SORIANO VS.

SPOUSES GALIT
(G.R. No. 156295, September 23, 2003)

FACTS: Respondent Ricardo Galit contracted a loan from petitioner Marcelo

Soriano, which was secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 569.7 After he failed to pay his obligation,
Soriano filed a complaint for sum of money against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Balanga City, Branch 1, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 6643.

Petitioner was issued a writ of possession in by the Regional Trial Court of Balanga,
Bataan. However, CA nullified it due to a parcel of land which was not among those
explicitly enumerated in the Certificate of Sale issued by the Deputy Sheriff, but on
which stand the immovables covered by the said Certificate. Petitioner contends that
the sale of these immovables necessarily encompasses the land on which they stand.

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the questioned writ of possession is in fact a nullity

considering that it includes real property not expressly mentioned in the Certificate
of Sale of Real Property.

RULING: The petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the
CA which declared the writ of possession issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Balanga City, Branch 1, on July 18, 2001, null and void, is AFFIRMED in toto.

The foregoing provision of the Civil Code enumerates land and

buildings separately. This can only mean that a building is, by itself, considered
immovable.

. . . while it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of

stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be
mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such mortgage would
be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable
property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.

In this case, what was sold by virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial
court was merely the storehouse and bodega constructed on the parcel of land,
which by themselves are real properties of the respondents, the same should be
regarded as separate and distinct from the conveyance of the lot on which they
stand.

1
MIDWAY MARITIME & TECHNOLOGICAL FOUNDATION v CASTRO
(GR No. 189061, Aug 6, 2014)

FACTS: The petitioner Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation

(petitioner) is the lessee of two parcels of land in Cabanatuan City. Its president, Dr.
Manglicmot, is the husband of Adoracion, who is the registered owner of the
property.

The two parcels of land, on a portion of which the residential building stand, were
originally owned by the respondents’ father. The respondent, alleged that they are
the owners of the residential building subject of the dispute and Manglicmot leased
the building from their mothe. Several suits were brought by the respondents against
the petitioner, including the case at bench, which is an action for Ownership, and
Recovery of Possession and Damages.

Petitioners denied respondent’s ownership of the residential building and claimed

that Adoracion owns the building having bought the same together with the land on
which it stands.

ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of the land included all the improvements thereon,
specifically the residential building?

RULING: No. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the
buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally.
Furthermore, a building by itself is a real or immovable property distinct from the
land on which it is constructed and therefore can be a separate subject of contracts.

It must be pointed out that what Tomas bought from Union Bank in the auction sale
were the two parcels of land. Contrary to the petitioner’s assertion, the property
subject of the mortgage and consequently the auction sale pertains only to these two
parcels of land and did not include the residential house. Adoracion’s subsequent
acquisition of the two parcels of land from her father does not necessarily entail the
acquisition of the residential building.

2
 PRUDENTIAL BANK v PANIS
(G.R No. L-50008, August 31, 1987)

FACTS: Spouses Magcale secured a loan of P700,000 from Prudential Bank. They
executed a deed of real estate mortgage over a 2-storey, semi-concrete residential
building with warehouse assessed in the name of Fernando Magcale with the right
of occupancy in the lot. The spouses secured another loan of P20,000 with a deed of
real estate mortgage of the same property. For failure to pay, the deeds of real estate
mortgage were extrajudicially foreclosed. The property was sold to Prudential Bank
as the highest bidder in the public auction sale. The Court of First Instance declared
that the deeds of real estate as null and void.
ISSUE: Whether a valid real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building
erected on the land belonging to another.
RULING: Yes, there is a valid real estate mortgage on the building. In Lopez vs
Orosa, Jr. et. al, it was held that in the enumeration of properties under Article 415
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the inclusion of "building" separate and distinct
from the land, in said provision of law can only mean that a building is by itself an
immovable property. In Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., it was ruled that while
it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation
of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building by itself may be mortgaged
apart from the land on which it has been built. Such a mortgage would be still a real
estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property even
if dealt with separately and apart from the land. It was established in Vda. de Bautista
vs. Marcos that possessory rights over said properties before title is vested on the
grantee, may be validly transferred or conveyed as in a deed of mortgage.

3
4
 FELS ENERGY, INC. vs. THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS
(G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007)
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
NATIONAL POWER CORP. vs. LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS OF BATANGAS (G.R. No. 170628, February 16, 2007)

FACTS: This is a consolidated case between FELS ENERGY and National Power
Corporation to which the latter entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc.
for Energy Conversion with an agreement that the former shall be responsible for
the payment of taxes to which latter may be subjected in performance of their
obligations under this contract. Subsequently, Polar assigned its rights under the
Agreement to FELS.
FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from
Provincial Assessor which they referred the matter to NPC reminding it of its
obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. NPC sought
reconsideration of the Provincial Assessor’s decision to assess real property taxes on
the power barges.
ISSUE: Whether or not power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal
properties and therefore, not subject to real property tax.

RULING: No. Under Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that "[d]ocks
and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to
remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast" are considered immovable property.
Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being in
the nature of machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry
or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of said industry or work. Therefore, power barges are real
property and are thus subject to real property tax.

5
 PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY V. ABIGAIL
RAZON ALVAREZ AND VERNON R. RAZON
(G.R. NO. 179408, March 05, 2014)
Facts
PLDT is the grantee of a legislative franchise which authorizes it to carry on the
business of providing basic and enhanced telecommunications services in and
between areas in the Philippines and between the Philippines and other countries and
territories. To safeguard the integrity of its network, PLDT regularly conducts
investigations through its Alternative Calling Patterns Detection Division or
(ACPDD) on various prepaid cards marketed and sold abroad to determine
alternative calling patterns and possible network fraud. The ACPDD bought The
Number One prepaid card, which is a marketed to Filipinos residing in the United
Kingdom in order for them to make overseas calls to the Philippines in a cheaper
rate. To test the card, ACPDD used two telephone lines, namely the dialing phone
and the receiving phone. Upon engaging the call, the receiving call reflected a PLDT
number as if the call was originating from a local telephone in Metro Manila instead
of United Kingdom. Later on it was discovered that the number belonged to Abigail
R. Razon-Alvarez from Paranaque. With this, PLDT’s Quality Control Division
together with the operatives from the Philippine National Police conducted an ocular
inspection in the home of Alvarez. They discovered that Alvarez was engaged in a
form of network fraud known as International Simple Resale (ISR). On these
grounds, PLDT charged Alvarez with theft.
Issue
Whether or not intangible objects, such as services, are properties which may be the
subject of theft.
Ruling
Yes, intangible objects, as long as susceptible to being appropriated, such as services
and businesses, are considered properties under the law. Further, that the use of the
same for the benefit of another without the owner or provider’s consent amounts to
theft. According to jurisprudence, the conduct of an ISR activity illegally
appropriates the services provided by PLDT. Therefore, Razon’s unauthorized usage
of these services, though intangible in nature, justifies the elements of theft under
the law.

6
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSE T. CHING
(G.R. 186166 Oct. 20, 2010)

FACTS: On August 9, 1999, respondent Jose Ching, represented by his Attorney-

in-Fact, Antonio Ching, filed a verified Application for Registration of Title
covering a parcel of land in Banza, Butuan City, Agusan del Norte. Respondent
alleged that on April 10, 1979, he purchased the subject land from the late former
governor and Congressman Democrito O. Plaza as evidenced by a Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Lands. The OSG and DENR filed oppositions alleging that the parcels
of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.

RTC dismissed application for registration. Upon appeal, the CA reversed the
resolution and granted respondent’s application for registration of title stating that
proof submitted by the respondent is enough to prove continuous and peaceful
ownership of respondent and his predecessors-in-interest from 1948 to 1999. Hence,
the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property for registration is an alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.

RULING: No, it is not an alienable and disposable land of public domain.

Applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must sufficiently establish:
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public
domain, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same and that
it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The Regalian doctrine states that the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption,
irrefutable evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of
registration has been declassified and now belongs to the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain.

The Court finds no evidence in this case that would show that the land in question
has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The sketch
plan, technical description and the tracing clothing plan that respondent presented
do not show the actual legal status of the land. Petition is granted. Decision of the
CA is reversed. Land registration is denied.

7
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CITY OF PARAÑAQUE
(GR No. 191109, July 18, 2012)

FACTS: The Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA), formerly Public Estates

Authority, was created and designated for integrating, directing and coordinating the
reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of lands for and on behalf
of the National Government.
PRA then reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City, and was issued Original
Certificates of Title and Transfer Certificates of Title over the reclaimed lands.
On February 2003, then Parañaque City Treasurer Carabeo issued Warrants of Levy
on PRA’s reclaimed properties located in Parañaque City based on the assessment
for delinquent real property taxes made by then Parañaque City Assessor for tax
years 2001 and 2002.
On April 2003, PRA sent a letter to Carabeo requesting the latter not to
proceed with the public auction of the subject reclaimed properties on April 7, 2003.
In response, Carabeo sent a letter stating that the public auction could not be deferred
because the RTC had already denied PRA’s TRO application.
The RTC ruled that PRA was not exempt from payment of real property taxes
because it was a GOCC, therefore, as a GOCC, local tax exemption is withdrawn by
virtue of Section 193 of the Local Government Code which was the prevailing law
in 2001 and 2002 with respect to real property taxation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reclaimed lands by PRA are part of public domain,
hence, exempt from real property tax.

RULING: YES. First of all, the SC stated that PRA is not a GOCC because it is
neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. PRA is a government instrumentality
vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to
Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an
incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property
tax. Section 234 of the LGC states that real property owned by the Republic is
exempt from real property tax unless the beneficial use thereof has been granted to
a taxable person. Here, there is no showing on record that PRA leased the subject
reclaimed properties to a private taxable entity. The subject reclaimed lands located
in the City of Parañaque are still part of the public domain, owned by the State. The
Administrative Code allows real property owned by the Republic to be titled in the
name of agencies or instrumentalities of the national government, hence, these real
properties remain owned by the Republic and continue to be exempt from real estate
tax.

8
 FRANCISCO U. DACANAY VS MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR.
(G.R. No. 93654, May 6, 1992)

FACTS:
In 1979, the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) enacted an ordinance
authorizing, regulating, and designating city and municipal streets, roads, and open
spaces as sites for flea markets, subject to its approval. Pursuant to this, in 1988, the
Caloocan City Mayor opened up (7) flea markets, issuing licenses to conduct
vending activities. One of the streets opened for lease was in Heroes del ’96 Street,
where Petitioner Dacanay lives.
Due to this, Dacanay, as taxpayer and concern citizen, wrote a letter to the
City Mayor calling the latter to demolish the illegally constructed stalls in his street,
invoking the Court’s previous decision in a civil case on the same disputed areas
finding that the streets in Caloocan, being a public dominion, may not be leased to
private individuals. Thus, City Mayor Asistio did not have the authority to give
permits, and as such, these permits are null and void.

ISSUE:
May public streets or thoroughfare be leased or licensed to market stallholders
through a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila Commission?

RULING:
NO.
Art. 420 of the Civil Code provides that properties which are intended for
public use such as roads are considered as a property of public dominion. These
properties, in the case of local government units (provinces, cities, and
municipalities) are further enumerated in Art. 424. Thus, being beyond the
commerce of men, these properties cannot be leased.
There is no doubt that the disputed areas by which Dacanay seeks to be evicted
are public streets which are intended for public use. Hence, it is outside the
commerce of men and may not be the subject of lease or other contract.
As such, the lease or license provided by the City Government of Caloocan is
null and void, for contravening the general law which reserves city streets and roads
for public use. The Court pronounced that the interests of a few should not prevail
over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety,
good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are legally obliged to
protect.

9
FRISCO F. DOMALSIN, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JUANITO VALENCIANO
and AMALIA VALENCIANO, Respondents

(G.R. NO. 158687 January 25, 2006)

Facts: The property subject of this action for forcible entry is a parcel of land located
at the road-right-of way of Kennon Road which petitioner Domalsin allegedly
bought by way of Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim from Castillo Binay-an. Domalsin
claims to be the lawful owner and possessor of said parcel of land since 1979 up to
the present (19 years). Domalsin allegedly introduced improvements consisting of
levelling, excavation, riprapping of the earth and a private road to the river, fruit-
bearing trees and other agricultural plants of economic value. On the other hand, sps.
Valenciano allegedly entered the premises to construct a building made of cement
and strong materials, without the authority and consent of Domalsin, by means of
force and strategy, and without a building permit from DPWH. Both parties are now
asserting that they are entitled to the possession of said lot so the matter was brought
to court. It must be made clear that the property subject of this case is a portion of
the road-right-of way of Kennon Road.

Issue: Whether or not, either of the two parties is entitled to the physical or material
possession of the property in dispute.

Ruling: No. Neither the petitioner nor the respondents can own nor possess the
subject property the same being part of the public dominion. The law provides that
property of public dominion are: (1) those intended for public use such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads, and other of similar character; and (2) those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. Therefore, the parties should not be permitted
to take possession of the land, much more, claim ownership thereof. The court
ordered sps. Valenciano to remove their structure on the subject land and to vacate
and deliver the physical possession thereof to the Office of the District Engineer,
Department of Public Works and Highways.

10
 Republic vs Tri Plus

G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006

Facts: On April 30, 1997 Tri-Plus Corporation filed with the MTC an Application for
Registration of Title over two parcels of land designated as Lots 1061 and 1062 of the
cadastral survey of Consolacion, Cebu and located at Barangay Tayud, Consolacion. Tri-
Plus alleged that it is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcels of land, including the
improvements thereon, having acquired the same through purchase; and that it is in actual,
continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful possession of the subject property in
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years, including that of its predecessors-in-
interest. The Republic opposed the application stating that the tax declarations and receipts
of tax payments, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide
acquisition of the land applied for or of its open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant
may no longer be availed of by the applicant because it failed to file an appropriate
application for registration in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 892; and that the
subject parcels of land are portions of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines and are not subject to private appropriation. The MTC and CA ruled in favor
of the respondents. Hence the appeal

Issue: Whether or not the lands in question are alienable or disposable

Ruling: NO. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a)
that the land forms part of alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain;
and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12,1945. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators and legislative act or statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable
and disposable. A mere Advance Plan bearing the notation certified by the DENR is not
sufficient to prove that the land is alienable or disposable. Tri Plus also failed to prove the
second requirement. JUDGEMENT OF THE CA IS REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

11
 MANESE v. VELASCO (G.R. 164024, January 29, 2009)

FACTS:
Dioscoro Velasco was issued an Original Certificate of Title for a foreshore
land measuring 85, 521 square meters fronting Tayabas Bay in Guisguis, Sariaya,
Quezon. Velasco sold the property to Sylvia Flores who was issued a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in her name. Flores later sold the land to Mildred Christine
Flores-Tantoco who was issued a TCT in her name. Later, the property was divided
into seven lots with each lot having a TCT under Flores-Tantoco’s name. Two of
these lots were sold back to Sylvia Flores.
On August 31, 1999, Luis Manese and other petitioners filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Title and Damages with the RTC against the spouses Velasco and
other respondents. The petitioners claim that the series of transfers of land titles were
null and void because Manese and the others were in “open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and use” of the said foreshore land. The respondents filed
a Motion to Dismiss stating that the petitioners do not have the legal personality to
file the complaint because the property forms part of the public domain and only the
Solicitor General could bring an action for reversion.
The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petitioners do
not have the legal personality to file the complained. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC’s order when it was appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not foreshore land forms part of the public domain

RULING: Yes, foreshore land forms part of the public dominion.

A foreshore land is a “strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks
and is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of tides.” It belongs to the
public domain.
Lands which belong to the public domain can only be leased and cannot be disposed
through other means.
Foreshore land is “outside the commerce of man.” It cannot be seized by private
individuals.
According to Section 101 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as The Public
Land Act, “all actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the
office acting in his stead.” Because a foreshore land is a land belonging to the public
domain, the petitioners are not the real parties because they do not own the land in
question. Only the Government, through the Solicitor General, has the legal
personality to file this case.

12
 Almagro vs. Kwan
(GR No. 175806 and 175810 October 20, 2010)
Facts:
This is a case involving a 17,181 sq. meter parcel of land, located at Negros
Oriental, registered in the name of spouses Kwan Chin and Zosima Sarana. The
respondents are the legitimate children of the said spouses. Upon the death of their
parents, respondents inherited the said land. On September 1996, respondents filed
with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) an action for recovery of possession and
damages against petitioners. During pre-trial, the parties agreed to refer the case to
the Chief of the Land Management Services Division, PENRO-DENR, Dumaguete
City, to conduct a verification survey designating Geodetic Engineer Jorge Suasin,
Sr. as joint commissioner to do the task. Thereafter, Engr. Suasin submitted a written
report that a big portion of the lot is submerged under the sea and only a small portion
remain as dry land and that some of the defendants have constructed their buildings
or houses inside the dry land while others have constructed outside or only a small
portion of their buildings or houses are on the said dry land. MTC dismissed the
complaint on the ground that the remaining dry portion of the lot has become
foreshore land and should be returned to the public domain. Respondents appealed
to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which conducted ocular inspections on two
separate dates during low tide and high tide and concluded that the disputed
remaining portion is not foreshore land because it remained dry even during high
tide.

