in the history of the world before their advent. The question of
their police control and reasonable search on highways or other
public places is a serious question far deeper and broader than
their use in so-called "bootleging" or "rum running," which is itself
is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private
ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and
transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or
on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially
guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling
extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate
commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality,
chastity, and decency, to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is
a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem a condition,
and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal
laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a
highway or other public place without a search warrant is
unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial
question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made.

Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila

Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance
with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purpose of the enforcement of
the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, We have thus resolved the principal and
decisive issue in the present case. We do not consider it
necessary, for the purposes of this decision, to discuss the
incidental issues raised by the parties in their pleadings.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:

(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by

petitioners;

(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without
jurisdiction, the order of respondent Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio,
dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila;

(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this

Court on March 31, 1967 restraining respondent Judge from
executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7,
1967 in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in said case;

(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of
First Instance of Manila; and 1äwphï1.ñët

(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the

costs.

It is SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,

J.P., Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur. 1äwphï1.ñët
15) G.R. No. L-41686 November 17, 1980
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH IX,
QUEZON CITY, presided by HON. ULPIANO SARMIENTO,
JESSIE HOPE and MONINA MEDINA, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
This original petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Order dated
August 20, 1975 issued by District Judge Ulpiano Sarmiento in
Criminal Case No. Q-3781 which stalled the prosecution of
respondents Sgt. Jessie C. Hope and Monina Medina for the
alleged violation of section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
The order declared as inadmissible in evidence the allegedly
smuggled articles obtained by apprehending agents in the
course of a warrantless search and seizure. Dispositively, the
order decreed:
WHEREFORE, in accordance with Article IV, Sec. 4, paragraph
2 of the present Constitution, the boxes and the watches and
bracelets contained therein seized from the car of the accused
Sgt. Jessie C. Hope, are hereby declared inadmissible in
evidence in this case; likewise, the pictures taken of said items
attempted to be presented as evidence in the instant case is
hereby declared in admissible as evidence against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The records disclose that one week before February 9, 1974, the
Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC) was informed
by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of highly dutiable
goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a
blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur
Manuel and Macario Sabado, on the aforesaid date and upon
order of the Chief of Intelligence and Operations Branch,
RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves in the
vicinity of the toll gate of the North Diversion Road at Balintawak,
Quezon City.
At about 6:45 A.M. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car with
Plate No. 21-87-73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was
accompanied by Monina Medina approached the exit gate and
after giving the toll receipt sped away towards Manila. The
RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car.
Agent Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop
but the latter instead of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North
Diversion Road, but he could not go through because of the
buses in front of his car. At this point, the agents succeeded in
blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel and
Sabado who were in civilian clothes showed their Identification
cards to respondents and introduced themselves as RASAC
agents.
The Agents saw four (4) boxes on the back seat of the Dodge
and upon inquiry as to what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope
answered "I do not know." Further, respondents were asked
where they were bringing the boxes, to which respondent Medina
replied that they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical Hut
at Epifanio de los Santos. Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car
with respondents while Agent Manuel took their own car and both
cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the
Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by telephone.
Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad
who had joined them waited for the man who according to
Monina Medina was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man
did not appear, Col. Abad "called off the mission" and brought
respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving there at
about 9:00 A.M. (Respondents' Memorandum, records, pp.
180-183).
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded
eleven (11) sealed boxes, four (4) on the rear seat and seven (7)
more in the baggage compartment which was opened on orders
of Col. Abad. On the same order of the intelligence officer, the
boxes were opened before the presence of respondents Hope
and Medina, representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Bureau of Customs, P.C., COSAC and photographers of the
Department of National Defense. The contents of the boxes
revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist watches of assorted
brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of assorted brands"
(based on a later inventory), supposedly untaxed.
As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz
requested the Bureau of Customs to issue a Warrant of Seizure
and Detention against the articles including the Dodge car. The
Collector of Customs did issue the same on February 12, 1974. It
was admitted, however, that when the apprehending agents
arrested respondents and brought them together with the seized
articles to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the former were
not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure.
In conjunction with the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued
by the Collector of Customs, seizure proceedings were instituted
and docketed as Seizure Identification No. 14281 against the
wrist watches and watch bracelets pursuant to Section 2530 (m)
— 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and Seizure Identification
No. 14281-A against the Dodge car pursuant to Section 2530(k)
of the same Code.
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases, respondents
disclaimed ownership of the seized articles. Ownership was
instead claimed by one Antonio del Rosario who intervened in
the proceedings. The claimant-intervenor testified that he bought
the watches and bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced
by a sales invoice certified to be authentic by the BIR Revenue
Regional Office No. 6 of Quezon City, which transaction was
entered in the book of accounts of aforesaid claimant; that the
same articles were brought to a buyer in Angeles City, but when
the sale failed to materialize, claimant contracted respondent
Monina Medina to transport back the boxes to Manila for a
consideration of P1,000.00 without disclosing the contents
thereof which claimant simply represented as PX goods; that
when he bought the watches from Buenafe, he presumed that
the corresponding duties have already been paid, only to be
surprised later on when he was informed that the same were
seized for non-payment of taxes.
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at
the time of apprehension, he had no knowledge of the contents
of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he never
knew that these are untaxed commodities that he consented to
transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon
request of his girl friend Monina as a personal favor; that he was
not present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor was he
ever told of their contents on the way. On the part of respondent
Monina Medina, she testified that what she did was only in
compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport
the boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical
Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr. Del
Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she came
to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp Aguinaldo.
As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies
of respondents and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario,
the Collector of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases
on April 1, 1975 declaring that the seized articles including the
car are not subject of forfeiture. The dispositive portion of this
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of Section 2312 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the subject
motor vehicle, one (1) Dodge, Model 1965, Motor No. 33859,
Serial No. W357348361, File No. 2B-1884, with Plate No. EH
21-87, '73 covered by Seizure Identification No. 14281-A be, as it
is hereby declared released to its registered owner, Jessie C.
Hope, upon proper Identification. Relative to Seizure
Identification No. 14281, it is further ordered and decreed that the
subject matter thereof to wit: 4,606 pcs. of assorted brands of
wrist watches, 1,399 pieces of assorted brands of wrist bracelets
and 100 pcs. of tools be, as they are hereby likewise declared
released to the rightful owner thereof, Antonio del Rosario, upon
payment of the levitable duties, taxes and other charges due
thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and taxes
thereof. Furthermore, should claimant-intervenor fail to pay the
assessable duties, taxes and other charges owing from the
aforestated articles within 30 days from the time this decision
becomes final and unappealable, the same shall be deemed
abandoned in favor of the government to be disposed of in the
manner provided for by law.
Meanwhile, on March 14, 1974, after the requisite preliminary
investigation, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding the
existence of a prima facie case against respondents Hope and
Medina, filed Criminal Case No. Q-3781 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on April 23,
1974, respondents pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced on
January 28, 1975 and while the prosecution through its first
witness, Agent Macario Sabado, was adducing as evidence the
pictures of the eleven (11) boxes containing the assorted
watches and watch bracelets, counsel for respondents objected
to the presentation of the pictures and the subject articles on the
ground that they were seized without the benefit of warrant, and
therefore inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2), Article IV
of the New Constitution. After the parties have argued their
grounds in their respective memoranda, respondent trial court
issued the questioned order of August 20, 1975 as cited earlier.
The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied on
September 30, 1975. Hence, this petition which was treated as a
special civil action in Our Resolution of May 5, 1976.
The substantive issue as urged in the petition is whether or not
the seizure of the merchandise in a moving vehicle by authorized
agents commissioned to enforce customs laws without warrant of
seizure breaches the constitutional immunity against
unreasonable search and seizure and therefore, such
merchandise are inadmissible in evidence. Corollary to the issue
is, has the trial court gravely abused its discretion in finding the
affirmative?
The State holds on the proposition that the rules governing
search and seizure had been liberalized when a moving vehicle
is the object of the search and the necessity of a prior warrant
has been relaxed on the ground of practicality, considering that
before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and
persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of
the issuing judge — a requirement which borders on impossibility
in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle
that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. Petitioner vigorously contends that contraband may be
seized without necessity of a search warrant since the
Constitution does not guaranty immunity to smugglers and that a
warrantless seizure of contraband in a moving vehicle is justified
by the traditional exception attached to the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution, and such exception must be adopted in
interpreting the relevant provision in the new Philippine
Constitution.
As counter argument, respondents maintain that the decision of
the Collector of Customs in their seizure cases which has now
become final and unappealable has made no pronouncement
that the subject articles are smuggled items. More so, the
decision has entirely cleared respondents of any liability or
responsibility in the alleged smuggling activity and as a
consequence, the decision has the direct effect of deciding finally
that the watches and bracelets are not smuggled and that
respondents have not violated the customs and tariff laws as
charged in the criminal complaint. Respondents argue further
that the interception of accused Jessie Hope's car by RASAC
Agents while in the course of a normal trip without any order of
the court and without having shown that the interception was
necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, is an impairment of the liberty of travel under
section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Finally, they claim
that the agents had one week's time before the date of
apprehension to secure the necessary warrant but since they
failed to get this court order, the search of Hope's car and the
spontaneous seizure of the boxes loaded therein and the
contents thereof is a violation of the constitutional guarantee
against "unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever nature
and for any purpose" under section 3, Article IV of the
fundamental law.
We find for petitioner. The opposing counsel's attempt to draw an
Identity between the seizure cases and the present criminal
action to the ultimate end that the decision in the former should
be made decisive of the issue of criminal liability must be
overruled. It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs
made no findings that the articles were smuggled. In fact, what
the Collector stated was that the prosecution failed to present the
quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant the forfeiture of the
subject articles (Pages 128 and 130 of Annex "E", Records, p.
109). In a general sense, this does not necessarily exclude the
possibility of smuggling. But if the aim of a confirmation that the
goods are indeed smuggled, is to draw an inference to tie up
respondents' criminal liability, the Collector is not duty bound, nor
is there any need for him to arrive at such a conclusion. It is quite
clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and
customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in
the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty
provided for in section 3601 of the Code . As can be gleaned
from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as
those instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in
character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the
administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation
of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure
cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might
be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both
kinds of penalties may be imposed.
In the case at bar, the decision of the Collector of Customs, as in
other seizure proceedings, concerns the res rather than
the persona. The proceeding is a probe on contraband or illegally
imported goods. These merchandise violated the revenue law of
the country, and as such, have been prevented from being
assimilated in lawful commerce until corresponding duties are
paid thereon and the penalties imposed and satisfied either in the
form of fines or of forfeiture in favor of the government who will
dispose of them in accordance with law. The importer or
possessor is treated differently. The fact that the administrative
penalty befalls on him is an inconsequential incidence to criminal
liability. By the same token, the probable guilt cannot be negated
simply because he was not held administratively liable. The
Collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to
forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were
transported in respondents' car and seized from their possession
by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the
strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced
in the information can only be determined in a separate criminal
action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our
penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by
preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
Considering now the critical area of the dispute, under the law,
the authority of persons duly commissioned to enforce tariff and
customs laws is quite exceptional when it pertains to the domain
of searches and seizures of goods suspected to have been
introduced in the country in violation of the customs laws. This
Court had occasion to recognize this power granted to persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of the Code, who in
order to discharge their official duties more effecttively —
... may at anytime enter, pass through, or search any land or
inclosure of any warehouse, store or other building not being a
dwelling house. (Section 2208, emphasis supplied)
... (to) go aboard any vessel or aircraft within the limits of any
collection district, and to inspect, search and examine said vessel
or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope on board,
and search any person on board the said vessel or aircraft and to
this end to hail and stop such vessel or aircraft if under way. to
use all necessary force to compel compliance; and if it shall
appear that any breach or violation of the customs and tariff laws
of the Philippines has been committed, whereby or in
consequence of which such vessels or aircrafts, or the article, or
any part thereof, on board of or imported by such vessel or
aircrafts, is hable to forfeiture to make seizure of the same or any
part thereof.
The power of search herein above given shall extend to the
removal of any false bottom, partition, bulkhead or other
obstruction, so far as may be necessary to enable the officer to
discover whether any dutiable or forfeitable articles may be
concealed. (Section 2210)
or,
... (to) open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other
container wherever found when he has reasonable cause to
suspect the presence therein of dutiable or prohibited article or
articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, and
likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such
article as aforesaid (Section 2211, emphasis supplied)
As enunciated in the leading case of Papa v. Mago , in the
exercise of the specific functions aforecited, the Code does not
mention the need of a search warrant unlike Section 2209 which
explicitly provides that a "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge (or justice of the
peace), upon swom application showing probable cause and
particularly describing the place to be searched and person or
thing to be seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court in that
case expressed the considered view that "except in the case of
the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
The rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional
doctrine in Carroll v. United States wherein an imprimatur
against constitutional infirmity was stamped in favor of a
warrantless search and seizure of such nature as in the case at
bar. On this stable foundation We refute the constitutional charge
of respondents that the warrantless seizure violated Article IV,
Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which finds origin in the
Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution
The Carroll doctrine arose from the indictment and conviction of
George Carroll and partner for transporting in an automobile
intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act.
They assailed the conviction on the ground that the trial court
admitted in evidence two of the sixty-eight bottles found by
searching the automobile and eventual seizure of the same
allegedly in violation of the 4th Amendment, and therefore that
the use of the liquor as evidence was improper. To paraphrase
the significant views of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, the legislative
history of the Act clearly established the intent of Congress to
make a distinction between the necessity for a search warrant in
the search of private dwellings and that of automobiles and other
road vehicles in the enforcement of the Act. This distinction is
consistent with the 4th Amendment since the latter does not
denounce an searches or seizures, but only such as are
unreasonable. Searches and seizures without warrant are valid if
made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction. Similarly, other statutes of the Union
such as the Act of 1789, Act of August 4, 1790, and Act of March
3, 1815, among others, construed in the light of the 4th
Amendment had recognized the distinctive feature of a
warrantless search of a ship motorboat, wagon, or automobile for
contraband goods where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. In such a
situation, what appears to the measure of legality of the seizure
was formulated in this sense: "that the seizing officer shall have
reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile
which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is
being illegally transported. " Therein the guarantee of the 4th
Amendment was fulfilled. Where seizure is impossible except
without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril
unless he can show the court probable cause.
The counsel for the State is candid enough to admit that the
Anti-Smuggling Action Center tries its best to follow-up the more
promising tips and information from informers, but ever often, the
information proves false or the smugglers are forewarned. It is
quite true the ASAC received one such information several days
or a week before the encounter; but the fact that its agents failed
to obtain a warrant in spite of the time allowance is not a sign that
they have been remiss in their duty. The records hardly reveal
anything certain and confirmatory of the report during the said
period except the general knowledge that some highly dutiable
goods would be transported from Angeles City to Manila in a blue
Dodge automobile. Not even the trial court has made any
findings that ASAC has established with exactitude the place to
be searched and the person or thing to be seized. Lacking this
essential determination, the agents could not have possibly
secured a valid warrant even if they had foreseen its compelling
necessity. For one thing, the information could have been just
another false alarm. Providentially, however, things turned out
differently when in the morning of February 9, 1974, the
undisclosed Informer himself went along with the agents to the
rendezvous point where at the appointed time he positively
Identified an approaching car as the one described by him a
week earlier to be the suspected carrier of untaxed merchandise.
Clearly therefore, the agents acted not on the basis of a mere
hearsay but on a confirmed information worthy of belief and
probable cause enough for them to adopt measures to freeze the
fleeting event.
We need not argue that the subjective phase of the police action
taken by the ASAC Agents to effect the apprehension of the
suspected violators can be anything less than the ensuing
interception and stoppage of respondents' vehicle after a short
chase. Neither can We sustain the argument that in doing so, the
agents violated respondents' constitutional "liberty of travel". To
recall again Mr. Chief Justice Taft: "(B)ut those lawfully within the
country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free
passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a
competent official authorized to search, probable cause for
believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise." What followed next in the scene was a simple
inquiry as to the contents of the boxes seen inside the car.
Respondents' baffled denial of knowledge thereof could not but
only heighten the suspicion of a reasonable and inquisitive mind.
Thus, the probable cause has not been any less mitigated.
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures is to prevent violations of
private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of
the sanctity of the home by officers of the law acting under
legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such
usurpation when attempted. The right to privacy is an essential
condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and
security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons
and correspondence. The constitutional inviolability of this great
fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures
must be deemed absolute as nothing is more closer to a man's
soul than the serenity of his privacy and the assurance of his
personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the
best of causes and reasons. We draw from the context of the
Constitution that an intended search or seizure attains a high
degree of propriety only when a probable cause duly determined
is branded on a warrant duly issued by a judge or other
responsible person as may be authorized by law. Not invariably,
however, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
interference is not wholly defendent on the presence of a warrant
or the lack of it. In the ordinary cases where warrant is
indispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribed by the
Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be followed
and satisfied. But We need not argue that there are exceptions.
Thus, in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary
to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be
performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable
or unreasonable search or seizure becomes purely a judicial
question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or
seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner
in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched and the character of the articles procured.
The ultimate question then, if any, that should confront the
actuations of the ASAC Agents in this case is whether the
warrantless search and seizure conducted by them is lawful or
not. We have already seen that what they did was a faithful
performance of a duty authorized under the Tariff and Customs
Code directing them as authorized agents to retrieve articles
reasonably suspected of having been possessed, issued or
procured in violation of the tariff laws for which the government
has a direct interest. The official capacity of the agents has never
been questioned by respondents. Neither did respondents raise
an issue on the constitutionality of the law giving the agents the
power to act as mandated. There 'is no question that the Agents
have not exceeded their authority nor have they acted so
licentiously to bear upon respondents moral embarrassment or
substantial prejudice beyond what is necessary. The purpose of
the search and seizure is more than clear to Us, hence, We rule
out the suspicion that the intention is only to elicit evidence to be
used against respondents.
We do not see strong justification for the trial court's failure to
recognize the circumstances at bar as among the "rare cases"
which it admittedly conceded to be exempted from the
requirement of a warrant. The lapse lies on the dismal gap in the
trial court's developmental treat- ment of the law on arrest,
search and seizure. It missed the vital distinction emphatically
laid down in Boyd v. United States which was cited
in Carroll with "particular significance and applicability." Thus,
We quote Mr. Justice Bradley in Boyd:
... The search and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods
liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are
totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's
private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information
therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him, The
two things differ in toto coelo. In the one case, the government is
entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.
The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law;
and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue
laws or concealed to avoid the duties payable on them, has been
authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and
the like seizure have been authorized by our revenue acts from
the commencement of the government. The first statute passed
by Congress to regulate the collection of duties, the Act of July 31,
1789. 1 State at L. 29, 43, chap. 5, contains provisions to this
effect. As this act was passed by the same Congress which
proposed for adoption the original Amendments to the
Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not
regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable' and
they are not embraced within the prohibition of the Amendment.
So also the supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of
the revenue over the manufacture of custody of excisable articles,
and the entries thereof in books required by law to be kept for
their inspection, are necessarily excepted out of the category of
unreasonable searches and seizures. So also the laws which
provide for the search and seizure of articles and things which it
is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose
of issue or disposition, such as counterfeit coin, lottery tickets,
implements of gambling, etc. are not within this
category. Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Met 329. Many other things
of this character might be enumerated. (Emphasis supplied).
Recently, in Viduya v. Berdiago " this Court reiterated the
controlling force of the Papa v. Mago ruling hereinbefore cited
and the persuasive authority of the leading decision in Carroll v.
U.S., supra, and in explaining the rationale of the doctrine
significantly said that "(i)t is not for this Court to do less than it
can to implement and enforce the mandates of the customs and
revenue laws. The evils associated with tax evasion must be
stamped out — without any disregard, it is to be affirmed, of any
constitutional right ...
The circumstances of the case at bar undoubtedly fall squarely
within the privileged area where search and seizure may lawfully
be effected without the need of a warrant. The facts being no less
receptive to the applicability of the classic American ruling, the
latter's force and effect as well as the Mago decision must be
upheld and reiterated in this petition. the find that the
constitutional guarantee has not been violated and the
respondent court gravely erred in issuing the order of August 20,
1975 declaring as inadmissible evidence the items or articles
obtained and seized by the apprehending agents without any
search warrant, as well as the pictures of said items attempted to
be presented as evidence against the accused.
Notwithstanding the reversal and setting aside of the order of
respondent judge assailed herein, thereby allowing the
introduction and admission of the subject prohibited articles in
the trial of the accused Jessie C. Hope and Monina Medina for
alleged smuggling, in the interest of speedy justice, the
prosecution is directed forthwith to re-assess and re-evaluate the
evidence at its disposal, considering the lapse of time since the
trial commenced on June 28, 1975 and was thus delayed due to
the filing of the instant certiorari petition and that on April 1, 1975,
after seizure proceedings initiated by the Collector of Customs,
the said articles were ordered released upon payment of the
leviable duties, taxes and other charges due thereon plus a fine
equivalent to 100% of the duties and taxes thereof. After such
re-assessment and re-evaluation, the prosecution must promptly
take the necessary action on the premises for the protection of
the rights and interests of all parties concerned.
WHEREFORE, the Order appealed from is hereby set aside and
the case is ordered remanded for further trial and reception of
evidence without excluding the articles subject of the seizure or
for such action as the prosecution may take after the
re-assessment and re-evaluation of its evidence as hereinabove
directed.
This judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, De Castro * and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J., files a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting and concurring:
This dissent is based on two aspects of the case at bar: I Firstly,
as discussed in Part I hereof, I believe that the case at hand does
not fall, either pointedly or tangentially, under any of the
recognized exceptions to the constitutionally mandated warrant
requirement, for the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension, search and seizure conducted by the RASAC
agents show that they had ample time and opportunity for a
week's time to secure the necessary search warrant conformably
with the constitutional requirement. The warrantless search and
seizure violated respondents' fundamental constitutional rights
and rendered the goods so seized inadmissible in evidence; and
II. Secondly, I hold that the decision of the Customs authorities
themselves, as cited in the majority opinion itself (at page 4 to 9)
wherein the seized articles (including the car of respondent Hope)
were declared not subject to forfeiture since said articles were
found to have been purchased in good faith by the claimant
thereof Antonio del Rosario under a genuine purchase invoice
from a trading firm and hence, the goods were ordered released
to said Antonio del Rosario upon payment of the corresponding
duties and taxes and penalties "as the rightful owner thereof" and
Hope's car was ordered released to him as the registered owner
in view of the finding that he had been merely asked to bring the
boxes back to Manila and had no hand in their importation nor
purchase, rendered moot the question of admissibility in
evidence of the goods in question. The admission in evidence of
the said goods which have been determined by the Customs
authorities themselves to have been lawfully purchased in good
faith by the claimant-intervenor would in no way established any
criminal liability for the importation or transitory possession by
respondents, who were found by said authorities to be merely
bringing them back to Manila on behalf of the owner.
Withal, I join and concur with the Court's directive in its judgment
that in consonance with the respondents-accused's right to
speedy trial and justice that the prosecution forthwith reassess
and reevaluate the evidence at its disposal" and thereafter
"promptly take the necessary action in the premises for the
protection of the rights and interests of all parties concerned"
which, to my mind, means that the prosecution must as a simple
matter of fairness and justice move for the dismissal of the
criminal case below as hereinbelow explained.
I rode Carroll and John Kiro, whom the said agents recognized,
The opinion of the majority in effect stamps approval on
the warrantless search for and seizure of the eleven (11) sealed
boxes containing wrist watches and watch bracelets of different
trademarks, aboard the four-door blue Dodge sedan owned by
TSgt Jessie C. Hope of the United States Air Force by the agents
of the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC), such
approval being accorded on the strength of the Court's ruling
in Papa v. Mago following, as the majority states, "the traditional
doctrine in Caroll v. United States , as enunciated by the U.S.
Supreme Court. An analysis and appreciation of the facts of the
case at bar and the fundamental principles on the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizure, as laid
down by this Court and the precedents set by the United States
Supreme Court in resolving Fourth Amendment issues, make it
clear to me that respondent judges' challenged Orders (1) dated
August 20, 1975 holding the warrantless "apprehension, search
and seizure" in question violative of the provisions of Section 3,
Article IV of the Constitution and consequently declaring the
boxes and their contents seized from Sgt. Hope's car as well as
the pictures taken of the said items inadmissible in evidence in
the prosecution of respondents Sgt. Hope and his companion in
the car, Monina Medina, for violation of the provisions of Section
3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philip- pines; and (2)
dated September 30, 1975 denying the State's motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated August 20, 1975, should be
upheld and the petition at bar accordingly dismissed.
1. I cannot accede to the majority's casual approach to the case
at bar which in the main raises an issue of constitutional
dimension. The majority opinion simply and broadly applied
judicial precedent was taking no heed of the injunction that when
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is
invoked, there is a need to scrutinize the facts rigorously to
preclude any infringement thereof. This injunction should be
given due regard with greater reason where, as in the case at bar,
the Court invokes the applicability of a judicially established
exception to a constitutionally protective rule. Indeed "[t]he
constitutional validity of a warrantless search [and seizure] is
pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in
the concrete factual context of the individual case."
2. The majority validates the warrantless search and seizure in
the case at bar as an exception to the warrant requirement
(spelled out by the second clause of Section 3, Article IV of the
Constitution) pursuant to the ruling in Papa, supra, which in turn
relied on the doctrinal pronouncements of the United States
Supreme Court in Carroll, supra. Carroll set the ruling that "if the
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable
cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and
destruction, the search and seizure are valid." The "necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may
be obtained, and search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought" supplied the underlying rationale for the Carroll rule. Put
simply, Carroll declared "a search warrant unnecessary where
there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the
car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be
obtained." thereby laying down the probable cause plus exigent
circumstances standard.
The following ultimate facts provided the basis for the
aforementioned rule in Carroll. — Three federal prohibition
agents and a state officer, while patrolling, on their regular tour of
duty, the highway leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, Michigan,
met and passed an Oldsmobile roadster in which
from recent personal contact and observation, as having been
lately engaged in illegal liquor dealings (bootlegging).The
government agents turned their car and pursued Carroll and Kiro
to a point about nineteen miles east of Grand Rapids "where they
stopped them and searched the car." The agents found, stashed
inside the upholstered seats, sixty-eight bottles of whiskey and
gin. Thereafter, the state officer and another took Carroll and Kiro,
the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids.
As could readily be seen, the "exigent circumstances" which
exist in connection with the ambulatory character of the
automobile provided the basic factor in the justification for the
warrantless search and seizure in Carroll Absent, thus, "these
exigent circumstances," notwithstanding the presence of
probable cause, a warrant must be secured and used
The U.S. Supreme Court took this jurisprudential direction in the
much later case of United States v. Joseph V. Chadwick, et al."
decided on June 21, 1977. The facts of the case were
summarized as follows:
When respondents arrived by train in Boston from San Diego,
they were arrested at their waiting automobile by federal
narcotics agents, who had been alerted that respondents were
possible drug traffickers. A double-locked footlocker, which
respondents had transported on the train and which the agents
had probable cause to believe contained narcotics, had been
loaded in the trunk of the automobile. Respondents, together with
the automobile and footlocker, which was admittedly under the
agents' exclusive control, were then taken to the Federal Building
in Boston. An hour and a half after the arrests the agents opened
the footlocker without respondents' consent or a search warrant
and found large amounts of marijuana in it. Respondents were
subsequently indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute it. The District Court granted their pretrial motion to
suppress the marijuana obtained from the footlocker, holding
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment unless they fall within some established
exception to the warrant requirement, and that the footlocker
search was not justified under either the 'automobile
exception' or as a search incident to a lawful arrest; the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, responding to the Government's argument
that the rationale of the Court's automobile search cases applied
as well to Chadwick, ruled that the footlocker's mobility does not
"justify dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant
Clause" for, "[o]nce the federal agents had seized it at the rail
road station and had safely transferred it to the Boston Federal
Building under their exclusive control, there was not the slightest
danger that the footlocker or its contents could have been
removed before a valid search warrant 13 could be obtained.
As to the contention of the Government that the search fell within
the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that "warrantless searches of luggage or
other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified
as incident to that arrest either if the 'search is remote in time or
place from the arrest,... or no exigency exists. Once lawful
enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal
property not immediately associated with the person of the
arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is
no longer an incident of the arrest. It was emphasized that "the
search was conducted more than an hour after federal agents
had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after
respondents were securely in custody; the search
therefore cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as
justified by any other exigency.
I perceive no reason why the rationale in Chadwick should not
find application to the case at bar. The record shows the
following undisputed facts: (1) A week before the actual
interception of Sgt. Hope and Medina in the former's Dodge
sedan, the RASAC agents already knew, from an informer, that
"a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to
Manila from Angeles City in a blue Dodge car and that the goods,
in "sealed boxes with yellow tie would consist of "watches"; (2)
After the interception, "Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car
with respondents while Agent Manuel took [his] own car and both
cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the
Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by
telephone"; and (3) "Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party,
together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man
who according to Monina was supposed to receive the boxes. As
the man did not appear, Col. Abad 'called off the mission' and
brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving
there at about 9:00 A.M.
In the case at bar, granting that the RASAC agents had probable
cause to effect the search and seizure, nonetheless, no exigent
circumstances justified their proceeding to do so without the
requisite warrant. The RASAC agents, having known a week
before they actually undertook the operation that they would be
intercepting a "blue Dodge car" transporting watches in "sealed
boxes," had ample opportunity within the one-week period to
secure the necessary warrant for the search and seizure
contemplated. Moreover, the RASAC agents had another
opportunity to obtain the search and seizure warrant on the day
of the operation itself. The actual interception took place "around
7:00 o'clock in the morning" at the Balintawak approach to the
North Diversion Road and the actual search and seizure
occurred past 9:00 o'clock the same morning at Camp
Aguinaldo. During the intervening period, Agent Manuel even
had time to telephone Colonel Abad to ask for instructions and
could have taken up then with him the matter of securing the
necessary search and seizure warrant. Colonel Abad, as well,
after learning from Agent Sabado that interception tion and
apprehension had already been effected, could himself, as
RASAC Chief of Intelligence and Operations, have secured the
necessary search and seizure warrant.
As stressed by respondent judge in his questioned order, "there
was ample time and opportunity to secure the necessary
warrant" and [j]ust because the RASAC-MBA agents have
information to make them believe that a certain person has
contraband goods in his possession, does not give them the right
to search him and seize whatever contraband may be found in
his possession. ASAC Agents are not by law empowered to
determine whether there exists a 'probable cause, and even if
they have such power, assuming it to be so, the determination of
the probable cause should be made by examining the
complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the thing or
person to be seized, and not simply on bare information given by
an unnamed informer, as in the instant case."
Respondent judge aptly added that
We cannot accept 'good faith' here, as an excuse to justify
violation of the Constitution in making the warrantless
apprehension search and seizure in question when there was
sufficient time — one week — within which they could have
procured a warrant of arrest and a search warrant in accordance
with the proscriptions of the present Constitution, had the ASAC
Agents wanted to. Agent Sabado simply said 'it is not necessary.'
Furthermore, if subjective good faith alone was the test, the
protection afforded the Filipino people by our present
Constitution against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure
would evaporate and rendered its provision nugatory, and our
people 'would be secured in their persons, houses, papers and
effects only in the discretion of the police'. And besides, what
would they have lost if they secured a warrant first? Would it
have frustrated their efforts in enforcing the provisions of the
Customs and Tariff Code if they secured the necessary warrant
before making the apprehension and search? Would it have
thwarted the purposes of the Customs and Tariff Code and would
the results have been different if they had taken the trouble of
securing the necessary warrants, and made the apprehension
and search in accordance with the Constitution? It would have
hardly made any difference These over earnestness and
zealousness on the part of the officers in the discharge of their
function, is what we should guard against. We might impress on
them the importance to our well ordered society of the 'rule of
law' — which necessarily imply respect for and obedience to the
Constitution and the laws of the land. This we can do by making it
clear to them that the fruits of such unreasonable searches and
seizures, are 'forbidden fruits' — in admissible in evidence.
Granting arguendo that the RASAC agents had no opportunity
after the apprehended respondents to secure the necessary
search and seizure warrant during the period prior to their arrival
at Camp Aguinaldo, they certainly could have delayed the actual
search and seizure until the necessary warrant had been
obtained, which would not have taken them beyond
mid-afternoon of the same day. The inconvenience which could
be caused by the delay to respondents Hope and Medina would
at least be tolerable, for such inconvenience could be
quantifiable only in terms of hours spent while waiting, rather
than the transgression of their rights through the warrantless
search and seizure which could be measured only in terms of
fundamental constitutional values violated.
The case at bar offers no situation "where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
As previously stated, after the interception, "Agent Sabado
boarded the Dodge car with the respondents" and directed Sgt.
Hope the route he should take. Agent Sabado had, in effect,
taken custody or control of Sgt. Hope's Dodge sedan, for, being
in there, on hand at all times from the moment he boarded it
through the trip to Bonanza Restaurant, Tropical Hut Foodmart
and, finally, Camp Aguinaldo to guard against any deviation by
Sgt. Hope from the route he had been directed to take or against
any attempt to run off with the car and its contents, his presence
had neutralized, if not eliminated, the said car's mobility.
Moreover, the RASAC agents, by directing the Dodge sedan to
Camp Aguinaldo and retaining it within the premises of the said
Camp, had effected its complete immobilization as well as of its
contents. Definitely under all these circumstances, there could
not have been the slightest possibility that Sgt. Hope and Medina
could have either moved the car or removed its contents — all
securely within the custody of the RASAC agents and the
premises of Camp Aguinaldo — before the necessary search
and seizure warrant could be secured.
Neither can the warrantless search in the case at bar be viewed
as a search incident to a valid arrest so as to fall within another
recognized exception from the warrant requirement. In Preston v.
United States, " the U.S. Supreme Court, in spelling out the rule
regarding this exception and the rationale therefor, stated that:
Unquestionably when a person is lawfully arrested, the police
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a
contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for
weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the
crime ... This right to search and seize without a search warrant
extends to things under the accused's immediate control ... and,
to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the
place where he is arrested ... The rule allowing
contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need
to seize weapons and other things which might be used
to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the
need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime — things
which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on
the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these
justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or
place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in
custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant,
is simply not incident to the arrest.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar cannot be sustained under
the exceptions heretofore discussed, for, even assuming the
apprehension of Sgt. Hope and Medina as lawful, the "search
was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental
to the arrest. Here, the RASAC agents intercepted and
apprehended Sgt. Hope and Medina "around 7:00 o'clock in the
morning" at the Balintawak approach to the North Diversion Road
but conducted the search of the sealed boxes loaded in the
Dodge sedan past 9:00 o'clock of the same morning at Camp
Aguinaldo.
3. The majority opinion also cites Boyd v. United States, with
particular reference to the dissertation therein on the distinction
between the search and seizure of "stolen or forfeited goods or
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment
thereof" and the search and seizure of "a man's private books
and papers for the purpose of obtaining information tion therein
contained, or of using them as evidence against him" as well as
on an historic and statutory account of instances "excepted out of
the category of unreasonable search and seizures."
Boyd raised the matter of distinction aforementioned in
connection with the resolution of whether or not "a search and
seizure or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory production of
a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him in a
proceeding to forfeit property for alleged fraud against the
revenue laws' partook of "an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution?' Mr. Justice Joseph P. Bradley, who delivered the
opinion of the Court, "sought to determine the meaning of the
fourth amendment reasonableness clause by looking to those
principles of the common law which defined the limits of the
state's power to search and seize the belongings of its citizens.
Although it could seize stolen goods and contraband, at common
law the government could not search for and seize for and
citizen's belongings in which it could not assert superior property
rights. He "concluded that the owner's 'indefeasible' natural law
property rights, enshrined in the common law and protected by
the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment placed his
private papers and other property absolutely beyond the reach of
government agents seeking evidence of crime. No matter how
compelling the showing of probable cause or with what
particularly the places to be search and the things to be might be
described, no warrant or subpoena could issue except for those
items already owned by or forfeited to the state. In other words,
the Court, in Boyd , ruled inter alia that the Constitution permitted
searches and seizures only of property in which
the government could claim superior property rights at common
law like "goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the
payment thereof. "
The distinction excerpted in the opinion of the majority in the
case at bar served, in Boyd, to underscore its property —
oriented rationale. However, this distinction — the very basis of
the property-focused rationale — had already been explicitly
abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Warden,
Maryland and Penitentiary v. Bennie Joe Hayden, wherein it was
stated that:
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the
distinction between 'mere evidence' and instrumentalities, fruits
of crime, or contraband. On its face, the provision assures the
'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects ...,'without regard to the use to which any of these
things are applied This 'right of the people' is certainly unrelated
to the 'mere evidence' limitation. Privacy is disturbed no more by
a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a
search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband.
A magistrate can intervene in both situation and the requirements
of probable cause and specificity can be preserved intact.
Moreover, nothing in the nature of property seized as evidence
renders it more private than property seized, for example, as an
instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. Indeed distinction
is wholly irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the
same 'papers and effects' may be mere evidence in one case
and instrumentality in another.
xxx xxx xxx
The premise that property interest control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited. Searches
and seizures may be 'unreasonable within the Fourth
Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior
property interest at common law. We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded
fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts ...
This shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about
through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform ...
xxx xxx xxx
... In determining whether someone is a 'person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure' we have refused 'to import into the
law ... subtle distinctions developed and refiled by the common
law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions
whose validity is largely historical ... [W]e have given recognition
to the interest in privacy despite the complete absence of a
property claim by suppressing the very items which at common
law could be seized with impunity: stolen goods ... ;
instrumentalities ...; and contraband ...
4. That necessity underlies the legislative grant of authority to
certain functionaries of the Government "to effect searchches
seizures and arrests" to secure the enforcement of the tariff and
customs laws need not be belabored. The scope of this authority,
however, should be circumscribed by the procedural safeguards
set forth by the Constitution. Fealty to these constitutional
guarantees requires that the Court, rather than accommodate
extended applications of the search — seizure-and-arrest
authority, should guard against shortcuts government
functionaries are prone to make which render nugatory the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. This authority should, as a matter of
principle, be subjected to the requirements of prior judicial inquiry
and sanction whenever possible and practicable. The Court
should not leave entirely to the hands of government
functionaries discretionary determinations susceptible of abuse
and misuse, for, indeed, "[p]ower is a heady thing."
We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and
seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret
and apply themselves and will push to the limit. We must
remember, too, that freedom from unreasonable search differs
from some of the other rights of the Constitution in that there
is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance
protection. For example, any effective interference with freedom
of the press, or free speech, or religion, usually requires a course
of suppressions against which the citizen can and often does go
to the court and obtain an injunction. Other rights, such as that
to ... the aid of counsel, are within the supervisory power of the
courts themselves. Such a right as just compensation for the
taking of private property may be vindicated after the act in terms
of money.
But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident,
perpetrated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely
beyond the court's supervision and limited only by the judgment
and moderation of officers whose own interests and records are
often at stake in the search. There is no opportunity for injunction
or appeal to disinterested intervention. The citizen's choice is
quietly to submit to whatever the officers undertake or to resist at
risk of arrest or immediate violence.
And we must remember that the authority which we concede to
conduct searches and seizures without warrant may be
exercised by the most unfit and ruthless officers as well as by
the fit and responsible and resorted to in case of petty
misdemeanors as well as in the case of the gravest felonies.
All told, I hold that the warrant less search and seizure conducted
by the RASAC agents in the case at bar should be invalidated
and the constitutional sanction declaring the evidence obtained
thereby "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" should
be upheld.
II
The outcome of the seizure and detention proceedings instituted
by the Collector of Customs against the goods in question
including Sgt. Hope's car, wherein the car and goods were
ordered returned to Sgt. Hope and the established claimant —
owner of the goods, Antonio del Rosario, respectively, (subject in
the case of the latter to payment of the leviable duties and taxes
and penalties), as recited on pages 4 to 9 of the majority opinion,
shows clearly the lack of any criminal liability on the part of the
respondents.
The separate seizure and detention proceedings were instituted
by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila on February 13,
1974 and after hearing, the Collector rendered his decision of
April 1, 1975 finding claimant Antonio del Rosario to be the lawful
owner and purchaser in good faith duly covered by an authentic
sales invoice issued by the trading firm which sold the same to
him and Sgt. Hope to have been unaware of the contents of the
11 boxes which his girlfriend, his co-respondent Monina Medina,
had asked him to bring to Manila in his car.
The majority opinion itself recites these established facts on
pages 4-5, as follows:
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases [seizures and detention
proceedings], respondents disclaimed ownership of the seized
articles. Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del
Rosario who intervened in the proceedings. The
claimant-intervenor testified that he bought the watches and
bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced by a sales invoice
certified to be authentic by the BIR Revenue Regional Office No.
6 of Quezon City, which transaction was entered in the book of
accounts of aforesaid claimant; that the same articles were
brought to a buyer in Angeles City, but when the sale failed to
materialize, claimant contracted respondent Monina Medina to
transport back the boxes to Manila for a consideration of
P1,000.00 without disclosing the contents thereof which claimant
simply represented as PX goods; that when he bought the
watches from Buenafe, he presumed that the corresponding
duties have already been paid, only to be surprised later on when
he was informed that the same were seized for non-payment of
taxes.
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at
the time of apprehension, he had no knowledge of the contents
of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he never
knew that these are untaxed commodities; that he consented to
transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon
request of his girl friend Monina Medina as a personal favor; that
he was not present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor
was he ever told of their contents on the way. On the part of
respondent Monina Medina, she testified that what she did was
only in compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to
transport the boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the
Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr.
Del Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she
came to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp
Aguinaldo.
As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies
of respondents and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario,
the Collector of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases
on April 1, 1975 declaring that the seized articles including the
car are not subject of forfeiture.
The Collector's decision of April 1, 1975, itself, as affirmed by the
Commissioner of Customs' endorsement of April 28,
1975, establishes in detail the above facts which absolve
respondents of any complicity in any smuggling activity, as
follows:
From the evidence thus adduced, it was established that the
boxes found inside the subject car are 4,606 pcs. of assorted
brands of wrist watches, 1,399 pcs of wrist bracelets likewise of
assorted brands and 100 pcs. tools, as evidenced by the
inventory list dated Feb. 22, 1974, (Exhs. '3'- '3-L' Hope) is the
prosecutions' contention that these articles were imported
without going through a customhouse in violation of Sec. 2530 m)
of the TCCP. As a consequence thereof, the vehicle which was
used in transporting the subject articles was likewise seized for
alleged violation of Section 2530 (k) of the same code.
With respect to the charge against the subject car, the claimant
thereof, TSgt Jessie C Hope asserted that he merely
accommodated Monina Medina, his girl friend who requested
him to help her bring her cargo to Manila by driving the car from
Angeles City to Manila; that he was not present when the 11
boxes were loaded in his car which was then parked on its usual
parking place which is a vacant cant lot adjacent to the house
where he lives. He further stated that Monina Medina has an
access to the key of his car which he usually put on a table in his
house and that she did not tell him of the contents of the 11
boxes. Moreover he asserted that he came to know of the
contents of the 11 boxes when they were opened at the RASAC
C office at Camp Aguinaldo. Upon being asked by this Office why
it never occurred to him to inquire from Monina Medina about the
con- tents of the 11 boxes, claimant categorically stated ...
'because of the girl's honesty to me.' In a similar vien, claimant
stated in his sworn statement given to the RASAC that he had
known Monina Medina for quite a time so that ... 'he did not
suspect her to carry anything against the law of the Philippines
and for that reason I did not bother to ask her.' (Exh. '5-A
Hope') These assertions find support in the direct testimony of
Col. Antonio Abad, Chief, Intelligence and Operations, RASAC,
who testified thus: (t.s.n., p. 104)
A. ... I asked him again, how come your car was load- ed with
foreign items? And he said 'that is my lady companion's. I told
him don't you know these are hot items?
B. What did he say?
C. He was surprised
Both Col. Antonio Abad and Agent Macario Sabado, one of the
apprehending agents admitted in open hearing that during their
initial interrogation of T/Sgt. Hope, he maintained and professed
that he did not know of the contents of the 11 boxes. Monina
Medina, on the other hand, stated on direct examination
that TSgt Hope was not present when the subject 11 boxes were
delivered to her at the vacant lot in Angeles City by Antonio del
Rosario. (tsn p. 169) Moreover, in her sworn statement given to
the RASAC, Monina Medina stated thus; (Exh. '4-A' Hope)
Q. When you told T/Sgt. Hope that you will load something in his
car, did he ask you what you were going to load?
R. No, sir.
Against the foregoing contentions, the prosecution failed to
adduce any evidence circumstantial or otherwise that may even
tend to disprove or controvert the same. Granting 'arguendo' that
T/Sgt. Jessie C. Hope was aware of the contents of the 11 boxes
that were found in his car, it is still incumbent upon the
prosecution to at least establish that he has knowledge that the
articles he was conveying are untaxed and/or smuggled as
contemplated in See. 2530 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
In the absence of evidence to prove such fact, which in this case
there is none whatsoever, the ground relied upon for the
forfeiture of the vehicle in question remains unsubstantiated and
therefore will not lie.
Forfeiture works to deprive one's right to his property. Like the
capital punishment which is the supreme penalty for human
beings forfeiture is the ultimate sanction imposable to property.
However, unlike the capital punishment which can only be
imposed after the cause thereof has been established beyond
reasonable doubt, forfeiture should at least be made tenable only
after the grounds therefor have been established to a reasonable
degree of certainty. It shall not lie if based on mere bare
presumptions and groundless conclusions. To hold otherwise
would be arbitrary and repugnant to the principle of judicial
and/or administrative due process.
With respect to Seizure Identification No. 14281, it is evident
that the claimant-intervenor herein Antonio del Rosario
purchased the subject wrist watches and bracelets from Teresa
Buenafe as evidenced by the covering purchase invoice No.
2637 dated February 7, 1974 which was certified to be authentic
by Jeron L. Castillo of Revenue Region No. 6, BIR Quezon City
(Exhs. '2', '3' & '4'). The aforesaid business transaction was
entered in the Columnar Book (Exh. '3') of claimant-intervenor
which fact is a manifestation that Antonio del Rosario was a
buyer in good faith and that the business transaction he entered
into with Teresa Buenafe was not simulated nor clandestine.
It is a well settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed, it must
be proven. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, which in
this case none whatsoever was presented the
claimant-intervenor herein is presumed to be a buyer in good
faith. However, it is incumbent upon the claimant-intervenor
herein to prove that the subject articles are tax-paid. Aside from
the covering sales invoice, not a scintilla of evidence was
adduced to prove that the duties and taxes due on the said items
were satisfied. In this connection, this Office does not share the
view of the herein claimant-intervenor that it is not the practice in
business circles to inquire whether or not the subject matter of a
business transaction are tax-paid. Considering the quantity of the
articles in question and the big volume of the amount involved,
Mr. Antonio del Rosario was quite negligent in failing to inquire
from the seller herein whether the duties and taxes of the items
he purchased were satisfied or not.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, it is the
studied opinion of this Office that while the claimant-intervenor
herein is liable for the payment of the assessable duties and
taxes owing from the subject articles, the forfeiture thereof will
not lie it appearing that the 'quantum' of evidence adduced by the
prosecution is insufficient to sustain the charges by the
prosecution is insufficient to sustain the charges levelled against
the said articles. Moreover, this Office referred this case to the
Central Bank for the necessary Release Certificate. However, Mr.
Cesar Lomotan, Deputy Governor, Central Bank, in his letter to
the Commissioner of Customs dated February 21, 1975 in effect
stated thus:
Based on subject's manager Mr. Antonio del Rosario's
representations that the items involved were bought from a local
dealer as supported by an alleged commercial invoice from
Teresa M. Buenafe Trading dated February 7, 1974 submitted
earlier, this Office cannot issue the required release certificate
therefor considering that no proof has been submitted to indicate
that subject imported goods in question.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of Section 2312 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the subject
motor vehicle, one (1) Dodge, Model 1965, Motor No. 33859,
Serial No. W357348361, File No. 28-1884, with Plate No. EH
21-87, '73 covered by Seizure Identification No. 14281-A be, as it
is hereby declared, released to its registered owner, Jessie C.
Hope, upon proper identification. Relative to Seizure
Identification No. 14281, it is further ordered and decreed that the
subject matter thereof, to wit: 4,606 pcs. of assorted brands of
wrist watches, 1,399 pieces of assorted brands of wrist bracelets
and 100 pcs. of tools be, as they are hereby likewise declared,
released to the rightful owner thereof, Antonio del Rosario, upon
payment of the leviable duties, taxes and other charges due
thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and taxes
thereof. Furthermore, should claimant-intervenor fail to pay the
assessable duties, taxes and other charges owing from the
aforestated articles within 30 days from the time this decision
becomes final and unappealable, the same shall be deemed
abandoned in favor of the government to be disposed of in the
manner provided for by law.
As pointed in the People's petition itself, the Collector's said
decision "has long become final and executory" Hope's car was
duly released and returned to him since May 8, 1975. And the
goods were likewise presumably released to the established
claimant-owner Antonio del Rosario, because at the trial of the
criminal case below, only pictures of the 11 boxes containing the
goods were sought to be presented by the prosecution.
The point is that the customs authorities, the Commissioner of
Customs and the Manila Collector of Customs are bound by their
own above stated decision and findings in the seizure and
detention proceedings that the goods in question were lawfully
owned by the claimant-intervenor Antonio del Rosario who had
purchased them in good faith in the regular course of business
and that respondent Hope was completely innocent of any
complicity in their importation and purchase, having agreed
merely to his girlfriend Monina Medina's request to bring the
goods back to Manila, without any knowledge of their contents,
and they should accordingly direct the prosecution to move for
dismissal of the case below. As the majority opinion itself states:
The collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to
forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were
transported in respondent's car and seized from their possession
by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the
strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced
in the information can only be determined in a separate criminal
action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our
penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by
preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
Certainly, if respondent Hope were absolved by the customs
authorities in the seizure and detention proceedings because of
the absolute lack of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise"
that would establish any complicity on his part "to a reasonable
degree of certainty" and justify the forfeiture of his car that was
used in transporting the goods to Manila, they must
necessarily on the same evidence or absolute lack thereof as
officially determined by themselves move in all fairness and
justice for and cause the dismissal of the criminal case below. If
their evidence in the seizure proceedings established that
respondents had no part whatever in the importation or purchase
by the claimant-intervenor of the goods, the very same evidence
cannot possibly lead to their being found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the smuggling charge nor overcome their
fundamental right of presumption of innocence,
The main issue at bar as to the non-admissibility in evidence of
the boxes and their photographs as ruled in respondent judge's
questioned order (which according to the petition has "the effect
of acquitting the accused [respondents] from the charges" in the
criminal case below) has thus been rendered moot by
respondents customs authorities' decision and findings. The
disposition of this case by the majority opinion of setting aside
respondent judge's order and ordering the case .remanded for
further trial and reception of evidence without excluding the
articles subject of the seizure" has likewise been thus rendered
moot. The admission in evidence of the said boxes or their
photographs whose contents have been found to be lawfully
owned and purchased in good faith by the claimant-intervenor
Antonio del Rosario would in no way establish any criminal
liability on the part of respondents.
Stated in another way, assuming that the seized goods or photos
thereof are admissible in evidence not-withstanding the
warrantless search and seizure (justified on the doctrine of "hot
pursuit"), as held in the majority opinion, still the People's petition
should be dismissed since the admission in evidence of the said
goods which have been determined by the Customs authorities
themselves to have been lawfully purchased in good faith by the
claimant-intervenor would in no way establish any criminal
liability for the importation or transitory possession by
respondents, who were found by said authorities to be merely
bringing them back to Manila on behalf of the owner. If the
prosecution's evidence in the seizure proceedings established
that respondents had no part whatever in the importation or
purchase by the claimant-intervenor of the goods, the very same
evidence cannot possibly lead to their being found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the smuggling charge in the case before us
nor overcome their fundamental right of presumption of
innocence.
The majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Guerrero, however,
reaches the conclusion that despite respondents' exoneration in
the administrative cases, the criminal- responsibility can be
determined only in the separate criminal action while conceding
that such criminal responsibility "must be proven not by
preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
This posture of the majority that any dismissal of the criminal
case should not be ordered outright by this Court but by the
court a quo, whether motu proprio or at the prosecutions
instance, is nonetheless understandable.
I join the Court's directive in its judgment that in consonance with
the respondents-accused's right to speedy trial and justice that
the prosecution forthwith "reassess and reevaluate the evidence
at its disposal" and thereafter promptly take the necessary action
in the premises for the protection of the rights and interests of all
concerned.
This means, as indicated above, that if the prosecution's
evidence (as supplied by the customs authorities) is totally
devoid of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise" that would
establish any complicity on the part of respondents "to a
reasonable degree of certainty", as determined in the very
Collector's decision of April 1, 1975 itself as affirmed by the
Commissioner of Customs, then the prosecution must as a
simple people matter of fairness and justice move for the
dismissal of the criminal case below. The judgment has been
made immediately executory, so that the prosecution may
comply with the Court's directive without further delay.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting and concurring:
This dissent is based on two aspects of the case at bar: I Firstly,
as discussed in Part I hereof, I believe that the case at hand does
not fall, either pointedly or tangentially, under any of the
recognized exceptions to the constitutionally mandated warrant
requirement, for the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension, search and seizure conducted by the RASAC
agents show that they had ample time and opportunity for a
week's time to secure the necessary search warrant conformably
with the constitutional requirement. The warrantless search and
seizure violated respondents' fundamental constitutional rights
and rendered the goods so seized inadmissible in evidence; and
II. Secondly, I hold that the decision of the Customs authorities
themselves, as cited in the majority opinion itself (at page 4 to 9)
wherein the seized articles (including the car of respondent Hope)
were declared not subject to forfeiture since said articles were
found to have been purchased in good faith by the claimant
thereof Antonio del Rosario under a genuine purchase invoice
from a trading firm and hence, the goods were ordered released
to said Antonio del Rosario upon payment of the corresponding
duties and taxes and penalties "as the rightful owner thereof" and
Hope's car was ordered released to him as the registered owner
in view of the finding that he had been merely asked to bring the
boxes back to Manila and had no hand in their importation nor
purchase, rendered moot the question of admissibility in
evidence of the goods in question. The admission in evidence of
the said goods which have been determined by the Customs
authorities themselves to have been lawfully purchased in good
faith by the claimant-intervenor would in no way established any
criminal liability for the importation or transitory possession by
respondents, who were found by said authorities to be merely
bringing them back to Manila on behalf of the owner.
Withal, I join and concur with the Court's directive in its judgment
that in consonance with the respondents-accused's right to
speedy trial and justice that the prosecution forthwith reassess
and reevaluate the evidence at its disposal" and thereafter
"promptly take the necessary action in the premises for the
protection of the rights and interests of all parties concerned"
which, to my mind, means that the prosecution must as a simple
matter of fairness and justice move for the dismissal of the
criminal case below as hereinbelow explained.
I the highway leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, Michigan, met
The opinion of the majority in effect stamps approval on
the warrantless search for and seizure of the eleven (11) sealed
boxes containing wrist watches and watch bracelets of different
trademarks, aboard the four-door blue Dodge sedan owned by
TSgt Jessie C. Hope of the United States Air Force by the agents
of the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action Center (RASAC), such
approval being accorded on the strength of the Court's ruling
in Papa v. Mago following, as the majority states, "the traditional
doctrine in Caroll v. United States , as enunciated by the U.S.
Supreme Court. An analysis and appreciation of the facts of the
case at bar and the fundamental principles on the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizure, as laid
down by this Court and the precedents set by the United States
Supreme Court in resolving Fourth Amendment issues, make it
clear to me that respondent judges' challenged Orders (1) dated
August 20, 1975 holding the warrantless "apprehension, search
and seizure" in question violative of the provisions of Section 3,
Article IV of the Constitution and consequently declaring the
boxes and their contents seized from Sgt. Hope's car as well as
the pictures taken of the said items inadmissible in evidence in
the prosecution of respondents Sgt. Hope and his companion in
the car, Monina Medina, for violation of the provisions of Section
3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philip- pines; and (2)
dated September 30, 1975 denying the State's motion for
reconsideration of the Order dated August 20, 1975, should be
upheld and the petition at bar accordingly dismissed.
1. I cannot accede to the majority's casual approach to the case
at bar which in the main raises an issue of constitutional
dimension. The majority opinion simply and broadly applied
judicial precedent was taking no heed of the injunction that when
the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure is
invoked, there is a need to scrutinize the facts rigorously to
preclude any infringement thereof. This injunction should be
given due regard with greater reason where, as in the case at bar,
the Court invokes the applicability of a judicially established
exception to a constitutionally protective rule. Indeed "[t]he
constitutional validity of a warrantless search [and seizure] is
pre-eminently the sort of question which can only be decided in
the concrete factual context of the individual case."
2. The majority validates the warrantless search and seizure in
the case at bar as an exception to the warrant requirement
(spelled out by the second clause of Section 3, Article IV of the
Constitution) pursuant to the ruling in Papa, supra, which in turn
relied on the doctrinal pronouncements of the United States
Supreme Court in Carroll, supra. Carroll set the ruling that "if the
search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable
cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or
other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and
destruction, the search and seizure are valid." The "necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house, or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may
be obtained, and search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or
automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought" supplied the underlying rationale for the Carroll rule. Put
simply, Carroll declared "a search warrant unnecessary where
there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the
highway; the car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the
car's contents may never be found again if a warrant must be
obtained." thereby laying down the probable cause plus exigent
circumstances standard.
The following ultimate facts provided the basis for the
aforementioned rule in Carroll.- Three federal prohibition agents
and a state officer, while patrolling, on their regular tour of duty,
and passed an Oldsmobile roadster in which rode Carroll and
John Kiro, whom the said agents recognized, from recent
personal contact and observation, as having been lately engaged
in illegal liquor dealings (bootlegging).The government agents
turned their car and pursued Carroll and Kiro to a point about
nineteen miles east of Grand Rapids "where they stopped them
and searched the car." The agents found, stashed inside the
upholstered seats, sixty-eight bottles of whiskey and gin.
Thereafter, the state officer and another took Carroll and Kiro, the
liquor and the car to Grand Rapids.
As could readily be seen, the "exigent circumstances" which
exist in connection with the ambulatory character of the
automobile provided the basic factor in the justification for the
warrantless search and seizure in Carroll Absent, thus, "these
exigent circumstances," notwithstanding the presence of
probable cause, a warrant must be secured and used
The U.S. Supreme Court took this jurisprudential direction in the
much later case of United States v. Joseph V. Chadwick, et al."
decided on June 21, 1977. The facts of the case were
summarized as follows:
When respondents arrived by train in Boston from San Diego,
they were arrested at their waiting automobile by federal
narcotics agents, who had been alerted that respondents were
possible drug traffickers. A double-locked footlocker, which
respondents had transported on the train and which the agents
had probable cause to believe contained narcotics, had been
loaded in the trunk of the automobile. Respondents, together with
the automobile and footlocker, which was admittedly under the
agents' exclusive control, were then taken to the Federal Building
in Boston. An hour and a half after the arrests the agents opened
the footlocker without respondents' consent or a search warrant
and found large amounts of marijuana in it. Respondents were
subsequently indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute it. The District Court granted their pretrial motion to
suppress the marijuana obtained from the footlocker, holding
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment unless they fall within some established
exception to the warrant requirement, and that the footlocker
search was not justified under either the 'automobile
exception' or as a search incident to a lawful arrest; the Court of
Appeals affirmed.
The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, responding to the Government's argument
that the rationale of the Court's automobile search cases applied
as well to Chadwick, ruled that the footlocker's mobility does not
"justify dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant
Clause" for, "[o]nce the federal agents had seized it at the rail
road station and had safely transferred it to the Boston Federal
Building under their exclusive control, there was not the slightest
danger that the footlocker or its contents could have been
removed before a valid search warrant 13 could be obtained.
As to the contention of the Government that the search fell within
the search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest exception, the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that "warrantless searches of luggage or
other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified
as incident to that arrest either if the 'search is remote in time or
place from the arrest,... or no exigency exists. Once lawful
enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal
property not immediately associated with the person of the
arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is
no longer an incident of the arrest. It was emphasized that "the
search was conducted more than an hour after federal agents
had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after
respondents were securely in custody; the search
therefore cannot be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as
justified by any other exigency.
I perceive no reason why the rationale in Chadwick should not
find application to the case at bar. The record shows the
following undisputed facts: (1) A week before the actual
interception of Sgt. Hope and Medina in the former's Dodge
sedan, the RASAC agents already knew, from an informer, that
"a shipment of highly dutiable goods would be transported to
Manila from Angeles City in a blue Dodge car and that the goods,
in "sealed boxes with yellow tie would consist of "watches"; (2)
After the interception, "Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car
with respondents while Agent Manuel took [his] own car and both
cars drove towards Tropical Hut making a brief stop at the
Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by
telephone"; and (3) "Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party,
together with Col. Abad who had joined them waited for the man
who according to Monina was supposed to receive the boxes. As
the man did not appear, Col. Abad 'called off the mission' and
brought respondents and their car to Camp Aguinaldo arriving
there at about 9:00 A.M.
In the case at bar, granting that the RASAC agents had probable
cause to effect the search and seizure, nonetheless, no exigent
circumstances justified their proceeding to do so without the
requisite warrant. The RASAC agents, having known a week
before they actually undertook the operation that they would be
intercepting a "blue Dodge car" transporting watches in "sealed
boxes," had ample opportunity within the one-week period to
secure the necessary warrant for the search and seizure
contemplated. Moreover, the RASAC agents had another
opportunity to obtain the search and seizure warrant on the day
of the operation itself. The actual interception took place "around
7:00 o'clock in the morning" at the Balintawak approach to the
North Diversion Road and the actual search and seizure
occurred past 9:00 o'clock the same morning at Camp
Aguinaldo. During the intervening period, Agent Manuel even
had time to telephone Colonel Abad to ask for instructions and
could have taken up then with him the matter of securing the
necessary search and seizure warrant. Colonel Abad, as well,
after learning from Agent Sabado that interception tion and
apprehension had already been effected, could himself, as
RASAC Chief of Intelligence and Operations, have secured the
necessary search and seizure warrant.
As stressed by respondent judge in his questioned order, "there
was ample time and opportunity to secure the necessary
warrant" and [j]ust because the RASAC-MBA agents have
information to make them believe that a certain person has
contraband goods in his possession, does not give them the right
to search him and seize whatever contraband may be found in
his possession. ASAC Agents are not by law empowered to
determine whether there exists a 'probable cause, and even if
they have such power, assuming it to be so, the determination of
the probable cause should be made by examining the
complainant and his witnesses under oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the thing or
person to be seized, and not simply on bare information given by
an unnamed informer, as in the instant case."
Respondent judge aptly added that
We cannot accept 'good faith' here, as an excuse to justify
violation of the Constitution in making the warrantless
apprehension search and seizure in question when there was
sufficient time — one week — within which they could have
procured a warrant of arrest and a search warrant in accordance
with the proscriptions of the present Constitution, had the ASAC
Agents wanted to. Agent Sabado simply said 'it is not necessary.'
Furthermore, if subjective good faith alone was the test, the
protection afforded the Filipino people by our present
Constitution against unreasonable arrest, search and seizure
would evaporate and rendered its provision nugatory, and our
people 'would be secured in their persons, houses, papers and
effects only in the discretion of the police'. And besides, what
would they have lost if they secured a warrant first? Would it
have frustrated their efforts in enforcing the provisions of the
Customs and Tariff Code if they secured the necessary warrant
before making the apprehension and search? Would it have
thwarted the purposes of the Customs and Tariff Code and would
the results have been different if they had taken the trouble of
securing the necessary warrants, and made the apprehension
and search in accordance with the Constitution? It would have
hardly made any difference These over earnestness and
zealousness on the part of the officers in the discharge of their
function, is what we should guard against. We might impress on
them the importance to our well ordered society of the 'rule of
law' — which necessarily imply respect for and obedience to the
Constitution and the laws of the land. This we can do by making it
clear to them that the fruits of such unreasonable searches and
seizures, are 'forbidden fruits' — in admissible in evidence.
Granting arguendo that the RASAC agents had no opportunity
after the apprehended respondents to secure the necessary
search and seizure warrant during the period prior to their arrival
at Camp Aguinaldo, they certainly could have delayed the actual
search and seizure until the necessary warrant had been
obtained, which would not have taken them beyond
mid-afternoon of the same day. The inconvenience which could
be caused by the delay to respondents Hope and Medina would
at least be tolerable, for such inconvenience could be
quantifiable only in terms of hours spent while waiting, rather
than the transgression of their rights through the warrantless
search and seizure which could be measured only in terms of
fundamental constitutional values violated.
The case at bar offers no situation "where it is not practicable to
secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
As previously stated, after the interception, "Agent Sabado
boarded the Dodge car with the respondents" and directed Sgt.
Hope the route he should take. Agent Sabado had, in effect,
taken custody or control of Sgt. Hope's Dodge sedan, for, being
in there, on hand at all times from the moment he boarded it
through the trip to Bonanza Restaurant, Tropical Hut Foodmart
and, finally, Camp Aguinaldo to guard against any deviation by
Sgt. Hope from the route he had been directed to take or against
any attempt to run off with the car and its contents, his presence
had neutralized, if not eliminated, the said car's mobility.
Moreover, the RASAC agents, by directing the Dodge sedan to
Camp Aguinaldo and retaining it within the premises of the said
Camp, had effected its complete immobilization as well as of its
contents. Definitely under all these circumstances, there could
not have been the slightest possibility that Sgt. Hope and Medina
could have either moved the car or removed its contents — all
securely within the custody of the RASAC agents and the
premises of Camp Aguinaldo — before the necessary search
and seizure warrant could be secured.
Neither can the warrantless search in the case at bar be viewed
as a search incident to a valid arrest so as to fall within another
recognized exception from the warrant requirement. In Preston v.
United States, " the U.S. Supreme Court, in spelling out the rule
regarding this exception and the rationale therefor, stated that:
Unquestionably when a person is lawfully arrested, the police
have the right, without a search warrant, to make a
contemporaneous search of the person of the accused for
weapons or for the fruits of or implements used to commit the
crime ... This right to search and seize without a search warrant
extends to things under the accused's immediate control ... and,
to an extent depending on the circumstances of the case, to the
place where he is arrested ... The rule allowing
contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need
to seize weapons and other things which might be used
to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the
need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime — things
which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on
the accused's person or under his immediate control. But these
justifications are absent where a search is remote in time or
place from the arrest. Once an accused is under arrest and in
custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant,
is simply not incident to the arrest.
Clearly, the search in the case at bar cannot be sustained under
the exceptions heretofore discussed, for, even assuming the
apprehension of Sgt. Hope and Medina as lawful, the "search
was too remote in time or place to have been made as incidental
to the arrest. Here, the RASAC agents intercepted and
apprehended Sgt. Hope and Medina "around 7:00 o'clock in the
morning" at the Balintawak approach to the North Diversion Road
but conducted the search of the sealed boxes loaded in the
Dodge sedan past 9:00 o'clock of the same morning at Camp
Aguinaldo.
3. The majority opinion also cites Boyd v. United States, with
particular reference to the dissertation therein on the distinction
between the search and seizure of "stolen or forfeited goods or
goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment
thereof" and the search and seizure of "a man's private books
and papers for the purpose of obtaining information tion therein
contained, or of using them as evidence against him" as well as
on an historic and statutory account of instances "excepted out of
the category of unreasonable search and seizures."
Boyd raised the matter of distinction aforementioned in
connection with the resolution of whether or not "a search and
seizure or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory production of
a man's private papers, to be used in evidence against him in a
proceeding to forfeit property for alleged fraud against the
revenue laws' partook of "an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution?' Mr. Justice Joseph P. Bradley, who delivered the
opinion of the Court, "sought to determine the meaning of the
fourth amendment reasonableness clause by looking to those
principles of the common law which defined the limits of the
state's power to search and seize the belongings of its citizens.
Although it could seize stolen goods and contraband, at common
law the government could not search for and seize for and
citizen's belongings in which it could not assert superior property
rights. He "concluded that the owner's 'indefeasible' natural law
property rights, enshrined in the common law and protected by
the reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment placed his
private papers and other property absolutely beyond the reach of
government agents seeking evidence of crime. No matter how
compelling the showing of probable cause or with what
particularly the places to be search and the things to be might be
described, no warrant or subpoena could issue except for those
items already owned by or forfeited to the state. In other words,
the Court, in Boyd , ruled inter alia that the Constitution permitted
searches and seizures only of property in which
the government could claim superior property rights at common
law like "goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the
payment thereof. "
The distinction excerpted in the opinion of the majority in the
case at bar served, in Boyd, to underscore its property —
oriented rationale. However, this distinction — the very basis of
the property-focused rationale — had already been explicitly
abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Warden,
Maryland and Penitentiary v. Bennie Joe Hayden, wherein it was
stated that:
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the
distinction between 'mere evidence' and instrumentalities, fruits
of crime, or contraband. On its face, the provision assures the
'right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects...,'without regard to the use to which any of these
things are applied This 'right of the people' is certainly unrelated
to the 'mere evidence' limitation. Privacy is disturbed no more by
a search directed to a purely evidentiary object than it is by a
search directed to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband.
A magistrate can intervene in both situation and the requirements
of probable cause and specificity can be preserved intact.
Moreover, nothing in the nature of property seized as evidence
renders it more private than property seized, for example, as an
instrumentality; quite the opposite may be true. Indeed distinction
is wholly irrational, since, depending on the circumstances, the
same 'papers and effects' may be mere evidence in one case
and instrumentality in another.
xxx xxx xxx
The premise that property interest control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited. Searches
and seizures may be 'unreasonable within the Fourth
Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior
property interest at common law. We have recognized that the
principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded
fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts ...
This shift in emphasis from property to privacy has come about
through a subtle interplay of substantive and procedural reform ...
xxx xxx xxx
... In determining whether someone is a 'person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure' we have refused 'to import into the
law ... subtle distinctions developed and refiled by the common
law in evolving the body of private property law which, more than
almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions
whose validity is largely historical ... [W]e have given recognition
to the interest in privacy despite the complete absence of a
property claim by suppressing the very items which at common
law could be seized with impunity: stolen goods ... ;
instrumentalities ...; and contraband ...
4. That necessity underlies the legislative grant of authority to
certain functionaries of the Government "to effect searchches
seizures and arrests" to secure the enforcement of the tariff and
customs laws need not be belabored. The scope of this authority,
however, should be circumscribed by the procedural safeguards
set forth by the Constitution. Fealty to these constitutional
guarantees requires that the Court, rather than accommodate
extended applications of the search — seizure-and-arrest
authority, should guard against shortcuts government
functionaries are prone to make which render nugatory the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. This authority should, as a matter of
principle, be subjected to the requirements of prior judicial inquiry
and sanction whenever possible and practicable. The Court
should not leave entirely to the hands of government
functionaries discretionary determinations susceptible of abuse
and misuse, for, indeed, "[p]ower is a heady thing."
We must remember that the extent of any privilege of search and
seizure without warrant which we sustain, the officers interpret
and apply themselves and will push to the limit. We must
remember, too, that freedom from unreasonable search differs
from some of the other rights of the Constitution in that there
is no way in which the innocent citizen can invoke advance
protection. For example, any effective interference with freedom
of the press, or free speech, or religion, usually requires a course
of suppressions against which the citizen can and often does go
to the court and obtain an injunction. Other rights, such as that
to ... the aid of counsel, are within the supervisory power of the
courts themselves. Such a right as just compensation for the
taking of private property may be vindicated after the act in terms
of money.
But an illegal search and seizure usually is a single incident,
perpetrated by surprise, conducted in haste, kept purposely
beyond the court's supervision and limited only by the judgment
and moderation of officers whose own interests and records are
often at stake in the search. There is no opportunity for injunction
or appeal to disinterested intervention. The citizen's choice is
quietly to submit to whatever the officers undertake or to resist at
risk of arrest or immediate violence.
And we must remember that the authority which we concede to
conduct searches and seizures without warrant may be
exercised by the most unfit and ruthless officers as well as by
the fit and responsible and resorted to in case of petty
misdemeanors as well as in the case of the gravest felonies.
All told, I hold that the warrant less search and seizure conducted
by the RASAC agents in the case at bar should be invalidated
and the constitutional sanction declaring the evidence obtained
thereby "inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" should
be upheld.
II
The outcome of the seizure and detention proceedings instituted
by the Collector of Customs against the goods in question
including Sgt. Hope's car, wherein the car and goods were
ordered returned to Sgt. Hope and the established claimant —
owner of the goods, Antonio del Rosario, respectively, (subject in
the case of the latter to payment of the leviable duties and taxes
and penalties), as recited on pages 4 to 9 of the majority opinion,
shows clearly the lack of any criminal liability on the part of the
respondents.
The separate seizure and detention proceedings were instituted
by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila on February 13,
1974 and after hearing, the Collector rendered his decision of
April 1, 1975 finding claimant Antonio del Rosario to be the lawful
owner and purchaser in good faith duly covered by an authentic
sales invoice issued by the trading firm which sold the same to
him and Sgt. Hope to have been unaware of the contents of the
11 boxes which his girlfriend, his co-respondent Monina Medina,
had asked him to bring to Manila in his car.
The majority opinion itself recites these established facts on
pages 4-5, as follows:
During the hearing of the aforesaid cases [seizures and detention
proceedings], respondents disclaimed ownership of the seized
articles. Ownership was instead claimed by one Antonio del
Rosario who intervened in the proceedings. The
claimant-intervenor testified that he bought the watches and
bracelets from Buenafe Trading as evidenced by a sales invoice
certified to be authentic by the BIR Revenue Regional Office No.
6 of Quezon City, which transaction was entered in the book of
accounts of aforesaid claimant; that the same articles were
brought to a buyer in Angeles City, but when the sale failed to
materialize, claimant contracted respondent Monina Medina to
transport back the boxes to Manila for a consideration of
P1,000.00 without disclosing the contents thereof which claimant
simply represented as PX goods; that when he bought the
watches from Buenafe, he presumed that the corresponding
duties have already been paid, only to be surprised later on when
he was informed that the same were seized for non-payment of
taxes.
On the other hand, respondent Hope testified to the effect that at
the time of apprehension, he had no knowledge of the contents
of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he never
knew that these are untaxed commodities; that he consented to
transport said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon
request of his girl friend Monina Medina as a personal favor; that
he was not present when the boxes were loaded in his car nor
was he ever told of their contents on the way. On the part of
respondent Monina Medina, she testified that what she did was
only in compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to
transport the boxes and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the
Tropical Hut who will in turn give her the contracted price; that Mr.
Del Rosario did not reveal the contents of the boxes which she
came to know of only when the boxes were opened at Camp
Aguinaldo.
As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies
of respondents and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario,
the Collector of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases
on April 1, 1975 declaring that the seized articles including the
car are not subject of forfeiture.
The Collector's decision of April 1, 1975, itself, as affirmed by the
Commissioner of Customs' endorsement of April 28,
1975, establishes in detail the above facts which absolve
respondents of any complicity in any smuggling activity, as
follows:
From the evidence thus adduced, it was established that the
boxes found inside the subject car are 4,606 pcs. of assorted
brands of wrist watches, 1,399 pcs of wrist bracelets likewise of
assorted brands and 100 pcs. tools, as evidenced by the
inventory list dated Feb. 22, 1974, (Exhs. '3'- '3-L' Hope) is the
prosecutions' contention that these articles were imported
without going through a customhouse in violation of Sec. 2530 m)
of the TCCP. As a consequence thereof, the vehicle which was
used in transporting the subject articles was likewise seized for
alleged violation of Section 2530 (k) of the same code.
With respect to the charge against the subject car, the claimant
thereof, TSgt Jessie C Hope asserted that he merely
accommodated Monina Medina, his girl friend who requested
him to help her bring her cargo to Manila by driving the car from
Angeles City to Manila; that he was not present when the 11
boxes were loaded in his car which was then parked on its usual
parking place which is a vacant cant lot adjacent to the house
where he lives. He further stated that Monina Medina has an
access to the key of his car which he usually put on a table in his
house and that she did not tell him of the contents of the 11
boxes. Moreover he asserted that he came to know of the
contents of the 11 boxes when they were opened at the RASAC
C office at Camp Aguinaldo. Upon being asked by this Office why
it never occurred to him to inquire from Monina Medina about the
con- tents of the 11 boxes, claimant categorically stated ...
'because of the girl's honesty to me.' In a similar vien, claimant
stated in his sworn statement given to the RASAC that he had
known Monina Medina for quite a time so that ... 'he did not
suspect her to carry anything against the law of the Philippines
and for that reason I did not bother to ask her.' (Exh. '5-A
Hope') These assertions find support in the direct testimony of
Col. Antonio Abad, Chief, Intelligence and Operations, RASAC,
who testified thus: (t.s.n., p. 104)
A. ... I asked him again, how come your car was load- ed with
foreign items? And he said 'that is my lady companion's. I told
him don't you know these are hot items?
B. What did he say?
C. He was surprised
Both Col. Antonio Abad and Agent Macario Sabado, one of the
apprehending agents admitted in open hearing that during their
initial interrogation of T/Sgt. Hope, he maintained and professed
that he did not know of the contents of the 11 boxes. Monina
Medina, on the other hand, stated on direct examination
that TSgt Hope was not present when the subject 11 boxes were
delivered to her at the vacant lot in Angeles City by Antonio del
Rosario. (tsn p. 169) Moreover, in her sworn statement given to
the RASAC, Monina Medina stated thus; (Exh. '4-A' Hope)
Q. When you told T/Sgt. Hope that you will load something in his
car, did he ask you what you were going to load?
R. No, sir.
Against the foregoing contentions, the prosecution failed to
adduce any evidence circumstantial or otherwise that may even
tend to disprove or controvert the same. Granting 'arguendo' that
T/Sgt. Jessie C. Hope was aware of the contents of the 11 boxes
that were found in his car, it is still incumbent upon the
prosecution to at least establish that he has knowledge that the
articles he was conveying are untaxed and/or smuggled as
contemplated in See. 2530 (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code.
In the absence of evidence to prove such fact, which in this case
there is none whatsoever, the ground relied upon for the
forfeiture of the vehicle in question remains unsubstantiated and
therefore will not lie.
Forfeiture works to deprive one's right to his property. Like the
capital punishment which is the supreme penalty for human
beings forfeiture is the ultimate sanction imposable to property.
However, unlike the capital punishment which can only be
imposed after the cause thereof has been established beyond
reasonable doubt, forfeiture should at least be made tenable only
after the grounds therefor have been established to a reasonable
degree of certainty. It shall not lie if based on mere bare
presumptions and groundless conclusions. To hold otherwise
would be arbitrary and repugnant to the principle of judicial
and/or administrative due process.
With respect to Seizure Identification No. 14281, it is evident
that the claimant-intervenor herein Antonio del Rosario
purchased the subject wrist watches and bracelets from Teresa
Buenafe as evidenced by the covering purchase invoice No.
2637 dated February 7, 1974 which was certified to be authentic
by Jeron L. Castillo of Revenue Region No. 6, BIR Quezon City
(Exhs. '2', '3' & '4'). The aforesaid business transaction was
entered in the Columnar Book (Exh. '3') of claimant-intervenor
which fact is a manifestation that Antonio del Rosario was a
buyer in good faith and that the business transaction he entered
into with Teresa Buenafe was not simulated nor clandestine.
It is a well settled rule that bad faith cannot be presumed, it must
be proven. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, which in
this case none whatsoever was presented the
claimant-intervenor herein is presumed to be a buyer in good
faith. However, it is incumbent upon the claimant-intervenor
herein to prove that the subject articles are tax-paid. Aside from
the covering sales invoice, not a scintilla of evidence was
adduced to prove that the duties and taxes due on the said items
were satisfied. In this connection, this Office does not share the
view of the herein claimant-intervenor that it is not the practice in
business circles to inquire whether or not the subject matter of a
business transaction are tax-paid. Considering the quantity of the
articles in question and the big volume of the amount involved,
Mr. Antonio del Rosario was quite negligent in failing to inquire
from the seller herein whether the duties and taxes of the items
he purchased were satisfied or not.
Viewed in the light of the foregoing considerations, it is the
studied opinion of this Office that while the claimant-intervenor
herein is liable for the payment of the assessable duties and
taxes owing from the subject articles, the forfeiture thereof will
not lie it appearing that the 'quantum' of evidence adduced by the
prosecution is insufficient to sustain the charges by the
prosecution is insufficient to sustain the charges levelled against
the said articles. Moreover, this Office referred this case to the
Central Bank for the necessary Release Certificate. However, Mr.
Cesar Lomotan, Deputy Governor, Central Bank, in his letter to
the Commissioner of Customs dated February 21, 1975 in effect
stated thus:
Based on subject's manager Mr. Antonio del Rosario's
representations that the items involved were bought from a local
dealer as supported by an alleged commercial invoice from
Teresa M. Buenafe Trading dated February 7, 1974 submitted
earlier, this Office cannot issue the required release certificate
therefor considering that no proof has been submitted to indicate
that subject imported goods in question.
WHEREFORE, by virtue of Section 2312 of the Tariff and
Customs Code, it is hereby ordered and decreed that the subject
motor vehicle, one (1) Dodge, Model 1965, Motor No. 33859,
Serial No. W357348361, File No. 28-1884, with Plate No. EH
21-87, '73 covered by Seizure Identification No. 14281-A be, as it
is hereby declared, released to its registered owner, Jessie C.
Hope, upon proper identification. Relative to Seizure
Identification No. 14281, it is further ordered and decreed that the
subject matter thereof, to wit: 4,606 pcs. of assorted brands of
wrist watches, 1,399 pieces of assorted brands of wrist bracelets
and 100 pcs. of tools be, as they are hereby likewise declared,
released to the rightful owner thereof, Antonio del Rosario, upon
payment of the leviable duties, taxes and other charges due
thereon plus a fine equivalent to 100% of the duties and taxes
thereof. Furthermore, should claimant-intervenor fail to pay the
assessable duties, taxes and other charges owing from the
aforestated articles within 30 days from the time this decision
becomes final and unappealable, the same shall be deemed
abandoned in favor of the government to be disposed of in the
manner provided for by law.
As pointed in the People's petition itself, the Collector's said
decision "has long become final and executory" Hope's car was
duly released and returned to him since May 8, 1975. And the
goods were likewise presumably released to the established
claimant-owner Antonio del Rosario, because at the trial of the
criminal case below, only pictures of the 11 boxes containing the
goods were sought to be presented by the prosecution.
The point is that the customs authorities, the Commissioner of
Customs and the Manila Collector of Customs are bound by their
own above stated decision and findings in the seizure and
detention proceedings that the goods in question were lawfully
owned by the claimant-intervenor Antonio del Rosario who had
purchased them in good faith in the regular course of business
and that respondent Hope was completely innocent of any
complicity in their importation and purchase, having agreed
merely to his girlfriend Monina Medina's request to bring the
goods back to Manila, without any knowledge of their contents,
and they should accordingly direct the prosecution to move for
dismissal of the case below. As the majority opinion itself states:
The majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Guerrero, however,
reaches the conclusion that despite respondents' exoneration in
the administrative cases, the criminal- responsibility can be
determined only in the separate criminal action while conceding
that such criminal responsibility "must be proven not by
preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.

