[ G.R. No.

409, January 30, 1947 ]

ANASTACIO LAUREL, PETITIONER, VS. ERIBERTO MISA, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

"In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on
the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory
that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason
defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason (1)
that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon
the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

"(1) Considering that a citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but
an absolute and permanent allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity
and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and
permanent allegiance should not be confused with the qualified and temporary
allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he
receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or
sovereign. (Carlisle vs. United States, 21 Law. ed., 429; Secretary of State Webster
Report to the President of the United States in the case of Thraser, 6 Web. Works,
526);

"Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a

territory occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the
government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, as we
have held in the cases of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil.,
113) and of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (75 Phil., 285), and if it is not transferred
to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government;
that the sovereignty vested in the titular government (which is the supreme power
which governs a body politic or society which constitute the state) must be
distinguished from the exercise of the rights inherent thereto, and may be
destroyed, or severed and transferred to another, but it cannot be suspended
because the existence of sovereignty cannot be suspended without putting it out of
existence or divesting the possessor thereof at least during the so-called period of
suspension; that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by the
enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that the subsistence of the sovereignty
of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the military forces of the
enemy during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from exercising the
supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our times'; (II
Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpacht ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary
implication, in articles 23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a
corollary of the conclusion that the sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists
during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of the inhabitants to their legitimate
government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no such thing as
suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the petitioner's
contention rests;

"Considering that the conclusion that the sovereignty of the United States was
suspended in Castine, set forth in the decision in the case of United States vs. Rice,
4 Wheaton, 246, 253, decided in 1819, and quoted in our decision in the cases of
Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon and Peralta vs. Director of
Prisons, supra, in connection with the question, not of sovereignty, but of the
existence of a government de facto therein and its power to promulgate rules and
laws in the occupied territory, must have been based, either on the theory adopted
subsequently in the Hague Convention of 1907, that the military occupation of an
enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty, or on the old theory that such
occupation transfers the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the
word 'sovereignty' used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the
rights of sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government
and is not transferred to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out
of existence or divesting said government thereof; and that in the second case, that
is, if the said conclusion or doctrine, refers to the suspension of the sovereignty
itself, it has become obsolete after the adoption of the Hague Regulations in 1907,
and therefore it can not be applied to the present case;

"Considering that even adopting the words 'temporary allegiance,' repudiated by

Oppenheim and other publicists, as descriptive of the relations borne by the
inhabitants of the territory occupied by the enemy toward the military government
established over them, such allegiance may, at most, be considered similar to the
temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the
territory wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives as above
described, and does not do away with the absolute and permanent allegiance which
the citizen residing in a foreign country owes to his own government or sovereign;
that just as a citizen or subject of a government or sovereign may be prosecuted
for and convicted of treason committed in a foreign country, in the same way an
inhabitant of a territory occupied by the military forces of the enemy may commit
treason against his own legitimate government or sovereign if he adheres to the
enemies of the latter by giving them aid and comfort; and that if the allegiance of a
citizen or subject to his government or sovereign is nothing more than obedience to
its laws in return for the protection he receives, it would necessarily follow that a
citizen who resides in a foreign country or state would, on one hand, ipso
facto acquire the citizenship thereof since he has to obey, with certain exceptions,
the laws of that country which enforce public order and regulate the social and
commercial life, in return for the protection he receives, and would, on the other
hand, lose his original citizenship, because he would not be bound to obey most of
the laws of his own government or sovereign, and would not receive, while in a
foreign country, the protection he is entitled to in his own;
"Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty by the legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy
military forces, because the authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed
into the hands of the occupant (Article 43, Hague Regulations), the political laws
which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and obligation of government and
citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation (Co Kim Cham vs.
Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively bear
relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable
to the government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national
security, such as treason and espionage, inciting to war, correspondence with
hostile country, flight to enemy's country, as well as those against public order,
such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms, which are
of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are penalized by our
Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also
suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not
be committed against the latter (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra); and that,
while the offenses against public order to be preserved by the legitimate
government were inapplicable as offenses against the invader for the reason above
stated, unless adopted by him, were also inoperative as against the ousted
government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the public
order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was
applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate
government, because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by
their allegiance to the latter during" the enemy occupation;

"Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue

in force, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce
public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has,
nevertheless, all the powers of a de facto government and may, at his pleasure,
either change the existing laws or make new ones when the exigencies of the
military service demand such action, that is, when it is necessary for the occupier
to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his army, subject to the
restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations, the usages
established by civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of
public conscience (Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, supra; 1940 United States Rules
of Land Warfare 76, 77); and that, consequently, all acts of the military occupant
dictated within these limitations are obligatory upon the inhabitants of the territory,
who are bound to obey them, and the laws of the legitimate government which
have not been adopted, as well and those which, though continued in force, are in
conflict with such laws and orders of the occupier, shall be considered as suspended
or not in force and binding upon said inhabitants;

"Considering that, since the preservation of the allegiance or the obligation of

fidelity and obedience of a citizen or subject to his government or sovereign does
not demand from him a positive action, but only passive attitude or forbearance
from adhering to the enemy by giving the latter aid and comfort, the occupant has
no power, as a corollary of the preceding consideration, to repeal or suspend the
operation of the law of treason, essential for the preservation of the allegiance
owed by the inhabitants to their legitimate government, or compel them to adhere
and give aid and comfort to him; because it is evident that such action is not
demanded by the exigencies of the military service or not necessary for the control
of the inhabitants and the safety and protection of his army, and because it is
tantamount to practically transfer temporarily to the occupant their allegiance to
the titular government or sovereign; and that, therefore, if an inhabitant of the
occupied territory were compelled illegally by the military occupant, through force,
threat or intimidation, to give him aid and comfort, the former may lawfully resist
and die if necessary as a hero, or submit thereto without becoming a traitor;

"Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended allegiance would

lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and would be
repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience, for it
would allow invaders to legally recruit or enlist the Quisling inhabitants of the
occupied territory to fight against their own government without the latter incurring
the risk of being prosecuted for treason, and even compel those who are not to aid
them in their military operation against the resisting enemy forces in order to
completely subdue and conquer the whole nation, and thus deprive them all of their
own independence or sovereignty—such theory would sanction the action of
invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign country to be a party in the
nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and independence and
repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to
commit a political suicide;

"(2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of the
Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, though originally
intended to be a crime against said government as then organized by authority of
the sovereign people of the United States, exercised through their authorized
representative, the Congress and the President of the United States, was made,
upon the establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935, a crime against
the Government of the Philippines established by authority of the people of the
Philippines, in whom the sovereignty resides according to section 1, Article II, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, by virtue of the provision of section 2, Article
XVI thereof, which provides that 'All laws of the Philippine Islands * * * shall
remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution * * * and all references
in such laws to the Government or officials of the Philippine Islands, shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the Government and corresponding
officials under this Constitution;'

"Considering that the Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign

government, though not absolute but subject to certain limitations imposed in the
Independence Act and incorporated as Ordinance appended to our Constitution,
was recognized not only by the Legislative Department or Congress of the United
States in approving the Independence Law above quoted and the Constitution of
the Philippines, which contains the declaration that 'Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them' (section 1, Article II),
but also by the Executive Department of the United States; that the late President
Roosevelt in one of his messages to Congress said, among others, 'As I stated on
August 12, 1943, the United States in practice regards the Philippines as having
now the status as a government of other independent nations—in fact all the
attributes of complete and respected nationhood' (Congressional Record, Vol. 29,
part 6, page 8173); and that it is a principle upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States in many cases, among them in the case of Jones vs. United States
(137 U. S., 202; 34 Law. ed., 691, 696) that the question of sovereignty is 'a
purely political question, the determination of which by the legislative and executive
departments of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all ofher
officers, citizens and subjects of the country.'

"Considering that section I (1) of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution which
provides that pending the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the
United States 'All citizens of the Philippines shall owe allegiance to the United
States', was one of the few limitations of the sovereignty of the Filipino people
retained by the United States, but these limitations do not do away or are not
inconsistent with said sovereignty, in the same way that the people of each State of
the Union preserves its own sovereignty although limited by that of the United
States conferred upon the latter by the States; that just as to reason may be
committed against the Federal as well as against the State Government, in the
same way treason may have been committed during the Japanese occupation
against the sovereignty of the United States as well as against the sovereignty of
the Philippine Commonwealth; and that the change of our form of government from
Commonwealth to Republic does not affect the prosecution of those charged with
the crime of treason committed during the Commonwealth, because it is an offense
against the same government and the same sovereign people, for Article XVIII of
our Constitution provides that 'The government established by this Constitution
shall be known as the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation
of Philippine independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth
be known as the Republic of the Philippines';

"This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more extended opinion,
to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above set
forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring
opinion therein, if any. Messrs. Justices Paras and Hontiveros dissent in a separate
opinion. Mr. Justice Perfecto concurs in a separate opinion."

[ G.R. No. 1582, March 28, 1904 ]

THE UNITED STATES, COMPLAINANT AND APPELLEE, VS. DALMACIO

LAGNASON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

WILLARD, J.:
The defendant was charged under section 1 of Act No. 292 with the crime of
treason, was convicted and sentenced to death. The following facts appeared from
the evidence. From the time of the occupation of the Province of Occidental Negros
by the American troops, there had existed therein a band of men in arms against
the Government of the United States, which band was led by the defendant and
which in October was campaigning through the northern part of the province. In the
southern part was another similar band led by Dionisio Papa. These two parties,
though in communication with each other, had formerly operated independently,
but in the month of September, 1902, the defendant had placed himself and his
forces under the orders of said Dionisio Papa. His band was constantly armed and
kept together, and its object was to establish an independent government.

On October 29,1902, the defendant with this band made an attack upon the pueblo
of Murcia in said province, but was driven off by the force of Constabulary there
stationed. During that night two inspectors of the Constabulary arrived with
additional fortes and early in the morning they left the pueblo in search of the
defendant. He was encountered with his party about three kilometers from the
pueblo and was attacked by the Constabulary. The fight lasted an hour and a half.
The defendant was captured in the battle and about twenty of his men were killed.
On the side of the Constabulary were killed two policemen of the vicinity who were
acting as guides. The defendant's band consisted of between seventy and eighty
men. They had for arms five or ten rifles, bolos, daggers, and one small cannon.
The defendant when captured was armed with a rifle, a revolver, and a bolo. Most
of his men wore black shirts, white pantaloons, and black caps. They
carried no banners, but did carry two large wooden crosses which were captured,
together with the cannon.

Article 3, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States provides as follows :

"Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them,
or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act
or on confession in open court."

The act of Congress of April 30, 1790 (1 Stat L., 112), contained the following
provision:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That if any person or persons, owing allegiance to
the United States of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their
enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, and
shall be thereof convicted, on confession in open court, or on the testimony of two
witnesses to the same overt act of the treason whereof he or they shall stand
indicted, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason against the
United States, and shall suffer death."
The statute law of the United States stood in that form, so far as we are informed,
until the act of July 17, 1862 (12 Stat. L., 589), was passed. The first and second
sections of that act were as follows:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That every person who shall hereafter commit the
crime of treason against the United States, and shall be adjudged guilty thereof,
shall suffer death, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; or, at
the discretion of the court, he shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and
fined not less than ten thousand dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared
and made free; said fine shall be levied and collected on any or all of the property,
real and personal, excluding slaves, of which the said person so convicted was the
owner at the time of committing the said crime, any sale or conveyance to the
contrary notwithstanding.

"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on
foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the
United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall
engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection,
and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding ten years, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars,
and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said
punishments, at the discretion of the court."

In the Revised Statutes of the United States these provisions appear in sections
5331, 5332, and 5334, which are as follows:

"Sec. 5331. Every person owing allegiance to the United States, who levies war
against them, or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the
United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason.

"Sec. 5332. Every person guilty of treason shall suffer death; or, at the discretion
of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than five years and fined
not less than ten thousand dollars, to be levied on and collected out of any or all of
his property, real and personal, of which he was the owner at the time of
committing such treason, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding;
and every person so convicted of treason shall, moreover, be incapable of holding
any office under the United States.

"Sec. 5334. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws
thereof, or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall, be punished by imprisonment for not
more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars, or by both
of such punishments; and shall, moreover, be incapable of holding any office under
the United States."

Sections 1 and 3 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission are as follows :
"Section 1. Every person, resident in. the Philippine Islands, owing allegiance to the
United States, or the Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war against
them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the Philippine
Islands or elsewhere, is guilty of treason, and, upon conviction, shall suffer death
or, at the discretion of the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than
five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars."

"Sec. 3. Every person who incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion
or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or of the Government of
the Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof, or who gives aid or comfort to anyone so
engaging in such rebellion or insurrection, shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for
not more than ten years and be fined not more than ten thousand dollars."

The Spanish Penal Code defines and punishes the crimes of treason, rebellion, and
sedition. Article 236 of that code, relating to sedition, appears as section 5 of
Act No. 292, but that act, as to treason and rebellion, is practically a reproduction
of the sections quoted from the Revised Statutes.

Prior to the act of July 17, 1862, and in the early history of the country, the
question as to what constituted a "levying of war" within the constitutional
definition of treason had been before the Federal courts on several different
occasions.

In ex parte Bollman (4 Cranch., 75) the Supreme Court of the United States quoted
the definitions of the phrase "levying war" which had been given by different judges
of the United States, and declared through the Chief Justice what the latter
afterwards said in Burr's case (25 Fed. Cases, 13), to wit:

"That part of his deposition which bears upon this charge is the plan disclosed by
the prisoner for seizing upon New Orleans and revolutionizing the Western States.
That this plan if consummated by overt acts would amount to treason no man will
controvert."

Whatever differences there may have been among the early judges as to whether
an armed resistance to the enforcement of a public law (see Act No. 292, sec. 5,1)
constituted a levying of war or not, and was or was not treason, yet they were all
unanimous in holding that acts of violence committed by an armed body of men
with the purpose of overthrowing the Government was "levying war against the
United States," and was therefore treason, whether it was done by ten men or ten
thousand. (See United States vs. Hanway, 2 Wall., jr., 139; 26 Fed. Cases, 105.)

No distinction was anywhere made between a foreign enemy and a rebel or

insurgent so far as the act of "levying war" is concerned. All of the cases tried
before the United States courts have grown out of insurrection. The case of Mitchell
grew out of the "whisky rebellion" in western Pennsylvania; the case of Fries, out of
the North-ampton Rebellion; the case of Bollman out of Burr's attempts; the case of
Hanway out of resistance to the fugitive slave law; and the case of Greathouse out
of the civil war. Such a distinction has, however, been made under the second
clause of the Constitutional provision, namely, giving aid or comfort to an enemy. It
has been said that the word "enemy" means there a foreign enemy and does not
include a rebel.

If it were not for the provisions of the second section of the act of July 17, 1862,
now section 5334 of the Revised Statutes, and section 3 of Act No. 292 of the
Commission, the case at bar would present no difficulty. The defendant would be
clearly guilty of treason and punishable under the first section of Act No. 292. He
was engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government and was captured after
an armed contest. It matters not how vain and futile his attempt was and how
impossible of accomplishment. The acts performed by him constituted a levying of
war.

Revised Statutes, section 5332, declares that treason shall be punished by death,
or imprisonment for not less than five years. Section 5334 declares that one
engaging in a rebellion or insurrection against the United States shall be punished
by imprisonment for not more than ten years. As the act of engaging in a rebellion
is levying war, and therefore treason, the same act seems to be punished by both
sections and in different ways.

This apparent inconsistency was pointed out in the case of United States vs.
Greathouse (4 Sawy., 457 S. C; 26 Fed. Cases, 18) by Mr. Justice Field while sitting
in the circuit court The defendants in that case were indicted under the second
section of the act of July 17, 1862 (now Revised Statutes, sec. 5334 and Act No.
292, sec. 3), for fitting out in the harbor of San Francisco a privateer to aid the
then existing rebellion. Justice Field there said, in charging the jury:

"But we are unable to conceive of any act designated in the second section which
would not constitute treason, except perhaps as suggested by my associate, that of
inciting to a rebellion. If we lay aside the discussion in the Senate, and read the
several sections of the act together, the apparent inconsistency disappears. Looking
at the act alone, we conclude that Congress intended (1) to preserve the act of
1790, which prescribes the penalty of death, in force for the prosecution and
punishment of offenses committed previous to July 17,1862, unless the parties
accused are convicted under the act of the latter date for subsequent offenses; (2)
to punish treason thereafter committed with death, or fine "and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court, unless the treason consist in engaging in or assisting a
rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws
thereof, in which event the death penalty is to be abandoned and a less penalty
inflicted. By this construction the apparent inconsistency in the provisions of the
different sections is avoided and-effect given to each clause of the act. The
defendants are, therefore, in fact, on trial for treason, and they have had all the
protection and privileges allowed to parties accused of treason, without being liable,
in case of conviction, to the penalty which all other civilized nations have awarded
to this, the highest of crimes known to the law."

Judge Hoffman, who sat with Justice Field, also said:

"If, then, every species of aid and comfort given to the present rebellion constitutes
a levying of war, it follows that in the two sections of the act referred to, Congress
has denounced the same crime; and that a party amenable to the second section
for having 'engaged in the rebellion and given it aid and comfort,' must also be
guilty of treason by levying war against the United States.

"As, then, the offenses described are substantially the same, though a different
penalty is attached to their commission by the sections referred to, it was held by
the court, under the first indictment, which was in terms for treason, that the
smaller penalty could alone be inflicted, that the prisoners could not be capitally
punished, and could therefore be admitted to bail. On the same grounds it was
considered that under the present indictment, which pursues the language of the
second section, the offense charged was treason; that both the offense as
described and the overt acts charged amounted to that crime, and that the accused
were entitled to all the privileges secured by the Constitution or allowed by law to
parties on trial for treason; and, this notwithstanding, that in consequence of the
legislation referred to, the penalty for treason could not be inflicted. In determining,
therefore, whether the defendants can be convicted under this indictment, it will be
proper to consider whether their acts constitute in law 'a levying of war,' for 'an
engaging in a rebellion and giving it aid and comfort' amounts to a levying of war;
while at the same time we may also inquire whether their acts are such as would, if
done with regard to a public enemy, constitute an adherence to him, ' giving him
aid and comfort.' "

As said by Justice Grier, in Hanway's case, " treason against the United States is
defined by the Constitution itself. Congress has no power to enlarge, restrain,
construe, or define the offense. Its construction is entrusted to the court alone."

Notwithstanding the fact that Congress does have the power to fix the penalty for
this crime and the construction placed upon the act of July 17, 1862, in the case of
Greathouse was that under both sections the offense was treason, but when the
treason consisted of engaging in an insurrection or rebellion, it could be punished
only by imprisonment for not more than ten years, in other cases it could be
punished under section 1 by death, or imprisonment for not less than five years.

That the Commission when it used the phrase " levies war," in the first section of
Act No. 292, intended to give to it the meaning which it then had in the United
States, can not be doubted.

In Burr's case, Chief Justice Marshall used the following language in speaking of the
phrase " levying war:".

"But the term is not for the first time applied to treason by the Constitution of the
United States. It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country
whose language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of our laws.
It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our
Constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we
borrowed it."
In United States vs. Greathouse, Justice Field, speaking of the same phrase, said:

"At the time the Constitution was framed, the language incorporated into it from
the English statute had received judicial construction and acquired a definite
meaning, and that meaning has been generally adopted by the courts of the United
States."

No one can believe that the Commission intended to abandon the well-recognized
meaning which the phrase then had and give to it a meaning entirely different. If
that had been their intension they would certainly have used other language, so
that their intent not to adopt the recognized meaning would have been manifest.

That the acts committed by the defendant constituted a "levying of war" as that
phrase was understood at the time the act of the Commission was passed, can not
be doubted. Neither can it be doubted that these same acts constituted a "rebellion
or insurrection'y within the meaning of the third section of Act No. 292. The two
sections can only be reconciled in the manner employed in the case against
Greathouse, and that decision should be followed.

However, in respect to the penalty, it makes no difference whether the offense

called rebellion in section 3 of Act No. 292 is considered an offense different from
that of treason denned in section 1, or whether the decision in the case of
Greathouse be followed and the acts punished by section 3 considered as of the
same character as those punished by section 1. In either case the punishment
cannot exceed ten years' imprisonment and a fine.

There would be a difference in respect to evidence to prove the two crimes. If

rebellion and insurrection are treason, a defendant can not be convicted under
section 3 except on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act or by
confession in open court. (Act of Congress, March 8, 1902, sec. 9.) If they are not
treason he could be convicted upon the testimony required in ordinary case's. In
United States vs. Greathouse the court held that the constitutional provision as to
two witnesses applied to prosecutions under the second section of the act of 1862
(our sec. 3). It is not necessary, however, to decide that question in this case, as
the overt act of the defendant was proved by two witnesses; neither is it necessary
to decide whether the omission in section 3 of the phrase " owing allegiance to the
United States," which is found in section 1 taken in connection with section 17 of
the act, makes a difference between the two sections in respect to the persons who
may be covered by them. In the case at bar the defendant was a native of Cebu
and is therefore covered both by section 1 and section 3.

This court has decided two cases in which treason was charged. In the case of
United States vs. Antonio de los Reyes, February 23, 1904,[1] the defendant was
acquitted because no overt act of treason was proved. In the case of United
States vs. Magtibay (1 Off. Gaz., 932[1]) the defendant was acquitted because there
were not two witnesses to the same overt act.
The judgment is affirmed with a change of the penalty, however, from death to ten
years and a fine of $10,000, money of the United States, with the costs of this
instance against the defendant.
 [ G.R. No. L-477, June 30, 1947 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.

APOLINAR ADRIANO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by the People's Court
sentencing the accused to life imprisonment, P10,000 fine, and the costs.

The information charged:

"That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the occupation of the
Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces, in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in
the mountains in the Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused, Apolinar Adriano, who is not a foreigner, but a
Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, in violation of said allegiance, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
criminally and treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the Philippines,
against which the Philippines and the United States were then at war, giving the
said enemy aid and comfort in the manner as follows:

"That as a member of the Makapili, a military organization established and designed

to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines in the
said enemy's war efforts and operations against the United States and the
Philippines, the herein accused bore arm and joined and assisted the Japanese
Military Forces and the Makapili Army in armed conflicts and engagements against
the United States armed forces and the Guerrillas of the Philippine Commonwealth
in the Municipalities of San Leonardo and Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija, and in
the mountains of Luzon, Philippines, sometime between January and April, 1945.
Contrary to Law."

The prosecution did not introduce any evidence to substantiate any of the facts
alleged except that of defendant's having joined the Makapili organization. What the
People's Court found is that the accused participated with Japanese soldiers in
certain raids and in confiscation of personal property. The court below, however,
said these acts had not been established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so
regarded them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy. But the court did
find established under the two-witness rule, so we infer, "that the accused and
other Makapilis had their headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva
Ecija; that the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was armed with
rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under a Japanese instructor; * * *
that during the same period, the accused in Makapili military uniform and with a
rifle, performed duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili
headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation of Gapan, Nueva
Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and other Makapilis retreated to the
mountains with the enemy;" and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered
to the Americans."

Even the findings of the court recited above in quotations are not borne out by the
proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses testified to a single one
of the various acts of treason imputed by them to the appellant. Those who gave
evidence that the accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and
performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts allegedly committed on
different dates without any two witnesses coinciding in any one specific deed. There
is only one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant was a
Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform carrying arms. Yet, again, on
this point it cannot be said that one witness is corroborated by another if
corroboration means that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one
particular thing, be it a routine military chore, or just walking or eating.

We take it that the mere fact of having joined a Makapili organization is evidence of
both adherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. Unless forced upon
one against his will, membership in the Makapili organization imports treasonable
intent, considering the purposes for which the organization was created, which,
according to the evidence, were "to accomplish the fulfillment of the obligations
assumed by the Philippines, in the Pact of Alliance with the Empire of Japan;" "to
shed blood and sacrifice the lives of our people in order to eradicate Anglo-Saxon
influence in East Asia;" "to collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the
Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in the Philippines;" and "to fight the common
enemies." Adherence, unlike overt acts, need not be proved by the oaths of two
witnesses. Criminal intent and knowledge may be gathered from the testimony of
one witness, or from the nature of the act itself, or from the circumstances
surrounding the act. (Cramer vs. U. S., 65 Sup. Ct., 918.)

At the same time, being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an overt act. It is not
necessary, except for the purpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendant
actually went to battle or committed nefarious acts against his country or
countrymen. The crime of treason was committed if he placed himself at the
enemy's call to fight side by side with him when the opportune time came even
though an opportunity never presented itself. Such membership by its very nature
gave the enemy aid and comfort. The enemy derived psychological comfort in the
knowledge that he had on his side nationals of the country with which his was at
war. It furnished the enemy aid in that his cause was advanced, his forces
augmented, and his courage was enhanced by the knowledge that he could count
on men such as the accused and his kind who were ready to strike at their own
people. The practical effect of it was no different from that of enlisting in the
invader's army.

But membership as a Makapili, as an overt act, must be established by the

deposition of two witnesses. Does the evidence in the present ease meet this
statutory test? Is the two-witness requirement fulfilled by the testimony of one
witness who saw the appellant in Makapili uniform bearing a gun one day, another
witness another day, and so forth?

The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so we have to look for
guidance from American sources on its meaning and scope. Judicial interpretation
has been placed on the two-witness principle by American courts, and authoritative
text writers have commented on it. We cull from American materials the following
excerpts which appear to carry the stamp of authority.

Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 3, section 1396, p. 2282, says:

"In England the original Statute of Edward, although requiring both witnesses to be
to the same overt act, was held to mean that there might be one witness to an
overt act and another witness to another overt act of the same species of treason;
and, in one case it has been intimated that the same construction might apply in
this country. But, as Mr. Wigmore so succinctly observes: 'The opportunity of
detecting the falsity of the testimony, by sequestering the two witnesses and
exposing their variance in details, is wholly destroyed by permitting them to speak
to different acts.' The rule as adopted in this country by all the constitutional
provisions, both state and Federal, properly requires that two witnesses shall testify
to the same overt act. This also is now the rule in England."

More to the point is this statement from VII Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., section
2038, p. 271:

"Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole of the overt act; or, if it is
separable, there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act."

Learned Hand, J., in United States vs. Robinson (D. C. S. D., N. Y., 259 Fed., 685),
expressed the same idea: "It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to
the whole overt act. It may be possible to piece bits together of the overt act; but,
if so, each bit must have the support of two oaths; * * *." (Copied as footnote in
Wigmore on Evidence, ante.) And in the recent case of Cramer vs. United States
(65 Sup. Ct., 918), decided during the recent World War, the Federal Supreme
Court lays down this doctrine: "The very minimum function that an overt act must
perform in a treason prosecution is that it show sufficient action by the accused, in
its setting, to sustain a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to
the enemy. Every act, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to
constitute treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses."