Issue: Whether or not the disputed portion of the land is still private or has become
foreshore land which forms part of the public domain.

Ruling:
The court ruled that the disputed land is not foreshore land. To qualify as
foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies between the high and low water
marks and is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. The land’s
proximity to the waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land. Thus,
in Republic of the Philippines v. Lensico, the Court held that although the two
corners of the subject lot adjoins the sea, the lot cannot be considered as foreshore
land since it has not been proven that the lot was covered by water during high tide.
Similarly in this case, it was clearly proven that the disputed land remained dry even
during high tide. Indeed, all the evidence supports the conclusion that the disputed
portion of the lot is not foreshore land but remains private land owned by
respondents.

13
 MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARAÑAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF
PARAÑAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARAÑAQUE,
CITY ASSESSOR OF PARAÑAQUE, and CITY TREASURER OF
PARAÑAQUE, respondents (G.R. No. 155650 July 20, 2006)

Manila International Airport authority, operator of Ninoy Aquino International

Airport, received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001 amounting to 624 Million. Due to
failure of former to settle the full amount, the latter issued notices of levy and
warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA filed in October original
petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order but was denied because it was filed beyond the 60-day
reglementary period. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Property was eventually sold in a public auction prior to the issuance of TRO from
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NAIA is a patrimonial property and subject to real estate tax
RULING:
No, The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and
therefore exempt from real estate tax.
The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy,
encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy
on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being
contrary to public policy.

14
 HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A.
Malabanan), vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. No. 179987, September 3, 2013)

FACTS:
On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration
covering a parcel of land in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite. In his application, he
claimed that he complied with the requirements provided under the law, his property
being an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and
adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years. To support
this claim, he presented a certification issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO). On December 2002, RTC-Tagaytay City
granted his application for land registration; however, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA. The OSG claims that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property in question belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he did not possess this property for
the length of time required under the law.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA cited Republic v.
Herbieto which opined that any period of possession prior to the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. Since the property had been declared
alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to this
date could not be tacked for purposes of computing the period of possession.
Due to the untimely demise of Mario Malabanan, his heirs appealed the CA’s
decision to the Supreme Court wherein they claimed that the Herbieto ruling is a
mere obiter dictum.

ISSUE:

Whether the property in question is considered as a patrimonial/private property;

Whether the property in question is considered as an alienable and disposable land

of the public domain?

RULING:

No. The SC ruled that the land in question cannot be converted to a private property.
In order for this conversion to take effect, the following requisites must concur:
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since

15
June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has
remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree. Only executive acts and law enactments by the Congress can declare the
land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth, without such declaration, the land continues to be ineligible for land
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In the case at
bar, petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945;
Thus, the Court denied the petitioners’ motion.

16
 Alonso vs Cebu Country Club Inc.
G.R. No. 130876, January 31, 2002

Pardo J:

FACTS:

Petitioner discovered documents and records including Friar Lands Sale

Certificate/ Register, showing that his father acquired a land from the government
of the Philippines in accordance with the Friar Lands Act. The documents shows
that one Leoncio Alburo, assigned his sales certificate with petitioner’s father who
completed the payment of installments. The government executed a final deed of
sale. It appears however that the deed was not registered, among them the approval
of the deed of sale by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as required
by law.

Upon investigation, it appears that the land has been administratively

reconstituted from the owner’s duplicate in the name of the predecessor of the
respondent. In the firm belief that his father was still the owner of the land, he made
a formal demand to respondent which was denied. Left with no recourse, he sued
respondent for the declaration of nullity and non-existence of the deed against
respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether the lot is owned by the father even though the sale was not
approved.

RULING:

Neither parties own the lot, in the recent case decided by the Supreme Court,
it was held that the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce of the
sale of friar lands is indispensable of its validity, hence, the absence of such approval
made the sale null and void. In this case, when the father acquired the said friar land,
it was not approved by the Secretary. Therefore, he is never the owner of the friar
land.

17
 SPOUSES FLANCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS & WILLIAM ONG
GENATO (G.R. No. 146997. April 26, 2005)

FACTS:

Spouses Flancia purchased a parcel of land from Oakland Development Resources

Corp. However, Oakland mortgaged to William Ong Genato two (2) parcels of land,
which includes the lot of the Spouses, as security and guaranty for the payment of a
loan. When Oakland failed to pay, Genato filed an action for foreclosure of the said
real estate mortgage. Spouses Flancia then received a copy of the execution
foreclosing the mortgage including the land they purchased.

Genato claims that the Contract to Sell between the spouses and Oakland was not
registered hence they are not bound by it. This then makes the registered mortgage
superior to the Contract to Sell considering that the ownership of the lot was not yet
transmitted to the spouses until full payment. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the registered mortgage constituted over the property was
valid and;
2. Whether or not the registered mortgage was superior to the contract to sell.

HELD:

1. Yes. Based on Art. 2085 of the Civil Code, the essential requisites of a
contract of mortgage are: (a) that it be constituted to secure the fulfillment of a
principal obligation;(b) that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing
mortgaged; and (c) that the persons constituting the mortgage have the free disposal
of their property, and in the absence thereof, that they be legally authorized for the
purpose. These said requirements were all present in this case. Specifically, on the
first essential requisite of a mortgage, it is undisputed that the mortgage was
executed as security for a loan obtained by Oakland from Genato.

2. A contract of sale and a contract to sell are worlds apart. In the case before us,
Oakland retained absolute ownership over the property under the contract to sell and
therefore had every right to mortgage it. Genato’s registered mortgage was superior
to the spouses’ contract to sell, subject to any liabilities Oakland may have incurred
in favor of Spouses Flancia by irresponsibly mortgaging the property to Genato
despite its commitments under their contract to sell.

18
19
 GARCIA VS. CA (G.R. NO. 133140, 10 AUGUST 1999)
FACTS
A parcel of land owned by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, with the consent of his wife
was sold to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband Luisito Magpayo.
The Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCom) to secure a loan. A Transfer of Certificate was then issued to the
Magpayos. The Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. PBCom bought the land at the public
auction sale as the highest bidder. The redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage
expired without the Magpayos redeeming the same, hence, title over the land was
consolidated in favor of PBCom. PBCom filed a petition for the issuance of a writ
of possession over the land but Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, Jose Ma. T Garcia, who
was in the possession of the land, refused to honor it. Garcia contended that he
inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother and that PBCom acquired no right
thereover.
ISSUE
Whether or not Garcia’s possession of the land could ripen into ownership.
RULING
No, Garcia’s possession of the land could not ripen into ownership.
Ownership and possession are entirely two different concepts. Ownership
exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. On the one
hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
In this case, even if Garcia was in the possession of the land since 1986, he
has no valid title and his possession was certainly not in the concept of an owner.
His possession in fact was that of an intruder because the Magpayos were the
registered owner of the land as early

20
 SPOUSES BUSTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 120784-85 January 24, 2001
Facts:
Paulino Fajardo died intestate. His four children, namely: Manuela, Trinidad,
Beatriz and Marcial inherited his estate. On Sept. 30, 1964 the heirs executed an
extra-judicial partition of the estate. On the same date, Manuela sold her part to
Moses G. Mendoza (Moses), husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. Trinidad
was at the time, in physical possession of the land (lot 284-A and 284-B) and refused
to surrender the land to Moses, despite several demands.
On Sept. 3, 1971, Moses filed with the CFI (Pampanga) a complaint for
partition claiming the share of Manuela which was sold to him. During the pendency
of the case, Trinidad died. He son Lucio, after the execution of an extra-judicial
partition of the estate, On Feb. 16, 1987, sold lot 284-B to spouses Venancio and
Cecilia Viray. On Feb. 8 1989, the RTC decided in favor of Moses. On Sept. 13,
1991 Moses sold the land to Warlito and Herminia Bustos whom at the time were in
possession of the land as lessees of Francisco (Husband of Trinidad). In the
meantime, on Nov. 6 1989, Spouses Viray filed a complaint of unlawful detainer
against spouses Bustos. The MTC Ruled in favor of spouses Viray. Spouses Bustos
appealed but was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether petitioners (sps. Bustos) could be ejected from what is now their land.
Ruling:
No, Spouses Bustos should not be ejected from the land. Admittedly, the
decision of the ejectment case is final and executory. However the ministerial duty
of the court to order the execution of a final and executory judgment admits of its
exceptions, such as if it is imperative in the higher interest if justice to direct the
suspension of the execution whenever it is necessary to accomplish the aims of
justice or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment became
final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust.
In the present case. The stay of the execution is warranted by the fact that
petitioners (Sps. Bustos) are now the legal owners of the land in question and are
occupants. To execute judgement by ejecting petitioners from land they owned
would certain result in injustice.

21
 DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by its REGIONAL
DIRECTOR TERESITA DOMALANTA, Petitioner, vs. MARIANO TULIAO,
Respondent
(G.R. 205644 | JUNE 9, 2014)
Facts: On 8 October 2002, Tuliao filed an action for recovery of possession and
removal of structure with damages against DepEd with the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities of Tuguegarao City (MTCC). He alleged that he was the registered owner of
the subject parcel of land and that a portion of the said property was allowed by his
predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary School (AES) as an
access road for the schoolchildren. In 1999, the AES decided to construct a
gymnasium within the said property. On March 2000, Tuliao discovered the
construction and demanded that the DepEd cease and desist and vacate the property.
DepEd refused.
In its defense, the DepEd argued that the complaint was already barred by
prescription and/or laches. Its occupation of the subject land was adverse, peaceful,
continuous, and in the concept of an owner for more than fifty (50) years. It also
alleged that it did not receive a notice to cease and desist or notice to vacate.
The MTCC ruled in favor of Tuliao and held that respondent’s possession was
merely tolerated. For said reason, Tuliao’s right to recover it was never barred by
laches. On appeal, DepEd argued that Tuliao failed to sufficiently and competently
prove the identity of the property and claimed that the material allegations of the
complaint established one of accion reivindicatoria, and not accion publiciana,
because Tuliao raised the issue of ownership and made it the anchor of his claim for
juridical possession. RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MTCC decision. It
stated that "[i]f a party in accion publiciana alleges that he owns the property in
question, it is not ex sequitur that the action is a reinvindicatory one," and that a
claimant could assert ownership as basis of his claim of possession. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.
Issue: Whether or not DepEd’s possession was only due to the acquiescence or
tolerance of herein respondent, and whether or not Tuliao’s claim is barred by laches
due to the uninterrupted possession of AES for at least thirty-two (32) years.
Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It noted
that Tuliao's claim that DepEd's possession was mere tolerance was not refuted.
Thus, the same is deemed admitted. This means that the DepEd 's possession was
not truly adverse.

22
 The Court once ruled that mere material possession of the land was not
adverse as against the owner, unless it was accompanied by the intent to possess as
an owner. Accordingly, the DepEd's possession can only be considered as adverse
from the time the gymnasium was being constructed in 1999. In March 2000, Tuliao
discovered the construction and demanded that the DepEd cease and desist from
continuing the same. When DepEd refused, Tuliao filed a complaint for recovery of
possession of the subject lot in 2002. Thus, only two (2) years had elapsed from the
time the DepEd resisted Tuliao's claims. Clearly, he did not sleep on his rights.

DepEd vs. Casibang

(GR 192268 | January 27, 2016)

23
FACTS: In 1965, a school was built on a portion of the property registered under
the name of the respondents’ late father (Juan Cepeda) who allowed its construction
and operation upon the then Mayor’s request. Upon Cepeda’s death in 1983, the
school continued its occupation on the said property without the respondents’
objection.
In 2000, the respondents occupied a portion of the property. DepEd, who was
managing the school’s operation, filed with the MCTC a complaint for Forcible
Entry and damages against the respondents. MCTC ruled in favor of DepEd and
ordered the respondents to vacate their property which was affirmed by RTC upon
appeal.
Thereafter, an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money was filed by
the respondents against DepEd. Their claim was evidenced by an Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) showing that the property was registered under the name of their
deceased father and tax receipts indicating payment for its real property taxes.
DepEd argued that the respondents’ action was barred by laches since they tolerated
the occupation of the school for more than 40 years. RTC ruled that the rightful
owners of the property are the respondents. On appeal, CA affirmed RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Whether or not DepEd has the right of ownership over the property on the
ground of prescription and/or laches.

RULING: No, DepEd has no right of ownership over the property. Neither laches
nor prescription will apply in this case. The court ruled that respondents are not
guilty of fault or negligence to assert their rights for they had no knowledge of the
school's adverse claim over the property until the filing of the case of Forcible Entry.
They merely tolerated the school’s occupation on their property. Being registered
owners of the land, their right to demand the return of property or to eject its illegal
occupants is imprescriptible and is never barred by laches. Length of stay is
immaterial if the occupation is unauthorized or is merely tolerated. The court
reiterated that a possessor by mere tolerance is bound by an implied promise that
they will leave the property upon demand.
However, since the construction of building and improvements was allowed by the
late Cepeda, the school was considered to be a builder in good faith. Following
Article 448 of the New Civil Code, respondents are left with the option to oblige
DepEd to pay the price of the property or to pay rent if the value of the property is
greater than the value of the buildings and improvements.

SPOUSES RAFAEL BENITEZ AND AVELINA BENITEZ, Petitioners, vs.

24
 COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RENATO MACAPAGAL and
ELIZABETH MACAPAGAL, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 104828. January 16, 1997)

FACTS:

Private respondents spouses Macapagal purchased a property adjacent to that of

petitioner’s. However, it turned out that a portion of their property was occupied by
petitioner’s house. Because of failure to vacate the said property despite verbal and
written demands, respondents Macapagal filed an ejectment case against Spouses
Benitez. The MeTC then ruled in favor of Respondents Macapagal, ordering
Spouses Benitez to surrender and vacate the property.

On appeal with the Court of Appeals, it denied Spouses Macapagal’s appeal ruling
that they built their house on respondents Macapagal on bad faith, hence cannot
demand that they sell the contested lot in their favor.

ISSUE:

Whether Spouses Benitez has the right to purchase the encroached portion of
Spouses Macapagal’s lot.

RULING:

No. Article 448 of the Civil Code17 is unequivocal that the option to sell the land on
which another in good faith builds, plants or sows on, belongs to the landowner. The
option is to sell, not to buy, and it is the landowner's choice. Not even a declaration
of the builder, planter, or sower's bad faith shifts this option to him per Article 450
of the Civil Code.18 This advantage in Article 448 is accorded the landowner
because "his right is older, and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled
to the ownership of the accessory thing."19 There can be no preemptive right to buy
even as a compromise, as this prerogative belongs solely to the landowner. No 5
compulsion can be legally forced on him, contrary to what petitioners asks from this
Court. Such an order would certainly be invalid and illegal. Thus, the lower courts
were correct in rejecting the petitioners' offer to buy the encroached land.

25
26
 JOSEFA V. SAN BUENAVENTURA
(G.R. NO. 163429, 3 March 2006)

Facts
Johnny Josefa entered into a Contract of Lease with Lourdes San Buenaventura over
a 364-square meter of land owned by the latter. The lease agreement is for five years,
“renewable upon the agreement of the parties”. Following the expiration of the
agreement, San Buenaventura informed Josefa that the lease would no longer be
extended. Still, Josefa continued to occupy the property and paid a monthly rental of
Php15,400. Despite demands of San Buenaventura, Josefa still refused to leave. This
prompted San Buenaventura to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Josefa.

Citing Art 1678, Josefa contends that he is entitled to reimburse one-half of the value
of his useful improvements on the leased premises on the argument that he is a
builder in good faith.

Issue
Whether or not Josefa can be considered a builder in good faith;

Ruling
No, Josefa cannot be considered a builder in good faith.

Jurisprudence dictates that lessees cannot be considered possessors or builders in

good faith, since their occupation of the premises continue only for the life of the
lease.

Initially, Josefa is considered a lawful possessor, because his entry into the property
is by virtue of a lease contract. However, as a mere lessee whose possession after
the expiration of the contract is at the sufferance of the property owner, Josefa cannot
claim to be a builder in good faith.

27
 HEIRS OF SARILI VS. LAGROSA, G.R. No. 193517 : January 15, 2014

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Facts: The respondent, represented by his attorney-in-fact Lourdes Labios Mojica

(Lourdes) through a special power of attorney (SPA) filed a complaint against
Spouses Sarili and the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City (RD) asserting his
ownership over a parcel of land situated in Caloocan City and claimed that he has
been paying the real estate taxes religiously, despite their migration to the USA since
1968.

Spouses Sarili asserted that they are innocent purchasers of the land, having
purchased it from a certain Ramon B. Rodriguez, who possessed a Special Power of
Attorney to sell / dispose the said land under a Deed of Absolute Sale.

However, the respondent alleged that the deed of sale was a result of fraudulent,
illegal and malicious acts committed through falsification of documents.

Issue/s: Whether or not there was a valid transmission of the subject property to
the petitioners, Spouses Sarili.