The collector's final declaration that the articles are not subject to
forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods were
transported in respondent's car and seized from their possession
by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the
strength of the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced
in the information can only be determined in a separate criminal
action. Respondents' exoneration in the administrative cases
cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute. But under our
penal laws, criminal responsibility, if any, must be proven not by
preponderance of evidence but by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
This posture of the majority that any dismissal of the criminal
case should not be ordered outright by this Court but by the
court a quo, whether motu proprio or at the prosecutions
instance, is nonetheless understandable.
I join the Court's directive in its judgment that in consonance with
the respondents-accused's right to speedy trial and justice that
the prosecution forthwith "reassess and reevaluate the evidence
at its disposal" and thereafter promptly take the necessary action
in the premises for the protection of the rights and interests of all
concerned.

Certainly, if respondent Hope were absolved by the customs
authorities in the seizure and detention proceedings because of
the absolute lack of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise"
that would establish any complicity on his part "to a reasonable
degree of certainty" and justify the forfeiture of his car that was
used in transporting the goods to Manila, they must
necessarily on the same evidence or absolute lack thereof as
officially determined by themselves move in all fairness and
justice for and cause the dismissal of the criminal case below. If
their evidence in the seizure proceedings established that
respondents had no part whatever in the importation or purchase
by the claimant-intervenor of the goods, the very same evidence
cannot possibly lead to their being found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the smuggling charge nor overcome their
fundamental right of presumption of innocence,
This means, as indicated above, that if the prosecution's
evidence (as supplied by the customs authorities) is totally
devoid of "any evidence circumstantial or otherwise" that would
establish any complicity on the part of respondents "to a
reasonable degree of certainty", as determined in the very
Collector's decision of April 1, 1975 itself as affirmed by the
Commissioner of Customs, then the prosecution must as a
simple people matter of fairness and justice move for the
dismissal of the criminal case below. The judgment has been
made immediately executory, so that the prosecution may
comply with the Court's directive without further delay.

The main issue at bar as to the non-admissibility in evidence of

the boxes and their photographs as ruled in respondent judge's
questioned order (which according to the petition has "the effect
of acquitting the accused [respondents] from the charges" in the
criminal case below) has thus been rendered moot by
respondents customs authorities' decision and findings. The
disposition of this case by the majority opinion of setting aside
respondent judge's order and ordering the case .remanded for
further trial and reception of evidence without excluding the
articles subject of the seizure" has likewise been thus rendered
moot. The admission in evidence of the said boxes or their
photographs whose contents have been found to be lawfully
owned and purchased in good faith by the claimant-intervenor
Antonio del Rosario would in no way establish any criminal
liability on the part of respondents.

Stated in another way, assuming that the seized goods or photos

thereof are admissible in evidence not-withstanding the
warrantless search and seizure (justified on the doctrine of "hot
pursuit"), as held in the majority opinion, still the People's petition
should be dismissed since the admission in evidence of the said
goods which have been determined by the Customs authorities
themselves to have been lawfully purchased in good faith by the
claimant-intervenor would in no way establish any criminal
liability for the importation or transitory possession by
respondents, who were found by said authorities to be merely
bringing them back to Manila on behalf of the owner. If the
prosecution's evidence in the seizure proceedings established
that respondents had no part whatever in the importation or
purchase by the claimant-intervenor of the goods, the very same
evidence cannot possibly lead to their being found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the smuggling charge in the case before us
nor overcome their fundamental right of presumption of
innocence.
16) G.R. No. L-23996 March 15, 1974
PEDRO PACIS, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port
of Manila, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL R. PAMARAN, as Assistant City Fiscal of Manila,
and RICARDO SANTOS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General, Dept. of Justice for petitioner.
Juan T. David for respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
For the petitioner Pedro Pacis, then Acting Collector of Customs
for the Port of Manila, it was vital that this prohibition proceeding
against the then Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, Manuel R.
Pamaran, should be instituted. For unless restrained, the
prosecutor was bent on continuing with the investigation of a
charge of usurpation of judicial
functions allegedly committed by him, when in the course of his
official functions and pursuant thereto, he issued a warrant of
seizure and detention for an automobile owned by respondent
Ricardo Santos, who, according to the records in his office, had
not paid the customs duty collectible thereon. To counter such a
move, and invoking what he alleged was a violation of the
constitutional provision that only a judge, under the 1935
Constitution could issue a search warrant, respondent Santos
filed the aforesaid complaint for usurpation. Based on such an
assumption and with petitioner clearly not being a member of the
judiciary, there was plausibility in the claim that he ran afoul of
the penal law. While the matter was pressed with vigor by
Attorney Juan T. David, counsel for respondent, the applicable
legal doctrine is on the side of petitioner. It is a well-settled
principle that for violations of customs laws, the power to issue
such a warrant is conceded. Thus there is justification for this
prohibition suit against respondent Assistant City Fiscal. On the
undisputed facts and in accordance with the controlling legal
doctrine, no such offense as usurpation of judicial function could
have been committed. Clearly then, respondent Assistant City
Fiscal should be restrained. So we rule and grant the writ prayed
for.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Respondent Ricardo
Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957. It was
brought into this country without the payment of customs duty
and taxes, its owner Donald James Hatch being tax-exempt. It
was from him that respondent Santos acquired said car. On June
25, 1964, he paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes. Petitioner
on July 22, 1964 received from the Administrator, General Affairs
Administration of the Department of National Defense, a letter to
the effect that the Land Transportation Commission reported that
such automobile was a "hot car." By virtue thereof, petitioner,
through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office.
Thus he did ascertain that although the amount of P311.00 was
already paid for customs duty, the amount collectible on said car
should be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such discrepancy,
on July 22, 1964, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued a
warrant of seizure and detention. On the strength thereof, the
automobile was taken while it was parked on Economia Street,
Manila, by Department of National Defense agents who were
authorized to do so by virtue of the said warrant. It was then
brought to the General Affairs Administration compound. Then on
August 26, 1964, respondent Ricardo Santos, through counsel,
wrote to the petitioner asking that such warrant of seizure and
detention issued against his car be withdrawn or dissolved and
the car released on his contention that the issuance of the
warrant was unauthorized. He likewise threatened to proceed
against the petitioner for violation of Article 241 of the Revised
Penal Code and for damages. Petitioner on August 31, 1964
answered counsel of respondent Ricardo Santos, denying the
request for the release of the car and adverting that the petitioner
had, under the law, authority to issue such warrant of seizure and
detention. What followed was the filing by respondent Ricardo
Santos on September 15, 1964 of a criminal complaint for
usurpation of judicial functions with the City Fiscal of Manila. It
was assigned to then respondent Fiscal Manuel R. Pamaran for
preliminary investigation. As the latter respondent was bent on
proceeding with the charge against petitioner, this action was
instituted.
Thus the significance attached to the jurisdictional question
posed was evident. There was moreover the necessity for a
definite ruling as to whether petitioner in the discharge of his
official function did lay himself open to a criminal prosecution for
usurpation of judicial functions, the drive against "hot cars" being
then at its height. Not much reflection was needed to show the
chilling effect of a criminal prosecution of this nature on the
vigorous enforcement of customs laws. This Court therefore
required respondent to answer so that the matter could be fully
ventilated. It was duly forthcoming, stress being laid on the
alleged infraction of the constitutional mandate that a warrant of
search and seizure, to be valid, must be the product of a judicial
determination. The question before this Tribunal is thus clear-cut
and well-defined.
As set forth at the outset, the law on the matter is clear. It is
undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs for the
Port of Manila, had the requisite authority for the issuance of the
contested warrant of seizure and detention for the automobile
owned by respondent Ricardo Santos. What was done by him
certainly could not be the basis of a prosecution for the
usurpation of judicial functions. Prohibition is therefore the proper
remedy.
1. It is to be admitted that the constitutional right to be free from
unreasonable search and seizure must not be eroded or
emasculated. The right to privacy so highly valued in civilized
society must not be diluted. Only upon compliance then with the
proper requisites mandated by law should one's possessions be
subject to seizure. That much is clear. Under the 1935
Constitution the intervention of a judge was well-nigh
indispensable. So it was under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916. Even then, however, as shown
by the leading case of Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, a 1920 decision, it
was the accepted principle following the landmark case of Boyd v.
United States that the seizure of goods concealed to avoid the
duties on them is not embraced within the prohibition of this
constitutional guarantee. More to the point. In a recent decision
of this Court, Papa v. Mago, where the seizure of alleged
smuggled goods was effected by a police officer without a search
warrant, this Court, through Justice Zaldivar, stated: "Petitioner
Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a
component court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require
said warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons
having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land,
inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling
house and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person
on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or
person suspected of holding or conveing any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law,
without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.
But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that
said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge or justice of the
peace ... ." It is our considered view, therefore, that except in the
case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police
authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws."
The plenitude of the competence vested in customs officials is
thus undeniable. No such constitutional question then can
possibly arise. So much is implicit from the very language of
Section 2205 of the Tariff and Customs Code. It speaks for itself.
It is not susceptible of any misinterpretation. The power of
petitioner is thus manifest. It being undeniable then that the sole
basis for an alleged criminal act performed by him was the
performance of a duty according to law, there is not the slightest
justification for respondent Assistant City Fiscal to continue with
the preliminary investigation after his attention was duly called to
the plain and explicit legal provision that did not suffer at all from
any constitutional infirmity. The remedy of prohibition lies.

2. The depth of the concern expressed by the Solicitor-General

as counsel for petitioner is easily understandable. No revenue
official can be expected to display the proper zeal in plugging all
the loopholes of tax or tariff statutes if the risk of a criminal
prosecution is ever present. At the same time, in fairness to
respondent Santos, his insistence on procedural regularity,
especially so where there is an alleged invasion of a
constitutional right, was in keeping with the soundest legal
tradition. The rule of law would be meaningless if what is
ordained by the fundamental law could be ignored or disregarded.
From the foregoing, there was no such infringement. What was
done by petitioner was strictly in accordance with settled
principles of law. No doubt need be entertained then as to the
validity of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention.
His liability for any alleged usurpation of judicial function is
non-existent. Such imputation was definitely unfounded. Even if
however the matter were less clear, the claim that the search and
seizure clause was in effect nullified is hardly impressed with
merit. Considering that what is involved is an alleged evasion of
the payment of customs duties, what was said by Circuit Judge
Hutcheson in the Ginsburg decision possesses relevance. Thus:
"Based on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, this is another of
those cases in which appellant and appellee, concerning
themselves little with the Constitutional words, seize upon
particular words in particular cases to roll them as sweet morsels
under their tongues. It may not be doubted that, in respect of
searches and seizures, the decisional gloss which constitutes the
common law of the Constitution has created in the federal courts
a climate of opinion favorable to the citizen, less favorable to his
oppressors. Neither may it be doubted that particular decisions
have not only struck down particular oppressors but in their vigor
and clarity have set up streams of tendency in accord with which
later decisions have run. It remains true, however, that each case
of this kind is a fact case. The correct decision of each depends
not so much upon a higher critical examination of the
accumulated decisional gloss as upon a common sense
determination of whether, within the meaning of the word the
Constitution uses, the particular search and seizure has been
"unreasonable," that is, whether what was done and found bears
a reasonable relation to the authority then possessed and
exercised or transcends it to become oppression."

WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition prayed for is granted and

the successor of respondent Manuel R. Pamaran, now a criminal
circuit court judge, or any one in the City Fiscal's Office of the
City of Manila to whom the complaint against petitioner for
usurpation of judicial functions arising out of the issuance of the
warrant of seizure and detention, subject-matter of this litigation,
has been assigned, is perpetually restrained from acting thereon
except to dismiss the same. No costs.