In the light of these decisions and opinions we have to set aside the judgment of
the trial court. To the possible objection that the reasoning by which we have
reached this conclusion savors of sophism, we have only to say that the authors of
the constitutional provision of which our treason law is a copy purposely made
conviction for treason difficult, the rule "severely restrictive." This provision is so
exacting and so uncompromising in regard to the amount of evidence that where
two or more witnesses give oaths to an overt act and only one of them is believed
by the court or jury, the defendant, it has been said and held, is entitled to
discharge, regardless of any moral conviction of the culprit's guilt as gauged and
tested by the ordinary and natural methods, with which we are familiar, of finding
the truth. Natural inferences, however strong or conclusive, flowing from the
testimony of a most trustworthy witness or from other sources are unavailing as a
substitute for the needed corroboration in the form of direct testimony of another
eye-witness to the same overt act.

The United States Supreme Court saw the obstacles placed in the path of the
prosecution by a literal interpretation of the rule of two witnesses but said that the
founders of the American government fully realized the difficulties and went ahead
not merely in spite but because of the objections. (Cramer vs. United States, ante.)
More, the rule, it is said, attracted the members of the Constitutional Convention
"as one of the few doctrines of Evidence entitled to be guaranteed against
legislative change." (Wigmore on Evidence, ante, section 2039, p. 272, citing
Madison's Journal of the Federal Convention, Scott's ed., II, 564, 566.) Mr. Justice
Jackson, who delivered the majority opinion in the celebrated Cramer case, said: "It
is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional
provision. Perhaps the framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony than
modern researchers in psychology warrant. Or it may be considered that such a
quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a crude
device at best or that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly the treason rule, whether wisely or
not, is severely restrictive." It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that " 'Treason may
sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult—as
in a traitorous correspondence with an enemy.' The provision was adopted not
merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of
them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most
venerated of that venerated group considered that 'prosecutions for treason were
generally virulent.' "

Such is the clear meaning of the two-witness provision of the American

Constitution. By extension, the law-makers who introduced that provision into the
Philippine statute books must be understood to have intended that the law should
operate with the same inflexibility and rigidity as the American forefathers meant.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs charged de oficio.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, and Padilla,
JJ., concur. Paras, J., concurs in the result.

[ G.R. No. L-778, October 10, 1947 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.

NEMESIO L. AGPANGAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERFECTO, J.:

Appellant stands accused of treason, committed between December, 1944, and

January, 1945, in the Province of Laguna, on only one count alleged in the
information as follows:

"That on or about December 20, 1944, the accused, a member of the Ganap, a
subversive pro-Japanese organization, joined the Pampars, a military organization
supporting the Imperial Japanese Army and designed to bear arms against the
army of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the
guerrillas in the Philippines; that he was equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle,
caliber 30, and was made to undergo 10 days training, consisting of military drill,
manual of arms, and target practice; and that from or about January 12, 1945 to
March 15, 1945, the said accused was assigned to guard duty once a week; that he
was armed with a rifle with orders to shoot any of the Filipino prisoners whom he
was guarding who might attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or American
soldier who might approach the Japanese garrison."

The lower court found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs.

Three witnesses testified for the prosecution.

Tomas C. Serrano, 46, farmer, resident of Siniloan, Second Lieutenant in the

Marking's guerrilla organization, testified that in December, 1944, he saw the
accused in the Japanese garrison in Siniloan, "he was a member of
the Makapili organization;" "he was doing guard duty, with a rifle, with a bayonet at
his side;" "he was at the entrance of the garrison and he made all civilians passing
through the entrance bow to him." If they did not bow, "he dragged them by the
arms and brought them to the captain of the garrison;" he served as guard "since
November, 1944, when the Japanese garrison was established in Siniloan, up to the
time I was arrested on March 25, 1945;" he saw the accused on guard duty in the
garrison "many times;" "I often saw him confiscating foodstuffs such as rice,
fruits, calabasa, and other vegetables, for the support of the Japanese soldiers;" "
he was with arms accompanied by Japanese soldiers and other members of the
Makapili;" "I often saw him accompanied by Japanese soldiers and
other Makapili members, arresting suspected guerrillas and sometimes they were
patrolling or camping in the hideouts of the guerrilla forces, I cannot tell how many
times, but I often saw him;" the witness was arrested on March 25, 1945, by
Japanese soldiers and Makapilis, with whom the accused was; "the next morning
we, the thirteen prisoners, were brought to the place where we were to be
executed; but luckily while we were on our way to the barrio, the American planes
came roaring, so the guards took cover;" "they were pulling the rope that tied us,
and luckily I was able to slip away because I was the second to the last man in the
line, and the rope was cut;" "I could not run fast because I was lame;" the rest
were executed, naming the following: "Alejandro Serrano, Custodio Adaro, Emilio
Javier, Peter Sardal, Elias Rodolfo, Ignacio Cavano, Beato Optis, Napoleon
Pagtakhan, Bienvenido Agapangan, and myself;" Miguel Palma "was in my back to
the last, so we two remained, and Pacifico (Adopina) remained untied" because he
was carrying food, and when the Japanese ran, "he escaped." Asked to explain how
he knew about the lot of those who were executed, the witness said that he went
home when the town was liberated, and he visited the place "because I know the
place," and when he reached the spot "I smelled very bad odor, and I recognized
the soil which swelled, so I said to myself that this is the place where our son was
buried;" "I went home and told the other parents of the victims" about the spot;
"the next month, about thirty days," the witness and the other parents requested
the municipal authorities to be allowed to exhume the bodies; when his son was
being taken to the place of execution. "I had not seen him that time;" the witness
based his knowledge as to appellant's being a Makapili on Exhibit A and he saw him
armed, guarding the Japanese garrison, confiscating foodstuffs for the Japanese,
and arresting guerrilla suspects in the town; Bienvenido Agapangan, one of those
who were executed by the Japanese, "was the son" of appellant; "I cannot tell you
whether he (appellant) was reporting to his officers any guerrilla;" Angel Javier and
Custodio Adaro were arrested by a party of which the accused was a member, and
"I know because he was with them when they were arrested;" the witness does not
know whether the accused was present during the execution "because there was
nobody present; only God had witnessed the killing of those persons."

Mauricio Adaro, 47, farmer, resident of Siniloan, testified that in December, 1944,
he saw the accused in the Japanese garrison in Siniloan; "he was mounting guard;"
asked from what date to what date he saw him in the garrison, the witness
answered that "I cannot remember the month in 1944 because we used to go out
of Siniloan every time;" appellant "was getting food supplies from the civilians and
giving them to the Japanese;" "the accused and the Japanese companions of his
arrested my son (Custodio) in our house;" the witness was not arrested, "because I
was able to hide;" he saw defendant mounting guard in the Japanese garrison
"many times;" "more than ten times;" the garrison was located "in the school
building."

Delfin Redor, 55, mayor of Siniloan, since 1937, testified that appellant "has been
my barrio lieutenant;" he belongs to Pampar Makapili and Pampar and Makapili, "I
believe are the same;" from December, 1944, to March, 1945, the witness saw the
accused "in the Makapili garrison, in the Siniloan plaza;" "I believe that he was a
member of the Makapili;" "Sometimes he was detailed as guard in front of the
garrison with arms and ammunitions—bayonet;" he saw him as such "many times;"
the witness was not a mayor during the Japanese occupation because "in 1944,
March, I escaped because, you know, I was wanted by the Japanese because I was
also a guerrilla; before that, "I was a mayor of the town;" "during December, 1944,
up to March, because, you know, I left the office, I was still in the town of Siniloan
collecting some supplies for the guerrillas;" after abandoning the office of mayor,
the witness "remained living in the poblacion of Siniloan;" he "never stopped living
in the poblacion;" "I had three times seen the accused accompanied by the
Japanese in raiding outside the poblacion;" the accused commandeered foodstuffs
"and took them to the garrison for food;" "the Japanese garrison was in the
Intermediate Building and the Makapili garrison is in Baybay Academy, about one
kilometer distant;" the witness saw the accused "in Makapili garrison;" the witness
was a captain of the guerrillas and was arrested by the Japanese four times, and in
those occasions he did not see the accused in the garrison; the witness does not
know of anybody who had been pointed out by the accused to the Japanese and
was arrested by the same.

The Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be
presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved." (Article II, section 1 [17].)
To overcome this constitutional presumption, the guilt of the accused must be
proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The evidence presented by the prosecution in
this case does not offer that degree of proof. None of the several overt acts alleged
in the information has been proved in accordance with the two-witness rule
provided in article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is imputed to appellant, in the first place, that he is a member of the Ganap, "a
subversive pro-Japanese organization," and "joined the Pampar, a military
organization supporting the Imperial Japanese Army and designed to bear arms
against the Army of the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines
and the guerrillas in the Philippines." No witness has testified that appellant is a
member of the Ganap. Only one witness, Redor, testified that appellant belonged
to Pampar, but he did not testify as to its nature.

The next allegation of the information is that appellant "was equipped with a 1903
Springfield rifle, caliber 30, and was made to undergo ten days training, consisting
of military drill, manual of arms, and target practice." No evidence has been
presented in support of this allegation.

The third allegation against appellant is that "from or about January 12, 1945, to
March 15, 1945, the said accused was assigned to guard duty once a week." The
fourth and the last allegation is that "he was armed with a rifle with orders to shoot
any of the Filipino prisoners whom he was guarding who might attempt to escape
and also any guerrilla or American soldier who might approach the Japanese
garrison." In connection with these two allegation, the only thing that the
prosecution attempted to prove is that appellant did guard duty and was armed
with a rifle. But the attempt does not meet the test under the two-witness rule.

The first two witnesses for the prosecution testified that they had seen the accused
doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison in Siniloan "many times," more than "ten
times," but neither of them has mentioned any specific time, day and hour. They
were able to mention only years and months. There is no way of concluding that
the two witnesses testified about the same overt act. The "many times" or more
than "ten times" mentioned by them may refer either to two different sets of
moments, not one instant of one set coinciding with any one of the other, or to only
one and identical set of instances or, although referring to two sets, some of the
instances are the same in both. As there is no basis on record upon which we may
determine which, among the two alternatives, is the correct one, the doubt must be
decided by taking the first alternative, the one compatible with the presumption of
innocence stated in the fundamental law. The case for the prosecution is further
weakened by the fact that its first two witnesses are contradicted by the third, who
testified that appellant did guard duty "many times," more than "ten times," in
the Makapili garrison, located in the Baybay Academy, one kilometer from the
Intermediate School building, where the Japanese garrison was located.

To meet the test under the two-witness rule, it is necessary that, at least, two
witnesses should testify as to the perpetration of the same treasonous overt act,
and the sameness must include not only identity of kind and nature of the act, but
as to the precise one which has actually been perpetrated. The treasonous overt act
of doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison on one specific date cannot be
identified with the doing of guard duty in the same garrison in a different date. Both
overt acts, although of the same nature and character, are two distinct and
inconfusable acts, independent of each other, and either one, to serve as a ground
for conviction of an accused for treason, must be proved by two witnesses. That
one witness should testify as to one, and another as to the other, is not enough.
Any number of witnesses may testify against an accused for treason as to a long
line of successive treasonous overt acts; but notwithstanding the seriousness of the
acts nor their number, not until two witnesses, at least, shall have testified as to
the perpetration of a single but the same and precise overt act, can conviction be
entertained.

In justice to appellant, we feel it necessary to state that our decision to acquit him
is not only based on the reasonable doubt we entertain as to his guilt, because the
prosecution has not satisfied the requirements of the two-witness rule, but because
we are rather inclined to believe his testimony to the effect that a guerrilla
member, Vicente Auxilio, was caught by the Japanese in appellant's house, tortured
and, finally, killed. For said reason, appellant was called by the Japanese,
investigated, and then told to do some work in the garrison, otherwise he would
have the same fate that befell Vicente Auxilio. "To save my life, I accepted the
order and worked there," he testified, adding: "The Japanese, not being contented
with my work, they got my carabao and on March, 1945, they got my son, who was
tortured and killed."

This son is the same Bienvenido Agpangan who, according to the first witness for
the prosecution, was executed by the Japanese with several other victims. We do
not believe that appellant could have adhered to the Japanese, the same who
tortured and killed his own son. We do not believe that, in the absence of proof, he
can be such a monster.

The decision of the People's Court is reversed and appellant is acquitted. He shall
be released from the custody of the agents of the law upon the promulgation of this
decision.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-1006, June 28, 1949 ]

 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.
FILEMON ESCLETO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former People's Court with
treason on three counts, namely:

"1. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the
municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to
give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies
of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably collaborate, associate and fraternize with
the said Imperial Japanese Forces, going out with them in patrols in search of
guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or in sympathy with the
resistance movement in the Philippines; bearing arms against the American and
guerrilla forces in the furtherance of the war efforts of the Imperial Japanese Forces
against the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and mounting
guard and performing guard duty for the Imperial Japanese Forces in their garrison
in the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines.

"2. That during the period of Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, in the
municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to
give aid or comfort to the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies
of the United States and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably accompany, join, and go out on patrols with
Japanese soldiers in and aro und the municipality of Lopez, Province of Tayabas, in
search of guerrillas and guerrilla hideouts, and of persons aiding or in sympathy
with the resistance movement in the Philippines.

"3. That on or about the 18th day of March, 1944, in the municipality of Lopez,
Province of Tayabas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, Filemon Escleto, with intent to give aid or comfort to the
Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines, then enemies of the United States and
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably arrest and/or cause to be arrested one Antonio Conducto as a guerrilla
and did turn him over and deliver to the Japanese military authorities in their
garrison, since which time, that is, since the said 18th day of March, 1944, nothing
has been heard from the said Antonio Conducto and is considered by his family to
have been killed by the Japanese military authorities."

The court found "no concrete evidence as to defendant's membership in the U.N. or
Makapili organization nor on what the patrols he accompanied actually did once
they were out of town", and so was "constrained to rule that the evidence of the
prosecution fails to establish, in connection with counts 1 and 2, any true overt act
of treason." We may add that no two witnesses eoinfefcded in any specific acts of
the defendant. The People's Court believed, however, "that the same evidence is
sufficient to prove beyond question defendant's adherence to the enemy."

As to the 3rd count, the opinion of the People's Court was that it had been fully
substantiated.

The record shows that on or about March 11, 1944, Japanese patrol composed of
seventeen men and one officer was ambushed and totally liquidated by guerrillas in
barrio Bibito, Lopez, province of Tayabas, now Quezon. As a result, some of the
inhabitants of Bibito and neighboring barrios, numbering several hundred, were
arrested and others were ordered to report at the poblacion. Among the latter were
Antonio Conducto, a guerrilla and former USAFFE, Conducto's wife, parents and
other relatives.

Sinforosa Mortero, 40 years old, testified that on March 18, 1944, at about 5 o'clock
in the afternoon, in obedience to the Japanese order, she and the rest of her family
went to the town from barrio Danlagan. Still in Danlagan, in fromt of Filemon
Escleto's house, Escleto told them to stop and took down their names. With her
were her daughter-in-law, Patricia Araya, her son Antonio Conducto, and three
grandchildren. After writing their names, Escleto conducted them to the PC garrison
in the poblacion where they were questioned by someone whose name she did not
know. This man asked her if she heard gunshots and she said yes but did not know
where it was. The next day they were allowed to go along with many others, but
Antonio Conducto was not released. Since then she had not seen her son. On cross-
examination she said that when Escleto took down their names Antonio Conducto
asked the accused if anything would happen to him and his family, and Escleto
answered, "Nothing will happen to you because I am going to accompany you in
going to town."

Patricia Araya declared that before reaching the town, Filemon Escleto stopped her,
her mother-in-law, her husband, her three children, her brother-in-law and the
latter's wife and took down their names; that after taking down their names Escleto
and a Philippine Constabulary soldier took them to the PC garrison; that her
husband asked Escleto what would happen to him and his family, and Escleto said
"nothing" and assured Conducto that he and his family would soon be allowed to go
home; that Escleto presented them to a PC and she heard him tell the latter, "This
is Antonio Conducto who has firearm;" that afterward they were sent upstairs and
she did not know what happened to her husband.

The foregoing evidence fails to support the lower court's findings. It will readily be
seen from a cursory examination thereof that the only point on which the two
witnesses, Patricia Araya and Sinforosa Mortero, agree is that the accused took
down the names of Conducto and of the witnesses, among others, and came along
with them to the town. Granting the veracity of this statement, it does not warrant
the inference that the defendant betrayed Conducto or had the intention of doing
so. What he allegedly did was compatible with the hypothesis that, being lieutenant
of his barrio, he thought it convenient as part of his duty to make a list of the
people under his jurisdiction who heeded the Japanese order.

It was not necessary for the defendant to write Conducto's name in order to report
on him. The two men appeared to be from the same barrio, Escleto knew Conducto
intimately, and the latter was on his way to town to present himself. If the accused
had a treasonable intent against Conducto, he could have furnished his name and
identity to the enemy by word of mouth. This step would have the added advantage
of concealing the defendant's traitorous action from his townmates and of not
appraising Conducto of what was in store for him, knowledge of which might impel
Conducto to escape.

That the list was not used for the purpose assumed by the prosecution is best
demonstrated by the fact that it included, according to witnesses, Conducto's wife
and parerits and many others who were discharged the next day. The fact that,
according to the evidence for the prosecution, spies wearing masks were utilized in
the screening of guerrillas adds to the doubt that the defendant had a hand in
Conducto's misfortune.

In short, Escleto's making note of persons who went to the poblacion as evidence of
overt act is weak, vague and uncertain.

The only evidence against the appellant that might be considered direct and
damaging is Patricia Araya's testimony that Escleto told a Philippine Constabulary
soldier, "This is Antonio Conducto who has firearm." But the prosecution did not
elaborate on this testimony, nor was any other witness made to corroborate it
although Patricia Araya was with her husband, parents and relatives who would
have heard the statement if the defendant had uttered it.

Leaving aside the question of Patricia's veracity, the failure to corroborate her
testimony just mentioned makes it ineffective and unavailing as proof of an overt
act of treason. In a juridical sense, this testimony is inoperative as a corroboration
of the defendant's taking down of the name of Conducto and others, or vice-versa.
It has been seen that the testimony was not shown to have been made for a
treasonable purpose nor did it necessarily have that implication. This process of
evaluating evidence might sound like a play of words but, as we have said in People
vs. Adriano, (44 Off. Gaz., 4300[1]) the authors of the two-witness provision in the
American Constitution, from which the Philippine treason law was taken, purposely
made it "severely restrictive" and conviction for treason difficult. In that case we
adverted to the following authorities, among others:

"Each of the witnesses must testify to the whole overt act; or if it is separable,
there must be two witnesses to each part of the overt act." (VII Wigmore on
Evidence, 3rd ed., Sec. 2038, p. 271.)

"It is necessary to produce two direct witnesses to the whole, overt act. It may be
passible to piece bits together of the same overt act; but, if so, each bit must have
the support of two oaths; * * *." (Opinion of Judge Learned Hand quoted as
footnote in Wigmore on Evidence, ante.)

"The very minimum function that an overt act must perform in a treason
prosecution is that it show sufficient action by the accused, in its setting, to sustain
a finding that the accused actually gave aid and comfort to the enemy.
Every action, movement, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute
treason must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses." (Cramer vs. U. S. of
A., 65 S. Ct. 918; 89 Law. ed., 1441.)

"It is not difficult to find grounds upon which to quarrel with this Constitutional
provision. Perhaps the framers placed rather more reliance on direct testimony
than:modern researches in psychology warrant. Or it may be, considered that such
a quantitative measure of proof, such a mechanical calibration of evidence is a
crude device at best that its protection of innocence is too fortuitous to warrant so
unselective an obstacle to conviction. Certainly, the treason rule, whether wisely or
not, is severely restrictive. It must be remembered, however, that the
Constitutional Convention was warned by James Wilson that Treason may
sometimes be practiced in such a manner, as to render proof extremely difficult—as
in a traitorous correspondence with an Enemy. 'The provision was adopted not
merely in spite of the difficulties it put in the way of prosecution but because of
them. And it was not by whim or by accident, but because one of the most
venerated of that venerated group considered that 'prosecutions for treason were
generally virulent.' "(Cramer vs. U. S. of A., supra.)

The decision of the People's Court will be and the same is reversed with costs de
oficio.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

MORAN, C. J.:

[ G.R. No. L-856, April 18, 1949 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SUSANO

PEREZ (ALIAS KID PEREZ), DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

Susano Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the
People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced, to death by electrocution.

Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence
only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court, were
substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1—

"Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other filipinos, recruited,
apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women against their will for
the purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral
purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims,
were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia
Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.

"It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the
accused; it is sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of Eriberta
Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to get
her and told her that she was wanted in the house of her aunt, but instead, she was
brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontañosas; that she escaped
and returned to Baclayon her hometown; that the accused came again and told her
that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept
the job; that a week later, the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded
in taking some other girls to Puppet Governor Agapito Hontañosas; that Governor
Hontañosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was
brought to Colonel Mini the flatter had nothing on but a "G" string; that he, Colonel
Mini threatened her with a sword, tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in
having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following night, again she was
brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was able to
escape and stayed in hiding for three weeks and only came out from the hiding
when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.

"As regards count No. 2—

"Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That the accused in company
with some Japs and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister Cleopatra Ramo
from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor of
Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito Hontañosas in order that said
Japanese Colonel might select those girls who would latter be taken to satisfy his
carnal appetite and that by means of threat, force and intimidation, the above
mentioned two sisters were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese
Commander at the Mission Hospital in Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced
to live a life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said
witnesses Eriberta Ramo and her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary
here to recite once more their testimony in support of the allegations in count No.
2; this Court is fully convinced that the allegations in said count No. 2 were fully
substantiated by the evidence adduced.

"As regards count No. 4—

"Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named
Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in Corella,
Bohol, by the accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to
the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal appetite, but these two, the
accused Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them
to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping
Eduardo S. Daohog, and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia
Lamay. Eduarda S. Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran,
the accused through force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that
she resisted with all her force against the desire of the accused, but of no avail;
that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer named
Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the
accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to her house! to take her and her sister;
that her sister was then out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a
revolver if she refuses to go; that she was placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog
was; that while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car,
and their companion Bullecer took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that when
the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter, Eduarda, covered her face,
crying; that later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on
arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontañosas, the Governor
exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls"; but the accused replied sayings "These
girls talked bad against the Japs, and that is why we arrested, them"; that the said
Governor Hontañosas then, saids "Take them to the Japs"; that the accused and
Bullecer brought the two girls to the Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda Was
taken to one room by the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia
Lamay) was taken to another room by another Japanese, living in that house; that
she was raped by that Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but
of no avail.

"In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and
Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Count No. 4 were fully proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

"As regards count No. 5—

"Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said adcused
commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext
that they were to be taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the
investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and upon arriving at
Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two girls to the residence of
Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed Forces in Bohol and by means of
violences threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual
intercourse with Flaviana "Bonalos; that the accused subsequently brought Flaviana
Bonalos to a small house near the headquarters of Colonel Mini and through
violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her
against her will; that about two days, later, upon the pretext of conducting the
unfortunate girls to their horns, the said accused brought the other girl Feliciana
Bonalos to a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by means of
threat and violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.

"Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get
her on the pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case affecting certain
Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were
brought in a car driven by the accused; that they were brought to the house of
Colonel Mini; that her sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and after
remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out with her hair and her dress
in disorder; that Flaviana told her immediately that she was raped against her will
by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after leaving the residence of said Japs officer,
was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation
the accused succeeded in raping her; that when she returned to her (the witness),
Flaviana was crying; that the following day while conducting the two girls back to
their hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited
house, against her will.

"Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as follows:

That on June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the Japs needed her
daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, her daughters, under that
understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she went to Tagbilaran to look for
her daughters and she found them in the office of the Puppet Governor; that on
seeing her, both daughters wept and told her that they were turned, over to the
Japs and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the witness) that after
the Japs had raped her the accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited
house; that the accused did not permit her two daughters to return home on the
pretext that the Puppet Governor was then absent and in the mean while they
stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that when her daughters returned to her
house ultimately, they related to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters
told her they would have referred death rather than to have gone to Tagbilaran;
that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had raped her.

"The information given by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part

of the res gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between the occurrence
and the time of the information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in
Court, there could be no doubt that they were telling the absolute truth. It is hard
to conceive that these girls would assume and admit the ignominy they have gone
through if they we're not true. The Court is fully convinced that all the allegations
contained in Count No. 5 have been iproven by the testimonies of these two
witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.

"As regards count No. 6—

"Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companions,
apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima Barcinas, nurses
of the Provincial Hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized
by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini and other Japs High ranking
officers, which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that upon being
brought before the Puppet Governor, they were severely reprimanded by the latter;
that on July 8, 1942, again said nurses were forced to attend another banquet and
dance in order that the Jap officers Mini and Takibayas might make a selection
which girl would suit best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible
invitations was to lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for
immoral purposes.

"Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P. A., testified at length. She declared:

That on June 29, 1942, she and companion nurses, saw the accused coming to the
hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the Office of the Puppet
Governor where they were severely reprimanded by the latter for not attending the
dance held on June 25, 1942; that the real purpose in compelling them to attend
said dances and receptions was to select from among them the best girl that would
suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for immoral purposes; that she and her companions
were always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to said Hospital; that
on one occasion, one of the nurses on perceiving the approach of the accused, ran
up into her room, laid down on her bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused
not satisfied, went up into the room of that particular nurse and pulled out the
blanket which covered her and telling her that it was only her pretext that she was
sick.

"The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora

Ralameda. Said testimony need not be reproduced here."

In a carefully written brief for the appellant, these findings are not questioned, but
it is contended that the deeds committed by the accused do not constitute treason.
The Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and
preserve the morale of the soldiers has always been, and will always be, a
fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of an army rests not
only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the morale of its soldiers" (citing
the annual report of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, for the fiscal year
ending June 30, 1933).

If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because
women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them, entertaining
them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason.
For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the same general result. Yet by
common agreement those and similar manifestations of sympathy and attachment
are not the kind of disloyalty that are punished as treason.

In a broad sense, the law of treason, does not proscribe all kinds of social, business
and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the invaded country
and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a country by the
enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between the invaders and the
natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature;
degree and purpose. To draw a line between treasonable and unreasonable
assistance is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is
comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate, as was said in Cramer vs. U. S., 89
Law. ed., 1441.

As a general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the
enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not merely as
individuals, and, in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile
designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy as a
friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is
to assist him as an individual and is not technically traitorious. On the other hand,
to lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in
waging war against the giver's country enhances his strength and by the same
count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That is treason. (See U.
S. vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673; 63 C. J., 816, 817.)

Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is
correct. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or
men or to enliven the entertainments held in their honor was not treason even
though the women and the entertainments helped to make life more pleasant for
the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women
themselves would have been if they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their
bodies or organised the entertainments. Sexual and social relations with the
Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve their war efforts or to
weaken the power of the United States. The acts herein charged were not, by fair
implication, calculated to strenghten the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple
the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the
defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the
war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital
ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be
gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog,
Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct participation. Without
his cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been
committed.

Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in

section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:

"Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to
support the offense (treason) charged, the People's Court, may, nevertheless,
convict and sentence the accused for any crime includes in the acts alleged in the
information and established by the evidence."

All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by
the evidence.

Counsel assails the constitutionality of this provision as violative of section 1,

Paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an accused the
right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The
contention is not well taken. The provision in question requires that the private
crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the
information and sustained by evidence. In the light of this enactment, the
defendant was warned of the hazard that he might be found guilty of rapes if he
was innocent of treason and thus afforded an opportunity to prepare and meet
them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In fact, under the
general law of criminal procedure, conviction for a crime different from that
designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practised, provided only
that such crime "is included or described in the body of the information, and is
afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial." (People vs. Perez, 45
Phil., 599.)

The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these
assaults are not charged against him and should be ruled, out. The crime of
coercion alleged and found on count No. 6 need not be noticed in view of the
severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must suffer.

We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for
each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 years of prision mayor to 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify
each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and to pay the costs; it being
understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed forty years.

Moran, C. J., Feria, Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-322, July 28, 1947 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO

MANAYAO ET AL., DEFENDANTS. PEDRO MANAYAO, APPELLANT.

DECISION

HILADO, J.:

Appellant Pedro Manayao and Filomeno Flores and Raymundo Flores were charged
with the high crime of treason with multiple murder in the People's Court. The
Floreses not having been apprehended, only Manayao was tried. Convicted of the
offense charged against him with the aggravating circumstances of (1) the aid of
armed men and (2) the employment or presence of a band in the commission of
the crime, he was sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of
P2,000 to the heirs of each of the persons named in the third paragraph of the
decision, and the costs. He has appealed from that decision to this Court.

On or about the 27th of January, 1945, the guerrillas raided the Japanese in sitio
Pulong Tindahan, municipality of Angat, Province of Bulacan. In reprisal, Japanese
soldiers and a number of Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, among them the
instant appellant, conceived the diabolical idea of killing the residents of barrio
Banaban of the same municipality (Exhibits A, C, and C-1). Pursuant to this plan,
said Japanese soldiers and their Filipino companions, armed with rifles and
bayonets, gathered the residents of Banaban behind the barrio chapel on January
29, 1945. Numbering about sixty or seventy, the residents thus assembled included
men, women and children—mostly women (Exhibits A, C, and C-1; pp. 3-16, 29,
30, 65, 102, t. s. n.).

The children were placed in a separate group from the men and women—the
prosecution star witnesses, Maria Paulino and Clarita Perez, were among the
children (pp. 3, 40, t. s. n.). Presently, the Japanese and their Filipino comrades set
the surrounding houses on fire (pp. 14, 48, 70, 71, 103, t. s. n.), and proceeded to
butcher all the persons assembled, excepting the small children, thus killing, among
others, those known by the following names: Patricia, Dodi, Banda, Tana, Uyang,
Mina, Marta, Sana, Eufemia, Doroteo, Andres, Perly, Tisiang, Urado, Pisan, Dorang,
Felisa, and Eulalia (pp. 8, 10, 13, 14, 31, 32, 47, 48, 61, 62, 63, t. s. n.).

Appellant alone killed about six women, two of whom were Patricia and Dodi whom
he bayoneted to death in the presence of their daughters, Maria Paulino and Clarita
Perez, respectively (pp. 8, 10, 13, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, t. s. n.). Patricia and Dodi
pleaded with appellant for mercy, he being their relative, but he gave the callous
answer that no mercy would be given them because they were wives of guerrillas
(pp. 10, 42, 43, 49, t. s. n.).

Appellant would also have killed the small children including Clarita Perez and Maria
Paulino if he had been allowed to have his way. For when all but the small ones had
been butchered, he proposed to kill them too, but the Japanese soldiers interceded,
saying that the children knew nothing of the matter (pp. 15, 49, 51, 66, 67, t. s.
n.). Appellant insisted in his proposal, arguing that the children would be wives of
guerrillas later when they grew up, but the Japanese decided to spare them (p. 22,
t. s. n.).

The foregoing facts have been clearly established by the testimony of eye-
witnesses—Clarita Paulino, Maria Perez, and Policarpio Tigas—to the ruthless
massacre of Banaban. There is a complete absence of evidence tending to show
motive on the part of these witnesses for falsely testifying against appellant—such
a motive is not even insinuated by the defendant. Indeed, appellant's counsel
frankly states (p. 3, brief) that he "does not dispute the findings of fact of the
People's Court." Speaking of the testimony of Clarita and Maria, both aged ten
years, the People's Court, who heard, observed and saw them testify, had the
following to say:

"The testimony of the last two in particular is entitled to very great weight. They
are simple barrio girls, only ten years old, whose minds have not yet been tainted
by feelings of hatred or revenge or by any desire to be spectacular or to
exaggerate. They were straight-forward and frank in their testimony and did not
show any intention to appeal to the sentiments of the court. They could nut have
been mistaken as to the presence and identity of the accused for they know him so
well that they referred to him by his pet name of 'Indong Pintor' or Pedro, the
painter. They could not have erred in the narration of the salient phases of the
tragic events of January 29, 1945, in Banaban, for they were forced eye-witnesses
to and were involved in the whole tragedy, the burning of the houses and the
massacre committed by the accused and his Japanese masters took place in broad
daylight and were not consummated in a fleeting moment but during a time
sufficient for even girls of tender age to retain a trustworthy mental picture of the
unusual event they could not help but witness."

Not only this, but the testimony of Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino is so clear,
positive and convincing that it would be sufficient for conviction without any further
corroboration. Yet, there is ample corroborative proof. Thus, Tomas M. Pablo
declared that he had seen the corpses of the massacred residents of Banaban
shortly after the happening of the heinous crime (p. 136, t. s. n.). And appellant
himself admitted his participation in the massacre in two sworn statements—one
made on August 28, 1945, before Lt. Jesus Cacahit, Detachment Commander of the
Angat 23d MP Command (Exhibit A; pp. 75-77, t. s. n.) and another made on
September 5, 1945 before Feliciano F. Torres, Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan
(Exhibits C, C-1; pp. 150-159, t. s. n.).

In No. 1 of his assignment of errors, appellant's counsel contends that appellant

was a member of the Armed Forces of Japan, was subject to military law, and not
subject to the jurisdiction of the People's Court; and in No. 2 he advances the
theory that appellant had lost his Philippine citizenship and was therefore not
amenable to the Philippine law of treason. We cannot uphold either contention. We
are of the considered opinion that the Makapili, although organized to render
military aid to the Japanese Army in the Philippines during the late war, was not a
part of said army. It was an organization of Filipino traitors, pure and simple. As to
loss of Philippine citizenship by appellant, counsel's theory is absolutely untenable.
He invokes in its support paragraphs 3, 4, and 6 of section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 63, providing:

"* * * A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or
events:

* * * * * * *

"(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constituton or laws of a

foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;

"(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign

country;

* * * * * * *

"(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine

Army, Navy, or Air Corps in time of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or
amnesty has been granted."

There is no evidence that appellant has subscribed to an oath of allegiance to

support the constitution or laws of Japan. His counsel cites (Brief, 4) the fact that in
Exhibit A "he subscribed an oath before he was admitted into the Makapili
association, 'the aim of which was to help Japan in its fight against the Americans
and her allies.'" And counsel contends from this that the oath was in fact one of
allegiance to support the constitution and Jaws of Japan. We cannot uphold such a
far-fetched deduction. The members of the Makapili could have sworn to help Japan
in the war without necessarily swearing to support her constitution and laws. The
famed "Flying Tiger" who so bravely and resolutely aided China in her war with
Japan certainly did not need to swear to support the Chinese constitution and laws,
even if they had to subscribe to an oath, upon entering the organization, to help
China fight Japan. During the first World War the "National Volunteers" were
organized in the Philippines, pledged to go to Europe and fight on the side of the
Allies, particularly of the United States. In order to carry out that mission—although
the war ended before this could be done—they surely did not have to take an oath
to support the constitution or laws of the United States or any of its allies. We do
not multiply these examples, for they illustrate a proposition which seems self-
evident.

Neither is there any showing of the acceptance by appellant of a commission "in the
military, naval, or air service" of Japan.

Much less is there a scintilla of evidence that appellant had ever been declared a
deserter in the Philippine Army, Navy or Air Corps—nor even that he was a member
of said Army, Navy, or Air Corps.

Further, appellant's contention is repugnant to the most fundamental and

elementary principles governing the duties of a citizen toward his country under our
Constitution. Article II, section 2, of said Constitution ordains:

"SEC. 2. The defense of the State is a prime duty of government, and in the
fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render
personal, military or civil service." (Italics supplied.)

This constitutional provision covers both time of peace and time of war, but it is
brought more immediately and peremptorily into play when the country is involved
in war. During such a period of stress, under a constitution enshrining such tenets,
the citizen cannot be considered free to cast off his loyalty and obligations toward
the Fatherland. And it cannot be supposed, without reflecting on the patriotism and
intelligence of the Legislature, that in promulgating Commonwealth Act No. 63,
under the aegis of our Constitution, it intended (but did not declare) that the duties
of the citizen solemnly proclaimed in the above-quoted constitutional precept could
be effectively cast off by him even when his country is at war, by the simple
expedient of subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws
of a foreign country, and an enemy country at that, or by accepting a commission
in the military, naval or air service of such country, or by deserting from the
Philippine Army, Navy, or Air Corps.

It would shock the conscience of any enlightened citizenry to say that this
appellant, by the very fact of committing the treasonous acts charged against him,
the doing of which under the circumstances of record he does not deny, divested
himself of his Philippine citizenship and thereby placed himself beyond the arm of
our treason law. For if this were so, his very crime would be the shield that would
protect him from punishment.

"But the laws do not admit that the bare commission of a crime amounts of itself to
a divestment of the character of citizen, and withdraws the criminal from their
coercion. They would never prescribe an illegal act among the legal modes by which
a citizen might disfranchise himself; nor render treason, for instance, innocent, by
giving it the force of a dissolution of the obligation of the criminal to hia country."
(Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. III, p. 731.)

"696. No person, even when he has renounced or incurred the loss of his
nationality, shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of
a felony and treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty." (Fiore's International
Law Codified, translation from Fifth Italian Edition by Borchard.)

As to the third asignment of error, the Solicitor General agrees with counsel that it
is improper to separately take into account against appellant the aggravating
circumstances of (1) the aid of armed men and (2) the employment of a band in
appraising the gravity of the crime. We likewise are of the same opinion,
considering that under paragraph 6 of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code
providing that "whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted
together in the commission of an offense it shall be deemed to have been
committed by a band," the employment of more than three armed men is an
essential element of and inherent in a band. So that in appreciating the existence of
a band the employment of more than three armed men is automatically included,
there being only the aggravating circumstance of band to be considered.

As to appellant's fourth assignment of error, the contention is clearly unacceptable

that appellant acted in obedience to an order issued by a superior and is therefore
exempt from criminal liability, because he allegedly acted in the fulfillment of a duty
incidental to his service for Japan as a member of the Makapili. It is obvious that
paragraphs 5 and 6 of article 11 of our Revised Penal Code cannot be construed as
sanctioning as legal acts done in compliance with duties to or orders from a foreign
sovereign, any more than obedience to an illegal order. The construction contended
for by appellant could entail in its potentialities even the destruction of this
Republic.

The contention that as a member of the Makapili appellant had to obey his
Japanese masters under pain of severe penalty, and that therefore his acts should
be considered. as committed under the impulse of an irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, is no less repulsive.

Appellant voluntarily joined the Makapili with full knowledge of its avowed purpose
of rendering military aid to Japan. He knew the consequences to be expected—if
the alleged irresistible force or uncontrollable fear subsequently arose, he brought
them about himself freely and voluntarily. But this is not all; the truth of the matter
is, as the Solicitor General well remarks, that "the appellant actually acted with
gusto during the butchery of Banaban." He was on that occasion even bent on more
cruelty than the very ruthless Japanese themselves as regards the little children.
And his Japanese masters—so fate willed it—were the very ones who saved the
little girls, Clarita Perez and Maria Paulino, who were destined to become the star
witnesses against him on the day of reckoning.

Conformably to the recommendation of the Solicitor General, we find appellant

guilty of the crime of treason with multiple murder committed with the attendance
of one aggravating circumstance, that of "armed band," thus discarding the first
aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court. A majority of the Court
voted to affirm the judgment appealed from, imposing the death penalty, convicting
defendant and appellant to pay a fine of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the
heirs of each of the victims named in the third paragraph of the lower court's
decision, and the costs. But due to the dissent of Mr. Justice Perfecto from the
imposition of the death penalty, in accordance with the applicable legal provisions
we modify the judgment appealed from as regards the punishment to be inflicted,
and sentence defendant and appellant Pedro Manayao to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessories of article 41 of the Revised Penal Code, to pay a fine
of P20,000, an indemnity of P2,000 to the heirs of each of the victims named in the
third paragraph of the lower court's decision, and the costs. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Hontiveros, Padilla, and Tuason,
JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-399, January 29, 1948 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.

EDUARDO PRIETO (ALIAS EDDIE VALENCIA), DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.

DECISION

TUASON, J.:

The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After
pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and
maintained the original plea as to counts 4, 5 and 6. The special prosecutor
introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that
he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. The defendant was found guilty
of count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay a
fine of P20,000.

Two witnesses gave evidence on count 4 but their statements do not coincide on
any single detail. Juanito Albaño, the first witness, testified that in March, 1945, the
accused with other Filipino undercovers and Japanese soldiers caught an American
aviator and had the witness carry the American to town on a sled pulled by a
carabao; that on the way, the accused walked behind the sled and asked the
prisoner if the sled was faster than the airplane; that the American was taken to
the Kempetai head quarters, after which he did not know what happened to the
flier. Valentin Cuison, the next witness, testified that one day in March, 1945, he
saw the accused following an American whose hands were tied; that the accused
struck the flier with a piece of rope; that with the American and the accused were
Japanese and other Filipinos.

These witnesses evidently referred to two different occasions. The last witness
stated that the American was walking as well as his captors, And there was no sled,
he said, nor did he see Juanito Albaño, except at night when he and Albaño had a
drink of tuba together.

This evidence does not satisfy the two-witness principle. The two witnesses failed to
corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on any part of it,
(People vs. Apolinar Adriano, 44 Off. Gaz., 4300; Cramer vs. U. S., 65 S. Ct. 918.)

The lower court believes that the accused is "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries," with "the aggravating
circumstances mentioned above." Apparently, the court has regarded the murders
and physical injuries charged in the information, not only as crimes distinct from
treason but also as modifying circumstances. The Solicitor General agrees with the
decision except as to the technical designation of the crime. In his opinion, the
offense committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of treason with homicide."

Counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 are as follows:

"1. On or about October 15, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of

Cebu, Philippines, said accused being a member of the Japanese Military Police and
acting as undercover man for the Japanese forces with the purpose of giving and
with the intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of
Japanese soldiers and Filipino undercovers to the barrio of Poknaon, for the purpose
of apprehending guerrillas and locating their hideouts; that said accused and his
companions did apprehend Abraham Puno, tie his hands behind him and give him
fist blows; thereafter said Abraham Puno was taken by the accused and his
Japanese companions to Yati, Liloan, Cebu, where he was severely tortured by
placing red hot iron on his shoulders, legs and back and from there he was sent
back to the Japanese detention camp in Mandaue and detained for 7 days;

"2. On or about October 28, 1944, in the Municipality of Mandaue, Province of

Cebu, Philippines, said accused acting as an informer and agent for the Japanese
Military Police, with the purpose of giving and with the intent to give aid and
comfort to the enemy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably, lead, guide and accompany a group of Filipino undercovers for the
purpose of apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects; that the herein accused
and his companions did in fact apprehend Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce from
their house; that said accused and his companions did tie the hands of said
Guillermo Ponce and Macario Ponce behind their backs, giving them fist blows on
the face and in other parts of the body and thereafter detained them at the Kempei
Tai Headquarters; that Guillermo Ponce was released the following day while his
brother Macario Ponce was detained and thereafter nothing more was heard of him
nor his whereabouts known;

"3. Sometime during the month of November, 1944, in the Municipality of

Mandaue, Province of Cebu, Philippines, for the purpose of giving and with the
intent to give aid and comfort to the enemy and her military forces, said accused
acting as an enemy undercover did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously,
and treasonably lead, guide and accompany a patrol of some 6 Filipinos and 2
Japanese soldiers to barrio Pakna-an, Municipality of Mandaue for the purpose of
apprehending guerrillas and guerrilla suspects, and said patrol did in fact apprehend
as guerrilla suspects Damian Alilin and Santiago Alilin who were forthwith tied with
a rope, tortured and detained for 6 days; that on the 7th day said Damian Alilin and
Santiago Alilin were taken about ½ kilometer from their home and the accused did
bayonet them to death;

"7. In or about November 16, 1944, in Mandaue, in conspiracy with the enemy and
other Filipino undercovers, said accused did cause the torture of Antonio Soco and
the killing of Gil Soco for guerrilla activities."

The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these counts and the
infliction of physical injuries on others are not offenses separate from treason.
Under the Philippine treason law and under the United States constitution defining
treason, after which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other does not make
treason.

In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be accomplished by
some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a deed or physical activity as
opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer vs. U. S., ante.) This deed or physical
activity may be, and often is, in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute
or provision. Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
becomes identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides. Just as one can not be punished for
possessing opium in a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, end a robber
cannot be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution for
robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass are inherent in
smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a defendant be made liable for
murder as a separate crime or in conjunction with another offense where, as in this
case, it is averred as a constitutive ingredient of treason. This rule would not, of
course, preclude the punishment of murder or physical injuries as such if the
government should elect to prosecute the culprit specifically for those crimes
instead of relying dn them as an element of treason. It is where murder or physical
injuries are charged as overt acts of treason that they can not be regarded
separately under their general denomination.
However, the brutality with which the killing or physical injuries were carried out
may be taken as an aggravating circumstance. Thus, the use of torture and other
atrocities on the victims instead of the usual and less painful method of execution
will be taken into account to increase the penalty under the provision of article 14,
paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, since they, as in this case, augmented
the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily to the attainment of the
criminal objective.

This aggravating circumstance is compensated by the mitigating circumstance of

plea of guilty. It is true that the accused pleaded not guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6 but
count 4 has not been substantiated while counts 5 and 6 were abandoned.

In his first assignment of error, counsel seeks reversal of the judgment because of
the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in
spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at
the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons".

The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions in favor of the legality
and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption
that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U. S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil.
82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless
it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.)
The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his
defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present
counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not
sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court
below did not necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the
interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes
that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing
worker," We do not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did
not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. If Attorney Garin did his best as a
sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his
sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the
rights of the appellant.

In conclusion, we find the defendant not guilty of count 4 and guilty of treason as
charged in counts 1, 2, 3 and 7. There being an aggravating circumstance and a
mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed is reclusiòn perpetua. The
judgment of the lower court will be modified in this respect accordingly. In all other
particulars, the same will be affirmed. It is so ordered, with costs of this instance
against the appellant.

Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

[ G. R. No. L-9529, August 30, 1958 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO

T. VILLANUEVA, DEFENDANT AND APPELALNT.
 DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Pedro T. Villanueva was sentenced to death by the Fifth Division of the
defunct People's Court for the crime of treason. On March 10, 1948, the case was
elevated to us (G. R. No. L-2073) not only by virtue of the appeal duly interposed
by the accused but also under the provisions of Section 9 of Rule 118 of the Rules
of Court which provides mandatory review by this Tribunal of all decisions or
judgments of the lower courts imposing death penalties. Meantime, it was
discovered that the transcript of stenographic notes taken down on October 8,
1947, before the People's Court was missing and unavailable, by reason of which
and upon recommendation of the Solicitor General, we promulgated a resolution on
August 1, 1952, remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
retaking of the missing testimonies of the four witnesses who testified before the
People's Court, namely, Gregorio Gaton, Ambrosio Tuble, Basilia Taborete, and the
accused himself. Thus the case was sent to that court.

On August 24, 1953, appellant filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo praying that he be allowed to withdraw his appeal so as to avail himself of the
benefits of the Executive clemency granted to all prisoners convicted of treason,
including those whose cases were pending appeal, on condition that such appeals
be first withdrawn. Whereupon the Court of First Instance of Iloilo returned the case
to us for whatever action we may take in view of the withdrawal requested, for, at
all events, the case had to be reviewed by us regardless of defendant's appeaL The
case was included in the agenda prepared by the Clerk of Court for September 21,
1953, only on the basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by appellant, without
calling the attention of the Tribunal that defendant had previously appealed from a
decision sentencing him to death, which decision called for an automatic review and
judgment by us. Accordingly, and following the practice of this Tribunal of acting
favorably on petitions for withdrawal of appeals where briefs had not been filed, as
in the present case, said petition for withdrawal was granted by resolution of
September 21, 1953. However, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same
date, and after the passing of the resolution, appellant filed directly with this Court
a petition reiterating his request for withdrawal of appeal previously made with the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching thereto two documents said to be copies
of the conditional pardon granted him and of the letter of the Legal Assistant in the
office of the President addressed to the Director of Prisons. It was only on
considering this second petition when we realized the nature of the case and that
the withdrawal of appeal granted on September 21, 1953, was a mistake and
contrary to legal precedents. So, in a resolution dated October 19, 1953, this
Tribunal reconsidered its resolution of September 21st granting withdrawal of
appeal, and again remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the
retaking of the testimonies above referred to, with instructions that a new decision
be rendered based on the said testimonies and on the standing evidence adduced
before the People's Court. The resolution of October 19th read as follows:
"By a decision dated November 19, 1947, the Fifth Division of the defunct People's
Court after trial of appellant Pedro T. Villanueva on a charge of treason on several
counts, found him guilty of treason and murder and sentenced him thus—

'IN THE VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court, finding the
accused Pedro T. Villanueva guilty of the complex crime of treason and murders as
defined in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, in connection with Article 48 of the
same Code, sentences him to suffer death penalty, with the accessories of the law,
to indemnify the heirs of Cosme Calacasan in the amount of P2,000, to indemnify
the heirs of Julia Cabilitasan in the amount of P2,000, to indemnify the heirs of
Sofia Tambirao in the amount of P2,000, and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000) and the costs of the proceedings.'

"Villanueva duly appealed to this Court. The records were sent up to us not only by
virtue of the appeal but also under the provisions of Rule 118, Section 9, of the
Rules of Court which provides for review and judgment by this Tribunal of all cases
in which the death penalty shall have been imposed by a court of first instance,
whether the defendant shall have appealed or not.

"It appearing that the stenographic notes taken of the testimony of the witnesses
who testified on October 8, 1947, could not be located, and following the
recommendation of the Solicitor General, a resolution was promulgated on August
1, 1952, remanding the case to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking
of the testimony of said witnesses.

"Thereafter before said court defendant-appellant Villanueva filed a petition dated

August 24, 1953, stating that about July 4, 1953, the Chief Executive granted
executive clemency to all prisoners convicted of treason, including those whose
cases were pending appeal, on condition that such appeals be first withdrawn,
supposedly to give finality to the judgment of the lower court, and asking that he
be allowed to withdraw his appeal. Acting upon said petition the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo issued an order dated September 10, 1953, directing the return of
the case to this Court for whatever action it may take in the premises, in view of
the petition for withdrawal of the appeal filed by appellant and because the case
had to be reviewed by the Supreme Court anyway regardless of the appeal by the
defendant.

"The case was considered by us on September 21, 1953. The agenda of this Court
on that date as regards this was prepared by the Clerk of Court's Office only on the
basis of the motion for withdrawal of appeal by the defendant. Our attention was
not called to the fact that defendant had previously appealed from a decision
sentencing him to death, which decision called for an automatic review and
judgment by us. So, following the practice of this Tribunal of acting favorably on
petitions for withdrawal of appeals where the briefs have not yet been filed, as in
the present case, said petition for withdrawal of appeal was granted by resolution of
September 21, 1953. On the same date, however, and presumably after the
passing of the resolution, appellant Villanueva filed directly with this Court a
petition reiterating the request for withdrawal of his appeal previously made with
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, attaching to his petition Exhibits 'A' and 'B', said
to be copies of the conditional pardon and of the letter of the Legal Assistant in the
Office of the President addressed to the Director of Prisons. It was only on
considering said petition that we realized the nature of the case and the decision
appealed to this Court, the withdrawal of which appeal had been granted by the
resolution of September 21, 1953.

"An accused appealing from a decision sentencing him to death may be allowed to
withdraw his appeal like any other appellant in an ordinary criminal case before the
briefs are filed, but his withdrawal of the appeal does not remove the case from the
jurisdiction of this Court which under the law is authorized and called upon to
review the decision though unappealed. Consequently, the withdrawal of the appeal
in this case could not serve to render the decision of the People's Court final. In
fact, as was said by this Court thru Justice Moreland in the case of U.S. vs. Laguna,
17 Phil. 532, speaking on the matter of review by this Court of a decision imposing
the death penalty, the judgment of conviction entered in the trial court is not final,
and cannot be executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been
passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a judgment of
conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has none of the attributes of a
final judgment and sentence; that until it has been reviewed by the Supreme Court
which finally passes upon it, the same is not final and conclusive; and that this
automatic review by the Supreme Court of decisions imposing the death penalty is
something which neither the court nor the accused could waive or evade.

"Furthermore, when the case was remanded to the lower court for the purpose of
retaking the testimony of those witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the
case was virtually remanded for new trial. Of course, the evidence and the
testimony received during the trial before the People's Court which is still intact and
available shall stand and the new trial will be confined to the testimony of the same
witnesses who testified on October 8, 1947, the stenographic notes or transcript of
which cannot now be found. Under these circumstances, it is necessary for the trial
court to render a new decision because the new trial is being held before a new
Judge and there is no assurance that the witnesses testifying, altho the very same
ones who were on the witness stand on October 8, 1947, would testify to the same
facts and in the same manner that they did at the former trial, altho they are
supposed to do so. (See Demetria Obien de Almario vs. Fidel Ibañez, et al., 46
O. G. No. 1, p. 390). Going over the record of the case, we find that it would not be
too difficult for the trial judge to see to it that the said witnesses as far as possible
confine themselves to the same points on which they testified on October 8, 1947,
because the testimonies of said witnesses including the defendant are referred to
and described in the decision of the People's Court on pages 87, 123, and 124 to
129, and that there are only four witnesses including the accused himself.