Ruling: The petition lacks merit. The Spouses Sarili relied on the authenticity of the
SPA presented by Ramos and declares that they are just innocent purchasers.
However, the Court explains that when the seller is not the registered owner, a higher
degree of prudence is required. The buyer should not only rely on one document
alone but all the factual circumstances necessary to determine if there are flaws in
the title of the transferor. In this case, when the SPA was closely checked there’s no
CTC number indicated and the signatures of the owners, Spouses Lagrosa, who have
already migrated to the US since 1968, were falsified. Despite these irregularities,
the spouses Sarili failed to show that they conducted an investigation into the
circumstances of its execution as required by the prevailing jurisprudence. Hence,
Sps. Sarili can’t be considered as innocent purchasers.

Due to the fraudulent SPA, the falsified signatures, and the totality of evidence at
hand, the Court agrees that the respondent was able to preponderate his claims of
forgery against the subject SPA. Thus, the sale relied on the SPA by Sps. Sarili to
prove their title to the property is therefore void and the rightful ownership of the
land remains with the respondent.

28
 Dionisia Bagaipo v. CA and Leonor Lozano
(G.R. No. 116290, December 8, 2000)

FACTS: Petitioner, Dionisia P. Bagaipo, is the registered owner of Lot No. 415, a
146,900 square meter agricultural land situated in Ma-a, Davao City. Respondent,
Leonor Lozano, is the owner of a registered parcel of land located across and
opposite the southeast portion of petitioner’s lot facing the Davao River.
Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for the recovery of a land area
which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed her property. Lozano
insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled
property. He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the
reduction in Bagaipo’s domain was caused by gradual erosion due to the current of
the Davao River.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner owns the lot in accordance with the principle of
accretion.
RULING: No. The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when
the following requisites are present: 1) That the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and 3)
That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. These
requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of
evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred
through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by
alluvium and erosion.
The decrease in petitioner’s land area and the corresponding expansion of
respondent’s property were the combined effect of erosion and accretion
respectively. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed
because the same is nonexistent. The riverbed’s former location cannot even be
pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place
gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the present. Wherefore, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with costs against petitioner.

29
 Reynante versus Court of Appeals (G.R No. 95907, April 8, 1992)

FACTS: For more than 50 years Jose Reynante was taken as tenant of late Don
Cosme Carlos, owner and father-in-law of private respondents, over a fishpond with
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 25618 located at Bulacan. Reynante constructed a
nipa hut where he and his family lived and took care of the nipa palms (sasahan). He
planted on lots 1 and 2, which are located between the fishpond and the Liputan
River. He harvested and sold nipa palms without interference and prohibition form
anybody, neither did the late Don Cosme Carlos. After the death of Don Cosme
Carlos, his heirs entered into a written agreement of “Sinumpaang Salaysay ng
Pagsasauli ng Karapatan” with Jose Reynante. Wherein for a consideration of
P200,000 turned over to Reynante, he surrendered all his rights as caretaker or
“bantay-kasama at tagapamahala”. The heirs leased the fishpond to Carlos de la Cruz
while Reynante continue to live in the nipa hut. Private repondents formally
demanded that petitioner to vacate the premises and filed a complaint for forcible
entry with preliminary mandatory injunction. The Trial Court dismiss the case and
ruled that Reynante has a prior possession while the Regional Trial Court and Court
of Appeals agreed to reverse the Trial Court’s decision and to restore the possession
to the heirs. During ocular inspection, both counsel observed muniment of title
embedded on the ground which is located at the inner side of the "pilapil" separating
the fishpond from the subject "sasa" plant with a height of 20 to 25 feet from water
level and it was judicially observed that the controversial premises is beyond the
titled property of the plaintiffs but situated along the Liputan, Meycauayan River it
being a part of the public domain.
ISSUE: Does the disputed lot belongs to private respondents as a result of
Accretion?
RULING: No, the disputed lot does not belong to private respondents. In Republic
vs CA, it was held that Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following
requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (c) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river. Assuming private respondents
had acquired the alluvial deposit (the lot in question), by accretion, still their failure
to register said accretion for a period of fifty (50) years subjected said accretion to
acquisition through prescription by third persons. Petitioner's possession for more
than 50 years over the property must be respected, unless the private respondents
can show a better title over the subject lots.

30
 VDA. DE NAZARENO vs. CA
(G.R. No. 98045, June 26, 1996)

FACTS: Jose Salasalan and Leo Rabaya entered into a lease agreement with
Antonio Nazareno for the lease of a land where the former’s house stood. Said land
was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried creek and along the banks
of the river. After several years, Nazareno filed for an ejection case for Salasalan
and Rabaya’s failure to pay the rent which was granted by the RTC and thus they
were ejected.

Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan to perfect
his title over the accretion area being claimed by him but was protested by Salasalan
and Rabaya resulting to the amendment of the survey plan segregating therefrom the
areas occupied by respondents who, if qualified, may file public land applications
covering their portions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disputed land is a public land

RULING: Yes, the subject land is a public land. Art 457 of the Civil Code provides
that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The following
requisites are: 1) deposition of soil or sediment is gradual and imperceptible 2) it is
a result of the action of the waters of the river or sea 3) the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of the river or sea (rules on alluvion). In this case,
the first and second requisites are absent. The accretion was formed by the dumping
of boulders, soil and other filming materials on the portions of the creek and river
bounding the land. It cannot be claimed that the accumulation was gradual and
imperceptible resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the creek and
the river. Art 457 excludes all deposits caused by the human intervention. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. A man made accretion is a part of the public
domain. In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of
sawdust by a lumber company consequent to its sawmill operations.

31
 REPUBLIC vs. SANTOS III, et al.

(G.R. No. 160453, November 12, 2012)

FACTS: Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include
Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-ownership of the property.
He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion and had been in their
joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for more than 30
years.

The City of Parañaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration,
stating that it needed the property for its flood control program; that the property was
within the legal easement of 20 meters from the river bank; and that the property
was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property is an accretion to respondents adjoining

land.

RULING: No. The land that the respondents sought to register is not an accretion.
It is the result of the drying up of the river bed to which the respondents did not
establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and
imperceptible deposit of soil by the effects of the current.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible;
(b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land
adjacent to the banks of rivers.

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the currents of the waters." In this case, it’s different. The land that the respondents
claim as theirs was a result of the process of drying up of a river to form dry land
involved the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land
did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of
soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level
did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian
owners had no legal right to claim ownership of said land. Considering that the clear
and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision
only to accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language.

32
 HEIRS OF NARVASA V. IMBORNAL
732 SCRA 171 (2014)
Facts:
Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Pangasinan which she conveyed
to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and Catalina (Imbornal sisters)
sometime in 1920. Meanwhile, Catalina’s husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied
for and was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land
(Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian, Pangasinan. He was
eventually awarded Homestead Patent No. 2499115 therefor, and, on December 5,
1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued in his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No.
1462 was cancelled, and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 101495 was issued
in the name of Ciriaco’s heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio, married to
Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz; Remedios Abrio,
married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Dominador Abrio; Francisca Abrio;
Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco). Ciriaco and his heirs had since
occupied the northern portion of the Motherland, while respondents occupied the
southern portion. Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq.
m. in area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15, 1952,
OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano, married to
Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion. Decades later, or in 1971, the
Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307 sq. m., more or less, abutted the First
Accretion on its southern portion.
On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the names of all the
respondents covering the Second Accretion. Claiming rights over the entire
Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on
February 27, 1984 an Amended Complaint for reconveyance, partition, and/or
damages against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They anchored
their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his wife Catalina, urged
Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan property.
Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation,
respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First Accretion, and the respondents
collectively, with regard to the Second Accretion, had illegally registered the said
accretions in their names, notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian
owners (as they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely formed
adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that they did not assert their
inheritance claims over the Motherland and the two (2) accretions because they
respected respondents’ rights, until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have

33
repudiated their (Francisco, et al.’s) shares thereon. Thus, bewailing that
respondents have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland,
but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the reconveyance
of said properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of their value, as well as the
award of moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 actual damages in the amount
of P150,000.00 including attorney’s fees and other costs.
On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Francisco, et al. and
thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to Francisco, et al. their respective
portions in the Motherland and in the accretions thereon, or their pecuniary
equivalent; and (b) pay actual damages in the amount of P100,000.00 moral damages
in the amount of P100,000.00, and attorney’s fees in the sum of P10,000.00, as well
as costs of suit.
On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision reversing and setting aside the
RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a) the descendants of Ciriaco as
the exclusive owners of the Motherland; (b) the descendants of respondent
Victoriano as the exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of
Pablo (i.e., respondents collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second
Accretion. At odds with the CA’s disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration which was, however denied by the CA in a Resolution dated May 7,
2008, hence, this petition taken by the latter’s heirs as their successors-in-interest.
Issue:
Whether or the properties in question may be reconveyed in favor of Francisco et.
al.
Ruling:
No, they may not. Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that: "[t]o the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters." Further, “being the owner of the land
adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has
preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the
Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936, which reads:
32. Preference of Riparian Owner. – The owner of the property adjoining
foreshore lands, marshylands or lands covered with water bordering upon
shores or banks of navigable lakes or rivers, shall be given preference to apply
for such lands adjoining his property as may not be needed for the public
service, subject to the laws and regulations governing lands of this nature,

34
 provided that he applies therefor within sixty (60) days from the date he receives
a communication from the Director of Lands advising him of his preferential
right.
Based on the facts of the case, Francisco, et al. are not the riparian owners of the
Motherland to which the First and Second Accretion is attached to. Further, they
were not able to prove that they acquired the properties through prescription fir they
were not in possession of any of them. In conclusion, whether through prescription
or accretion, the properties in question cannot be reconveyed in favor of Francisco
et. al.

35
 REX DACLISON vs. EDUARDO BAYTION
(G.R. No. 219811, April 6, 2016)

FACTS: Eduardo Baytion filed a complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages against
Rex Daclison. Baytion alleged that he awas a co-owner of a parcel of land through
inheritance. One of the lessors is Leonida Dela Cruz and when her lease expired,
Daclison, occupied the leased portion. Upon learning of Daclison’s unauthorized
entry, Baytion demanded that he vacate it, which Daclison refused to do.

Daclison, averred that in 1978, Baytion leased the subject portion to Antonio dela
Cruz and that a stone walling was erected at the creek lying beside the property,
leaving a deep down-sloping area. Antonio had the down-slope filled up until it was
leveled with the leased portion. Leonida took over the business which was later taken
over by Ernanie Dela Cruz, and that he has business ventures with him. Baytion and
Ernanie agreed to continue the lease of the property but two weeks later, Baytion
and demanded that Ernanie vacate the property.

MeTC dismissed the case on the ground that Baytion failed to include his co-owners,
as plaintiffs in the case. Baytion appealed the case to the RTC, which decided that
Baytion had a better right of possession over the property, to which the CA affirmed.
Daclison insists the filled-up portion should be the subject portion. Baytion
contended that it forms an integral part of the latter because under the law, any
accretion belongs to him and his co-owners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property is owned by Baytion through accretion.

RULING: No. The property is not owned by Baytion through accretion.

The law requires the following to concur in order for an accretion to be considered.
That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible, that it be made through the effects of
the current of the water and that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to
the banks of rivers.

The contested portion cannot be considered an accretion. The land came about not
by reason of a gradual and imperceptible deposit. The deposits were artificial and
man-made. Baytion failed to prove the attendance of the indispensable requirement
that the deposit was due to the effect of the current of the river or creek. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature and not a result of human intervention.

The petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is reversed. Complaint for

possession is dismissed.

36
 ELSA DEGAYO v CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, ET AL.
(GR No. 173148, April 6, 2015)

FACTS: Degayo and Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al. were conflicting claimants over a

parcel of land located on the riverbank of Jalaud River. They owned parcels of land
opposite each other, with the river separating it. Eventually, the river changed its
course and moved towards the parcel of land of Magbanua-Dinglasan. As a result,
Magbanua-Dinglasan’s area decreased in size while the banks where the river was
previously located (now adjacent to Degayo’s area), increased. Degayo now
believed that the area was an accretion to their property and cultivated it with corn
and tobacco. Magbanua-Dinglasan argued that the disputed property was an
abandoned riverbed which should belong to them as compensation for the portion of
their area that the river now occupies.

ISSUE: Whether or not the area in dispute was an abandoned riverbed and NOT an
accretion to Degayo’s property.

RULING: No. The disputed parcel of land belongs to Magbanua-Dinglasan, et al.

The claim of accretion could not be sustained because the portion of land is
ostensibly within the metes and bounds of the area, owned and registered in the name
of Magbanua-Dinglasan. On the other hand, the remaining portion referring to the
abandoned river bed, is thus governed by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which states
that River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of
the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new
course in proportion to the area lost.

37
 SPOUSES CRISPIN and CARIOAD GALANG VS SPOUSES CONRADO
and FE DE KASTRO REYES
(G.R. No. 184746, August 8, 2012)
FACTS:
Spouses Reyes filed a case for the annulment of the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) of the spouses Galang obtained from DENR, alleging that the latter was
able to secure the certificate by means of fraud and manipulation. The case involved
an adjoining property separated by the Marigman Creek, which the Reyeses alleged
to have dried up sometime in 1980 when it changed its course and passed through
Ponderosa. The spouses Reyes alleged that as the owners of the land where the new
course of water passed, they are entitled to the ownership of the property to
compensate them for the loss of the land being occupied by the new creek.
Spouses Galang denied the complaint and countered that the land subject was
not part of a creek, and the certificate was issued to them by their compliance with
the requirements of DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether the Spouses Reyes were the true owner of the land, and were illegally
dispossessed of it by the Petitioners
RULING:
NO. The ownership of the property is not automatically vested in the Spouses
Reyes.
Art. 461 of the Civil Code provides that the ownership of river beds which are
abandoned through natural change belong to the owners whose lands are occupied
by the new course. It provides that if indeed a property was the former bed of a creek
that changed its course and passed through the property of the claimant, then, the
ownership of the old bed left to dry by the change of course
was automatically acquired by the claimant. However, the fact of the natural
abandonment must be shown and proven that the creek changed its course without
artificial intervention. Thus, the claimant must prove by clear and convincing
evidence (3) key elements: 1) the creek’s old course; 2) the creek’s new course; and
3) the natural change of course of the creek from the old location to the new one.
With this, the Reyeses failed to adduce concrete evidence to prove all the key
elements. Thus, their evidence is clearly wanting. It is not clear whether the
Marigman Creek dried-up naturally in 1980, nor was there any report submitted by
the DENR or Bureau of Lands which has jurisdiction over the lot on the issue of the
creek’s nature of change. The Court adduced that as between the two claims, it is
inclined to be in favor of the Galangs, who hold a valid and subsisting title to the
property as evidenced by their DENR-issued OCT. Moreover, the respondents failed
to adduce substantial evidence to support their allegation that the spouses Galang
fraudulently registered the land to their names.

38
 MAXIMO JAGUALING, ANUNCITA JAGUALING and MISAMIS
ORIENTAL CONCRETE PRODUCTS, INC., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (FIFTEENTH DIVISION), JANITA F. EDUAVE and
RUDYGONDO EDUAVE, respondents.
(G.R. No. 94283 March 4, 1991)
Facts: Respondent Janita Eduave claims that she inherited the land from his father
together with co-heir Factura and acquired sole ownership of the property by virtue
of a Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with sale. Eduave states that the entire land had
an area of 16,452 square meters appearing in the deed of extrajudicial partition, while
in tax declaration the area is only 4,937 square meters because she included the land
that was under water. The land was eroded sometime in 1964 due to typhoon,
destroying the bigger portion and the improvements leaving only a coconut tree. In
1966, due to the movement of the river deposits on the land that was not eroded,
increased the area to almost half a hectare. The island was formed by the branching
off, of the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the accumulation of alluvial
deposits. Petitioners Jagualing, also the heirs of Factura, asked Eduave’s permission
to plant corn and bananas, provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area.
Then the land was the subject of a reconveyance case. Jagualing had abandoned a
portion of the land with an area of 1,289 square meters to Eduave, in a notarial
document of conveyance. Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave and
asserted that they are the real owners of the land in litigation containing an area of
18,000 square meters. Eduave’s land was just across the land in litigation and in
going to the land of Jagualing, one has to cross a distance of about 68 meters of the
Tagoloan river to reach the land in litigation.
Issue: Whether or not, the owner of the land along the margin nearest to the island
in dispute is the owner thereof.
Ruling: Yes. The right is granted to Eduave who is the owner of the land located in
the margin nearest the formed island for the reason that they are in the best position
to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. The law provides that the
island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole owner thereof.
Therefore, the court declared Eduave as the lawful and true owner of the land subject
of this case and ordered petitioners Jagualing to vacate the premises and deliver
possession of the land to private respondent.