Zaldivar, (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,

concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

17) G.R. No. 86218. September 18, 1992.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
ELSIE BAGISTA y BANGCO, Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE.
— The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be
stated in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of
his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence
except by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a
lawful arrest. The basis for the rule can be found in Article III,
Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Art. III, Section 3 (2) further
ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of the
aforementioned right shall, among others, "be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE, AN
EXCEPTION. — The constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions.
Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle, and the
seizure of evidence in plain view. With regard to the search of
moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the
mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITE. — This in no way, however,
gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only
as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or
probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to
be searched.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. —
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to
stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop,
Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they
received from their regular informant that a woman having the
same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable
cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits
the description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there
was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any
evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible
against Accused-Appellant.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS;
FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE; RULE AND EXCEPTION; CASE
AT BAR. — The prosecution had shown, primarily through the
positive testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing the
dried marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellant’s
possession. She denies this fact and contends that the bag in
question was actually taken from the luggage carrier above the
passenger seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two
opposing versions of what actually happened at the checkpoint in
Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the
accused-appellant’s apprehension, that of the prosecution and
that of the defense. In situations like this, the matter of assigning
values to the testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial
courts because, unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such
testimony in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of
the witnesses at the trial. The exception is when the trial court
has overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, which We do not find in the
instant case.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR DISCREPANCIES;
CASE AT BAR. — As to the alleged discrepancies in the
prosecution’s case, such as the color of the stripes of the bag
which contained the marijuana and whether the items seized
from accused-appellant were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit
tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the
prosecution’s case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property
Seized, which was signed by accused-appellant, that these were
the very items taken from her at the time of her arrest.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE; RULE;
SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION;
REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR. — In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the
bag of the accused on the basis alone of an information they
received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair,
and 5’2" or 5’3" in height would be transporting marijuana. The
extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the baggages
of all passengers of the bus where the accused was riding,
whether male or female, and whether or not their physical
appearance answered the description of the suspect as
described in the alleged information. If there really was such an
information, as claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a
perplexing thought why they had to search the baggages of ALL
passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to answer
the description of the woman suspected of carrying marijuana.
Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when
the NARCOM agents searched her bag, where they allegedly
found the marijuana. From the circumstances of the case at bar,
it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for
evidence when they searched the baggages of all the
passengers, including that of the accused. They had no probable
cause to reasonably believe that the accused was the woman
carrying marijuana alluded to in the information they allegedly
received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal
effects of herein accused on the basis of mere information,
without more, is to my mind bereft of probable cause and
therefore, null and void. It follows that the marijuana seized in the
course of such warrantless search was inadmissible in evidence.
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
Appeal by accused-appellant Elsie Bagista from the decision
dated September 26, 1988 of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The facts of the case are as follows: On July 4, 1988, at around
8:00 o’clock in the morning, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
Detachment Office located at the Arix Building, Bokawkan Road,
Baguio City, received information from one of its regular
informants that a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally
curly hair, and with a height of 5’2" or 5’3", would be transporting
marijuana from up north. 1 Acting upon this piece of information,
Sgt. Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a
civilian NARCOM agent proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay,
Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00 o’clock
that same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged
down all vehicles, both private and public, coming from the north
to check if any of these vehicles were carrying marijuana leaves
on board. 2
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa
Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD 938 and body number 428, which
came from Lepanto, Benguet. Sgts. Parajas and Fider boarded
the bus and thereupon Sgt. Parajas announced to the
passengers that they were NARCOM agents and that they were
going to search their baggages. Sgt. Parajas then proceeded to
the rear of the bus while Sgt. Fider began inspecting the bags in
the front. 3
While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair
seated at the right side (as one is facing the driver) of the last
seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange
stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and
discovered three (3) bundles of marijuana leaves covered by
assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were
confiscated and the woman arrested; she was later brought to
the NARCOM office in Baguio City where she was booked and
investigated. The woman was then identified
as Accused-Appellant. 5 The confiscated bundles were
subjected to laboratory examination, and found positive for
marijuana. 6
Accused-appellant’s defense rests solely on denial. She claimed
that she was engaged in the buying and selling of vegetables,
particularly cabbages. On the day in question, she boarded the
Dangwa Tranco bus at Abatan, Benguet, bringing with her ten
(10) sacks of cabbages which she intended to sell to a certain
Maria Opino in Baguio City. While inside the bus, she
approached the conductor for her ticket to cover the fare for her
sacks of cabbages, but was told by the latter that he would attend
to her later.
When the bus reached Tublay, Benguet, it was stopped by the
NARCOM agents who boarded the same and began inspecting
the baggages of the passengers. Accused-appellant claimed that
the bag containing the marijuana was taken from the luggage
carrier above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted
owning the bag, the NARCOM agent approached her, took the
shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with them for
investigation as she fits the description of the would-be
transporter of the marijuana given by the NARCOM informer.
She denied having anything to do with the marijuana found on
the bus.
To corroborate her story, Accused-appellant presented the
conductor of the Dangwa Tranco bus, Nestor Yangkin. He
testified that when the NARCOM agents boarded the bus at
Tublay, Benguet, one of them got a bag from the luggage carrier,
opened it, and smelled the contents. The agent then asked the
passengers who among them owned the bag; when nobody
answered, he walked to the back of the bus, all the time looking
at the faces of the passengers. When the agent approached
accused-appellant, who was seated at the rear of the bus, the
former talked to her, then escorted her out of the bus. 7
During Yangkin’s cross-examination, it came out that the 10
sacks of vegetables that were loaded at Abatan were brought by
a man who told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon
arrival at the Dangwa Station in Baguio City but that the owner of
the sacks would be riding in the bus. And yet, Yangkin did not
seek out the alleged owner of the sacks. The witness also
testified that none of the passengers approached him and offered
to pay for the fare of the sacks, 8 contrary to accused-appellant’s
testimony.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court found the
testimony of Sgt. Parajas credible. Said the court a quo:
". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and
straightforward as he gave all the requisite details of the
entrapment operation they conducted based on an information
provided by a coordinating individual. His testimony reveals that
the bag containing the marijuana leaves was found on the lap of
the accused. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Sgt.
Parajas was moved by any motive than simply the carrying out of
his official mission or duty. Where there is no evidence and
nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution
was actuated by improper motives, the presumption is that he
was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and
credit (People v. Francia, L-69253, September 30, 1987, 154
SCRA 495)." 9
The trial court brushed aside the defense’s observation that there
were discrepancies between the testimony of Sgt. Parajas and
the evidence presented, such as the color of the bag allegedly
taken from accused-appellant and the kind of marijuana taken
from the bag, as immaterial. Similarly brushed aside was the
defense’s contention that the evidence against
accused-appellant, such as the Receipt of Property Seized 10
and her signature thereon, 11 and the Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report 12 and her signature thereon, 13 were inadmissible due
to the absence of counsel, since these were not confessions or
extra-judicial statements.
Finally, the trial court did not give credence to the testimonies of
accused-appellant and her witness Nestor Yangkin, in view of the
testimony of Sgt. Parajas that he took the bag containing the
marijuana from accused-appellant’s lap. Moreover, the court a
quo observed that there was a discrepancy between the
testimonies of accused-appellant and Yangkin on the matter of
the 10 sacks of cabbage, which led the court to conclude that the
former was in the act of transporting marijuana at the time of her
arrest.
Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that the marijuana leaves found in the bag taken from her was
inadmissible in evidence as it was the product of a warrantless
search, which motion was denied by the trial court for lack of
merit on November 22, 1988.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Aggrieved, Accused-appellant filed the instant appeal, alleging
that the court a quo erred (1) in not finding the warrantless search
conducted by the NARCOM agents as illegal and
unconstitutional, and (2) in admitting the illegally obtained
evidences and convicting her on the basis of said evidences.
Accused-appellant is in error.
The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated
in this manner: no person shall be subjected to a search of his
person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except
by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest.
14 The basis for the rule can be found in Article III, Section 2 of
the 1987 Constitution, which states:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Article III, Section 3 (2) further ordains that any evidence
obtained in violation of the aforementioned right shall, among
others, "be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library
The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures admits of certain exceptions. Aside from a search
incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld
in cases of a moving vehicle, 15 and the seizure of evidence in
plain view. 16
With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been
justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 17
This in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in the
absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the
search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 18
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to
stop and search all vehicles coming from the north at Acop,
Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they
received from their regular informant that a woman having the
same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be
bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable
cause to search accused-appellant’s belongings since she fits
the description given by the NARCOM informant.
Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM
agents, any evidence obtained during the course of said search
is admissible against Accused-Appellant.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
At any rate, no objection was raised by the accused-appellant in
the court below on the inadmissibility of the evidence against her
on the ground that the same was obtained in a warrantless
search. This amounts to a waiver of the objection on the legality
of the search and the admissibility of the evidence obtained
therefrom. Amid a waiver, the court is duty bound to admit the
evidence.
Reviewing the evidence, We find the same sufficient to prove
accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution had shown, primarily through the positive
testimony of Sgt. Parajas, that the bag containing the dried
marijuana leaves was taken from accused-appellant’s
possession.
She denies this fact and contends that the bag in question was
actually taken from the luggage carrier above the passenger
seats and not from her. Indisputably, We have two opposing
versions of what actually happened at the checkpoint in Km. 16,
Acop, Tublay, Benguet, resulting in the accused-appellant’s
apprehension, that of the prosecution and that of the defense. In
situations like this, the matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is best performed by the trial courts
because, unlike appellate courts, they can weigh such testimony
in the light of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the
witnesses at the trial. 21 The exception is when the trial court has
overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result, 22 which We do not find in the
instant case.
Moreover, Accused-appellant’s defense was weakened by the
fact that her witness Nestor Yangkin contradicted her on the
matter of the 10 sacks of vegetables appellant claims to have
brought with her at the time of her arrest. Appellant claims she
loaded the sacks of vegetables on the bus and tried to pay for its
fare, but that conductor Yangkin, put her off. Yangkin claims
otherwise: the sacks of vegetables were loaded by a man who
told him that the fare for the sacks will be paid upon arrival in
Baguio City, and that no one on the bus offered to pay for the
same.cralawnad
In weighing contrary declarations and statements, greater weight
must generally be given to the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses than the denials of the Accused-Appellant.
Given the discrepancy on this point, the trial court correctly
disregarded the corroborative testimony of Nestor Yangkin. The
matter of the ownership of the 10 sacks of vegetables is material
since appellant’s reason for being on the bus was to deliver these
sacks to Baguio City. If the sacks of vegetables are not hers, then
the only conclusion that can be drawn is that she was on her way
to Baguio City to sell the marijuana found in her possession.
As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case, such
as the color of the stripes of the bag which contained the
marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-appellant
were marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in
character and do not detract from the prosecution’s case since it
was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was
signed by accused-appellant, that these were the very items
taken from her at the time of her arrest.
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from,
the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
against Accused-Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Melo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Although there is a similarity in the factual circumstances of the
case at bar with those of the Malmstedt case (GR No. 91107, 19
June 1991, 198 SCRA 101) where the Court upheld the validity
of the warrantless search, however, in the present case, I am of
the view that the information alone received by the NARCOM
agents, without other suspicious circumstances surrounding the
accused, did not give rise to a probable cause justifying the
warrantless search made on the bag of the accused.
In the Malmstedt case, it will be recalled that no extensive search
was immediately made of the Personal effects of the accused. It
was only after the NARCOM agents noticed a bulge on the waist
of the accused (causing them to suspect that he was carrying a
gun) and only after he failed or refused to present his passport
when required to do so, that a warrantless search was made of
the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the
information received by the NARCOM agents that a certain
Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying
prohibited drugs together with the suspicious failure or refusal of
the accused to present his passport, supplied the probable cause
that reasonably led the NARCOM agents to believe that the said
accused was then and there committing a crime. Thus —
"Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has
been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was
acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee."
x x x
"The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus
the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport,
taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to
reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something
illegal from the authorities. From these circumstances arose a
probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the
acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his
pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found
inside said bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as
well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears
with hashish stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused’s
own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his
possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and
facility to act accordingly, including, to search even without
warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the
detriment of society." (198 SCRA 401).

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the
accused on the basis alone of an information they received that a
woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5’2" or 5’3"
in height would be transporting marijuana. The extensive search
was indiscriminately made on all the baggages of all passengers
of the bus where the accused was riding, whether male or female,
and whether or not their physical appearance answered the
description of the suspect as described in the alleged information.
If there really was such an information, as claimed by the
NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to
search the baggages of ALL passengers, not only the bags of
those who appeared to answer the description of the woman
suspected of carrying marijuana.

Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when

the NARCOM agents searched her bag, where they allegedly
found the marijuana.

From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the
NARCOM agents were only fishing for evidence when they
searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of
the accused. They had no probable cause to reasonably believe
that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in
the information they allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless
search made on the personal effects of herein accused on the
basis of mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of
probable cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that the
marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was
inadmissible in evidence.
18) G.R. No. L-58889 July 31, 1986
NATHANIEL S. MANIPON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Second Division composed of HON.
BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ as Acting Presiding Justice and
HON. BUENAVENTURA J. GUERRERO and HON. MOISES C.
KALLOS, as Associate Justices, respondents.
Guillermo B. Bandonill for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNAN, J.:
This is a case of direct bribery penalized under Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code.
In its decision dated September 30, 1981, the Sandiganbayan
found accused Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., 31, guilty of direct
bribery, sentenced him to four months and twenty days of arresto
mayor with temporary special disqualification for eight years and
one day and a fine of P2,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Manipon came to this Court on petition for review on certiorari
seeking the reversal of the judgment of conviction. The Court
dismissed the petition, "the question raised being factual and for
lack of merit." However, upon motion for reconsideration, the
Court reconsidered its resolution and gave due course to the
petition.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Nathaniel S. Manipon, Jr., a deputy sheriff of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio City and Benguet, Branch IV, was assigned to
enforce an order of the Minister of Labor dated October 31, 1979
directing the Sheriff of Baguio City or his deputy to execute the
decision of the labor arbiter in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79
entitled "Longog Tabek, et al vs. Harry Dominguez et al" and to
make a return within thirty (30) days from said date. The labor
arbiter's decision ordered Harry Dominguez, a building contractor
and the then municipal mayor of Tadian, to pay Longog Tabek
and the other judgment creditors the amount of P2,720.00 with
interest, as the balance of their work contract.
Pursuant to that assignment, Manipon on November 9, 1979 sent
a notice to the Commercial Bank and Trust branch [Comtrust] in
Baguio City garnishing the bank accounts of Dominguez. The
bank agreed to hold the accounts. For one reason or another,
Manipon did not inform the labor arbiter of the garnishment nor
did he exert efforts to immediately satisfy the judgment under
execution.
On November 12, 1979, Dominguez sought Manipon's help in
the withdrawal of the garnished account. Manipon told
Dominguez that the money could not be withdrawn.
However, on December 27, 1979 when the two met again at the
Office of the National Intelligence and Security Authority [NISA]
in Baguio City, Manipon told Dominguez that he "can remedy the
withdrawal so they will have something for the New
Year." Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would
withdraw the garnished amount for a consideration. Dominguez
agreed and they arranged to meet at the bank later in the
afternoon. After Manipon left, Dominguez confided the offer to
NISA Sub-Station Commander Luisito Sanchez. They then
hatched up a plan to entrap Manipon by paying him with marked
money the next day. Col. Sanchez and a Col. Aguana were able
to put up P700.00 in fifty-peso bills which were then
authenticated, xeroxed and dusted with fluorescent powder.
Thus, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of December 28,
1979, Dominguez went to Comtrust as planned. Manipon
showed up with two companions, named Deputy Sheriff Crisanto
Flora and Baltazar Pacis. Manipon delivered his letter to the bank
lifting the garnishment. Then Dominguez prepared a withdrawal
slip for P2,500.00. As soon as Dominguez received the money
from the teller, he took out P300.00 therefrom added it to the P
700.00 in marked bills and handed the total amount of P l,000.00
to Manipon. Then they all left the bank. Dominguez walked over
to his car and drove off. Manipon and his two companions walked
down Session Road. Moments later, PC and NISA operatives
accosted them, seized the P1,000.00 from the left breast pocket
of Manipon and thereafter brought them to Camp Dangwa for
questioning. Manipon was subjected to an ultraviolet light test
and found positive for fluorescent powder. However, after
executing a certification relative to the money recovered, he
refused to give any statement. He filed his sheriff's return
unsatisfied on February 20, 1980 or after 114 days.
Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 46 for having demanded and received P l,000.00
from Dominguez, a private individual, for a favor extended by him
to the latter, i.e., by not enforcing the garnishment order issued to
Comtrust which was his official duty. However, in an amended
information dated February 16, 1981, the charge was changed to
direct bribery under the Revised Penal Code.
Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not
guilty.
In his brief, Manipon contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in
convicting him of direct bribery, in not giving credence to the
defense theory that there was novation of the money judgment
and in admitting illegally-obtained evidence.
The crime of direct bribery as defined in Article 210 of the
Revised Penal Code consists of the following elements: (1) that
the accused is a public officer; (2) that he received directly or
through another some gift or present, offer or promise; (3) that
such gift, present or promise has been given in consideration of
his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime,
or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do,
and (4) that the crime or act relates to the exercise of his
functions as a public officer. The promise of a public officer to
perform an act or to refrain from doing it may be express or
implied.
It is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the crime
Manipon was the deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of
Benguet and Baguio assigned to implement the execution order
issued in NLRC Case No. RB-1-C-1428-79. It is also not disputed
that Manipon garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at
Comtrust and that he lifted the same on December 28, 1979 after
which he received P l,000.00 from Dominguez.
It is the theory of the defense that the P1,000.00 Manipon
collected from Dominguez on December 28, 1979 was not a
bribe but a payment in partial satisfaction of the judgment under
execution to which the judgment creditors headed by Longog
Tabek had agreed.
Manipon narrates that during his meeting with Dominguez at the
NISA office on December 27, 1979, Dominguez requested
Manipon to convey to the creditors that he was only willing to pay
for the time being a partial amount of P1,000.00, the balance of P
1,720. 00 to be paid after the New Year. So he visited Longog
Tabek who was the "lead man." Tabek, an illiterate, consented to
the lesser amount because he needed money badly. His
arrangements with Tabek and Dominguez were all verbal. At that
time he found no reason to have some written memorandum for
his own protection.
At Comtrust after Dominguez had given him the P1,000.00
Manipon made a move to hand him a temporary receipt but
Dominguez brushed it aside and said he was in a
hurry.
Manipon maintains that Dominguez had framed him up because
of a grudge. He said that in 1978 he and Flora had levied
execution against several vehicles owned by Dominguez, an act
which the latter had openly resented.
The defense theory is so incredible that it leaves no doubt
whatsoever in the Court's mind that Manipon is guilty of the crime
charged.
It is very strange indeed that for such an important agreement
that would modify a final judgment, no one took the bother of
putting it down on paper. Of course Manipon would have us
believe that there was no need for it because he trusted
Dominguez and Tabek. And yet did he not also claim that
Dominguez had framed him up because of a grudge? And if
there was really an agreement to alter the judgment, why did he
not inform the labor arbiter about it considering that it was the
labor arbiter who had issued the order of execution? Manipon
could not give satisfactory explanations because there was no
such agreement in the first place.
The temporary receipt adduced by Manipon, as correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, is a last-minute fabrication to provide
proof of the alleged agreement for the trial payment of the
judgment debt. Contrary to Manipon's claim, it is hard to believe
that Dominguez was not interested in getting said temporary
receipt because precisely that was the proof he needed to show
that he had partially complied with his legal obligation.
The testimonies of Crisanto Flora and Longog Tabek are of no
help either to the defense. Flora is Manipon's co-sheriff and is
therefore biased. On the other hand, Tabek, on several
occasions on the witness stand, answered with obvious
hesitation, betraying himself to be a rehearsed witness. While he
claimed that he was the supposed headman of the other
creditors, he could not present any authority that would allow him
to speak for them, let alone agree to receive a lesser amount in
their behalf. He even admitted that he did not know their names.
Indeed, Manipon's behavior at the very outset, had been marked
with irregularities. As early as November 9, 1979, he had already
garnished the bank accounts of Dominguez at Comtrust, but he
did not notify the labor arbiter so that the corresponding order for
the payment by the bank of the garnished amount could be made
and the sum withdrawn immediately to satisfy the judgment
under execution. His lame excuse was that he was very busy in
the sheriff's office, attending to voluminous exhibits and court
proceedings. That was also the same excuse he gave for not
informing the labor arbiter of the novation. In fact he candidly
admitted that he never communicated with the NLRC concerning
the garnishment. He returned the writ unsatisfied only on
February 20, 1980 although by its express terms, it was
returnable within thirty days from October 29, 1979. Clearly,
Manipon had planned to get Dominguez to acquiesce to a
consideration for lifting the garnishment order.
Manipon was also asked about the affidavit he executed during
the preliminary investigation. That affidavit contained two
annexes but the temporary receipt which he allegedly prepared
on December 28, 1979 was not included. He said he misplaced it
in his office and found it only several weeks after he had made
the affidavit. This leads us to strongly suspect there was actually
no temporary receipt at all at the time of payment on December
28 and that it was concocted by the defense as a last-ditch effort
to make the authorities believe that what had transpired was not
a payoff but a legitimate partial satisfaction of a judgment debt.
In the final analysis, it all boils down to credibility. In this regard,
the prosecution witnesses have acquitted themselves welt The
Sandiganbayan did not err in giving weight and credence to their
version instead of Manipon's. Indeed, Manipon's guilt for the
crime of direct bribery has been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
Dwelling on one last point, Manipon has pointed out that the
P1,000.00 was illegally seized because there was no valid March
warrant and therefore inadmissible.
The argument is untenable. The rule that searches and seizures
must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.
There are at least three exceptions to the rule recognized in this
jurisdiction. These are: 1) search incidental to an arrest, 2)
search of a moving vehicle, and 3) seizure of evidence in plain
view.
In the case at bar, the records show that at about 2:00 p.m. on
December 28,1979, NISA Sub-Station Commander Colonel
Luisito Sanchez held a final briefing among his men and some
operatives from the Benguet Philippine Constabulary concerning
the planned entrapment. He had earlier received word from
Dominguez that the lifting of the garnishment would be effected
that afternoon and he informed them that Manipon was asking
money from Dominguez. As Colonel Sanchez earlier testified,
part of the money to be withdrawn after lifting the garnishment
was to be given to the accused for agreeing to lift the order of
garnishment. After the briefing which lasted from ten to fifteen
minutes, they an headed for the Comtrust bank.
NISA Agent Caesar Murla stationed himself near the door of the
bank so that he could observe what transpired inside the
bank. He testified that he saw Dominguez give the marked
money to Manipon which the latter accepted and counted. Upon
seeing Manipon take the money from Dominguez, Agent Murla
gave a signal to some of the agents positioned nearby by placing
his right hand on his head to indicate that the money had
changed hands. Immediately thereafter, Dominguez left the bank,
Manipon placed the money in his left breast pocket and followed
suit. As Manipon walked past Murla on his way out, the latter
gave another signal by putting his hand on his left breast to
indicate that Manipon had placed the money in his left breast
pocket.
Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents and the PC
operatives approached Manipon and his two companions. After
Identifying themselves as peace officers, they retrieved the P
l,000.00 from Manipon. Through it all, Manipon remained
amazingly silent and voiced no protest.
The search and seizure of the P1,000.00 from Manipon would
therefore fall within the first exception. The search was made as
an incident to a lawful arrest, in accordance with our
pronouncement in Moreno v. Ago Chi 12 Phil. 439, reiterated
in Alvero v. Dizon 76 Phil. 637, to wit:
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
any money or property found upon his person which was used in
the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which
might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence
or escaping, or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the
case.
The evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the
arresting officer against physical harm from the person being
arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon and also
to prevent the person arrested from destroying evidence within
his
reach.
Since the other issues raised by Manipon are factual they need
not be discuss here.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

denied for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner-accused
Nathaniel Manipon, Jr. The decision of the Sandiganbayan dated
September 30, 1981 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
19) G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARI MUSA y HANTATALU, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
The appellant, Mari Musa, seeks, in this appeal, the reversal of
the decision, dated August 31, 1990, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Zamboanga City, Branch XII, finding him guilty of selling
marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972.
The information filed on December 15, 1989 against the
appellant reads:
That on or about December 14, 1989, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the
above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell to one SGT.
AMADO ANI, two (2) wrappers containing dried marijuana leaves,
knowing the same to be a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon his arraignment on January 11, 1990, the appellant
pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses,
namely: (1) Sgt. Amado Ani, Jr. of the 9th Narcotics Command
(NARCOM) of Zamboanga City, who acted as poseur-buyer in
the buy-bust operation made against the appellant; (2) T/Sgt.
Jesus Belarga, also of the 9th Narcotics Command of
Zamboanga City, who was the NARCOM team leader of the
buy-bust operation; and (3) Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the
Document Examiner and Forensic Chemist of PC-INP Crime
Laboratory of Regional Command (RECOM) 9. The evidence of
the prosecution was summarized by the trial court as follows:
Prosecution evidence shows that in the morning of December 13,
1989, T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS
COMMAND (NARCOM) team based at Calarian, Zamboanga
City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test
buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City.
Information received from civilian informer was that this Mari
Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt.
Amado Ani, another NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in
company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of Mari
Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The
same civilian informer had also described to him the appearance
of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one
newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana (Exh. "E") for P10.00. Sgt.
Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the
newspaper-wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt.
Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found it to be
marijuana.
The next day, December 14, 1989, about 1:30 P.M., a buy-bust
was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer
for which purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by
Belarga. The
buy-bust money had been taken by T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga from
M/Sgt. Noh Sali Mihasun, Chief of Investigation Section, and for
which Belarga signed a receipt (Exh. "L" & "L-l" ) The team under
Sgt. Foncargas was assigned as back-up security. A
pre-arranged signal was arranged consisting of Sgt. Ani's raising
his right hand, after he had succeeded to buy the marijuana. The
two NARCOM teams proceeded to the target site in two civilian
vehicles. Belarga's team was composed of Sgt. Belarga, team
leader, Sgt. Amado Ani, poseur buyer, Sgt. Lego and Sgt. Biong.
Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of Mari
Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned
themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari
Musa's house. T/Sgt. Belarga could see what went on between
Ani and suspect Mari Musa from where he was. Ani approached
Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he
wanted. Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari
Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari
Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado
Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani
opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced
that the contents were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his
companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM teams,
riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined
Belarga's team and returned to the house.
At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four
persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two
women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be
Mari Musa's wife. The second time, Ani with the NARCOM team
returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known
as Mari Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga
frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00 marked money
with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and
he told the NARCOM team he has given the money to his wife
(who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen.
Mari Musa was then placed under arrest and brought to the
NARCOM office. At Suterville, Sgt. Ani turned over to Sgt.
Belarga the two newspaper-wrapped marijuana he had earlier
bought from Mari Musa (Exhs. "C" & "D").
In the NARCOM office, Mari Musa first gave his name as Hussin
Musa. Later on, Mari Musa gave his true name — Mari Musa.
T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga turned over the two newspaper-wrapped
marijuana (bought at the buy-bust), the one newspaper-wrapped
marijuana (bought at the test-buy) and the plastic bag containing
more marijuana (which had been taken by Sgt. Lego inside the
kitchen of Mari Musa) to the PC Crime Laboratory, Zamboanga
City, for laboratory examination. The turnover of the marijuana
specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory was by way of a
letter-request, dated December 14, 1989 (Exh. "B"), which was
stamped "RECEIVED" by the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B-1")
on the same day.
Mrs. Athena Elisa P. Anderson, the Forensic Chemist of the PC
Crime Laboratory, examined the marijuana specimens subjecting
the same to her three tests. All submitted specimens she
examined gave positive results for the presence of marijuana.
Mrs. Anderson reported the results of her examination in her
Chemistry Report D-100-89, dated December 14, 1989, (Exh. "J",
"J-1", "J-2", "J-3", "J-4" and "J-5"). Mrs. Anderson identified in
court the two newspaper wrapped marijuana bought at the
buy-bust on December 14, 1989, through her initial and the
weight of each specimen written with red ink on each wrapper
(Exhs. "C-1" and "D-1"). She also identified the one
newspaper-wrapped marijuana bought at the test-buy on
December 13, 1989, through her markings (Exh. "E-1"). Mrs.
Anderson also identified her Chemistry Report (Exh. "J" &
sub-markings.)
T. Sgt. Belarga identified the two buy-bust newspaper wrapped
marijuana through his initial, the words "buy-bust" and the words
"December 14, 1989, 2:45 P.M." (written on Exhs. "C" and "D").
Belarga also identified the receipt of the P20 marked money (with
SN GA955883) (Exh. "L"), dated December 14, 1989, and his
signature thereon (Exh.
"L-1"). He also identified the letter-request, dated December 14,
1989, addressed to the PC Crime Laboratory (Exh. "B") and his
signature thereon (Exh. "B-2") and the stamp of the PC Crime
Laboratory marked "RECEIVED" (Exh. "B-1").
For the defense, the following testified as witnesses: (1) the
accused-appellant Mari H. Musa; and (2) Ahara R. Musa, his wife.
The trial court summarized the version of the defense, thus:
[O]n December 14, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Mari
Musa was in his house at Suterville, Zamboanga City. With him
were his wife, Ahara Musa, known as Ara, his one-year old child,
a woman manicurist, and a male cousin named Abdul Musa.
About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one
hand, his wife was inside the one room of their house, putting
their child to sleep. Three NARCOM agents, who introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got
inside Mari Musa's house whose door was open. The NARCOM
agents did not ask permission to enter the house but simply
announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM
agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them
if they had a search warrant. The NARCOM agents were just
silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose
contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know
if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living
with him, or his father, who was living in another house about ten
arms-length away. Mari Musa, then, was handcuffed and when
Mari Musa asked why, the NARCOM agents told him for
clarification.
Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the
NARCOM Office at Calarian, Zamboanga City. Inside the
NARCOM Office, Mari Musa was investigated by one NARCOM
agent which investigation was reduced into writing. The writing or
document was interpreted to Mari Musa in Tagalog. The
document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and
Mari Musa was asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign
because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa said he
was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel,
although he himself told the NARCOM agents he wanted to be
assisted by counsel.
Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed between the fingers
of his right hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very
painful. The NARCOM agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost
consciousness. While Mari Musa was maltreated, he said his
wife was outside the NARCOM building. The very day he was
arrested (on cross-examination Mari Musa said it was on the next
day), Mari Musa was brought to the Fiscal's Office by three
NARCOM agents. The fiscal asked him if the marijuana was
owned by him and he said "not." After that single question, Mari
Musa was brought to the City Jail. Mari Musa said he did not tell
the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM agents
because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's
office.
Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge that he had sold
two wrappers of marijuana to them; that he had received from
them a P20.00 bill which he had given to his wife. He did not sell
marijuana because he was afraid that was against the law and
that the person selling marijuana was caught by the authorities;
and he had a wife and a very small child to support. Mari Musa
said he had not been arrested for selling marijuana before.
After trial, the trial court rendered the assailed decision with the
following disposition:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Mari Musa y Hantatalu guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to
Sec. 4, Art II of Rep. Act No. 6425, he is sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay the fine of P20,000.00, the latter
imposed without subsidiary imprisonment.
In this appeal, the appellant contends that his guilt was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt and impugns the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses.
The appellant claims that the testimony of Sgt. Ani, the
poseur-buyer, is not credible because: (1) prior to the buy-bust
operation, neither Sgt. Ani nor the other NARCOM agents were
personally known by the appellant or vice-versa; and (2) there
was no witness to the alleged giving of the two wrappers of
marijuana by the appellant to Sgt. Ani.
Sgt. Ani testified that on December 13, 1989, upon instruction by
T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, he conducted a test-buy operation on the
appellant whereby he bought one wrapper of marijuana for
P15.00 from the latter. He reported the successful operation to
T/Sgt. Belarga on the same day. Whereupon, T/Sgt. Belarga
conducted a conference to organize a buy-bust operation for the
following day.
On December 14, 1989, at 1:30 p.m., two NARCOM teams in
separate vehicles headed by T/Sgt. Belarga and a certain Sgt.
Foncardas went to the place of operation, which was the
appellant's house located in Laquian Compound, Suterville,
Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani was with the team of T/Sgt. Belarga,
whose other members were Sgts. Lego and Biong. Sgt. Ani was
given a marked P20.00 bill by T/Sgt. Belarga, which was to be
used in the operation.
Upon reaching the place, the NARCOM agents positioned
themselves at strategic places. Sgt. Ani approached the house.
Outside the house, the appellant asked Sgt. Ani what he wanted.
Sgt. Ani asked him for some more marijuana. Sgt. Ani gave him
the marked P20.00 bill and the appellant went inside the house
and brought back two paper wrappers containing marijuana
which he handed to Sgt. Ani. From his position, Sgt. Ani could
see that there were other people in the house.
After the exchange, Sgt. Ani approached the other NARCOM
agents and made the pre-arranged signal of raising his right
hand. The NARCOM agents, accompanied by Sgt. Ani, went
inside the house and made the arrest. The agents searched the
appellant and unable to find the marked money, they asked him
where it was. The appellant said that he gave it to his wife.
The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the
testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-bust operation, which
resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent
conviction of the appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright.
Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material
points, it deserves credence.
The contention that the appellant could not have transacted with
Sgt. Ani because they do not know each other is without merit.
The day before the
buy-bust operation, Sgt. Ani conducted a test-buy and he
successfully bought a wrapper of marijuana from the appellant.
Through this previous transaction, Sgt. Ani was able to gain the
appellant's confidence for the latter to sell more marijuana to Sgt.
Ani the following day, during the buy-bust operation. Moreover,
the Court has held that what matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and the seller, for quite often, the parties to
the transaction may be strangers, but their agreement and the
acts constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana.
The appellant, again to cast doubt on the credibility of Sgt. Ani,
argues that it was impossible for the appellant to sell marijuana
while his wife, cousin and manicurist were present. But the place
of the commission of the crime of selling prohibited drugs has
been held to be not crucial and the presence of other people
apart from the buyer and seller will not necessarily prevent the
consummation of the illegal sale. As the Court observed
in People v. Paco, these factors may sometimes camouflage the
commission of the crime. In the instant case, the fact that the
other people inside the appellant's house are known to the
appellant may have given him some assurance that these people
will not report him to the authorities.
The appellant, besides assailing Sgt. Ani's credibility, also
questions the credibility of T/Sgt. Belarga. The appellant submits
that since T/Sgt. Belarga admitted that he was about 90 meters
away from Sgt. Ani and the appellant, he could not have possibly
witnessed the sale. The appellant invokes People v.
Ale where the Court observed that from a distance of 10-15
meters, a policeman cannot distinguish between marijuana
cigarette from ordinary ones by the type of rolling done on the
cigarette sticks. And since T/Sgt. Belarga allegedly did not see
the sale, the appellant contends that the uncorroborated
testimony of Sgt. Ani can not stand as basis for his conviction.
People v. Ale does not apply here because the policeman in that
case testified that he and his companion were certain that the
appellant therein handed marijuana cigarettes to the
poseur-buyer based on the appearance of the cigarette sticks.
The Court rejected this claim, stating that:
This Court cannot give full credit to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses marked as they are with contradictions
and tainted with inaccuracies.
Biñan testified that they were able to tell that the four cigarettes
were marijuana cigarettes because according to him, the rolling
of ordinary cigarettes are different from those of marijuana
cigarettes. (tsn, November 13, 1984, p. 10).
It is however, incredible to believe that they could discern the
type of rolling done on those cigarettes from the distance where
they were observing the alleged sale of more or less 10 to 15
meters.
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively
claim that he saw the appellant hand over marijuana to Sgt. Ani.
What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles
between the two. The relevant portion of T/Sgt. Belarga's
testimony reads:
Q Now, do you remember whether Sgt. Ani was able to reach the
house of Mari Musa?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q After reaching Mari Musa, did you see what happened (sic)?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q Could you please tell us?
A From our vehicle the stainless owner type jeep where Sgt.
Lego, Sgt. Biong were boarded, I saw that Sgt. Ani proceeded to
the house near the road and he was met by one person and later
known as Mari Musa who was at the time wearing short pants
and later on I saw that Sgt. Ani handed something to him,
thereafter received by Mari Musa and went inside the house and
came back later and handed something to Sgt. Ani.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, it was not impossible
for T/Sgt. Belarga to have seen, from a distance of 90-100
meters, Sgt. Ani hand to the appellant "something" and for the
latter to give to the former "something."
Notwithstanding the fact that T/Sgt. Belarga could not have been
certain that what Sgt. Ani received from the appellant was
marijuana because of the distance, his testimony, nevertheless,
corroborated the direct evidence, which the Court earlier ruled to
be convincing, presented by Sgt. Ani on the following material
points: (1) T/Sgt. Belarga instructed Sgt. Ani to conduct a
surveillance and test-buy operation on the appellant at Suterville,
Zamboanga City on December 13, 1989; (2) later that same day,
Sgt. Ani went back to their office and reported a successful
operation and turned over to T/Sgt. Belarga one wrapper of
marijuana; (3) T/Sgt. Belarga then organized a team to conduct
a buy-bust operation the following day; (4) on December 14,
1989, T/Sgt. Belarga led a team of NARCOM agents who went to
Suterville, Zamboanga City; (5) T/Sgt. Belarga gave a P20.00
marked bill to Sgt. Ani which was to be used in the buy-bust
operation; (6) upon the arrival of the NARCOM agents in
Suterville, Zamboanga City, Sgt. Ani proceeded to the house of
the appellant while some agents stayed in the vehicles and
others positioned themselves in strategic places; the appellant
met Sgt. Ani and an exchange of articles took place.
The corroborative testimony of T/Sgt. Belarga strengthens the
direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. Additionally, the Court has
ruled that the fact that the police officers who accompanied the
poseur-buyer were unable to see exactly what the appellant gave
the poseur-buyer because of their distance or position will not be
fatal to the prosecution's case provided there exists other
evidence, direct or circumstantial, e.g., the testimony of the
poseur-buyer, which is sufficient to prove the consummation of
the sale of the prohibited drug
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as
evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana which the
NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that
after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-arranged signal to the other NARCOM
agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the
house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but
didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the appellant said that he
gave the marked money to his wife. Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga
and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt.
Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe
hanging at the corner of the kitchen." They asked the appellant
about its contents but failing to get a response, they opened it
and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant
questioned the admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana
it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that these are
admissible in evidence.
Built into the Constitution are guarantees on the freedom of every
individual against unreasonable searches and seizures by
providing in Article III, Section 2, the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Furthermore, the Constitution, in conformity with the doctrine laid
down in Stonehill v. Diokno, declares inadmissible, any evidence
obtained in violation of the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures.
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a
search and seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are
recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon, the Court stated that. "[t]he
most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is
the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest."
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a
warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.
There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search
upon the person of the person arrested. As early as 1909, the
Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may take from
the person arrested any money or property found upon his
person which was used in the commission of the crime or was
the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the
means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the
trial of the cause . . . " Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted
to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize
the marked money found on the person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and
search warrants.
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of
the appellant after arresting him in his house but found nothing.
They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found
and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's
lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested
to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate
control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence.
In Ker v. California police officers, without securing a search
warrant but having information that the defendant husband was
selling marijuana from his apartment, obtained from the building
manager a passkey to defendants' apartment, and entered it.
There they found the defendant husband in the living room. The
defendant wife emerged from the kitchen, and one of the officers,
after identifying himself, observed through the open doorway of
the kitchen, a small scale atop the kitchen sink, upon which lay a
brick-shaped package containing green leafy substance which
he recognized as marijuana. The package of marijuana was used
as evidence in prosecuting defendants for violation of the
Narcotic Law. The admissibility of the package was challenged
before the U.S. Supreme Court, which held, after observing that it
was not unreasonable for the officer to walk to the doorway of the
adjacent kitchen on seeing the defendant wife emerge therefrom,
that "the discovery of the brick of marijuana did not constitute a
search, since the officer merely saw what was placed before him
in full view. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless
seizure of the marijuana was legal on the basis of the "plain view"
doctrine and upheld the admissibility of the seized drugs as part
of the prosecution's evidence.
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch
unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a
general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated
the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police
officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in
the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for
another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with
a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view"
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in
"plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will not justify the seizure of
the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not
apparent from the "plain view" of the object. Stated differently, it
must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that
they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person
searched in the living room. Failing to retrieve the marked money
which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the
whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic
bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view" when they
arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM
agents had to move from one portion of the house to another
before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California,
where the police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the
adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw the marijuana,
the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with
the obvious intention of fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag
hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had no clue as to its
contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained.
When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found
the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was
visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this
case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the
contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even
assuming then, that the NARCOM agents inadvertently came
across the plastic bag because it was within their "plain view,"
what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just
the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of
the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent
from the "plain view" of said object. It cannot be claimed that the
plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents
are obvious to an observer.
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the
"plain view" doctrine does not apply and the marijuana contained
in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in
evidence pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however,
diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the
appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. We hold that by virtue of the
testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings
of marijuana sold by the appellant to Sgt. Ani, among other
pieces of evidence, the guilt of the appellant of the crime charged
has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of
the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
20) G.R. No. L-69803 October 8, 1985
CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO, MILA AGUILAR-ROQUE and WILLIE
C. TOLENTINO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City; HON. ANTONIO P. SANTOS, Presiding
Judge, Branch XLII, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City:
HON. SERGIO F. APOSTOL, City Fiscal, Quezon City; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, LT. GEN. FIDEL RAMOS and COL.
JESUS ALTUNA, respondents.
Jose W .Diokno, Joker P. Arroyo, Rene A. V. Sarmiento, Dan
Malabonga and Cesar Maravilla for petitioners.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
The facts before the Court in these Certiorari, Prohibition, and
mandamus proceedings will be briefly stated. The three
petitioners will be referred to through their surnames of
NOLASCO, AGUILAR-ROQUE and TOLENTINO.
1. Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without
the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the accused of
Rebellion in Criminal Case No.
MC-25-113 of Military Commission No. 25, both cases being
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She
was then still at large.
2. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and
NOLASCO were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group
(CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street,
Quezon City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not
denied by respondents. The record does not disclose that a
warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against
NOLASCO.
3. At 12:00 N. on August 6th, elements of the CSG searched the
premises at 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City. The stated time is
an allegation of petitioners, not specifically denied by
respondents. In their COMMENT, however, respondents have
alleged that the search was conducted "late on the same day";
that is late on august 6th.
4. On August 6th, at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G.
Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from
respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B
Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined tyo be the leased
residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round
the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has
been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer
of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected
with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.
In connection with the Search Warrant issued, the following may
be stated:
(a) The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Accused,
Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion" (the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE). Judge Panos Court was Branch 88.
(b) It does not appear from the records before us that an
application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to
Judge Paño.
(c) According to the record, Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness
S/A Dionicio A. Lapus, were examined under oath by Judge
Paño but only the deposition of S/A Lapus has been submitted to
us. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there
were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents
and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic
Front, including support money from foreign and local sources
intended to be used for rebellion.
5. In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th
the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises.
He was arrested by the searching party presumably without a
warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written
materials, and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden
boxes, making 431 items in all.
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH
WARRANT CASE on August 10th, the search was made in the
presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and
of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that
TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and
documents attached to the Return was signed by the two
Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.
6. (a) On August 10th, the three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE,
NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon
City Fiscal's Office (the CITY FISCAL, for short) upon complaint
filed by the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion
and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion."
(b) On August 13th, the CITY FISCAL filed an Information for
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of
Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos,
presiding.
(c) On August 16th, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with
the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and
NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied
on November 16th.
7. (a) On September 10th, the CSG submitted an Amended
Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying, inter alia, that
the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and
articles, in connection with cases that are presently pending
against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal's
Office and the court.
(b) On September 28th, petitioners were required by Judge Pano
to comment on the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE
did on October 18th, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any
evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.
(c) On December 13, 1984, Judge Paño admitted the Amended
Return and ruled that the seized documents "shall be subject to
disposition of the tribunal trying the case against respondent."
8. (a) On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress
in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of
the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was
claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were
unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on
the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be
litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was apparently
not aware of the Order of Judge Paño of December 13th issued
in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to
annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant issued by respondent
RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return
and granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of
respondent MTC Judge Santos denying petitioners' Motion to
Suppress.
This Court, on February 12, 1985, issued a Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining the respondents or their duly
authorized representatives from introducing evidence obtained
under the Search Warrant.
The PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is
void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently
describe with particularity the things subject of the search and
seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly
established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant's witness. The respondents, represented by the
Solicitor General, contend otherwise, adding that the questions
raised cannot be entertained in this present petition without
petitioners first moving for the quashal of the disputed Search
Warrant with the issuing Judge.
We find merit in the Petition.
Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
The disputed Search Warrant (No. 80-84) describes the
personalities to be seized as follows:
Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of
the Phihppines/New Peoples Army and/or the National
Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans
of these groups, Programs, List of possible supporters,
subversive books and instructions, manuals not otherwise
available to the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources.
It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes
the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes
everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not
specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make
them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the
officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should
seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2
wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and
infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular
description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this
Court, search warrants of similar description were considered
null and void for being too general. Thus:
Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines. Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement.
The things to be seized under the warrant issued by respondent
judge were described as 'subversive documents, propaganda
materials, FAs, printing paraphernalia and all other subversive
materials Such description hardly provided a definite guideline to
the search team as to what articles might be lawfully seized
thereunder. Said description is no different from if not worse than,
the description found in the search warrants in "Burgos, et al. v.
the Chief of Staff"which this Court declared null and void for
being too general.
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent
judge allowed the seizure of printed copies of the Philippine
Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication, newspaper
dummies subversive documents, articles, etc., and even
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape
recording machines. Thus, the language used is so all embracing
as to include all conceivable records and equipment of petitioner
regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The search
warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general
warrant which is constitutionally objectionable.
The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of
the witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant.
Q Mr. Dionicio Lapus, there is an application for search warrant
filed by Lt. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno and the Court would like to
know if you affirm the truth of your answer in this deposition?
(The deposition instead)—
A Yes, sir,
Q How long did it take you for the surveillance?
A Almost a month, sir.
Q Are you a lawyer, Mr. Lapus?
A No, Your Honor, but I was a student of law.
Q So, you are more or less familiar with the requisites of the
application for search warrant?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How did you come to know of the person of Mila
Aguilar-Roque?
A Because of our day and night surveillance, Your Honor, there
were so many suspicious persons with documents.
Q What kind of documents do you refer to?
A Documents related to the Communist Party of Philippines and
New People's Army.
Q What else?
A Conferences of the top ranking officials from the National
Democratic Front, Organization of the Communist Party of the
Philippines ...
Q And may include what else?
A Other papers and documents like Minutes of the Party
Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of possible
supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not
otherwise available to the public and support money from foreign
and local sources.
The foregoing questions propounded by respondent Executive
Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to
justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts
and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon
them and act in pursuant thereof. Of the 8 questions asked, the
1st, 2nd and 4th pertain to Identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading
not searching questions. The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the
description of the personalities to be seized, which is Identical to
that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of
particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature
and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere
generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may
issue.
Respondents claim, however, that the proper forum for
questioning the illegality of a Search Warrant is with the Court
that issued it instead of this original, independent action to quash.
The records show, however, that petitioners did raise that issue
in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE in their Comment, dated
October 18, 1984. In fact, they already questioned the
admissibility of the evidence obtained under the Search Warrant,
even during the inquest investigation on August 10, 1984. And in
the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, they filed a Motion to
Suppress on December 12, 1984 claiming that the proceedings
under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Substantially, therefore,
while not denominated as a motion to quash, petitioners had
questioned the legality of the Search Warrant.
Parenthetically, it strikes the Court that the pendency of the
SEARCH WARRANT CASE and of the SUBVERSIVE
DOCUMENTS CASE before two different Courts is not
conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be
advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by
one Court, or Branch, and a criminal prosecution is initiated in
another Court, or Branch, as a result of the service of the Search
Warrant, the SEARCH WARRANT CASE should be consolidated
with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal
case is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding,
and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the
right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant
and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid
search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered
returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some
searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section 12, Rule
126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides:
Section 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A
person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
The provision is declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the
search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been
arrested. It is also a general rule that, as an incident of an arrest,
the place or premises where the arrest was made can also be
search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent
and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own
facts and circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the
application of general rules, there is some confusion in the
decisions as to what constitutes the extent of the place or
premises which may be searched. "What must be considered is
the balancing of the individual's right to privacy and the public's
interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of
criminals."
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with
Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant
for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of
time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her
dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a
half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect,
the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need
a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest
of public order.
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained.
by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion
Case, leaving it to AGUILAR-ROQUE to object to their relevance
and to ask Special Military Commission No.1 to return to her any
and all irrelevant documents and articles.
WHEREFORE, while Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued on
August 6, 1984 by respondent Executive Judge Ernani Cruz
Paño is hereby annulled and set aside, and the Temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondent from introducing
evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant in the
Subversive Documents case hereby made permanent, the,
personalities seized may be retained by the Constabulary
Security Group for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal
Case No. SMC-1-1, pending before Special Military commission
No. 1, without prejudice to petitioner Mila Aguilar-Roque
objecting to their relevance and asking said Commission to
return to her any and all irrelevant documents and articles.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Escolin Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Alampay and
Patajo concur.
Makasiar, C.J., concurs in the result.
Aquino, J.; took no part.
Concepcion Jr., J., reserves his vote.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Vicente Abad Santos. The questioned search warrant has
correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a
general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional
mandate that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated" (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights
orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence:
"Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This
constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule
has proved by historical experience to be the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence
illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of
state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the
plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power
of the courts to change or modify.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally
and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three
petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman
vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court
has held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly
comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the
statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in
favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or
gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify it." (Mata vs. Bayona, 128
SCRA 388, 393-394)
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner
Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a
warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the
constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr.
Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in the dissenting portion of
his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the
arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a
search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. The
exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search
of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his
person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously
cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this
case, petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on
board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall
Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day"
be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation,
if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
I vote to grant the petition in toto.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside
Search Warrant No. 80-84 issued by Executive Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño for the reasons adduced by Justice Melencio Herrera.
In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the
legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant or he allowed himself to be used by the military. In either
case his action can only be described as deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities
seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for
possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1
pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree with
Justice Cuevas. for the reasons stated by him, that their retention
cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with Justice
Cuevas, statement that not all the things seized can be ordered
returned to their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials
seized by the government agents." What are subversive
materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a
conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the determination?
Certainly not the military for it is not competent to do so aside
from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. thus
copies of Playboy magazines were seized from a labor leader
now deceased and medicines were also seized from a physician
who was suspected of being a subversive. I say return everything
to the petitioners.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting
I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion
nullifying Search warrant No. 80-84 issued by the Hon. Ernani
Cruz Paño Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City
It does not specify with requisite particularity the things, objects
or properties that may be seized hereunder. Being in the nature
of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional mandate that
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,
'must be particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973
Constitution)
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum
justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person
charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the
warrantless search under the aforequoted provision (Sec. 12,
Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by,
the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the
warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person
of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are
limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the offense." Hence—
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
any money or property found upon his person which was used in
the commission of the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the
means of committing violence or escaping or which may be used
as evidence in the trial of the cause ... (In Re Moreno vs. Ago Chi,
12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search
allowed by law, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful
arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been
conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately
thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
a person lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and
seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the
means by which it was committed, as well as weapons or other
things to effect an escape from custody is not to be
doubted. CAROLL vs. US 267 US 122. 158. ... But the right does
not extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several
blocks distant from Alba's house where the arrest was made.
When it was entered and searched, the conspiracy was ended
and the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere.
That search cannot be sustained as an incident of the
arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199. (Emphasis supplied)
(Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)
The second element which must exist in order to bring the case
within the exception to the general rule is that, in addition to a
lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest.
The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it
is not incident to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this
latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have a
right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if
the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an
arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future
arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S.
273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84 F 2d 160, 163)
In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of
Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976.
The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest,
that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same
day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence
of petitioner AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B May•n St., Quezon City.
How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place
where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record.
But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a
place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of
nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore, that
such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not
being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at
239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH
WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights
of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the
occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in
evidence under the exclusionary rule. However, not all the things
so seized can be ordered returned to their owners. Objects and
properties the possession of which is prohibited by law, cannot
be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their
seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 1984 citing Castro vs.
Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials seized
by the government agents which cannot be legally possessed by
anyone under the law can and must be retained by the
government.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the concurring and dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Vicente Abad Santos. The questioned search warrant has
correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a
general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional
mandate that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated" (Bill of Rights, sec. 3). The Bill of Rights
orders the absolute exclusion of all illegally obtained evidence:
"Any evidence obtained in violation of this . . . section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding" (Sec. 4[2]). This
constitutional mandate expressly adopting the exclusionary rule
has proved by historical experience to be the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures by outlawing all evidence
illegally seized and thereby removing the incentive on the part of
state and police officers to disregard such basic rights. What the
plain language of the Constitution mandates is beyond the power
of the courts to change or modify.
All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally
and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three
petitioners, as held by the majority in the recent case of Galman
vs. Pamaran (G.R. Nos. 71208-09, August 30, 1985). The Court
has held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly
comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the
statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in
favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or
gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No
presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process
when an officer undertakes to justify it." (Mata vs. Bayona, 128
SCRA 388, 393-394)
The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to (petitioner
Mila Aguilar- Roque's) arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon
Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a
warrant, for evidence of rebellion" is patently against the
constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Mr.
Justice Cuevas amply discusses this in the dissenting portion of
his separate opinion. Suffice it to add and stress that the
arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a
search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. The
exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search
of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his
person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously
cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this
case, petitioner Aguilar-Roque was arrested at 11:30 a.m. on
board a public vehicle on the road (at Mayon and P. Margall
Streets). To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day"
be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation,
if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
I vote to grant the petition in toto.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside
Search Warrant
No. 80-84 issued by Executive Judge Ernani Cruz Paño for the
reasons adduced by Justice Melencio Herrera. In addition I wish
to state the judge either did not fully know the legal and
constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant
or he allowed himself to be used by the military. In either case his
action can only be described as deplorable.
I do not agree with the ponencia when it says that personalities
seized may be retained by the Constabulary Security Group for
possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case No. SMC-1-1
pending before Special Military Commission No. 1. I agree with
Justice Cuevas. for the reasons stated by him, that their retention
cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court. But then again I cannot agree with Justice
Cuevas, statement that not all the things seized can be ordered
returned to their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials
seized by the government agents." What are subversive
materials? Whether a material is subversive or not is a
conclusion of law, not of fact. Who will make the determination?
Certainly not the military for it is not competent to do so aside
from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. thus
copies of Playboy magazines were seized from a labor leader
now deceased and medicines were also seized from a physician
who was suspected of being a subversive. I say return everything
to the petitioners.
CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting:
I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion
nullifying Search warrant No. 80-84 issued by the Hon. Ernani
Cruz Paño Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City which was served at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City
It does not specify with requisite particularity the things, objects
or properties that may be seized hereunder. Being in the nature
of a general warrant, it violates the constitutional mandate that
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized,
'must be particularly described. (Art. IV, Sec. 3, 1973
Constitution)
I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum
justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 12. Search without warrant of person arrested.—A person
charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the
warrantless search under the aforequoted provision (Sec. 12,
Rule 126) the same must be limited to and circumscribed by,
the subject, time, and place of said arrest. As to subject, the
warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person
of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are
limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used
as proof of the commission of the offense." Hence—
An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested
any money or property found upon his person which was used in
the commission of the crime or might furnish the prisoner with the
means of committing violence or escaping or which may be used
as evidence in the trial of the cause ... (In Re Moreno vs. Ago Chi,
12 Phil. 439: People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169)
With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search
allowed by law, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful
arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been
conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately
thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested,
The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search
a person lawfully arrested while committing a crime and to
search the place where the arrest is made in order to find and
seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the
means by which it was committed, as well as weapons or other
things to effect an escape from custody is not to be
doubted. CAROLL vs. US 267 US 122. 158. ... But the right does
not extend to other places. Frank Agnello's house was several
blocks distant from Alba's house where the arrest was made.
When it was entered and searched, the conspiracy was ended
and the defendants were under arrest and in custody elsewhere.
That search cannot be sustained as an incident of the
arrests. MARSON vs. US, 275 US 192, 199. (Emphasis supplied)
(Agnello vs. U.S., 269 U.S. 20,30)

The second element which must exist in order to bring the case
within the exception to the general rule is that, in addition to a
lawful arrest, the search must be incident to the arrest.