"Examining Exhibits 'A' and 'B' submitted by appellant in relation to his petition for
the withdrawal of his appeal, we find that although his name appears in the list of
prisoners convicted by the People's Court and supposed to be pardoned
conditionally, the pardon itself refers to the remission of the 'unexpired portions of
the prison sentence terms and the fines of the prisoners listed below who were
convicted by the defunct People's Court of treason and committed! to the new
Bilibid Prison to serve their sentence.' It is highly doubtful that the pardon could
have contemplated and included appellant herein because his sentence of death
does not merely involve a prison term which expires in time. Besides, a death
sentence is not exactly served but rather executed. Moreover, Exhibit 'B' says that
'those prisoners whose cases are still pending on appeal shall be released only after
their appeal has been withdrawn.' The implication is that the withdrawal of the
appeal rendered the decision of the People's Court final, resulting in conviction, this
to bring it into harmony with Art. VII, Sec. 10(6) of the Constitution which requires
conviction as a condition precedent to the exercise of Executive clemency. As we
have already stated, despite defendant's withdrawal of his appeal from the decision
imposing the death sentence, there is no definite conviction or sentence until and
after this Tribunal has reviewed the case and rendered its own decision affirming,
modifying or reversing that of the lower court, unless of course in the new decision
of the trial court based on the new trial a sentence other than death is imposed, in
which case there would be no automatic review by us.

"Let the record of this case be again remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo for new trial and thereafter, for a new decision."

At the new trial, only the testimonies of witnesses for the defense, Ambrosio Tuble
and Basilio Taborete, were introduced. Appellant also presented documentary
evidence relative to the conditional pardon allegedly granted him. The Court of First
Instance of Iloilo found nothing in the newly adduced evidence to disturb the
decision of the People's Court, and, reproducing said decision, rendered judgment
on October 11, 1955, sentencing appellant to capital punishment. The case was
again elevated to us for automatic review and judgment and given the present
docket number.

In the amended information filed before the People's Court, appellant was accused
of treason on ten counts, but the prosecution adduced evidence only on seven of
them, namely, Counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. The lower court found that Counts 1
and 2 were not proven, and convicted the accused on Counts 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

The prosecution established that during the Japanese occupation, appellant, who is
a Filipino citizen, and owing allegiance to the United States of America and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, gave the enemy aid and comfort by rendering
service with the Japanese Imperial Army as secret agent, informer and spy, of its
Detective Force in the province of Iloilo, and that in the performance of such
service, he participated actively and directly in the punitive expeditions periodically
made by the Japanese forces in the guerilla-infested areas of the province of Iloilo,
and committed robberies, arson and mass-murders, specifically as follows:

Count No. 6. Anent this Count, the amended information recites:

"6. That on or about June 10, 1943, at the barrios of Baroc and Atabayan,
municipality of Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
the above-named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did
adhere to the enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy
aid and comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force,
Imperial Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and several
Japanese soldiers, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably arrest Vicente Garrido, Juan Tatlonghari, Clodovio Trieco, Melchor
Trieco, Cosme Tobias, Leoncio Tumamudtamud, Quirino Toranto, Napoleon Luceno,
Modesto Torremoro and Dionisio Belandrez on the charge that they were guerrilla
soldiers and/or sympathizers and did investigate, maltreat and torture them; that
subsequently the persons above-mentioned were taken away and were not seen or
heard of since then; that on the occasion of the aforementioned patrol, the above-
named accused and his companions, .with intent of gain and without consent of the
owners thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously loot the
house of Jose T. Belandrez, taking therefrom genuine Philippine currency in the
amount of P300; emergency notes in the amount of P1,200; jewelry valued at
P500; clothing valued at P200; and other personal effects; and from the house of
Toribia Taleon, jewelry, watches, clothing and other personal effects with a total
value of P160 more or less."

Jose T. Belandrez, Salvador Toranto, Toribia Taleon and Maria Mendoza,

corroborating one another, testified that at dawn of June 10, 1943, appellant,
accompanied by some Filipinos and Japanese soldiers, went to the house of Jose T.
Belandrez situated at Tigbauan, Iloilo, and took therefrom P1,200 in cash, jewelry
worth P300, and clothing valued at P200; that they also arrested Dionisio
Belandrez, Modesto Torremoro and Napoleon Luceno, members of the Bolo
Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the guerrillas; that since that fateful day, the said
three members of the Bolo Battalion never returned.

Count No. 7. The amended information respecting this Count, reads as follows:

"7. That on or about the 9th and 10th day of August, 1943, in the municipality of
Tigbauan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the
enemy, and with treasonable intent to give, as he did give said enemy, aid and
comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial
Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest and
apprehend several persons suspected of guerrilla activities, among whom were
Federico Tinamisan, Eustaquio Doga, Roque Tiologo, Salvador Tedor, Tomas
Trompeta, Agapito Trompeta, Andres Tayo, Victorio Tuante, Manuel Teano, Matias
Tirante, Rufo Tolate, Celedonio Tupino, Alfredo Trompeta, Hilarion Toga and several
others, who were gathered in the Chapel at barrio Napnapan, where the persons
aforesaid were investigated, maltreated and tortured, as a consequence of which
Salvador Tedor died of the beating and torture inflicted upon him by the herein
accused and his companions; that the following morning about thirty-seven persons
were taken to the yard of Valentina Amandoron's house, where Jesus Astrologo,
Carlos Palma, Filipino co-spies of the accused, and the Japanese killed by beheading
Andres Tai, Victorio Tuante, Roque Tiologo, Manuel Teano, Matias Tirania, Rufo
Tulato, Agapito Trompeta, Tomas Trompeta, Celedonio Tupino, Simeon Ledesma,
Hermenegildo Taleon, Marcelo Turid, Magdaleno Turid, Enrique Turid, Jose Tamon,
Cornelio Taghap, Eustaquio Doga, Eugenio (LNU), Francisco (LNU) Lucio (LNU),
Juan (LNU), Casimiro (LNU), Gorteo (LNU), and several others whose names are
unknown, while Alfredo Trompeta and Hilarion Toga were struck and wounded on
their necks but miraculously escaped death."

Six witnesses testified on this Count, namely, Severa Gua, Natividad Duga, Alfredo
Trompeta, Hilario Taghap and Valentina Amandoron who, corroborating one
another, stated that on August 9 or 10, 1943, which was a Monday, at about six
o'clock in the evening, while Eustaquio Duga and his family were at their home in
Tigbauan, Iloilo, he saw Japanese soldiers and some Filipinos approaching their
house; that Eustaquio Duga notified his wife and they immediately started to flee;
that unfortunately, they were overtaken by the Japanese soldiers, and Eustaquio
Duga was arrested by herein appellant who was in company with said Japanese
soldiers; that Eustaquio Duga was taken to the nearby barrio of Napnapan; that
sometime later, Severa Gua found the dead body of Eustaquio Duga, with his head
almost severed, among other corpses in the yard of the house of Valentina
Amandoron.

On the same day, while Alfredo Trompeta and his companion Roque Teologo were
walking in a barrio road in Napnapan, Tigbauan, Iloilo, they were arrested by
Japanese soldiers who were with the appellant; that Trompeta and Teologo were
taken to the barrio of Ermita, of the same municipality, where they were
investigated together with about thirty persons who were suspected as guerrillas;
thence they were brought to the house of Valentina Amandoron where appellant
and his companions killed in cold blood Trompeta's companions as well as those
persons who were brought there earlier. Among the twenty-five persons killed on
that occasion, were Andres Tayo, Tomas Trompeta, Rufo Tolato, Roque Teologo,
Jose Taucon and Matias Tiranea.

Count No. 8. The information equally recites:

"8. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality of Leon, Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy, and with
treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his
capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese
Army; and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably arrest Cosme Calacasan,
Nazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario Calacasan, Marcos Sobrevega, Jose
Canillas, Aurelio Calacasan, Graciano (LNU), Juan (LNU), and three others, names
unknown, on the charge that the persons aforesaid were guerrilla soldiers or
guerrilla sympathizers; that thereafter these persons were taken to barrio Taal
municipality of San Miguel, where the accused and his companions set fire to and
burned several houses in the aforesaid barrio; and later to barrio Baguingin,
municipality of Leon, where the above-named accused and his conmpanions
investigated, maltreated and tortured them; that the above-named accused further
adhering to the enemy did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably, and with evident premeditation and treachery, bayonetted to death
Cosme Calacasan, while tied to a tree with hands tied behind his back; while
Nazario Calimutan was bayonetted and killed in the same manner by Jesus
Astrologo, Filipino co-spy of the herein accused; while Graciano (LNU) and Juan
(LNU) and two others (names unknown) were bayoneted to death by the Filipino
and Japanese companions of the accused; that after the killing of the aforesaid
persons, the above-named accused and his companions did gather the corpses of
their victims in the house of Juan Caya and thereafter did set fire to and burn that
house with the dead bodies inside."

Aurelio Calacasan and Jose Canillas, corroborating each other, testified that at
about eight o'clock in the morning of August 12, 1943, while Aurelio Calacasan,
Cosme Calacasan, Anazario Calimutan, Alberto Caborique, Nazario Calacasan,
Marcos Sobrevieja and Jose Canillas and several others were in the barrio of
Anonang, Leon, Iloilo, they were arrested by Japanese soldiers and taken to the
barrio of Taal, of the same municipality, where they saw appellant and his
companions. After setting afire the houses in said barrio, appellant and his
companions brought the prisoners to barrio Agboy, of the same municipality, where
they were investigated regarding their guerilla activities or connections; that during
the investigations, appellant stabbed to death Cosme Calacasan who was a member
of the Bolo Battalion, an auxiliary unit of the guerrillas; that after several prisoners
were killed, their corpses were gathered and placed in a house which was set on
fire.

Count No. 9. Concerning this Count, the amended information recites:

"9. That on or about August 12, 1943, in the municipality of Leon, Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused,
Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the enemy and with
treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and comfort, in his
capacity as agent, informer, spy of the Detective Force, Imperial Japanese Army,
and in company with other Filipino spies and Japanese soldiers, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treasonably conduct and carry out a raid against
and mass arrest of persons suspected as guerrilla soldiers and sympathizers, as a
consequence of which, about eighty persons, male and female, both young and old
were arrested and gathered in a schoolhouse and chapel in the barrio of
Buenavista, and thereat investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein
accused and his companions; that subsequently about thirty persons including
women and children were taken to the house of Aquilino Sales, where about
fourteen persons were bayonetted and killed by Japanese soldiers, namely, Julia
Cabilitasan, Mercedes Calopez, Andrea Cahipo, Eustaquia Cabilinga, Isabel Canag,
Rosalia Calopez, Luz Caldito, Estelita Camorahan, Roman Cabilinga, Tomas Canag,
Luis Cabalfin, Juan Cabalfin, Macario Cabilitasan and Aurelio Caldito; while Paulina
Cantara, Alejandro Calsona and Bienvenido Cabankalan received and sustained
bayonet wounds but survived and were able to escape after the house of aforesaid
Aquilino Sales was set on fire and burned by said patrol of Filipino spies and
Japanese soldiers."
Aquilina Cabilitasan, Bienvenido Cabankalan, Alejandro Calsena and Perpetua
Canag, who testified for the prosecution, corroborating one another, stated that at
about eight o'clock in the morning of August 12, 1943, several residents of barrio
Buenavista, Leon, Iloilo, were arrested by the appellant, who was armed with
revolver and bayonet, and his companions consisting of Filipinos and Japanese
soldiers; that said barrio residents were brought to the barrio schoolhouse where
they were investigated. During the investigation, Julia Cabilitasan was singled out
by the appellant who tied her hands behind her back and brought her under a
"doldol" (kapok) tree, near a chapel, where she was stripped of all her clothings
until she was naked. Appellant investigated her regarding the whereabouts of her
husband who was a USAFFE soldier. Appellant, after severely beating Julia
Cabilitasan, brought her to the house of Aquilino Sales where there were other
Filipino prisoners. Shortly thereafter, appellant and his companions started the
massacre of the prisoners. Appellant stabbed Julia Cabilitasan three times with a
bayonet. In that massacre, fourteen persons including women and children were
killed. Among those killed were Julia Cabilitasan, Macario Cabilitasan, Roman
Cabelenga, Andrea Cahipos and Julia Calpit. Later, said house was set on fire.

Count No. 10. Lastly, the amended information regarding this Count, recites:

"10. That on or about March 18, 1944, in the municipalities of Guimbal and
Tubuñgan, Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-
named accused, Pedro T. Villanueva, with intent to adhere as he did adhere to the
enemy, and with treasonable intent to give as he did give said enemy aid and
comfort, in his capacity as agent, informer and spy of the Detective Force, Imperial
Japanese Army, and in company with other Filipino spies, Bureau of Constabulary
and Japanese soldiers, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably arrest Rosalio Tambirao, Joaquin Escorido, Carolina Escorido, Romero
Escorido, Edgardo Escorido, Editha Escorido, Sofia Tambiras, Raul Tabanda, Nestor
Tabanda, Elena Gierza, Natividad Gersalino, Jovita Gersalino, Ernesto Tambirao,
Ruly Tambirao, Jesusa Jimenez, Eustaquio Tortugalete, Paz Tabora, Basilisa
Taborete, Gloria Escorido, Ciriaco Gierza and several others with unknown names
on the charge that the persohs aforesaid were either guerrilla soldiers,
sympathizers and supporters; that the aforesaid persons were then taken to the
house of Jacinto Toborete, where the herein accused, did then and their investigate,
maltreat, or otherwise torture Basilisa Taborete, Gloria Escorido and Eustaquia
Tortugalete in an effort to make them confess as to their connection with the
guerrilla movement and the whereabouts of the guerrilla soldiers; that
subsequently the herein accused further adhering to the enemy did deliver to a
Japanese executioner Juan Gelario, Felipe Tanato, David Garnica, Juana Tabacoran,
Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana, who were all executed and killed one after
another; that the killing of Juana Tabacoran, Jesusa Jimenez and Luz Tabiana took
place shortly after they were abused and raped by the Japanese and BC soldiers in
the house of Jacinto Taborete; that while this was going on, Jovita Gersalino and
Lourdes Tabanda were taken to another house by the herein accused, Filemon
Palacios, Jr., Vicente Tolosa and a Japanese soldier, where they were abused and
raped; that subsequently the persons gathered were asked who of them were
relatives of Tranquilino Geonanga for they would be released and when an old
woman answered that they were all relatives of Tranquilino Geonanga, the
Japanese soldiers at once started to inflict and deliver bayonet thrusts on the
persons gathered and as a consequence of which about thirty of them were killed
and several were wounded: that subsequently, the herein accused and his
companions proceeded to barrio Buluangan, where one Saturnino (LNU) was
arrested, investigated, maltreated and tortured by the herein accused and later
killed by the Japanese."

Gloria Escprido, Basilisa Gierza and Ciriaco Gierza, testifying in support of this
Count, and corroborating one another, stated that at about seven o'clock in the
morning of March 16, 1944, while the appellant and several Japanese soldiers were
on a punitive expedition in the barrio of Miadan, Guim^al, Iloilo, they arrested the
barrio residents who fled to the Dalihi creek in Tubongan, Iloilo; that the barrio
residents, who were about fifty persons, were brought to the barrio of Laguna,
Tubongan, Iloilo, where they were investigated and maltreated; that during the
investigation, appellant tied the feet of Gloria Escorido, hanged her with her head
downward and beat her with the branch of an "aguho" tree; that appellant likewise
brought to the house of Jacinto Batorete three females, namely, Luz Tabiana,
Jesusa Jimenez and Juana Tabiana where the said girls were abused by the
appellant and his companions; that appellant also bayoneted to death Sofia
Tambirao for the simple reason that she was the cousin of Tranquilino Geonanga,
an officer of the guerrillas; that appellant and his companions massacred on that
occasion around thirty persons, among whom were Jovita Gersalino, Carolina
Escorido, Romero Escorido, Sofia Tambierao, and Edgardo Escorido.

We have, therefore, that appellant not only participated actively in the punitive
raids made by the Japanese soldiers and in arresting and killing Filipino Guerrillas,
but personally manhandled Gloria Escorido, a girl barely 16 years of age at the time
(Count 10), and killed in cold blood Cosme Calacasan by bayoneting him three
times (Count 8), Julia Cabilitasan by likewise bayoneting her three times, with the
added ignominy of stripping her stark naked moments before killing her (Count 9),
and Sofia Tambirao (Count 10.) These specific overt acts of appellant as testified to
by eyewitnesses who have survived the harrowing massacres, speak eloquently
that his adherence to the enemy in giving it aid and comfort, was accompanied by
cruelty and ruthlessness, in wanton disregard of the feelings and decency of his
fellow citizens.

The foregoing facts were not impugned by any evidence for appellant, his defense
in the lower court merely consisting of (1) his denial of the overt acts imputed upon
him, and (2) that if he ever served in the detective force of the Japanese Army
since January 1st, 1944, it was because he was made to accept the position under
duress, and that his acceptance of such position was for the good of the people, He
having saved many Filipino lives from Japanese atrocities.

We have carefully analyzed the evidence on record because of the seriousness of

the charges against appellant, and we find that the evidence for the prosecution is
overwhelming, such that appelant's counse de officio instead of m'ng a brief, made
a manifestation dated November 29, 1955, stating that "after a thorough study of
the records of the case, he finds nothing therein sufficient to disturb the decisions
of the People's Court and of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo imposing capital
punishment on the accused." Said counsel further'stated that "The accused's only
evidence which directly attacked the government's proofs was his denial of what
several witnesses testified to." This manifestation was considered by this Tribunal
as appellant's brief, in its resolution of December 6, 1955. Certainly mere denial by
appellant cannot prevail upon the positive assertion of the witnesses for the
government establishing incriminating facts, for it is a well settled rule of evidence
that as between positive and negative testimony, the former deserves more weight
and credit.

Anent the defense of duress allegedly exerted by the Japanese upon appellant for
which he had to serve in the detective force of the Japanese Army, we agree with
the Solicitor-General that "except the lone and self-serving testimony of the
appellant that he was coerced to cooperate with and serve the Japanese soldiers,
there is not an iota of proof that he was in fact compelled or coerced by the
Japanese. Much less is there any evidence showing that the alleged compulsion or
coercion was grave and imminent."

"Duress, force, fear or intimidation to be available as a defense, must be present,

imminent and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of
future injury is not enough." (16 C. J., 91).

"To be available as a defense, the fear must be well-founded, an immediate and

actual danger of death or great bodily harm must be present and the compulsion
must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to accused for escape or
self-defense in equal combat. It would be a most dangerous rule if a defendant
could shield himself from prosecution for crime by merely setting up a fear from or
because of a threat of a third person." (Wharton's Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 384).

"Fear as an excuse for crime has never been received by the law. No man, from
fear or circumstances to himself has the right to make himself a party to
committing mischief upon mankind" (Lord Denman in Reg. vs. Tyler, 8 Car. and P.
(Eng.) 616, vs. Duddely, L. R. 14, Q. B. Div. (Eng.) 273).

When the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the retaking
of lost testimonies, appellant attempted to give the case a new twist by filing a
motion to quash on the ground that the pardon extended him has already
extinguished his criminal liability and that his conviction by the People's Court had
placed him in jeopardy. This motion was denied, but during the trial appellant was
allowed to present documentary evidence relative to the clemency extended him,
consisting of Exhibit 1 which is a certified copy of his conditional pardon; Exhibit 2,
a certified copy of the letter of the Legal Assistant of the President dated June 30,
1953, addressed to the Director of Prisons; Exhibit 3 the motion to withdraw appeal
filed before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo; and Exhibit 4, the Tribunal's
resolution of September 21, 1953, granting said withdrawal. In addition, appellant
presented an Exhibit 5 the decision of the People's Court in the case of People vs.
Jesus Astrologo, dated December 11, 1947, sentencing him to death; Exhibit 6 the
conditional pardon extended to said accused dated June 27, 1953; and Exhibit 7 the
letter of the Legal Assistant of the Office of the President to the Director of Prisons,
to show that said Jesus Astrologo who is now enjoying his freedom by reason of the
pardon extended, has been allowed by this Tribunal to withdraw his appeal pending
review of his death sentence.

Regarding the alleged pardon granted to appellant, we reiterate our ruling in our
resolution of October 19, 1953, hereinbefore quoted. As to appellant's contention
respecting the applicability of the Astrologo case, we find it untenable, for the
Astrologo case (88 Phil., 423) was elevated to us for review on March 4, 1948; he
filed his brief on October 21, 1949, and we rendered judgment on March 30, 1951,
commuting the sentence to life imprisonment for lack of sufficient vote. The pardon
granted him on June 27, 1953, or more than two years after the final judgment,
was therefore in order, and cannot be invoked by herein appellant as a precedent.

As to the payment of Indemnity in the amount of P2,000 to the respective heirs of

each of the victims of appellant, the Solicitor-General recommends that this amount
imposed by the lower court be increased to P6,000. We find this Recommendation
to be correct, as it is in consonance with the repeated decisions of this Tribunal on
the matter; hence the decision of the lower court should be amended accordingly.
Furthermore, although the facts of the case verily justify the imposition of death
penalty, yet, for lack of sufficient votes said penalty should be, as it is hereby
commuted to reclusion perpetua, in accordance with law.

Wherefore, and with the modifications above indicated, the decision appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion,
Reyes, J. B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. L-2189, March 31, 1950 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CILDO

(ALIAS CELDO CENENTE [CALAGAN]), DIALING (CALAGAN) AND MUDA
(TAGACAOLO), DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANT.

DECISION

OZAETA, J.:

The soul is transfixed in horror by the extreme wantonness and brutality of the
murders involved in this case. Two helpless women and three innocent children
were attacked while asleep and butchered for a most trivial motive in their dwelling
in the sitio of Sacub, barrio of Sinayawan, municipality of Sta. Cruz, province of
Davao, on the night of November 10, 1947. The victims were Cuya Baga Lim, 35;
her children Emilia Lim, 9, and Eli Lim, 8; her maidservant Constancia Bagaan, 30;
and the latter's daughter, Candelaria Bagaan 7.

The nearest neighbor of the victims was the accused Dialang, a non-Christian
belonging to a tribe called Calagan, whose house was only about 30 meters distant
from theirs, iihen he was investigated by the constabulary as to what he knew of
the horrible occurrence he made a statement to this effect: That about five o'clock
in the afternoon of November 10, 1947, he went to the river near his house to fetch
water and there saw and heard Unte Tagacaolo, Cania Galagan, Faustino
Tagacaolo, Muda Tagacaolo, Cildo Galagan, and I-iakinista Calagan conversing and
plotting to kill the Chinese widow named Cuya who owned a store near his house;
that Unte proposed to kill Cuya because she had much money, she having just sold
some corn; that Faustino seconded the proposition because she sold her wares at
an exorbitant price; that he (Dialang) tried to dissuade them from their evil
purpose, even telling then that Cuya was the only one who owned a store near
then, and that he left them still planning to kill her; that during the night of
November 10, prayers were being said in the house of Cuya which ended about ten
o'clock; that not long after that Cania Calagan and four others came to his house
and called for Muda Tagacaolo, who was already in his (Dialang's) house vraiting;
that Muda joined them and while downstairs they all agreed to continue their plan
but waited for some time because it was still early; that he (Dialang) was afraid and
tried his best to advise them not to commit the crime, but Faustino warned him to
keep quiet or else they would also kill him; that about twelve o'clock they left and
went directly to the store; that Cania was armed with a home-made shotgun; Cildo,
with an ax, and the others with bolos; that while they were walking towards the
store of Cuya he (Dialang) followed them and hid himself among the bananas in
front of the store; that Cildo Calagan called the Chinese woman on pretext to buy
some dried fish; that when the store was opened Gildo entered first, Unte next, and
then Faustino and Makinista followed; that Cania Calagan guarded the main door of
the store while Muda guarded the kitchen door; that immediately he heard a
woman cry inside and then heard a shot; that a crying child was able to escape
outside through the kitchen but was pursued and killed by Muda; that because he
was very much afraid he returned to his house and waited till norning, when he
reported the case to Mr. Pio Acot, president of the parents-teachers association of
Sacub. (Exhibit B.)

Upon being apprehended Muda, another non-Christian belonging to a tribe called

Tagacaolo, admitted his participation in the crime, saying that he was called by
Cania and Faustino and that he went with them because he was afraid they might
kill him; that his companions were Faustino, Cildo, Cania, Unte, and Hakinista; that
during the attack one girl was able to escape through the kitchen but that he was
able to catch and kill her; that Cania found some money and gave him some
amount near the school-house of Sacub and after that they all returned to their
respective homes; and that the following morning he escaped to Mandulog where
he was apprehended bj soldiers. (Exhibit C.)

The constabulary filed a complaint for robbery with multiple homicide against
Dialang and all the persons implicated by him in his statement.
When the case was called before the justice of the peace of Sta. Cruz for
preliminary investigation, the accused Cildo and Muda pleaded guilty and swore to
written statements before the justice of the peace to the effect that Dialang was
their ringleader and that they (Cildo and Muda) were induced by him to participate
in the commission of the crime. They made no mention of the accused Unte, Cania,
Faustina, and I'lakinista, and the constabulary said it had no proof against them.
The complaint was then and there amended by excluding the said accused and
including only Cildo, Muda, and Dialang.

After the preliminary investigation Dialang, who pleaded not guilty, admitted before
Policeman Felicisimo Bolado of Sta. Cruz in a conversation they had at the
municipal jail that he (Dialang) was there confined because he had killed Cuya Lim,
Eli, and Candelaria. The policeman reported that conversation later to the chief of
police, Tamoteo Aguilar, who took Dialang's statement by question-and-answer in
writing and later brought Dialang before the justice of the peace where Dialang
swore to and thumbmarked his said statement Exhibit E after the justice of the
peace had explained to him its contents and asked him whether they were true.

After the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance Judge Enrique A. Fernandez
found the accused Dialang and Muda guilty of five separate crimes of murder
(acquitting them of robbery for lack of sufficient evidence) and sentenced each of
them to life imprisonment for each of the five murders with an indemnity of P2,000
in each case. The accused Cildo was found guilty as an accomplice of each of the
five murders and was sentenced in each case to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
4 years, 2 months, and 1 day of prisi6n correccional as minimum to 10 years and 1
day of prisi6n mayor as maximum, with the appropriate indemnity in each case.
From that sentence the three accused have appealed.

The main proofs against the accused are their respective confessions before the
justice of the peace of Sta. Cruz—Exhibits E (by Dialang), F (by Cildo) and G (by
Muda); and the only question before us is whether said confessions were made
voluntarily and with full knowledge of the facts therein narrated.

The accused Dialang, 58, is married to a sister of the accused Muda, 40, and is the
grandfather of the accused Cildo, 17.