39
 Residents of Lower Atab & Teacher’s Villages vs. Sta Monica

G.R. No. 198878, October 15, 2014

Facts: In May 2001, petitioners-residents of Lower Atab & Teachers’ Village, Sto. Tomas
Proper Barangay, Baguio City filed a civil case for quieting of title with damages against
respondent Sta. Monica Industrial and Development Corporation. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 4946-R and assigned to Branch 59 of the Baguio RTC. The Complaint
in said case essentially alleged that petitioners are successors and transferees-in-interest of
Torres, the supposed owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Baguio City (the subject
property, consisting of 177,778 square meters) which Torres possessed and declared for
tax purposes in 1918; that they are in possession of the subject property in the concept of
owner, declared their respective lots and homes for tax purposes, and paid the real estate
taxes thereon; that in May 2000, respondent began to erect a fence on the subject property,
claiming that it is the owner of a large portion thereof by virtue of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-631849 (TCT No. T-63184); that said TCT No. T-63184 is null and void, as it
was derived from Original Certificate of Title No. O-281 (OCT No. O-281), which was
declared void pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 127110 (PD 1271) and in the decided
case of Republic v. Marcos; and that TCT No. T-63184 is a cloud upon their title and
interests and should therefore be cancelled. Petitioners thus prayed that respondent’s TCT
No. T-63184 be surrendered and cancelled; that actual, moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, legal expenses, and costs be awarded in their favor; and finally, that
injunctive relief be issued against respondent to prevent it from selling the subject property.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents saying that petitioners have no cause of action. CA
affirmed the RTC’s ruling. Hence the petition

Issue: Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in finding that petitioners have no cause of
action

Ruling: One of the requisites for a quieting of a title to prosper is that the plaintiff has to
have a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action.
Petitioners do not have legal or equitable title to the subject property. Evidently, there are
no certificates of title in their respective names. In their Petition before this Court, they
particularly prayed that TCT No. T-63184 be nullified in order that the said title would not
hinder the approval of their townsite sales applications pending with the DENR.Thus,
petitioners admitted that they are not the owners of the subject property. PETITION IS
DENIED

40
 Syjuco v. Bonifacio (G.R. No. 148748, Juanuary 14, 2015)
FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land in in Balintawak, part of the larger Maysilo
Estate, which is the subject of two Transfer Certificate of Titles which purportedly
came from the same Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994. The petitioners
traced the roots of their TCT from the said OCT which was registered on May 3,
1917 while the respondents traced theirs on the OCT registered on April 19, 1917.
Two SC cases (MWSS v. CA and Gonzaga v. CA) previously found that the
OCT registered on April 19, 1917 should prevail. However, these two cases were
declared functus officio (can no longer be cited as precedents) when in Manotok
Realty v. CLT Realty declared that the true OCT was the one registered on May 3,
1917.
The subject land is in the possession of the petitioners. However, in 1994, the
petitioners found out that the subject land was being offered for sale by Felisa
Bonifacio who claims that she has a title to the land. The Syjucos, therefore, lodged
a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity and Cancellation of Bonifacio’s TCT with
the RTC. However, the RTC deemed the petition as a special civil action for quieting
of title. The RTC dismissed the petition, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ action to quiet title over the subject land is
an appropriate civil action
RULING: Yes, the action to quiet title is an appropriate civil action.
1. The action to quiet title does not fall under the prohibited collateral attack on
the certificate of title of respondents. An attack is collateral when in an action
for a different relief, an attack on another title is made.
2. In an action to quiet title, the case is clearly a direct attack on a certificate of
title to real property. The petition’s objective is actually to quiet that title in
order to remove a doubt on the title – in this case, of a piece of land having
two contrasting title.
3. As long as the petitioner is in possession of the property, the action for
quieting of title is imprescriptible.
4. A certificate is not a conclusive evidence if it can be shown that the piece of
land has been registered at an earlier date. However, as in this case, a title with
an earlier registration date is not automatically considered genuine. The court
can still look into the authenticity of the registration of the titles.

41
 De Guzman vs Tabango Realty
(G.R. No. 154262 February 11, 2015)
Facts:
In 1980, Serafin de Guzman and Josefino de Guzman applied for, and were
granted, authority to distribute oil and lubricating products manufactured and
marketed by Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (FSPC). In the course of their
business, they purchased on credit oil and lubricating products from FSPC, but they
eventually failed to pay for their credit purchases. Thus, FSPC filed before the RTC
of Manila a complaint for sum of money against Serafin and Josefino. After trial,
RTC Manila rendered judgment ordering Serafin and Josefino to pay their
outstanding obligations to FSPC. Since Serafin and Josefino no longer appealed, the
judgment became final and executory. On June 30, 1983, FSPC levied upon a parcel
of land, with an area of 74,415 square meters, in Sta. Cruz de Malabon, Trece
Martires City, Cavite Province, in the name of spouses Serafin and Amelia de
Guzman. According to the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale dated February 4, 1988, the
subject property was sold, after due publication and notice, at a public auction, in
favor of respondent, which gave the highest bid of ₱70,000.00. On October 19, 2001,
petitioners filed a Complaint for quieting of title against respondent before RTC-
Trece Martires. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they inherited the property
by intestate succession upon the death of their parents and they are therefore its
owners and are the ones in possession of the property. Further, the existence of the
Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale and the continued annotation of the encumbrances on
TCT cast a cloud on and are prejudicial to the title.
Issue: Whether or not RTC committed reversible error in dismissing petitioners’
Complaint for Quieting of Title on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Ruling:
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon
or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. For an action to quiet
title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur: (1) the plaintiff or
complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of
the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting
a cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its
prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
With the reality that petitioners are not holders of any legal title over the
property subject of this case and are bereft of any equitable claim thereon, the very
first requisite of an action to quiet title, i.e., that the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject matter of the
action, is miserably wanting. The allegations in petitioners’ complaint also do not
support the second requisite for an action to quiet title, i.e., that the deed, claim,

42
encumbrance or proceeding alleged to cast cloud on a plaintiff's title is in fact invalid
or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

43
HEIRS OF DATU DALANDAG KULI, REPRESENTED BY DATU CULOT
DALANDAG, Petitioners, v. DANIEL R. PIA, FILOMENA FOLLOSCO,
AND JOSE FOLLOSCO, SR., Respondent (G.R. No. 199777, June 17, 2015)
FACTS:
The parcel of land subject of this case (Lot 2327) was awarded to Datu Kuli through
cadastral proceedings. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Cotabato City registered
the property in his name on 12 November 1935 as evidenced by Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 1654. When Datu Kuli died on 8 July 1985, the possession of
Lot 2327 was passed on to his heirs, the present petitioners, who continue to hold
possession thereof.
When petitioners sought to have Datu Kuli's title reconstituted, they were
informed by the Register of Deeds that a different title had already been issued in
the name of Jose Follosco, Sr. (respondent Jose). It appears from the records that on
21 December 1940, TCT 1608 covering Lot 2327 was issued in respondent Pia's
name. Although the Register of Deeds could no longer produce a copy of the alleged
Deed of Sale, it issued a Certification that a Deed of Sale executed by Datu Kuli in
respondent Pia's favor had been presented to it. On the strength of this deed, Datu
Kuli's OCT 1654 was cancelled, and TCT 1608 issued.
Petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title but RTC ruled in favor of the
respondents since the plaintiffs were not able to prove their affirmative allegations
and the existence of a valid cause of action. CA Subsequently dismissed their appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in dismissing the petition for lack of cause of
action.

RULING: No. The following requisites must concur, so that an action for quieting
of title may prosper: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title
to or interest in the real property, subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on the title must be shown
to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.
The argument of petitioners that failure of the Register of Deeds to produce a copy
of the Deed of Conveyance used as basis to cancel Datu Kuli's OCT proves that the
property was never sold to respondent Pia holds no water. While the law requires
the Register of Deeds to obtain a copy of the Deed of Conveyance before cancelling
the seller's title, its subsequent failure to produce the copy, after a new title had
already been issued is not a sufficient evidence to hold that the claimed sale never
actually happened.

44
 LETICIA NAGUIT AQUINO et. al., vs CESAR B. QUIAZON et. al
G.R. No. 201248
March 11, 2015
FACTS:

Petitioner Leticia Naguit Aquino et. al., heirs of Epifanio Makam and Severina
Bautista, filed a complaint for Annulment and Quieting of Title. They claimed that
they acquired a house and lot situated in Magalang, Pampanga, consisting of 557
square meters, by virtue of a Deed of Sale, and that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, adverse, and notorious possession of this
property for more than a hundred years. In addition, they stated that they constructed
houses and paid real estate taxes on the property.

On June 2005, respondents Cesar Aquino et. al., claimed ownership over the subject
property and demanded petitioners to vacate the area. Upon evaluation, the Register
of Deeds confirmed that the property had been titled in the name of respondents, that
the latter were its true owners, and that TCT No. 213777-R was invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable.

Due to this. petitioners contested that they were the true owners of the said property.
Hence, they prayed that this title be cancelled and a new title be issued in their favor.
Respondents denied the allegations of the petitioner and claimed that the were indeed
the absolute owners of the property, that they inherited the same from their
predecessors-in-interest, and that petitioners had been occupying the territory by
mere tolerance. Respondents also claimed that petitioners have “no valid, legal, and
sufficient cause of action” for quieting of title, which was eventually treated by the
RTC and the CA as “failure to state cause of action” in their decisions.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners failed to state a cause of action for quieting of title?

RULING:

No. The SC ruled that the petitioners’ complaint has relevant allegations as to the
cause of action for quieting of title. Petitioners' cause of action relates to an action
to quiet title under Article 476 of the Civil Code, requisites of which are: (1) the
plaintiff or complainant has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed
to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative

45
despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. In the case at bar, it
is apparent that the petitioners had an interest over the subject property by virtue of
a Deed of Sale; and that (2) the title of respondents under TCT No. 213777-R was
invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable. Satisfying the requisites for quieting
of title, petitioners may be granted their claim.

46
 Victoria and Pidlaoan vs Pidlaoan et.al
G.R. No. 196470, April 20, 2016

Brion, J:

FACTS:
Rosario Victoria and Elma Pidlaon, both petitioners lived together until the
former left for Saudi Arabia. Sometime in 1994, Elma bought a parcel of land in
Lucena City. When Rosario came home, she caused the construction of the house
and then after the house was built she left again for Saudi Arabia. . Elma mortgaged
the house to a certain Thi Hong Villanueva. When the properties are about to be
foreclosed, Elma asked her sister-in-law to redeem the property. Her sister-in-law
then asked Normita, one of the respondents to provide the funds.

A deed of sale was executed between Elma and Normita. The last
provision states that Elma shall eject the person who erected the house and deliver
the lot to Normita. When Rosario came home and discovered the sale, she went to
court and asked for the reformation of contract and the cancellation of the TCT title
in favor or Normita.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Rosario was also the co-owner of the lot because of the fact that
he caused the construction of the house in the same lot.

RULING
1. No, Art 448 of the New Civil Code states that co-ownership of an undivided thing
or right belongs to different persons. In this case, the house belongs to Rosario while
the lot belongs to Elma. Therefore, there is no co-ownership of the lot between them.

47
ARSENIO TABASONDRA, ET AL. VS. SPS. CONRADO CONSTANTINO, ET
AL. (G.R. No. 196403. December 7, 2016)

FACTS:

Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were
also the registered owners of the three (3) parcels of land. The three died intestate and
without partitioning the property covered by one of the three (3) parcels of land with
TCT No. 106012. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, as
descendants of Cornelio, possessed and occupied the property.

The Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint against the Defendants-Appellants as the

parcels of land are owned in common by them but the latter does not give them any
share in the fruits thereof. Their filing of the suit praying that the subject land and its
fruits be partitioned and accounted. Defendants-Appellants agreed but provided that the
same should be made only with respect to Cornelio's share. They contended that they
already own the shares of Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of the
Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed in their favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly order the partition and accounting with respect to only
33,450.66 square meters of the property registered under TCT No. 10612.

HELD:

Yes. There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by
Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana; and that each of the co-owners had the right to one-
third of such total area. It was established that Valentina and Valeriana executed the
Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they specifically disposed of their shares in the
property registered under TCT No. 10612 in favor of Sebastian Tabasondra and Tarcila
Tabasondra.

The Court upheld the right of Valentina and Valeriana based from Article 493 of the
Civil Code regarding co-ownership. The two have the right to alienate their pro indiviso
shares without the knowledge or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the
alienation covered the disposition of only their respective interests in the common
property.

48
49
 QUINTOS, ET. AL. VS. NICOLAS, ET. AL.
(G.R. NO. 210252, 25 JUNE 2014)
FACTS
The subject property was left by the Ibarra spouses to their ten children.
Having their action for partition against petitioners dismissed, respondent siblings
resorted to executing a Deed of Adjudication and was issued a new TCT in the names
of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. Subsequently, respondent siblings sold their
7/10 undivided share over the property in favor of their co-respondents spouses
Candelario. The court ordered the partition of the subject lots between the petitioners
and the respondent spouses. Petitioners contended that the partition should no longer
be allowed since it is already barred by res judicata when the respondent siblings
filed a case for partition was dismissed with finality. Petitioners cited Rule 17, Sec
3 of Rules of the Court where a complaint may be dismissed due to the plaintiff’s
fault.
ISSUE
Whether or not dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules
of Court can defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time.
RULING
No, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court
cannot defeat the right of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time, provided that
there is no actual adjudication of ownership yet.
Article 494 provided that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned
in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Between the dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court and the right granted to co-owners under Art. 494 of the Civil Code, the latter
must prevail. For the Rules to be consistent with the statutory provisions, the Court
hold Art. 494 as an exception of Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect
that even if the order of dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on whether or not
it is with the prejudice, it shall be deemed without prejudice.

50
 DELA CRUZ vs. DELA CRUZ
G.R. No. 192383 December 4, 2013
Facts:
In 1975, Isabelo C. Dela Cruz (Isabelo) and his sisters, Lucila and Cornelia,
bought on installment land in Las Piñas from Gatchalian Realty, Inc. (GRI) Isabelo
and Cornelia paid the down payment and the amortizations. On the Following year,
isabelo constructed a residential house on the subject lot. In order to help their cousin
(Corazon) acquire a loan from Philippine Veterans Bank, Isabelo agreed to have the
land used as collateral. To make this possible, Lucila paid the remaining Php 8,000
they owed. On Jan. 18, 1979 the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in Lucila’s
name. The land was mortgaged for Corazon’s benefit. But Corazon failed to pay her
loan, the bank foreclosed on the property on March 1, 1989. Lucila redeemed it on
March 27, 1997.
On Oct. 7, 2002 Lucila executed an affidavit of waiver relinquishing her share
of half the lot to Isabelo and to her niece Emelinda. On the same date, Isabelo and
Emelinda executed an acknowledgement, claiming the property. On Aug. 22, 2005
Isabelo filed an action for partition before the RTC (Las Piñas). Lucila countered
that the house and lot belonged to her. She claimed that her affidavit did not cede
the ownership of half the property to Isabelo since the waiver would only take effect
only if the problems that beset their family were resolved. Since this condition had
not been met, she had every right to revoke the waiver as in fact she did so on Sept.
24, 2004 in the Kasulatan ng Pagsasawalang Bisa.
The RTC ruled in favor of Lucila. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the Lucila’s Affidavit of Waiver ceding to Isabelo half of the subject
property conveys to him a right of ownership over half the land.
Ruling:
Yes, the Affidavit of Waiver ceded to Isabelo half of the subject property.
The phrase "hereby waive" means that Lucila was, by executing the affidavit,
already waived her right to the property, irreversibly divesting herself of her existing
right to the same. After he and his co-owner Emelinda accepted the donation, Isabelo
became the owner of half of the subject property having the right to demand its
partition.

51
RURAL BANK OF CABADBARAN, INC., Petitioner, vs. JORGITA A. MELECIO-
YAP, LILIA MELECIO PACIFICO (deceased, substituted by her only child
ERILL*ISAAC M. PACIFICO, JR.), REYNALDO A. MELECIO DELOSO, and
SARAH MELECIO PALMA-GIL, Respondents.
(G.R. No. 178451 | July 30, 2014)
Facts: Herein respondents, the Melecio Heirs, inherited a 3,044 square meter-residential
lot, together with the ancestral house and two other structures. Armed with a Special Power
of Attorney purportedly signed by the other Melecio heirs, Erna applied for and was
granted a commercial loan by RBCI in the amount of 200,000.00 with 27% interest rate
per annum, payable within a period of 180 days. Erna, however, defaulted in the payment
of her loan obligation, causing RBCI to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage. In a letter
written in 1995, respondents informed RBCI that they were unaware of the loan obtained
and did not authorize the mortgage transaction over the subject properties which they co-
owned. They claimed that the SPA submitted by Erna was spurious, and that their
signatures appearing thereon were falsified.
The RTC decided in favor of RBCI, declaring the real estate mortgage and the
consequential foreclosure proceedings to be valid and binding against respondents,
notwithstanding the allegation of forgery in the questioned documents. It also noted that
despite constructive knowledge of the falsification as early as 1993, respondents
questioned the foreclosure proceedings only in 1996. However, the CA reversed the
decision and held that Erna had no authority to mortgage the subject properties to RBCI
since the SPA was actually forged. The CA pointed out that acquiescence cannot validate
or ratify an inexistent or void document nor can estoppel lie against respondents who had
no deliberate intent to mislead
Issue: Whether or not the presumption of regularity accorded to the notarized SPA can
stand and whether or not the respondents are guilty of laches and, thus, estopped from
questioning the validity of the real estate mortgage.
Held: No. RBCI failed to show that the subject SPA was regularly notarized. Aside from
the respondents who denied having participated in the execution and notarization of the
subject SPA, the witnesses to the instrument categorically denied having appeared before
Notary Public. Thus, the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents
can no longer apply. The forged status of the SPA alone is already enough for the Court to
declare the real estate mortgage contract null and void but only with respect to the shares
of the other co-owners (i.e., respondents) whose consent thereto was not actually procured
by Erna. While Erna, as herself a co-owner had the right to mortgage or even sell her
undivided interest in the said properties, she, could not, however, dispose of or mortgage
the subject properties in their entirety without the consent of the other co-owners.