The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it

is not incident to the arrest. AGNELLO vs. U.S. supra. In this
latter case, 269 U.S. 20 at 30, it is said that the officers have a
right to make a search contemporaneously with the arrest. And if
the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an
arrest, but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future
arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. BYARS vs. U.S.
273 U.S., 28 ET AL. (Papani vs, U. S. 84 F 2d 160, 163)

In the instant case, petitioners were arrested at the intersection of

Mayon St. and P. Margall St. at 11:30 A.M. of August 6. 1976.
The search, on the other hand, was conducted after the arrest,
that was at around 12:00 noon of the same day or "late that same
day (as respondents claim in their "COMMENT") at the residence
of petitioner AGUILAR-ROQUE in 239B Mayon St., Quezon City.
How far or how many kilometers is that place from the place
where petitioner was arrested do not appear shown by the record.
But what appears undisputed is that the search was made in a
place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of
nor immediately after the arrest. It cannot be said, therefore, that
such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not
being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at
239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH
WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights
of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the
occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in
evidence under the exclusionary rule. However, not all the things
so seized can be ordered returned to their owners. Objects and
properties the possession of which is prohibited by law, cannot
be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their
seizure. (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 388, 1984 citing Castro vs.
Pabalan, 70 SCRA 478). Thus, the subversive materials seized
by the government agents which cannot be legally possessed by
anyone under the law can and must be retained by the
government.
21) G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Davao del Sur, 11 th Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur
convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos y Tito of The
crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of
Subversion. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Ruben Burgos
sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt, of the offense
charges , pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 9, in relation to
General Order No. 6, dated September 22, 1972, and General
Order No. 7, dated September 23, 1972, in relation further to
Presidential Decree No. 885, and considering that the firearm
subject of this case was not used in the circumstances as
embraced in paragraph I thereof, applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law, accused Ruben Burgos is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal maximum, as minimum penalty, to reclusion
perpetua, as maximum penalty, pursuant to sub-paragraph B, of
Presidential Decree No. 9, as aforementioned, with accessory
penalties, as provided for by law.
As a result of this judgment, the subject firearm involved in this
case (Homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with
Serial No. 8.69221) is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Likewise,
the subversive documents, leaflets and/or propaganda seized
are ordered disposed of in accordance with law.
The information charged the defendant-appellant with the crime
of illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion in an
information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13, 1982 and thereabout at Tiguman,
Digos, Davao del Sur, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above- named accused with intent to possess and
without the necessary license, permit or authority issued by the
proper government agencies, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously keep, possess, carry and have in his
possession, control and custody one (1) homemade revolver,
caliber .38, make Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221,
which firearm was issued to and used by the accused at Tiguman,
Digos, Davao del Sur, his area of operations by one Alias
Commander Pol for the New People's Army (NPA), a subversive
organization organized for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through lawless
and violent means, of which the accused had knowledge, and
which firearm was used by the accused in the performance of his
subversive tasks such as the recruitment of New Members to the
NPA and collection of contributions from the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized in the decision
of the lower court as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat. Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo
Taroy, it appears that by virtue of an intelligent information
obtained by the Constabulary and INP units, stationed at Digos,
Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok
personally and voluntarily surre0ndered to the authorities at
about 9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur Constabulary
Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused
Ruben Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the
use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one
(1) chopa of rice and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his
contribution to the NPA TSN, page 5, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of
PC-INP units, composed of fifteen (15) members, headed by
Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following day, May 13,
1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest
accused Ruben Burgos. The team left the headquarter at 1:30
P.M., and arrived at Tiguman, at more or less 2:00 o'clock PM
where through the help of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the
team was able to locate accused, who was plowing his field.
(TSN, pages 6-7, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused, the latter was caned by the team
and Pat. Bioco asked accused about his firearm, as reported by
Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said
firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro
Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a
place below their house where a gun was buried in the ground.
(TSN, page 8, Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by accused's wife and
dug the grounds, after which he recovered the firearm,
Caliber .38 revolver, marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the
team, subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock
pile of qqqcogon at a distance of three (3) meters apart from his
house. Then Sgt. Taroy accordingly verified beneath said cogon
grass and likewise recovered documents consisting of notebook
colored maroon with spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the prosecution;
a pamphlet consisting of eight (8) leaves, including the front and
back covers entitled Ang Bayan, Pahayagan ng Partido
Komunista ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo,
Leninismo Kaisipang Mao qqqZedong dated December 31, 1980,
marked as Exhibit "C", and another pamphlet Asdang
Pamantalaang Masa sa Habagatang Mindanao, March and April
1981 issue, consisting of ten (10) pages, marked as Exhibit "D"
for the prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with the firearm Exhibit "A", after its
recovery, readily admitted the same as issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez, otherwise known as a certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly
team leader of the sparrow unit of New People's Army,
responsible in the liquidation of target personalities, opposed to
NPA Ideological movement, an example was the killing of the late
Mayor Llanos and Barangay Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos,
Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-16, Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive activities, Cesar Masamlok, a
former NPA convert was presented, who declared that on March
7, 1972, in his former residence at Tiguman Digos, Davao del
Sur, accused Ruben Burgos, accompanied by his companions
Landrino Burgos, Oscar Gomez and Antonio Burgos, went to his
house at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and called him downstair.
Thereupon, accused told Masamlok, their purpose was to ask
rice and one (1) peso from him, as his contribution to their
companions, the NPA of which he is now a member. (TSN,
pages 70, 71, 72, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told Masamlok, he has to join their
group otherwise, he and his family will be killed. He was also
warned not to reveal anything with the government authorities.
Because of the threat to his life and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then told him, he should attend a
seminar scheduled on April 19, 1982. Along with this invitation,
accused pulled gut from his waistline a .38 caliber revolver which
Masamlok really saw, being only about two (2) meters away from
accused, which make him easily Identified said firearm, as that
marked as Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72, 73,
and 74, Hearing-January 4, 1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously invited, Masamlok,
accompanied by his father, Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and
Ayok Ides went to the house of accused and attended the
seminar, Those present in the seminar were: accused Ruben
Burgos, Antonio Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino Burgos, alias
Pedipol and one alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused Ruben Burgos, who said very
distinctly that he is an NPA together with his companions, to
assure the unity of the civilian. That he encouraged the group to
overthrow the government, emphasizing that those who attended
the seminar were already members of the NPA, and if they reveal
to the authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to the audience pamphlets and
documents, then finally shouted, the NPA will be victorious.
Masamlok likewise Identified the pamphlets as those marked as
Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for the prosecution. (TSN, pages
75, 76 and 77, Hearing-January 4, 1983)
Other speakers in said meeting were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar
Gomez, who likewise expounded their own opinions about the
NPA. It was also announced in said seminar that a certain Tonio
Burgos, will be responsible for the collection of the contribution
from the members. (TSN, pages 78-79, Hearing- January 4,
1983)
On May 12, 1982, however, Cesar Masamlok surrendered to
Captain Bargio of the Provincial Headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo Lovitos was presented t prove
that on May 19, 1982, he administered the subscription of th
extra-judicial confession of accused Ruben Burgos, marked as
Exhibit "E " for the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said office, for the subscription of his
confession, Fiscal Lovitos, realizing that accused was not
represented by counsel, requested the services of Atty. Anyog,
whose office is adjacent to the Fiscal's Office, to assist accused
in the subscription of his extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in the reading of his confession
from English to Visayan language, resulting to the deletion of
question No. 19 of the document, by an inserted certification of
Atty. Anyog and signature of accused, indicating his having
understood, the allegations of his extra-judicial statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused signed his statement, explained to
him his constitutional rights to remain silent, right to counsel and
right to answer any question propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog, accused signed his confession in the
presence of Atty. Anyog and Fiscal Lovitos, without the presence
of military authorities, who escorted the accused, but were sent
outside the cubicle of Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for the accused.
(TSN, pages 36-40, nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal possession by accused of the
subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio Comabig in-charge of firearms and
explosives, NCO Headquarter, Philippine Constabulary, Digos,
Davao del Sur, was presented and testified, that among the lists
of firearm holders in Davao del Sur, nothing was listed in the
name of accused Ruben Burgos, neither was his name included
among the lists of persons who applied for the licensing of the
firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1745.
After the above-testimony the prosecution formally closed its
case and offered its exhibits, which were all admitted in evidence,
despite objection interposed by counsel for accused, which was
accordingly overruled.
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's version of the case
against him is stated in the decision as follows:
From his farm, the military personnel, whom he said he cannot
recognize, brought him to the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao del
Sur, and arrived there at about 3:00 o'clock, on the same date. At
about 8:00 o'clock P.M., in the evening, he was investigated by
soldiers, whom he cannot Identify because they were wearing a
civilian attire. (TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June 15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted in the PC barracks, where he
was detained with respect to the subject firearm, which the
investigator, wished him to admit but accused denied its
ownership. Because of his refusal accused was mauled, hitting
him on the left and right side of his body which rendered him
unconscious. Accused in an atmosphere of tersed solemnity,
crying and with emotional attachment, described in detail how he
was tortured and the ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his consciousness, he was again
confronted with subject firearm, Exhibit "A", for him to admit and
when he repeatedly refused to accept as his own firearm, he was
subjected to further prolong (sic) torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were covered with wet black cloth with
pungent effect on his eyes. He was undressed, with only
blindfold, pungent water poured in his body and over his private
parts, making his entire body, particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent pain.
All along, he was investigated to obtain his admission, The
process of beating, mauling, pain and/or ordeal was repeatedly
done in similar cycle, from May 13 and 14, 1982. intercepted only
whenever he fell unconscious and again repeated after recovery
of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after undergoing the same torture and
physical ordeal he was seriously warned, if he will still adamantly
refuse to accept ownership of the subject firearm, he will be
salvaged, and no longer able to bear any further the pain and
agony, accused admitted ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling and torture stopped, but
accused was made to sign his affidavit marked as Exhibit "E" for
the prosecution, consisting of five (5) pages, including the
certification of the administering officer, (TSN, pages 141-148,
Hearing-June 15, 1983)
In addition to how he described the torture inflicted on him,
accused, by way of explanation and commentary in details, and
going one by one, the allegations and/or contents of his alleged
extrajudicial statement, attributed his answers to those questions
involuntarily made only because of fear, threat and intimidation of
his person and family, as a result of unbearable excruciating pain
he was subjected by an investigator, who, unfortunately he
cannot Identify and was able to obtain his admission of the
subject firearm, by force and violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of being involved in any subversive
activities, and also to support his denial to the truth of his alleged
extra-judicial confession, particularly questions Nos. 35, 38, 41,
42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47, along with qqqs answers to those
questions, involving Honorata Arellano ahas Inday Arellano, said
Honorata Arellano appeared and declared categorically, that the
above-questions embraced in the numbers allegedly stated in
the extrajudicial confession of accused, involving her to such
NPA personalities, as Jamper, Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true
because on the date referred on April 28, 1982, none of the
persons mentioned came to her house for treatment, neither did
she meet the accused nor able to talk with him. (TSN, pages 118-
121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being familiar with one Oscar Gomez,
and that she was personally charged with subversion in the
Office of the Provincial Commander, Philippine Constabulary,
Digos, Davao del Sur, but said charge was dismissed without
reaching the Court. She likewise stated that her son, Rogelio
Arellano, was likewise charged for subversion filed in the
Municipal Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, but was likewise
dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction.
(TSN, pages 121-122, in relation to her cross-examination,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
To support accused's denial of the charge against him, Barangay
Captain of Tiguman, Digos, Davao del Sur, Salvador
qqqGalaraga was presented, who declared, he was not
personally aware of any subversive activities of accused, being
his neighbor and member of his barrio. On the contrary, he can
personally attest to his good character and reputation, as a law
abiding citizen of his barrio, being a carpenter and farmer thereat.
(TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-examination, that there were a lot
of arrests made by the authorities in his barrio involving
subversive activities but they were released and were not
formally charged in Court because they publicly took their oath of
allegiance with the government. (TSN, pages 133-134, in relation
to page 136, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's denial of the subject firearm, his
wife, Urbana Burgos, was presented and who testified that the
subject firearm was left in their house by Cesar Masamlok and
one Pedipol on May 10, 1982. It was night time, when the two left
the gun, alleging that it was not in order, and that they will leave it
behind, temporarily for them to claim it later. They were the ones
who buried it. She said, her husband, the accused, was not in
their house at that time and that she did not inform him about
said firearm neither did she report the matter to the authorities,
for fear of the life of her husband. (TSN, page 24, November 22,
1983)
On cross-examination, she said, even if Masamlok during the
recovery of the firearm, was wearing a mask, she can still Identify
him. (TSN, page 6, Hearing-November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony, accused through counsel formally
rested his case in support of accused's through counsel
manifestation for the demurrer to evidence of the prosecution, or
in the alternative for violation merely of simple illegal possession
of firearm, 'under the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, reflected in the manifestation of counsel
for accused. (TSN, pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises the following
assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE
ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID
WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE SEARCH IN
THE HOUSE OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR FIREARM
WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN RELATION TO
GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his
house and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and
documents allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful and
valid manner? Does the evidence sustaining the crime charged
meet the test of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities
went to the house of Ruben Burgos for the purpose of arresting
him upon information given by Cesar Masamlok that the accused
allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army (NPA),
they did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with
them (TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61, November
15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard against wanton and
unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to
his person, papers and effects. This Court explained
in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA 345) why this right is so
important:
It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right,
but it could be also looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 US
293 [19661) What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative
to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of
who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such
have access except under the circumstances above noted, for in
the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his
castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of
his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life, (Cf.
Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and
Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630 [1886]). In the same vein,
Landynski in his authoritative work (Search and Seizure and the
Supreme Court [1966], could fitly characterize this constitutional
right as the embodiment of a 'spiritual concept: the belief that to
value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is
no legs than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not
be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural safeguards.' (Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the accused-appelant without
any warrant as falling under one of the instances when arrests
may be validly made without a warrant. Rule 113, Section 6 * of
the Rules of Court, provides the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
The Court stated that even if there was no warrant for the arrest
of Burgos, the fact that "the authorities received an urgent report
of accused's involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his
arrest, even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of
Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court and applicable
jurisprudence on the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search and seizure of the
firearm and the alleged subversive documents would become an
incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Section 12,
which states:
A person charged with an offense may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person
who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an
offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense
must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo
v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever
knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its
entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was
he committing any act which could be described as subversive.
He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable
seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most
basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which allows
exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly
construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly
unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally
construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its
application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do
so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right
so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still
be considered lawful under Section 6(b) using the test of
reasonableness. He submits that. the information given by Cesar
Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not
enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the
person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in
fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not
enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The
fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The
test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of
Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to
suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still
fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of
information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the
arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the
moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned
tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with
which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail
to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining
a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no
showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused
was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no
showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the
verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to
subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion
for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution. (TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently, the
need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and
a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the
accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being
unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards
could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a
valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that
consent was given by the accused to be searched simply
because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin,
65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the
entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a
search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed
out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V.
Locsin (supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in
the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights
and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised of any of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest is evident from the
records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went to the area to arrest Ruben Burgos, you were
not armed with an arrest warrant?
A None Sir.
Q Neither were you armed with a search warrant?
A No Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos was not present in his house when
you went there?
A But he was twenty meters away from his house.
Q Ruben Burgos was then plowing his field?
A Yes Sir.
Q When you called for Ruben Burgos you interviewed him?
A Yes Sir.
Q And that you told him that Masamlok implicated him?
A No Sir.
Q What did you tell him?
A That we received information that you have a firearm, you
surrender that firearm, first he denied but when Sgt. Buncalan
interviewed his wife, his wife told him that it is buried, I dug the
firearm which was wrapped with a cellophane.
Q In your interview of Burgos you did not remind him of his rights
under the constitution considering that he was purposely under
arrest?
A I did not.
Q As a matter of fact, he denied that he has ever a gun?
A Yes Sir.
Q As a matter of fact, the gun was not in his possession?
A It was buried down in his horse.
Q As a matter of fact, Burgos did not point to where it was
buried?
A Yes Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26, Hearing-October 14, 1982)
Considering that the questioned firearm and the alleged
subversive documents were obtained in violation of the
accused's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches
and seizures, it follows that they are inadmissible as evidence.
There is another aspect of this case.
In proving ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged
subversive documents, the prosecution presented the two
arresting officers who testified that the accused readily admitted
ownership of the gun after qqqs wife pointed to the place where it
was buried. The officers stated that it was the accused himself
who voluntarily pointed to the place where the alleged subversive
documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled that the accused
was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his
arrest. So that when the accused allegedly admitted ownership of
the gun and pointed to the location of the subversive documents
after questioning, the admissions were obtained in violation of
the constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec. 20 of
Art. IV of the Bill of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any evidence obtained in
violation of this right is inadmissible in evidence. Consequently,
the testimonies of the arresting officers as to the admissions
made by the appellant cannot be used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial confession of the
accused as inadmissible in evidence. The court stated that the
appellant's having been exhaustively subjected to physical terror,
violence, and third degree measures may not have been
supported by reliable evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation gives rise to the
"provocative presumption" that indeed torture and physical
violence may have been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his constitutional right
to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. The
lower court correctly pointed out that the securing of counsel, Atty.
Anyog, to help the accused when he subscribed under oath to his
statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It could have no
palliative effect. It cannot cure the absence of counsel at the time
of the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statement
was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged
subversive documents inadmissible in evidence against the
accused-appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain the
charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of
Subversion is the testimony of Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate to convict Burgos
beyond reasonable doubt. It is true that the trial court found
Masamlok's testimony credible and convincing. However, we are
not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court
attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People vs..
Cabrera (100 SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have stated that when it comes to
question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to
great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason th+at it was
able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we have also said that this rule is
not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of
convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial
court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and
substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court.
The situation under which Cesar Masamlok testified is analogous
to that found in People vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is built on Ternura's testimony,
and the issue hinges on how much credence can be accorded to
him. The first consideration is that said testimony stands
uncorroborated. Ternura was the only witness who testified on
the mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk under detention at the time. He
knew his fate depended upon how much he cooperated with the
authorities, who were then engaged in a vigorous anti-dissident
campaign. As in the case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose testimony
We discounted for the same reason, that of Ternura cannot be
considered as proceeding from a totally unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was totally WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial
uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is
military certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he hereby ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt, of the
cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be crime with which he has been charged.
charged with subversion. The trade-off appears to be his
membership in the Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83, The subject firearm involved in this case (homemade revolver,
January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be considered as an interested caliber .38, Smith and Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the
witness. It can not be said that his testimony is free from the alleged subversive documents are ordered disposed of in
opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even accordance with law.
fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom.
Cost de oficio.
Despite the fact that there were other persons present during the
alleged NPA seminar of April 19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's
SO ORDERED.
father ,Matuguil Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p. 74,
January 4, 1983) who could have corroborated Cesar
Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in
furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in
subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other
witness.

This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that the evidence

presented by the prosecution is insufficient to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34 SCRA 347):

It is evident that once again, reliance can be placed on People v.

Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where after stressing that accusation is
not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt, it
was made clear: 'Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been
committed precisely by the person on trial under such an
exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly
taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of
reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway
judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged;
that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime. What is required then is moral certainty.' (Ibid, 64. Cf.
People v. Alvarez, 55 SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64 SCRA 126;
People vs. Ramirez, 69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov 72 SCRA
69; People v. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205; People v. Poblador, 76
SCRA 634; People v. Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People v.
Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484; People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1;
People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA 260; and People vs. Ibanga 124
SCRA 697).

We are aware of the serious problems faced by the military in

Davao del Sur where there appears to be a well-organized plan
to overthrow the Government through armed struggle and
replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology. The
open defiance against duly constituted authorities has resulted in
unfortunate levels of violence and human suffering publicized all
over the country and abroad. Even as we reiterate the need for
all freedom loving citizens to assist the military authorities in their
legitimate efforts to maintain peace and national security, we
must also remember the dictum in Morales vs. Enrile (1 21 SCRA
538, 569) when this Court stated:

While the government should continue to repel the communists,

the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with an the means at
its command, it should always be remembered that whatever
action is taken must always be within the framework of our
Constitution and our laws.

Violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion.

A cavalier attitude towards constitutional liberties and protections
will only fan the increase of subversive activities instead of
containing and suppressing them.
22) G.R. No. 71410 November 25, 1986
JOSEFINO S. ROAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ROMULO T. GONZALES, PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MARINDUQUE,
BRANCH XXXVIII; THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF
MARINDUQUE; THE PROVINCIAL COMMANDER, PC-INP
MARINDUQUE, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
Once again we are asked to annul a search warrant on the
ground that it violates the Constitution. As we can do no less if
we are to be true to the mandate of the fundamental law, we do
annul.
One of the most precious rights of the citizen in a free society is
the right to be left alone in the privacy of his own house. That
right has ancient roots, dating back through the mists of history to
the mighty English kings in their fortresses of power. Even then,
the lowly subject had his own castle where he was monarch of all
he surveyed. This was his humble cottage from which he could
bar his sovereign lord and all the forces of the Crown.
That right has endured through the ages albeit only in a few
libertarian regimes. Their number, regrettably, continues to
dwindle against the onslaughts of authoritarianism. We are
among the fortunate few, able again to enjoy this right after the
ordeal of the past despotism. We must cherish and protect it all
the more now because it is like a prodigal son returning.
That right is guaranteed in the following provisions of Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution:
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
SEC. 4. (1) The privacy of communication and cor- respondence
shag be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety and order require otherwise.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Invoking these provisions, the petitioner claims he was the victim
of an illegal search and seizure conducted by the military
authorities. The articles seized from him are sought to be used as
evidence in his prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. He
asks that their admission be temporarily restrained (which we
have) and thereafter permanently enjoined.
The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent
judge on May 10, 1984. The petitioner's house was searched two
days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found
in the premises one Colt Magnum revolver and eighteen live
bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the
charge against the petitioner.
To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable
cause to be determined by the judge or some other authorized
officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce. No less important, there must be a specific
description of the place to be searched and the things to be
seized, to prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant.
Probable cause was described by Justice Escolin in Burgos v.
Chief of Staff as referring to "such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched." As held in a long line of decisions, the probable
cause must refer to only one specific offense.
The inclusion of the requirement for the "examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce" was a refinement proposed by Delegate Vicente J.
Francisco in the1934 Constitutional Convention. His purpose
was the strengthening of the guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Although the condition did not appear in
the corresponding provision of the federa Constitution of the
United States which served as our model it was then already
embodied in the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless,
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill
of Rights of that body, readily accepted the proposal and it was
thereafter, following a brief debate, approved by the Convention.
Implementing this requirement, the Rules of Court provided in
what was then Rule 126:
SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The municipal or city
judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to
the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the
respondent judge in accordance with the above rule, but this is
not entirely true. As a matter of fact, depositions were taken of
the complainant's two witnesses in addition to the affidavit
executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
Commenting on this matter, the respondent judge declared:
The truth is that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally
filed his application for a search warrant on May 10, 1984, he
appeared before me in the company of his two (2) witnesses,
Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise
presented to me their respective affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V.
Lining, a police investigator assigned to the PC-INP command at
Camp Col. Maximo Abad. As the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to, I proceeded to examine Captain
Quillosa on the contents thereof to ascertain, among others, if he
knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and
swore to the same before me.
By his own account, an he did was question Captain Quillosa on
the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain, among others, if he
knew and understood the same," and only because "the
application was not yet subscribed and swom to." The suggestion
is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit
had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In
any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited
himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the
applicant's deposition in writing and attach them to the record,
together with the affidavit presented to him.
As this Court held in Mata v. Bayona:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing
of the complainant and the witnesses he niay produce and attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence
or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it wifl be found later that his declarations are
false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with
illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them
to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to
have applicant Quillosa's deposition taken considering that he
was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information
provided by the aforenamed witnesses whose depositions as
aforementioned had already been taken by the undersigned."
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the
search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of
information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence." The rationale of the requirement, of course, is to
provide a ground for a prosecution for perjury in case the
applicant's declarations are found to be false. His application,
standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the
warrant sought. It was therefore necessary for the witnesses
themselves, by their own personal information, to establish the
apphcant's claims.
Even assuming then that it would have sufficed to take the
depositions only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself,
there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions.
It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed
probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must
make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application.
A study of the depositions taken from witnesses Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence
informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement
of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made
in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the
respondent judge. Significantly, the meaningful remark made by
Tohilida that they were suspicious of the petitioner because he
was a follower of the opposition candidate in the forthcoming
election (a "Lecarista") did not excite the respondent judge's
own suspicions. This should have put him on guard as to the
motivations of the witnesses and alerted him to possible
misrepresentations from them.
The respondent judge almost unquestioningly received the
witnesses' statement that they saw eight men deliver arms to the
petitioner in his house on May 2, 1984. This was supposedly
done overtly, and Tohilida said he saw everything through an
open window of the house while he was near the gate. He could
even positively say that six of the weapons were.45 caliber
pistols and two were.38 caliber revolvers.
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the respondent
judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the
caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or
whether it was on the first floor or a second floor, or why his
presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really
done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that
these acts were against the law. These would have been
judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead,
the declarations of the witnesses were readily accepted and the
search warrant sought was issued forthwith.
The above-discussed defects have rendered the search warrant
invalid. Nonetheless, the Solicitor General argues that whatever
defect there was, was waived when the petitioner voluntarily
submitted to the search and manifested his conformity in writing.
We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the
military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign
the supposed waiver as a guaranty against a possible challenge
later to the validity of the search they were conducting.
Confronted with the armed presence of the military and the
presumptive authority of a judicial writ, the petitioner had no
choice but to submit. This was not, as we held in a previous
case, the manifestation merely of our traditional Filipino
hospitality and respect for authority. Given the repressive
atmosphere of the Marcos regime, there was here, as we see it,
an intimidation that the petitioner could not resist.
The respondents also argue that the Colt Magnum pistol and the
eighteen have bullets seized from the petitioner were illegal per
se and therefore could have been taken by the military
authorities even without a warrant. Possession of the said
articles, it is urged, was violative of P.D. 1866 and
considered malum prohibitum. Hence, the Wegal articles could
be taken even without a warrant.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search
is valid. In this case, it was not because: 1) there was no valid
search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right thereto
was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military
officers who entered the petitioner's premises had no right to be
there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol and
bullets.
It does not follow that because an offense is malum
prohibitum, the subject thereof is necessarily illegal per
se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita, but the subjects of this
kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because
they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. If the rule
were otherwise, then the military authorities could have just
entered the premises and looked for the guns reportedly kept by
the petitioner without bothering to first secure a search warrant.
The fact that they did bother to do so indicates that they
themselves recognized the necessity of such a warrant for the
seizure of the weapons the petitioner was suspected of
possessing.
It is true that there are certain instances when a search may be
validly made without warrant and articles may be taken validly as
a result of that search. For example, a warrantless search may
be made incidental to a lawful arrest, as when the person being
arrested is frished for weapons he may otherwise be able to use
against the arresting officer. Motor cars may be inspected at
borders to prevent smuggling of aliens and contraband and even
in the interior upon a showing of probable cause. Vessels and
aircraft are also traditionally removed from the operation of the
rule because of their mobility and their relative ease in fleeing the
state's jurisdiction. The individual may knowingly agree to be
searched or waive objections to an illegal search. And it has also
been held that prohibited articles may be taken without warrant if
they are open to eye and hand and the peace officer comes upon
them inadvertently.
Clearly, though, the instant case does not come under any of the
accepted exceptions. The respondents cannot even claim that
they stumbled upon the pistol and bullets for the fact is that these
things were deliberately sought and were not in plain view when
they were taken. Hence, the rule having been violated and no
exception being applicable, the conclusion is that the petitioner's
pistol and bullets were confiscated illegally and therefore are
protected by the exclusionary principle.
Stonehill v. Diokno established this rule which was later
expressly affirmed in the 1973 Constitution. While conceding that
there may be occasions when the criminal might be allowed to go
free because "the constable has blundered," Chief Justice
Concepcion observed that the exclusionary rule was nonetheless
"the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional
injunction" against abuse. The decision cited Judge Learned
Hand's justification that "only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, know that it cannot profit by their
wrong, will the wrong be repressed. "

The pistol and bullets cannot, of course, be used as evidence

against the petitioner in the criminal action against him for illegal
possession of firearms. Pending resolution of that case, however,
the said articles must remain in custodia legis.

Finally, it is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to

this Court, filed a motion for the quashal of the search warrant by
the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure.
But as we said and did in Burgos, "this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised.

WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 1-84 issued by the

respondent judge on May 10, 1984, is hereby declared null and
void and accordingly set aside. Our restraining order of August
6,1985, is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
23) G.R. No. L-61688 October 28, 1987
VLASONS ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JR., et
al. respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
In a civil action for the recovery of possession of two (2) pieces of
a salvaged bronze propeller of a sunken vessel, instituted in the
Manila Court of First Instance 1 by Florencio Sosuan, has buyer
thereof, against the seller, Lo Bu and also against the persons
from whom Lo Bu had purchased the propeller, Alfonso Calixto
and Ernesto Valenzuela — and alternatively against Vlasons
Enterprises Corporation-the presiding Judge, Judge Alfredo Cruz,
Jr., issued an Order dated March 22, 1982 granting the motion of
Sosuan ". . . to Repossess Propeller Pieces" pendente lite upon
his posting of a bond in the sum of P82,940.00 representing the
uncontroverted value thereof — this, after Sosuan had rested
his case and before the defendants could begin presenting
theirs.
Some five months before the filing of the suit, or more precisely
on June 21, 1979, those propeller pieces had been seized by
METROCOM agents from Florencio Sosuan on the strength of a
search warrant issued by another branch of the same Manila
Court of First Instance, presided over by Judge Maximo
Maceren. The search warrant was issued at the instance of
Vlasons Enterprises Corporation (hereafter simply referred to as
Vlasons), which claimed to be the owner of the propeller. Vlasons
alleged that the propeller was an accessory of an oil tanker (the
"MT Feoso Sun) which it had purchased on December 21, 1978
and which had sunk at a point off Limay, Bataan; that some
chains and the spare bronze propeller of the vessel had been
stolen by a certain Calixto; that the propeller, had been traced to
a junk shop of a man named Garcia in Cavite Street, Tondo,
Manila, and when discovered, appeared to have been broken
into two (2) pieces; and that the propeller pieces had been
subsequently sold for P71,000.00 to Kim Hoc Hing Foundry at
Jaboneros Street, Binondo, Manila, owned by Florencio Sosuan
After the METROCOM officers had taken custody of the propeller
pieces, they filed with the Office of the Manila City Fiscal a
complaint accusing Alfonso Calixto and Ernesto Valenzuela of
theft of said propeller. They also filed a second
complaint charging Florencio Sosuan with violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law for having allegedly purchased the propeller
pieces from Lo Bu, a scrap dealer, with knowledge that they were
stolen goods. Those complaints were however dismissed by the
Fiscal on April 9, 1981, for insufficiency of evidence. The fiscal's
action was in due course affirmed by the Minister of Justice on
November 17, 1981, who also denied Vlasons motion for
reconsideration on June 16, 1982. A final attempt by Vlasons to
overturn those resolutions of dismissal by certiorari petitions
presented before this Court failed.
In the meantime, in the civil action to recover possession of the
propeller pieces filed by Sosuan pending before Judge Cruz'
Branch, the order mentioned in the opening paragraph of this
opinion-authorizing Sosuan to take possession of the propellers
pending action was promulgated on March 22, 1982. the Order
stressed "the fact that no criminal action has been filed in Court
in connection with the seizure of the propellers in question " and
accordinglly directed —
... the Commanding Officer, METROCOM Investigating Unit,
Camp Crame, Quezon City... to release to the plaintiff (Sosuan)
the two (2) pieces of scrap bronze propellers, which the former
seized from the latter last June 21. 1979, by virtue of a Search
Warrant No. 85-78 upon plaintiff's posting a bond in the amount
of P82,940.00 to answer for any damages that might be caused
the defendants and/or Third Party defendant and/or Alternative
Defendant by reason of the issuance of this order.
This Order was also challenged by Vlasons in the Court of
Appeals on certiorari. That Court however refused to nullify the
order. In its judgment dated July 30, 1982, it declined to sustain
Vlasons' theory — that Judge Cruz had no power to authorize the
release of the propeller pieces because these articles were
in custodia legis of another Branch of the Court, presided over by
Judge Maceren; and that in authorizing the release thereof,
Judge Cruz had interfered with the jurisdiction and prerogative of
a co-equal court. According to the Court of Appeals, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court does not provide that things seized under a
search warrant could be released only by the court issuing the
warrant; that the articles were not in fact in the custody of the
court but of the authorities at Camp Crame, Quezon City; and no
criminal case had been filed in the sala of Judge Maceren
involving the articles in question.
Vlasons has come to this Court on appeal by certiorari, to
attempt to bring about a reversal of the Appellate Court's verdict.
Its appeal was given due course by Resolution dated March 7,
1983.
The proceeding for the seizure of property in virtue of a search
warrant does not end with the actual taking of the property by the
proper officers and its delivery, usually constructive, to the court.
The order for the issuance of the warrant is not a final one and
cannot constitute res judicata. Such an order and can not
ascertain and adjudicate the permanent status or character of the
seized property. By its very nature, it is provisional, interlocutory.
It is merely the first step in the process to determine the character
and title of the property. That determination is done in the
criminal action involving the crime or crimes in connection with
which the search warrant was issued. Hence, such a criminal
action should be prosecuted, or commenced if not yet instituted,
and prosecuted. The outcome of the criminal action will dictate
the disposition of the seized property. If found to be
contraband, i.e., articles the possession of which, without more,
constitutes a crime and the repossession of which would subject
defendant to criminal penalties and frustrate the express policy
against the possession of such objects, they will not be returned,
but shall be confiscated in favor of the State or destroyed, as the
case may be. If not contraband, the property shall be returned
without in due delay to the person who appears from the
evidence to be the owner or rightful possessor, whether or not
the property was subject to theft, robbery or other crime. Should
there be conflictitig claims of ownership over the property seized
under a warrant-and subsequently shown by the evidence not to
be contraband, or otherwise illicit or subject to forfeiture-the
appropriate remedy, it has been held, is the institution of a civil
suit by any of the parties concerned or by the Government itself,
assuming the role of stakeholder, although there is authority to
the effect that a magistrate issuing a search warrant on the
ground that property has been stolen has jurisdiction to dispose
of the property seized thereunder, even if there be no criminal
prosecution for the larceny where the applicable statute does not
require a prosecution as a condition precedent to such
disposition, but that this jurisdiction is an exceptional one.
In the case at bar, no criminal prosecution was ever instituted in
the Maceren Branch of the Manila Court of First Instance with
respect to the propeller pieces, subsequent to the issuance by
said Branch of a search warrant and the resultant seizure of
those articles. Nor could any criminal prosecution ever be
expected at any time thereafter since both the fiscal and the
Minister of Justice had opined that no crime had been proven to
have attended the acquisition by the suspects of the propeller
pieces, an opinion which this Court had refused to nullify.
On the other hand, the property could not be permitted to stay in
a perpetual state of custodia legis. Not being contraband, and not
having been shown to be subject of any crime, it clearly should
have been returned, under normal circumstances, to its rightful
owner, or at least to the person from whom the property had
been seized under the warrant. That return was however
precluded by the existence of conflicting claims of title over the
property being asserted by two different persons, a conflict that
obviously could not be summarily disposed of by the Maceren
Branch, but indeed called for a formal judicial inquiry and
adjudication, with full opportunity for submission of evidence by
the contending parties; i.e., an ordinary civil action.
Now, the record shows that that civil action was indeed
commenced by Florencio Sosuan; but as fate would have it, it
was raffled to another branch of the same Manila Court of First
Instance, the Cruz Branch, not the Maceren Branch. The first
question that arises in view of this development is whether or not
the Cruz Branch had jurisdiction over this particular action for the
recovery of title to the personal property in question valued at
more than twenty thousand pesos; and the answer cannot but be
in the affirmative, in the light of the clear provisions of the
law. The Maceren Branch, on the other hand, could not take
cognizance of the issue of title for the simple reason that the
action regarding that issue had not been raffled to it. The
situation would of course have been less complicated had the
case been assigned by raffle to the Maceren Branch. But even
had this transpired, the Maceren Branch would still have been
obligated to conduct a full-dress trial in order to finally resolve the
question of title to the property. It could not make any disposition
of the property merely because it had earlier issued a search
warrant therefor, or on the basis merely of the evidence adduced
in support of the application for the warrant. The fact of the matter
is that absent any contemporaneous or subsequent criminal
action involving the crime or crimes for which the search warrant
had been issued, and specially in the light of the dismissal of the
criminal complaints in connection therewith, said search warrant
and the proceedings thereon were rendered inconsequential as
far as the resolution of the civil action involving the conflicting
claims of title to the property was concerned. The question of title
would have to be adjudged principally on the basis of the
pleadings filed and the evidence adduced in that civil action.
These premises considered, it is therefore immaterial which court
takes cognizance of that civil suit, whether it be the court issuing
the search warrant or any other. After all, the former performs in
this situation the function of no more than a custodian of the
property. No peculiar or additional competence to adjudicate the
question of title was acquired by it by reason of its having issued
a search warrant. No possible inconsistency or contradiction in
disposition of the property could in the circumstances possibly
arise between it and the court where the civil action is pending,
since only the latter could and would render a judgment on the
question of title. There is therefore no reason to declare the court
which issued the search warrant to be the only branch which
should exercise jurisdiction over the suit to resolve conflicting
claims of ownership over the seized articles. Nor may any valid
reason be cited why, under the peculiar circumstances obtaining
in this case, the seizing court may not release the seized articles
to the person pronounced by the final judgment in the civil action
to be entitled thereto, or even to transfer the custody of the goods
to the branch where the action is pending, upon due application,
at any time prior to the final judgment.
The Court is not unmindful of its earlier ruling in 1967,
in Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, to the effect that —
... The moment a court of first instance has been informed
through the filing of an appropriate pleading that a search
warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it
cannot, even if the literal language of the Rules of Court (Section
3, Rule 60) yield a contrary impression which in this case
demonstrated the good faith of respondent Judge for acting as
he did, require a sheriff or any proper officer of the Court to take
the property subject of the replevin action if theretofore it came
into custody of another public officer by virtue of a search warrant.
Only the court of first instance that issued such a search warrant
may order its release. Any other view would be subversive of a
doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose
of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial
actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if
courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with
each other's lawful orders.
... The remedy for questioning the validity of a search warrant
may be sought in the Court of First Instance that issued it, not in
the sala of another Judge, and as admitted in the dissenting
opinion of Justice Laurel, not through replevin.
At once apparent however is that the situation in Pagkalinawan is
quite distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar.
In Pagkalinawan the same property was being seized at the
same time by different courts upon different writs: one by search
warrant, the other by writ of seizure issued in a replevin action.
There was then a palpable and real conflict in jurisdiction. And
the Pagkalinawan ruling was laid down precisely to avoid that
conflict in jurisdiction. In the instant case, however, since it was
fairly certain that no criminal action could possibly ensue
subsequent to or in connection with the search warrant, no such
conflict in jurisdiction or in the ultimate disposition of the seized
property could be expected to arise.
It is therefore this Court's holding that where personalty has been
seized under a search warrant, and it appears reasonably
definite that the seizure will not be followed by the filing of any
criminal action for the prosecution of the offenses in connection
with which the warrant was issued, the public prosecutors having
pronounced the absence of basis therefor, and there are,
moreover, conflicting claims asserted over the seized property,
the appropriate remedy is the institution of an ordinary civil action
by any interested party, or of a special civil action of interpleader
by the Government itself, that action being cognizable not
exclusively by the court issuing the search warrant but by any
other competent court to which it may be assigned by raffle. In
such a case, the seizing court shall transfer custody of the seized
articles to the court having jurisdiction of the civil action at any
time, upon due application by an interested party. But such a
transfer, it must be emphasized, is a matter of comity, founded
on pragmatic considerations, not compellable by or resulting from
any overriding authority, of a writ or process of the court having
cognizance of the civil action.
The second question calling for resolution is the validity of the
Order of Judge Cruz decreeing the transfer to the
plaintiff pendente lite of the possession of the litigated property.
The order is obviously designed to grant a temporary, provisional
remedy. But the slightest reflection will immediately make
apparent that it is not one of the provisional remedies
contemplated and authorized by the Rules of Court. It cannot be
characterized and justified as a writ of seizure or delivery under
Rule 60 of the Rules of Court. The order was not applied for
"before answer," as prescribed by Section I of Rule 60.
Furthermore, the bond required and filed in connection therewith
was not "in double the value of the property," as required in the
same cited provision. Neither may the order be categorized and
sanctioned as a writ of preliminary attachment, no pretense
having been made of the existence of any of the specific grounds
therefor set out in Section 1, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, or as
a writ of receivership, in accordance with Rule 59 or
of preliminary mandatory injunction under Rule 58. And, of
course, any attempt to justify the order as one of
support pendente lite under Rule 61 would be facetious. It thus
appears that the order cannot be justified by any of the provisions
governing provisional remedies in the Rules of Court. It is sui
generis, an innominate provisional remedy. If it is to be upheld at
all it must be on the general authority of the court to award such
relief as may be proper in the premises.
The order is plainly and patently an advance concession or
award to the plaintiff of a contingent, alternative relief prayed for
in the complaint to be embodied in the final judgment. The relief
is sought in the plaintiff's complaint in the following terms:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be
rendered in favor of plaintiff ordering:
As Against Defendants Lo Bu, Calixto and Valenzuela:
A. Jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P82,940.00
representing the purchase price of the scrap marine propeller ...
should it turn out that alternative defendant corporation (Vlasons)
is the lawful owner of the said propeller:
As Against Alternative Defendant Vlasons Enterprises Corp.:
B. To return to plaintiff at its own expense, the said two broken
pieces of a scrap bronze marine four bladed propeller weighing a
total of 14,300 kilos, seized at its instance by the PC
METROCOM under Manila CFI Search Warrant No.
8578, should defendants Lo Bu Calixto and Valenzuela be found
to be the true and lawful owners of the propeller above
described;
Also patently erroneous is the holding of the Court of Appeals
that "[t]he articles seized were under the custody of Camp Crame,
at Quezon City, and not in the custody of the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided over by Judge Maceren." The
METROCOM officers obtained custody of the propeller in virtue
of the search warrant issued by the Maceren Court and were
holding possession thereof by that Court's authority. The officers
at Camp Crame were not exercising control over the propeller on
their own authority, but by virtue of the power of the Court. Their
custody of the propeller was obviously and undeniably the
custody of the Court. Finally, the lack of any provision in Rule 126
of the Rules of Court ordaining "that the things seized could be
released only by the court issuing the search warrant," also
adverted to by the Court of Appeals, certainly does not negate
the indisputable fact that said court does acquire custody and
control of the property described in the warrant after its seizure,
to the exclusion of any other court; and that that custody and
control cannot be interfered with by any other coordinate court or
branch of the same court.
Nothing in the record therefore justifies the Order of Judge Cruz
transferring possession of the property in controversy to the
plaintiff pendente lite. That relief can be awarded only after trial,
by final judgment declaring in whom the title to said property
rests. What may be done in the meantime, as already above
pointed out, is simply the transfer by the Maceren Branch, upon
proper application, of custody over the property to the Cruz
Branch, there to await the outcome of the suit.

xxx xxx xxx WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated
on July 30, 1982, subject of this appeal, is reversed and set aside,
and the Order of the Trial Court dated March 22, 1982 declared
The order is attempted to be justified by Judge Cruz by the fact
null and void. The case shall forthwith be remanded to the
"that no criminal action has been filed in Court in connection with
corresponding Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
the seizure of the propeller-in-question," and by Sosuan by the
prompt resumption of trial and rendition of final judgment. Costs
further fact that no such criminal case "can in the future be filed
against private respondents.
under the doctrine of res adjudicata arising from the dismissal of
the petition in G.R. No. 60875-(76) (and hence) the said
propeller pieces have never been nor will ever be in custodia Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras * and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
legis under the search warrant issued by Judge Maximo
Maceren ...," as well as the additional circumstance that "[t]he
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila is
one legal entity composed of several branches, each one acting
for and in behalf of the same legal entity. Consequently, while the
act of the Honorable Maximo Maceren as the presiding Judge of
Branch XVIII in seizing the propeller pieces in question, is the act
of this entity, the act of respondent Judge Alfredo V. Cruz, Jr. as
the presiding Judge of Branch XXIX, is likewise the act of the
same legal entity, the Court of First Instance (RTC) of Manila and
being the most recent, it should be construed as the prevailing
and latest act of the said Court."