Timoteo Acot, one of the neighbors of the victims, testified that about 6:30 in the
morning of November 11, 1947, Dialang came to his house and told him that Cuya
had been robbed and that there was plenty of blood and many died. This witness
testified: "I asked him, 'Why is it that you did not find out what happened before
you came here?' He said he was afraid. I told him to go to the barrio lieutenant, but
he refused on account of the distance. He insisted that I should go with hin to find
out what happened and because of that I went with him. We went to the place of
the incident, to the house of Cuya Daga Lira. On our way we met the rural
policeman and I told him to report to the barrio lieutenant."

Juan Armilla, sergeant of the constabulary, testified in substance as follows: About

one o'clock in the afternoon of November 12, 1947, I was assigned to investigate
the killing at Sacub, Sta. Cruz, Davao. I went to the place where the dead persons
were. The nearest neighbor is Dialang. I asked him whether he heard any cry or
shout of persons that night inasmuch as he is near the place, lie said that he did
not hear. I asked him whether some persons happened to sleep in his house and he
said Muda slept there on the 10th of November. I asked him where Muda was and
he said he was no longer there. I took him around to the neighbors of his house. On
November 13 Dialang admitted that Makinista, Cildo, and Cania Calagan were the
ones who killed the Chinese. I got these men and brought them to Malalag. I
delivered them to Captain Castillo and the latter and another sergeant investigated
them. I arrested Muda in Bocalil on November 18. On the way to Malalag I
investigated him and he admitted that he was the companion of Dialang in killing
those persons. I brought him to Malalag and turned him over to the company
commander and he was investigated by Sergeant Fabiania.

David Fabiania, sergeant of the constabulary, testified that he investigated the

accused Dialang and wrote his statement Exhibit B which he (Dialang) later
thumbmarked before the justice of the peace; that he also took the statement of
Muda (Exhibit C) and that the latter affixed his thumbmark to it before the justice
of the peace of Sta. Cruz, who asked Muda if the contents were true after it was
translated to Muda in the Oebuano Visayan dialect. He further testified in substance
as follows: On November 24, 1947, Muda was brought to the justice of the peace of
Sta. Cruz for preliminary trial. After the trial I had a conversation with him. He told
me that the bolo he used in the commission of the crime was thrown bj him into the
river. Because he was already delivered to the jailer at ota. Cruz, I requested
permission to bring Muda with me to recover the bolo. lie also said that there was a
khaki pant which he took from the house of Cuya Daga Lim and which he also
threw away. I brought him to the place where he said he threw the khaki pant and
the bolo. When we arrived at the place I asked him to look for the bolo and khaki
pants. He could not find them because during those days it was rainy season and
the river had overflowed its banks.

Felicisimo Bolado, patrolman of Sta. Cruz, Davao, testified in substance as follows:

On November 24, I was sergeant of the guard and I inspected the municipal jail
and found Cania, Cildo, and Dialang there. I asked them what crime they were
charged with and Dialang answered that he had killed Cuya Lim, Eli, and Candelaria
and that his companion was Muda, who killed Emilia and Constancia. I asked him
why he killed them and he said that at nine o'clock in the morning Cuya tried to
collect from him his indebtedness of P7 and that he was not able to pay his
indebtedness and Cuya got angry and scolded him, calling him a shameless Calagan
and slapped him on his left cheek and he showed to me one of his teeth which was
moving due to the slapping. During that conversation Cildo and Cania were present.
At that time Muda was with the MPC. The chief of pollco was absent. When he
arrived on November 26 I reported to him the confession given to me by Dialang.
He sent for Dialang and asked him whether he was the one who killed at Sacub and
Dialang answered yes. The chief of police took his affidavit in Visayan. After the
affidavit was finished Biclang was brought before the justice of the peace with the
affidavit which is Exhibit E. The justice of the peace read the affidavit and asked
Dialang whether the contents are true and he answered they are true.
Timoteo Aguilar, chief of police of Sta. Cruz, testified in substance as follows: On
the morning of November 24, 1947, I investigated Muda and Cildo. They were
brought out of the jail to my office preparatory to the preliminary investigation
which was set on that day and in my investigation they admitted before me that
they committed the crime charged. After I was convinced that what they told me
was true I typed their statements. After typing their statements I took them to the
justice of the peace to have their oaths taken. Exhibit F is the statement of Cildo
and Exhiibit G is the statement of Muda. The justice of the peace read and
explained to the accused the contents of Exhibits F and G and after reading and
explaining to them they were asked if the contents were true and the accused Cildo
and Muda said yes. After the preliminary investigation Sergeant Fabiania asked
permission from me to bring with him Muda in order to show to Sergeant Fabiania
the river or place where Muda had thrown the west point cloth and the bolo. I was
informed later that they "were not able to recover those things because on the
previous days the river overflowed its banks and probably those things were carried
away by the flood. On November 26, when I reported to the office, Patrolman
Bolado approached me and told me that Dialang had confessed to him and
admitted to have participated in the killing of Cuya Lim and companions at Dacub.
Immediately I ordered the guard to bring Dialang to me. When Dialang was before
me I confronted him with the report made by Bolado and Dialang readily admitted
that the conversation lie had with Bolado was true. On November 27 I took him
before the justice of the peace with his statement Exhibit E. The justice of the
peace ordered patrolman Bolado to read and translate the affidavit to Dialang.

Artemio Cometa, justice of the peace of Sta. Cruz, testified for the prosecution and
vouched for the authenticity and voluntariness of the different confessions made by
the accused and thumbmarked and sworn to by each of them before him, assuring
the court that each of the accused thumbmarked his confession before him after
the contents were translated and explained to him in the Visayan dialect and after
each had affirmed before him (the J. P.) that they were true.

We shall disregard the first statements made by the accused Dialang and Muda to
the constabulary, Exhibits B and C, as inaccurate and consider onl;r their
statements, Exhibits E, F, and G, taken subsequently by the chief of police of Sta.
Cruz.

Exhibits E and E-1, translated into English as Exhibits E-2 and E-3, read as follows:

"I, Dialang Calagan, of legal age, married and a resident of Sacub, Padada, Sta.
Cruz, Davao, after having been duly sworn according to law, depose and say:

"Q. In the evening of November 10, 1947, what happened in Sacub, Sta. Cruz,
Davao?—A. Cuya, Tanciang, two children of Cuya (Emilia and Eli) and one child of
Tanciang, Candelaria, were killed.

"Q. Who killed them?—A. I killed Cuya, Eli and Candelaria, and Kuda killed Tanciang
and Emilia.
"Q. why did you kill those persons?—A. I killed them because I was slanderously
scolded by Cuya and her children. I was put to shame and I could no longer endure.

"Q. You said that you were put to shame; what then happened between you and
Cuya?—A. I was indebted to Cuya in the amount of P7. She tried to collect from me
my debt on Sunday at about 9:00 A.M. I told her to please wait for a while as I was
going to harvest yet my corn. But she slanderously reprimanded me and put me to
shame. She called me a Calagan without manners. Her children helped also in
defaming me. And I was slapped by Cuya on my left face.

"Q. When did you think or decide to kill Cuya?—A. Muda arrived at my house at
12:00 noon, Monday, November. 10, 1947. In the afternoon I decided to kill Cuya
because Muda was already there who could help me.

"Q From the time you decided to kill Cuya please state what you actually did until
you consimmated your plot.—A. At about 5:00 P.M., Monday, I told Muda of my
plan to kill Cuya. I told him the reasons ana because he is my brother-in-law he
sympathized with me and he acceded. I tola also Muda that I will call for Cildo to
accompany us. In the evening, after the prayer (novena) in the house of Cuya, I
went to the house where Cildo lived and woke him up without the knowledge of his
housemates. I told Cildo of my plan while on the way to my house. At the outset
Cildo did not like to consent, but I forced him, he being my grandson and I
promised him that he will just stay outside. Aaien we arrived at our house I woke
up Muda so that we can leave without the knowledge of my wife and children. At
about 12:00 midnight we left for the house of Cuya. I then opened the back door of
the kitchen and entered followed by Muda while Oildo stayed outside, "when we
entered we already drew our bolos from the scabbard. We saw Cuya and
companions sleeping as there was a light from the lamp. I immediately stabbed and
slashed Cuya until she died and then I killed lili and Candelaria. lluda killed first
Tanciang and because Emilia ran outside I ordered Muda to follow her and he killed
Emilia. When they were dead already I got one khaki pant. When Muda reentered
the house after killing Emilia, we left passing thru the main door. The short west
point khaki pant was taken by me from a hanger inside the store. When we went
out I gave the pant to Muda and then we returned to our house while Cildo went to
ths house where he was living. Early the next morning Muda returned to the
mountains.

"Q. Why did you not also kill the two other children of Cuya?—A. We did not kill
them because they could not yet talk and as such they could not report.

"Q. Why did you kill Tanciang and her daughter when they are not your enemies?—
A. We killed them because they will report what we have done.

"Q.. In your affidavit which you have sworn to before the Justice of the Peace, Sta.
Cruz, Davao, on November lo, 1947, you stated that Cania, Fnustino, Makinista,
Unte, Cildo and lluda were the ones who killed Cuya and companions, and now you
stated again that the ones who killed are Muda, Cildo and you, which is now true?—
A. The truth is Void a and myself while Cildo accompanied us only and he stayed
outside of the house.

"Q. why did you report Cania, Makinista, Faustino and Unte when in fact they are
innocent?—A. I reported them because I was afraid of the MPC and so that it will
not be known that I was the one who killed.

"Q. What else did you get from the store of Cuya?—A. Nothing else except the west
point pant, we were not able to get the money because we were in a hurry to get
out due to fear of being discovered.

"Q. When you were investigated by the authorities in Sacub why did you not tell the
truth?—A. At the beginning I did not tell the truth as I was afraid that I will be killed
by the MPC, but later when there were no more MPC I told the truth to a policeman
of Sta. Cruz.

"Q. Do you have anything more to say?—A. No more.

"Q. Do you swear to the truth of the foregoing statenient and that it is your own
free and voluntary declaration without force, threat or intimidation nor any promise
of reward of any kind?—A. Yes, sir.

"Witness:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police
(marked)
"Dialang Calagan
"Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of November, 1947, at Sta.
Cruz, Davao.
(Sgd.) "Artemio Cometa
"Justice of the Peace
"Note: The above confession xjonsists of two pages. The confession was read to the
affiant by Patrolman Felicisirno Bolado before said affiant swore it before the
undersigned.
(Sgd.) "Artemio Cometa
"Translated by:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police"

Exhibit F, translated into English as Exhibit F-1, reads as follows:

"I, Cildo Cemente (Calagan), of age, single, farmer and a resident of Sacub,
Padada, Sta. Cruz, Davao, after having been duly sworn to, depose and say:

"Q. On Monday, the 10th of this month where were you?—A. I was in our house
and in the evening I went to the house of Cuya to attend the novena.
"Q. After the novena was finished where did you go?—A. I went home to sleep.

"Q. Did. you see Dialang on the night of Monday?.—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Where?—A. When I was already sleeping I was awakened by Dialang and he
told me that we will kill Cuya so that he could get the money of Cuya to pay his
debt to Muda. I refused when he told me but he forced me and for fear that he will
kill me I went with him.

"Q. From your house where did you go and what did you do?—A. Dialang brought
me to his house and then he awakened i-iuda. when Muda was awakened Dialang
again said that we will kill Cuya. It was about 12:00 midnight more or less we went
to the house of Cuya bringing with us our respective bolos. When we arrived at the
house of Cuya Dialang opened the back door and he entered followed by Muda. I
stayed outside listening. I heard that they were hacking and stabbing the people
inside and then a child ran out of the house. Dialang ordered Muda. to run after the
child. Muda ran after the child and he stabbed and killed also the child. Not long
after Dialang came out bringing with him "West Point khaki good for one pantalon.
This was given to Muda and Dialang said that he was able to get money in the
amount of P100.00 but he did not give me anything. After that I went home while
Dialang and Muda went together.

"Q. "Why did you not report the matter to the authorities?—A. Because I was
advised by Dialang not to tell anybody and I was afraid that Dialang might kill me.

"Q. Do you have anything more to say?—A. No more.

"Q. Do you swear to the truth of the foregoing without force, threat or intimidation
nor promise of reward of any kind and that the above is your free and voluntary
statement?—A. Yes, sir.

"Witness:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police
(marked)
"Cildo Cenente
" Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of November, 1947, at Sta.
Cruz, Davao.
(Sgd.) "Artemio Cometa
"Justice of the Peace
"Translated from original Visayan confession of Cildo Cenente by:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police
November 26, 1947"

Exhibit G, translated into English as Exhibit G-1, reads as follows:

"I, Muda Tagacaolo, of age, married, farmer and a resident of Magdolog, Sta. Cruz,
Davao, after having been duly sworn in accordance to law, depose and say:

"Q. Where were you on Monday, the 10th of this month?—A. I went to Dialang
Galagan at Sacub to collect his debt of a horse and I arrived at his house at 12
noon.

"Q. On the night of Monday where were you?—A. In the house of Dialang.

"Q. During the time you were in the house of Dialang what happened to you?—A. At
about 12 midnight I was awakened by Dialang and when I woke up Cildo was
already there. Dialang said that we will kill Cuya.

"Q. From the time you have agreed (to kill Cuya) what did you do?—A. We went to
the store of Cuya. When we arrived, Dialang opened the door in the kitchen and he
entered followed by Cildo and me. We saw that everybody were sleeping in the
house. Then Dialang stabbed Cuya and Cildo stabbed Constancia. When Cuya died
he (Dialang} also hacked the two children. When we were stabbing one of the
children ran out of the house in the direction of the toilet, When Dialang saw he
ordered me to run after the child so that I also ran out and killed the child, life used
our respective bolos in killing those people. After I killed the ehild outside I did not
enter anymore inside the store. I only waited for them outside.

"Q. Why did you know whom Dialang and Cildo killed?—A. I saw them because of
the light of the lamp (lamparilla). did they bring? A. Dialang brought West Point
Khaki good for one pantalon and he gave it to me.

"Q. Where is that West Point given to you?—A. When I went to Bocalil I threw it
into the river together with my bolo because I was afraid of what we have done.

"Q. How much money were you able to get from the store?—A. I did not know
because they did not give me anything.

"Q. After you have robbed and killed those people where did you go?—A. Dialang
and myself returned to his house while Cildo returned to his house also. Early in
that morning Dialang ordered me to return to the mountains.

"Q. You have anything more to say on this investigation?—A. No more.

"Q. Do you swear to the truth of the foregoing statement freely and voluntarily
without any force, threat or intimidation or any promise of reward of any kind?—A.
Yes, sir.

"Witness:
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
(marked)
"Muda Tagacaolo
" Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of November, 1947, at Sta.
Cruz, Davao.
(Sgd.) "Artemio Cometa
"Justice of the Peace
: "Translated from original Visayan confession of Cildo Cenente by
(Sgd.) "Teotimo S. Aguilar
"Chief of Police
November 26, 1947"

As against the foregoing evidence for the prosecution, the evidence for the defense
consists merely in the denial by each of the accused of any knowledge of the
contents of their respective confessions.

Dialang testified that the contents of his confessions Exhibits B and E are not true.
He said: "I did not know what I was signing, whether it was good or not. When they
prepared Exhibits B and B-1 I was sleeping. I did not know where they prepared it.
I learned of this in the following morning." This witness, however, cannot be
believed because his testimony shows that he had no regard for the truth. We
quote a portion of his testimony on direct examination as follows:

"Q. Did you, Cildo and Muda ever go to the house of Cuya on the night of
November 10, 1947?—A. No, sir, I was sick, I was wearing a patadyong. I stated
those statements because they threatened me with the revolver, they pointed to
me the revolver.

"Q. Did they not explain to you the contents of Exhibits E and E-1?—A. No, sir.

"Q. In exhibits E and E-1 it appears that you appeared before the justice of the
peace; is it true that you appeared before the justice of the peace in connection
with exhibits 2 and E-1?—A. No, sir.

"Q. Please tell the truth, because I myself I am convinced that you appeared before
the justice of the peace. Did you really not appear before the justice of the peace in
connection with exhibits E and E-1?—A. No, sir."

Thus Dialang denied under oath having appeared before the justice of the peace to
sign Exhibit E, although his own attorney believed, and it had been clearly
established, that he did appear. As between his testimony and that of the justice of
the peace, the chief of police, and Patrolman Bolado, we find that the trial court did
not err in rejecting the former and in accepting the latter.

The testimony of Teopisto Capul, provincial warden of the City of Davao, as a

witness for the defense, to the effect that on December 2, 1947, the accused
Dialang was sent to the public hospital because he complained that one of his ribs
was dislocated, has no decisive weight because such complaint of the accused was
not verified either by the warden himself or by a doctor of the hospital. It was a
mere self-serving statement of the accused, and the accused himself did not testify
during the trial that one of his ribs was damaged due to any maltreatment inflicted
by an officer of the law to extract a confession from him. Besides, the testimony of
the provincial warden that Dialang could not walk alone and had to be held by other
prisoners was contradicted by the next witness for the defense, Generoso
Evangelico, who testified that he was the one who received Dialang in the provincial
jail on November 29 and that Dialang could walk alone, although with difficulty.
Dialang in his testimony repeatedly asserted that he suffered from a boil.

The accused Cildo, also a Calagan, who pleaded guilty before the justice of the
peace, according to the record and according to the latter's testimony, denied that
he entered that plea. He said that he was maltreated by the soldiers in the house of
Dialang. On cross-examination he testified in part as follows:

"Q. And during that preliminary investigation of the case the justice of the peace
asked you whether you were guilty of the murder of Cuya, and you answered the
justice of the peace that you were guilty?—A. I stated I was not guilty.

"Q. Just tell the truth, is it not true that you said yes, there were many people
there?—A. I stated I was not guilty.

"Q. And during the time that the justice of the peace was asking you, your other
coaccused were there, hearing your confession, is that not true?—A. I did not say
that I was guilty.

"Q. And during that investigation or preliminary investigation of your case the
justice of the peace showed you a paper and asked you to thirnbmark that paper, is
that right?—A. I was made to sign certain caper but I did not know what it was.

"Q. But it was the justice of the peace who asked you to thumbmark on that paper,
is that right?—A. He said to sign it because it is for our own good.

"Q. And when you put your thurabmark on said paper, all your coaccused were
present, is that true?—A. They were there and they saw.

"Q. They also heard your conversation with the justice of the peace relative to that
paper on which you were placing your thumbmark?—A. Maybe they heard, because
they were there.

"Q. And after you narked that paper, the justice of the peace called your coaccused
Muda and had a talk with him, is that true?—A. Me was asked.

"Q. And the justice of the peace showed Muda some paper and asked Muda to
thumbmark that paper, is that true?—A. Muda was forced to sign.

"Q. Who forced him?—A. The justice of the peace.

"Q. What did the justice of the peace say in having Mud a sign that paper?—A. He
said to sign it because it is for his own good."
The accused Muda, who lived in Bocalil, about two days' walk from Sacub, admitted
that on the night of November 10, 1947, he was in Sacub, to ask his sister, the wife
of Dialang, to help him harvest his palay, but that she could not go with him
because her husband Dialang was sick with a boil. He testified that he was forced to
thumbmark his concfession, Exhibits G and G-1. From the testimony of this accused
it also appears that he has little or no regard for the truth. We quote from his
testimony on cross-examination as follows:

"Q. You remember that during the preliminary investigation the justice of the peace
had a talk with you right in his court, is that right?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. The justice of the peace spoke to you about the killing of Cuya and members of
her family, is that right?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And during that preliminary investigation the justice of the peace showed to you
some document which you thurnbmarkeilater on, is that right?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q.. And during your conversation with the justice of the peace and during the time
that you were talking with him about the killing of Cuya Lira and some members of
her family there were plenty of people who were inside the Court room, is it not?—
A. Many people.

"Q. And during your conversation with the justice of the peace your coaccused
Dialang and Cildo were present and hearing that conversation, is that right?—A.
They were not.

"Q. They were not there?—A. They were there but they did not hear our
conversation, myself and the justice of the peace.

"Q. And during that occasion the justice of the peace also had a talk with Cildo, is it
not?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And their conversation was about the killing of Cuya Lim and some members of
her family, is it not?—A. No, sir.

"Q. But you have just told us that they had conversation. Tell the truth.—A. No, sir.

"Q. What were they talking about?—A. They were not talking anything.

"Q. Is it not true that during that occasion Cildo also thumbmarked some paper?—
A. No, sir.

"Q. Are you sure of that?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. I want to call your attention that Cildo has testified here and stated that he had
thumbmarked certain paper in your presence at the office of the justice of the
peace. Tell the truth now.—A. There was none.
"Q. But Cildo was present during that occasion?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And so also was Dialang?—A. Yes, sir.

"Q. So it is not true then that the two were not present?—A. They were there."

We do not accept confessions readily and without due care and caution because we
are aware that some officers of the law resort to the illegal and. reprehensible
tactics of extorting confessions thru violence and intimidation (People vs.
Tipay, G.R. Mo. 49014, March 31, 1944[*]). But in the present case we believe with
the trial judge that the confessions of the accused were voluntary and true. The fact
that the four individuals who were at first implicated by Dialang and Kuda and who
were also arrested and included in the original complaint were not forced to sign
any confession or statement, tends to show that the constabulary and the local
police acted properly in handling this case.

The Solicitor General recommends affirmance and we find his recommendation in

order. The judgment is affirmed, with costs.

[ Commonwealth Act No. 616, June 04, 1941 ]

AN ACT TO PUNISH ESPIONAGE AND OTHER OFFENSES AGAINST THE

NATIONAL SECURITY.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. Unlawfully obtaining or permitting to be obtained information affecting

national defense.— (a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information
respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information
to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the Philippines or of the United States,
or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or
otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense,
navy yard, naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo,
station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine, telegraph,
telephone, wireless, or signal station, building, office, or other place connected with
the national defense, owned or constructed, or in progress of construction by the
Philippines or by the United States or under the control of the Philippines or of the
United States, or any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Philippines or of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft,
arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for the use in time of war are
being made, prepared, repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with
the Philippines or the United States, or with any person on behalf of the Philippines
or the United States, or any prohibited place within the meaning of section six
hereof; or

(b) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, and with like intent or reason to believe,
copies, takes, makes, or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy,
take, make, or obtain, any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print,
plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything
connected with the national defense; or

(c) Whoever, for the purpose aforesaid, receives or obtains or agrees or attempts
or induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source
what ever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph,
photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note
of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to
believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids
another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or
disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this Act; or

(d) Whoever, lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or
being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch,
photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument,
appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates or
transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not
entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand
to the officer or employee of the Philippines or of the United States entitled to
receive it; or

(e) Whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any
document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blue print, plan, map. model, note or information, relating to the national
defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper
place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of this trust or to be lost, stolen,
abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten
years and may, in addition thereto, be fined not more than ten thousand pesos.

SEC. 2. Unlawful disclosing information affecting national defense.— (a) Whoever,

with the intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the
Philippines or of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation,
communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to,
communicate, deliver, or transmit to any foreign government, or any faction or
party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or
unrecognized by the Philippines or by the United States, or to any representative,
officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any
document, writing code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic
negative, blue print, plan, map, model, instrument', appliance, or information
relating to the national defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more
than twenty years, if the offense is committed in time of peace, or by death or
imprisonment for not more than thirty years, if it is in time of war.

(b) Whoever, in time of war with intent that the same shall be communicated to the
enemy, shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or attempt to elicit any
information with respect to the movement, number, description, condition, or
disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the
Philippines or of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or
supposed plans or conduct of any military, naval, or air operations, or with respect
to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the
fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public
defense which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by
imprisonment for not more than thirty years.

SEC. 3. Disloyal acts or works in time of peace.— It shall be unlawful for any
person, with intent to interfere with, impair, or influence the loyalty, morale, or
discipline of the military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines or of the United
States: (a) to advise, counsel, urge, or in any manner cause insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military, naval, or air
forces of the Philippines or of the United States; or (b) to distribute any written or
printed matter which advises, counsels, or urges insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty by any member of the military, naval, or air forces of the
Philippines or of the United States. The violation of this section shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than ten years, or by fine not more than ten thousand
pesos, or both.

SEC. 4. Disloyal acts or words in time of war. — Whoever, when the Philippines or
the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false
statements with the intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military,
naval, or air forces of the Philippines or of the United States or to promote the
success of its enemies shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military, naval, or air forces of the
Philippines or the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or
enlistment service of the Philippines or of the United States, to the injury of the
service of the Philippines or of the United States, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or by a fine of not more than twenty
thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 5. Conspiracy to violate preceding sections. — If two or more persons conspire

to violate the provisions of sections one, two, three, or four of this Act, and one or
more of such persons does not act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each of
the parties to such conspiracy shall be punished as in said sections provided in the
case of the doing of the act the accomplishment of which is the object of such
conspiracy.

SEC. 6. Harboring or concealing violators of the law. — Whoever harbors or

conceals any person who he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect,
has committed, or is about to commit, an offense under this Act, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not more than ten years and may, in addition thereto, be fined
not more than ten thousand pesos.

SEC. 7. Designation of prohibited places by proclamation. — The President of the

Philippines in time of war or in case of national emergency may by proclamation
designate any place other than those set forth in subsection (a) of section one
hereof in which anything for the use of the army, navy, or air forces are being
prepared or constructed or stored as a prohibited place for the purpose of this Act:
Provided, That he shall determine that information with respect thereto would be
prejudicial to the national defense.

SEC. 8. Photographing, etc., defensive installations regulated; penalties. —

Whenever, in the interests of national defense, the President of the Philippines shall
define certain vital military, naval, or air installations or equipment as requiring
protection against the general dissemination of information relative thereto, it shall
be unlawful to make any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical
representation of such vital military, naval, and air installations or equipment
without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the military, naval,
or air post, camp, or station concerned, or higher authority and promptly
submitting the product obtained to such commanding officer or higher authority for
censorship or such other action as he may deem necessary. Any person found
guilty of a violation of this section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more
than one year, or by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 9. Photographing, etc., from aircraft. — Any person who uses or permits or
procures the use of an aircraft for the purpose of making a photograph, sketch,
picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation of vital military naval or air
installations or equipment, in violation of section eight of this Act, shall be liable to
the penalty therein provided.

SEC. 10. Reproducing, publishing, selling, etc., un-censored copies. — After the
President of the Philippines shall have defined any vital military, naval, or air
installation or equipment as being within the category contemplated under section
eight of this Act, it shall bs unlawful for any person to reproduce, publish, sell, or
give away any photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map or graphical
representation of the vital military, naval, or air installations or equipment so
defined, without first obtaining permission of the commanding officer of the
military, naval, or air post, camp, or station concerned, or higher authority, unless
such photograph, sketch, picture, drawing, map, or graphical representation has
clearly indicated thereon that it has been censored by the proper military, naval, or
air authority. Any person found guilty of a violation of this section shall be punished
as provided in section eight of this Act.