52
 Spouses Marcos vs Heirs of Bangi
(G.R. No. 185745 | October 15, 2014)

FACTS: In 1943, the parents of respondents (Isidro and Genevova) bought 1/3
portion of the property in controversy through a sale executed by Eusebio Bangi.
The property is registered under the name of Eusebio’s father (Alipio). After the
sale, Spouses Bangi took possession over the property until they expired.
Respondents then maintained possession of the same.
Respondents alleged that in the year 1995 the property (including the portion sold to
their parents) was transferred to petitioners by virtue of two (2) Deeds of Absolute
Sale (DAS) supposedly executed by Alipio and Primo; and two (2) Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT). They claimed that the Deeds of Absolute Sale were
forged since both were executed after the death of Alipio and Primo. Hence,
respondents sought for the nullification of the DASs, cancellation of TCTs and the
restoration of the OCT.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioners appealed and maintained that the
sale executed by Eusebio was void since no extrajudicial partition was made prior
to the execution. CA upheld RTC’s decision and gave no credence to the
Extrajudicial Partition presented by petitioners since it seemed that it was executed
as a mere afterthought. CA also found that an oral partition was made after the death
of Alipio.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners had already effected the partition of the estate
before the sale of the 1/3 portion of the property to Spouses Bangi.

RULING: Yes, the court ruled that a partition was already effected prior to the sale
of the property to Spouses Bangi. Case law provides that oral partition is effective
when the parties have consummated it by the taking of possession of their respective
portions and exercising ownership over it. The court emphasized in Hernandez vs
Andal that in spite of the statute of frauds, the courts of equity may enforce oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed. A deed of partition may
be presumed or inferred from every act of the co-heirs intending to divide the
property. In this case, the court considered the view that Eusebio Bangi exercised
ownership and acquired an interest in dividing the property when he executed the
sale in favor of Isidro in 1943.

53
 JUAN P. CABRERA, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY YSAAC, Respondent.
G.R. No. 166790, November 19, 2014

FACTS:

Henry Ysaac leased out a portion of property which he is one of the co-owners to
Juan Cabrera. Juan Cabrera subsequently requested that his lot be increased since
the current lot cannot accommodate a parking space. A sale for two adjoining lots
proceeded. In several instances, Juan Cabrera tried to make a payment for the lot,
however, wasn’t always able to do so for some reasons that Henry Ysaac was not
available to receive the payment.

However, on September 21, 1994 Henry Ysaac’s counsel informed Juan Cabrera’s
counsel that it is already rescinding the contract of sale because Cabrera failed to
pay the balance of the purchase price of the land. Moreover, he could no longer sell
the said land because the property already has a new administrator.

The RTC and the CA ruled that there was a perfected contract of sale between
Cabrera and Ysaac, stating that Ysaac, a co-owner, may sell a definite portion of the
property.

ISSUE:

Whether Henry Ysaac, co-owner of an undivided land, may dispose a portion of that
property.

RULING:

No. If the alienation precedes the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite
portion of the land without consent from his co-owners. Ysaac was never able to
prove that he was authorized by his co-owners to sell the portion of the land occupied
by Cabrera, the Espiritu Family, or the Borbe Family. Ysaac had no right to define
any portion of the land as his. Absent the consent of the co-owners, no partial
partition operated in favor of the sale to Cabrera. At best, what transpired between
the two was a contract to sell, which is a promise to sell an object subject to
suspensive conditions.

54
55
 PAMPLONA V. MORETO, ET.AL.
(G.R. NO. L-33187, 31 March 1980)
Facts
During the marriage of Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega, they acquired
adjacent lots (nos. 1495, 4545, 1496) with a total area of 2,346 sq. m. Six years after
his wife died intestate, but without the consent of the heirs of his wife (his children
with Monica), Flaviano executed a deed of sale covering Lot No. 1495 in favor of
Geminiano Pamplano who is married to Apolonia Onte. The lot has an area of 781
sq. m. After Flaviano died intestate, his children instituted an action seeking the
ejection of Spouses Pamplona from the property. They argument that Flaviano had
no right to sell the lot as it belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and
Monica.
Issue
Whether or not Flaviano had the right to sell the said lot.
Ruling
Yes, Flaviano, being a co-owner of the adjacent lots, had the right to sell that part
which pertains to him.
Art 493 of the Civil Code provides that every co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. He may alienate, assign,
or mortgage the same. The effect of alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.
The lots were no longer part of the conjugal properties of Flaviano and Monica, as
the latter’s death dissolved the conjugal partnership. At the time of the sale, the
adjacent lots were co-owned by Flaviano and his children. Being a co-owner,
Flaviano was entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land as his share (or 1,173
sq. m). Pursuant to Art 493, he had the right to dispose of 781 sq. m. of his share to
Pamplona spouses. In fact, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. m. parcel of
land belonging to him at the time of the sale.

56
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILS. VS. REV. CORTEZ, G.R. No. 197472
September 7, 2015

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts: The respondent, Rev. Claudio R. Cortez, Sr. (Rev. Cortez), is a missionary
engaged in humanitarian and charitable activities, established an orphanage and
school in Punta Verde, Palaui Island, San Vicente, Sta. Ana, Cagayan. He claimed
that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares of land
located in the western portion of Palaui Island in Sitio Siwangag, Sta. Ana, Cagayan.

However, President Marcos issued a Proclamation reserving the 2,000 hectares of

land in Palaui Island, for military purposes and more than two decades later, Pres.
Ramos declared Palaui as a marine reserve.

In viewof this, Rev. Cortez for a petition for Injunction with a Prayer for the issuance
of writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the Commanding Officer of
Philippine Navy who made them vacate the land that they are occupying. This was
initially granted by RTC but the Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal.

Issue/s: Whether Rev. Cortez is entitled to a final writ of mandatory injunction.

Ruling: The Court granted the Petition. When Rev. Cortez occupied the land, there
is no such proof showing that the subject portion of Palaui Island has been declared
alienable and disposable. Hence, it must be considered as still inalienable public
domain. As such, it cannot be appropriated and therefore not a proper subject of
possession. Viewed in this light, Rev. Cortez’ claim of possession has no basis. His
possession of the subject area, even if the same be in the concept of an owner or no
matter how long, cannot produce any legal effect in his favor since the property
cannot be lawfully possessed in the first place.

We note that Rev. Cortez alleged that he sought the injunction so that he could
continue his humanitarian works. However, considering that inalienable public land
was involved, this Court is constrained to rule in accordance with the
aforementioned.

57
 SANTOS v. MANALILI
(G.R. NO. 157812, November 22, 2005)

FACTS: Reynaldo Manalili, predecessor-in-interest of respondent Ronald C.

Manalili, filed with the Board of Liquidators an application to purchase a parcel of
land.The application was favorably acted upon.After the lapse of nine (9) years and
even as the BOL had already issued the approval of the sale of the land to applicant
Reynaldo Manalili, petitioner Rodolfo Santos wrote an undated letter to the BOL
protesting Manalili's application. After investigation, the BOL came out with a
report that petitioner was not actually occupying the lot and that he only hired people
to plant trees and maintain a vegetable garden thereon presumably to establish
a bona-fide occupancy over the lot, and recommended the dismissal of petitioner's
protest and the approval of the sale to Manalili.
Petitioner filed complaints for Reconveyance, Damages, Attorney's Fees and/or
Annulment of Title against the BOL and the Manalilis. Petitioner submits that he
has clearly established a better right of possession over the subject property. Per his
testimony and those of his two witnesses, petitioner acquired the property after
which he himself introduced various improvements thereon and continuously
occupied the same up to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has the better right of possession over the lot in
dispute.
RULING: No. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of
another.It is not necessary that the owner or holder of the thing exercise personally
the rights of possession. Rights of possession may be exercised through agents.
The SC affirmed the BOL's finding that the Manalili’s had a better right of
possession thereto. It was sufficiently established that Reynaldo Manalili had
already filed an Affidavit of Occupancy with the BOL, the government agency
tasked to administer it; that the Manalili’s administered the land before they left for
Manila, after they moved to Manila they appointed an administrator to oversee the
land and the improvements and crops they have planted thereon; and that the
Manalili’s have been paying the real estate taxes for the subject land even before the
sale thereof to them.

58
 Heirs of Rogelio Isip versus Quintos (G.R No. 172008, August 1, 2012)

FACTS: Rogelio Isip. Sr. occupied and took possession of land in Taguig in 1986.
He constructed a small house to serve as place of residence. Toyo Keiki put up a
water distribution system and tore down Rogelio Sr.’s house and replaced it with a
bigger structure with a room for the latter and an office in front. The deep well was
rehabilitated with funding from Sunrise Management Corporation and Jiro
Yamashita. Sunrise Management Corporation operated the water distribution system
with Rogelio Sr. as General Manager, assisted by his two sons Rolando and Rogelio
Rogelio Jr. and brother-in-law Alfredo Lobo. A car repair shop was constructed in
the compound, as proposed by Rodolfo Quintos who is a former claims manager in
an insurance company and is familiar with running a business. After death of Rogelio
Sr, Rolando Jr was appointed as General Manager. Rolando Jr temporarily vacated
the compound as per advice of Quintos for the ocular inspection. Upon returning, he
was refused entry and noticed that Sunrise Management Corporation had been
dissolved and that the deep well compound was already under the management of
Roniro Enterprises Company. Petitioners filed a complaint for forcible entry. While
the respondents asserted that a certain Pontino was the owner of the land since 1984
who sold it Hadji Datu but the latter failed to pay. Despite non-payment, the latter
also sold the said lot to Toyo Keiki with Sagara as President and a buyer in good
faith. Jedco Corporation then acquired the right of possession over the premises in
question and the control over the operation of the water distribution system by virtue
of Deed of Assignment entered by it with Pontino. It decided to withdraw and
relinquish its rights over the premises in question in favor of De Guzman. De
Guzman then took over the premises and summoned the late Ireneo Isip (Ireneo) and
Quintos to help him in the operation of the water distribution business. Ireneo then
recommended his brother Rogelio Sr. to manage the said business under the Sunrise
Management Corporation. After the death of Rogelio Sr., De Guzman wrote a letter
stating that he is terminating the services of the said corporation because of the
unfortunate death of Rogelio.
ISSUE: Who has the better right of possession over the subjected property?
RULING: The respondents have a better right of possession. In Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, it was held that the owner of real estate has possession, either when he
himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another person who
recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy. Said declaration is in conformity
with Art. 524 of the Civil Code which provides that possession may be exercised in
one’s own name or in the name of another. Also in Dalida v. Court of Appeals, it
was held that a mere caretaker of a land has no right of possession over such land.

59
 OCHOA vs. APETA
(G.R. No. 146259, September 13, 2007)

FACTS: Since 1910, petitioners surnamed Ochoa and their predecessor-in-

interest have been occupying Lot 1580 covered by TCT 40624, where their houses
and apartment building were built. On May 1982, respondents Mauro Apeta and
Apolonia Almazan, found out that they are the true owners of the lot. They filed a
complaint for the recovery of possession and damages against the petitioners. To
determine the true owners, the land was resurveyed and found out that such lot was
registered in the name of Margarita Almada, respondent’s predecessor-in-interest,
and that such covering TCT 40624 was not for Lot 1580 but rather on Lot 1581 in
the name of Servillano Ochoa, petitioner’s predecessor-in-interest which is occupied
by Isidro Jasmin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are builders in good fait allowed to take
possession of the improvements

RULING: Yes, the subject land is a public land. Art 457 of the Civil Code provides
that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which
they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The following
requisites are: 1) deposition of soil or sediment is gradual and imperceptible 2) it is
a result of the action of the waters of the river or sea 3) the land where the accretion
takes place is adjacent to the banks of the river or sea (rules on alluvion). In this case,
the first and second requisites are absent. The accretion was formed by the dumping
of boulders, soil and other filming materials on the portions of the creek and river
bounding the land. It cannot be claimed that the accumulation was gradual and
imperceptible resulting from the action of the waters or the current of the creek and
the river. Art 457 excludes all deposits caused by the human intervention. Alluvion
must be the exclusive work of nature. A man made accretion is a part of the public
domain. In the case at bar, the subject land was the direct result of the dumping of
sawdust by a lumber company consequent to its sawmill operations.

60
 BALLESTEROS v. ABION (G.R. NO. 143361 : February 9, 2006)

FACTS: The property subject of this petition is a two-door, three-story commercial

building and the parcel of land on which it stands. The property was originally owned
by Ruperto Ensano.

Petitioner entered into a contract of lease for one door of the building with Ronald
Vargas, son of Dr. Vargas, who represented himself as the absolute owner of the
property which was to run until April 1, 1996. On September 27, 1995, Dr. Vargas
sold the property to respondent. On October 30, 1995, petitioner entered into a new
contract of lease with Ronald Vargas who again misrepresented himself as the
absolute owner of the property. It was to be effective for a period of five years from
November 1, 1995, or until November 1, 2000. Since respondent had not yet taken
possession of the building, petitioner immediately occupied the additional door upon
the execution of the new contract of lease. The respondent, new owner of the dispute
property, sought to eject the lease agreement between the petitioner and the former
owner of said property, Dr. Vargas.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent could legally eject petitioner or terminate the
lease.

RULING: Yes. Ronald Vargas was not the owner of the property and had no
authority. Although the lesser need not be the owner of the property being leased, he
should have a right or at least an authority to lease it out. Here, Ronald Vargas had
neither the right nor the authority to grant petitioner the lease of the property. Under
the principle of relativity of contracts, the sale of the property by Dr. Vargas to
respondent bound Ronald Vargas as an heir of the seller. Neither did respondent
authorize him to enter into a new lease contract with petitioner. Thus, Ronald Vargas
could not have validly executed the second lease agreement upon which petitioner
now bases his right to the continued possession of the property. Suffice it to say that
the second lease contract was legally inexistent for lack of an object certain. Under
Arts. 1318 and 1409 (3) of the Civil Code, contracts the cause or object of which did
not exist at the time of the transaction are inexistent and void ab initio. The river
cannot rise higher than its source. Where the purported lessor is bereft of any right
or authority to lease out the property, then his supposed lessee does not acquire any
right to the possession or enjoyment of the property.

61
 MANGASER V. UGAY
(744 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 204926, December 3, 2014)

Facts:
Mangaser was the owner of a land in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, evidenced by
OCT No. RP-174 and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707. In October 21, 2006,
Mangaser discovered that Ugay intruded and occupied a portion of his property, in
which Ugay has also constructed a house. Mangaser filed a case for Forcible Entry
with Damages against ugay in the MTC. The MTC ruled in favor of Ugay, stating
that Mangaser has failed to prove his prior physical possession of the lot in question.
Mangaser appealed to the RTC which reversed the MTC ruling, stating that actually
physical possession is not necessary as long as the lot in question is subject to the
action of one’s will. Further, that the OCT and Tax Declaration should not be set
aside as these proves Mangaser’s possession of the property since 1987. Ugay
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC ruling emphasizing that
the petitioner must allege that he was in prior physical possession of the property,
especially in a case of forcible entry.

Issue:
Whether or not prior physical possession is required to establish ownership over
land.

Ruling:
No, it is not. The Supreme Court ruled with finality that prior physical possession is
not necessary to establish Mangaser’s ownership over the land. Although the Court
has consistently ruled that prior physical possession is an indispensable requirement
in forcible entry cases, the principle that possession can be acquired not only by
material occupation but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action one’s will
or by the proper acts and legal formalities is equally important. In the case at bar, the
OCT and Tax Declarations are sufficient proof of the fact that the petitioner was able
to subject then property to the action of his will. Therefore, prior physical possession
is not required to establish ownership over the property in question.

62
 EDNA PALERO-TAN vs. CIRIACO I. URDANETA, JR.
(555 SCRA 28, June 18, 2008)

FACTS: Edna Palero-Tan charged Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr with Conduct

Unbecoming a Court Personnel, for stealing her ring and bracelet.

Complainant alleged that she discovered that her ring and bracelet were missing and
that the only person who was present and saw her take out the jewelry from her table
drawer was respondent, whose table is adjacent to hers.

An officemate confided to her that respondent and his wife had a quarrel because the
latter discovered a ring and a bracelet in respondent’s coin purse. The wife suspected
that respondent bought the jewelry for his mistress. Complainant approached the
RTC presiding judge, Judge Absalon U. Fulache relayed to him the information she
gathered.