The attempt at justification must fail. The petitioner's thesis is

untenable. The absence of any criminal prosecution in the
Maceren Branch in relation to the propeller has no relevance
whatever to the question of whether or not in the civil suit before
the Cruz Branch the plaintiff, who claims to be the owner of the
propeller, is entitled to its possession pending action as against
defendant Vlasons, who also claims to be the owner thereof. Non
sequitur. The absence of such a criminal prosecution and
consequently of any occasion for the Maceren Court to decide
the question of title to the propeller, merely makes necessary the
civil suit to precisely resolve that issue. It does not of itself furnish
basis for or warrant the transfer of possession from one party to
the other in the civil action. The theory that the act of one branch
of a court of first instance (regional trial court) may be deemed to
be the act of another branch of the same court is, upon its face,
absurd. It flies in the teeth of the all too familiar actuality that each
branch is a distinct and separate court, exercising jurisdiction
over the cases assigned to it to the exclusion of all other
branches.
24) G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial
Court of Kalookan City; HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with
another primae impressionis case through the present petition
wherein the parties have formulated and now pose for resolution
the following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance
of an application for a search warrant in connection with an
offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter,
issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the
court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.
The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are
best taken from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals on
which there does not appear to be any dispute, to wit:
From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court,
it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V.
Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector)
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application
for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in
connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25
Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On
March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued
Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30
p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search
warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a
labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education
and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to
CAPCOM's "Inventory of Property Seized," firearms, explosive
materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized
and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons
found within the premises searched were brought to Camp
Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with
the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who
were indicated for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No.
Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C.
Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the
Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the
Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for
Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of
Evidence Illegally Obtained.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge
issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but
denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under
attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the
same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the
contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region
of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under
challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of October
5, 1990, petitioners have come to this Court via the instant
petition, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF
AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT IN
CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED
OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A
WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE LIKEWISE
OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, in effect
affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the
petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it
had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This
judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to
be reversed through the present recourse before us.
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by
petitioners in support of their submissions. Their disquisitions
postulate interpretative theories contrary to the letter and intent of
the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal
obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area of law
enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they
do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter
of (1) the court which has the competence to issue a search
warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible
jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search
warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues
while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the
resolution of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other.
Accordingly, to avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these
questions shall be discussed seriatim.
I
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of
criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed
toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached
illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to be buttressed by
the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter
court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was
accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in
criminal actions involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without
jurisdiction to do so.
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the
institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It
would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the
power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to
a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the
requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a
criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined
in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of
a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural
concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is
definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by
a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues
as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also
the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of
courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a
writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire
jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or
enforce the judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other
process issuing from a court of justice.
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial
process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in
the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at
bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance to require
observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may
eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having
as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial
jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be
seized are then located. This is aside from the consideration that
a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules
for delitos continuados or in those instances where different trial
courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same
criminal offense.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners'
implausible position may create, we need not stray far from the
provisions of Section 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the
venue of criminal actions and which we quote:
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted. —
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action
shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place.
(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an
aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while in the course
of its trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the
court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or
other vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of
departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the
course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and
tried in the proper court of the first port of entry or of any
municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during
such voyage, subject to the generally accepted principles of
international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but
punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code
shall be cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first
filed. (14a)
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement
authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine
where they should apply for a search warrant in view of the
uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case
under the foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance
with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said
warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain
the same from what may later turn out to be a court not within the
ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present
vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 1948 or the
recent Judiciary Reorganization Act, have never required the
jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to
be inferentially drawn from the silence of the reglementary
provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory
omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but mean
that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress
itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of
national policy and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal
manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime.
For us to now impose such conditions or restrictions, under the
guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably
construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would be
tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something
that has been omitted but which someone believes ought to have
been embraced therein.
Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to
resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a particular
court and a search warrant is needed to secure evidence to be
presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case
may properly issue the warrant, upon proper application and due
compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application
would only be an incident in that case and which it can resolve in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles
are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no
further complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect,
however, where such articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction,
which aspect will be addressed hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration,
petitioners, after discoursing on the respective territorial
jurisdictions of the thirteen Regional Trial Courts which
correspond to the thirteen judicial regions, invite our attention to
the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority granted by
law, has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a
Regional Trial Court over which the particular branch concerned
shall exercise its
authority. From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be
searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to
search that place." Support for such position is sought to be
drawn from issuances of this Court, that is, Circular No. 13
issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on
August 4, 1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars
were not intended to be of general application to all instances
involving search warrants and in all courts as would be the case if
they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These
circulars were issued by the Court to meet a particular exigency,
that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search
warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and other
courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of
the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the
Revised Penal Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or
ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other
words, the aforesaid theory on the court's jurisdiction to issue
search warrants would not apply
to single-sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule
sought by petitioners to be adopted by the Court would actually
result in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to
legal and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners'
contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court,
supposedly "defining the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts," was the source of the subject matter
jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative
order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch.
— The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which
a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority.
The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the
venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or
criminal, . . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by
an administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by
said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is
basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides
that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to
a region which shall be his permanent station," and he "may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to any branch or city or
municipality within the same region as public interest may require,
and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to
another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new
appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars
Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered
regional trial court or its branches, such that non-observance
thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order
merely defines the limits of the administrative area within which a
branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the
jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The circulars
only allocated to the three executive judges the administrative
areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants
under the special circumstance contemplated therein, but
likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas
Pambansa Blg, 129.
Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the
conclusion that the grant of power to the courts mentioned
therein, to entertain and issue search warrants where the place
to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended
to exclude other courts from exercising the same power. It will
readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to
provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its
predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of
requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search
warrants, if they had been filed with the executive judge, among
the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19
eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle and ordered
instead that such applications should immediately be "taken
cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial
Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is
located," or by their substitutes enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never
intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges.
In view of the fact, however, that they were themselves directed
to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the
same among the other judges as was the previous practice, it
was but necessary and practical to require them to so act only on
applications involving search of places located within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was,
therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of
applications among them, in recognition of human capabilities
and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion of all other
courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No. 13 even specifically
envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that
provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are
seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court,
said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7
dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried
and decided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not
necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has
jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant,
as would be the consequence of petitioners' position that only
the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be
searched can issue a warrant to search the same. It may be
conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is
pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch
thereof, has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and
where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the
executive judges or their lawful substitutes in the areas and for
the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall
have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial
jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot
issue a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that
search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling
considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely,
neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has
jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an
executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations
provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or
nullified just because it was implemented outside the court's
territorial jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the
permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search
warrants.
II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is
whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority to
issue a warrant for the search of a place outside its territorial
jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the
negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule
imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same
manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest.
Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction,
there were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest
could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for
the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten
days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a
return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant
does not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely
until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the
lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules
at ten days but there is no provision as to the extent of the
territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented
on and within the premises specifically described therein which
may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing
court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize
the fact that when the law or rules would provide conditions,
qualifications or restrictions, they so state. Absent specific
mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary
implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to
be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a
contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be
countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The
jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the
so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province
only with the approval of the former court of first instance. Under
the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs
and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial
court. On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of
the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the
Philippines, under the Interim or Transitional Rules and
Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court
are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest
of clarity and contrast, it is necessary that said provision be set
out in full:
3. Writs and processes. —
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may
be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or
a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit
trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the
last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further
belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule
enumerates the writs and processes which, even if issued by a
regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region.
In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all other writs and
processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated,
a search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action.
No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or
impliedly provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of
enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the
interim Rules expressly authorizes its enforcement anywhere in
the country, since it is not among the processes specified in
paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made
regarding the processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the
nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be
blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to
detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of
illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is
accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for
the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit
items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by
imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of
jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are
unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck
down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the
landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al., the searches
in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of
therein petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants
issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and by the Municipal Courts of Manila and
Quezon City, but the same were never challenged on
jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently nullified
for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further
sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional
proscription against illegal searches and seizures. We do not
believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a
court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be
searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor
are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law
enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a
permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the
warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a
search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the
constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated
safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
for the issuance of a search warrant, and all these have to be
observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is
importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said
requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime of the
warrant would discourage resort to a court in another judicial
region, not only because of the distance but also the
contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are
really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it
does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been
made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable
indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only
property and privacy, but persons and liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the
authorities have to contend now and then with local and national
criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political
or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy
any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under
their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do
so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to
and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk,
danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution,
obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by
the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court:
This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of
information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a
search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate
within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or
municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is
located.
The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken
into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in
the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one
district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in
another district of the county and made returnable before the
justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction
to deal with the matters involved. In the present state of our law
on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with
respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the
enforcement thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
III
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or,
more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the
criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is
issued by another court for the seizure of personal property
intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case. This
arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our
jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was
anticipated in Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited
scenario contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the
following policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have
primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and
for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant
may be filed with another court only under extreme and
compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the
satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due
course to the application depending on the validity of the
justification offered for not filing the same in the court with
primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to
quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said
court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate
higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the
issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent
or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall
be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or
resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in
the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression
as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if
the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate
courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress
evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to
prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that
objections not available, existent or known during the
proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the
hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on
the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper
remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the
motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from
further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under
the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court
wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary
safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same
criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints
and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction
over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try
the case shall have been resolved, such court shall be
considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on
applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is
DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J.,
The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:
1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a
court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may
validly entertain an application for and thereafter issue a search
warrant in connection with the commission of such crime; and
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was
filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case; however, under
extreme and compelling circumstances, another court may issue
a search warrant in connection with said case.
I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the
second.
A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority
opinion adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial
jurisdiction over the crime committed can validly entertain an
application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said
crime. The majority opinion says:
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined
in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of
a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because
of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural
concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is
definitively considered merely as a process generally issued by a
court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal
action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues
as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also
the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of
courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a
writ, summons, or order in a judicial proceeding to acquire
jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or
enforce judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other
processes issuing from a court of justice.
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial
process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in
the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. . . ." (citations omitted)
What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or
disquisition on the concept of a search warrant are the following:
(a) it is "in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a court "in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by the Rules to
respond only to an incident in the main case . . . or in anticipation
thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the
court entertaining the application for and issuing the search
warrant has jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course,
the crime in connection with whose commission the warrant was
issued.
The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases
governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16
thereof provides:
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the
indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the
government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible
objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained
from others by seizure or process, upon a showing that the items
sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and
that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice and
Procedure with Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).
Note that the required motion is filed after the filing of the
indictment or information.
"Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or
incidental to an original jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is
defined as follows:
Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine
matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an
action.
Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court
acquires jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and
may, as incident to disposition of matter properly before it,
possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by case,
though district court could not have taken cognizance of them if
they had been independently presented.
. . ."Ancillary jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either
proceedings which are concerned with pleadings, processes,
records or judgments of court in principal case or proceedings
which affect property already in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law
Dictionary 79 [5th ed., 1979]).
"Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which,
perforce, must be within the court's jurisdiction. Incident is
defined thus:
Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which,
either usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon,
appertains to, or follows another that is more worthy. Used as a
noun, it denotes anything which inseparably belongs to, or is
connected with, or inherent in, another thing, called the
"principal". Also, less strictly, it denotes anything which is usually
connected with another, or connected for some purposes, though
not inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)
Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and
Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:
3. Writs and processes. — (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued
by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or
a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit
trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the
last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court.
is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or
processes issued by a court in a case pending before it and not
to a case yet to be filed with it or pending in another court.
The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a
court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction should not be
construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice in
the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view
suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi,
Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain an application for a
search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime
committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines,
including the municipal trial courts, can validly issue a search
warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the
Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines
have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over
the entire archipelago.
I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search
warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the
exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to
issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's
territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an
exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial
jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would
amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the
courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial
courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In
the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that
would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the
infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and
inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused who is a
resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a
search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in
connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat,
Batanes.
Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative
confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to
issue search warrants in connection with crimes committed
outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the
forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by
several Judges — specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the
City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of
Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez
of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) — there
is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for
the searches and seizures of properties outside the territorial
jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued
against the petitioners and corporations of which they were
officers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7
have addresses in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which
includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the Seventh
Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground
the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of
the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants.
B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second
principle where another court may, because of extreme and
compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection
with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate
this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may
validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City
and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used
in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an
information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I
submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even
in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires
jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the exclusion of the other.
(People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so,
it is with more reason that a court which does not have
concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance
of the case does not also have the authority to issue writs or
processes, including search warrants, in connection with the
pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant
is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary
jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has
exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the
issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith.
Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception
may provide room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial process,
wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective
law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of
any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that
first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet
within its broad powers and authority.
In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original
view in this case, I respectfully submit that:
1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a
search warrant in connection with said crime. However, in the
National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13
of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be
observed.
2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the
appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime
charged may only be issued by said court.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The majority opinion enunciates these two principles:
1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a
court which has no territorial jurisdiction over the crime may
validly entertain an application for and thereafter issue a search
warrant in connection with the commission of such crime; and
2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was
filed has primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case; however, under
extreme and compelling circumstances, another court may issue
a search warrant in connection with said case.
I am unable to agree with the first and with the exception to the
second.
A.. By the very definition of a search warrant which the majority
opinion adopts, it is clear to me that only a court having territorial
jurisdiction over the crime committed can validly entertain an
application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said
crime. The majority opinion says:
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined
in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of
a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in nature, and made necessary because
of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural
concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is
definitively considered merely as a process generally issued by a
court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal
action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues
as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also
the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of
courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to include a
writ, summons, or order in a judicial proceeding to acquire
jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the cause or
enforce judgment, or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other
processes issuing from a court of justice.
2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial
process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in
the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. . . (citations omitted)
What are to be underscored in the foregoing definition or
disquisition on the concept of a search warrant are the following:
(a) it is "in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery," (b) it is generally issued by a court "in the exercise of
its ancillary jurisdiction," and (c) it is "designed by the Rules to
respond only to an incident in the main case... or in anticipation
thereof." All of these are premised on the assumption that the
court entertaining the application for and issuing the search
warrant has jurisdiction over the main case, meaning, of course,
the crime in connection with whose commission the warrant was
issued.
The writ of discovery is the discovery in federal criminal cases
governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 16
thereof provides:
Upon motion of the defendant at any time after the filing of the
indictment or information, the court may order the attorney for the
government to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or
photograph designated books, papers, documents or tangible
objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained
from others by seizure or process, upon a showing that the items
sought may be material to the presentation of his defense and
that the request is reasonable. (4 Federal Practice and
Procedure with Forms, Rules Edition, 1951 ed., 124).
Note that the required motion is filed after the filing of the
indictment or information.
"Ancillary," in reference to jurisdiction can only mean in aid of or
incidental to an original jurisdiction. Ancillary jurisdiction is
defined as follows:
Ancillary jurisdiction. Power of court to adjudicate and determine
matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an
action.
Under "ancillary jurisdiction doctrine" federal district court
acquires jurisdiction of case or controversy as an entirety and
may, as incident to disposition of matter property before it,
possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by case,
though district court could not have taken cognizance of them if
they had been independently presented. . . . "Ancillary
jurisdiction" of federal court generally involves either proceedings
which are concerned with pleadings, processes, records or
judgments of court in principal case or proceedings which affect
property already in court's custody. . . . (Black's Law Dictionary
79 [5th ed., 1979]).
"Incident in the main case" also presupposes a main case which,
perforce, must be within the court's jurisdiction. Incident is
defined thus:
Incident. Used both substantively and adjectively of a thing which,
either usually or naturally and inseparably, depends upon,
appertains to, or follows another that is more worthy. Used as a
noun, it denotes anything which inseparably belongs to, or is
connected with, or inherent in, another thing, called the 'principal'.
Also, less strictly, it denotes anything which is usually connected
with another, or connected for some purposes, though not
inseparably. . . . (Id., at 686)
Reliance upon Section 3 of the Interim or Transitional Rules and
Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 which reads:
3. Writs and processes. — (a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued
by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or
a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit
trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the
last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the
regional trial court.
is misplaced for the reason that said section refers to writs or
processes issued by a court in a case pending before it and not
to a case yet to be filed with it or pending in another court.
The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a
court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction should not be
construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice in
the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime
committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view
suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi,
Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain an application for a
search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime
committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines,
including the municipal trial courts, can validly issue a search
warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the
Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines
have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over
the entire archipelago.
validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City
and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used
in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an
information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I
submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even
in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires
jurisdiction over the case acquires it to the exclusion of the other.
(People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so,
it is with more reason that a court which does not have
concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance
of the case does not also have the authority to issue writs or
processes, including search warrants, in connection with the
pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrant
is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary
jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has
exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the
issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith.
Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception
may provide room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial process,
wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective
law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of
any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that
first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet
within its broad powers and authority.

I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search

In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original
warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the
view in this case, I respectfully submit that:
exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to
issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the court's
territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an 1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a
jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would search warrant in connection with said crime. However, in the
amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13
courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be
Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial observed.
courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and
municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In 2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the
the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime
would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the charged may only be issued by said court.
infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and
inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused who is a
resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a
search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in
connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat,
Batanes.

Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative

confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to
issue search warrants in connection with crimes committed
outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the
forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by
several Judges — specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the
City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of
Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez
of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) — there
is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for
the searches and seizures of properties outside the territorial
jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued
against the petitioners and corporations of which they were
officers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7
have addresses in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which
includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the Seventh
Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground
the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of
the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants.

B. I have serious misgivings on the exception to the second

principle where another court may, because of extreme and
compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection
with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate
this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may
25) G.R. No. 95902 February 4, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DON RODRIGUEZA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
On appeal before us is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City, Branch 10, finding accused-appellant Don
Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No.
6425, as amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs.
However, the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional
stance in the prosecution of criminal cases, recommends the
acquittal of appellant for the reasons stated in his Manifestation
for Acquittal (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief) filed with the Court. We
have reviewed and analyzed the testimonial and documentary
evidence in this case and we find said recommendation to be
well taken.
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza
and his co-accused, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, with
allegedly having in their custody and possession 100 grams of
marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said
100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of
P200.00.
During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge against them. At the trial, the prosecution and the
defense presented several witnesses after which the court a
quo rendered judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia and Antonio
Lonceras but convicting and penalizing herein appellant as
hereinbefore stated.
The following facts are culled from the decision of the trial court
and the evidence presented by the prosecution.
At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, CIC
Ciriaco Taduran was in their headquarters at the Office of the
Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City,
together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC Leonardo B. Galutan
and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M. Zeidem,
when a confidential informer arrived and told them that there was
an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga,
Albay. Major Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation, which team was given P200.00 in different
denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were treated with
ultraviolet powder at the Philippine Constabulary Crime
Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to Taduran
who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain
Don, the alleged seller of prohibited drugs. Taduran went to
Tagas alone and, while along the road, he met Samuel Segovia.
He asked Segovia where be could find Don and where he could
buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when be returned, he
was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him
as Don, herein appellant.
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of
marijuana, Don halted a passing tricycle driven by Antonio
Lonceras. He boarded it and left Taduran and Segovia. When he
came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain object wrapped in a
plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and received
payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of
marijuana.
Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to
conduct an operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening
of the same date, CIC Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded
to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and arrested appellant, Antonio
Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables were not,
however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended
the three accused. The arrestees were brought to the
headquarters for investigation.
Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, father of
appellant. Taduran did not go with them. During the raid, they
were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic
syringe, among others. The search, however, was not authorized
by any search warrant.
The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released
from detention but appellant was detained. An affidavit, allegedly
taken from and executed by him, was sworn to by him before the
assistant city prosecutor. Appellant had no counsel when his
sworn statement was taken during that custodial investigation.
The arrestees were also examined by personnel of the PCCL
and were found positive for ultraviolet powder.
The three accused presented different versions of their alleged
participations.
Samuel Segovia testified that he was in their house in the
evening of July 1, 1987 listening to the radio. Later, he ate his
merienda and then went out to buy cigarettes from the store.
While he was at the store, a jeep stopped behind him. Several
armed men alighted therefrom and ordered him to get inside the
jeep. He refused but he was forced to board the vehicle. He was
even hit by the butt of a gun. 8
He was thereafter brought to Camp Bagong Ibalon where he was
investigated and was repeatedly asked regarding the
whereabouts of Rodrigueza. He was manhandled by the
NARCOM agents and was detained while inside the camp. He
was then made to hold a P10.00 bill treated with ultraviolet
powder. When he was taken to the PCCL and examined he was
found positive of the ultraviolet powder. He was also made to
sign some papers but he did not know what they were all about.
Appellant, on the other hand, testified that on said date he was in
the house of his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed
there overnight and did not leave the place until the next day
when his brother arrived and told him that their father was taken
by some military men the preceding night. Appellant went to
Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 o'clock in
the morning of July 2, 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he
knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he
answered in the negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a
P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime laboratory for
examination. From that time on, he was not allowed to go home
and was detained inside the camp. He was also tortured in order
to make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale of
marijuana.
In the assignment of errors in his brief, appellant contends that
the trial court erred in (1) admitting in evidence the sworn
statement of appellant which was obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights; (2) convicting appellant of the crime charged
despite the fact that the 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves
allegedly bought from him were not properly identified; (3)
convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the
evidence for the prosecution is weak and not convincing; and (4)
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling or at
least acting as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of marijuana to
CIC Taduran late in the afternoon of July 1, 1987, despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
We rule for the appellant and approve the recommendation for
his acquittal. In disposing of this case, however, we feel that the
issues raised by appellant should properly be discussed seriatim.
1. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by
peace officers to trap and catch a malefactor in flagrante
delicto. Applied to the case at bar, the term in flagrante
delicto requires that the suspected drug dealer must be caught
redhanded in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drug
to a person acting or posing as a buyer.
In the instant case, however, the procedure adopted by the
NARCOM agents failed to meet this qualification. Based on the
very evidence of the prosecution, after the alleged consummation
of the sale of dried marijuana leaves, CIC Taduran immediately
released appellant Rodrigueza instead of arresting and taking
him into his custody. This act of CIC Taduran,
assuming arguendo that the supposed sale of marijuana did take
place, is decidedly contrary to the natural course of things and
inconsistent with the aforestated purpose of a buy-bust operation.
It is rather absurd on his part to let appellant escape without
having been subjected to the sanctions imposed by law. It is, in
fact, a dereliction of duty by an agent of the law.
2. The admissibility of the sworn statement allegedly executed by
appellant was squarely placed in issue and, as correctly pointed
out by the defense, said sworn statement is inadmissible in
evidence against appellant.
We have once again to reiterate and emphasize that Article III of
the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
An examination of said sworn statement shows that appellant
was informed of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be
assisted by counsel during custodial examination. He was also
asked if he was waiving his right to be assisted by counsel and
he answered in the affirmative. However, while the rights of a
person under custodial investigation may be waived, such waiver
must be made not only voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently but
also in the presence and with the assistance of counsel. In the
present case, the waiver made by appellant being without the
assistance of counsel, this omission alone is sufficient to
invalidate said sworn statement.
3. Corollary to this, we take cognizance of the error of the trial
court in admitting in evidence against appellant the articles
allegedly confiscated during the raid conducted in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza.
As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid,
must generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by
the proper government authority. True, in some instances, this
Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches
and seizures even without a search warrant. Thus, when the
owner of the premises waives his right against such
incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when
it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs
laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it
involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in cases of
inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly
made even without a search warrant.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM
agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized
by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the
situation falls under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence,
appellant's right against unreasonable search and seizure was
clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified
their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the situation
because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some
time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they
should, because they easily could, have first secured a search
warrant during that time.
4. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the
identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other
prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against
appellant.
CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that
appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves wrapped
in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has
been advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined
by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the
appellant were the following items:
One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the
following:
Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves
and seeds contained inside a white colored plastic labelled
"Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected
dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total weight of seven grams
then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each
containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those
confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in the house of
Jovencio Rodrigueza. The unanswered question then arises as
to the identity of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of
appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the
occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana
leaves contained therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime.
As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and
conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of
the prosecution.
5. It is accepted that, as a rule, minor inconsistencies in the
testimony of a witness will not affect his credibility. It even
enhances such credibility because it only shows that he has not
been rehearsed. However, when the inconsistencies pertain to
material and crucial points, the same detract from his overall
credibility.
The exception, rather than the rule, applies in the case at bar. As
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses are tainted with serious flaws and
material inconsistencies rendering the same incredible.
CIC Taduran, in his testimony, said that they had already been
conducting surveillance of the place where the buy-bust
operation was to take place. It turned out, however, that he did
not even know the exact place and the identity of the person from
whom he was to buy marijuana leaves. Thus:
Finally, the Court has repeatedly ruled that to sustain the
conviction of the accused, the prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense. As clearly shown by the evidence, the prosecution has
failed to establish its cause. It has not overcome the presumption
of innocence accorded to appellant. This being the case,
appellant should not be allowed to suffer for unwarranted and
imaginary imputations against him.

FISCAL TOLOSA WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction of the court below is

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant Don
Rodrigueza is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged. It is
Q What place in Tagas were you able to go (to)?
hereby ordered that he be immediately released from custody
unless he is otherwise detained for some other lawful cause.
WITNESS
SO ORDERED.
A I am not actually familiar in (sic) that place, in Tagas, although
we occasionally passed there.

Q Now, upon your arrival in Tagas, what did you do that

afternoon?

A I waited for the suspect because previously, we have already

been conducted (sic) surveylance (sic) in the vicinity.

Q Upon arrival in Tagas, were you able to see the suspect?

A By the road, sir.

Q Who was the first person did you see (sic) when you arrived at
Tagas?

A The first person whom I saw is Samuel Segovia.

Q Were you able to talk with this Samuel Segovia?

A According to him, we could get some.

The same findings go for the testimony of witness Galutan. In his

direct examination, he declared that they arrested the three
accused all at the same time on the fateful night of July 1, 1987.
But, in his cross-examination and as corroborated by the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest submitted by him and Molinawe, it appeared
that Lonceras and Segovia were arrested on different times and
that appellant Don Rodrigueza was not among those who were
arrested. Instead, it was Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father, who
was picked up at a much later time.

With said inconsistencies in sharp focus, we are constrained to

give more credibility to the testimony of appellant Rodrigueza.
While it is true that appellant's defense amounts to an alibi, and
as such is the weakest defense in a criminal prosecution, there
are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to the truth
in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates
his testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on
the night of July 1, 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified
that appellant Rodrigueza was not with them when they were
apprehended by the NARCOM agents.