SEC. 11. Destroying or injuring or attempting to injure or destroy war material in

time of war. — When the Philippines or the United States is at war, whoever, with
intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines or the United States or
any associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war, or whoever, with
reason to believe that his act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines
or the United States or any associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war,
shall willfully injure or destroy, or shall attempt to so injure or destroy, any war
material, war premises, or war utilities, as herein defined, shall be imprisoned not
more than thirty years or be fined not more than thirty thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 12. Making or causing war material to be made in defective manner. — When
the Philippines or the United States is at war, whoever, with intent to injure,
interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines or the United States or any associate
nation in preparing for or carrying on the war, or whoever, with reason to believe
that his act may injure, interfere with, or obstruct the Philippines or the United
States or any associate nation in preparing for or carrying on the war, shall willfully
make or cause to be made in a defective manner,, or attempt to make or cause to
be made in a defective manner, any war material, as herein defined, or any tool,
implement, machine, utensil, or receptacle used or employed in making, producing,
manufacturing or repairing any such war material as herein defined, shall be
imprisoned not more than thirty years or be fined not more than thirty thousand
pesos, or both.

SEC. 13. Injuring or destroying national defense material, premises, or utilities. —

Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of
the Philippines or the United States shall willfully injure or destroy, or shall attempt
to so injure or destroy, any national defense material, national defense premises, or
national defense utilities, as herein provided, shall be imprisoned not more than ten
years or be fined not more than ten thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 14. Making or causing to be made in a defective manner, or attempting to

make or cause to be made in a defective manner, national defense material. —
Whoever, with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the national defense of
the Philippines or of the United States, shall willfully make or cause to be made in a
defective manner, or attempt to make or cause to be made in a defective manner,
any national defense material, as herein defined, or any tool, implement, machine,
utensil, or receptable used or employed in making, producing, manufacturing, or
repairing any such national defense material, as herein defined, shall be imprisoned
not more than ten years, or fined not more than ten thousand pesos, or both.

SEC. 15. Definition of terms. — The term "aircraft" as used in this Act means any
contrivance known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation or flight
in the air. The expression "post, camp, or station" as used in this Act shall be
interpreted to include naval vessels, military and naval aircraft, and any separate
military, naval or air command.

The words "war or national defense material" as used herein shall include arms,
armament, ammunition, livestock, stores of clothing, food, foodstuffs, or fuel; and
shall also include supplies, munitions, and all other articles of whatever description,
and any part or ingredient thereof intended for, adapted to, or suitable for the use
of the Philippines or the United States, or any associate nation, in connection with
the conduct of war or national defense.

The words "war or national defense premises," as used herein, shall include all
buildings, grounds, mines, or other places wherein such war or national defense
material is being produced, manufactured, repaired, stored, mined, extracted,
distributed, loaded, unloaded, or transported, together with all machinery and
appliances therein contained; and all ports, arsenals, navy yards, prisons, camps,
or other military, naval, or air stations of the Philippines or the United States or any
associate nation.
The words "war or national defense utilities," as used herein, shall include all
railroads, railways, electric lines, roads of whatever description, railroad or railway
fixture, canal, lock, dam, wharf, pier, dock, bridge, building, structure, engine,
machine, mechanical contrivance, car, vehicle, boat, or aircraft, or any other means
of transportation whatsoever, whereon or whereby such war or national defense
material or any troops of the Philippines or of the United States, or of any associate
nation, are being or may be transported either within the limits of the Philippines or
the United States or upon the high seas; and all dams, reservoirs, aqueducts, water
and gas mains, oil or gasoline stations, pipes, structures, and buildings, whereby or
in connection with which water, or gas, or oil, or gasoline, or other fluid is being-
furnished, or may be furnished, to any war or national defense premises or to the
military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines or the United States, or any associate
nation, and all electric light and power, steam or pneumatic power, telephone, and
telegraph plants, poles, wires, and fixtures and wireless stations, and the buildings
connected with the maintenance and operation thereof used to supply water, light,
heat, gas, oil, gasoline, fluid, power, or facilities of communication to any war or
national defense premises or to the military, naval, or air forces of the Philippines
or of the United States, or any associate nation.

The words "associate nation," as used in this chapter, shall be deemed to mean any
nation at war with any nation with which the Philippines or the United States is at
war.

The words "foreign government," as used in this Act, shall be deemed to include
any government, faction, or body of insurgents within a country with which the
Philippines or United States is at peace, which government, faction, or body of
insurgents may or may not have been recognized by the Philippines or the United
States as a government.

SEC. 16. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, June 4, 1941.

 [ BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 39, September 07, 1979 ]

AN ACT REGULATING THE ACTIVITIES AND REQUIRING THE

REGISTRATION OF FOREIGN AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES.

Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:

SECTION 1. Title.—This Act shall be known as the "Foreign Agents Act of 1979".

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It shall be the purpose and policy of this Act for
reasons of national security and interest to regulate the activities of foreign agents
and to require them to register and to disclose their political activities in the
Republic of the Philippines, so that the government and the people of the
Philippines may be informed of their identity and may appraise their statements
and actions.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of this Act—

1. "Person" refers to an individual, partnership, association, corporation or any

other combination of individuals.
2. "Foreign principal" refers to the government of a foreign country or a foreign
political party; a foreigner located within or outside the jurisdiction of the
Republic of the Philippines; or a partnership, association, corporation,
organization or other entity owned or controlled by foreigners.
3. "Foreign agent" refers to any person who acts or agrees to act as political
consultant, public relations counsel, publicity agent, information
representative, or as agent, servant, representative, or attorney for a foreign
principal or for any domestic organization subsidized directly or indirectly in
whole or in part by a foreign principal. The term "foreign agent" shall not
include a duly accredited diplomatic or consular officer of a foreign country or
officials of the United Nations and its agencies and of other international
organizations recognized by the Republic of the Philippines while engaged in
activities within the scope of their legitimate functions as such officers or
a bona fide member or employee of a foreign press service or news
organization while engaged in activities within the scope of his legitimate
functions as such.
4. "Political activity" refers to political propaganda or any other activity which
seeks in any reasonable degree to prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert,
induce, persuade, or in any other way influence any agency or official of the
Philippine Government, or any section of the public within the Philippines
with respect to the domestic or foreign policies of the Philippines, or with
respect to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a foreign
government or a foreign political party.
5. "Political propaganda" refers to any oral, visual, graphic, written, pictorial, or
other communication or expression :
 (a) which seeks in any reasonable degree to prevail upon, indoctrinate,
convert, induce, or in any other way influence a person or any section of the
public within the Philippines with respect to the political or public interests,
policies, or relations of a foreign government or a foreign political party or
with respect to the foreign policies of the. Philippines; or

(b) which advocates, advises, instigates, or promotes social, political, or

religious dissension, disorder, civil riot, or conflict involving the use of force,
or the overthrow of the government of the Republic of the Philippines.

6. "Political consultant" refers to any person who engages in informing or

advising any other person on the domestic or foreign policies of the
Philippines or on the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a
foreign government or of a foreign political party.
7. "Public relations counsel" refers to any person who engages directly or
indirectly in informing, advising, or in any way representing a principal in any
matter affected by the public policies or interests of a principal.
8. "Publicity agent" refers to any person who engages directly or indirectly in
the dissemination and/or publication of information for and on behalf of a
principal.
9. "Information representative" refers to any person who engages in collecting
or gathering data and in disseminating and/or publishing the same for and on
behalf of a principal.

SEC. 4. Registration.— (1) Every person who is now a foreign agent shall, within
thirty days after this Act takes effect, and every person who shall hereafter become
a foreign agent shall, within ten days thereafter, file with the Ministry of Justice a
true and a complete registration statement, under oath, which shall set forth—

a. The name, principal business address, and all other business and residence
addresses in the Philippines or elsewhere, if any, of the registrant.
b. The name of the foreign principal or other person/s or organization/s for
which such person is acting as agent.
c. A copy of the contract/s of employment, or in the absence thereof, a full
statement of the terms and conditions, under which such person acts or
agrees to act as agent.
d. The date when such contract or each of such contracts was made, the date of
commencement of activity thereunder and the period during which such
contract or each of such contracts is to be in effect.
e. The compensation to be paid, if any, and the form and manner of such
compensation.
f. The name of every foreign principal or other person, or organization which
contributed or which has promised to contribute to the compensation
provided for such contract.
g. A detailed statement of every activity which the registrant is performing or is
assuming or purporting or has agreed to perform for himself or any other
person other than a foreign principal and which requires his registration.
 h. If the registrant be a partnership, association, or corporation, a true and
complete copy of its charter, articles of incorporation, association,
constitution, and by-laws and any other instruments relating to its
organizations, powers and purposes.
i. Such other statements, information or documents as the Ministry of Justice
for purposes of this Act may from time to time require.

(2) The termination of the status of the foreign agent shall not relieve him from his
obligation to file a registration statement in accordance with this Act for the period
during which he was such an agent.

SEC. 5. Additional Statement.—Every person who has filed a registration statement

required by Section four shall, within thirty days after the expiration of a period of
six months succeeding the first filing, and every six months thereafter, file with the
Ministry of Justice a statement, under oath, which shall set forth—

1. Such facts as may be necessary to make the information required under

Section four hereof accurate and current with respect to such period.
2. The name, business, and residence address, and if an individual, the
nationality, of any person other than a foreign principal for whom the
registrant is acting, assuming or purporting to act or has agreed to act under
such circumstances as require his registration hereunder, the extent to which
such person is supervised, directed, owned, controlled, financed, or
subsidized, in whole or in part, by any foreign government or foreign political
party or by any other foreign principal, and the nature and amount of
contributions, income, money," or thing of value, if any, that the registrant
has received during the preceding sixty days from such person in connection
with any of the activities referred to under this Act, either as compensation
or for disbursement or otherwise, and the form and time of each such
payment and from whom received.
3. A detailed statement of money and other things of value spent or disposed of
by the registrant during the preceding sixty days in furtherance of, or in
connection with activities which require his registration hereunder, and which
have been undertaken by him either as a foreign agent, or for himself, or any
other person, or in connection with any activity relating to his becoming such
an agent.

SEC. 6. Statement Open to Public Scrutiny.—The Minister of Justice (hereinafter

referred to as the Minister) shall retain in permanent form all statements filed under
this Act, and such statements shall be public records and open to public
examination and inspection at all reasonable hours, under such rules and
regulations as the Minister may prescribe.

The Minister shall, promptly upon receipt, transmit one copy of every registration
statement and other statements or matters related thereto, to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Public Information for such comment and use as
they may determine to be appropriate from the point of view of the foreign
relations and internal policies of the Philippines.
SEC. 7. Exemptions.—This Act shall not apply to any person engaging or agreeing
to engage only—

1. In private and non-political activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or

commerce of a foreign principal;
2. In activities in furtherance of bona fide charitable, religious, scholastic,
academic, artistic or scientific pursuits ;
3. In the legal representation of a foreign principal before any court or
government agency: Provided, That for purposes of this subsection, legal
representation does not include attempts to influence or persuade
government personnel or officials other than in the course of their ordinary
official business.

SEC. 8. Amended Registration.—If the Minister determines that a registration

statement does not comply with the requirements of this Act or the regulations
issued thereunder, he shall so notify the registrant in writing, specifying in what
respects the statement is deficient.

It shall be unlawful for any person to act as a foreign agent at any time after
receipt of such notification without filing an amended registration statement in full
compliance with the requirements of this Act and the regulations issued thereunder.

SEC. 9. Filing and Labelling of Political Propaganda.— A foreign agent who transmits
or disseminates in the Philippines any political propaganda for or in the interest of
his foreign principal among two or more persons shall, not later than forty-eight
hours after the beginning of the transmittal thereof, file with the Ministry of Justice
two copies thereof, setting forth full information as to

The places, times and extent of such transmittal. Violation of this provision shall
constitute an offense under this Act.

SEC. 10. Injunction.—Whenever in the judgment of the Minister any person is

engaged in or about to engage in any act which constitutes or will constitute a
violation of any provision of this Act, or regulations issued thereunder, or whenever
any foreign agents fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Act, or the
regulations issued thereunder, or otherwise is in violation of this Act, the Minister
may secure from the appropriate court an order requiring compliance with any
appropriate provision of the Act or regulation thereunder. The court shall have
jurisdiction and authority to issue a temporary or permanent injunction, restraining
order or such other order as it may deem proper. The proceedings shall enjoy the
highest priority and shall be expedited in every way.

SEC. 11. Unlawful Acts.—(1) It shall be unlawful for any person within the
Philippines who is a foreign agent:

a. to transmit, convey, or otherwise furnish to any agency or official of the

government for or in the interest of a foreign principal any political
propaganda, or to request from any agency or official for or in the interest of
 such foreign principal any information or advice pertaining to any political or
public interests, policies or relations of a foreign country or of a political party
or pertaining to the foreign or domestic policies of the Philippines, unless the
propaganda being issued or the request being made is prefaced or
accompanied by a true and accurate statement to the effect that such person
is registered as a foreign agent under this Act;
b. to be a party to any contract, agreement, or understanding, either express or
implied, with a foreign principal pursuant to which the amount or payment of
the compensation, fee or other remuneration of such agent is contingent in
whole or in part upon the success of any political activity carried out by such
agent;
c. To make, directly or indirectly, any contribution of money or other thing of
value, or promise expressly or impliedly to make any such contribution, in
connection with any convention, caucus or other process to select candidates
for any political office.

(2) It shall be unlawful for any person in the Philippines to solicit, accept, or
receive, directly or indirectly, from any foreign agent or from a foreign principal,
any of the contributions, or promises to make such contributions, referred to in
subsection (c) of this Section.

(3) It shall be unlawful for any public officer or employee or his spouse to act as a
foreign agent. However, the government may employ any foreign agent: Provided,
That the head of the employing agency certifies that such employment is required
in the national interest. A certification issued under, this paragraph shall be
forwarded by the head of such agency to the Minister who shall cause the same to
be filed along with the registration statement and other documents filed by such
agent.

SEC. 12. Penalties.—Any person who violates any provision of this Act or any
regulation thereunder; or who fails to file any statement required to be filed under
this Act; or in complying with the provision of this Act, makes a false statement of
material fact, or omits to state any material fact required to be stated therein shall
be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine
not exceeding P10,000.00 or both.

If the offense, is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or any other

organization or entity, the penalty provided herein shall be imposed on the
president, managing director, managing partner, or chief operating officer,
whichever the case may be: Provided, That if the offender is a foreigner, he shall,
after payment of the fine and/or service of the sentence, be subject to deportation.

SEC. 13. Rules and Regulations.—The Minister of Justice shall forthwith promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the provisions of this
Act; such rules and regulations shall have the effect of law fifteen (15) days
following their publication in the. Official Gazette.
SEC. 14. Separability Clause.—It, for any reason, any provision or part hereof is
declared unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act shall not be affected by such
declaration.

SEC. 15. Revealing Clause.—All provisions of law which are m conflict with this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SEC. 16. Effectivity.—This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, September 7, 1979.

[ PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 532, August 08, 1974 ]

ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY ROBBERY LAW

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements

are still committing acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of
innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby
disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic
and social progress of the people;

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery,

brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries; and,

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

perpetrating such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders,
with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational
and community progress of the people;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972 and No. 1104, dated January 17, 1973 and
General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree as
part of the law of the land the following:

SECTION 1. Title. — This Decree shall be known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. — The following terms shall mean and be understood,
as follows:

a. Philippine Waters. — It shall refer to all bodies of water, such as but not
limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the
Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth,
length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by
historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular
 shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction.
b. Vessel. — Any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and
cargo from one place to another through Philippine Waters. It shall include all
kinds and types of vessels or boats used in fishing.
c. Philippine Highway. — It shall refer to any road, street, passage, highway
and bridges or other parts thereof, or railway or railroad within the
Philippines used by persons, or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the
movement or circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles, or
property or both.
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the
whole or part thereof or Its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of
its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed
by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall
be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided.
e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. — The seizure of any person for ransom,
extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of
another by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things of other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway.

SEC. 3. Penalties. — Any person who commits piracy or highway

robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be
punished by:

a. Piracy. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum

periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed
as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed. If rape, murder or homicide is committed as a result or on the
occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without
means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing
upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are
committed during or on the occasion of the commission of robbery or
brigandage, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed. If kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or
homicide, or rape is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.

SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway

robbery/brigandage. — Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or
protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information
about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner
derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the
commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an
accomplice of the principal offenders and be punished in accordance with the Rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this
Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

SEC. 5. Repealing clause. — Pertinent portions of Act No. 3815, otherwise known
as the Revised Penal Code; and all laws, decrees, or orders or instructions, or parts
thereof, insofar as they are inconsistent with this Decree are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.

SEC. 6. Effectivity. — This Decree shall take effect upon approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 8th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-four.

[ G.R. No. 104461, February 23, 1996 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROMEO MENDOZA

Y REYES AND JAIME REJALI Y LINA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The main question answered in this case is whether the accused should be
convicted of highway robbery with homicide punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532, or of robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Appellants Romeo Mendoza and Jaime Rejali were charged on June 17, 1991 before
the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila (Branch 156) of the crime of
"ROBBERY HOLD-UP (sic) with HOMICIDE (P.D. No. 532, Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highwat (sic) Robbery Law of 1974)"[1] in an Information which reads as follows:

"That on or about the 29th day of May 1991, in the municipality of San Juan, Metro
Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the
above- named accused, armed with gun and knives, conspiring and confederating
together with one alias Jack whose true identity and present whereabouts is still
unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one another with intent to gain and by
means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, rob and divest one Glory Oropeo of cash money amounting to
P3 0.00, while the said victim was aboard a passenger jeep, cruising along Aurora
Blvd., San Juan, Metro Manila, which is a Philippine Highway, to the damage and
prejudice of the owner thereof, in the aforementioned amount of P30.00; that on
the occasion of said robbery (hold-up) and for the purpose of enabling them to
take, rob and carry away personal belongings of all passengers in pursuance of
their criminal act said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the passengers (sic)
of said passenger jeep, one Ramilyn Zulueta by then and there hitting her head
with a gun and kicked (sic) her out of the passenger jeep which caused her to fall in
(sic) the pavement hitting her head on the ground, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal injuries which directly caused her death, while Ma. Grace Zulueta, punching
her face and hitting her head with a gun, as a result of which said Ma. Grace
Zulueta sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period
of less than nine (9) days and incapacitated her from performing her customary
labor for the same period of time.

"CONTRARY TO LAW."
The records show that both accused were assisted by their counsel de oficio, Atty.
Fernando Fernandez of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), when they pleaded not
guilty to the charge upon arraignment on August 9, 1991.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution thereafter established that on May 29, 1991, at about 9:00 in the
evening, 17-year-old Ma. Grace Zulueta and her elder sister, Ma. Ramilyn, were on
their way home from their grandparents’ house in Altura Ext., Sta. Mesa, Manila.
They boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Cubao via Aurora Blvd. The jeepney
was fully loaded with the driver, his wife and two children on the front seat and
eight passengers on each of the two parallel back seats.[2]

The Zulueta sisters were seated near the rear entrance of the jeepney[3] with
accused Romeo Mendoza seated beside Grace.[4] It was through Mendoza that
Grace handed over their fare to the driver as the jeepney passed by the SM
complex.[5] Glory Oropeo (or Lory Europeo[6]), who boarded the same jeepney near
the Stop and Shop Supermarket, was seated behind the driver. Accused Jaime
Rejali was beside Glory while their companion named Jack, who has remained at
large, was seated across her.[7]

When the jeepney reached the dark portion of Aurora Blvd. in San Juan, Metro
Manila, near St. Paul’s College, just after the bridge and before Broadway Centrum,
someone announced a hold-up[8] Both Mendoza and Rejali had guns while Jack was
armed with a knife. It was Rejali who fired his gun.[9] Jack told the Zulueta sisters
that they would "bring" the sisters along. As the accused appeared drunk, the
sisters ignored them. However, a male passenger jumped off the jeepney and a
commotion ensued. Perplexed ("naguluhan") by this turn of events, the accused
held Ramilyn who started kicking, trying to extricate herself from their grasp. This
prompted Mendoza to hit her on the head with his gun. He boxed and kicked her,
causing Ramilyn to fall out of the jeepney into the street where she rolled. [10]

Mendoza then held Grace by her right arm. As she struggled, Grace shouted,
"bitawan mo ako, bitawan mo ako," in an attempt to call the attention of the drivers
of the other vehicles on the road. One of the accused hit Grace on the head with a
gun causing her to lose consciousness.[11] (She finally came to at the St. Luke’s
Hospital; she was confined there up to June 7, 1991.[12]) While all this was
happening, Rejali poked his gun at the other passengers.[13]

From Glory, the accused were able to get the amount of P30.00. She handed it to
the holdupper seated in front of her. When the commotion took place, the driver
slowed down the jeepney but the holduppers told him to keep on moving. One of
them ordered the driver to proceed to J. Ruiz St. and make several turns until,
when they reached Paterno, the culprits alighted and made their escape.[14]

Ramon Zulueta, the father of Grace and Ramilyn, learned about the incident from
his other daughter, Joralyn, who was informed that Grace was at the St. Luke’s
Hospital. Grace, who was then a student employed at the Pizza Hut for P3,000.00 a
month, was confined in said hospital from May 30 to June 7, 1991 for head trauma;
she had contusions and hematomas on the left temporal region and on the right
occipito-parietal and anterior temporal regions, and abrasions on the supra orbital
area as well as elbow.[15] Ramon Zulueta spent around P 19,000.00 for Grace’s
hospitalization.[16]

Upon learning from Grace that Ramilyn had been with her, Ramon Zulueta
surmised that she might have been brought to the hospital nearer the place of the
incident, the UERM hospital. When he got there, he learned that Ramilyn, 21 years
old and a computer management student, had already died of severe, traumatic
head injuries.[17] The Zulueta family spent around P 15,000.00 for her interment.[18]

Two days after the incident, Ramon Zulueta was informed that the jeepney driver
and his wife had "surrendered" to the police station in San Juan. The following day,
he went there but the driver was not around. He gave a statement to the police.[19]

By fluke of fate, it was Grace herself who brought about the apprehension of
Mendoza. On the morning of June 12, 1991, Grace saw Mendoza selling ice cream
along Altura St. She noticed Mendoza staring at her. When she stared back,
Mendoza lowered his gaze and left immediately. That same afternoon, she saw him
again. Considering her poor eyesight, she was instructed by her cousin to buy ice
cream from Mendoza so that she could get near enough to be sure if he was indeed
one of the holduppers. When she approached and asked Mendoza, "Mama, kilala
kita?", he could not look her in the eyes and seemed confused. Certain now that he
was one of the holduppers, Grace announced to her brother and the other people
present that Mendoza was one of the holduppers. Mendoza tried to make a run for
it, but the people gave chase and overtook him.[20]

Mendoza was brought to the police station where he was identified by Grace in a
line-up.[21] Rejali was apprehended that same night by police operatives. According
to SPO1 Dalmacio Luces, Lucia Salinas, the wife of jeepney driver Virgilio Salinas,
described one of the suspects to the NBI cartographer who came out with a sketch
of his face.[22] However, Luces failed to get a statement from Lucia.[23]

Evidence for the Defense

Appellants interposed denial and alibi as defenses. Both of them admitted knowing
each other as they were working as ice cream vendors at the Ana Maria Ice Cream
Factory in 1045 Balic-balic, Sampaloc, Manila where they also lodged in rooms
provided by their employer. Mendoza, 28 years old, swore that on that fateful day,
he sold ice cream from 8:30 a.m. to about 4:00 p.m. From the factory, he went as
far as V. Mapa St., passing under the bridge near the Stop and Shop Supermarket.
By 5:30 in the afternoon, he was back at the factory. He spent the night of May 29,
1991 in his living quarters at the factory taking care of his child as his wife was
pregnant. [24]

For his part, 27-year-old Rejali testified that he also sold ice cream on the date in
question, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., along E. Tuazon St. near Balic-balic. He
claimed that he had not gone to San Juan as he did not even know where San Juan
was, being new in the vicinity. Once back in the factory, he prepared ice cream for
sale the next day. Then he rested in his room.[25]

Myrna Balderama, who also stayed in the living quarters within the same ice cream
factory, corroborated the testimonies of the two accused. According to her, she saw
Mendoza enter the compound in the afternoon of May 29, 1991. From outside her
room, she could see Mendoza’s room; on the night in question, she saw him taking
care of his child. As to Rejali, she knew that he did not leave the premises that
evening as she had a conversation with him up to 10:00 p.m. while he was
preparing ice cream.[26]

On March 10, 1992, the trial court[27] rendered the Decision subject of this appeal.
Its dispositive portion reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds both accused ROMEO

MENDOZA y REYES and JAIME REJALI y LINA guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974) and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties, to indemnify the heirs
of Ramilyn Zulueta in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), to
pay the sum of P23,673.35 by way of reimbursement of the hospitalization, burial
and other related expenses for Ramilyn Zulueta and the further sum of P30,000.00
by way of moral and exemplary damages; to pay Glory Oropeo the sum of P30.00
by way of reparation of the stolen cash money; to pay Ma. Grace Zulueta the sum
of P6,400.00 by way of reimbursement of her hospitalization expenses, all without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

"In the service of their sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the
period of their preventive imprisonment.

"SO ORDERED."
In this appeal, appellants fault the trial court for giving credence to the
"inconsistent, conflicting and contradictory testimonies" of prosecution witnesses
Grace Zulueta and Glory Oropeo and for convicting them of the crime charged
"despite the failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
"[28]

Although not directly raised by the appellants, we find, - upon a thorough scrutiny
of the facts - that there is yet another question which is of concern to the bar and
the bench: are the facts attendant to this case constitutive of the crime of highway
robbery with homicide under Pres. Decree No. 532 or of the felony of robbery with
homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code?
The Court’s Ruling

This appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of witnesses. As this Court
has ruled in innumerable cases, the trial court is best equipped to make the
assessment on said issue and therefore, its factual findings are generally not
disturbed on appeal unless the court a quo is perceived to have overlooked,
misunderstood or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if
properly considered, would affect the result of the case and warrant a reversal of
the decision involved.[29] We do not find in the instant case any such reason to
depart from said general principle. Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial
justice, we shall confront the issues raised herein by the appellants.

Appellants allege the following "inconsistent" testimonies of the prosecution

eyewitnesses: (a) Grace testified that it was Rejali who shouted "hold-up," pulled
out a gun and fired, in contradiction to Glory’s testimony that the man in front of
her, referring to Jack, announced the hold-up, and (b) at the direct examination,
Grace pointed out that she was struck behind her right ear but during cross-
examination, she said that she was hit on the left ear.