The respondent’s wife admitted that she and respondent had a fight because she
found a ring and bracelet inside respondent’s coin purse and believed he would give
to his mistress. In a separate meeting with Judge Fulache, respondent confessed that
he found complainant’s jewels in the court’s premises, but he could no longer return
them because he already threw them away.

ISSUE: Whether or not Urdaneta can be held liable for throwing the jewelries he
found.

RULING: Yes, he can be held liable.

Under the law, when a person who finds a thing that has been lost or mislaid by the
owner takes the thing into his hands, he acquires physical custody only and does not
become vested with legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged
with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus respondent’s duty to
report to his superior or his officemates that he found something.

Contrary to respondent’s claim, this Court is convinced that respondent had the
intention to appropriate the jewelry to himself had these not been discovered by his
wife. His claim that the ring and bracelet were worthless "fancy" jewelry is
immaterial because the basis for his liability is his act of taking something which
does not belong to him.

The court found Ciriaco I. Urdaneta, Jr., guilty of Grave Misconduct.

63
 MERCEDES MORALIDAD vs SPS PERNES
(GR No. 152809, August 3, 2006)
FACTS: The parcel of land (located in the heart of Davao City) involved in this case
is one which Moralidad bought while she was living and working in the USA. She
decided to buy the property when she received news that the outskirts of Davao City,
where her niece and her niece’s husband (Sps. Pernes) was living, was infested by
NPA Rebels. She then executed a document which states that Sps. Pernes may build
their house on the said property and stay for as long as they like. She also stated that
any of her kins could stay in the property with the condition that they live there
peacefully. After Moralidad’s retirement, she decided to return to the Philippines
and live with Sps. Pernes. However, through the course of time, their relationship
turned sour. She experiencd slander, harassment, threat, and defamation from the
Pernes family. She raised it to the barangay lupon who ordered the Pernes family to
vacate Moralidad’s property but not after they are reimbursed for the value of the
house they built there. They could not agree on the amount. Their confrontations
became violent so Moralidad eventually filed a complaint with the MTCC of Davao
City against the spouses.
ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not what was constituted between the parties is one of
usufruct over a piece of land; 2.) Whether or not the usufruct has been terminated or
extinguished.
RULING: 1.) YES. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the
obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the
law otherwise provide. (Art. 562, Civil Code) Usufruct is nothing else but simply
allowing one to enjoy another's property. It is also defined as the right to enjoy the
property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and the jus fruendi,
with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same
2.) YES. One of the modes of extinguishment of usufruct stated in Art. 603 of
the Civil Code is: “(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or
by the fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the title creating the
usufruct;” The resolutory conditions were clearly fulfilled when Moralidad
experienced harassment and when violent confrontations occurred, despite her
advanced age and frail condition. These are enough factual bases to consider the
usufruct as having been terminated. By express provision of law, the spouses do not
have the right to reimbursement for the improvements they may have introduced on
the property. They will have to be ordered to vacate the premises without any right
of reimbursement. They may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they
may have introduced thereon without damaging the petitioner’s property.

64
 NHA VS CA, BULACAN GARDEN CORP., and MANILA SEEDLING
BANK FOUNDATION, INC.
(G.R. No. 148830, April 13, 2005)
FACTS:
On 1968, Proclamation No. 481 was issued to set aside a 120-hectare portion of a
land in Quezon City owned by NHA to be used for the site of the National
Government Center (NGC). Following this, on 1977, Proclamation No. 1670
removed a 7-hectare portion from the coverage of NGC to be reserved for the MSBC.
Over the years, MSBF’s occupancy exceeded the 7-hectare area subject to its
usufructuary rights. The area it occupied became 16 hectares. On 1987, MSBC
leased a portion of its area (4,590 sqm.) to BGC and other stallholders.
On 1988, Memorandum No. 127 was issued revoking the reserved status of “the 50
hectares remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property for the NGC”,
authorizing NHA to commercialize the area and sell it to the public. Acting on this,
the NHA gave BGC 10 days to vacate its occupied area. With this, the BGC filed a
petition to enjoin the NHA from demolishing BGC’s facilities on the leased to it by
MSBF.
ISSUE:
Whether the premises leased by BGC from MSBF is within the 7-hectare area that
Proclamation No. 1670 granted to MSBF by way of usufruct
RULING:
The case is REMANDED to the RTC to order a joint survey on the metes and bounds
of the 7-hectare portion of MSBF.
Art. 565 of the Civil Code provides that the rights and obligations of the usufructuary
shall be governed by the title constituting the usufruct, which in this case, is the
Proclamation No. 1670, authorizing MSBF to determine the location of the 7-hectare
area giving it the latitude to determine the location. However, the problem arises as
to MSBF’s act of exceeding the 7-hectare portion granted to it.
A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges as the usufructuary has the duty
to protect the owner’s interests. A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of
another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
The Court agreed that MSBF has abused the privilege given it under Proclamation
No. 1670. However, the 7-hectare portion of MSBF is no longer easily determinable
as there are varied structures erected within and surrounding the area, and by the
different outcomes of the survey conducted by NHA and MSBF. As such, there is a
need for new survey.

65
 MARIANO FLOREZA, petitioner,

vs.

MARIA D. de EVANGELISTA and SERGIO EVANGELISTA, respondents.

(G.R. No. L-25462 February 21, 1980)

Facts: The Evangelistas are the owners of a residential lot located at Tanay, Rizal.
The Evangelitas borrowed from Floreza the amount of P100.00. On or about
November 1945, with the consent of the Evangelistas, Floreza occupied the above
residential lot and built thereon a house of light materials (barong- barong) without
any agreement as to payment for the use of said residential lot owing to the fact that
the Evangelistas has then a standing loan of P100.00 in favor of Floreza. The
Evangelistas again borrowed several times from Floreza where the last three are
evidenced by private documents stating that the residential lot stands as security
therefor and that the amounts covered thereunder are payable within six years from
date, without mention of interest. Floreza demolished this house of light materials
and in its place constructed one of strong materials assessed in his name.
Evangelistas sold their residential lot to Floreza, with a right to repurchase within a
period of 6 years from date. Before the expiry of the repurchase period, the
Evangelistas paid in full the repurchase price. Evangelistas, through their counsel,
wrote Floreza a letter asking him to vacate the premises. Floreza refused to vacate
unless he was first reimbursed the value of his house.

Issue: Whether or not, Floreza has the right to indemnification.

Ruling: No. Petitioner Floreza has no right to reimbursement of the value of the
house which he had erected on the residential lot of the Evangelistas, much less to
retention of the premises until he is reimbursed. The rights of petitioner are more
analogous to those of a usufructuary who, under Article 579 of the Civil Code, may
make on the property useful improvements but with no right to be indemnified
therefor. Usufruct is a limited real right found in civil-law and mixed jurisdictions
that unites the two property interests with the right to use or enjoy a thing possessed,
directly and without altering it and right to derive profit from a thing possessed.
Therefore, as subject to usufruct, Floreza cannot be indemnified of the value of the
house.

66
 Cristobal vs CA

G.R. 125339, June 22, 1998

Facts: Cristobal owned a house and lot in Visayas Avenue Extension. Ledesma on the
other hand was the owner of the adjoining subdivision, which included the disputed lots 1
and 2. Lots 1 and 2 were originally a part of the private road. Upon the making of Visayas
Avenue as a public road, Ledesma petitioned the exclusion of the two disputed lots from
the road. He was granted to do so. Upon the sale of the lots to a third person, it was
discovered that there were squatters on the land and that it was being used as a passageway
by petitioners. This prompted the new owner to enclose the lot. Petitioners protested the
enclosure alleging that their property was bounded on all sides by residential houses
belonging to different owners and had no adequate outlet and inlet to Visayas Avenue
except through the property of the Paciones. As their protest went unheeded, petitioners
instituted an action for easement of right of way with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). The trial court issued a TRO directing the Pacione spouses to
cease and desist from fencing the disputed property. The trial court dismissed the complaint
holding that one essential requisite of a legal easement of a right of way was not proved.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the findings of
the trial court. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied. Hence the petition.

Issue: WON the conversion of lot 2 to a residential lot was legal.

Ruling: The Supreme Court denied the petition. The essential requisites for the compulsory
right of way are as follows; The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no
adequate outlet to a public highway, It must be established at the point least prejudicial to
the servient estate and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest, There must be payment of the
proper indemnity, The isolation should not be due to the proprietor’s own acts In
consideration of the above, mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is
required by law as the basis for setting up the compulsory right of way. The Court ruled
that the first element of a compulsory easement of right of way, i.e., “that the dominant
estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway”
is clearly absent. As found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, an outlet already
exists, which is a path walk located at the left side of petitioners’ property and which is
connected to a private road about five hundred (500) meters long. PETITION DENIED.

67
 REYES v. RAMOS (G.R. 194488, February 11, 2015)
FACTS:
Alicia Reyes filed a complaint for easement of right of way against the
spouses Francisco Valentin and Anatalia Ramos claiming that a portion of the
respondents’ property was the only adequate way from her property to the highway.
The respondents said that the petitioner’s property became isolated because of the
act of the petitioner’s mother of subdividing the property among her children.
Moreover, the respondents said that there was an open space that connected the
petitioner’s property to a public road.
Upon ocular inspection of the Regional Trial Court, it was found out that the
easement asked by the petitioner would pass through improvements already made
by the respondents on their property like the garage, garden and grotto. In addition,
there is an irrigation canal which can be used as access road to another barangay
road if a bridge is constructed just like what other property owners have done.
The RTC dismissed the petition because the proposed right of way was not
the least onerous to the servient estate. The Court of Appeals denied the subsequent
appeal by the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the compulsory easement of right of way
over the respondents’ property
RULING: No, the petitioners do not have the compulsory easement of right of way.
1. The petitioners failed to prove that the proposed right of way was the least
prejudicial to the respondents’ estate, which is one of the requirements to
demand a right of way. (cf. Art. 650, NCC). The petitioners failed to
establish that there was no outlet to the public highway when there is an
adequate exit in another part of the property – through the irrigation canal.
2. The fact that a bridge can be constructed over it is enough to ensure that there
is an outlet to the highway. Thus, there is no need to use the respondents’
property. Even if it is more inconvenient and farther rather than passing
through the respondents’ property, the law is clear that mere inconvenience
is not enough to ask for an easement of right of way.
3. There is a preference of “least prejudice on the servient estate” over the
“distance between the dominant estate and the public highway.”
4. The value of an easement is not based solely on the price of the property but
on the price of foregone opportunity of the owners to use their own land.

68
5. There is no necessity for an easement of right of way when the dominant
land is not even used at the present. The fact that there is no imperative need
is also part of the question of “least prejudice.”

69
 Calimoso vs. Roullo
(G.R. No. 198594 January 25, 2016)

Facts:
Respondent, Alex Roullo alleged that his lot is isolated by several surrounding
estates, including the lot owned by petitioners Helen, Marilyn, and Liby Calimoso;
that he needs a right-of-way in order to have access to a public road; and that the
shortest and most convenient access to the nearest public road, i.e., Fajardo
Subdivision Road, passes through the petitioners’ lot. The petitioners objected to the
establishment of the easement because it would cause substantial damage to the two
(2) houses already standing on their property. They alleged that the respondent has
other right-of-way alternatives.

Issue: Whether the right-of-way passing through the petitioners’ lot satisfies the
fourth requirement for easement of right-of-way.

Ruling:
Article 650 of the Civil Code provides the fourth requisite for the easement of
right-of-way that “it shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest”.
Under this guideline, whenever there are several tenements surrounding the
dominant estate, the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where the
distance to the public road or highway is shortest and where the least damage would
be caused. If these two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur in
a single tenement, we have held in the past that the least prejudice criterion must
prevail over the shortest distance criterion.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the petitioners’ lot
would cause the destruction of the wire fence and a house on the petitioners’
property. Although this right-of-way has the shortest distance to a public road, it is
not the least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and that an option
to traverse two vacant lots without causing any damage, albeit longer, is available.
We have held that “mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required
by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory easement;” that “a longer way may
be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are constructions
or walls which can be avoided by a round-about way”.

70
 CRISPIN DICHOSO, JR., EVELYN DICHOSO VALDEZ, AND
ROSEMARIE DICHOSO PE BENITO, PETITIONERS,vs.PATROCINIO L.
MARCOS, RESPONDENT
(G.R. No. 180282, April 11, 2011)

FACTS:

Petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against respondent

Patrocinio L. Marcosa. They alleged that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553 of
the Cadastral Survey of Laoag City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
31219; while respondent is the owner of Lot No. 1. As petitioners had no access to
a public road to and from their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot
No. 1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the
passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners have been granted another
passageway by Spouses Arce’s property, the owners of another adjacent lot.

The RTC found that petitioners adequately established the requisites to justify an
easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code
but CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and consequently dismissed
petitioners’ complaint. Considering that a right of way had already been granted by
the (other) servient estate owned by the Spouses Arce, the appellate court concluded
that there is no need to establish an easement over respondent’s property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are entitled to a grant of legal easement of right of way

RULING:

No. The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant
of compulsory right of way. To be sure, the true standard for the grant of the legal
right is "adequacy." Hence, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from
the dominant estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet,
for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open up another servitude is
entirely unjustified.

71
 PACITA DAVID-CHAN
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.

G.R. No. 105294 February 26, 1997

FACTS:
Pacita David-Chan filed an amended petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory
injunction to enjoin Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. from fencing its property. She
claimed that her property was surrounded by various establishments, therefore she
was only left with a very small access to the highway measuring two feet and four
inches wide through the property of private respondent. Petitioner alleged that
private respondent was about to complete the construction of its concrete fence on
the said lot which would result in depriving petitioner of the only available right of
way.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioner is legally entitled to a right of way through private
respondent’s property?
2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to such easement through the recognition
and application of the Filipino values of pakikisama and pakikipagkapwa-
tao?

RULING:
1. No. The SC ruled that the petitioner failed to satisfy the second and third
requisite of an Easement of Right of Way, to wit: (2) proper indemnity is paid;
(3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor's own acts. As to the second
requisite, the SC adopted the findings made by the RTC and the CA, and found
that there was no showing that plaintiff ever made a tender of payment of the
proper indemnity for the right of way. As the lower court said, "The fact that
plaintiff prays that defendant Rabbit be ordered to sell to her the disputed
premises hardly satisfies the requisite regarding the payment of the proper
indemnity.

As for the third requisite, the CA, and as adopted by the SC, also found that
petitioner caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda
property by building a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her
property, and thus separating it from the property of the Pinedas’. She even
closed the entrance which she could use as to reach the National Highway
without passing through the property of defendant.

72
2. No. According to the Supreme Court, equity is applied only in the absence of,
and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. In the case at
bar, it was found that petitioner is not legally entitled to a right of way on the
property of private respondent. Thus, such equitable arguments cannot prevail
over the legal findings.

73
 UNISOURCE COMMERCIAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH CHUNG, KIAT CHUNG and
KLETO CHUNG, Respondents (G.R. NO. 173252 : July 17, 2009)

FACTS:
Petitioner Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation is the
registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 176253 of the Register of Deeds of Manila. The title contains a memorandum
of encumbrance of a voluntary easement which has been carried over from the
Original Certificate of Title of Encarnacion S. Sandico in favor of Francisco M.
Hidalgo, predecessor in interest of the respondents
Petitioner filed a Petition to Cancel the Encumbrance of Voluntary Easement
of Right of Way on the ground that the dominant estate has an adequate access to a
public road which is Matienza Street. RTC granted the petition. On Appeal, CA
reversed the decision since the presence of an adequate outlet to a highway
extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements but not voluntary easements like
in the instant case. The same can be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of the encumbrance of Voluntary Easement
of Right of Way is valid.
RULING: No. Petitioner itself admitted that a voluntary easement of right of way
exists in favor of respondents. Having made such an admission, petitioner cannot
now claim that what exists is a legal easement and that the same should be cancelled
since the dominant estate is not an enclosed estate as it has an adequate access to a
public road which is Callejon Matienza Street.
Neither can petitioner claim that the easement is personal only to Hidalgo since
the annotation merely mentioned Sandico and Hidalgo without equally binding their
heirs or assigns. That the heirs or assigns of the parties were not mentioned in the
annotation does not mean that it is not binding on them. Again, a voluntary easement
of right of way is like any other contract. As such, it is generally effective between
the parties, their heirs and assigns, except in case where the rights and obligations
arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law
.

74
 SPS. MANUEL AND VICTORIA SALIMBANGON vs. SPS. SANTOS AND
ERLINDA TAN (G.R. No. 185240, January 20, 2010)

FACTS:

Guillermo Ceniza died intestate leaving a parcel of land to his children who, later on,
executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition. Lots A, B, and C were
adjacent to a city street. But Lots D and E were not, they being interior lots. To give
access to the street, the heirs established in their extrajudicial partition an easement of
right of way consisting of a 3-meter wide alley between Lots D and E that continued on
between Lots A and B and on to the street.

