Thayer Consultancy Background Brief

ABN # 65 648 097 123

South China Sea: China’s Grey
Zone Tactics and ASEAN
November 13, 2019

We request your assessment of the following issues:

1.Your comment on China's strategy of causing tensions but not pushing the
situation to war?
ANSWER: In 2003, China incorporated the concept of three warfares – public opinion
warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare – in its revised “Political Work
Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).” In other words, the PLA
incorporated political warfare into its fighting mission.
In recent years, it has become fashionable to characterize China’s actions in the South
China Sea as a form of a “grey zone” strategy. Grey zone strategy refers to actions to
assert Chinese sovereignty that fall just short of armed conflict. The China Coast Guard
and Maritime Militia are the key instruments of this strategy. China couches its actions
as “sovereignty protection” to provide a legal basis for its assertiveness.
China’s strategy involves the physical deployment of China Coast Guard, Maritime
Militia and its fishing fleet into waters included in its nine-dash line. They remain on
station for long periods of time. The China Coast Guard ships are larger, heavier and
better armed than their regional counterparts.
The object of China’s action is to create a ‘new normal’ whereby regional states
acquiesce to China’s presence in their Exclusive Economic Zone because they lack the
capacity to expel Chinese ships. China subjects target nations to a barrage of legal
psychological and public opinion warfare.
China can modulate its actions, pushing hard at one time, then easing off at another
time. China has established a permanent Coast Guard presence at Luconia Breakers
in Malaysia’s EEZ and China has surrounded Thitu (Pagasa) island in the Philippines’
EEZ. Neither Malaysia nor the Philippines has offered any palpable resistance.
In sum, China has a long-term strategy to assert control over the South China Sea b y
using “grey zone” tactics.
2. And how does China's behavior in the South China Sea affect regional security and
stability?
ANSWER: China’s actions deny Southeast Asian littoral states the ability to exercise.
sovereign jurisdiction over the marine resources in their EEZs. China’s actions have
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kept Southeast Asian states divided and thus make it difficult for them to present a
united front to China. China’s actions are intimidating and thus place regional states
under duress in negotiating a South China Sea Code of Conduct.
China’s actions are also designed to curtail external maritime powers and other
members of the international community from intervening on behalf of littoral
states.
Slowly but surely China is establishing hegemony over the South China Sea because
ASEAN is divided and China has put pressure on Southeast Asian states not to
cooperate with “countries outside the region.”
3. Given the unreasonable claims and illegal Chinese militarization in the South China
Sea, how should ASEAN respond?
ANSWER: ASEAN members should adopt a collective response to China’s actions and
enlist the support of the international community to protect their sovereign rights in
the South China Sea. But internal divisions in ASEAN have prevented its members
from reaching consensus and forming a united front.
ASEAN and China negotiated for seven years (2004-2011) to adopt the Guidelines to
Implement the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. When
negotiations concluded China succeeded in getting ASEAN to drop its insistence that
ASEAN member states form a common position first before negotiating with China.
This was a strategic mistake as ASEAN lost its best bargaining chip.
4. The concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific region to the United States. And how
China's artificial island building and militarization affect the US' Indian Pacific
strategy?
ANSWER: China’s construction and militarization of seven artificial islands in the
Spratly archipelago predated the U.S. Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy. In
effect, China presented the United States with a fait accompli. China can dominate
the sea lanes in the South China Sea with its advance weaponry on its artificial
islands. These islands now serve as forward operating bases for the China Coast
Guard, Maritime Militia and fishing fleet so they can remain on station indefinitely in
the Spratly islands.
The U.S. FOIP is basically a loose arrangement with Japan, Australia and to a lesser
extent India. While these countries assist regional states in training, capacity building
and maritime domain awareness, they are not formal treaty allies. In other words,
China’s grey zone strategy is largely unopposed.
The U.S. FOIP also offers alternate sources of funding for quality infrastructure and
seeks to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Japan and Australia have contributed
funding to this initiative.
The U.S. Departments of State and Defense will continue to pursue a FOIP strategy
but they are handicapped by President Donald Trump’s unpredictability and his
inability to think and act strategically. Neither President Trump nor Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo showed up in Bangkok for the 4 November round of ASEAN and
related summits. This undercut the East Asian Summit as a leaders’ led forum. And
seven ASEAN states chose to downgrade their representation at the ASEAN-United
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States Summit when the U.S. was represented by its National Security Adviser and
Secretary of Commerce.
Vietnam, as ASEAN Chair, faces the unenviable task of obtaining consensus from
ASEAN members on how to respond to Trump’s invitation to host a special U.S.-
ASEAN Summit in the first half of next year.

Media Identification: Carl Thayer is emeritus professor at The University of

New South Wales, Canberra or Carl Thayer is emeritus professor at The University of
New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

Suggested citation: Carlyle A. Thayer, “South China Sea: China’s Grey Zone Tactics and
ASEAN,” Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, November 13, 2019. All background
briefs are posted on Scribd.com (search for Thayer). To remove yourself from the
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Thayer Consultancy provides political analysis of current regional security issues and
other research support to selected clients. Thayer Consultancy was officially
registered as a small business in Australia in 2002.