The first inconsistency may be attributed to the difference in the relative positions
of Grace and Glory inside the jeepney. Grace was seated near the rear entrance of
the jeepney while Glory was behind the driver. Because Grace was far from both
Jack and Rejali who were seated near Glory, this could have affected her perception
of who announced the hold-up. At any rate, such disparity in their testimonies does
not at all derail the sufficiently established fact that both appellants herein
participated in the hold-up. As regards the injuries sustained by Grace, the
certificate issued by her attending physician, Dr. Sosepatro Aguila, states that she
sustained injuries on both sides of the head,[30] clearly showing no "contradictions"
in her testimony with respect to where she was hit.

Be that as it may, these "inconsistencies" or "contradictions" are minor ones which

do not have any material, bearing on the culpability of the appellants as they do not
in any way refute their positive identification by the two eyewitnesses as the
perpetrators of the hold-up.[31] On the contrary, they reflect the truthfulness of the
testimonies of Grace and Glory. As this Court said in People vs. Retuta:[32]
"The discrepancy signifies that the two witnesses did not deliberately pervert the
truth in their narrations. The discordance in their testimonies on minor matters
heightens their credibility and shows that their testimonies were not coached or
rehearsed (People v. Doria, 55 SCRA 425). As this Honorable Court held in People
v. Agudu, 137 SCRA 516 to wit:

‘However, the variance, if any, is on a minor detail which would not destroy the
effectiveness of their testimony. We cannot expect absolute uniformity in every
detail because witnesses react differently to what they see and hear, depending
upon their situation and state of mind. Complete uniformity in details is a badge of
untruthfulness. The light contradictions, on the other hand, strengthens the
sincerity of the testimony of the witnesses.’

"Thus, far from evidence of falsehood, the minor inconsistency between the
testimonies could justifiably be regarded as a demonstration of their good faith."

The strongest part of the defense arguments concerns the identification of the
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime considering the lighting condition inside
the jeepney. Appellants believed that they could not have been recognized because
both Grace and Glory admitted that the place was dark, and so surmised that it
would have been darker inside the jeepney because the eyewitnesses failed to point
out the source of light therein.[33] However, in trying to prove their allegation,
appellants unwittingly brought out details via Grace’s testimony which demolish
their surmise. Thus:

"Q. Despite the darkness, you were able to identify the gun?

A. I did not say it was completely dark. I said in the jeepney it was quite lighted.
I said it was dark outside but in the jeepney, it was quite lighted."[34] (Italics
supplied.)
It seems, moreover, that appellants only quoted portions of the testimonies of
Grace and Glory to suit their purpose. Had the appellants been candid enough, they
would have retained portions of the same testimonies evidencing that it was
the place where the jeepney was passing through that was dark but, inside the
jeepney, it was "medium light." Grace had testified on cross-examination as
follows:
"Q. Will you mention again the exact location of the alleged incident?
A. I am not familiar with the streets, sir. It was after a bridge. After UERM, sir.
Q. What was the condition of the place at that time?
A. It was moderately dark. Quite lighted. Medium.
Q. How about inside the passenger jeepney? Was it lighted?
A. Medium, sir. Since it was dark, you cannot have a complete light there.
Q. It was quite dark?
A. Yes, sir."[35]
For her part, Glory testified on cross-examination in this wise:
"Q. Madam witness, will you mention again the exact location where you said you
 were allegedly held up?
A. San Juan, H. Lozada and J. Ruiz St., sir.
Q. What was the condition of that place at that time?
A. It was dark because it was already nighttime.
Q. You mean the exact place where you were held-up is a dark place?
A Yes, sir."[36] (Italics supplied.)
Visibility is an important factor in the identification of a criminal offender. However,
its relative weight and significance depends largely on the attending circumstances
and the discretion of the trial court.[37] Another overriding consideration is the fact
that the most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the
appearance of the perpetrator of the crime and observe the manner in which the
crime was being committed.[38]

In the case before us, Grace’s unrebutted testimony is that the jeepney was "quite
lighted x x x medium." Even granting that the light was dim as most jeepneys have
colored or low-wattage bulbs for the passenger area, the added illumination from
the headlights of passing vehicles traveling the busy Aurora Boulevard would have
been sufficient to permit positive identification of the appellants.[39] Moreover,
identification of the appellants as the hold-uppers was facilitated by their physical
proximity to the said eyewitnesses. Grace was seated beside appellant Mendoza
while Glory was beside Rejali. That Grace had poor eyesight does not affect her
positive identification of Mendoza because she was wearing her eyeglasses when
the hold-up took place.[40] As stated above, because they were victims of violence,
both Grace and Glory must have had the appellants’ features indelibly imprinted in
their minds.

In light of the positive identification of the appellants as the perpetrators of the

crime, their alibis are worthless.[41] Moreover, the defense failed to meet the
requisites for alibi to be considered as a valid defense. It is not enough that the
appellants were somewhere else when the crime transpired. They must likewise
duly establish that they were so far away that it was not physically possible for
them to be present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at or about the time
of its commission.[42] Balic-balic in Sampaloc, Manila and Aurora Boulevard in San
Juan, Metro Manila are not very distant from each other considering the numerous
public transportation facilities plying between said places.

But, while there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to lay culpability on the
appellants for the killing of Ma. Ramilyn Zulueta, the physical injuries sustained by
her sister Grace and the asportation of Glory Oropeo’s thirty pesos, we do not agree
with the trial court that the crime committed by appellants is covered by P.D. No.
532.

In its Decision, the trial court curtly said:

"The Court finds all the elements of the offense charged, namely, intent to gain,
unlawful taking of property of another, (the P30.00 of Glory Oropeo) violence
against or intimidation of any person, on a Philippine Highway and death of Ramilyn
Zulueta and physical injuries upon Ma. Grace Zulueta, (Section 2, par. 3 and
Section 3, par. b, Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974, Pres.
Decree No. 532) have been duly proved in the instant case."

Highway Robbery or Robbery with Homicide?

Conviction under P.D. No. 532 requires not only the above elements mentioned by
the court a quo. Highway robbery or brigandage is defined by Section 2 of said
decree as follows:

"e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. - The seizure of any person for ransom, extortion
or other unlawful purposes or the taking away of the property of another by means
of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful
means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway."

In People vs. Puno,[43] this Court, speaking through the learned Mr. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado, explained the purpose of brigandage as follows:

"In fine, the purpose of brigandage is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If
the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in
band if there are at least four armed participants. (citing U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil.
422 [1904]) x x x

"x x x Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only
acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery
committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, x x x"

Consistent with the above, to obtain a conviction for highway robbery, the
prosecution should have proven that the accused, in the instant case, were
organized for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. There, however,
was a total absence of such proof. There was also no evidence of any previous
attempts at similar robberies by the accused - to show the "indiscriminate"
commission thereof.

Incidentally, it would be relevant to add that the number of perpetrators

is no longer an essential element of the crime of brigandage as defined by P.D. No.
532. Mr. Justice Regalado explained this in Puno:

"True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and
307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and
without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree
does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of
robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they
use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. x x x"[44]
Under the old doctrine, brigandage was committed by a "cuadrilla"[45] or by "more
than three armed persons" per the definition of brigands in Article 306 of the
Revised Penal Code.[46]

Even before the Puno holding, however, there had been cases[47] where less than
four offenders were held guilty of highway robbery under P.D. No. 532, which just
strengthens the view that the number of offenders is not an essential element in
the crime of highway robbery.[48]

It is possible that since Aurora Boulevard is a highway within the purview of

P.D. No 532,[49] the prosecutors deemed it proper to charge appellants with
violation of said decree. In this regard, the Puno ruling is enlightening. This Court
held:

x x x (i)t would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking
of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an
elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should
not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce
to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an
instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, and the fundamental rule that
criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

"If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be
the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be
far-fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our
substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of
reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls
far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid
absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a
highway, is forcibly taken at gunpoint by the accused who happened to take a fancy
thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking
necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus
rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972?
And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is
large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same
highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential
Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974?"[50]

Hence, in charging a crime under P.D. No. 532, it is important to consider whether
or not the very purpose for which the law was promulgated has been transgressed.
Citing the "whereas clauses" of P. D. No. 532[51] in Puno, the Court said:

"Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular

person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the ‘innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another,’ and which single act of depredation would be capable of ‘stunting the
economic and social progress of the people’ as to be considered ‘among the highest
forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries,’ and would
accordingly constitute an obstacle ‘to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people,’ such that said isolated act would constitute the
highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous."[52]

Petty robbery in public transport vehicles (with or without personal violence and
death) committed against the middle and lower economic classes of society is as
reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale robbery committed against the
economically well-heeled. Nonetheless, the law must be interpreted not only to
bring forth its aim and spirit but also in light of the basic principle that all doubts
are to be resolved liberally in favor of the accused. As such, appellants may not be
held liable under P.D. No. 532 but only under the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.

In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the designation but the
description of the offense charged.[53] Considering the allegations of the
aforequoted Information, appellants herein should be liable for the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery
having been duly established beyond reasonable doubt by the asportation of thirty
pesos from Glory Oropeo. It is immaterial that Ramilyn Zulueta’s death was
accidental because it was produced by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery.[54] The physical injuries inflicted upon Grace Zulueta during the
commission of the crime are absorbed in the crime of robbery with homicide. [55]

Conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated actions of the appellants and their
companion[56] of depriving Glory of her money and injuring both Ramilyn and Grace
which resulted in Ramilyn’s accidental death. Since both appellants took part in the
robbery, they shall be liable for the complex crime of robbery with homicide in the
absence of proof that they endeavored to prevent the accidental killing of
Ramilyn.[57] In view of the prohibition against the imposition of the death penalty
when the crime was committed, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was then the
single and indivisible penalty for robbery with homicide. It shall be imposed on each
of the appellants regardless of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances
attending the commission of the crime.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila
(Branch 156) in Crim. Case No. 87218 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Romeo
Mendoza y Reyes and Jaime Rejali y Lina are hereby found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide and
accordingly, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The other portions of the trial court’s decision, including the monetary
awards imposed against them, are AFFIRMED. Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
 [ G.R. No. 116734, March 29, 1996 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LARRY LAURENTE

Y BEJASA, MELVIN DAGUDOG, AND RICHARD DISIPULO, ACCUSED. LARRY
LAURENTE Y BEJASA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a case for our automatic review[1] in view of the death penalty imposed upon
accused-appellant Larry Laurente (hereinafter Laurente).

In a decision[2] promulgated on 23 August 1994 in Criminal Case No. 104785, the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 156, found Laurente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery with Homicide, defined and
penalized under P.D. No. 532,[3] and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death;
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay them
P27,300.00 as funeral expenses and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs.

We declare at the outset that even granting ex gratia that the established facts
prove beyond reasonable doubt that Laurente and his two co-accused indeed
committed the acts charged in the information,[4] Laurente cannot be validly
convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No. 532. The object of the
decree is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts of depredation
upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel
from one place to another - which acts constitute either piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage - thereby disturbing the peace, order, and tranquility of the
nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people.[5] It is directed
against acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person
on Philippine highways, as defined therein, and not those committed against a
predetermined or particular victim. Accordingly, a robbery committed on a
Philippine highway by persons who are not members of the prescribed lawless
elements or directed only against a specific, intended, or preconceived victim, is not
a violation of P.D. No. 532. This Court, per Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, so held
in People vs. Puno[6] and a reiteration of the discussion therein is in order. Thus:

Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General Presidential Decree No. 532 is
not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident
from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that
is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling,
and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and
brigands are synonymous.

Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put
our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of
brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of
ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of
the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery
and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope
with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed.

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than
three armed persons for the purpose indicated in Art. 306. Such formation is
sufficient to constitute a violation of Art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in
a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime
is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as
are contemplated by Art.
306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were n
ot primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., th
e crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was
committed by a band of more than three armed persons, it would not follow that it
was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required
that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar."

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If
the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in
band if there are at least four armed participants. The martial law legislator, in
creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives
announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the
contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous
construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under
which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or
construction is the best and strongest in the law.

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or

brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any
person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of
robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident
from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are
still committing acts of depredation upon
the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from
one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nati
on and stunting the economic and social progress of the people;

WHEREAS, such acts and depredations constitute x x

x highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness c
ondemned by the penal statutes of all countries;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from

perpetrating such acts and depredations by imposing [a] heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view
of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community pro
gress of the people; (Italics supplied.)

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular

person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as
committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place
to another," and which single act of depredation could be capable of "stunting the
economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the
highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and
community progress of the people," such that said isolated act would constitute the
highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This
would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and
307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its
applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and
without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the
decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of
robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they
use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we
broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of
depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific,
intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims
anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as
the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in
the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for
that matter, under the old Brigandage Law.

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the
crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said
amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what
has already been stressed regarding the absence of the requisite elements which
thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment
of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that
any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered
thereby. It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the spirit of intent of
the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we
have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the
letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, and the fundamental
rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of
doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be
the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be
far-fetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our
substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of
reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls
far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid
absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a
highway, is forcibly taken at gunpoint by the accused who happened to take a fancy
thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking
necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus
rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972?
And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is
large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same
highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential
Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-
Cattle Rustling Law of 1974?

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the
robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course
of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation
envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that
particular provision precisely define[s] "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we
have amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by
appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
(citations omitted)

In the instant case, there is not a shred of evidence that Laurente and his co-
accused, or their acts, fall within the purview of P.D. No. 532, as interpreted
above. Thus, to repeat, Laurente cannot be validly convicted for highway robbery
with homicide under P.D. No 532.

Assuming further, however, that Laurente and his co-accused may be convicted
under P.D. No. 532, the death penalty cannot be legally imposed on Laurente.
While it is true that Section 3 of the said decree prescribes the penalty of death for
highway robbery with homicide, the imposition of capital punishment was
suspended[7] by Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[8]

The reimposition of the death penalty by R.A. No. 7659[9] did not ipso jure lift the
suspension as far as P.D. No. 532 is concerned. An examination of the former
reveals that while it specifically imposed the death penalty or restored it for certain
crimes,[10] it failed to do so for the latter - in fact, R.A. No. 7659 does not mention
P.D. No. 532 at all. Clearly, by failing to squarely deal with P.D. No. 532, Congress
is deemed not to have considered highway robbery with homicide a "heinous
crime"; or if it did, it found no "compelling reason" to reimpose the death penalty
therefor.

Nevertheless, the amended information hereinafter quoted[11] indubitably shows,

that except for the emphasis of the place where the robbery was committed, i.e.,
a highway, the charge is actually for robbery with homicide as defined and
penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. This provision now reads,
as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659:

ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. - Penalties. -

Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of

the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery
shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson x x x.

Simply, the information remains a valid information for robbery with homicide
under the above provision. The investigating prosecutor’s characterization that it
was for highway robbery with homicide is of no moment. On the matter of an
accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,[12] it is
elementary that what determines the offense charged is not the characterization
made by the prosecutor who prepared the information, but the allegations in the
indictment.[13]

Accordingly, on the assumption that the prosecution established beyond reasonable

doubt all the elements of robbery and of homicide committed on the occasion
thereof, Laurente can nevertheless be meted the penalty of death under Article
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since the crime
was committed on 14 February 1994, or one month and thirteen days after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 7659. But whether the prosecution in fact discharged its
burden is an entirely different matter which goes into the merits of this appeal.

We shall then turn our attention to the appeal proper.

In an information[14] dated 17 February 1994 and filed with the trial court on 21
February 1994, Laurente was charged with the crime of Highway Robbery with
Homicide. The information was later amended to include his co-accused, Melvin
Dagudog and Richard Disipulo. The indictment in the amended information read as
follows:

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Melvin Dagudog and
Richard Disipulo, who are still at large, and all of them mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent of [sic] gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
divest from Herminiano G. Artana of his earnings in and [sic] undetermined amount
along F. Concepcion St., Bgy. San Joaquin, Pasig, Metro Manila, which is a
Philippine Highway; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, divest and carry away the said money, in pursuance of their
conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring success of their criminal act, said
accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strangle said victim
with a leather belt and hit him with a blunt instrument, causing him to sustain
physical injuries which directly caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[15]

Laurente was taken into custody on 15 February 1994,[16] but his two co-accused
have remained at large. The case then proceeded as against Laurente only.

Upon arraignment, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, Laurente entered a plea
of not guilty.[17] At trial on the merits, the prosecution presented four witnesses,
namely: (1) SPO1 Crispin Pio, the investigating/arresting officer; (2) eyewitness
Myra Guinto; (3) Felicitas Matematico, the victim’s daughter; and (4) Dr. Emmanuel
Arañas, the medico-legal officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory Services, who performed the autopsy on the victim. The prosecution
attempted to present the other eyewitness, Noel Guinto (Myra’s brother-in-law),
but despite the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and the trial court’s grant of one
last chance to present him, the prosecution was unable to do so.[18]

SPO1 Crispin Pio testified that on 14 February 1994, while on duty as a homicide
investigator at the Pasig Police Station, he received a case assignment relative to
one Herminio Artana. He proceeded to the place of the incident, which was just a
few meters away from the exit gate of the Capitol Compound in Pasig. Upon
arrival, he saw a parked taxicab and looked inside it. He saw a dead man, who, he
supposed, was the taxicab driver. Pio recalled that the taxicab was an "Adet taxi,"
but he forgot its plate number.[19]

At such time, Pio asked the Guinto siblings-in-law and other persons present about
the incident, but gained no meaningful information from them. He conducted a
"cursory investigation" and saw that the body "sustained strangulation marked [sic]
and wounds on the face and head," thus he sent the body to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. He then conducted a "crime scene search inside the
taxicab and within the vicinity," which yielded a "colored brown wallet containing an
SSS [Social Security System] ID of x x x Larry Laurente" and "a leather belt
supposedly used in strangling the dead man."[20]

Pio took the articles, went to the police station to make an incident report, and
"requested the SSS to secure the complete record" of Laurente. From the SSS
records, the police authorities learned that Laurente lived "somewhere in Kalawaan
Sur, Pasig"; accordingly, a "follow-up" team was formed to arrest him.[21]

Pio further testified that on 15 February 1994, the "follow-up" team arrested and
brought Laurente to the police station for investigation, and that during the
investigation, after having been apprised of his constitutional rights, Laurente:

[V]erbally admitted that he together with his friend[s] Richard and Melvin boarded
the taxicab and they grabbed the taxicab driver and after which they strangulated
[sic] the driver with the use of [the] belt while Melvin hit the taxi driver with the
used [sic] of a blunt instrument at the head and face.[22]

Thereafter, Laurente was "put under [sic] police line-up wherein the 2 witnesses
positively identified him as one of the 3 persons they saw coming from the taxicab."
Pio was present during the conduct of the police line-up and, under his and his
superior’s[23] supervision, he had the line-up photographed (Exhibits "D" and "D-
1").[24]

Pio next took the statements of the witnesses (Exhibits "F" and "G")[25] and the
complainant (Exhibit "E"),[26] proceeded to make his report (Exhibit
"I"),[27]
executed an affidavit (Exhibit "H")[28] attesting to the conduct of the
investigation and arrest, and secured the death certificate of the victim from the
PNP Crime Laboratory (Exhibit "J").[29] To close his testimony on direct examination,
Pio identified Laurente and further disclosed their efforts to locate the other
suspects.[30]

On cross-examination, Pio clarified certain details regarding the findings of the

investigation, e.g., the locus criminis was well lit as a lamp post was
nearby.[31] However, Pio admitted that although he informed Laurente of his
constitutional rights while he was investigated at the police station, Laurente was
not represented by counsel during such investigation; he was merely accompanied
by a sister and some cousins. Nevertheless, despite the absence of counsel,
Laurente verbally admitted his complicity in the crime, although the admission was
not reduced in writing.[32]

Myra Guinto testified that on 14 February 1994, at about 9:15 p.m., she was selling
cigarettes at Sitio Square, Shaw Boulevard, Pasig, around a meter away from the
Provincial Capitol.[33] At such time, she saw people scrambling inside a yellow
taxicab which was "at the stop position" on the other side of the Street. Three men
then left the taxicab, ran towards her, and at the time these men passed in front of
her, they were "about 2 arms length[s]" away. These men then boarded a jeepney
headed towards Pasig. A fourth man approached the taxicab, saw the taxicab
driver inside already dead and called the police.[34]

She was questioned by the policemen upon their arrival, and at a later date,
reduced her statements into writing (Exhibit "F"). After she identified Exhibit "F,"
Guinto then identified Larry Laurente as one of the three men who left the taxicab
and passed in front of her.[35]

On cross-examination, Guinto declared that the "taxi was rather of old vintage" and
that it did not have tinted windows, in fact, one "could see the persons inside the
taxi." She likewise declared that the place where she first saw the taxicab had "a
big white bulb" and was approximately fifteen meters away from where she was
selling cigarettes.[36]

Felicitas Matematico testified that the victim was her father and presented the
following as evidence of funeral expenses: (a) several pieces of paper with the
tagalog caption "nagastos noong lamay"[37] (Exhibit "K");[38] (b) a receipt dated 22
February 1994 for P800.00, for the construction of a niche cover (Exhibit
"L");[39] and (c) a receipt dated 21 February 1994 from Sta. Marta Funeral Homes
for P 10,000.00 (Exhibit "N");[40] for a total of P27,300.00. To close her testimony
on direct examination, she stated that she was "still sad" about the death of her
father; and when asked to "quantify her sadness," she responded that her mother
was in a better position to do so.[41]

Dr. Emmanuel Arañas testified on the autopsy he conducted on the cadaver of the
victim and the medico-legal report (Exhibit "O") he made on 15 February
1994.[42] He reiterated his finding that the cause of death of the victim was
"traumatic injuries of head," and that he suffered the following injuries: "(1)
Hematoma, right peri-orbital region, measuring 5 by 3 cm., 4 cm. on the anterior
midline; and (2) Contusion, neck, measuring 15 by 1.8 cm., crossing the anterior
midline, 2 cm. to the right and 13 cm. to the left," and that "[t]here are subdural
and subarachnoidal hemorrhages." He opined that the injuries could have been
caused by a "hard blunt instrument," such as a belt, a piece of wood, or a head
(buckle) of a belt.[43]

On his part, accused Larry Laurente interposed the defense of alibi. On the witness
stand, he related that on 14 February 1994, at around 3:00 to 3:30 p.m., he was in
his house at Consorcia Street, San Joaquin, Pasig, together with his friends Melvin
Dagudog and Richard Disipulo. Supposedly, they began a drinking session at
around 3:30 p.m. which lasted four hours, during which period they consumed two
bottles of "Tanduay 5 years." After that, he did not leave his house anymore,[44] as
he got so drunk, "lost consciousness," and did not wake up until 4:00 a.m. the next
day. It was only then that he found out his two friends had left his house.[45]

In the morning of 15 February 1994, he had to look for his wallet as it got lost "in
[his] wooden bed (papag) where [he slept]." That wallet contained an "I.D., SSS
number and P250.00." He then presumed that Melvin Dagudog and Richard Disipulo
had taken his wallet as they were the only ones in the house during the drinking
session. Having failed to obtain any information from his neighbors, Mang Roming
and Ate Baby, as to where Dagudog and Disipulo had gone, he went home to rest;
then he took a shower and got ready to report for work. He had been a shingle
molder at Winning Enterprises for the past three years, with offices in Taguig,
Rizal.[46] He maintained that on 15 February 1994, he reported for work at 6:00
a.m. and stayed in the office till 8:00 p.m.[47]

After returning home from work, four policemen were waiting for him, and in
Laurente’s own words, "bigla na lang po akong sinugod at hinila."[48] He surmised
that they were policemen even if they were not in uniform because they were
"holding guns." Although they had no warrant of arrest, the policemen brought him
to the Pasig police station where he was investigated for being "a hold-upper"; and
throughout the investigation, he was not assisted by counsel.[49] On cross-
examination of Laurente, the prosecution obtained an admission that it would take
him "about half an hour" to travel from his house to the Provincial Capitol.[50]
On 23 August 1994, the trial court promulgated the challenged decision wherein, as
stated earlier, it found Laurente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of highway robbery
with homicide "punishable by death as a single indivisible penalty under Presidential
Decree No. 532 entitled ‘Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.’"[51] It
gave full faith and credit to the eyewitness account of Myra Guinto and rejected the
defense of alibi proffered by the Laurente as "he failed miserably to give any
evidence to support this claim."[52] Regarding Laurente’s presence at the locus
criminis, it relied on the positive identification made by Myra and Laurente’s SSS ID
card which was found inside the taxicab of the victim. Apparently, finding it difficult
to impose a death penalty, the trial court stated:

[W]hile the undersigned Presiding Judge does not believe in the imposition of the
death penalty as a form of punishment, as he has stated about a month ago in
Criminal Case No. 104781, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Elpidio Mercado. et al., this same Court, nevertheless,
in obedience to the law which is his duty to uphold, the Court hereby sentences
accused LARRY LAURENTE y Bejasa to death x x x.[53]

Laurente forthwith filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court noted therein that the
review by this Court was automatic.[54]

In his Brief, Laurente assigns the following errors committed by the trial court, but
being interrelated, discusses them jointly:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT LARRY

LAURENTE WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE PROSECUTION WITNESS.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF HIGHWAY

ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ELEMENTS OF
COMMITTING SUCH CRIME WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY PROVEN BY THE
PROSECUTION.[55]

Laurente anchors his prayer for acquittal on the unreliability of the positive
identification made of him by the lone eyewitness who testified at the trial, Myra
Guinto. He initially attempts to discredit this by deducing from Myra’s testimony in
court that she was neither able to recognize the three men she allegedly saw
coming out of the taxicab, nor see Laurente stab the victim. Thus:

ATTY.FERNANDEZ:
xxx
Q: By the way, do you know these men who came out from the taxi and
passed by you?
A: No, sir.
 xxx(TSN, May 6, 1994)
Q: And also did not have any knowledge that there was a stabbing incident
that happened inside the taxi?
A: None, sir.
Q: Now, you said that there were three men who ran passed [sic] infront of
you. Is that correct?
A: Yes. sir.
Q: And because of that speed, you were not able to identify any of these
persons?
A: No, sir. I was able to recognize one of them because they ran in front of
me, sir.
xxx
Q: Will you describe to the Honorable Court how fast these man passed by in
front of you?
A: It was quite fast, sir.
xxx
Q: You identified the accused in this case as the one who allegedly killed the
victim in this case. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, did you personally see the accused stabbed [sic] the victim or killed
[sic] the victim?
A: No, sir. (Ibid, p. 7-8) (Italics Ours)[56]

Hence, Laurente concludes that "[t]he identification [by Myra Guinto] of the
accused-appellant in the police line-up as one of those who killed the victim. . . is .
. . not entirely reliable."[57]

Laurente then continues his assault on Myra’s positive identification by surmising:

[T]hat it was only thru the SSS ID Card of the accused-appellant which was found
inside the taxicab that made the police authorities conclude or suspect [the]
accused-appellant. . .. Thus, in all probability, the identification. . . in the police
line-up was because of the SSS ID Card but not for the reason that she recognized
the accused-appellant on the night of the incident.[58]

As to his SSS ID card in the wallet found inside the taxicab, Laurente submits that
the said card:

[W]ill not suffice as a ground for conviction, for neither was it established that
accused-appellant had left the I.D. while committing the felony. It may well be that
who ever took appellant’s wallet with the I.D. in it purposely left the same to
implicate [the appellant] . . ..It was established by the defense that the wallet of
the accused-appellant which contained his SSS ID Card was stolen from him by his
co-accused [and] this allegation remain[s] unrebutted by the prosecution.[59]

Finally, Laurente challenges the trial court’s rejection of the defense of alibi and
relates this to the allegedly improbable positive identification by Myra Guinto and
ultimately, the constitutional presumption of innocence:
While it may be admitted that the defense of alibi. . . is. . . weak this gains strength
when the evidence of the prosecution is equally weak. As earlier discussed, there
is no positive identification of the [appellant] by. . . Myra Guinto, thus the defense
of alibi of the appellant perforce prevails. As held, the weakness of alibi of the
accused could not strengthen the prosecution’s case for settled is [the] rule that the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of
the defense. (People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349) Further, alibi as a defense assumes
commensurate strength . . . where the evidence presented by the prosecution [is]
unreliable and uncertain since it is not relieved of the onus probandi just because
alibi is the defense invoked by the accused (People v. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680).[60]

At bottom, Laurente’s line of reasoning flows as such: First, the positive

identification by Myra Guinto is unreliable as she did not see the three men who
came out of the taxicab, neither did she see Laurente stab the victim. Second, in
the light of the improbability of Myra having adequately seen Laurente at the locus
criminis, the positive identification at the police line-up necessarily cannot be relied
upon as well. Third, without the positive identification of Laurente, only his SSS ID
card found inside the taxicab links him to the crime; however, Laurente
satisfactorily proved that his wallet containing his SSS ID card had been
taken. Hence, he concludes, the spurious positive identification, either at the scene
of the crime or at the police line-up, coupled with the weak link provided by his SSS
ID card found inside the taxicab, should not be allowed to overcome the defense of
alibi and the presumption of innocence.