The Spouses Salimbangon owned Lot A. One of their garages could get to street only
by means of the easement. Lot B, C, D and E were bought by Spouses Tan who
introduced improvement on Lot B and closed off the access that Spouses Salimbangon
had on the easement. The Salimbangon’s filed a complaint against the Tans, while the
Tans filed with the RTC a motion to extinguish the easement. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in admitting in evidence contrary to the parol

evidence rule Eduardo Ceniza’s testimony respecting the true intent of the heirs in
establishing the easement of right of way as against what they stated in their written
agreement; and

2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the easement of right of way
established by the partition agreement among the heirs for the benefit of Lot A has been
extinguished.

HELD:

1. No. The Parol Evidence Rule admits exceptions, such as this case. Based from,
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the Tans were entitled to
introduce evidence to establish the true intent and agreement of the parties although this
may depart from what the partition agreement literally provided.

2. No. The existence of a dominant estate and a servient estate is incompatible with
the idea that both estates belong to the same person. When the owner of Lots D and E
also became the owner of Lot B, the easement of right of way on Lot B became extinct
by operation of law.

75
 MERCADER, JR. VS. BARDILAS (G.R. NO. 163157, 27 JUNE 2016)
FACTS
This concerns about the lots owned by the spouses Mercader and spouses
Bardilas. The Clarita Village Association erected a concrete perimeter to close the
exit point of the Right of Way of the spouses Bardilas. The closure forced the
spouses Bardilas to use the second exit of which they are to demolish a portion of
their wall fence and replace it with iron gate so they can use it anytime. The spouses
Mercader received a letter from the Bardilas demanding for P30,000 as payment for
the 14 sq.m which the Mercader’s house and wall fence have encroached or they
should just demolish the wall fence and the portion of the house which encroached
Bardilas’s property. The spouses Mercader contended that the technical description
of their property contained the phrase “with existing Right of Way (3.00 meters
wide),” signified that they were equally entitled to the road-right-of way.
ISSUE
Whether or not spouses Mercader are equally entitled to the road-right-of-
way being conferred upon them by Title pursuant to Article 622 of the NCC.
RULING
No, the spouses Mercader are not equally entitled to the road-right-of-way.
Easement or servitude, according to Valdez v. Tabisula, is "a real right
constituted on another's property, corporeal and immovable, by virtue of which the
owner of the same has to abstain from doing or to allow somebody else to do
something on his property for the benefit of another thing or person." "It exists only
when the servient and dominant estates belong to two different owners. It gives the
holder of the easement an incorporeal interest on the land but grants no title thereto.
Article 622 of the Civil Code provides that continuous non-apparent
easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only
by virtue of title. But the phrase with existing Right of Way in the TCT is not one of
the modes of acquisition of the easement by virtue of a title.
What really defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its description,
but the boundaries therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.
The spouses Mercader could not claim to own even a portion of the road right of
way because Article 630 of the Civil Code expressly provides that the owner of the
servient estate retains ownership of the portion on which the easement is established,
and may use the same in such manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement.

76
 CRUZ vs. PANDACAN HIKER'S CLUB, INC
G.R. No. 188213 January 11, 2016

Facts:

Natividad C. Cruz (Cruz) was Punong Barangay of barangay 848. On Nov.

10, 2006, within the vicinity of her barangay, she confronted persons playing
basketball, telling them that they had no right to play at the Court. She then ordered
Benjamin Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz) to destroy the basketball ring by cutting it up with
a hacksaw. The Pandacan Hiker’s Club, who donated and operated the basketball
court for the Pandacan community, filed a complaint (for Malicious Mischief, Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of
Authority) before the prosecutor’s office and the office of the Ombudsman.
Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace in the barangay and
was the subject of many complaints from residents asking for its closure. But was
often ignored.
The office of the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint. The PHC appealed to
the CA which ruled in their favor.
Issue:
Whether Cruz merely abated the public nuisance by removing the basketball
ring.
Ruling:
No. Prevailing jurisprudence holds that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se,
it may not be summarily abated.
Jurisprudence recognizes that the term "nuisance" is so comprehensive that it
has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the
citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of his property, or his comfort. It
is a nuisance per se, when it affects the immediate safety of persons and property,
which may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
In the case at bar, There is no factual finding that the basketball ring was a
nuisance per se. that is susceptible to a summary abatement. And based on what
appears in the records, it can be held, at most, as a mere nuisance per accidens, for
it does not pose an immediate effect upon the safety of persons and property.

77
LINDA RANA, Petitioner, vs. TERESITA LEE WONG, SPS. SHIRLEY LEE ONG
and RUBEN ANG ONG, represented by their Attorney-in-fact WILSON UY, and
SPS. ROSARIO and WILSON UY
(G.R. No. 192861 & G.R. No. 192862 | June 30, 2014)

Facts: Wong and Sps. Ong are co-owners pro-indiviso of a residential land situated in
Peace Valley Subdivision, Lahug, Cebu City, abutting a 10-meter wide subdivision road.
On the opposite side of the subject road, across the Wong-Ong property, are the adjacent
lots of Sps. Uy and Sps. Rana. The said lots follow a rolling terrain with the Rana property
standing about two (2) meters higher than and overlooking the Uy property, while the
Wong-Ong property is at the same level with the subject road. Sometime in 1997, Sps.
Rana elevated and cemented a portion of the subject road in order to level it with their gate.
Sps. Rana likewise backfilled a portion of the perimeter fence separating the Rana and Uy
properties without erecting a retaining wall that would hold the weight of the added filling
materials. Wong, Sps. Ong, and Sps. Uy filed a Complaint for Abatement of Nuisance with
Damages, seeking to: (a) declare the subject portion of the road as a nuisance and (b)
declare the subject backfilling as a nuisance considering that it poses a clear and present
danger to the life and limb of the Uy family arising from the premature weakening of Sps.
Uy’s perimeter fence due to the seeping of rain water from the Rana property that could
cause its sudden collapse;
RTC declared that the parties all acted in bad faith, and, therefore, no relief can be
granted to them against each other. The CA Partly granted the said decision.
Issue: Whether or not the subject road and subject backfilling are nuisances and are
susceptible of summary abatement?
Held: The petitions are partly meritorious. Jurisprudence classifies nuisances in relation to
their legal susceptibility to summary abatement-- the corrective action without prior
judicial permission. A nuisance may either be: (a) a nuisance per se or one which "affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated"; or (b) a
nuisance per accidens or that which "depends upon certain conditions and circumstances,
and its existence being a question of fact, cannot be abated without due hearing thereon."
It is a standing jurisprudential rule that unless a nuisance is a nuisance per se, it may
not be summarily abated. In the present cases, with respect to the elevated and cemented
subject portion, the Court finds that the same is not a nuisance per se. It was built primarily
to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was admittedly
located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong
properties. Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se it cannot be summarily abated.

78
 As for the subject backfilling touching the perimeter fence of the Uy property,
records show that the said fence was not designed to act as a retaining wall but merely to
withhold wind load and its own load. With these findings, the Court thus agrees with the
courts a quo that there is a need for Linda Rana to construct a retaining wall which would
bear the weight and pressure of the filling materials introduced on their property.

79
 Perez vs Spouses Madrona
(G.R. No. 184478 | March 21, 2012)

FACTS: Respondent-spouses Madrona are registered owners of a residential

property in Marikina City covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 169365.
In 1989, they constructed their house on the said property and enclosed it with a
concrete fence and steel gate.

In 1999, respondents received a letter from the Chief of the Marikina Demolition
Office, petitioner - Jaime Perez, ordering them to remove their fence within 7 days
upon receipt of letter as it allegedly encroached the sidewalk. Respondents answered
stating that such accusation was libelous and that their fence did not extend to the
sidewalk. In 2001, petitioner sent another letter with the same contents but gave them
10 days to remove the structure. This impelled the respondents to file a complaint
for injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).

RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the respondents. The RTC ruled that the
respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se and it does not present an immediate
danger to the community. Hence, the demolition is unwarranted. On appeal, CA
upheld RTCs decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents’ fence is a nuisance per se thereby justifying its
immediate demolition without judicial intervention.

RULING: No, the court upheld the ruling that the respondents’ fence is not a
nuisance per se. The fence was mainly built to secure the property of respondents
and to prevent trespassers from entering it. The court is of the view that the structure
is not injurious to the health and welfare of the public. Respondents correctly pointed
out that the sidewalk still exists; thus, the fence did not encroach it. Therefore,
petitioner cannot avail of the remedy to demolish the structure after the respondents
refused to heed his request to remove it. If petitioner found it to be a nuisance, he
should go to the court and prove the respondents supposed violations in the
construction of the fence. The court emphasized that unless a thing is a nuisance per
se, it may not be abated immediately without judicial intervention.

80
 CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, Respondent.
G.R. No. 211356

FACTS:

Petitioner Aquino is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay West Cove
Hotel which although was already operating a resort in Malay, Aklan, applied for a
zoning compliance for the construction of a three-storey hotel. However, the same
was denied on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no
build zone” demarcated in a Municipal Ordinance. Pending appeal for
reconsideration, the petitioner continued its construction with the hotel. On June 7,
2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued EO 10 ordering the closure
and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel, which was partially implemented on
June 10, 2011.

ISSUE:

Whether the mayor of the Municipality of Malay, Aklan committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the demolition of the subject hotel.

RULING:

No. As jurisprudence elucidates, nuisances are of two kinds: nuisance per se and
nuisance per accidens. The Boracay West Cove Hotel falls under nuisance per
accidens since it is a nuisance depending upon certain conditions and circumstances.
In establishing a no build zone through local legislation, the LGU effectively made
a determination that constructions therein, without first securing exemptions from
the local council, qualify as nuisances for they pose a threat to public safety. The
hotel was demolished not exactly because it is a nuisance but because it failed to
comply with the legal requirements prior to construction. It just so happened that, in
the case at bar, the hotel's incident that qualified it as a nuisance per accidens, it
being constructed within the no build zone further resulted in the non-issuance of
the necessary permits and clearances, which is a ground for demolition under the
LGC. Under the premises, a court order that is required under normal circumstances
is hereby dispensed with.

81
 VILLANUEVA V. SPOUSES BRANOCO
(G.R. NO. 172804, 24 January 2011)
Facts
Villanueva sued Spouses Branoco to recover a 3,942 square-meter parcel of land.
Villanueva claimed that he bought the property in 1971 from Casimiro Vere who, in
turn, bought the property from Alvegia Rodrigo in 1970. Whereas, Spouses Branoco
alleged that they bought the same property from Eufracia Rodriguez to whom
Rodrigo donated the property evidenced by a Deed of Donation signed by Rodrigo
(donor) and Rodriguez (donee) and two witnesses. The said Deed stipulated, among
others, (1) that the ownership would be vested on donee upon the demise of donor,
(2) that the land would not be reverted to the donor in case the donee predeceases
her, and (3) that done would give one-half of the produce of the land to donor during
her lifetime.
Villanueva contended that the Deed was a donation mortis causa, which was
effectively revoked by Rodrigo when she sold it to Vere in 1970.
Issue
Whether or not the donation was a donation mortis causa
Ruling
No, the donation of land by Rodrigo to Rodriguez was a donation inter vivos.
Jurisprudence provides that the designation of donation as mortis causa, or the
inclusion of a provision to the effect that the donation is to take effect at the death of
the donor, is not controlling. The instrument must be read in its entirety to give effect
to the real intent of the donor. In case of doubt, the conveyance shall be deemed
donation inter vivos rather than mortis causa.
Here, the Deed of Donation explicitly provided for the irrevocability of the donation
in case Rodriguez predeceases Rodrigo. Considering this non-reversibility clause,
the statement that the ownership shall be vested on Rodriguez only upon the demise
of Rodrigo can be inferred to pertain to usufructuary right only (i.e., one-half of the
produce of the land). The existence of other considerations for the donation, such as
the donor’s love and affection, corroborated the express irrevocability of donation
inter vivos. In its entirety, the disposition was a donation inter vivos, despite the
statement that the ownership would be transferred to donee upon the death of the
donor.

82
 DEL ROSARIO VS. FERRER, G.R. No. 187056 : September 20, 2010

ABAD, J.:

Facts: Spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe Gonzales executed a document entitled

"Donation Mortis Causa" in favor of their two children, Asuncion and Emiliano, and their
granddaughter, Jarabini (daughter of their predeceased son, Zoilo) covering the spouses'
126-square meter lot and the house on it in Pandacan, Manila in equal shares. They both
stated that the Donation Mortis Causa shall be irrevocable and shall be respected by the
surviving spouse.

Guadalupe, the donor wife, died in September 1968. A few months later or on December
19, 1968, Leopoldo, the donor husband, executed a deed of assignment of his rights and
interests in subject property to their daughter Asuncion. Leopoldo died in June 1972.

Jarabini filed a petition for the probate of the deed of donation mortis causa before the RTC
Manila while Asuncion opposed the petition, invoking his father’s assignment of his rights
and interests in the property to her.

Issue/s: Whether or not the spouses Leopoldo and Guadalupe's donation to Asuncion,
Emiliano, and Jarabini was a donation mortis causa, as it was denominated, or in fact a
donation inter vivos.

Ruling: The donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative
and final. Such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned
of the donee's acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute
owner of the property donated.

Given that the donation was irrevocable or given inter vivos, Leopoldo's subsequent
assignment of his rights and interests in the property to Asuncion should be regarded as
void for, by then, he had no more rights to assign. He could not give what he no longer
had.

The three donees signed their acceptance of the donation, which acceptance the deed
required. The Court held that the donation is inter vivos, because the acceptance is the only
requirement only for such kind of donations. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of
a will, need not be accepted by the donee during the donor's lifetime.

83
 GESTOPA V. COURT OF APPEALS
(G.R. NO. 111904, OC 5, 2000)

FACTS: Spouses Danlag executed three deeds of donation mortis causa in favor of
private respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil. After six years, the spouses executed a
deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned parcels of land plus two
other parcels, again in favor of private respondent Mercedes. This contained two
conditions that the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of the land
during their lifetime, and that the donee cannot sell or dispose of the land during the
lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent and approval.

Diego and Catalina Danlag sold parcels 3 and 4 to herein petitioners, Mr. and Mrs.
Agripino Gestopa. The Danlags executed a deed of revocation recovering the six
parcels of land subject of the aforecited deed of donation inter vivos.

Mercedes Pilapil (herein private respondent) filed with the RTC a petition against
the Gestopas and the Danlags, for quieting of title over the above parcels of land.The
Danlags asserted that the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death
of the donor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Danlags executed a donation inter vivos, declaring
Mercedes Danlag Pilapil as the absolute and exclusive owner of the six (6) parcels
of land.

RULING: Yes. The Danlags executed a donation inter vivos. Crucial in resolving
whether the donation was inter vivos or mortis causa is the determination of whether
the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon the execution
of the deed. First, the granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of
love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a donation inter vivos. Second,
the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer the
naked ownership over the properties. As correctly posed by the Court of Appeals,
what was the need for such reservation if the donor and his spouse remained the
owners of the properties? Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his
maintenance in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor
intended to part with the six parcels of land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation.
It was held by the SC that an acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter
vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis
causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donee during
the donors' lifetime.

84
 Spouses Sicad versus Court of Appeals (G.R No. 125888, August 13, 1998)

FACTS: Aurora Virto DA. de Motinola executed a deed of donation inter vivos over
a parcel of land in favor of her grandchildren, namely: Catalino Valderrama, Judy
Cristina Valderrama and Jesus Antonio Valderrama. The deed also contained the
signatures of the donees in acknowledgment of their acceptance of the donation. A
Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of the donees. Montinola retained
the owner’s duplicate copy and property until she transferred it 10 years later to
Spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of
donation and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on the belief that the
donation was mortis causa and it had to comply with the formalities of a will. Since
it did not comply, the donation was void and the transfer certificate title in favor of
donees should be cancelled. The donees averred that the donation was inter vivos
and was valid since it complied with the requirements of Art 729. When Montinola
died, a petition was raised by Spouses Sicad in which they averred that they become
the owner of the property in virtue of deed of definite sale and affidavit executed by
Montinola. The evidence establishes that when the deed of donation prepared by
Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treñas) was read and explained by the latter to the parties,
Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years
from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for
such period. She never stopped treating the property as her own. She continued, as
explicitly authorized in the deed itself, to possess the property, enjoy its fruits and
otherwise exercise the rights of dominion, paying the property taxes as they fell due
— all these she did until she transferred the Property to the Sicad Spouses.
Issue: Was the donation an inter vivos or mortis causa?
Ruling: The donation was mortis causa. It is void because the essential requisites
for its validity have not been complied with. The court held that the real nature of a
deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as
demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution. Nothing of any
consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question to Montinola's
grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They did not get possession of the property
donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of
dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to
dispose of the property, which would accrue to them only after ten (10) years from
Montinola's death.