Secondly, the apparent motive of the NARCOM agents in

prosecuting the accused was also revealed during the trial of the
case. Rebuttal witnesses Gracita Bahillo, sister of appellant, and
Hospicio Segovia, father of Samuel Segovia, testified that Sgt.
Molinawe, who has since been reportedly dismissed from the
service, asked for P10,000.00 from each of them in exchange for
the liberty of the accused. This allegation was never refuted by
the prosecution. Hence, the rule laid down by this Court that the
statements of prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and
credit has no application in the case at bar.
26) G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD
PADILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live
ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin
Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.:
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919
with six (6) live ammunitions;
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4)
long and one (1) short magazine with ammunitions;
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8)
ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber
revolver.
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992,
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions under P.D. 1866 thru
the following Information:
That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of
Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP
131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with
ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson,
SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro
Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions,
without having the necessary authority and permit to carry and
possess the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, but granted
his application for bail. During the arraignment on January 20,
1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for petitioner after he
refused, upon advice of counsel, to make any plea. Petitioner
waived in writing his right to be present in any and all stages of
the case.
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered
judgment dated April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime
charged and sentenced him to an "indeterminate penalty from 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to
21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum". Petitioner filed his
notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. Pending the appeal in the
respondent Court of Appeals, the Solicitor-General, convinced
that
the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December
2, 1994 a motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution
of this motion was incorporated in the now assailed respondent
court's decision sustaining petitioner's conviction the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the
P200,000.00 bailbond posted by accused-appellant for his
provisional liberty, FGU Insurance Corporation Bond No. JCR (2)
6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 61,
Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of
accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National
Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the
said accused-appellant shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal, should he appeal to the Supreme Court.
This shall be immediately executory. The Regional Trial Court is
further directed to submit a report of compliance herewith.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. On
August 9, 1995 he filed a "motion for reconsideration (and to
recall the warrant of arrest)" but the same was denied by
respondent court in its September 20, 1995 Resolution copy of
which was received by petitioner on September 27, 1995. The
next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari with application for bail followed by two
"supplemental petitions" filed by different counsels, a "second
supplemental petition" and an urgent motion for the separate
resolution of his application for bail. Again, the
Solicitor-General sought the denial of the application for bail, to
which the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31,
1996. The Court also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to
file a consolidated comment on the petitions and thereafter
required the petitioner to file his reply. However, after his
vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in
the respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of
petitioner's guilt in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the
Solicitor-General now makes a complete turnabout by filing a
"Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying for petitioner's
acquittal.
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by
evidence on record and given credence by respondent court, is
as follows:
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique
Manarang and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the
Manukan sa Highway Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City
where they took shelter from the heavy downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN,
February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on motorcycles
(pp 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the
restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero,
running fast down the highway prompting him to remark that the
vehicle might get into an accident considering the inclement
weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, he said thus: "Ka bilis
na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya." (p. 7, ibid).
True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the
restaurant, Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound
produced by the sudden and hard braking of a vehicle running
very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a sickening sound of the
vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite sure of
what had happened, remarked "oy ta na" signifying that
Manarang had been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid).
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw
the vehicle occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving
it a slight tilt to its side (pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a
member of both the Spectrum, a civic group and the Barangay
Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident to
the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He
took out his radio and called the Viper, the radio controller of the
Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the
time Manarang completed the call, the vehicle had started to
leave the place of the accident taking the general direction to the
north (p. 11, ibid).
Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that
the vehicle had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid).
He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the
restaurant, rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p.
11 ibid). During the chase he was able to make out the plate
number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, TSN, February 15,
1193). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p.
34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number
PMA 777 was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN,
June 8, 1993). The Viper, in the person of SP02 Ruby Buan,
upon receipt of the second radio call flashed the message to all
units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the
vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City
reached by the alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales
Street near the Traffic Division (pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993).
SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito Miranda immediately
borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and positioned
themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it
was the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It
took them about ten (10) seconds to cover the distance between
their office and the Abacan bridge (p. 9, ibid).
Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash
message from SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the
Pulongmaragal Detachment which was then conducting patrol
along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993). On
board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2
Odejar (p. 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3
Tan to proceed to the MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle
with plate number PMA 777 (p. 10, ibid).
In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which
figured in the hit and run incident, even passing through a
flooded portion of the MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in
front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but he could not catch up with
the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993). When he saw
that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he
proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal
was not passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan
bridge, he found Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda watching all vehicles coming their way (p. 10, TSN,
February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed them
that there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning
that the two police officers already knew about the incident,
Manarang went back to where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid).
When Manarang was in front of Tina's Restaurant, he saw the
vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident emerging from
the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February 15,
1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the
vehicle bore the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it
(p. 15, ibid) towards the Abacan bridge.
Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2
Miranda of Mobile No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When
the vehicle was about twelve (12) meters away from their position,
the two police officers boarded their Mobile car, switched on the
engine, operated the siren and strobe light and drove out to
intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the
vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12,
TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with
plate number PMA 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p.
12, ibid). The driver rolled down the window and put his head out
while raising both his hands. They recognized the driver as Robin
C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was no one
else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja
noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle
behind the vehicle of appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told
appellant to alight to which appellant complied. Appellant was
wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993) such
that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit
"C") tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN,
February 23, 1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja
made the move to confiscate the gun but appellant held the
former's hand alleging that the gun was covered by legal papers
(p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun really
was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the
office (p. 16, ibid). After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him
about the hit and run incident which was angrily denied by
appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a crowd had formed at the
place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun
and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid).
While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with
SPO Ruben Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board
arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8, 1993). As the most senior
police officer in the group, SPO Mercado took over the matter
and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the hit and
run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that
the plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and
the hood were dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant,
however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, instead, played
with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and pointing
to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril
ko" (pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his
gesture exposed a long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in
appellant 's back right, pocket (p. 16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw
this and so when appellant turned around as he was talking and
proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine
from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could
also be carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a
magazine, SPO2 Mercado prevented appellant from going back
to his vehicle by opening himself the door of appellant's vehicle
(16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying
horizontally at the front by the driver 's seat. It had a long
magazine filled with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp.
17-21, ibid). He asked appellant for the papers covering the rifle
and appellant answered angrily that they were at his home (pp.
26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid).
SPO Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp.
28-29, ibid).
The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at
Jake Gonzales Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant
voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a pietro berreta pistol
(Exhibit "L") with a single round in its chamber and a magazine
(pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets.
Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two
additional long magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M,
N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid). After appellant had been interrogated
by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was transferred to the
Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the
City Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions
were turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN,
July 13, 1993). During the investigation, appellant admitted
possession of the firearms stating that he used them for shooting
(p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any permit to carry or
memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18, TSN,
January 25, 1994).
On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit "F") was issued by
Captain, Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record
Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN,
March 4, 1993). The Certification stated that the three firearms
confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP
131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919
and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the
name of Robin C. Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated
December 11, 1992 issued by Captain Espino stated that the
three firearms were not also registered in the name of Robinhood
C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid).
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal
and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a confidential agent authorized,
under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the
subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court is
convinced that petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands
on terra firma, notwithstanding the Solicitor-General's change of
heart.
Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his
arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the
arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension
at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he
has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred
here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in
a hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest petitioner.
It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only
require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when
he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once
to the scene." As testified to by Manarang, he heard the
screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim
(balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter
gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in
order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to
the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan
bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and
SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected
the actual arrest of petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest
by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not
at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That
Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who
admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in
effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety
of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action
Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by
himself, inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better
trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like
herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a
degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able
to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a
reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law
enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is
precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein
involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the
long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like
petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in
motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was
confronted by an urgent need to render aid or take action. The
exigent circumstances of — hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a
moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime — all
created a situation in which speed is essential and delay
improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make
the forcible stop since they had more than mere "reasonable and
articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been
engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith &
Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's
warrantless arrest was proper as he was again actually
committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could
likewise be justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just
committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a
considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves at
the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero of
petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by
Manarang), and the dented hood and railings thereof. These
formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting
police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not
on unreliable hearsay information.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any
objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made
before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner's belated
challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash the information,
his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence,
placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his
arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail, petitioner patently waived
such irregularities and defects.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from
petitioner without a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence
of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search
and seizure of property is valid, are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized
under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence ,
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be where they are;
(c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search.
3. search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation
of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable
cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.
4. consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed
appears that the authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms
and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search
which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying into hidden
places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith &
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for
they came within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently
discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner's waist
and back pocket respectively, when he raised his hands after
alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately
apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the
Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's
seat. Thus it has been held that:
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a
criminal offense, the . . . police officers should happen to discover
a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not
precluded from performing their duties as police officers for the
apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the, corpus
delicti.
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently
found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant.
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing
assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to
the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and seizure , and that his
failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products
of an active search done by the authorities on the person and
vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without a search warrant
nonetheless can still be justified under a search incidental to a
lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected,
the police may undertake a protective search of the passenger
compartment and containers in the vehicle which are within
petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the
offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search:
(i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
custody or area of immediate control and (ii) the search was
contemporaneous with the arrest. The products of that search
are admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule.
Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third
instance). In connection therewith, a warrantless search is
constitutionally permissible when, as in this case, the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a
law-offender (like herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run)
or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been
instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some
criminal offense.
Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not
be convicted of violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed
civilian agent authorized to possess and carry the subject
firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo
Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga,
Surigao del Sur. The contention lacks merit.
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites
must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm
and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the
firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to
possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject
firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner's
possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered
in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was
convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's
purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior
in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution
as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission
Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this
score, we lift from respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the
Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order were issued before
the subject firearms were seized and confiscated from him by the
police officers in Angeles City. That is not so. The evidence
adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and Mission
Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been
apprehended on October 26, 1992.
Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as
proof of his authority to possess and carry the subject firearms.
During the preliminary investigation of the charge against him for
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions he could not,
despite the ample time given him, present any proper document
showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the Memorandum
Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those
documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least
during the preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his
counsel inform the prosecutor that appellant is authorized to
possess and carry the subject firearms under Memorandum
Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial presentation of his
evidence in court, appellant could have produced these
documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not.
He did not even take the witness stand to explain his possession
of the subject firearms.
Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the
prosecution rested contain no allegation of a Memorandum
Receipts and Mission Order authorizing appellant to possess and
carry the subject firearms.
At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness
cited was one James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued.
Superintendent Gumtang was not even mentioned. James
Neneng appeared in court but was not presented by the defense.
Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense found
Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without
subpoena on January 13, 1994.
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present
the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt if they were really
issued and existing before his apprehension. Petitioner's
alternative excuses that the subject firearms were intended for
theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the Presidential
Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As
to be reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like
herein petitioner, would grab the earliest opportunity to present
the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt in question and
save himself from the long and agonizing public trial and spare
him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In fact, the Mission
Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief of
Staff, is explicit in providing that:
VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by
enforcement units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and
other Military Police Units of AFP, the Mission Order should be
shown without resentment to avoid embarrassment and/or
misunderstanding.
IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the
confidential instruction will be carried out through all legal means
and do not cover an actuation in violation of laws. In the latter
event, this Mission Order is rendered inoperative in respect to
such violation.
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent
explanation.
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt, moreover, were ably controverted.
Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Durendes denied under
oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission Order and
declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his
behalf. His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled
as
"Durembes." In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of
Offices have the authority to issue Mission Orders and
Memorandum Receipts under the Guidelines on the Issuance of
MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. PNP Supt. Rodialo Gumtang who
issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt is
neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere
deputy commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized
source, petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are
infirm and lacking in force and effect. Besides, the Mission Order
covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City," areas outside Supt.
Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval
"by next higher Headquarters" which is absent in this case. The
Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as
required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of
Defense which pertinently provides that:
No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms
without corresponding certification from the corresponding
Responsible Supply Officer of the appropriate AFP unit that such
firearm has been officially taken up in that units property book,
and that report of such action has been reported to higher AFP
authority.
Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see
no reason why he cannot present the corresponding certification
as well.
What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified
to by the Director for Personnel of the PNP, does not even
appear in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of
Civilian Agents or Employees of the PNP which could justify the
issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by petitioner's
counsel. The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then
PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are
clear and unambiguous, thus:
No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing
the same to carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is
included in the regular plantilla of the government agency
involved in law enforcement and is receiving regular
compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the agency.
Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law
enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special
project which specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure
its accomplishment and that the project is duly approved at the
PC Regional Command level or its equivalent level in other major
services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher levels of
command. Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then
Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:
If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the
uniformed service), they must be civilian agents included in the
regular plantilla of the government agency involved in law
enforcement and are receiving regular compensation for the
service they are rendering.
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were
fabricated pieces of evidence is accentuated all the more by the
testimony and certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of
the firearms and Explosives Office of the PNP declaring that
petitioner's confiscated firearms are not licensed or registered in
the name of the petitioner. Thus:
Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness,
what did you find, if any?
A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered
owner of one 9 mm pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No.
TCT 8214 and the following firearms being asked whether it is
registered or not, I did not find any records, the M-16 and the
caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with the
same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or
registered in the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina.
Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused
Robin C. Padilla is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with
Serial No. TCT 8214?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not
listed in the names of the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
And the certification which provides as follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of the Interior and Local Government
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE
Camp Crame, Quezon City
PNFEO5 28 November 1992
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St.,
Quezon City is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and
Wesson Cal 9mm with serial number TCT8214 covered by
License No. RL M76C4476687.
Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with
this Office per verification from available records on file this
Office as of this date:
M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial
number 35723Y, licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva
Fallorina of 29 San Juan St., Capitol Pasig, MM under
Re-Registered License.
This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of
Angeles.
FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
(Sgd.)
JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO
Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the
testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the PNP
Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a person is
not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of illegal possession of
firearm. In People vs. Tobias, we reiterated that such
certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no
license. From the foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner
does not have the license or permit to possess was
overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The certification may
even be dispensed with in the light of the evidences that an
M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol,
akin to the confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a
civilian, as in the case of petitioner. The Court, therefore,
entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's conviction especially
as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented, to
depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and
respondent court which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with
respect and finality.
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in
applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a
non-subversive context" and adds that respondent court should
have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of
firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D.
1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years
and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm
is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial
court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing
law at the time of appellant's commission of the offense for it is a
rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it
is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it
stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted
for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes
adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty
for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for
simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges
from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary
to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty
does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. "The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24 C.J.S.,
1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to
come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive", "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community"
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes,
it is not so much the extent as the nature of the punishment that
determines whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and that
sentences of imprisonment, though perceived to be harsh, are
not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the
statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note,
was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law,
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In
fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by
this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent
laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any
provision of the Constitution. . . " Appellant's grievances on the
wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us.
Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of
laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of
Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who
approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we
reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed
by respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
maximum), we reduce the same in line with the fairly recent case
of People v. Lian where the Court en banc provided that the
indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal possession of
firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to
twelve years (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20)
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is discernible from the
following explanation by the Court:
In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
have been alleged or proved, In accordance with the doctrine
regarding special laws explained in People v. Simon, although
Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a special law, the penalties
therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code, hence the rules
in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the proper
period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the
offense of simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium
period of the complex penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years,
8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in
accordance with the rules therefor and not merely imposable as a
general prescription under the law, shall be the maximum of the
range of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum thereof shall
be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty next lower
in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
Appeals sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of
the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner's
indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
27) G.R. No. 123595 December 12, 1997
SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an Information filed on 30 August 1990, in Criminal Case No.
90-86748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 5, petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as follows:
That on or about August 27, 1990, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly keep, possess and/or acquire a hand
grenade, without first securing the necessary license and/or
permit therefor from the proper authorities.
At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by
counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
At pre-trial on 11 March 1991, petitioner admitted the existence
of Exhibits "A," "A-1," and "A-2," while the prosecution admitted
that the police authorities were not armed with a search warrant
nor warrant of arrest at the time they arrested petitioner.
At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following
police officers as its witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer;
Josefino G. Serapio, the investigating officer; and Orlando
Ramilo, who examined the grenade.
Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police
Force of the Integrated National Police, Police Station No. 3,
Quiapo, Manila, testified that on 27 August 1990, at about 6:30
p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he
was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in
uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the
Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two
groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of
three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of
Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men
were acting suspiciously with "[t]heir eyes. . . moving very fast."
Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points
and observed both groups for about thirty minutes. The police
officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up
with and apprehended petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu
found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside petitioner's "front
waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran,
apprehended Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was
recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then brought to Police
Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander.
On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot
patrol due to a report that a group of Muslims was going to
explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda.
Yu recognized petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August
1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner and 2 others
attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when
Yu and other policemen chased petitioner and his companions;
however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter. Yu
further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing
on the corner of Quezon Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27
August 1990. Although they were not creating a commotion,
since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his
companions approached them. Yu did not issue any receipt for
the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.
Josefino G. Serapio declared that at about 9:00 a.m. of 28
August 1990, petitioner and a certain Abdul Casan were brought
in by Sgt. Saquilla for investigation. Forthwith, Serapio
conducted the inquest of the two suspects, informing them of
their rights to remain silent and to be assisted by competent and
independent counsel. Despite Serapio's advice, petitioner and
Casan manifested their willingness to answer questions even
without the assistance of a lawyer. Serapio then took petitioner's
uncounselled confession (Exh. "E"), there being no PAO lawyer
available, wherein petitioner admitted possession of the grenade.
Thereafter, Serapio prepared the affidavit of arrest and booking
sheet of petitioner and Casan. Later, Serapio turned over the
grenade to the Intelligence and Special Action Division (ISAD) of
the Explosive Ordinance Disposal Unit for examination.
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's
confession knowing it was inadmissible in evidence.
Orlando Ramilo, a member of the Bomb Disposal Unit, whose
principal duties included, among other things, the examination of
explosive devices, testified that on 22 March 1991, he received a
request dated 19 March 1991 from Lt. Eduardo Cabrera and PO
Diosdado Diotoy for examination of a grenade. Ramilo then
affixed an orange tag on the subject grenade detailing his name,
the date and time he received the specimen. During the
preliminary examination of the grenade, he "[f]ound that [the]
major components consisting of [a] high filler and fuse assembly
[were] all present," and concluded that the grenade was "[l]ive
and capable of exploding." On even date, he issued a
certification stating his findings, a copy of which he forwarded to
Diotoy on 11 August 1991.
Petitioner was the lone defense witness. He declared that he
arrived in Manila on 22 July 1990 and resided at the Muslim
Center in Quiapo, Manila. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27
August 1990, he went to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh
air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered all males
to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other
men, but found nothing in their possession. However, he was
arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No.
3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The
officer showed the gunshot wounds he allegedly sustained and
shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer then
inserted the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and said,
"[y]ou are the one who shot me." Petitioner denied the charges
and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However,
several other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches
and guns. Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was
found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was
presented.
The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of
petitioner was akin to it a "stop and frisk," where a "warrant and
seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by
an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status
quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information." Probable cause was not required as it was not
certain that a crime had been committed, however, the situation
called for an investigation, hence to require probable cause
would have been "premature." The RTC emphasized that Yu
and his companions were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in
which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens the
destruction of evidence" and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste,"
as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously,
considering the time, place and "reported cases of bombing."
Further, petitioner's group suddenly ran away in different
directions as they saw the arresting officers approach, thus "[i]t is
reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose
of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to
allow the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of
violence."
The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from
petitioner was incidental to a lawful arrest, and since petitioner
"[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for
the purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that
sufficient evidence existed to establish petitioner's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
In its decision dated 10 February 1994 but promulgated on 15
February 1994, the trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of P.D.
No. 186, and sentenced him to suffer:
[T]he penalty of not less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR
(4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL,
as minimum, and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS
OF RECLUSION PERPETUA, as maximum.
On 18 February 1994, petitioner filed a notice of
appeal indicating that he was appealing to this Court. However,
the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals
which docketed it as CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 and issued a notice
to file briefs.
In his Appellant's Brief filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner
asserted that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SEARCH UPON THE PERSON OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
AND THE SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED HANDGRENADE
FROM HIM "WAS AN APPROPRIATE INCIDENT TO HIS
ARREST."
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE HANDGRENADE
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM HIM AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF
AN UNREASONABLE AND ILLEGAL SEARCH.
In sum, petitioner argued that the warrantless arrest was invalid
due to absence of any of the conditions provided for in Section 5
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, citing People vs. Mengote. As
such, the search was illegal, and the hand grenade seized,
inadmissible in evidence.
In its Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General
agreed with the trial court and prayed that its decision be
affirmed in toto.
In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court, noting, first, that petitioner abandoned his original
theory before the court a quo that the grenade was "planted" by
the police officers; and second, the factual finding of the trial
court that the grenade was seized from petitioner's possession
was not raised as an issue. Further, respondent court focused on
the admissibility in evidence of Exhibit "D," the hand grenade
seized from petitioner. Meeting the issue squarely, the Court of
Appeals ruled that the arrest was lawful on the ground that there
was probable cause for the arrest as petitioner was "attempting
to commit an offense," thus:
We are at a loss to understand how a man, who was in
possession of a live grenade and in the company of other
suspicious character[s] with unlicensed firearm[s] lurking in Plaza
Miranda at a time when political tension ha[d] been enkindling a
series of terroristic activities, [can] claim that he was not
attempting to commit an offense. We need not mention that
Plaza Miranda is historically notorious for being a favorite bomb
site especially during times of political upheaval. As the mere
possession of an unlicensed grenade is by itself an offense,
Malacat's posture is simply too preposterous to inspire belief.
In so doing, the Court of Appeals took into account petitioner's
failure to rebut the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that
they received intelligence reports of a bomb threat at Plaza
Miranda; the fact that PO Yu chased petitioner two days prior to
the latter's arrest, or on 27 August 1990; and that petitioner and
his companions acted suspiciously, the "accumulation" of which
was more than sufficient to convince a reasonable man that an
offense was about to be committed. Moreover, the Court of
Appeals observed:
The police officers in such a volatile situation would be guilty of
gross negligence and dereliction of duty, not to mention of gross
incompetence, if they [would] first wait for Malacat to hurl the
grenade, and kill several innocent persons while maiming
numerous others, before arriving at what would then be an
assured but moot conclusion that there was indeed probable
cause for an arrest. We are in agreement with the lower court in
saying that the probable cause in such a situation should not be
the kind of proof necessary to convict, but rather the practical
considerations of everyday life on which a reasonable and
prudent mind, and not legal technicians, will ordinarily act.
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the rule laid down
in People v. Mengote, which petitioner relied upon, was
inapplicable in light of "[c]rucial differences," to wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never received any intelligence
report that someone [at] the corner of a busy street [would] be in
possession of a prohibited article. Here the police officers were
responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a check on the series of
terroristic bombings in the Metropolis, and, after receiving
intelligence reports about a bomb threat aimed at the vicinity of
the historically notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted foot
patrols for about seven days to observe suspicious movements
in the area. Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers [had] no
personal knowledge that the person arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Here,
PO3 Yu [had] personal knowledge of the fact that he chased
Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before he finally succeeded in
apprehending him.
Unable to accept his conviction, petitioner forthwith filed the
instant petition and assigns the following errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE WARRANTIES
ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT FIND
APPLICATION IN THE INSTANT CASE.
In support thereof, petitioner merely restates his arguments
below regarding the validity of the warrantless arrest and search,
then disagrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals that he
was "attempting to commit a crime," as the evidence for the
prosecution merely disclosed that he was "standing at the corner
of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard" with his eyes "moving
very fast" and "looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic)
to them." Finally, petitioner points out the factual similarities
between his case and that of People v. Mengote to demonstrate
that the Court of Appeals miscomprehended the latter.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General prays that we
affirm the challenged decision..
For being impressed with merit, we resolved to give due course
to the petition.
The challenged decision must immediately fall on jurisdictional
grounds. To repeat, the penalty imposed by the trial court was:
[N]ot less than SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS taken in palpable violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of
AND ONE (1) DAY OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL, as minimum, the Constitution, which provide as follows:
and not more than THIRTY (30) YEARS OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA, as maximum. Sec. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
The penalty provided by Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866 upon any remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
person who shall unlawfully possess grenades is reclusion preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
For purposes of determining appellate jurisdiction in criminal counsel.
cases, the maximum of the penalty, and not the minimum, is
taken into account. Since the maximum of the penalty xxx xxx xxx
is reclusion perpetua, the appeal therefrom should have been to
us, and not the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(3) of the (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129), in relation Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, Section 5(2) of Article
VIII of the Constitution and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of the Rules
Serapio conducted the custodial investigation on petitioner the
of Court. The term "life imprisonment" as used in Section 9 of
day following his arrest. No lawyer was present and Serapio
B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and Section 3 of Rule
could not have requested a lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO
122 must be deemed to include reclusion perpetua in view of
lawyer was then available. Thus, even if petitioner consented to
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the Constitution.
the investigation and waived his rights to remain silent and to
counsel, the waiver was invalid as it was not in writing, neither
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that he was appealing was it executed in the presence of counsel.
from the trial court's decision to this Court, yet the trial court
transmitted the record to the Court of Appeals and the latter
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was in possession of a
proceeded to resolve the appeal.
grenade, the arrest and search of petitioner were invalid, as will
be discussed below.
We then set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals for having
been rendered without jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is
having been directly brought to us, with the petition for review as
that a warrant is needed in order to validly effect the same. The
petitioner's Brief for the Appellant, the comment thereon by the
Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches
Office of the Solicitor General as the Brief for the Appellee and
and seizures refers to those effected without a validly issued
the memoranda of the parties as their Supplemental Briefs.
warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Deliberating on the foregoing pleadings, we find ourselves Rules of Court, which reads, in part:
convinced that the prosecution failed to establish petitioner's guilt
with moral certainty.
Sec. 5. — Arrest, without warrant; when lawful — A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police officer Yu that a
grenade was found in and seized from petitioner's possession.
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
Notably, Yu did not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
seized. According to him, he turned it over to his commander
offense;
after putting an "X" mark at its bottom; however, the commander
was not presented to corroborate this claim. On the other hand,
the grenade presented in court and identified by police officer (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
Ramilo referred to what the latter received from Lt. Eduardo personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
Cabrera and police officer Diotoy not immediately after arrested has committed it; and
petitioner's arrest, but nearly seven (7) months later, or on 19
March 1991; further, there was no evidence whatsoever that (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
what Ramilo received was the very same grenade seized from escaped . . .
petitioner. In his testimony, Yu never declared that the grenade
passed on to Ramilo was the grenade the former confiscated A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated
from petitioner. Yu did not, and was not made to, identify the under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante
grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim that the delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a
grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, "hot pursuit" arrest.
the law enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve
the chain of evidence so crucial in cases such as these.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles;
Second, if indeed petitioner had a grenade with him, and that two (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a
days earlier he was with a group about to detonate an explosive search incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk."
at Plaza Miranda, and Yu and his fellow officers chased, but
failed to arrest them, then considering that Yu and his three
In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless
fellow officers were in uniform and therefore easily cognizable as
search as a "stop and frisk" with "the seizure of the grenade from
police officers, it was then unnatural and against common
the accused [as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence
experience that petitioner simply stood there in proximity to the
necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions
police officers. Note that Yu observed petitioner for thirty minutes
to the warrant requirement.
and must have been close enough to petitioner in order to
discern petitioner's eyes "moving very fast."
At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts
of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
Finally, even assuming that petitioner admitted possession of the
These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the
grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer
Serapio, such admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was
requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly effected
and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest
determines the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the
arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot
be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting
officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to
destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used
in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal
knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had
just been committed, was being committed or was going to be
committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this
case, plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have
been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a
"stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer clothing
for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes
unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light
of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he
identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment . . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally,
a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk"
was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was
a member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda
two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police
report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who
allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility
as a witness, this likewise diminishes the probability that a
genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If
only to further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to
his claim that petitioner and his companions had to be chased
before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A")
expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other
police officers, petitioner and his companions were "immediately
collared."
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct
which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other
than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an observation
which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or
trouble, as Yu explicitly declared on cross-examination:
Q And what were they doing?
A They were merely standing.
Q You are sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you saw them standing, there were nothing or they
did not create any commotion.
A None, sir.
Q Neither did you see them create commotion?
A None, sir.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None
was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any
telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a
grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. In fact, as noted by
the trial court:
When the policemen approached the accused and his
companions, they were not yet aware that a handgrenade was
tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging object in
[sic] his person.
What is unequivocal then in this case are blatant violations of
petitioner's rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of
Article III of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Seventeenth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is SET
ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on
ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of 10 February 1994 of
Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED
and petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby
ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released from
detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other
lawful cause.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:
I agree with the persuasive ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. that:
1. the search conducted on petitioner (a) was not incidental to a
lawful arrest and (b) did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk; thus,
the grenade found in his person cannot be admitted as evidence
against him; and
2. the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
from the trial court's decision.
I wish, however, to correlate the present case with four relevant
decisions I authored for the Court: Manalili vs. Court of
Appeals, People vs. Encinada, People vs. Lacerna and People
vs. Cuizon, all of which were promulgated without any dissenting
view. This correlation may be of benefit to the bench, the bar and,
particularly, to law enforcement officers. Let me first present a
background on each.
Manalili Involved a
Valid Stop-and-Frisk
In Manalili, anti-narcotics policemen conducted a surveillance in
response to information that drug addicts were roaming the area
fronting the city cemetery of Kalookan, and chanced upon
Manalili who was observed to have reddish eyes and to be
walking in a wobbly manner. Because his appearance was
characteristic of a person "high on drugs," the lawmen
approached him, introduced themselves and inquired as to what
was in his hands. At first, Manalili resisted but the police
prevailed and he showed them his wallet. The anti-narcotics men
found inside what they suspected to be
crushed marijuana residue. They took Manalili to their station for
further investigation. A chromatographic test of the wallet
contents positively affirmed the lawmen's suspicions. Manalili
was thus charged, tried and convicted of illegal possession of the
prohibited substance. He subsequently challenged before us the
legality of his search and arrest, and the admission of the
marijuana as evidence. He contended that the latter two were
products of the illegal search.
Rejecting his appeal, this Court held that the search was akin to a
stop-and-frisk. The police had sufficient reason to stop Manalili,
who "had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk . . . [in] a
popular hangout of drug addicts," in order to investigate if he was
actually "high" on drugs. The situation verily called for a
stop-and-frisk.
Lawmen Had Sufficient Opportunity
to Secure Warrant in Encinada
In Encinada, a police officer received late in the afternoon a tip
from an informant that the following morning, appellant would be
arriving at the Surigao port bringing marijuana. Without securing
a search warrant allegedly because courts were already closed
for the day, the lawmen proceeded early next morning to the city
wharf. About 8:30 a.m., they saw the suspect, carrying two
plastic baby chairs, disembark and thereafter board a tricycle.
The police followed immediately and ordered the driver to stop.
After introducing themselves, the policemen asked Encinada to
alight and to hand over his luggage for inspection. Found
between the baby chairs was a bulky package which was later
found to contain marijuana. On these particulars, he was charged,
tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II
of RA 6425, holding that Encinada was caught in flagrante delicto.
Hence, the warrantless search following his arrest was valid, and
the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence.
Reversing the trial court, this Court stressed the following:
Encinada was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police; the latter did not have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that he just committed an offense; and raw intelligence
information was not a sufficient ground for a warrantless
arrest. Furthermore, "[t]he prosecution's evidence did nor show
any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from
the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact
demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to
appellant under such bare circumstances." Having known the
identity of their suspect the previous day, the law enforcers could
have secured a warrant of arrest even within such limited period
(per Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, s. 1987).
In emphasizing the importance of according respect to every
person's constitutional right against illegal arrests and searches,
the Court exhorted:
Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate every law they are
expected to enforce. [The policeman's] receipt of the intelligence
information regarding the culprit's identity, the particular crime he
allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the
need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed to do so.
Such failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a
constitutional right of the appellant.
. . . That the search disclosed a prohibited substance in
appellant's possession and thus confirmed the police officers'
initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality.
An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest
effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.
Consent Validated an Otherwise
Illegal Search in Lacerna
In Lacerna meanwhile, a police officer observed that the
occupants of a taxicab bowed their heads and slouched when
they passed through the checkpoint he was manning, making
him suspect that something was amiss. He signaled the driver to
stop, then asked permission to search the vehicle. The
occupants consented. Found inside a plastic bag were several
blocks wrapped in newspaper, which were later discovered to
contain marijuana. Lacerna questioned his warrantless arrest
and seizure, claiming that they were violative of his constitutional
rights.
The Court, despite declaring that the prior attendant
circumstances did not justify a warrantless search and seizure,
ruled that the search was valid, not because Lacerna was
caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to
the search. Although appellant and his companion were stopped
by the police on mere suspicion — without probable cause —
that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise, the Court
stressed that their permission for the search was expressly
sought and obtained by the law enforcers. This consent validated
the search, waiver being a generally recognized exception to the
rule against warrantless search. The marijuana, therefore, was
admissible in evidence. "There was no poisonous tree to speak
of."
Mere Suspicion of Criminal Activity
Did Not Justify Search of Cuizon
Lastly, in Cuizon, the NBI, after conducting a surveillance on
Cuizon for about a month, received in the morning a tip from an
informant that Cuizon and his wife were arriving at NAIA that
same day, bringing a large quantity of shabu. A team was
immediately organized and sent to the airport to intercept the
suspect. Shortly after noon, the Cuizon spouses arrived. While at
the airport arrival area, Cuizon handed four travelling bags to Pua
and Lee who thereafter bearded a taxicab, while the Cuizons
took a different vehicle. The NBI team members posted at the
NAIA parking area, however, failed to intercept the suspects. The
team merely trailed the taxicab which proceeded to the Manila
Peninsula Hotel in Makati. After identifying themselves to the
suspects in their hotel room, the team asked permission to
search their bags in the presence of the hotel's chief security
officer. Pua and Lee consented in writing. Found inside three of
the four bags similar to those handed to them by Cuizon at the
airport were plastic packages of white crystalline substances
which, upon later examination, were confirmed to be shabu.
Taking with them the two accused (who, however, did not
implicate Cuizon), the NBI team proceeded to the Cuizon
residence where they found a bag allegedly containing the same
substance. The three were charged and convicted of illegal
transport of the regulated drug. On appeal, only Cuizon
challenged the validity of his warrantless arrest, search and
seizure.
Reiterating the doctrine that "where a person is searched without
a warrant, and under circumstances other than chose justifying a
warrantless arrest . . . , upon a mere suspicion that he has
embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of
discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then
the search made of such person as well as his arrest [is] deemed
illegal," this Court declared unlawful the arrest of Cuizon as well
as the incidental search and seizure. The warrantless arrest and
search were not justified by the rules on "in flagrante delicto" or
"hot pursuit" for, at the time of his arrest, Cuizon was inside his
home resting with his wife and child. No offense had just been
committed or was actually being committed or attempted by him
in the presence of the lawmen, nor did the latter have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Cuizon authored an offense
that had just in fact been committed. Consequently, any evidence
obtained during the illegal search, "even if tending to confirm or
actually confirming the initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible
for any purpose and in any proceeding, the same being 'the fruit
of the poisonous tree.'"
The same would have been true as regards Pua and Lee. But
Pua effectively waived his right against the warrantless search
when he agreed in writing for the NBI team to search his luggage.
Besides, he failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and
search and the admission of the evidence obtained thereby.
However, the case against Lee, who could not speak English or
Filipino, was remanded for a retrial, because he was effectively
denied his right to counsel; for although he was provided with
one, he could not understand and communicate with him
concerning his defense.
After reviewing previous decisions on valid warrantless arrests
and searches, the Court underscored in sum that there was need
for facts providing probable cause, such as the "distinct odor of
marijuana, reports about drug transporting or positive
identification by informers, suspicious behavior, attempt to flee,
[or] failure to produce identification papers" to justify warrantless
arrests and searches. Likewise, urgency must attend such
arrests and searches, as where motor vehicles are used and
there is great probability that the suspect would get away before
a warrant can be procured. Most important is that the law
enforcers must act immediately on the information received,
suspicions raised or probable cause established, and should
effect the arrests and searches without any delay.
Instant Case Correlated
with Four Cited
Now to the correlation with the case at bar.
(1) As in Manalili, lawmen were on surveillance in response to
information that a criminal activity could be in the offing at a
specified place. The stark difference, however, is that in Manalili,
the reported activity involved drug use and the lawmen belonged
to the anti-narcotics group, while in the instant case, the police on
patrol were ordinary law enforcers on the lookout for possible
bombers. In the former, the law enforcers concerned may be
presumed to possess special knowledge and skill to detect the
physical features exhibited by a current drug user. Thus, when
these specially trained enforcers saw Manalili with reddish eyes
and walking in a wobbly manner characteristic of a person "high"
on drugs per their experience, and in a known hangout of drug
users, there was sufficient genuine reason to stop and frisk the
suspect. It is well to emphasize that under different
circumstances, such as where the policemen are not specially
trained, and in common places where people ordinarily converge,
the same features displayed by a person will not normally justify
a warrantless arrest or search on him.
The case before us presents such a situation. The policemen
merely observed that Malacat's eyes were moving very fast.
They did not notice any bulges or packets about the bodies of
these men indicating that they might be hiding explosive
paraphernalia. From their outward look, nothing suggested that
they were at the time armed and dangerous. Hence, there was
no justification for a stop-and-frisk.
(2) In relation to the cases of Encinada and Cuizon, at the time of
the arrests of the suspects, none of the actions of Accused
Encinada and Cuizon were beyond normal as to suggest that
they were then engaged in felonious activities. The simple
handing over of the baggage by Cuizon to Pua and Lee was far
from being indicative of any illegal activity. Such act by itself does
not, by any stretch of imagination, even appear to be suspicious.
Granting that indeed an offense was committed by Cuizon at the
airport, his subsequent arrest cannot even be justified under the
rule on "hot pursuit." He did not attempt to flee, but was actually
able to leave the premises and reach his house unhampered by
the police. There was considerable interruption between the
supposed commission of the crime and his subsequent arrest in
his house where he was already resting.
Moreover, Encinada and Cuizon had been previously identified
and subjected to surveillance. Police informants themselves,
presumably reliable, tipped off their alleged criminal activity.
Specifically with respect to Encinada, there was sufficient time to
priorly obtain a warrant for his arrest. It must be stressed that raw
unverified intelligence information alone is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest or search. That is why it is important to bring
one's evidence before a judge who shall independently
determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant.
It is not for the police to make such determination.
As regards Cuizon, it was, worse, the ineptness of the NBI team
dispatched to intercept him which foiled his arrest and search. In
the present case, if it were true that the arresting officer saw
Malacat two days earlier attempting to detonate a grenade in the
same vicinity, again it was the policemen's ineptitude that
frustrated his valid arrest there and then and, further, their
inability to effectively investigate and identify the culprit — so as
to have obtained a lawful arrest warrant — that hindered his valid
seizure thereafter.
(3) In Lacerna, true, the occupants of the taxicab bowed their
heads and slouched when they passed through the police
checkpoint. Although such acts could raise suspicions, they did
not provide sufficient reason for the police to stop and investigate
them for possible criminal operation; much less, to conduct an
extensive search of their belongings. A checkpoint search is
limited to a roving view within the vehicle. A further search may
be validly effected only if something probably illegal is within his
"plain view." In Lacerna, if not for the passengers' free and
express consent, the search would have been undoubtedly
declared illegal. Similarly, the fast-moving eyes of Malacat,
although connoting unusual behavior, was not indicative that he
was armed and dangerous as to justify a search on his person.
Mengote Supports
Present Ponencia
Bolstering the invalidity of the arrest and search of Malacat
is People vs. Mengote, another classic on the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon receiving a
telephone call shortly before noon from an informer that there
were suspicious-looking persons at a certain street corner in
Tondo, Manila, the Western Police District dispatched a
surveillance team to said place. There they saw two men "looking
from side to side" with one" holding his abdomen." The police
approached them and identified themselves, whereupon the two
tried to flee but failed as other lawmen surrounded them. The
suspects were searched, and recovered from Mengote was a
fully loaded pistol; from his companion, a fan knife.
The Court ruled that the situation was not one calling for a lawful
warrantless search and arrest. As the Court, through Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, succinctly put it: "What offense could possibly
have been suggested by a person 'looking from side to side' and
'holding his abdomen' and in a place not exactly forsaken?"
. . . [T]here could have been a number of reasons, all of them
innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and he was
holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about.
In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were
dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from
the informer that there were 'suspicious-looking' persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay
Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men
looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In closing, the Court lamented and thus warned:
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily
arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen,
even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace
officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on
suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done
in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted
over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting
officer may be justified in the name of security.
Under our rule in Mengote, petitioner's dubious act of moving his
eyes swiftly from side to side can in no way justify a
stop-and-frisk. To convict a person on the basis only of his queer
behavior and to sentence him to practically a lifetime in prison
would simply be unfathomable. Nothing can be more wrong,
unjust and inhuman.
WHEREFORE, I vote to SET ASIDE the assailed decision and to
ACQUIT Petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar
Separate Opinions
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion:
I agree with the persuasive ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr. that:
1. the search conducted on petitioner (a) was not incidental to a
lawful arrest and (b) did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk; thus,
the grenade found in his person cannot be admitted as evidence
against him; and
2. the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
from the trial court's decision.
I wish, however, to correlate the present case with four relevant
decisions I authored for the Court: Manalili vs. Court of
Appeals, People vs. Encinada, People vs. Lacerna and People
vs. Cuizon, all of which were promulgated without any dissenting
view. This correlation may be of benefit to the bench, the bar and,
particularly, to law enforcement officers. Let me first present a
background on each.
Manalili Involved a
Valid Stop-and-Frisk
In Manalili, anti-narcotics policemen conducted a surveillance in
response to information that drug addicts were roaming the area
fronting the city cemetery of Kalookan, and chanced upon
Manalili who was observed to have reddish eyes and to be
walking in a wobbly manner. Because his appearance was
characteristic of a person "high on drugs," the lawmen
approached him, introduced themselves and inquired as to what
was in his hands. At first, Manalili resisted but the police
prevailed and he showed them his wallet. The anti-narcotics men
found inside what they suspected to be
crushed marijuana residue. They took Manalili to their station for
further investigation. A chromatographic test of the wallet
contents positively affirmed the lawmen's suspicions. Manalili
was thus charged, tried and convicted of illegal possession of the
prohibited substance. He subsequently challenged before us the
legality of his search and arrest, and the admission of the
marijuana as evidence. He contended that the latter two were
products of the illegal search.
Rejecting his appeal, this Court held that the search was akin to a
stop-and-frisk. The police had sufficient reason to stop Manalili,
who "had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk . . . [in] a
popular hangout of drug addicts," in order to investigate if he was
actually "high" on drugs. The situation verily called for a
stop-and-frisk.
Lawmen Had Sufficient Opportunity
to Secure Warrant in Encinada
In Encinada, a police officer received late in the afternoon a tip
from an informant that the following morning, appellant would be
arriving at the Surigao port bringing marijuana. Without securing
a search warrant allegedly because courts were already closed
for the day, the lawmen proceeded early next morning to the city
wharf. About 8:30 a.m., they saw the suspect, carrying two
plastic baby chairs, disembark and thereafter board a tricycle.
The police followed immediately and ordered the driver to stop.
After introducing themselves, the policemen asked Encinada to
alight and to hand over his luggage for inspection. Found
between the baby chairs was a bulky package which was later
found to contain marijuana. On these particulars, he was charged,
tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II
of RA 6425, holding that Encinada was caught in flagrante delicto.
Hence, the warrantless search following his arrest was valid, and
the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence.
Reversing the trial court, this Court stressed the following:
Encinada was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police; the latter did not have personal knowledge of facts
indicating that he just committed an offense; and raw intelligence
information was not a sufficient ground for a warrantless
arrest. Furthermore, "[t]he prosecution's evidence did nor show
any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from
the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact
demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to
appellant under such bare circumstances." Having known the
identity of their suspect the previous day, the law enforcers could
have secured a warrant of arrest even within such limited period
(per Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, s. 1987).
In emphasizing the importance of according respect to every
person's constitutional right against illegal arrests and searches,
the Court exhorted:
Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate every law they are
expected to enforce. [The policeman's] receipt of the intelligence
information regarding the culprit's identity, the particular crime he
allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the
need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed to do so.
Such failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a
constitutional right of the appellant.
. . . That the search disclosed a prohibited substance in
appellant's possession and thus confirmed the police officers'
initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality.
An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest
effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.
Consent Validated an Otherwise
Illegal Search in Lacerna
In Lacerna meanwhile, a police officer observed that the
occupants of a taxicab bowed their heads and slouched when
they passed through the checkpoint he was manning, making
him suspect that something was amiss. He signaled the driver to
stop, then asked permission to search the vehicle. The
occupants consented. Found inside a plastic bag were several
blocks wrapped in newspaper, which were later discovered to
contain marijuana. Lacerna questioned his warrantless arrest
and seizure, claiming that they were violative of his constitutional
rights.
The Court, despite declaring that the prior attendant
circumstances did not justify a warrantless search and seizure,
ruled that the search was valid, not because Lacerna was
caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to
the search. Although appellant and his companion were stopped
by the police on mere suspicion — without probable cause —
that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise, the Court
stressed that their permission for the search was expressly
sought and obtained by the law enforcers. This consent validated
the search, waiver being a generally recognized exception to the
rule against warrantless search. The marijuana, therefore, was
admissible in evidence. "There was no poisonous tree to speak
of."
Mere Suspicion of Criminal Activity
Did Not Justify Search of Cuizon
Lastly, in Cuizon, the NBI, after conducting a surveillance on
Cuizon for about a month, received in the morning a tip from an
informant that Cuizon and his wife were arriving at NAIA that
same day, bringing a large quantity of shabu. A team was
immediately organized and sent to the airport to intercept the
suspect. Shortly after noon, the Cuizon spouses arrived. While at
the airport arrival area, Cuizon handed four travelling bags to Pua
and Lee who thereafter bearded a taxicab, while the Cuizons
took a different vehicle. The NBI team members posted at the
NAIA parking area, however, failed to intercept the suspects. The
team merely trailed the taxicab which proceeded to the Manila
Peninsula Hotel in Makati. After identifying themselves to the
suspects in their hotel room, the team asked permission to
search their bags in the presence of the hotel's chief security
officer. Pua and Lee consented in writing. Found inside three of
the four bags similar to those handed to them by Cuizon at the
airport were plastic packages of white crystalline substances
which, upon later examination, were confirmed to be shabu.
Taking with them the two accused (who, however, did not
implicate Cuizon), the NBI team proceeded to the Cuizon
residence where they found a bag allegedly containing the same
substance. The three were charged and convicted of illegal
transport of the regulated drug. On appeal, only Cuizon
challenged the validity of his warrantless arrest, search and
seizure.
Reiterating the doctrine that "where a person is searched without
a warrant, and under circumstances other than chose justifying a
warrantless arrest . . . , upon a mere suspicion that he has
embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of
discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then
the search made of such person as well as his arrest [is] deemed
illegal," this Court declared unlawful the arrest of Cuizon as well
as the incidental search and seizure. The warrantless arrest and
search were not justified by the rules on "in flagrante delicto" or
"hot pursuit" for, at the time of his arrest, Cuizon was inside his
home resting with his wife and child. No offense had just been
committed or was actually being committed or attempted by him
in the presence of the lawmen, nor did the latter have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Cuizon authored an offense
that had just in fact been committed. Consequently, any evidence
obtained during the illegal search, "even if tending to confirm or
actually confirming the initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible
for any purpose and in any proceeding, the same being 'the fruit
of the poisonous tree.'"
The same would have been true as regards Pua and Lee. But
Pua effectively waived his right against the warrantless search
when he agreed in writing for the NBI team to search his luggage.
Besides, he failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and
search and the admission of the evidence obtained thereby.
However, the case against Lee, who could not speak English or
Filipino, was remanded for a retrial, because he was effectively
denied his right to counsel; for although he was provided with
one, he could not understand and communicate with him
concerning his defense.
After reviewing previous decisions on valid warrantless arrests
and searches, the Court underscored in sum that there was need
for facts providing probable cause, such as the "distinct odor of
marijuana, reports about drug transporting or positive
identification by informers, suspicious behavior, attempt to flee,
[or] failure to produce identification papers" to justify warrantless
arrests and searches. Likewise, urgency must attend such
arrests and searches, as where motor vehicles are used and
there is great probability that the suspect would get away before
a warrant can be procured. Most important is that the law
enforcers must act immediately on the information received,
suspicions raised or probable cause established, and should
effect the arrests and searches without any delay.
Instant Case Correlated
with Four Cited
Now to the correlation with the case at bar.
(1) As in Manalili, lawmen were on surveillance in response to
information that a criminal activity could be in the offing at a
specified place. The stark difference, however, is that in Manalili,
the reported activity involved drug use and the lawmen belonged
to the anti-narcotics group, while in the instant case, the police on
patrol were ordinary law enforcers on the lookout for possible
bombers. In the former, the law enforcers concerned may be
presumed to possess special knowledge and skill to detect the
physical features exhibited by a current drug user. Thus, when
these specially trained enforcers saw Manalili with reddish eyes
and walking in a wobbly manner characteristic of a person "high"
on drugs per their experience, and in a known hangout of drug
users, there was sufficient genuine reason to stop and frisk the
suspect. It is well to emphasize that under different
circumstances, such as where the policemen are not specially
trained, and in common places where people ordinarily converge,
the same features displayed by a person will not normally justify
a warrantless arrest or search on him.
The case before us presents such a situation. The policemen
merely observed that Malacat's eyes were moving very fast.
They did not notice any bulges or packets about the bodies of
these men indicating that they might be hiding explosive
paraphernalia. From their outward look, nothing suggested that
they were at the time armed and dangerous. Hence, there was
no justification for a stop-and-frisk.
(2) In relation to the cases of Encinada and Cuizon, at the time of
the arrests of the suspects, none of the actions of Accused
Encinada and Cuizon were beyond normal as to suggest that
they were then engaged in felonious activities. The simple
handing over of the baggage by Cuizon to Pua and Lee was far
from being indicative of any illegal activity. Such act by itself does
not, by any stretch of imagination, even appear to be suspicious.
Granting that indeed an offense was committed by Cuizon at the
airport, his subsequent arrest cannot even be justified under the
rule on "hot pursuit." He did not attempt to flee, but was actually
able to leave the premises and reach his house unhampered by
the police. There was considerable interruption between the
supposed commission of the crime and his subsequent arrest in
his house where he was already resting.
suspects were searched, and recovered from Mengote was a
fully loaded pistol; from his companion, a fan knife.
The Court ruled that the situation was not one calling for a lawful
warrantless search and arrest. As the Court, through Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, succinctly put it: "What offense could possibly
have been suggested by a person 'looking from side to side' and
'holding his abdomen' and in a place not exactly forsaken?"
. . . [T]here could have been a number of reasons, all of them
innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and he was
holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the
arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has
nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about.
In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were
dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from
the informer that there were 'suspicious-looking' persons in that
vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay
Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men
looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.
In closing, the Court lamented and thus warned:

Moreover, Encinada and Cuizon had been previously identified

It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily
and subjected to surveillance. Police informants themselves,
arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen,
presumably reliable, tipped off their alleged criminal activity.
even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace
Specifically with respect to Encinada, there was sufficient time to
officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on
priorly obtain a warrant for his arrest. It must be stressed that raw
suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
unverified intelligence information alone is not sufficient to justify
actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done
a warrantless arrest or search. That is why it is important to bring
in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted
one's evidence before a judge who shall independently
over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting
determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant.
officer may be justified in the name of security.
It is not for the police to make such determination.

Under our rule in Mengote, petitioner's dubious act of moving his

As regards Cuizon, it was, worse, the ineptness of the NBI team
eyes swiftly from side to side can in no way justify a
dispatched to intercept him which foiled his arrest and search. In
stop-and-frisk. To convict a person on the basis only of his queer
the present case, if it were true that the arresting officer saw
behavior and to sentence him to practically a lifetime in prison
Malacat two days earlier attempting to detonate a grenade in the
would simply be unfathomable. Nothing can be more wrong,
same vicinity, again it was the policemen's ineptitude that
unjust and inhuman.
frustrated his valid arrest there and then and, further, their
inability to effectively investigate and identify the culprit — so as
to have obtained a lawful arrest warrant — that hindered his valid WHEREFORE, I vote to SET ASIDE the assailed decision and to
seizure thereafter. ACQUIT Petitioner Sammy Malacat y Mandar.

(3) In Lacerna, true, the occupants of the taxicab bowed their

heads and slouched when they passed through the police
checkpoint. Although such acts could raise suspicions, they did
not provide sufficient reason for the police to stop and investigate
them for possible criminal operation; much less, to conduct an
extensive search of their belongings. A checkpoint search is
limited to a roving view within the vehicle. A further search may
be validly effected only if something probably illegal is within his
"plain view." In Lacerna, if not for the passengers' free and
express consent, the search would have been undoubtedly
declared illegal. Similarly, the fast-moving eyes of Malacat,
although connoting unusual behavior, was not indicative that he
was armed and dangerous as to justify a search on his person.

Mengote Supports
Present Ponencia

Bolstering the invalidity of the arrest and search of Malacat

is People vs. Mengote, another classic on the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon receiving a
telephone call shortly before noon from an informer that there
were suspicious-looking persons at a certain street corner in
Tondo, Manila, the Western Police District dispatched a
surveillance team to said place. There they saw two men "looking
from side to side" with one" holding his abdomen." The police
approached them and identified themselves, whereupon the two
tried to flee but failed as other lawmen surrounded them. The
28) G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MIKAEL MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for
defendant-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael
Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the accused) was charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet,
Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of
Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The
factual background of the case is as follows:
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the
Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as a tourist. He
had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon
his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a
bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused
went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first
available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned
to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to
Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May
1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body
number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May
1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer
14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of
checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The
order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by
persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of
NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.
The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in
coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at
the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and
inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused
was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the
bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM
and that they would conduct an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM
officers started their inspection from the front going towards the
rear of the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the
bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's
waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him
to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The
bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape,
prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The
wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of
marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning.
But before he alighted from the bus, accused stopped to get two
(2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and
opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the
teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the
same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the
officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his
passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM
at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation.
At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears
and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative
samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal
effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects
examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of
marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty."
For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his
personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted
by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2)
travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada.
He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more seats
available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and
asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would
meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers
demanded for his passport and other Identification papers, he
handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging
on his neck containing, among others, his passport, return ticket
to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his
companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said
officer came back, he charged the accused that there was
hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture
was taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial
court did not give credence to accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure to raise such defense
at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the
Provincial Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his
lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in
his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when
he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of the two
(2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425,
as amended. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt
established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds him
GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425,
as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs.
Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First
Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La Trinidad
Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of
Republic Act 6425, as amended.
SO ORDERED.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him
guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that the search of his
personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as
evidence against him.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the
search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. (6a 17a).
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting
prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed
by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a
search warrant when the search was made over the personal
effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the
case, there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to
believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by
any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each
case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has
been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a
plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was
acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that
vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and
other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that
particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of
NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by
bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.
When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the
apprehension of herein accused, that a Caucasian travelling from
Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs,
there was no time to obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben
case, the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the
Victory Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San
Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of
dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some
informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting suspiciously and
pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by
the police authorities. It was held that when faced with
on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and
there was no time to secure a search warrant.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely
conducted a routine check of the bus (where accused was riding)
and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially
made. It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the
waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of
accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to do
so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular
norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the
authorities, to readily present his identification papers when
required to do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken
together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably
believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from
the authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable
cause which justified the warrantless search that was made on
the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of
the NARCOM officers in requiring the accused to open his pouch
bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said
bag (which was discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two
(2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to
hide his identity by refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had prohibited drugs in his possession. To deprive
the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly,
including, to search even without warrant, in the light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of
conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring and dissenting:
The ancient tradition that a man's home is his castle, safe from
intrusion even by the king, has not only found its niche in all our
charters, from 1935 to the present; it has also received unvarying
recognition and acceptance in our case law. The present
Constitution declares that —
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It further ordains that any evidence obtained in violation of said
right, among others, "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The rule is that no person may be subjected by the police or
other government authority to a search of his body, or his
personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue
of a search warrant or on the occasion of a legitimate arrest.
An arrest is legitimate, of course, if effected by virtue of a warrant
of arrest. Even without a warrant, an arrest may also be lawfully
made by a peace officer or a private person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against
in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
In any of these instances of a lawful arrest, the person arrested
"may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant." And it has been held that the search may
extend to the area "within his immediate control," i.e., the area
from which said person arrested might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.
Apart from "search incidental to an arrest," a warrantless search
has also been held to be proper in cases of "search of a moving
vehicle, and "seizure of evidence in plain view." This was the
pronouncement in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA
267, 276, which drew attention to Moreno v. Ago Chi; Alvero v.
Dizon, Papa v. Mago, and an American precedent, Harris v. U.S.
If, on the other, a person is searched without a warrant, or under
circumstances other than those justifying an arrest without
warrant in accordance with law, supra, merely on suspicion that
he is engaged in some felonious enterprise, and in order to
discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the
arrest which is illegal but also, the search on the occasion thereof,
as being "the fruit of the poisonous tree. In that event, any
evidence taken, even if confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." But the right
against an unreasonable search and seizure may be waived by
the person arrested, provided he knew of such right and
knowingly decided not to invoke it.
There is unanimity among the members of the Court upon the
continuing validity of these established principles. However, the
Court is divided as regards the ultimate conclusions which may
properly be derived from the proven facts and consequently, the
manner in which the principles just cited should apply thereto.
The proofs of the prosecution and those of the defense are
diametrically at odds. What is certain, however, is that the
soldiers had no warrant of arrest when they conducted a search
of Malmstedt's person and the things in his possession at the
time. Indeed, the Court a quo acknowledged that the soldiers
could "not be expected to be armed with a warrant or arrest nor a
search warrant everytime they establish a temporary
checkpoint . . . (and) no judge would issue them one considering
that searching questions have to be asked before a warrant
could be issued." Equally plain is that prior to the search, a
warrantless arrest of Malmstedt could not validly have been in
accordance with the norms of the law. For Malmstedt had not
committed, nor was he actually committing or attempting to
commit a crime, in the soldiers' presence, nor did said soldiers
have personal and competent knowledge that Malmstedt had in
fact just committed a crime. All they had was a suspicion that
Malmstedt might have some prohibited drug on him or in his bags;
all they had was, in the words of the Trial Court, "the hope of
intercepting any dangerous drug being transported," or, as the
Office of the Solicitor General asserts, "information that most of
the buses coming . . . (from the Cordillera) were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs."
This case, is remarkably similar to Peo. v. Aminnudin, decided on
July 6, 1988 also by the First Division. There, Aminnudin was
arrested without a warrant by PC officers as he was
disembarking from an inter-island vessel. The officers were
waiting for him because he was, according to an informer's report,
then transporting marijuana. The search of Aminnudin's bag
confirmed the informer's report; the bag indeed contained
marijuana. The Court nevertheless held that since the PC officers
had failed to procure a search warrant although they had
sufficient time (two days) to do so and therefore, the case
presented no such urgency as to justify a warrantless search, the
search of Aminnudin's person and bag, the seizure of the
marijuana and his subsequent arrest were illegal; and the
marijuana was inadmissible in evidence in the criminal action
subsequently instituted against Aminnudin for violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act.
There are, on the other hand, other cases adjudicated by this
Court in which apparently different conclusions were reached. It
is needful to devote a few words to them so that the relevant
constitutional and legal propositions are not misunderstood.
In People v. Claudio (decision promulgated on April 15,
1988), the accused boarded a "Victory Liner" passenger bus
going to Olongapo from Baguio City. She placed the plastic bag
she was carrying at the back of the seat then occupied by Obiña,
an INP member "on Detached Service with the Anti-Narcotics
Unit." This avowedly aroused Obiña's suspicion, and at the first
opportunity, and without Claudio's knowledge, he surreptitiously
looked into the plastic bag and noted that it contained camote
tops as well as a package, and that there emanated from the
package the smell of marijuana with which he had become
familiar on account of his work. So when the bus stopped at Sta.
Rita, and Claudio alighted, Obiña accosted her, showed her his
ID, identified himself as a policeman, and announced his
intention to search her bag which he said contained marijuana
because of the distinctive odor detected by him. Ignoring her plea
— "Please go with me, let us settle this at home" — he brought
her to the police headquarters., where examination of the
package in Claudio's bag confirmed his suspicion that it indeed
contained marijuana. The Court held the warrantless arrest under
the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified, and the
evidence thus discovered admissible in evidence against the
accused.
In People v. Tangliben (decision promulgated on April 6,
1990), two police officers and a barangay tanod were conducting
a "surveillance mission" at the Victory Liner Terminal at San
Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga, "aimed not only against
persons who may commit misdemeanors . . . (there) but also on
persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs
based on information supplied by informers; . . . they noticed a
person carrying a red travelling bag . . who was acting
suspiciously;" they asked him to open the bag; the person did so
only after they identified themselves as peace officers; found in
the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in plastic weighing one
kilogram, more or less; the person was then taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, where he was
investigated; and an information was thereafter filed against that
person, Tangliben, charging him with a violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425), as amended. Upon
these facts it was ruled, citing Claudio, supra, that there was a
valid warrantless arrest and a proper warrantless search incident
thereto.
The facts in Tangliben were pronounced to be different from
those in People v. Aminnudin, supra. "In contrast"
to Aminnudin where the Court perceived no urgency as to
preclude the application for and obtention of a search warrant, it
was declared that the Tangliben case —
. . . presented urgency. . . (The evidence revealed) that there was
an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying
marijuana . . . Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to secure
a search warrant . . . To require search warrants during
on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of
firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband goods,
robber, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to
contain the crimes with which these persons are associated.
In Tangliben, therefore, there was in the Court's view sufficient
evidence on hand to enable the PC officers to secure a search
warrant, had there been time. But because there was actually no
time to get the warrant, and there were "on-the-spot" indications
that Tangliben was then actually committing a crime, the search
of his person and his effects was considered valid.
Two other decisions presented substantially similar circumstance
instances: Posadas v. C.A., et al., decided on August 2,
1990, and People v. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al., decided on August
20, 1990.
In the first case, Posadas was seen to be acting suspiciously by
two members of the INP, Davao Metrodiscom, and when he was
accosted by the two, who identified themselves as police officers,
he suddenly fled. He was pursued, overtaken and,
notwithstanding his resistance, placed in custody. The buri bag
Posadas was then carrying was found to contain a revolver, for
which he could produce no license or authority to possess, four
rounds of live ammunition, and a tear gas grenade. He was
prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition and
convicted after trial. This Court affirmed Posadas' conviction,
holding that there was, in the premises, probable cause for a
search without warrant, i.e., the appellant was acting
suspiciously and attempted to flee with the buri bag he had with
him at the time. The Court cited with approval the ruling of the
U.S. Federal Supreme Court in John W. Terry v. State of Ohio, a
1968 case, which the Solicitor General had invoked to justify the
search.
In the case of Maspil, et al., a checkpoint was set up by elements
of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics Command at
Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize
vehicles on the highway going towards Baguio City. This was
done because of a confidential report by informers that Maspil
and another person, Bagking, would be transporting a large
quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were
with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As expected, at
about 2 o'clock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a
jeepney approached the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with
Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw
that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big
round tin cans. When opened, the sacks and cans were seen to
contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen
thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and
confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were
verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of
the search thus conducted, as being incidental to a lawful
warrantless arrest, and declared that, as in Tangliben, supra,
Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante
delicto transporting prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest.
Again, the Court took occasion to distinguish the case
from Aminnudin in which, as aforestated, it appeared that the
police officers were aware of Aminnudin's identity, his projected
criminal enterprise and the vessel on which he would be arriving,
and, equally as importantly, had sufficient time and opportunity to
obtain a search warrant. In the case of Maspil and Bagking, the
Court found that the officers concerned had no exact description
of the vehicle the former would be using to transport marijuana,
and no inkling of the definite time of the suspects' arrival, and
pointed out that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a
passenger boat on the high seas whose route and time of arrival
are more or less certain, and which ordinarily cannot deviate from
or otherwise alter its course, or select another destination.
The most recent decision treating of warrantless search and
seizure appears to be People v. Lo Ho Wing; et al., G.R. No.
88017, decided on January 21, 1991 (per Gancayco, J.). In that
case, an undercover or "deep penetration" agent, Tia, managed
somehow to gain acceptance into a group of suspected drug
smugglers, which included Peter Lo and Lim Ching Huat. Tia
accompanied Peter Lo to Guangzhou, China, where he saw him
and other person empty the contents of six (6) tins of tea and
replace them with white powder. On their return to Manila with
the cans of substituted "tea," they were met at the airport by Lim.
As they were leaving the airport in separate vehicles, they were
intercepted by officers and operatives of the Narcotics Command
(NARCOM), who had earlier been tipped off by Tia, and placed
under arrest. As search of the luggage brought in by Tia and
Peter Lo, loaded on the group's vehicles, quickly disclosed the
six (6) tin cans containing fifty-six (56) bags of white crystalline
powder which, upon analysis, was identified as
metamphetamine. Tia, Lo and Lim were indicted for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Tia was discharged as state
witness. Lo and Lim were subsequently convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment. One of the questions raised by them in this
Court on appeal was whether the warrantless search of their
vehicles and personal effects was legal. The
Court, citing Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267
(1986), held legal the search of the appellants' moving vehicles
and the seizure therefrom of the dangerous drug, considering
that there was intelligence information, including clandestine
reports by a planted spy actually participating in the activity, that
the appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country;
that the requirement of obtaining a search warrant "borders on
the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a
moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity," and "it is not practicable to secure a
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
In all five cases, Claudio, Tangliben, Posadas, Maspil, and Lo Ho
Wing, facts existed which were found by the Court as justifying
warantless arrests. In Claudio, the arresting officer had secretly
ascertained that the woman he was arresting was in fact in
possession of marijuana; he had personally seen that her bag
contained not only vegetables but also a package emitting the
odor of marijuana. In Tangliben, the person arrested and
searched was acting suspiciously, and had been positively
pointed to as carrying marijuana. And in both cases, the accused
were about to board passenger buses, making it urgent for the
police officers concerned to take quick and decisive action.
In Posadas, the person arrested and searched was acting
suspiciously, too, and when accosted had attempted to flee from
the police officers. And in Maspil and Lo Ho Wing, there was
definite information of the precise identity of the persons
engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and
place.
Now, as regards the precise issue at hand, whether or not the
facts in the case at bar make out a legitimate instance of a
warrantless search and seizure, there is, as earlier pointed out, a
regrettable divergence of views among the members of the
Court.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I believe that
the appellant should be absolved on reasonable doubt. There
was in this case no confidential report from, or positive
identification by an informer; no attempt to flee; no bag or
package emitting tell-tale odors; no other reasonably persuasive
indications that Malmstedt was at the time in process of
perpetrating the offense for which he was subsequently
prosecuted. Hence, when the soldiers searched Malmstedt's
pouch and the bags in his possession, they were simply "fishing"
for evidence. It matters not that the search disclosed that the
bags contained prohibited substances, confirming their initial
information and suspicion. The search was not made by virtue of
a warrant or as an incident of a lawful warrantless arrest, i.e.,
under circumstances sufficient to engender a reasonable belief
that some crime was being or about to be committed, or adjust
been committed. There was no intelligent and intentional waiver
of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure. The
search was therefore illegal, since the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest of an individual before a search of his body and
his belongings may licitly be made. The process cannot be
reversed, i.e., a search be first undertaken, and then an arrest
effected, on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.
An arrest made in that case would be unlawful, and the search
undertaken as an incident of such an unlawful arrest, also
unlawful.
The fact that when investigated at the headquarters of the
Narcotic Command at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Malmstedt
had, it is said, willingly admitted that there were was hashish
inside the "teddy bears" in the luggage found in his possession
— an admission subsequently confirmed by laboratory
examination — does not help the cause of the prosecution one
bit. Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Malmstedt
was accorded the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all
persons under custodial investigation. He was not informed, prior
to being interrogated, that he had the "right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice," and that if he could not afford the services of
counsel, he would be provided with one; not does it appear at all
that he waived those rights "in writing and in the presence of
counsel." The soldiers and the police officers simply went ahead
with the investigation of Malmstedt, without counsel. The
admissions elicited from Malmstedt under these circumstances,
as the Constitution clearly states, are "inadmissible in evidence
against him.
The prohibited drugs supposedly discovered in Malmstedt's bags,
having been taken in violation of the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, are inadmissible against
him "for any purpose in any proceeding." Also pronounced as
incompetent evidence against him are the admissions
supposedly made by him without his first being accorded the
constitutional rights of persons under custodial investigation.
Without such object evidence and admissions, nothing remains
of the case against Malmstedt.
It may be conceded that, as the Trial Court points out, the
evidence presented by Malmstedt in his defense is feeble,
unworthy of credence. This is beside the point; for conformably to
the familiar axiom, the State must rely on the strength of its
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense. The
unfortunate fact is that although the existence of the hashish is
an objective physical reality that cannot but be conceded, there is
in law no evidence to demonstrate with any degree of persuasion,
much less beyond reasonable doubt, that Malmstedt was
engaged in a criminal activity. This is the paradox created by the
disregard of the applicable constitutional safeguards. The
tangible benefit is that the hashish in question has been correctly
confiscated and thus effectively withdrawn from private use.
What is here said should not by any means be taken as a
disapproval or a disparagement of the efforts of the police and
military authorities to deter and detect offenses, whether they be
possession of and traffic in prohibited drugs, or some other.
Those efforts obviously merit the support and commendation of
the Courts and indeed of every responsible citizen. But those
efforts must take account of the basic rights granted by the
Constitution and the law to persons who may fall under suspicion
of engaging in criminal acts. Disregard of those rights may not be
justified by the objective of ferreting out and punishing crime, no
matter how eminently desirable attainment of that objective might
be. Disregard of those rights, as this Court has earlier stressed,
may result in the escape of the guilty, and all because the
"constable has blundered," rendering the evidence inadmissible
even if truthful or otherwise credible.
I therefore vote to reverse the Trial Court's judgment of October
12, 1989 and to acquit the appellant on reasonable doubt.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I join Mr. Justice Andres R. Narvasa in his dissent, which I
believe represents the correct application to the facts of this case
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Rules of Court on
searches and seizures. It is consistent with my ponencia in
People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, and also with Alih v.
Castro, 151 SCRA 279, the latter being a unanimous decision of
the Court en banc, and my dissents in Umil v. Ramos (on
warrantless arrests, 187 SCRA 311, Valmonte v. De Villa (on
checkpoints), 178, SCRA 211, 185 SCRA 665, and Guazon v. De
Villa (on "zonas"), 181 SCRA 623.
I write this separate opinion merely to remark on an observation
made during the deliberation on this case that some members of
the Court seem to be coddling criminals instead of extending its
protection to society, which deserves our higher concern. The
inference is that because of our wrong priorities, criminals are
being imprudently let free, to violate our laws again; and it is all
our fault.
Believing myself to be among those alluded to, I will say without
apology that I do not consider a person a criminal, until he is
convicted by final judgment after a fair trial by a competent and
impartial court. Until then, the Constitution bids us to presume
him innocent. He may seem boorish or speak crudely or sport
tattoos or dress weirdly or otherwise fall short of our own
standards of propriety and decorum. None of these makes him a
criminal although he may look like a criminal.
It is so easy to condemn a person on the basis of his appearance
but it is also so wrong.

On the question before us, it seems to be the inclination of some

judges to wink at an illegal search and seizure as long as the
suspect has been actually found in possession of a prohibited
article That fact will retroactively validate the violation of the Bill
of Rights for after all, as they would rationalize, the suspect is a
criminal. What matters to them is the fact of illegal possession,
not the fact of illegal search and seizure.

This kind of thinking takes us back to the intolerant days of

Moncado v. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1, which was discredited in
Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, even before it was definitely
rejected by an express provision in the 1973 Constitution. That
provision, which has been retained in the present Constitution,
again explicitly declares that any evidence illegally obtained
"shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."

The fruit of the poisonous tree should not be allowed to poison

our system of criminal justice. In the case at bar, the search was
1âwphi1

made at a checkpoint established for the preposterous reason

that the route was being used by marijuana dealers and on an
individual who had something bulging at his waist that excited the
soldier's suspicion. Was that probable cause?
The ponencia notes that the military had advance information
that a Caucasian was coming from the Sagada with prohibited
drugs in his possession. This is what the military says
now, after the fact, to justify the warrantless search. It is so easy
to make such a claim, and I am surprised that the majority should
readily accept it.

The conclusion that there was probable cause may have been
influenced by the subsequent discovery that the accused was
carrying a prohibited drug. This is supposed to justify the soldier's
suspicion. In other words, it was the fact of illegal possession
that retroactively established the probable cause that validated
the illegal search and seizure. It was the fruit of the poisonous
tree that washed clean the tree itself.

In Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438, Justice Holmes said sixty-four

years ago:

. . . It is desirable that criminals should be detected, and to that

end that all available evidence should be used. It is also1avvphi 1

desirable that the government should not itself foster and pay for
other crimes, when they are the means by which the evidence is
to be obtained. If it pays its officers for having got evidence by
crime, I do not see why it may not as well pay them for getting it
in the same way, and I can attach no importance to protestations
of disapproval if it knowingly accepts and pays and announces
that in the future it will pay for the fruits. We have to choose, and
for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the government should play an ignoble part.

If by deterring the government from playing "an ignoble part," I

am "coddling criminals," I welcome the accusation and take pride
in it. I would rather err in favor of the accused who is impaled with
outlawed evidence than exalt order at the price of liberty.
29) G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches
but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of
illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him,
held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life
imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after
disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening,
in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him
simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked
liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed
against him. Later, the information was amended to include
Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that
same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned
and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement
of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough
investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only
against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received
a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant was
on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. He was Identified by name. Acting on this tip, they
waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached
him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had
pointed to him. They detained him and inspected the bag he was
carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, who
testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and
chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the
corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring
that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket,
two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was
confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the
marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the
chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still
handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana
looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. He also argued that the marijuana he was
alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and
could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of
the PC headquarters.
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination
of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell
watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from
Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to
mention his other expenses. Aminnudin testified that he kept the
two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they
were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the
arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling. He also said he sold one of the watches for
P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches
belonged not to him but to his cousin, to a friend whose full
name he said did not even know. The trial court also rejected his
allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently
proved the injuries sustained by him.
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings,
considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate access
to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to
weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice,
meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in
the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this,
discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's
conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten up
because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible
Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time
under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No
bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however,
and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and searched
without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his
possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of
Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part,
the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came
under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental
to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who
testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when they
arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their
only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it
was two days before the arrest, another two weeks and a third
"weeks before June 25." On this matter, we may prefer the
declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol,
Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect
to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by
reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the
possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984
we have already reports of the particular operation which was
being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before
June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence
report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to
the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling
operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days
before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding
the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities
of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of
information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify
the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that
Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to
Iloilo with marijuana was received by you many days before you
received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his
activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he
was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I
received the information that he was coming. Regarding the
reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already
consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was
mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or
search of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result
you do not need a search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary.
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it
comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court
cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government
of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of
the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been
committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked
to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of
Roldan v. Arca, for example. Here it was held that vessels and
aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant
can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the
conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they
had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo
on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made
to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting
team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant
was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED
warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a
result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at
the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the
prohibited drug. Separate Opinions

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment
of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in
flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the
moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from
the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian
hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act
No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be
lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of
Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana
leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule
126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial
court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our Separate Opinions

country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship, when
any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and AQUINO, J., dissenting:
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that
kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in
disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of flagrante, for he was carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the
Rights guarantees.
moment of his arrest. He was not "innocently disembarking from
the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of marijuana (Indian
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act
indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that fact No. 6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be
alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional lawfully effected without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared Court), and the search of his bag (which yielded the marijuana
even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec. 12, Rule
strong enough to convict him. 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial
court finding him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from
Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence
cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by
the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized
illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a
lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by
the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also
illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government

against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our
law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this
malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth.
But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so
than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the
liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of
criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of
high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in
disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order.
Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should
escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It
is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce
another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana

as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
30) G.R. No. 189669 February 16, 2015
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION and
PETRON CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
ROMARS INTERNATIONAL GASES
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court praying that the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution dated
September 14, 2009, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration thereof, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are:
Petitioners received information that respondent was selling,
offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by
illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured byand bearing
the duly registered trademark and device of respondent Petron.
Petron then obtained the services of a paralegal investigation
team who sent their people to investigate. The investigators went
to respondent's premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines
Sur, bringing along four empty cylinders of Shellane, Gasul, Total
and Superkalan and asked that the same be refilled.
Respondent's employees then refilled said empty cylinders at
respondent's refilling station. The refilled cylinders were brought
to the Marketing Coordinator of Petron Gasul who verified that
respondent was not authorized to distribute and/or sell, or
otherwise deal with Petron LPG products, and/or use or imitate
any Petron trademarks. Petitioners then requested the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of
respondent for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting
establishments conducting illegal refilling, distribution and/or sale
of LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell,
which acts constitute a violation of Section 168, in relation to
Section 170 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, otherwise known as
the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, and/or Section
2 of R.A. No. 623, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate the
Use of Duly Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs,
Barrels and Other Similar Containers.
The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found
commercial quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders
stockpiled at respondent's warehouse. They also witnessed
trucks coming from respondent's refilling facility loaded with
Gasul, Shellane and Marsflame cylinders, which then deposit
said cylinders in different places, one of them a store called
"Edrich Enterprises" located at 272 National Highway, San
Nicolas, Iriga City. The investigators then bought Shellane and
Gasul cylinders from Edrich Enterprises, for which they were
issued an official receipt.
Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate
Applications for Search Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1, in
relation to Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293 against respondent
and/or its occupants. On October 23, 2002, the RTC-Naga City
issued an Order granting said Applications and Search Warrant
Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28 were issued. On the same day, the
NBI served the warrants at the respondent's premises in an
orderly and peaceful manner, and articles or items described in
the warrants were seized.
On November 4, 2002, respondent filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28, where the only
grounds cited were: (a) there was no probable cause; (b) there
had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to
the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the
cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third
person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of
Gasul and Marsflame. In an Order dated February 21, 2003, the
RTC-Naga denied the Motion to Quash.
However, on March 27,2003, respondent's new counsel filed an
Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration. It was only in said
motion where respondent raised for the first time, the issue of the
impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the
RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. Respondent
pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to
state any compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a
court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of
the commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner
opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was
already too late for respondent to raise the issue regarding the
venue of the filing of the application for search warrant, as this
would be in violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule.
In an Order dated July 28, 2003,the RTC-Naga issued an Order
granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby
quashing Search Warrant Nos. 2002-27 and 2002-28.
Petitioner then appealed to the CA, but the appellate court, in its
Decision dated March 13,2009, affirmed the RTC Order quashing
the search warrants. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
CA Decision was denied per Resolution dated September 14,
2009.
Elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorari, petitioner presents herein the following issues:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT VENUE IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT
IS JURISDICTIONAL. THIS IS BECAUSE A SEARCH
WARRANT CASE IS NOT A CRIMINAL CASE.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
THAT RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO QUASHIS NOT SUBJECT
TO THE OMNIBUS MOTION RULE AND THATTHE ISSUE OF
LACK OF JURISDICTION MAY NOT BE WAIVED AND MAY
EVEN BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Petitioner's arguments deserve closer examination.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides thus:
SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed.
- An application for search warrant shall be filed with the
following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending. (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision is clear enough. Under paragraph (b)
thereof, the application for search warrant in this case should
have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed
with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering
that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place
where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of the
provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of
compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does
not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of
the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a
limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against
state authorities who would be enforcing the search warrants. On
this point, then, petitioner's application for a search warrant was
indeed insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to
state therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the
application in a court that did not have territorial jurisdiction over
the place where the alleged crime was committed.
Notwithstanding said failure to state the compelling reasons in
the application, the more pressing question that would determine
the outcome of the case is, did the RTC-Naga act properly in
taking into consideration the issue of said defect in resolving
respondent's motion for reconsideration where the issue was
raised for the very first time? The record bears out that, indeed,
respondent failed to include said issue at the first instance in its
motion to quash. Does the omnibus motion rule cover a motion to
quash search warrants?
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in
relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available
objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said
objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the
court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion
are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence
of another action pending between the same parties for the same
cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations. It
should be stressed here that the Court has ruled in a number of
cases that the omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to
quash search warrants. Furthermore, the Court distinctly stated
in Abuan v. People, that "the motion to quash the search warrant
which the accused may file shall be governed by the omnibus
motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress x
x x."
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial
court could only take cognizance of an issue that was not raised
in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or
existent when they filed the motion to quash the search warrant;
or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was
available and existent at the time of filing of the motion to quash.
What remains to be answered then is, if the newly raised issue of
the defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction.
In resolving whether the issue raised for the first time in
respondent's motion for reconsideration was an issue of
jurisdiction, the CA rationcinated, thus:
It is jurisprudentially settled that the concept of venue of actions
in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place
where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of
the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any
one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein
by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person
charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that
limited territory.
Unfortunately, the foregoing reasoning of the CA, is inceptionally
flawed, because as pronounced by the Court in Malaloan v.
Court of Appeals, and reiterated in the more recent Worldwide
Web Corporation v. People of the Philippines, to wit:
x x x as we held in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, an application
for a search warrant is a "special criminal process," rather than a
criminal action:
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the
application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the
institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It
would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the
power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a
criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific
courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the
requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search
warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a
criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is defined
1âwphi1
in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property
and bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of
a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary
because of a public necessity.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural
concept and provisions on search warrants, such warrant is
definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by
a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a
criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original
jurisdiction. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal
action. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing explanation shows why the CA arrived at the
wrong conclusion. It gravely erred in equating the proceedings
for applications for search warrants with criminal actions
themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said
applications are not criminal in nature and, thus, the rule that
venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue
of whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga
City or RTC-Naga, is not one involving jurisdiction because, as
stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special
criminal process is inherent in all courts.
Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the
RTC-Naga to have even taken into consideration an issue which
respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not
involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is
quite clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal
processes such as a search warrant.
Moreover, the Court must again emphasize its previous
admonition in Spouses Anunciacion v. Bocanegra, that:
We likewise cannot approve the trial court's act of entertaining
supplemental motions x x x which raise grounds that are already
deemed waived. To do so would encourage lawyers and litigants
to file piecemeal objections to a complaint in order to delay or
frustrate the prosecution of the plaintiffs cause of action.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals, dated March 13, 2009, and the Resolution
dated September 14, 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80643 are
REVERSED. The Order dated February 21, 2003 issued by the
Regional Trial Court of Naga, Camarines Sur, Branch 24,
denying respondent's motion to quash, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
31) G.R. No. 188794
HONESTO OGA YON y DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision dated March 31, 2009, and the Resolution dated July
10, 2009, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154.
The appealed decision affirmed the joint judgment dated
September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,
Ligao City, Albay, which convicted petitioner Honesto Ogayon of
violating Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
The Antecedent Facts
On December 1, 2003, two Informations were filed against
Ogayon for the crimes allegedly committed as follows:
I. Criminal Case No. 4738:
That at about 5:20 o’clock (sic) in the morning of October 2,
2003 at Barangay Iraya, Municipality of Guinobatan,
Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control four (4) pcs. of small
aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. Of disposable lighter in different
colors, one (1) blade trademark "Dorco," and one (1) roll
aluminum foil, instruments used or intended to be used for
smoking or consuming shabu, without authority of law, to
the damage and prejudice of the public interest and welfare.
II. Criminal Case No. 4739:
That at about 5:20 o’clock (sic) in the morning of October 2,
2003 at Barangay Iraya, Municipality of Guinobatan,
Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to violate the law, and without authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, custody and control two (2)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing 0.040
gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), with full
knowledge that in his possession and control is a dangerous
drug, to the damage and prejudice of the public interest and
welfare.
During his arraignment in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and 4739 on
January 21, 2004, and March 17, 2004, respectively, Ogayon
denied both charges and pleaded "not guilty." The joint pre-trial
held on May 5, 2004 yielded only one factual admission on the
identity of the accused. A joint trial on the merits ensued.
The Prosecution Version
On October 2, 2003, at around 5:20 a.m., Police Chief Inspector
Elmer Ferrera, together with the other members of the Albay
Provincial Police Office, proceeded to Ogayon’s house in
Barangay Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay, to enforce Search Warrant
No. AEK 29-2003.The warrant was for the seizure of shabu and
drug paraphernalia allegedly kept and concealed in the premises
of Ogayon’s house. Barangay Tanod Jose Lagana (Tanod
Lagana) and Kagawad Lauro Tampocao assisted the police
team in conducting the search.
Upon reaching Ogayon’s house, the police team noticed several
persons inside a nipa hut located nearby. Suspecting that a pot
session was about to be held, the police team restrained two of
the five persons and immediately proceeded to Ogayon’s house.
After introducing themselves as police officers, Senior Police
Officer Herminigildo Caritos (SPO4 Caritos) informed Ogayon
that they had a warrant to search his place. SPO4 Caritos
handed a copy of the warrant to Ogayon, who allowed the police
team to conduct the search.
Led by SPO4 Caritos, some members of the police team went to
the comfort room located about five meters away from Ogayon’s
house. When they searched the area, they found an object
(wrapped in a piece of paper with blue prints) that fell from the
wooden braces of the roof. Upon SPO4 Caritos’ inspection, the
paper contained two (2) small, heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachets that the police team suspected to contain shabu.
The search of the comfort room also uncovered four (4)
disposable lighters, one (1) knife measuring six inches long, used
aluminum foil, one (1) roll of aluminum foil, and a "Dorco"
blade. SPO4 Caritos then placed his initials on the two (2) plastic
sachets before joining the rest of the police officers who were
conducting a search in Ogayon’s house. The police officers who
searched Ogayon’s house found live ammunition for an M-16
rifle.
After conducting the search, the police team prepared a Receipt
of Property Seized. The receipt was signed by the seizing
officers, representatives from the Department of Justice and the
media, and two (2) barangay officials who were present during
the entire operation.
The police team thereafter arrested Ogayon and the two (2) other
persons who had earlier been restrained, and brought them to
Camp Simeon Ola for booking. The seized items were likewise
brought to the camp for laboratory examination. In his Chemistry
Report,1 Police Superintendent Lorlie Arroyo (forensic chemist of
the Philippine National Police Regional Crime Laboratory)
reported that the two (2) plastic sachets seized from Ogayon’s
place tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
The Defense Version
The defense presented a different version of the events.
Testifying for himself, Ogayon disavowed any knowledge of the
prohibited drugs and claimed that he saw the seized items for the
first time only when they were being inventoried. His statements
were corroborated by the testimony of his wife, Zenaida Ogayon.
Ogayon asserted that prior to the search, he was asleep in his
house. His wife Zenaida woke him up because several
policemen and barangay officials came to his house. He claimed
that the police team did not present any search warrant before
conducting the search, and it was only during trial that he saw a
copy of the warrant.
He recounted that the police officers, splitting into two groups,
conducted a simultaneous search of his house and the comfort
room located nearby. He noticed that SPO4 Caritos, who was
part of the group that searched the comfort room, came out and
went to the Barangay Hall. Shortly after, SPO4 Caritos returned,
accompanied by Tanod Lagana. SPO4 Caritos again went inside
the comfort room, leaving Tanod Lagana waiting outside. SPO4
Caritos thereafter came out from the comfort room and ran
towards Ogayon’s house while shouting "positive, positive."
The RTC Ruling
On September 5, 2007, the RTC rendered a joint judgment
convicting Ogayon of the two criminal charges against him.
Relying on the presumption of regularity, the RTC rejected
Ogayon’s frame-up defense. The dispositive portion of the joint
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, under the above considerations, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
a. In Criminal Case No. 4738, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section
12, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165, known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful possession of
drug paraphernalia, namely: four (4) pcs. small aluminum foil,
one (1) roll aluminum foil, four (4) pcs. disposable lighters, and
one (1) pc. blade; thereby sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one
(1) day to two (2) years and to pay a FINE of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00);
b. In Criminal Case No. 4739, accused, Honesto Ogayon y Diaz
is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section
11, Art. II, Republic Act No. 9165, known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for his unlawful possession of
two (2) pcs. Small heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu," with total net weight
of 0.0400 gram; thereby, sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and to pay a FINE of three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00).
Ogayon appealed to the CA. This time, he questioned the validity
of the search warrant, claiming it was improperly issued. He
argued that the search warrant was defective for lack of transcript
showing that the issuing judge conducted an examination of the
applicant for search warrant and his witnesses.
The CA Ruling
In accordance with Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, a
judge must examine under oath and in writing an applicant for
search warrant and his witnesses. Although the CA found no
evidence in the records showing compliance with this
requirement, it nevertheless upheld the search warrant’s validity
due to Ogayon’s failure to make a timely objection against the
warrant during the trial.
That Ogayon objected to the prosecution’s formal offer of exhibits,
which included the search warrant, was not sufficient for the CA.
Ogayon merely claimed that the chemistry report was not
executed under oath, the items were not illegal per se, and that
he did not sign the Receipt of Property Seized since he was not
present when the seized items were confiscated. The CA noted
that the objections were not based on constitutional grounds, and
for this reason, concluded that Ogayon is deemed to have
waived the right to question the legality of the search warrant.
Based on the search warrant’s validity, the CA affirmed Ogayon’s
conviction for possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia.
Although the comfort room was located outside Ogayon’s house,
the CA declared that he exercised exclusive control over it and
should rightly be held responsible for the prohibited drugs and
paraphernalia found there.
As with the RTC, the CA relied on the presumption of regularity of
the police team’s operation and found Ogayon’s claim of
frame-up to be unsupported. The CA thus ruled that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Ogayon was
liable for the crimes charged.
The Issues
In the present petition, Ogayon raises the following assignment
of errors:
I.
The CA erred in finding that Ogayon had waived his right to
question the legality of the search warrant.
II.
Even granting without admitting that Ogayon had already
waived his right to question the legality of the search
warrant, the search conducted was still highly irregular,
thereby rendering the seized articles as inadmissible in
evidence.
Ogayon primarily argues that there was a violation of his
constitutional right to be secure in his person, house, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. He denies
waiving the right through his supposed failure to assail the search
warrant’s validity during the trial. On the contrary, he claims to
have objected to the prosecution’s formal offer of the search
warrant.
Even assuming that he questioned the search warrant’s validity
only during appeal, Ogayon contends that this should not be
interpreted as a waiver of his right. Since an appeal in a criminal
case throws the whole case open for review, any objection made
on appeal, though not raised before the trial court, should still be
considered.
Ogayon next argues that the search conducted by the police
team on his premises, pursuant to an already defective search
warrant, was highly irregular. He and his spouse were in their
house when SPO4 Caritos allegedly discovered the shabu in the
comfort room located outside their house, so they were not able
to witness the search. Moreover, he claimed that there were
other persons near the premises of his house (and the comfort
room) when the search was conducted. Hence, it could not
indubitably be concluded that the seized items were under his
actual and effective control and possession.
The Court’s Ruling
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is one of
the fundamental constitutional rights. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution, reads:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
[emphasis ours]
This right has been included in our Constitution since 1899
through the Malolos Constitution and has been incorporated in
the various organic laws governing the Philippines during the
American colonization, the 1935 Constitution, and the 1973
Constitution.
The protection afforded by the right is reinforced by its
recognition as a fundamental human right under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, to both of which the Philippines is a
signatory. Both the Covenant and the Declaration recognize a
person’s right against arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s
privacy and property.
Given the significance of this right, the courts must be vigilant in
preventing its stealthy encroachment or gradual depreciation and
ensure that the safeguards put in place for its protection are
observed.
Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant is central to the right,
and its existence largely depends on the finding of the judge
conducting the examination. To substantiate a finding of
probable cause, the Rules of Court specifically require that –
Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. –
The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statem gether with the
affidavits submitted. [emphasis ours]
Ogayon’s appeal of his conviction essentially rests on his claim
that the search warrant was defective because "there was no
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in which the
issuing judge had allegedly propounded the required searching
questions and answers in order to determine the existence of
probable cause." We find that the failure to attach to the records
the depositions of the complainant and his witnesses and/or the
transcript of the judge’s examination, though contrary to the
Rules, does not by itself nullify the warrant. The requirement to
attach is merely a procedural rule and not a component of the
right. Rules of procedure or statutory requirements, however
salutary they may be, cannot provide new constitutional
requirements.
Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct
an "examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce," after which he determines the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The
examination requirement was originally a procedural rule found in
Section 98 of General Order No. 58, but was elevated as part of
the guarantee of the right under the 1935 Constitution. The intent
was to ensure that a warrant is issued not merely on the basis of
the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, but only after
examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses.
As the same examination requirement was adopted in the
present Constitution, we declared that affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are insufficient to establish the
factual basis for probable cause. Personal examination by the
judge of the applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and
the examination should be probing and exhaustive, notmerely
routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.
The Solicitor General argues that the lack of depositions and
transcript does not necessarily indicate that no examination was
made by the judge who issued the warrant in compliance with the
constitutional requirement.
True, since in People v. Tee, we declared that –
[T]he purpose of the Rules in requiring depositions to be
taken is to satisfy the examining magistrate as to the
existence of probable cause. The Bill of Rights does not
1âwphi 1
make it an imperative necessity that depositions be
attached to the records of an application for a search
warrant. Hence, said omission is not necessarily fatal, for as
long as there is evidence on the record showing what
testimony was presented.
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown
by the depositions and the transcript. In their absence, however,
a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the records
that the requisite examination was made and probable cause
was based thereon. There must be, in the records, particular
facts and circumstances that were considered by the judge as
sufficient to make an independent evaluation of the existence of
probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant.
The Solicitor General claims that, notwithstanding the absence of
depositions and transcripts, the records indicate an examination
was conducted. In fact, a statement in the search warrant itself
attests to this:
Search Warrant
xxxx
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after
examination under oath of the applicant and his witnesses
that there is probable cause to believe that respondent,
without authority of law, has under his possession and
control the following articles to wit:
---Methamphetamine Hydrochloride "Shabu" and
paraphernalia which are kept and concealed in the premises
of his house particularly in the kitchen and in the CR outside
his house both encircled with a red ballpen, as described in
the sketch attached to the Application for Search Warrant,
located at Bgy. Iraya, Guinobatan, Albay. (emphasis and
underscore ours)
Generally, a judge’s determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant is accorded great deference by a
reviewing court, so long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. "Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection
with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be
searched."
Apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find
nothing in the records of this case indicating that the
issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the
applicant and his witnesses. The absence of depositions and
transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the
application for the search warrant and the affidavits, although
acknowledged by Ogayon himself, could not be found in the
records. Unlike in Tee, where the testimony given during trial
revealed that an extensive examination of the applicant’s witness
was made by the judge issuing the warrant, the testimonies given
during Ogayon’s trial made no reference to the application for the
search warrant. SPO4 Caritos testified that he was among those
who conducted the surveillance before the application for a
search warrant was made. However, he was not the one who
applied for the warrant; in fact, he testified that he did not know
who applied for it.
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can
infer that the requisite examination was made, and from
which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the
search warrant was derived. A search warrant must conform
strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issuance;
otherwise, it is void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence
that the search warrant was issued after the requisite
examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the
Court declares Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003 a nullity.
The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from
considering Ogayon’s belated objections thereto.
The CA declared that Ogayon had waived the protection of his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures due to his
failure to make a timely objection against the search warrant’s
validity before the trial court. It based its ruling on the procedural
rule that any objections to the legality of the search warrant
should be made during the trial of the case. Section 14, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court provides the manner to quash a search
warrant or to suppress evidence obtained thereby:
Section 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress
evidence; where to file. — A motion to quash a search
warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may
be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action
has been instituted. If no criminal action has been instituted,
the motion may be filed in and resolved by the court that
issued the search warrant. However, if such court failed to
resolve the motion and a criminal case is subsequently filed
in another court, the motion shall be resolved by the latter
court. [emphasis ours]
We find the CA’s casual treatment of a fundamental right
distressing. It prioritized compliance with a procedural rule over
compliance with the safeguards for a constitutional right.
Procedural rules can neither diminish nor modify substantial
rights; their non-compliance should therefore not serve to
validate a warrant that was issued in disregard of the
constitutional requirements. As mentioned, the existence of
probable cause determined after examination by the judge of the
complainant and his witnesses is central to the guarantee of
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The ends of justice are
better served if the supremacy of the constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures is preserved over technical
rules of procedure.
Moreover, the courts should indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights;
we should not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights. In People v. Decierdo, the Court declared that "[w]henever
a protection given by the Constitution is waived by the person
entitled to that protection, the presumption is always against the
waiver." The relinquishment of a constitutional right has to be laid
out convincingly.
In this case, the only evidence that Ogayon waived his
constitutional right was his failure to make a timely motion during
the trial to quash the warrant and to suppress the presentation of
the seized items as evidence. This failure alone, to our mind, is
not a sufficient indication that Ogayon clearly, categorically,
knowingly, and intelligently made a waiver. He cannot
reasonably be expected to know the warrant’s defect for lack of
data in the records suggesting that defect existed. It would thus
be unfair to construe Ogayon’s failure to object as a waiver of his
constitutional right. In People v. Bodoso, the Court noted that "[i]n
criminal cases where life, liberty and property are all at stake…
The standard of waiver requires that it ‘not only must be voluntary,
but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.’"
At this point, we note the purpose for the enactment of Section
14, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court – a relatively new provision
incorporated in A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC or the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000). The provision
was derived from the policy guidelines laid down by the Court in
Malaloan v. Court of Appeals to resolve the main issue of where
motions to quash search warrants should be filed. In other words,
the provision was "intended to resolve what is perceived as
conflicting decisions on where to file a motion to quash a search
warrant or to suppress evidence seized by virtue thereof…." It
was certainly not intended to preclude belated objections against
the search warrant’s validity, especially if the grounds therefor
are not immediately apparent. Thus, Malaloan instructs that "all
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be
raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal
of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived," and that
"a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the
omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not
available, existent or known during the proceedings for the
quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion
to suppress."
A closer reading of the cases where the Court supposedly
brushed aside belated objections would reveal that the
objections were disregarded because they had been cured or
addressed based on the records.
In Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, the accused asserted that the
search warrant was never produced in court, thus suggesting its
absence. The Court, however, noted that "there were supposed
testimonies of its existence."
In People v. Tee, the accused claimed that the issuing judge
failed to exhaustively examine the complainant and his witnesses,
and that the complainant’s witness (a National Bureau of
Intelligence operative) had no personal knowledge of the facts
comprising probable cause, but the Court brushed these claims
aside. It found that the witness’ knowledge of the facts supporting
probable case was not based on hearsay as he himself assisted
the accused in handling the contraband, and that the issuing
judge extensively questioned this witness. In People v.
Torres, the accused assailed the validity of the search conducted
pursuant to a search warrant as it was supposedly made without
the presence of at least two witnesses, but the Court found
otherwise, citing the testimonies taken during the trial
contradicting this claim. A similar objection was made by the
accused in People v. Nuñez, but the Court noted the testimony of
the officer conducting the search who stated that it was made in
the presence of the accused himself and two barangay officials.
The rulings in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals, People v. Court of
Appeals, and People v. Correa are without significance to the
present case. As mentioned, Malaloan v. Court of Appeals
involved the question of where motions to quash search warrants
should be filed, and the guidelines set therein was applied in
People v. Court of Appeals. People v. Correa, on the other hand,
involved a warrantless search of a moving vehicle.
We reiterate that the requirement to raise objections against
search warrants during trial is a procedural rule established by
jurisprudence. Compliance or noncompliance with this
requirement cannot in any way diminish the constitutional
guarantee that a search warrant should be issued upon a finding
of probable cause. Ogayon’s failure to make a timely objection
1âwphi1
cannot serve to cure the inherent defect of the warrant. To
uphold the validity of the void warrant would be to disregard one
of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution.
In the light of the nullity of Search Warrant No. AEK 29-2003, the
search conducted on its authority is likewise null and void. Under
the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of a person’s
right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. With the
inadmissibility of the drugs seized from Ogayon' s home, there is
no more evidence to support his conviction. Thus, we see no
reason to further discuss the other issues raised in this petition.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, the Decision dated March
31, 2009, and the Resolution dated July 10, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 31154 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction, as stated in the
joint judgment dated September 5, 2007, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 12, Lig ity, Albay, in Criminal Case Nos. 4738 and
4739, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner HONESTO
OGA YON y DIAZ is ACQUITTED of the criminal charges against
him for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

SO ORDERED.
32) G.R. No. 218891, September 19, 2016
EDMUND BULAUITAN Y MAUAYAN,* Petitioner, v. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated March 26, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated June
17, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36117,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated September 20, 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch 5
(RTC) in Criminal Case No. 10086, finding petitioner Edmund
Bulauitan y Mauayan (Bulauitan) guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
for violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
The instant case stemmed from an Information6 dated
November 7, 2003 filed before the RTC, charging Bulauitan of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized
under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165,7 the accusatory portion
of which reads:
That on or about October 03, 2003, in the Municipality of Solana,
Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, [Bulauitan], without authority, did then
and there willfully[,] unlawfully[,] and feloniously have in his
possession and under his control and custody three (03) pieces
of heat sealed plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly known
as shabu which he kept inside his residence/dwelling at Centro
Northeast, Solana, Cagayan weighing 0.22 grams which
dangerous drug was confiscated by elements of the PNP Solana,
Cagayan which conducted a search at the residence/dwelling of
the accused by virtue of Search Warrant No. 21 issued by
Executive Judge, Honorable VILMA T[.] PAUIG of RTC Branch II,
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan which resulted to the confiscation of
the above-mentioned dangerous drug as the accused while in
possession thereof do not have necessary permit and/or
authority [sic].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The prosecution alleged that on October 3, 2003, the Philippine
National Police of Solana, Gagayan constituted a team headed
by P/Insp. Kevin Bulayungan (P/Insp. Bulayungan) as leader,
with SPO2 Lito Baccay (SPO2 Baccay) and PO3 Elizalde Tagal
(PO3 Tagal) as search officer and investigator, respectively, to
implement a search warrant issued by Executive Judge Vilma T.
Pauig to search Bulauitan's residence. Before going to the target
residence, the search team first went to the house of Barangay
Chairman Jane Busilan, who in turn, assigned Kagawad (Kgd.)
Jerry Soliva (Kgd. Soliva) and Kgd. Herald de Polonia (Kgd.
Polonia) as search witnesses. Upon arriving at Bulauitan's
residence, the search team was met by Bulauitan's two (2)
children and housekeeper, who informed them that Bulauitan
was not home. This notwithstanding, the search team explained
to the children and housekeeper the reason for their presence,
prompting the latter to allow them inside the house and conduct
the search. SPO2 Baccay then proceeded to Bulauitan's room
and there, discovered three (3) heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the
contents are shabu, the search team showed the sachets to the
children and housekeeper and photographed the same. SPO2
Baccay then gave the sachets to P/Insp. Bulayungan, who in turn,
handed them over to PO3 Tagal who wrapped the confiscated
items with a piece of paper for transport to the Solana PNP
Station. When Bulauitan arrived at his residence, the search
team effected his arrest and took him to the police station with
the seized sachets. Upon arrival thereat, PO3 Tagal prepared the
police blotter and request for laboratory examination, marked the
sachets with his initials, and delivered the same to forensic
chemist S/Insp. Myrna Madriaga Tulauan of the PNP Crime
Laboratory. A qualitative examination revealed that the three (3)
plastic sachets contained an aggregate of 0.22 gram of shabu.
In his defense, Bulauitan denied owning the sachets allegedly
recovered by the search team in his house. He narrated that in
the morning of the fateful day, he went with his wife to
Tuguegarao City to tend to their meat shop. He eventually
received a call from his daughter, Maria Bulauitan (Maria),
informing him that policemen are in their house and conducting a
search therein, prompting him to immediately go home. Upon
reaching his house, the policemen informed him that they
recovered shabu from his room, and thus, arrested him. Finally,
Bulauitan averred that Joseph Juan - the person who executed
the affidavit in support of the application for search warrant —
wanted to get even with him as his wife testified against Juan in a
theft case. Upon arraignment, Bulauitan pleaded not guilty to the
charges against him.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision11 dated September 20, 2013, the RTC found
Bulauitan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged,
and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
two (2) months, and one (1) day, as maximum, and to pay a fine
in the amount of P300,000.00.
The RTC found that Bulauitan constructively possessed the
sachets containing shabu as they were found inside his house
where he exercised dominion and control. In this relation, the
RTC opined that the policemen must be accorded the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official
duties, especially in the absence of any evidence from Bulauitan
to show otherwise.
Aggrieved, Bulauitan elevated his conviction before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated March 26, 2015, the CA affirmed
Bulauitan's conviction. It held that all the elements of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs are present, considering that
Bulauitan without any authority constructively possessed the
seized sachets containing shabu as they were found inside his
house. The CA further held that the prosecution had established
an unbroken chair, of custody of the seized sachets. Finally, the
CA ruled that the search which yielded the seized sachets was
properly implemented as it was done in the presence of
Bulauitan's two (2) children and housekeeper.
Aggrieved, Bulauitan moved for reconsideration which the CA
denied in a Resolution16 dated June 17, 2015; hence, this
petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Bulauitan's
conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165, should be
upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an
appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the
appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision
based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as
errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction
over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty,
and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
In this light and as will be explained hereunder, the Court is of the
view that Bulauitan's conviction must be set aside.
Section 2,18 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a
search and seizure must be carried out through or on the
strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause, absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of the said constitutional
provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches
and seizures, Section 3 (2),19 Article III of the 1987 Constitution
provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches
and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in
any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and
seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being
the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
It must, however, be clarified that a search warrant21 issued in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not give the authorities limitless discretion in
implementing the same as the same Rules provide parameters in
the proper conduct of a search. Section 8, Rule 126 of the
aforesaid Rules, states that:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in
presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room or
any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the
lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the
absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality.
Under this provision, a search under the strength of a warrant is
required to be witnessed by the lawful occupant of the premises
sought to be searched. It must be stressed that it is only upon
their absence that their presence may be replaced by two (2)
persons of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality. In People v. Go,22 the Court held that a departure from
the said mandatory rule - by preventing the lawful occupant or a
member of his family from actually witnessing the search and
choosing two (2) other witnesses observe the search - violates
the spirit and letter of the law, and thus, taints the search with the
vice of unreasonableness, rendering the seized articles
inadmissible due to the application of the exclusionary rule, viz.:
As pointed out earlier, the members of the raiding team
categorically admitted that the search of the upper floor, which
allegedly resulted in the recovery of the plastic bag containing
the shabu, did not take place in the presence of either the lawful
occupant of the premises, i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son
Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground
floor). Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses prescribed by
law are prevented from actually observing and monitoring the
search of the premises, violates both the spirit and letter of the
law:
xxxx
That the raiding party summoned two barangay kagawads to
witness the search at the second floor is of no moment. The
Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy
among the witnesses in whose presence the search of the
premises must be conducted. Thus, Section 8, Rule 126 provides
that the search should be witnessed by "two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality" only in
the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any
member of his family. Thus, the search of appellant's residence
clearly should have been witnessed by his son Jack Go who was
present at the time. The police officers were without discretion to
substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the
law.
xxxx
The raiding team's departure from the procedure mandated by
Section 8, Rule 126 of tote Rules of Court, taken together with
the numerous other irregularities attending the search of
appellant's residence, tainted the search with the vice of
unreasonableness, thus compelling this Court to apply the
exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles inadmissible in
evidence. This must necessarily be so since it is this Court's
solemn duty to be ever watchful for the constitutional rights of the
people, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon. In the
oft-quoted language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence
competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that
exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is
true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls
the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will
that wrong be repressed.23 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In People v. Del Castillo,24 the Court similarly held that the
search of the premises must be witnessed by the lawful occupant
or the family members; otherwise, the search become
unreasonable, thus rendering the seized items inadmissible
under the exclusionary rule.
In this case, a judicious perusal of the records reveals that the
policemen involved in the search of Bulauitan's residence — as
shown in their own testimonies - did not conduct the search in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
In his testimony, P/Insp. Bulayungan was adamant that Bulauitan
was present when the search was commenced, to wit:
[Asst. Pros. Frederick D. Aquino (Pros. Aquino)]: And was
[Bulauitan] then present when you implemented the search
warrant?
[P/Insp. Bulayungan]: Yes, sir.
xxxx
[Pros. Aquino]: So after showing to the accused a copy of the
search warrant, what did the members of your team do, if any?
[P/Insp. Bulayungan]: We conducted an orderly search at the
residence of the accused I Bulauitan], sir.
xxx
[Atty. Rolando C. Acacio (Atty. Acacio)] So you mean to say that
[Bulauitan] was not present when you went to implement the
search warrant?
[P/Insp. Bulayungan]: He was present, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: At what point in time was he present Mr. Witness?
[P/Insp. Bulayungan]: When we introduced ourselves as
policemen and tell our purpose of being there, [Bulauitan] arrived,
sir.
xxxx
[Atty. Acacio]: But at that time that there was a sort of reluctance
you know for a fact that the accused was not in their house?
[P/Insp. Bulayungan]: He was there already, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: He was there?
[P/Insp. Bulayungan]: Yes sir because before we enter the house,
that is the time that [Bulauitan] was already there after we
introduced ourselves as police officers and tell our purpose of
being there [sic].25cralawred (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
However P/Insp. Bulayungan's testimony was belied by that of
another member of the search team, PO3 Tagal, who testified
that Bulauitan was not in the premises when they conducted the
search:
[Asst. Pros. Maita Grace Deray-Israel (Pros. Israel)]: And what
happened when you reached the residence of [Bulauitan]
[PO3 Tagal]: The house helper met us together with the two (2)
children of [Bulauitan] and we asked them where is [Bulauitan]
and they answered us that [Bulauitan] was out of his house and
he is in Tuguegarao City, Ma'am.
xxxx
[Pros. Israel]: And what happened when you arrived in the house
of [Bulauitan]?
[PO3 Tagal]: I asked our team leader [P/Insp. Bulayungan] if we
continue [sic] to search the house of [Bulauitan] considering that
the owner of the house is not around, Ma'am.
xxxx
[Pros. Israel]: And what is the reply of this [P/Insp. Bulayungan]?
[PO3 Tagal]: He said that we will continue, Ma'am.
xxxx
[Pros. Israel]: Alright, Mr.Witness, after you have presented that
search warrant to the two (2) children of [Bulauitan], what
happened next, if any?
[PO3 Tagal]: We requested them to open the door of their house,
Ma'am.
[Pros. Israel]: And they accede [sic]?
[PO3 Tagal]: Yes, Ma'am.
[Pros. Israel]: And after they have opened the door of their house,
what happened next?
[PO3 Tagal]: Then we explained to them what is our subject and
we requested them to follow us inside the room of [Bulauitan]
together with the two (2) Barangay kagawads, Ma'am.
x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
While Bulauitan's absence in the search, per se, did not violate
Section 8, Rule 126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
the search team committed other errors which led to such
violation. For instance, Bulauitan's daughter, Maria, was
effectively precluded from witnessing the search conducted by
SPO2 Baccay in Bulauitan's room as PO3 Tagal kept her in the
living room by searching the area and asking her a lot of
questions. Maria's testimony states:
[Atty. Acacio]: And who were with you then at the house at that
time?
[Maria]: I was alone, sir.
xxxx
[Atty. Acacio]: And when [the police officers] asked you the
whereabouts of your father what did you tell them?
[Maria]: I told them that they were in Tuguegarao selling, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: And then when you told them that your father is in
Tuguegarao selling, what did the policemen do?
[Maria]: They said that they have a search warrant against my
father, sir.
xxxx
[Atty. Acacio]: When the policemen told you that there is a search
warrant for your father, what did they do?
[Maria]: I was not supposed to let them enter the house because
my father was not around but they said that they will still enter
because they have a search warrant for my father otherwise they
will force to open the door, sir [sic].
xxxx
[Atty. Acacio]: And what did you do when they told you that even
without your father we still have to search the house?
[Maria]: I let them entered [sic] the house, sir.
xxxx
[Atty. Acacio]: When these three policemen were allowed access
in the house by you, what did they do?
[Maria]: When they were at the receiving room [SPO2 Baccay]
read the contents of the search warrant and asked me and to
confirm the room of my father, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: And when [SPO2 Baccay] did that, what did you
do?
[Maria]: I told them that this is the room of my father, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: And after confirming that indeed that is the room of
your father, what did they do?
[Maria]: [SPO2 Baccay] and the other policemen went inside the
room while [PO3 Tagal] was left at the receiving room, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: Now, what was [PO3 Tagal] doing when he stayed
in the sala or receiving room?
[Maria]: He was searching our belongings and at the same time
inquiring from me, sir.
xxxx
[Atty. Acacio]: Now, when you were in the sala were you able to
observe what was happening inside the room of your parents?
[Maria]: No, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: And why can't you see what was happening inside
the room of your parents?
[Maria]: When the call rang the owner of the phone and then she
[Maria]: Because the door of the room was then half closed, let me waited and I was able to talk to my mother, sir [sic].
sir.27 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
[Atty. Acacio]: And what did you tell your mother?
Maria's direct testimony was further bolstered by her consistency
during cross examination, to wit: [Maria]: When I was able to talk to my mother I told her to let my
father to go home because policemen were there inside the
house, sir [sic].
[Pros. Ronnel B. Nicolas (Pros. Nicolas)]: In other words, madam
witness, you confirm that when the policemen conducted a
xxxx
search, the search was conducted in the presence of these two
barangay councilmen?
[Atty. Acacio]: And what happened when you went home?
[Maria]: Yes they were present but they were outside the house,
[Maria]: When I was able to reach our house I saw [PO3 Tagal]
sir.
and he asked from me if I was able to contact my father, sir.
xxx
[Atty. Acacio]: And what did you tell him?
[Pros. Nicolas]: You also made mention madam witness that
[Maria]: I told him that I was able to talk to my mother and she will
when the search was being conducted one of the policemen
ask my father to go home, sir.
remained in the sala and conducted search therein, is it not?
[Atty. Acacio]: And after telling that to [PO3 Tagal] what
[Maria]: Yes, sir.
happened next?
[Pros. Nicolas]: And in fact you were present at the time the
[Maria]: [PO3 Tagal] told to [SPO2 Baccay] to enter inside and
policemen conducting a search in the sala? [sic]
then we went inside the house, sir. [sic]
[Maria]: Yes, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: And when you entered to the house, what
happened next? [sic]
[Pros. Nicolas]: You also made mention madam witness that two
policemen conducted search inside the room of your father, is it
[Maria]: When we reached the receiving room, [SPO2 Baccay]
not? [sic]
said that they found something, sir.
[Maria]: Yes, sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: And where was [SPO2 Baccay] when he made
that announcement that he found something?
[Pros. Nicolas]: And you also made mention that you were not
able to actually see them searching because the door leading to
[Maria]: He was inside the room, sir.
the room of your father was half closed, is it not?
[Atty. Acacio]: And at that time where were you?
[Maria]: Yes, sir.
[Maria]: I was at the receiving room, sir.
[Pros. Nicolas]: And of course you just opted to stay in
the sala even you had the opportunity to enter the room of 3 our
xxxx
parents if you chose it, is it not? [sic]
[Atty. Acacio]: And did your father finally arrive?
[Maria]: Because while [PO3 Tagal] was conducting search he
had so many questions that I need to answer, sir. [sic]
[Maria]: Yes, sir.
[Pros. Nicolas]: And definitely madam witness nobody prevented
[Atty. Acacio]: Where were you when your father arrived?
you to enter the room of your father at the time the policemen
conducted the search inside the room of your parents?
[Maria]: I was outside of our house, sir.29 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
[Maria]: I was supposed to go with [SPO2 Baccay] inside the
room of my parents but [PO3 Tagal] talked to me so we remained
in the sala (receiving room), sir.28 (Emphases and underscoring The foregoing statements were corroborated by Kgd. Soliva's
supplied) testimony, which essentially stated that: (a) Bulauitan was not
present when the search was conducted; (b) Maria wasn't able to
witness the conduct of such search; and (c) even he and Kgd.
Worse, the search team even instructed Maria to contact her
Polonia - the two (2) witnesses designated by the barangay
father via telephone, which she could only do by leaving their
chairman - did not witness the search as they remained outside
residence and going to the house of a certain Dr. Romeo Bago
Bulauitan's residence:
(Dr. Bago) to use the telephone therein. It was only after her
return to their residence that SPO2 Baccay announced that they
have allegedly found shabu in Bulauitan's room: [Atty. Acacio]: And what happened when you reached the house
of [Bulauitan]?
[Atty. Acacio]: Now, what did you do when they told you that you
[Kgd. Soliva]: They [the police officers and the PDEA agents]
contact your father [through] telephone?
knocked at the door of the house of [Bulauitan] and the door was
opened by the daughter of [Bulauitan], sir.
[Maria]: I left our house and went to the house of [Dr. Bago], sir.
xxxx
xxxx
[Atty. Acacio]: And what was the response of the daughter of
[Atty. Acacio]: And what happened when you were able to
[Bulauitan] when asked as to his whereabouts?
contact the phone number at the stall of your father?

[Kgd. Soliva]: She answered that they were at the public market,
sir.
[Atty. Acacio]: And after that, what happened next?
[Kgd. Soliva]: They sent the daughter to contact her father, sir.
xxxx
[Atty. Acacio]: While the members of the police and the PDEA
were inside the house of [Bulauitan], what transpired thereafter, if
any?
xxxx
[Kgd. Soliva]: I was surprised when they said that they
seized shabu inside the house, sir.
xxxx
exonerated from all criminal liability.
As a final note, it is fitting to mention that "[t]he Court strongly
supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction
and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers
against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this
campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of
the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in
the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution
covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty
alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those who are
supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the
right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a
price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes [once said,] x x x 'I
think it is less evil that some criminals should escape than that
the government should play an ignoble part.' It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself."32

[Court]: When the PDEA and the police operatives conducted a
search, you were outside?
[Kgd. Soliva]: Yes, your Honor.
[Court]: And when the police authorities were able to find what
they were looking for you did not see how they find [sic] it?
[Kgd. Soliva]: No more your Honor because when I saw them
they were already holding the seized item.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
March 26, 2015 and the Resolution dated June 17, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36117 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner
Edmund Bulauitan y Mauayan is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged.
SO ORDERED.

[Court]: And then the first time you saw the seized item, was that
when you enter [sic] the house after they were already seized, is
that right?

[Kgd. Soliva]: Yes, your Honor.

xxxx

Q: And when you entered the house for the first time after you
heard that something was seized inside the house, did you see
already [Bulauitan] inside the house?