85
 CARINAN vs. SPOUSES CUETO
(G.R. No. 198636, October 8, 2014)

FACTS: Esperanza and Jose Carinan acquired a parcel of land, under the name
of GSIS, from Roberto Ventura which resulted to the assumption of the remaining
monthly amortizations. Due to the impending cancellation of sale to Roberto for
Esperanza and Jose’s failure to pay the amortizations, Esperanza sought financial
assistance to her brother, Gavino. Gavino paid for the balance of P785,680.37 from
his conjugal savings on the condition that Esperanza and Jazer, her son, will execute
a deed of absolute sale in favor of the respondents once the title over the property
was transferred to their name, subject to the condition that they would be given the
first option to buy it back within three years reimbursing the expenses, such as title
transfer expenses and house renovation expenses, incurred by the respondents on the
property. The TCT already under the name of Esperanza was surrendered to the
respondents. Afterwards, respondents demanded the transfer of the title on their
names but were not complied by Esperanza and Jazer. Esperanza and Jazer claimed
that Gavino paid the balance with GSIS out of sheer generosity and pity upon her
sister.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of respondent’s payment of Esperanza’s arrears

with GSIS was a contract of loan or donation

RULING: It is a contract of loan. A donation is a simple act of liberality where a

person give freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it. Art 748
states that the donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. An oral
donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document
representing the right donated. If the value of the personal property donated exceeds
P5,000, the donation and acceptance shall be made in writing, otherwise void. It
must comply with the mandatory formal requirements set forth by law for its
validity. The donation of money as well as its acceptance should be in writing,
otherwise invalid. The aid needed by Esperanza was for the immediate production
of the money that could pay for her obligations to the GSIS and effect transfer of
title, in order that here payments and interest over the property would not be
forfeited. It did not follow that respondents could no longer be allowed to later
demand repayment.

86
LAGAZO vs. CA and Alfredo Cabanlit. (G.R. No. 112796, March 5, 1998)

FACTS: This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the Decision of the Court
of Appeals on the controversy of herein petitioner .Catalina Jacob Vda. de Reyes, a
widow and grandmother of plaintiff-appellee, was awarded a 60.10-square meter lot
which is a portion of the Monserrat Estate located in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. Catalina
Jacob constructed a house on the lot. Catalina executed an SPA in favor of her son-
in-law Español authorizing him to execute all documents for her claim as awardee
of the lot. She revoked said SPA due to the failure of Español to accomplish what
he is tasked to. Catalina executed another SPA over the subject lot in favor of
Lazago.

Lazago found out that the property was in the delinquent list, so that he paid the
installments in arrears and the remaining balance on the lot and declared the said
property in the name of Catalina Jacob. Español surreptitiously sold the house to
Cabanlit. Lazago thereafter sent a demand letter to Cabanlit asking him to vacate the
premises but refused to vacate the premises claiming ownership thereof.

ISSUE: Whether the donation be deemed onerous and thus governed by the law on
ordinary contracts.

RULING: No. A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality
while an onerous donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future
services equal to or more in value than the thing donated. Under Article 733 of the
Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on
contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not
applicable. The Court rules that the donation was simple, not onerous. It is clear that
the donor did not have any intention to burden or charge petitioner as the donee. The
words in the deed are in fact typical of a pure donation. We agree with Respondent
Court that the payments made by petitioner were merely his voluntary acts. This
much can be gathered from his testimony in court, in which he never even claimed
that a burden or charge had been imposed by his grandmother.

The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney
executed by Catalina Reyes in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to
execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her obligations. Nothing in the records
shows that such acts were meant to be a burden in the donation.

87
 QUILALA VS. ALACANTARA
(G.R. 132681, December 3, 2001)
Facts:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a “Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos” in favor of Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila.
The document consists of two pages. The first contains the deed of donation itself
and sig signed by Catalina on the bottom portion as donor, Violeta as Donee, and
two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgement made
before the Notary Public stating that Catalina personally appeared before the notary
public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed.
On the left hand margin of the second page, the signatures of Catalina and one of the
witness can be seen, and on the right hand, the signatures of Violeta and the other
witness.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May
22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta
Quilala. Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes
and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate,
dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property. They filed
an action for declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos for the reason that the
document was acknowledged before the notary only by Catalina rather than both
Catalina and Violeta. Therefore, this fails to convert the document into a public
instrument and shall therefore be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether or not both the donor and the donee should appear before a notary public
and/or affix their signatures on the Acknowledgement as a requirement in a donation
inter vivos.
Ruling:
No, they need not. According to the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must
be made in a public instrument in order to be valid, specifying therein the property
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. In the case at bar,
only Catalina’s signature was affixed in the Acknowledgement, which led the trial
court to believe that such fails to convert the document into a public instrument. The
Supreme Court disagreed, stating that “the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee
before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The

88
instrument should be treated in its entirety.” Catalina’s appearance before a notary
public and her signature on the page is sufficient proof of the conversion of the
donation into a public instrument. Therefore, the donation inter vivos is valid.

89
 HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF TALAYAN VILLAGE INC., vs
J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. (G.R. No. 203883, November 10, 2015)

FACTS: J.M Tuason owns Block 494 in Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision in Quezon
City. On 1962, the Quezon City Council passed an ordinance, directing all
subdivision owners to turn over to the city government the open spaces in city
subdivisions. A deed of Donation and Acceptance was executed but no record or
document exists to show that the donation was, indeed, accepted.

The subject property was developed at the expense of Homeowners Association of

Talayan Village, Inc. and the Quezon City government. J.M. Tuason then sold Block
494 to Talayan Holdings, Inc. which eventually obtained a loan from Equitable
Banking Corporation secured by real estate mortgage of Block 494. HATVI filed a
case for it had no knowledge of the delinquency sale and that its members purchased
their respective home lots on the belief that Block 494 was an open space for
use. J.M. Tuason and THI contended that the donation was not accepted Block 494
remained a private property.

The RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, CA modified RTC's decision and
ruled that J.M. Tuason and THI were in bad faith for allowing the amenities to be
built on Block 494 .

ISSUE: Whether or not the land was validly donated to the local government of
Quezon City.

RULING: No, The Deed of Donation is not validly donated.

J.M., Tuason’s donation did not operate to divest the property of its private character.
The donation was not embodied in a public document as provided under Article
749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the record is entirely bereft of showing that
said donation was duly accepted in accordance with Article 745 of the same Code.
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that
such acceptance is duly communicated to the donor. Since the donation is considered
perfected only upon the moment the donor is apprised of such acceptance, it has
been ruled that lack of such acceptance, as expressly provided under the law, renders
the donation null and void.

Therefore, the Deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance by the done and for
not having been made in a public instrument.

90
 C-J YULO & SONS, INC. vs ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SAN
PABLO, INC.
(GR No. 133705, March 31, 2005)
FACTS: C-J Yulo & Sons, Inc. donated unto the Roman Catholic Bishop of San
Pablo, Inc. a parcel of land at Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. The deed of donation
which also bears the acceptance of the donee stated such conditions that it shall be
used for the construction of a home for the aged and infirm and for other charitable
purposes and cannot be used for any other purposes without the consent of the
former. Thereafter, the donee, for purposes of generating funds to build the perimeter
fence on the donated property and the construction of a building (“Casa dela
Merced”) for the aged and the infirm, leased a portion of the donated property to
one Martin Gomez who planted said portion with sugar cane. There is no dispute
that the lease agreement was entered into by the donee without the prior written
consent of the donor, as required in the deed of donation. The lease to Gomez ended
in 1985. The donee leased the portion of the donated property again to 2 more
persons consecutively, who used it as a ranch and as area for fattening cattles, to
generate funds for Casa dela Merced. They leased it again without securing a prior
written consent to the donor.
Hence, pursuant to a board resolution, the donor, through its president Miguel
A. Yulo, addressed a letter to the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the
donation in accordance with Section 5 of the deed due to the donee’s non-compliance
with and material breach of the conditions stipulated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the revocation of donation is proper.
RULING: NO. The court identified that the donation was an onerous one, which
imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, the kind of
donation made for a valuable consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more
than the thing donated, therefore, the CA correctly applied the law on contracts
instead of the law on donations, saddled as it is by a burden imposed upon the donee
to put up and operate a home for the aged and the infirm. The general rule is that
rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only
for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the
parties in making the agreement. The 3 lease contracts entered into by the donee
were for the sole purpose of pursuing the objective for which the donation was
intended. Hence, considering that the donee’s acts did not detract from the very
purpose for which the donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a
lack of prior written consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the
deed, which will not warrant the revocation of the donation.

91
 SECRETARY OF EDUCATION and DR. BENITO TUMAMAO VS HEIRS
OF RUFINO DULAY, SR, represented by IGNACIA VICENTE
(G.R. No. 164748, January 27, 2006)
FACTS:
The spouses Dulay (Rufino and Ignacia) were the owners of a parcel of a 29,002
sqm. land in Rizal, Isabela covered by an Original Certificate of Title. On 1981, the
spouses executed a deed of donation of the 10,000 sqm. portion of the property to
the Ministry of Education and Culture (now, DECS), intended for school purposes.
Later on, the property was subdivided and a Transfer Certificate Title was issued in
the name of the Ministry represented by the Superintendent of Schools in Isabela.
However, the property was not used for school purposes and remained idle. In 1988,
the DECS started construction of the Rizal National High School on a parcel of land
2 kilometers away from the land donated by the spouses.
Due to this, the spouses requested that the property be returned to them since it was
never used since 1981, or for more than 13 years. Subsequently, they filed a
complaint for the revocation of the deed and cancellation of the TCT.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the Department of Education through the Rizal National High School
complied with the condition imposed in the deed of donation
2. Whether the donation could be revoked
RULING
1. The Secretary of Education failed to prove that the donated property was used for
school purposes, which was indicated in the deed of donation. There was nothing
except the bare allegations which could concretely prove that the resolutory
condition has been complied with.
2. YES. It must be stressed that this donation is an onerous one, burdening DECS to
utilize the land for the intended purposes. Art. 733 of the Civil Code provides that a
donation with an onerous cause is essentially and contract and is governed by its
rules. The petitioners surmise that the action of cancellation of the TCT already
prescribed and thus, the donation cannot be revoked. However, since the deed is a
written contract, it is governed by Art. 1144 providing the prescriptive period for an
action arising from a written contract (10 years) accruing from the expiration of the
time within the done must comply with the obligations.
Since there was no time fixed in the contract, then Art. 1197 must govern. The court
deemed that from the nature and circumstances of the donation, it can be inferred
that a period was contemplated by the donors; they could not have contemplated that
the property remain idle for a long period of time. The donors specifically obliged
DECS to utilize the property for school purposes. Thus, the claim for the cancellation
of TCT is not barred by prescription and thus the donation could be revoked by the
donors.

92
 JOSEPH DORMAN D. TAMAYO, LAUREANA D. TAMAYO and
LINAFLOR D. TAMAYO, Petitioners,

vs.

JOSE D. TAMAYO, JR., FLORITS TAMAYO-MAGNO, LUZMINDA

TAMAYO-ANTHONY and FORTUNA TAMAYO-ENRIQUEZ, Respondent.

(G.R. No. 148482 August 12, 2005)

Facts: Petitioners and respondents are half-blood siblings. Their mother is Dorothela
Dayanghirang-Tamayo. Respondents are Dorothela’s legitimate children with Dr.
Jose Tamayo, Sr. while petitioners, are her illegitimate children with Jose Matuco.
Dorothela eventually separated from Jose Matuco. Respondents took care of
Dorothela and petitioners. Respondents sent petitioners to school and even caused
the issuance of their birth certificates, allowing them to use the surname Tamayo.
Spouses Tamayo executed, in favor of respondents, a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos
of their two parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title. These titles
were cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificates of Title were issued in their
names. Dr. Jose Tamayo, Sr. died. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the Regional
Trial Court a complaint for the revocation of the said donation, alleging they were
preterited from the estate of Dr. Tamayo and that respondents fraudulently caused
the execution of the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos.

Issue: Whether or not the donation may be revoked by petitioners.

Ruling: No. The period for revocation has already lapsed. The law provides that the
right to bring the case of revocation or reduction of an inofficious donation must be
brought within five (5) years from the donor’s death, in this case, Dr. Jose Tamayo,
Sr., who died in October 1990. This case was filed in June 1996 way beyond the
five-year period. Therefore, the action for revocation on the ground of fraud had
prescribed.

93
 Santos vs. Alana

G.R. No. 154942, August 16, 2005

Facts: Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos-Alana, respondent, are half-
blood siblings both asserting their claim over a 39-square meter lot located at 1339-B
Andalucia St., Sta. Cruz, Manila. It was registered in the name of their father, Gregorio
Santos, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14278 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila. He died intestate on March 10, 1986. During his lifetime, or on January 16, 1978,
Gregorio donated the lot to petitioner which the latter accepted on June 30, 1981. The deed
of donation ("Pagsasalin ng Karapatan at Pag-aari") was annotated on Gregorio’s title. On
April 8, 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to petitioner as per a Deed of Absolute Sale. On June
26, 1981, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, TCT No. 14278 in Gregorio’s name
was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 144706 was issued by the Registry of Deeds of
Manila in petitioner’s name. On January 11, 1991, respondent Constancia Santos filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 15, a complaint for partition and reconveyance
against petitioner. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father Gregorio denied having
sold the lot to petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is
inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime. Petitioner then countered that respondent’s
suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware that he has been in possession
of the lot as owner for more than ten years; and that the lot was sold to him by his father,
hence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent.
CA affirmed with the RTC even saying that the Deed of Absolute Sale is void. Hence the
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the donation is inofficious

Ruling: No person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may five or
receive at will. The donation is inofficious if it exceeds this limitation. At the time of
Gregorio’s death, he left no property other than the lot now in controversy he donated to
petitioner; and that the deceased made no reservation for the legitime of respondent, his
daughter and compulsory heir. Clearly, by donating the entire lot to petitioner, The
Supreme Court agree with both lower courts that Gregorio’s donation is inofficious as it
deprives respondent of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists
of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of
both parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half
(1/2) thereof. PETITION IS DENIED.

94
 ARCABA v. TABANCURA (G.R. 146683, November 22, 2001)
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana owned a lot in Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte. After Zosima died, Francisco asked his niece Leticia,
the latter’s cousin, Luzviminda, and Cirila Arcaba, the petitioner, who at this time
was a widow, to take care of his house and the store inside. After Leticia and
Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.
Before Francisco’s death, he executed a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos to Cirila
where he gave her a part of the above-mentioned lot. Cirila accepted the donation
and had the land registered in her name.
The relationship between Francisco and Cirila became the object of this case.
According to the Family Code (Art. 87), persons “living together as husbands and
wives without a valid marriage” are also banned from giving donations to each other.
According to Arcaba, she was only a mere helper. The respondents, however, claim
that she was Francisco’s common-law wife because Cirila had been using
Francisco’s surname in various documents and she wasn’t receiving a regular salary.
The respondents file for a “declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter
vivos, recovery of possession and damages” on the basis of the above-mentioned
grounds. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. The Court of Appeals upheld
the ruling of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not a donation can be revoked based on the prohibition of
Article 87 of the Family Code
RULING: Yes, a donation can be revoked if found against the provisions of Article
87 of the Family Code.
1. Cohabitation is a public assumption that two people are living together as
husbands and wife in the absence of a valid marriage. It is proven based on
the conduct of the couple. Are they living as if they are married?
2. Cirila’s use of Francisco’s surname in public documents and the fact that she
did not demand a regular salary from Francisco are enough proof to show
that they are indeed common-law sposes.
3. Because the evidence shows that Francisco and Cirila had lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the provisions of Article 87 of
the Family Code applies to them. Thus, Francisco cannot donate the piece of
land to Cirila.
4. The donation was revoked.

95
 Calanasan vs. Dolorito
(G.R. No. 171937 November 25, 2013)
Facts:
The petitioner, Cerila J. Calanasan took care of her orphan niece, respondent
Evelyn C. Dolorito, since the latter was a child. In 1982, when Evelyn was already
married to respondent Virgilio Dolorito, the petitioner donated to Evelyn a parcel of
land which had earlier been mortgaged for Pl5,000.00. The donation was
conditional: Evelyn must redeem the land and the petitioner was entitled to possess
and enjoy the property as long as she lived. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the
donation and its terms in the same deed. Soon thereafter, Evelyn redeemed the
property, had the title of the land transferred to her name, and granted the petitioner
usufructuary rights over the donated land. On August 15, 2002, the petitioner,
assisted by her sister Teodora, complained with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that
Evelyn had committed acts of ingratitude against her. She prayed that her donation
in favor of her niece be revoked; in their answer, the respondents denied the
commission of any act of ingratitude. The petitioner died while the case was pending
with the RTC. Her sisters, Teodora and Dolores substituted for her.

Issue: Whether Evelyn committed ungrateful acts causing for the revocation of the
donation.

Ruling:
Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous
cause are governed not by the law on donations but by the rules on contracts. Insofar
as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a
donation exists, and the legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite
the applicability of the provisions on donation to the gratuitous portion, the petitioner
may not dissolve the donation. She has no factual and legal basis for its revocation,
as aptly established by the RTC. First, the ungrateful acts were committed not by the
donee; it was her husband who committed them. Second, the ungrateful acts were
perpetrated not against the donor; it was the petitioner's sister who received the
alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place the case out of the purview
of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.

96