[Kgd. Soliva]: No, your honor.

xxxx

[Atty. Acacio]: After you got out of the house together with the
members of the police and the PDEA and you went all outside of
the house, did you see [Buluaitan]?

xxxx

[Kgd. Soliva]: No, sir.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The testimonies given in the case at bar ultimately prove that: (a)
Bulauitan was not in his residence when the search was
conducted; (b) his daughter, Maria, was not able to witness
SPO2 Baccay's search of Bulauitan's room as PO3 Tagal kept
her in the living room and even instructed her to leave the house
to contact her parents; and (c) Kgd. Soliva and Kgd. Polonia
neither witnessed the search as they remained outside
Bulauitan's residence. Accordingly, the search conducted therein
by the search team fell way below the standard mandated by
Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and thus deemed unreasonable within the purview of the
exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution. As a consequence,
the three (3) plastic sachets containing an aggregate amount of
0.22 gram of shabu recovered therefrom are inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
Since the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged,31 Bulauitan must necessarily be acquitted and
33) G.R. No. 204419, November 7, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. EDMAR P.
CASTILLO, SR., AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 6,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, APARRI, CAGAYAN AND
JEOFREY JIL RABINO Y TALOZA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA,** J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court dated November 12, 2012 of petitioner People of
the Philippines as represented by Second Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, that seeks to reverse and set
aside the Regional Trial Court's (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan)
Joint Resolution1 dated May 14, 2012 quashing Search Warrant
No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Gattaran,
Cagayan and eventually dismissing Criminal Case No. 11-10881
against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza.
The facts follow.
On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of
Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45, which reads,
in part, as follows:
SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER
TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after
examining under oath SPO1 RONEL P. SATURNO of the
Regional Intelligence Division based at Regional Office 2, Camp
Adduru, Tuguegarao City, the applicant herein, and his witness
that there is probable cause to believe that a Violation [of] R.A.
9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drug, has been and is being
committed and there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
that JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal
Street, Maura, Aparri, Cagayan has in his possession or control
the following items, to wit:
SHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS you are
hereby ordered to make an immediate search at any time of the
day or night but preferably at daytime at the afore-stated
residential place of JEOFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO and its
premises and forthwith seize and take possession of the
above-described items to immediately bring him, thereafter, to
the undersigned to be dealt with in accordance with Section 12,
Rule 126 of the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012,
at Gattaran, Cagayan.
Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a
search was conducted by elements of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and officers of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) yielding one (1) sachet containing residue
of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house
of private respondent Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan. When
the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime
Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for
qualitative examination, the test gave positive result for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Thus, an Information4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against
private respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which reads as follows:
That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri,
[P]rovince of Cagayan, and within, the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any legal
authority thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession and under his control and
custody one (1) big zip-lock transparent plastic sachet containing
two (2) pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white
crystalline substance, one sachet with traces of said substance
gave POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as Shabu, a
dangerous drag, while the other sachet gave negative results to
said tests, the said accused knowing fully well and aware that it is
prohibited for any person to possess or use any dangerous drug
regardless of the quality of the purity thereof, unless authorized
by law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881, the case was raffled
to the RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by respondent
Judge Castillo.
Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012,
private respondent Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence with
the following grounds:
Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial jurisdiction
over the place to be searched; No compelling reason for MTC
Gattaran to issue warrant
xxxx
No probable cause to issue Search Warrant
xxxx
No searching question elicited from deponent
x xx x
No particularity in the places to be searched
xxxx
Irregularity in the implementation of the search
x x xx
Suppression of Evidence Just and Proper5
The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above
motion in its Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012, which partly
reads as follows:
It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for
illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years, which penalty is way beyond imprisonment of six (6)
years. A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the application for and to issue Search Warrant No. 45.
As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null and void. [Corollary]
thereto, all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and
void.
With the foregoing conclusion, any further discussion on the
grounds relied upon by the accused to buttress his motion and
the opposition interposed by the public prosecutor are deemed
mere surplusage.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is
GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 45 is hereby ordered
QUASHED. Consequently, all evidence obtained in the execution
of Search Warrant No. 45 are likewise ordered SUPPRESSED.
There being no more evidence to support them, the Informations
in the above-captioned cases are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by
the same court in its Joint Order7 dated September 24, 2012.
Hence, the present petition.
The issue and arguments raised by petitioner are as follows:
With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012
was issued by respondent Judge Castillo with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or is patently
erroneous. It is respectfully submitted that the Municipal Trial
Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue Search
Warrant No. 45 earlier mentioned to search and seize the shabu
stated therein in Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within the
same second judicial region in violation of R.A. 9165,
notwithstanding the fact that the power to hear and try the
offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.
Private respondent, on the other hand, in his Comment8 dated
January 25, 2016, claims that the petition was filed in violation of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He also argues that the
petition should have been filed by the State, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B, Sagucio. Lastly, private
respondent insists that the petition does not show that the
assailed Joint Resolution of the RTC was issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
This Court finds merit to the petition.
Before proceeding with the discussion on the substantial issue
raised in the petition, certain procedural issues have been
pointed out by private respondent that need to be tackled.
According to the private respondent, the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner before this Court
must be struck down as it violates the doctrine on hierarchy of
courts. Private respondent further argues that petitioner did not
provide any compelling reason that would merit the direct filing
with this Court of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It is also
averred that the petition should have been filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General and not the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
because the petition is in the nature of an appeal and the former
is vested with the power of representing the people before any
court.
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there
is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or
modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
proper when (1) any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for
the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.9 Grave
abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility;
or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act
to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of
discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross.10 On the other hand, a remedy is considered "plain,
speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from
the injurious effects of the judgment the acts of the lower court or
agency.11 Its principal office is only to the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse
availed of by petitioner in questioning the quashal of the search
warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the judge that ordered the said quashal. In his allegation
that the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the
proper courts authorized to issue a search warrant, petitioner has
shown that the quashal of the search warrant was patently and
grossly done. In any case, the Court had allowed even direct
recourse to this Court13 or to the Court of Appeals14 via a
special civil action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a
search warrant.15 The general rule is that a party is mandated to
follow the hierarchy of courts. Howevever, in exceptional cases,
the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of
the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.16 In this case, since the pivotal issue raised by
petitioner involves an application of a rule promulgated by this
Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the
Constitution17 regarding the jurisdiction of courts in the proper
issuance of a search warrant, this Court deems it proper to
resolve the present petition.
As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the
People, is only the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and not the
Office of the Solicitor General, such technicality can be relaxed in
the interest of justice. The Court has allowed some meritorious
cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses.
This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that
strict and rigid application of rules which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must always be avoided.18 It is a far better
and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a
technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to
attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on
technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false
impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in
more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.19 In certain cases, this
Court even allowed private complainants to file petitions
for certiorari and considered the said petitions as if filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General. In United Laboratories, Inc. v.
Isip,20 this Court ruled that an exception exists to the general
rule that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme
Court assailing any adverse order of the RTC in the search
warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the
OSG, thus:
The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA
or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the
search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation
(the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and
considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the
said case even held that the petitioners therein could argue its
case in lieu of the OSG:
From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners
were involved in the proceedings which led to the issuance of
Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared
that while the general rule is that it is only the Solicitor General
who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the
People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is
brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if there
appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due
process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private
complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In
line with this ruling, the Court gives this petition due course and
will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned
order in lieu of the Solicitor General.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the
hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it. In
this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition,
considering the nature of the issues raised by the parties.21
Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions
filed by private complainants and deemed them as if filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General, there is no reason to disallow the
petition herein filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.
Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the
authority to issue a search warrant involving an offense in which
it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in the affirmative.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. -
An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was
committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court
within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the
place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the
application shall only be made in the court where the criminal
action is pending.
Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was
filed within the same judicial region where the crime was
allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial
Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search
warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the
application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the
same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant was issued
means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the
said application after the latter was found by the same judge to
have been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with.
It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say
that the court issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction
over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the
resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction
over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search
warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the
exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be
entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.24 Thus,
in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any
court may issue a search warrant even though it has no
jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all
the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be Rules of Court, dated November 12, 2012, of petitioner People of
determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, the Philippines is GRANTED. Consequently, the Joint Resolution
in writing and under oatn or affirmation, the complainant and the dated May 14, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Aparri,
witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45 issued by
witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan,
the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No.
the things to be seized.22 Necessarily, a motion to quash a 11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza
search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search is REINSTATED.
warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized
are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) SO ORDERED.
there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search

wan-ant and eventually dismissed the case based merely on the
fact that the seerch warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran,
Cagayan proceeding from a suspected violation of R.A. 9165
or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the latter court. It is therefore safe to presume that
the other grounds raised by the private respondent in his motion
to quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone, the respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search
warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. It must be
remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all
the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be
quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.

This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for

a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
34) G.R. No. 196045
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
AMADOR PASTRANA AND RUFINA ABAD, Respondents
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid
warrant is not only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Any evidence obtained in violation of said
right shall thus be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at
times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional
rights of the citizens; for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and
set aside the Decision, dated 22 September 2010, and
Resolution, dated 11 March 2011, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 77703. The CA affirmed the Omnibus
Order, dated 10 May 2002, of the Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, Branch 58 (RTC), which nullified Search Warrant No.
01-118.
THE FACTS
On 26 March 2001, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBJ) Special Investigator Albert Froilan
Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed a Sworn Application for a Search
Warrant before the RTC, Makati City, Branch 63, for the purpose
of conducting a search of the office premises of respondents
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad at Room 1908, 88 Corporate
Center, Valero Street, Makati City. SI Gaerlan alleged that he
received confidential information that respondents were engaged
in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Some of their
employees would call prospective clients abroad whom they
would convince to invest in a foreign-based company by
purchasing shares of stocks. Those who agreed to buy stocks
were instructed to make a transfer for the payment thereof. No
shares of stock, however, were actually purchased. Instead, the
money collected was allocated as follows: 42% to respondent
Pastrana's personal account; 32% to the sales office; 7% to
investors-clients, who threatened respondents with lawsuits; 10%
to the cost of sales; and 8% to marketing. Special Investigator
Gaerlan averred that the scheme not only
constituted estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), but also a violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8799
or the Securities Regulation Code (SRC).
In support of the application for search warrant, SI Gaerlan
attached the affidavit of Rashed H. Alghurairi, one of the
complainants from Saudi Arabia; the affidavits of respondents'
former employees who actually called clients abroad; the articles
of incorporation of domestic corporations used by respondents in
their scheme; and the sketch of the place sought to be searched .
On 26 March 2001, Judge Tranquil Salvador, Jr. (Judge Salvador,
Jr.) of the RTC, Branch 63, Makati City, issued Search Warrant
No. 01-118, viz:
PEOPLE OF THE Search Warrant No.
PHILIPPINES, 01-118 For: Violation of
-versus- R.A. 8799 (The Securities
Regulation Code) and
AMADOR PASTRANA Estafa (Art. 315, RPC)
AND RUFINA ABAD of
1908 88 Corporate Center,
Valero St., Makati City
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after
examining under oath the applicant NBI [Special
Investigator] ALBERT FROILAN G. GAERLAN and his
witnesses RONNIE AROJADO and MELANIE O. BATO,
that there is probable cause to believe that AMADOR
PASTRANA and RUFINA ABAD have in their
possession/control located in [an] office premises located at
1908 88 Corporate Center, Valero St., Makati City, as
shown in the application for search warrant the following
documents, articles and items, to wit:
Telephone bills showing the companies['] calls to clients
abroad; list of brokers and their personal files; incorporation
papers of all these companies[,] local and abroad; sales
agreements with clients; copies of official receipts purposely
for clients; fax messages from the clients; copies of credit
advise from the banks; clients['] message slips; company
brochures; letterheads; envelopes; copies of listings of
personal assets of Amador Pastrana; list of clients and other
showing that these companies acted in violation of their
actual registration with the SEC.
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search
anytime of the day of the premises above-described and
forewith seize and take possession thereof and bring said
documents, articles and items to the undersigned to be
dealt with as the law directs.
The officer(s) making the search shall make a return of their
search within the validity of the warrant.
This search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days from this
Date.
Thus, on 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proceeded to
respondents' office to search the same. The search was
witnessed by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Denna, Chief Security
Officer and Building Administrator, respectively of 88 Corporate
Center. Pursuant to the Return, dated 2 April 2001, and the
Inventory Sheet attached thereto, the NBI and the SEC were
able to seize the following:
1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following
documents:
a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;
b. List of brokers and 201 files;
c. Sales agreements;
d. Official receipts;
 e. Credit advise;
f. Fax messages;
g. Clients message slips;
h. Company brochures;
i. Letterheads; and
j. Envelopes.
2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;
3. Offshore incorporation papers;
4. Lease contracts; and
5. Vouchers/ledgers.
On 11 June 2001, respondent Abad moved to quash Search
Warrant No. 01-118 because it was issued in connection with two
(2) offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other
for estafa under the RPC, which circumstance contravened the
basic tenet of the rules of criminal procedure that search
warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause
in connection with one specific offense. Further, Search Warrant
No. 01-118 failed to describe with specificity the objects to be
seized.
On 19 September 2001, pending the resolution of the motion to
quash the search warrant, respondent Abad moved for the
inhibition of Judge Salvador, Jr. She contended that the lapse of
three (3) months without action on the motion to quash clearly
showed Judge Salvador, Jr. 's aversion to passing judgment on
his own search warrant.
In an Order, dated 15 November 2001, Judge Salvador, Jr.
voluntarily inhibited himself from the case. Hence, the case was
re-raffled to the RTC, Makati City, Branch 58.
The Regional Trial Court Ruling
In an Omnibus Order, dated 10 May 2002, the RTC ruled that the
search warrant was null and void because it violated the
requirement that a search warrant must be issued in connection
with one specific offense only. It added that the SRC alone
punishes various acts such that one would be left in limbo
divining what specific provision was violated by respondents; and
that even estafa under the RPC contemplates multifarious
settings. The RTC further opined that the search warrant and the
application thereto as well as the inventory submitted thereafter
were all wanting in particularization. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 01-118 issued on
March 26, 2001 is hereby QUASHED and NULLIFIED. All
documents, articles and items seized are hereby ordered to
be RETURNED to petitioner/accused. Any and all items
seized, products of the illegal search are INADMISSIBLE in
evidence and cannot be used in any proceeding for
whatever purpose. The petition to cite respondent SEC and
NBI officers for contempt of court is DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
elevated an appeal before the CA.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In its decision, dated 22 September 2010, the CA affirmed the
ruling of the RTC. It declared that Search "Warrant No. 01-118
clearly violated Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which
prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one
specific offense, because the application failed to specify what
provision of the SRC was violated or even what type
of estafa was committed by respondents. The appellate court
observed that the application for search warrant never alleged
that respondents or their corporations were not SEC-registered
brokers or dealers, contrary to petitioner's allegation that
respondents violated Section 28.1 of the SRC which makes
unlawful the act of buying or selling of stocks in a dealer or broker
capacity without the requisite SEC registration.
The CA further pronounced that the subject search warrant failed
to pass the test of particularity. It reasoned that the inclusion of
the phrase "other showing that these companies acted in
violation of their actual registration with the SEC" rendered the
warrant all-embracing as it subjected any and all records of
respondents inside the office premises to seizure and the
implementing officers effectively had unlimited discretion as to
what property should be seized. The CA disposed the case in
this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. The Omnibus Order dated May 10, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 58, Makati City is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied
by the CA in its resolution, dated 11 March 2011. Hence, this
petition.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR
IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER WHICH
QUASHED SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
READ TOGETHER, THE ALLEGATIONS IN NBI
AGENT GAERLAN'S APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH
WARRANT AND SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118
SHOW THAT SAID WARRANT WAS ISSUED IN
CONNECTION WITH THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 28.1 OF R.A. NO. 8799.
II.
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 01-118 PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED THE ITEMS LISTED THEREIN WHICH
SHOW A REASONABLE NEXUS TO THE OFFENSE
OF ACTING AS STOCKBROKER WITHOUT THE
REQUIRED LICENSE FROM THE SEC. THE
IMPUGNED STATEMENT FOUND AT THE END OF
THE ENUMERATION OF ITEMS DID NOT INTEND
TO SUBJECT ALL DOCUMENTS OF
RESPONDENTS TO SEIZURE BUT ONLY THOSE
"SHOWING THAT THESE COMPANIES ACTED IN
VIOLATION OF THEIR ACTUAL REGISTRATION
WITH THE SEC."
Petitioner argues that violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC
and estafa are so intertwined that the punishable acts defined in
one of them can be considered as including or are necessarily
included in the other; that operating and acting as stockbrokers
without the requisite license infringe Section 28.1 of the SRC;
that these specific acts of defrauding another by falsely
pretending to possess power or qualification of being a
stockbroker similarly constitute estafa under Article 315 of the
RPC; and that both Section 28.1 of the SRC and Article 315 of
the RPC penalize the act of misrepresentation, an element
common to both offenses; thus, the issuance of a single search
warrant did not violate the "one specific offense rule."
Petitioner further contends that the subject search warrant is not
a general warrant because the items listed therein show a
reasonable nexus to the offense of acting as stockbrokers
without the required license from the SEC; that the statement
"and other showing that these companies acted in violation of
their actual registration with the SEC" did not render the warrant
void; and that the words "and other" only intend to emphasize
that no technical description could be given to the items subject
of the search warrant because of the very nature of the offense.
In their comment, respondents counter that the lower court was
correct in ruling that the subject warrant was issued in connection
with more than one specific offense; that estafa and violation of
the SRC could not be considered as one crime because the
former is punished under the RPC while the latter is punished
under a special law; that there are many violations cited in the
SRC that there can be no offense which is simply called "violation
of R.A. No. 8799;" and that, similarly, there are three classes
of estafa which could be committed through at least 10 modes,
each one of them having elements distinct from those of the
other modes.
Respondents assert that Search Warrant No. 01-118 does not
expressly indicate that the documents, articles, and items sought
to be seized thereunder are subjects of the offense, stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense; that
it is a general warrant because it enumerates every conceivable
document that may be found in an office setting; that, as a result,
it is entirely possible that in the course of the search for the
articles and documents generally listed in the search warrant,
those used and intended for legitimate purposes may be included
in the seizure; that the concluding sentence in the subject
warrant "and other showing that these companies acted in
violation of their actual registration with the SEC" is a
characteristic of a general warrant; and that it allows the raiding
team unbridled latitude in determining by themselves what items
or documents are evidence of the imputation that respondents
and the corporations they represent are violating their registration
with the SEC.
In its reply, petitioner avers that the validity of a search warrant
may be properly evaluated by examining both the warrant itself
and the application on which it was based; that the acts alleged
in the application clearly constitute a transgression of Section
28.1 of the SRC; and that the nature of the offense for which a
search warrant is issued is determined based on the factual
recital of the elements of the subject crime therein and not the
formal designation of the crime itself in its caption.
THE COURT'S RULING
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every
individual the right to personal liberty and security of homes
against unreasonable searches and seizures, viz:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security
in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of
the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial
sanction, and to give remedy against such usurpations when
attempted.
Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure provide for the requisites for the issuance of
a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witness he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be
anywhere in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Examination of complainant; record. The judge
must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits
submitted.
Hence, in the landmark case of Stonehill v. Diokno
(Stonehill), the Court stressed two points which must be
considered in the issuance of a search warrant, namely: (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined personally by the judge; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Moreover,
in Stonehill, on account of the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the search warrants involved in that
case, the Court deemed it fit to amend the former Rules of Court
by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense."
The search warrant must be
issued for one specific offense.
One of the constitutional requirements for the validity of a search
warrant is that it must be issued based on probable cause which,
under the Rules, must be in connection with one specific offense
to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant. In search
warrant proceedings, probable cause is defined as such facts
and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched.
In Stonehill, the Court, in declaring as null and void the search
warrants which were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code," stated:
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the
offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to
have found the existence of probable cause, for the same
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions,
violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter
 of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege
any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody
of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," -
as alleged in the aforementioned applications - without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws; or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be
to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights
guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication
and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or
passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to
be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted -
to outlaw the socalled general warrants. It is not difficult to
imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife,
when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
In Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Alvarez, the
Court further ruled:
In the determination of probable cause, the court must
necessarily determine whether an offense exists to justify
the issuance or quashal of the search warrant because the
personal properties that may be subject of the search
warrant are very much intertwined with the "one specific
offense" requirement of probable cause. The only way to
determine whether a warrant should issue in connection
with one specific offense is to juxtapose the facts and
circumstances presented by the applicant with the elements
of the offense that are alleged to support the search
warrant.
xx xx
The one-specific-offense requirement reinforces the
constitutional requirement that a search warrant should
issue only on the basis of probable cause. Since the primary
objective of applying for a search warrant is to obtain
evidence to be used in a subsequent prosecution for an
offense for which the search warrant was applied, a judge
issuing a particular warrant must satisfy himself that the
evidence presented by the applicant establishes the facts
and circumstances relating to this specific offense for which
the warrant is sought and issued. x x x
In this case, Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for "violation
of R.A. No. 8799 (The Securities Regulation Code) and
for estafa (Art. 315, RPC)." First, violation of the SRC is not an
offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the
said law such as manipulation of security prices, insider
trading, acting as dealer or broker without being registered with
the SEC, use of unregistered exchange, use of unregistered
clearing agency, and violation of the restrictions on borrowings
by members, brokers, and dealers among others. Even the
charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC" is vague for there
are three ways of committing the said crime: (1) with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence; (2) by means of false
pretenses or fraudulent acts; or (3) through fraudulent means.
The three ways of committing estafa may be reduced to
two, i.e., (1) by means of abuse of confidence; or (2) by means of
deceit. For these reasons alone, it can be easily discerned that
Search Warrant No. 01-118 suffers a fatal defect.
Indeed, there are instances where the Court sustained the
validity of search warrants issued for violation of R.A. No. 6425 or
the then Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. In Olaes v. People, even
though the search warrant merely stated that it was issued in
connection with a violation of R.A. No. 6425, the Court did not
nullify the same for it was clear in the body that it was issued for
the specific offense of possession of illegal narcotics, viz:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states
that it is in connection with Violation of R.A. No. 6425,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is
clearly recited in the text thereof that [t]here is probable
cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias
Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City, [have] in their possession and control and custody of
marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other
regulated/prohibited and exempt narcotics preparations
which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although
the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not
pinpointed, there is no question at all of the specific offense
alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of
probable cause. The search warrant also satisfies the
requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity of the
description to be made of the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. (emphasis supplied)
In People v. Dichoso, the search warrant was also for violation of
R.A. No. 6425, without specifying what provisions of the law were
violated. The Court upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants' contention that the search warrant in question
was issued for more than one (1) offense, hence, in violation
of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is
unpersuasive. He engages in semantic juggling by
suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal
possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is
clearly for more than one (1) specific offense. In short,
following this theory, there should have been three (3)
separate search warrants, one for illegal possession of
shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This
argument is pedantic. The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is
a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs
which are subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs
and defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are
closely related or which belong to the same class or species.
Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be validly
issued for the said violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. (emphases supplied)
Meanwhile, in Prudente v. Dayrit, the search warrant was
captioned: For Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms, etc.), the Court held that while "illegal possession of
firearms is penalized under Section I of P .D. No. 1866 and illegal
possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it
cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the
various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and
explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive of life
and property are related offenses or belong to the same species,
as to be subsumed within the category of illegal possession of
firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866."
The aforecited cases, however, are not applicable in this case.
Aside from its failure to specify what particular provision of the
SRC did respondents allegedly violate, Search Warrant No.
01-118 also covered estafa under the RPC. Even the application
for the search warrant merely stated:
Amador Pastrana and Rufina Abad through their employees
scattered throughout their numerous companies call
prospective clients abroad and convince them to buy shares
of stocks in a certain company likewise based abroad. Once
the client is convinced to buy said shares of stocks, he or
she is advised to make a telegraphic transfer of the money
supposedly intended for the purchase of the stocks. The
 transfer is made to the account of the company which
contacted the client. Once the money is received, the same
is immediately withdrawn and brought to the treasury
department of the particular company. The money is then
counted and eventually allocated to the following: 42% to
Pastrana, 32% for the Sales Office, 7% for the redeeming
clients (those with small accounts and who already
threatened the company with lawsuits), 10% for the cost of
sales and 8% goes to marketing. No allocation is ever made
to buy the shares of stocks.
Moreover, the SRC is not merely a special penal law. It is first
and foremost a codification of various rules and regulations
governing securities. Thus, unlike, the drugs law wherein there is
a clear delineation between use and possession of illegal drugs,
the offenses punishable under the SRC could not be lumped
together in categories. Hence, it is imperative to specify what
particular provision of the SRC was violated.
Second, to somehow remedy the defect in Search Warrant No.
01-118, petitioner insists that the warrant was issued for violation
of Section 28.1 of the SRC, which reads, "No person shall
engage in the business of buying or selling securities in the
Philippines as a broker or dealer, or act as a salesman, or an
associated person of any broker or dealer unless registered as
such with the Commission." However, despite this belated
attempt to pinpoint a provision of the SRC which respondents
allegedly violated, Search Warrant No. 01-118 still remains null
and void. The allegations in the application for search warrant do
not indicate that respondents acted as brokers or dealers without
prior registration from the SEC which is an essential element to
be held liable for violation of Section 28.l of the SRC. It is even
worthy to note that Section 28.1 was specified only in the SEC's
Comment on the Motion to Quash, dated 5 April 2002.
In addition, even assuming that violation of Section 28.1 of the
SRC was specified in the application for search warrant, there
could have been no finding of probable cause in connection with
that offense. In People v. Hon. Estrada, the Court pronounced:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable
cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained
under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence
is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the
existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged -
for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in
the present case - and such evidence is within the
knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily
produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be
secured at the time of application, the applicant must show
a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the
judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural
safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give
meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy
of his home and personalities. (emphasis supplied)
Here, the applicant for the search warrant did not present proof
that respondents lacked the license to operate as brokers or
dealers. Such circumstance only reinforces the view that at the
1âшphi 1
time of the application, the NBI and the SEC were in a quandary
as to what offense to charge respondents with.
Third, contrary to petitioner's claim that violation of Section 28.1
of the SRC and estafa are so intertwined with each other that the
issuance of a single search warrant does not violate the
one-specific-offense rule, the two offenses are entirely different
from each other and neither one necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other. An offense may be said to
necessarily include another when some of the essential elements
or ingredients of the former constitute the latter. And vice versa,
an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form
part of those constituting the latter.
The elements of estafa in general are the following: (a) that an
accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means
of deceit; and (b) that damage and prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused the offended party or third
person. On the other hand, Section 28.1 of the SRC penalizes
the act of performing dealer or broker functions without
registration with the SEC. For such offense, defrauding another
and causing damage and prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation are not essential elements. Thus, a person who is
found liable of violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC may, in
addition, be convicted of estafa under the RPC. In the same
manner, a person acquitted of violation of Section 28.1 of the
SRC may be held liable for estafa. Double jeopardy will not set in
because violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC is ma/um
prohibitum, in which there is no necessity to prove criminal intent,
whereas estafa is ma/um in se, in the prosecution of which, proof
of criminal intent is necessary.
Finally, the Court's rulings in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. CA
(Columbia) and Laud v. People (Laud) even militate against
petitioner. In Columbia, the Court ruled that a search warrant
which covers several counts of a certain specific offense does
not violate the one-specific-offense rule, viz:
That there were several counts of the offense of copyright
infringement and the search warrant uncovered several
contraband items in the form of pirated videotapes is not to
be confused with the number of offenses charged. The
search warrant herein issued does not violate the
one-specific-offense rule.
In Laud, Search Warrant No. 09-14407 was adjudged valid as it
was issued only for one specific offense - that is, for Murder,
albeit for six (6) counts.
In this case, the core of the problem is that the subject warrant
did not state one specific offense. It included violation of the SRC
which, as previously discussed, covers several penal provisions
and estafa, which could be committed in a number of ways.
Hence, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having
been issued for more than one specific offense.
Reasonable particularity of the
description of the things to be
seized
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to
be seized. The constitutional requirement of reasonable
particularity of description of the things to be seized is primarily
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1)
readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them
from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers
with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized and thus
prevent unreasonable searches and seizures. It is not, however,
required that the things to be seized must be described in precise
and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities.
In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, it was pointed out
that one of the tests to determine the particularity in the
description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is
when the things described are limited to those which bear direct
relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
In addition, under the Rules of Court, the following personal
property may be the subject of a search warrant: (i) the subject of
the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used or intended
to be used as the means of committing an offense.

Here, as previously discussed, Search Warrant No. 01-118 failed

to state the specific offense alleged committed by respondents.
Consequently, it could not have been possible for the issuing
judge as well as the applicant for the search warrant to determine
that the items sought to be seized are connected to any crime.
Moreover, even if Search Warrant No. 01-118 was issued for
violation of Section 28.1 of the SRC as petitioner insists, the
documents, articles and items enumerated in the search warrant
failed the test of particularity. The terms used in this warrant were
too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to
the transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to
search and seizure. Even the phrase "and other showing that
these companies acted in violation of their actual registration with
the SEC" does not support petitioner's contention that Search
Warrant No. 01-118 was indeed issued for violation of Section
28.1 of the SRC; the same could well-nigh pertain to the
corporations' certificate of registration with the SEC and not just
to respondents' lack of registration to act as brokers or dealers.

In fine, Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having
been issued for more than one offense and for lack of
particularity in the description of the things sought for seizure.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 22 September 2010

Decision and 11 March 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 77703 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
RULE 127 - PROVISIONAL REMEDIES IN
CRIMINAL CASES
1) G.R. No. L-4600 February 28, 1952
PEDRO BABALA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MAXIMINO ABAÑO, ET AL., respondents.
Agustin Lukban and Generoso F. Obusan for petitioner.
Victoriano Yamson and Rafael de la Cruz for respondents. Hon.
Maximino Abaño for and in his own behalf.
PARAS, C.J.:
Consequent upon a dispute over a market stall, an information
for grave coercion was filed on January 26, 1951, in the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Norte, against the herein petitioner
Pedro Babala, at the instance of the herein respondent Patricio
Canela. On the same date, respondent Canela filed in said court
a civil action against petitioner Babala, for damages based on the
same facts alleged in the information for grave coercion, in which
action respondent Canela prayed for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. In the civil case, the petitioner
insisted that the criminal case should have precedence, The
Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, however, issued an
order dated February 6, 1951, providing that the trial of the civil
case upon the merits was suspended until after the criminal case
shall have been decided and terminated, but that the hearing on
the petition for preliminary injunction might be proceeded with.
The present petition for certiorari and prohibition was instituted
by the petitioner to set aside this order, it being argued that the
criminal case suspended the trial of the civil case, including the
matter of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner's contention is unfounded. In the case of Ramcar, Inc.,
vs. De Leon (44 off. Gaz., p. 3795; 78 Phil., 449) we have already
ruled that, although the civil action is suspended until final
judgment in the criminal case, the court is not thereby deprived of
its authority to issue preliminary and auxiliary writs, such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, appointment of receiver, fixing
amounts of bonds, and other processes of similar nature which
do not go into the merits of the case. It was reasoned out that "if
those ancillary processes cannot be resorted to during the
suspension, there is no sense in the rule providing only for
suspension, when its effect is to kill the action."
It becomes unnecessary to touch upon the contention of the
respondents that the petition for certiorari and prohibition is
defective for lack of verification.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and
Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PABLO, J., dissidente:
Disiento por las mismas razones expuestas en mi disidencia en
Ramcar, Inc., contra De Leon, 44 O.G., 3795; 78 Phil., 449.
2) G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L-18252
August 31, 1962
IRINEO SANTOS, JR., ANTONIO PINEDA, BENITO PUZON,
VIRGILIO ELAYDA, GRACIANO ABAD, BERNARDINO
TORRIJOS, VIRGILIO MICLAT AND MARINO
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE P. FLORES, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of La Union; ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, RUFINO
MARASIGAN and PEDRO OFIANA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-18256 and L-18260 August 31, 1962
FLORENTINO B. MOLINYAWE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE P. FLORES, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of La Union; ALEJANDRO E. SEBASTIAN, RUFINO
MARASIGAN and PEDRO OFIANA, respondent.
Nos. L-18251 & L-18252:
Montenegro, Madayag, Viola & Hernandez for petitioners.
Alejandro E. Sebastian for and in his own behalf as respondent.
Nos. L-18256 & L-18260:
Gregorio R. Puruganan for petitioner.
Aleiandro E. Sebastian for and in his own behalf as respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
These cases are interrelated. The petitioners in L-18251 and
L-18252 are Irineo Santos, Jr., Antonio Pineda, Benito Puzon,
Virgilio Elayda, Graciano Abad, Bernardino Torrijos, Virgilio
Miclat and Marino Reyes, whereas Florentino B. Molinyawe is
the sole petitioner in G.R. Nos. L-18256 and L-18260. The
respondents in these four (4) cases, are identical, namely, Hon.
Jose P. Flores, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union and Alejandro Sebastian, Rufino Marasigan and Pedro
Ofiana.
It appears that on November 27, 1959, the Secretary of Justice
issued Administrative Order No. 185, directing respondent
Alejandro Sebastian, aside from Isidro Vejunco and Meneleo
Mesina, "to assist the provincial fiscal of La Union and other
provincial and city fiscals and attorneys in the investigation and
prosecution of the alleged ACCFA's fraudulent tobacco deals".
Thereupon, respondents Rufino Marasigan and Pedro Ofiana, as
provincial fiscal and assistant provincial fiscal, respectively, of La
Union, together with respondent Sebastian, who are hereinafter
referred to collectively as the prosecutors, seized ACCFA
(Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration)
and CCE (Central Cooperative Exchange) records of tobacco
purchases and redrying, sealed the ACCFA warehouses in the
redrying plant in Agoo, La Union, where the tobacco purchased
in 1959 were stored, and conducted ex parte the investigation
referred to in said Administrative Order, by taking down the
testimony of witnesses, and examining, with the assistance of
tobacco experts, the confiscated tobacco, a considerable amount
of which turned oat to be native tobacco, although purchased
and based off, as well as paid for, as Virginia tobacco, aside from
a size-able quantity of low grade Virginia tobacco purchased as
high grade tobacco and paid for at the price fixed by law for said
high grade tobacco. After ascertaining the names of the persons
involved in said tobacco deals, hereinafter referred to as
defendants, the prosecutors prepared corresponding
informations; against them. Inasmuch, however, as some of the
aforementioned defendants had subsequently asked the
Department of Justice for an opportunity to give their side of the
matter before the filing of said informations, the prosecutors
decided that all of the defendants be given such opportunity.
Hence, the prosecutors sent to said defendants, including
petitioners herein, a notice, dated March 23, 1960, informing
them that the former would conduct a preliminary investigator,
"on March 20 — April 2, 1960, at 8:30 a.m., in the office of the
Provincial Fiscal, San Fernando, La Union." The notice received
by Molinyawe, reads as follows:
You are hereby notified that the undersigned will conduct the
preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case on March 20 -
Apr. 2, 1960 at 8:30 a.m., in the Office of the Provincial Fiscal,
San Fernando, La Union. At the hearing, you may appear in
person or with the assistance of counsel. Failure to appear and
adduce evidence in your favor will be considered a waiver on
your part to be heard, and such steps as the facts and the law on
the case warrant will then be taken.
For your information, you are advised that, in a previous inquiry,
it has been established that during the period from September 1,
1959 and November 10, 1959, in the Redrying Plant of the
Central Cooperative Exchange (CCE) in the Municipality of Agoo,
Province of La Union, in violation of existing laws which authorize
it to buy only Virginia type leaf Tobacco grown and produced in
the Philippines, the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative
Financing Administration, commonly known as ACCFA, in a
series of transactions purchased from different Farmers
Cooperative Marketing Associations (Facomas), two million kilos
of native leaf tobacco which have been falsely entered and made
to appear in papers and books kept by ACCFA as Virginia leaf
tobacco and which were paid for as such, to the damage of the
Government which supplied the money used in such purchases
in the amount of Three Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P3,500,000.00). Needless to say, the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds Through Falsification of Public and Official
Documents was committed. You were, during the period alluded
to, employed as ACCFA Chief of Operations, with the function of
exercising full control in purchasing tobacco in Agoo, La Union
and the evidence gathered reveals that directly or indirectly, and
in connivance with your co-respondents, you participated in the
commission of the crime. The evidence constitutes a prima
facie case against you and unless overcome, justifies your
inclusion in the information to be filed in Court.
The notices received by the other petitioners herein were
identical, except as regards the description of the positions they
respectively held as employees of the ACCFA.
When the preliminary investigation began on March 29, 1960, the
prosecutors announced that their purpose was merely to hear the
side of the defense and to receive its evidence, because that
introduced at the previous inquiry had already been found to be
sufficient to justify the filing of the corresponding informations.
Counsel for petitioners in these four (4) cases then asked that
they be informed of the particulars of the charges against them
and allowed to examine the records of the ex parte investigation,
and the evidence introduced therein, as well as to cross-examine
that witnesses who had testified on said occasion. Acting upon
this request, the prosecutors caused the draft of the informations
prepared by them — which are substantially identical to those
eventually filed in court — to be read to petitioners herein. The
latter were not allowed to examine the records of the ex parte
investigation, particularly the affidavits made by said witnesses,
but the documentary evidence, consisting of records of the
ACCFA and the CCE, were placed at their disposal for two (2)
days. Moreover, the prosecutors refused to recall said witnesses
for cross-examination by petitioners, who protested against the
procedure being followed by said prosecutors and announced
that they (petitioners) would have nothing to do with the
proceedings. The prosecutors then gave petitioners herein up to
April 5, 1960 to take up the matter with the Supreme Court,
whereupon petitioners and other defendants walked out of the
room in which the investigation was being held and did not attend
further hearings. This notwithstanding the investigation continued,
with respect to other defendants, from March 29 to April 6, 1960,
during which period the testimony of around 80 defendants and
their witnesses was taken. Upon the request of some defendants,
who resided in Manila and nearby provinces and had complained
about the expenses incident to their stay in San Fernando, La
Union, the investigation was resumed in Manila on April 12 and
subsequent dates.
Thereafter, or on May 16, 1960, two (2) informations, one for
malversation of public funds with falsification of public and official
documents, and another for malversation of public funds, were
filed with the Court of First Instance of La Union and docketed
therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997, thereof, against
61 and 48 persons, respectively, including, in both cases,
petitioners herein. On or about June 15, 1960, said informations
were amended by dropping thirty-one (31) and six (6) defendants,
respectively, not including petitioners herein, from the charges in
said Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997.
Meanwhile, on motion of respondents Sebastian and Marasigan,
dated May 17, 1960, writs of preliminary attachment of the
properties of the defendants in said criminal cases were issued
on May 27, 1960. Said defendants sought, on June 17, 1960, the
dissolution of said writs, which was denied by respondent Hon.
Jose P. Flores, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of La
Union, on June 28, 1960. The arraignment of the defendants
having subsequently been set for November 21, 1960,
petitioners in G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L-18252 moved to quash
the amended informations.
Prior thereto, or on November 5, 1960, the Government had
instituted Civil Case No. 6279 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, against several defendants, including herein petitioner,
Florentino Molinyawe, for forfeiture of property allegedly acquired
by him, during his incumbency, in an amount manifestly out of
proportion to his lawful income, as a public official, in violation of
Republic Act No. 1379, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft Law.
Thereupon, or on November 16, 1960, Molinyawe moved to
quash the informations in the aforesaid Criminal Cases Nos.
2996 and 2997, relying not only upon the grounds invoked by
petitioners in said cases G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L-18252, but,
also, upon said Republic Act No. 1379. The motions to quash
these two (2) sets of defendants were denied by respondent
Judge on March 13, 1961. Soon, thereafter, or on March 17,
1961, petitioners were notified that their arraignment would take
place on April 4, 1961. Thereupon, or on March 27, 1961, Irineo
Santos, Jr., Antonio Pineda, Benito Puzon, Virgilio Elayda,
Graciano Abad, Bernardino Torrijos, Virgilio Miclat and Marino
Reyes, instituted Cases G.R. Nos. L-18251 and L-18252 of this
Court. The next day, Molinyawe commenced Cases G.R. Nos.
L-18256 and L-18260.
These four (4) cases are for certiorari, prohibition and/or
mandamus, with preliminary injunction to restrain the
respondents, their associates, representatives, delegates,
subordinates, substitutes and all other persons acting by or
under their direction or in cooperation with them, from further
proceeding in said Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997 and from
enforcing the orders and writs of attachment issued therein, as
well as from doing any act tending directly or indirectly to render
ineffectual whatever judgment may be rendered by this Court.
Petitioners pray, also, that, after due hearing, judgment be
rendered, annulling the preliminary investigation conducted by
the prosecutors and the proceedings relative to the filing of the
writs informations and amended informations and to the issuance
of the writs of preliminary attachment above referred to, declaring
that respondent Judge has no jurisdiction to hear said criminal
cases and commanding him to forthwith dismiss the same.
Furthermore, petitioner Molinyawe prays that he be declared,
pursuant to section 8 of Republic Act No. 1379, immune from
further prosecution in the aforementioned criminal cases, by
reason of the pendency of Civil Case No. 6379 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal against him, and that respondents herein
be commanded to "forever desist from prosecuting" him "for any
transaction, matter or thing he is compelled to explain in said
Civil Case No. 6379".
The main issues, common to these four (4) cases, are: (1)
whether petitioners herein, as defendants in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 2996 and 2997, are entitled, as a matter of right, to examine
the affidavits of the witnesses who appeared before the
prosecutors in the course of the investigation conducted by them
prior to March 28, 1960, and to cross-examine said witnesses;
and (2) whether the writs of preliminary attachment issued on
May 27, 1960, should be dissolved or annulled, owing to the
alleged insufficiency of the affidavit submitted by the prosecution
in said cases in support of its motion for the issuance in said
writs.
The first issue hinges on the proper interpretation and
construction of section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code,
as amended, the pertinent part of which reads:
A provincial fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal and a special
counsel appointed under section 1686 of this Code shall have
authority to conduct investigation into the matter of any crime or
misdemeanor and have the necessary information or complaint
prepared or made against persons charged with the commission
of the same. If the offense charged falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, the defendant shall not
be entitled as a matter of right to preliminary investigation in any
case, where the provincial fiscal himself, or an assistant
provincial fiscal, or a special counsel, after due investigation of
the facts made in the presence of the accused if the latter so
requested, shall have presented an information against him in
proper form and certified under oath by the said provincial fiscal
or assistant provincial fiscal or special counsel that he conducted
a proper preliminary investigation. To this end, he may, with due
notice to the accused, summon reputed witnesses and require
them to appear before him and testify and be cross-examined
under oath by the accused upon the latter's request. The
attendance or evidence of absent or recalcitrant witnesses who
may be summoned or whose testimony may be required by the
provincial fiscal, or assistant provincial fiscal, or special counsel
under the authority herein conferred shall be enforced by proper
process upon application to be made by the provincial fiscal, or
assistant provincial fiscal, or special counsel to any Judge of First
Instance of the Judicial District. But no witness summoned to
testify under this section shall be compelled to give testimony to
incriminate himself.
At the outset, it will be recalled that, prior to the preliminary
investigation held on March 29, 1960 and subsequent dates, the
prosecutors had made an investigation of the facts pertinent to
the malversation of public funds and falsification of public and
official documents which, later on, became the subject matter of
Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997. Had the prosecutors filed
the informations therein relying exclusively upon the evidence
obtained in said previous investigation, there would have been
no possible doubt that petitioners herein would not be entitled to
examine the sworn statements aforementioned and to
cross-examine the makers thereof, for the provision above
quoted explicitly declares that "the defendant shall not be entitled
as a matter of right to preliminary investigation". His right, under
said provision, to be present to the investigation conducted by
the prosecutor and to cross-examine the witnesses who may
appear before the latter, is conditioned upon the existence of a
"request", which must, perforce, precede said investigation by
the prosecutor. There had been no such request by herein
petitioners before March 29, 1960. The request made by them on
that date did not impose upon the prosecutors the mandatory
duty to disclose the details of the evidence introduced, and to
recall the witnesses who had testified, prior thereto. This was a
matter entirely within the sound discretion of the prosecutors,
who, we find, had acted within the proper bounds thereof.
It should be noted, also, that the prosecutors considered the
evidence and facts gathered by them prior to March 29, 1960 as
sufficient to warrant the filing of the corresponding informations,
which were, accordingly, prepared by them, and that the
institution of the corresponding criminal actions was deferred at
the behest merely of some of the prospective defendants, who
had asked that their respective sides be heard before the filing of
said informations. For this reason, the notice sent to herein
petitioners and other defendants advised them that the evidence
introduced in the previous inquiry "constitutes a prima facie case
against you and unless overcome justifies your inclusion in the
information to be filed in court". This notice did not have the effect
of revoking or annulling the investigation previously conducted by
the prosecutors. It gave petitioners herein no other right than that
to give their side of the case, if they wanted to. It did not entitle
them to examine the sworn statements taken at said previous
inquiry or to cross-examine the respective affiants. By giving to
petitioners the gist of the evidence secured at said previous
investigation and placing at their disposal the documentary
evidence then taken, consisting of records of the ACCFA and the
CCE, the prosecutors had complied with the letter and spirit of
section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended,
and satisfied the demands of justice and due process.
1äwphï1.ñët
In the language of Senator Sumulong, the sponsor of Senate Bill
No 315, which upon approval, became Republic Act No. 732,
amending said section 1687, of the Revised Administrative Code,
the purpose of the amendment was merely "to authorize
provincial fiscal to conduct preliminary investigation in the same
way that is being done ... in the City of Manila". Hence, referring
to a provision in the Charter of Roxas City analogous to that of
the City of Manila, we held in People vs. Ramilo, L-7380
(February 29, 1956):
Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court dearly provides that,
the right of a defendant after his arrest is (1) to be informed of the
complaint or information filed against him and of the substance of
the testimony and evidence presented against him; and (2) to be
allowed, if he so desires, to testify or to present witnesses or
evidence in his favor. As of right, therefore, in a preliminary
investigation, and accused is not entitled to cross-examine the
witnesses presented against him. Hence, the demand of the
herein accused during the re-investigation conducted by the City
Attorney that the witnesses for the prosecution be recalled so
that she could cross-examine them was not based on any
provision of law and therefore the City Attorney of Roxas City has
correctly denied such demand.
Such view was reiterated in Abrera vs. Muños, L-14743 (July 26,
1960), and we find no plausible reason to depart therefrom.
Indeed, the purpose of a preliminary investigation is, not to have
a full dress investigation that would delay unnecessarily the
disposition of judicial proceedings, but, no more than "to secure
the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial, and, also, to protect the State from useless and
expensive trials". (U.S. vs. Grant, 18 Phil. 122; U.S. vs. Marfori,
35 Phil. 666; Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 Phil. 82; People vs. Magpole,
70 Phil. 176.) For these reasons, pursuant to section 11 of Rule
108 of the Rules of Court:
After the arrest of the defendant and his delivery to the court, he
shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him,
he shall also be informed of the substance of the testimony and
evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to
present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to
do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to
writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and
subscribed by him.
This is exactly what has been done in connection with Criminal
Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997. Petitioners herein were informed of
the gist of the testimony taken at the previous investigation and
allowed to examine the documents, consisting of official records,
seized prior thereto, as well as to present evidence in their
defense. Under these facts, it is clear to us that the objective of
the law on preliminary investigations had been attained.
Petitioners assail the propriety and validity of the investigations
conducted in Manila on April 12, 1960 and subsequent dates as
violative of the provisions concerning venue. Regardless,
however, of the merits of the objection in abstract, it appears that
said investigations were held in Manila upon the request of
defendants other than petitioners herein and referred exclusively
to the participation of said defendants, not to that of petitioners
herein, in the commission of the aforementioned offenses.
Petitioners, accordingly, have no cause for complaint thereon.
They insist, however, that the writs of preliminary attachment
above mentioned were illegally issued and that the same should
be, either dissolved, or annulled, upon the following grounds,
namely: (a) the motion for the issuance of said writs was filed by
respondent Alejandro Sebastian, who, petitioners aver, has no
personality to filled said motion, the offended party being the
ACCFA; (b) the motion was sworn to by said respondent, who, it
is urged, has no personal knowledge of the truth of the
allegations of fact made in said motion.
that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise,
required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to
prosecution; but no individual shall be prosecuted criminally for
or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against
self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, documentary or
otherwise, except that such individual so testifying shall not be
exempt from prosecution and conviction for perjury or false
testimony committed in so testifying or from administrative
proceedings.
Pursuant to this provision, "no individual shall be prosecuted
criminally for or on account of a transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise ...". The records before us do not
show that he has already testified or produced evidence in Civil
Case No. 6379. Much less do said records indicate the nature of
said testimony or evidence, and, consequently, its bearing, if any,
on the criminal cases referred to above. Indeed, not even copies
of the pertinent pleadings in said Civil Case No. 6379 have been
attached to said records. Hence, we are not in a position to
determine the applicability of said section 8 of Republic Act No.
1379 to the aforementioned criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in these four (4) cases are denied
and said cases are hereby dismissed, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J.. Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

We find no merit in this pretense. As one of the official

prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997, respondent
Sebastian has the authority to apply for such remedies as may
be necessary to protect the interest of the offended party in said
cases, particularly considering that the corresponding civil liability
of the culprits is to be determined therein, no reservation having
been made of the right to enforce it in a separate civil action.
Again, respondent Sebastian alleged specifically in the aforesaid
motion that he "personally" knew the facts of these cases.
Although he explained this knowledge by adding that he had
"conducted personally the preliminary investigation of the same",
it does not follow that his aforesaid knowledge is hearsay in
nature. In this connection, we must not overlook the fact that the
main issues in Criminal Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997 were: (a)
whether native tobacco had been purchased, passed off and
paid for as Virginia Tobacco; (b) whether low grade tobacco were
purchased as high grade tobacco and paid for at the price, fixed
by law for such high grade tobacco; and (c) whether the public
and official records of said purchases had been falsified, and, in
the affirmative, by whom. The nature of these issues is such that
the determination thereof depends principally upon the contents
of said records and the stock found in the warehouse in which
the tobacco purchased had been stored, of which respondent
Sebastian could have, and seemingly had, personal knowledge.

As indicated above, petitioner Molinyawe maintains that Criminal

Cases Nos. 2996 and 2997 should be dismissed, insofar as he is
concerned, and respondents should be re-strained from further
prosecution in said cases, in view of the pendency of Civil Case
No. 6379 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal for forfeiture of
property allegedly acquired by him in violation of Republic Act No.
1379, section 8 of which reads:

Neither the respondent nor any other person shall be excused

from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers,
correspondence, memoranda and other records on the ground