Laurente’s attempts to cast doubt upon the positive identification made of him by
Myra must fail.

Laurente’s contention that Myra did not see the three men who came out of the
taxicab deserves scant consideration. As the proceedings below clearly established,
the place where Myra saw Laurente was well-lit due to a lamp post nearby and the
latter was only two arms lengths away from her when he passed in front of her.
Moreover, she identified Laurente at the police line-up, which was even
photographed, and in open court. Finally, as observed by the trial court:

Nothing in the demeanor of prosecution witness Myra Guinto would indicate that
she harbors ill-feelings towards accused Larry Laurente that she will falsely testify
against him. Her testimony is thus given much weight by the Court. . .[61]

This assessment of the credibility of eyewitness Myra Guinto deserves the highest
respect of this Court, considering that the trial court had the direct opportunity to
observe her deportment and manner of testifying and availed of the various aids to
determine whether she was telling the truth or concocting lies.[62] This is a settled
rule in this jurisdiction and the exceptions thereto, viz., some fact or circumstance
of weight and influence has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted, which if considered might affect the result of the case,[63] have not
been shown to exist in this case.

Equally settled is the rule that where there is no evidence, and nothing to indicate
that the principal witnesses for the prosecution - like Myra in this case - were
actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated
and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[64]

Laurente’s next contention that Myra did not actually see him stab the victim must
likewise fail. From the circumstances obtaining in this case, it cannot be doubted
that Laurente and his companions acted in conspiracy in committing the
crime. They were together in the taxicab when it stopped and Myra saw them
"scrambling inside," after which, they ran off and boarded a jeepney to escape. On
the matter of proving the existence of conspiracy, it is settled that direct proof of
the previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced
from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from
the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.[65] There is no doubt in our minds that
the victim was killed by the co-conspirators. That Myra did not actually see that it
was Laurente who stabbed the victim is of no moment. Once conspiracy is
established, the act of one is the act of all.[66]

Laurente’s story on the alleged loss of his SSS ID card and its being found in the
taxicab is simply unbelievable. As to his defense, the trial court assessed
Laurente’s testimony in this manner:

Accused Larry Laurente would like the Court to believe that he was someplace else
when the hold-up and killing . . . occurred . . . During his testimony, he first
claimed to have gone to work on February 14, 1994, and then on the same breath,
he suddenly changed his mind and said that he was absent. He would also like to
convince the Court that his co-accused in this case, Richard Disipulo and Melvin
Dagudog, came out of the blue, had a drinking session with him, and just left with
nary a word to him.

"Evidence to be believed must proceed not only from the mouth of a credible
witness but the same must be credible in itself as when it conforms to the common
experience and observation of mankind." (People vs. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680).

The Court also noted that [the] accused. . . contradicted himself when he said that
he ha[d] been a molder . . in Tagig, Metro Manila for the past three (3) years and
yet, he has only been in Manila from Negros Oriental last October! Such
inconsistencies destroy his credibility and further bolster the Court’s findings that
his defense of alibi is merely invoked as a matter of convenience.[67]

We are in full accord with such assessment, and further reiterate the rule that alibi,
being the weakest of all defenses as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove,
cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification of the
accused.[68] But most telling in this case is that Laurente’s alibi does not meet the
requirements of time and place. It is not enough to prove that the accused was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time the same was committed.[69] On cross-
examination, Laurente admitted that it would take "about half an hour" to traverse
the distance from his house to the scene of the crime.[70] Such distance is so near
as not to preclude his having been at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. We are, therefore, left with no option but to rule that the prosecution
has discharged its burden to prove the commission of homicide by Laurente and to
reject his defense of alibi.

Proof of the commission of robbery, however, must be examined more closely.

Laurente pleads that the prosecution failed to prove the element of robbery, thus,
his conviction of the crime charged should not be sustained. On this score,
Laurente calls this Court’s attention to the fact:

[T]hat not a single [shred of] evidence was introduced by the prosecution to prove
robbery or unlawful taking of property from the victim. Nothing was shown whether
the victim was divested of his money or other personal belongings. It cannot be
presumed that the main purpose of the killing . . . was to rob [the victim]. There
must be evidence showing the unlawful taking of another by means of violence or
force upon things to make the accused-appellant liable under Pres. Dec. No. 532. .
..[71]

An examination of the records of this case reveals that the following constitute the
evidence to prove the robbery aspect of the offense: the statement given by the
victim’s daughter to the investigating! arresting officer,[72] and the contents of the
affidavit executed by the investigating/arresting officer himself.[73]

The police statement of the victim’s daughter contained the following exchange:
"05. Nalaman mo ha naman kung ano
t: ang dahilan at pinatay ang iyong
tatay?
s: Ang tatay ko po ay hinoldap.
06. t: Ano naman ang trabaho nang
iyong tatay, para siya holdapin?
s: Siya po ay taxi driver.
xxx
08. t: Nalaman mo ha naman kung
magkano ang nakuha O’ naholdap
sa iyong tatay?
s: Hindi ko po alam kung magkano
pero wala na po ang kinita niya sa
pagpapasada ng taxi.
09. t: Papaano naman ninyo nalaman na
hinoldap at napatay ang iyong
tatay?
s. Nuong pang gabi ng petsa 14 ng
Pebrero 1994, mayroon pong
pumunta sa aming bahay at kami
po ay inimpormahan na ang aking
 tatay ay hinoldap at napatay
habang sakay siya ng kanyang
inilalabas na taxi.[74] (italics
supplied)

Clearly, such constituted inadmissible hearsay as any knowledge as to the robbery

aspect of the offense was not derived from her own perception[75] and did not fall
within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.[76] However, assuming arguendo
that the said statements were admissible for failure of the defense counsel to raise
a timely objection, nevertheless, such statements carry no probative value.[77]

On the subject of SPO1 Pio’s affidavit concerning the conduct of the investigation, it
becomes the sole piece of evidence to prove the robbery in the case before us. The
relevant portion is quoted hereunder:

That . . . a crime scene search was conducted by this investigator, during said
search, . . . a leather wallet colored brown was found on the passenger seat at the
back . . . further the personal belongings of the dead man known as the taxi driver
was [sic] intact, however, his daily earnings was [sic] missing, showing that the
victim was robbed before being killed. . ..[78] (italics supplied)

This Court holds that the above statements, as the lone measure by which to judge
the commission of robbery, are insufficient to prove the same, i.e., that the victim
actually earned money and that these earnings were unlawfully taken by the
accused. The prosecution, in this regard, failed to discharge the burden of proof
and satisfy the quantum of evidence for the robbery aspect in this case.

A conviction for robbery simply cannot be had in the light of the total absence of
evidence regarding the taxicab driver’s earnings and the sweeping statement that
"the personal belongings of the dead man . . . [were] intact." Moreover, the
prosecution did not even bother to introduce evidence as to what time the victim in
this case started plying his route, which may have led to a reasonable inference
that he had earned some money by the time the crime was committed. In sum,
there is no conclusive evidence proving the physical act of asportation by Laurente
and his co-accused.[79]

It is settled that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide, it is imperative that the robbery itself be proven as conclusively as any
other essential element of a crime. In the absence of such proof, the killing of the
victim would only be simple homicide or murder, depending on the absence or
presence of qualifying circumstances.[80]

We thus rule that the crime committed by Laurente is homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code and penalized therein with reclusion temporal.
Since no modifying circumstances have been established, it shall be imposed in its
medium period pursuant to Article 64(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

In passing, this Court notes with much concern that the law enforcers in this case
failed to respect Laurente’s rights against unlawful arrest[81] and during custodial
investigation.[82]

In this case, the follow-up team which arrested Laurente on 15 February 1994 had
only the latter’s SSS ID card as possible basis to link Laurente to the crime. None of
the members of the team were eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime; they
had, therefore, nothing to support a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Under this section, a peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person only: (a) when in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from confinement
to another.

SPO1 Crispin Pio candidly admitted that he investigated Laurente without the
benefit of counsel after Laurente was arrested, although he informed him of his
constitutional rights. As to what these rights were, he never disclosed; moreover,
neither did Pio demonstrate that he exerted the requisite effort to ensure that
Laurente understood his rights.[83] Undoubtedly, the custodial investigation had
commenced, as the police authorities had in fact pinpointed Laurente as the author
or one of the authors of the crime or had focused on him as a suspect
thereof. Finally, there is no evidence that Laurente waived the rights to remain
silent and to counsel. Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides as
follows:

SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

There was then a total disregard of the duties of an investigator during custodial
investigation, which this Court laid down in Morales vs. Enrile,[84] reiterated in
several cases.[85]

It cannot be overemphasized that the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights[86] are
the very mechanisms by which the delicate balance between governmental power
and individual liberties is maintained. Thus, it does not bode well for society when
our law enforcers defy the fundamental law of the land in ignoring these rights
designed to ensure the very equilibrium of our democracy.

It must, however, be pointed out that the conviction of Laurente is not based on his
alleged oral admission during his custodial investigation by SPO1 Crispin Pio.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 156 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig in Criminal Case No. 104785 is hereby modified as to the nature of the
offense committed. As modified, accused-appellant LARRY LAURENTE y BEJASA is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as co-principal by direct participation, of the
crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused-
appellant LARRY LAURENTE y BEJASA is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum. In all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

[ G. R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.

LOL-LO AND SARAW, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J.:

The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain
A very and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when
grotesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history
and romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century
piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so
as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta,
another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject,
and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of
Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the
second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East
Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros
all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for
themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of
the women by methods too horrible to be described. All of the persons on the Dutch
boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and
holes were made in it, with the idea that it would submerge/although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored.
Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros finally
arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who
also raped one of the women, and Saraw, At Maruro the two women were able to
escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in
the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was
interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of
any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public
offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was
overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding
the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment
(cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in
another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of coprax which had
been robbed, or to indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-
half part of the costs.

A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de
officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly
disposed of.

The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are
present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal
hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lower court and
as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without
jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime
not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the
competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which
he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial
limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the
crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for
those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." ( U. S. vs. Furlong
[1820], 5 Wheat, 184.)

The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for
the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the
crime of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code read as
follows:

"ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of
another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war
with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

"ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the
next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and
those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same
article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:

"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.

"2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the

physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred
and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.

"3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in

Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.

"4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving
themselves.

"5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.

"ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this
code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the
national territory.

"ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person,
who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard
shall be considered as such."

The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States
relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United
States are well- known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily
changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the Constitution, the
laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government,
remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of
transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Island, etc., R. Co. vs.
McGlinn [1885], 114 U. S., 542.)

These principles, of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines
by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley
Merritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines,
when he said:

"Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and
immediately operate upon the political Condition of the inhabitants, the municipal
laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and
property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in
force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not
usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by
the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This
enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
occasion." (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See
also General Merritt's Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)

It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with
piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in
relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make
the provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as
piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of
the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the
concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal
Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and
the Novisima Recopilacion.

The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the
power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
offenses against the law of nations. ( U. S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, ,cl. 10.) The
Congress;, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary legislation,
provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by
the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States,
shall be imprisoned for life. (U. S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.
S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the members of
Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception
under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines
relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in
the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A
logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the
crime of piracy, would be that wherever " Spain" is mentioned, it should be
substituted by the words " United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned,
the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands." Somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the
case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word
"authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer
comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
Government of the Philippine Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as
follows:
"The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of
the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United
States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena
perpetua.

"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war
with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor."

We hold those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably
articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation
to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the
last cited article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy
was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of
persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only
necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or
death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one
aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one
mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of
the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three
aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its
commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means were
employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number
and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present,
which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction,
and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose
capital punishment.

The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the
imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo (the
accused who raped one of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the
defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the court, Mr. Justice
Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of
Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor
to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first
instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and
severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-
half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez,

JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROGER P. TULIN,

VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG
SAN HIONG, AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the
Court for sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to
undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27,
2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene,
2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value
of P40,426,793,87. was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on,

Second Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded,
with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio
Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45
and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and took complete
control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew
members to paint over, using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front
and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the chimney of the
vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San
Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending
misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the
vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air
Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded
negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and
cruised around the area presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed
to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the Philippines on March 14,
1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to
18 nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi
Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to
transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong
San Hiong supervised the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer,
after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was completed on March
30,1991.

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the
transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel
remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in
three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government
authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be
killed. The first batch was fetched from the shoreline by a newly painted passenger
jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio Changco, who
brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of
the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by
accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were brought to
different places in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew,
called the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident.
The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The
incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the
officers and members of the crew executed sworn statements regarding the
incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were
present at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of
surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.

b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo

Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to
evade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the
lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.

On October 24 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of

Presidential Decree No. 532 (piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-
appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,

CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine
(9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as
follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates
inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then manning a motor launch
and armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fire upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC
TABANGCO loaded with petroleum products, together with the complement and
crew members, employing violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of
the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon
arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon
ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some

inconsistencies in their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991,
maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer
of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having
their own respective sources of livelihood. Their story is to the effect that on March
2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain
Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the
seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in a vessel.
They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid
P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that
period. They agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they
cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They
denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas.
Upon arrival thereat in the morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00
each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the balance would be
remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment
signed by the parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at

home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of
Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence
that he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and
later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years
on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port
Captain. The company was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including
shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and international markets. It
owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco
and his cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile
Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio
telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean
broker, who offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00
Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to
Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the
firm, proceeded to the high seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the
contact vessel.

The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong,
upon his return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-
to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be
designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of
the oil and was given the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the
purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board
"Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T
Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was
made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. was
able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew
list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did
not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the
vessel carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers
then told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer
of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T
Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong
claimed that he did not ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the
latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi
Pride" and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report
which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then
handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the
morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to
the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by
the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first
transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and
drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The
transfer took ten hours and was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid
in full for the transfer.
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four
vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as
a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the
Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of
the new transfer, this time with "M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that
the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend. After
being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the
name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned
out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong
was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the

crime charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby

rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of
the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential
Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime.
Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is
mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the
Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, ]r., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused
Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant
to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The
accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are
hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation the "M/T
Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are
hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof
in the amount of P11,240,000.00 Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the
rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount is paid in full. All
the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex
Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer
return the said cargo to said corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to
pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the
amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is
paid in full. After the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall
be deported to Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National
Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case
provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules
and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation.
With costs against all the accused.

SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants
may be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin Virgilio Loyola Andres C. Infante Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the
trial court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time
they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby
depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his
appearance as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings,
or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a
member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and
examined seven witnesses for the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly

contend that during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical
violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity to
read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not
informed of their rights, in violation of their constitutional rights,

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of
qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who
totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-
appellants conclude, could have overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the
crime committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is
lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge
that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao"
and/or that the cargo of the vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or
piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice to the crime
of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and
Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him
as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in
making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and
which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court
erred in convicting him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 when he was charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree,
thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not
prove any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified
piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking
of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was
not aware that the vessel and its cargo were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information
with qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was
convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have
criminal jurisdiction, the act must have been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the
legal effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-
appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in
finding that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic
Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and
(5) can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as accomplice when he was not
charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or
executed outside Philippine waters and territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record)
was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on
February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when
they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be
valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial,
accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical
manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal
consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and
intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents
when asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). It is true that an
accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and
by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of
judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged
on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is
also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus,
the same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he
can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy , but
without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is
amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly
protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the record
will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there
was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial,
considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made and with
the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of
due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been
made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680
[1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial
investigation may not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof

shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section
as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U. S. 436 [1966]) which gave
birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any
questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in
writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions
of the accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the
Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the
aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree
doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case
of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once
the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible.
The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State
should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA
293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of
accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible
and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise
inadmissible in evidence against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is

sufficient evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree
with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U"
and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, .and Infante, Jr. did conspire and
confederate to commit the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now
Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals -

...The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and

members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to
the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T Tabangao" on
March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro,
with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew
of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical
miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the Accused Cheong San
Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi
Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30,
1991...

x x x

x x x

x x x

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on
board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April
10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt in the
mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and
identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were
taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed
their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as
some of the pirates.

x x x
 x x x

x x x

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3)
Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the
evening of March 2 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its,
destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of
denial is not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater
weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of
the crime (People v. Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate tale that they were
hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate
Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were
conversing with one another along the seashore at Apkaya, Balibago, Calatagan,
Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-
shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and
handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their
families, without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage,
without the personal effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is
incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As pointed out by the
trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their
companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a
completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks or handymen (p. 113,
Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14
and 17, he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house
in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and
inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses
(People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and
concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and
convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically
impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to
do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work on the
dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is

accorded the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a
certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one
need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in
every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in
the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are times when
conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated
to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a
common criminal design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused- appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the
"M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was
to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan,
Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the
crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on
their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective common to all other
accused- appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another.

Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka
Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping
Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are
approximately six or seven kilometers away from each other. Their families are
close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio since their
parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-
appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers by affinity .Besides,
Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking case regarding
"M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in
1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola
at that time remained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted

of piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a],
respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659
(effective January 1, 1994) which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
has impliedly superseded Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that
Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because
both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in
order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person" mentioned in Section 1
[d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential
Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the complement
or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to
offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel,
hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. -The penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or
seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall
seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal
belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Underscoring supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 January 1, 1994), reads:

Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. -
The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the
high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a
member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the
cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or
passengers.

(Underscoring ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - The following shall mean and be understood, as

follows:

d. Piracy. -Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the
whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person.
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates
and punished as hereinafter provided (underscoring supplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,
provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by
Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to
include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy
embraces any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of
said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy
under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from
crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of
Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the
Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist
harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside
Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were
committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by
the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And
such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct
supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and
seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the
disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act
of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As
such, it is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same
principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law,
Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in Philippine waters. Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its
purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v.
Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the
law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
(People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right

to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground
that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section
2 of said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in
the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; ( c) and that his act was
indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was
indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in
the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532
which provides:

SEC. 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway

robbery brigandage. -Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or
protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them information
about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or
acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner
derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the
commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an
accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this
Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.

The ruling of the trial court is Within well-settle jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as
principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in
favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs.
Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential

Decree No 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided
in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the
case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption
that he knowingly abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property
taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of
the stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi
Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine
Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and
verified the quantity of the petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services
personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the
illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and
supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance
while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure)
and Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi
Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by
Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said
entries, the Singapore Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal
activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution
in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi
Pride" could not have been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail
accused-appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized
as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the
"Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T
Galilee"; that the firm submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH",
Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that the "General
Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore
(Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled
to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no passengers on
board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel
was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel
from "M/T Galilee" with' Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto
Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C
CSH, Record) stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross
cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his
signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH",
Record); that he then paid $150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the
amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one; and that in the requisite
"General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock
in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely
appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high seas during
said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of
diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed
above. It was likewise supervised by accused- appellant Cheong from his end while
Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source
and nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao".
Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided
any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances
under which it was acquired. He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale
or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he
never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to
the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo
whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo; he knew
that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night
which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time
Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any
receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean
national and thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the
cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$l,000,000.00 (computed at
P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for
less than one-half of its value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of
this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend
much time and money for transportation -only to sell at the aforestated price if it
were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records,
clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that the cargo that his
firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the
orders of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience
to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that
the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised
Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior
Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine, but of
international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated
vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally
unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records, using a
mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented
himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate
Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature and
the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have
refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo
to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the
consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence

on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

[ G.R. No. 97841-42, November 12, 1997 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VICTOR TIMON Y

CASAS, JOSE SAMPITON Y SENTUS, JESUS LAGARAS Y CORNELIO AND
CLARO RAYA Y BERENO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In denying this appeal from a conviction of piracy, the Court reiterates some well-
settled doctrines on identification of felons, waiver of objections to illegal arrest,
and assessment of the credibility of witnesses.

The Case

Before us is an appeal from the Decision dated September 24, 1990 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72,[1] convicting Appellants Victor
Timon, Jose Sampiton, Claro Raya and Jesus Lagaras of piracy defined under
Presidential Decree No. 532 and sentencing them to “life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua.”
In Criminal Case No. 8492-MN, Asst. Fiscal Hannibal V. Santillan filed before the
court a quo an Information dated October 5, 1989[2] charging herein appellants with
piracy in the high seas with homicide allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about September 20, 1989, at the territorial water of Navotas, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together with four (4) John Does, whose true
names are unknown and all of North Bay Blvd., Navotas, M.M., and who are still at
large, mutually helping and aiding each other, not being a member of the
complement nor a passenger, all armed with guns, with intent to gain, and with the
use of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, seize the vessel named “M/B Kali” and board on the said vessel
and poked their guns against the crew of the vessel and forcibly take, rob and carry
away cash money worth P100,00.00, wristwatch, men’s ring and two (2) telescope,
all belonging to and owned by one PAQUITO RODRIGUEZ II, owner of the said M/B
“Kali”, to the damage and prejudice of the said Paquito Rodriguez II, that on the
occasion of the aforesaid piracy and for the purpose of enabling them to rob the
said M/B “Kali”, in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of ensuring
success of their criminal act, armed with a gun, with intent to kill, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the said
Paquito Rodriguez II by then and there shooting the latter on the head, thereby
inflicting upon the said Paquito Rodriguez II gun shot wounds, which immediately
and directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.”

In Criminal Case No. 8493-MN, Appellant Timon was also charged by Asst. Fiscal Gil
Savedia with illegal possession of firearms allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about October 4, 1989, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have in his possession, control
and direct custody a firearm, to wit: one (1) Homemade Shot gun with one 12
gauge live ammunition and one (1) magazine, without first securing the necessary
license and permit from a competent government authority.

Contrary to law.”[3]

During the arraignment held on November 10, 1989, Appellants Victor Timon, Jose
Tampiton, Jesus Lagaras and Claro Raya, all assisted by Counsel de Oficio Froilan C.
Zapanta of the Public Attorney’s Office, pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No.
8492-MN.[4] Timon, assisted by the same counsel de oficio, also pleaded not guilty
in Criminal Case No. 8493-MN. Thereafter, joint trial of the two criminal cases
ensued in due course. On September 24, 1990, the trial court promulgated the
assailed Joint Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the
accused in Crim. Case No. 8492-MN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
of the crime (sic) charged against them. All of them are hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment or RECLUSION PERPETUA. The penalty should have been death, but
same has been abolished.

All the accused are also ordered to pay proportionately the heirs of their victim in
the amount of P30,000.00 for the loss of the latter’s life, as well as the additional
amount of P100,000.00 representing the cash money taken from the victim and
another P70,000.00 for the expenses incurred by the family of the victim in
connection with the latter’s death and burial and to pay the costs.

Accused Victor Timon y Casas is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence in

Crim. Case No. 8493-MN. His unrebutted testimony that the firearm subject matter
of the said case was merely brought out by a policeman from a locker in the police
station and the failure of the prosecution to present the “maong” jacket allegedly
wrapping said firearm rendered doubtful the accusation against Timon in this case.

SO ORDERED.”

Hence, this appeal.[5]

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

The facts as viewed by the prosecution are narrated in the Appelle's Brief as
follows: [6]

"At about 12:00 o'clock noon on September 20, 1989, the fishing boat, "M/B Kali"
left Navotas, Metro Manila with its owner Modesto[7] Rodriguez and seven (7) crew
members to buy fresh fish in Palawan (pp. 4-7, tsn, January 19, 1990; pp 5-9, tsn,
February 9, 1990; pp. 13-15, tsn, March 7, 1990).

The "M/B Kali" had not yet left the territorial waters of Navotas when it was
intercepted by eight (8) armed pirates, six (6) of them including appellants boarded
"M/B Kali" unnoticed, while the other two stayed behind in their pump boat (pp. 7-
8, tsn, January 19, 1990; pp. 16-20, tsn, March 7, 1990; pp. 3-5, tsn, March 9,
1990).

Once on board, the six (6) pirates herded the owner and crew members of "M/B
Kali" and ordered them to lie face down. Thereafter, three (3) of the pirates,
including appellants Lagaras and Sampiton, accosted Rodriguez at the "fuente" and
ordered him to take our the money which he had to buy fish worth about
P100,000.00, after he was pointed to by the crew members as their boss (pp. 9-11,
tsn, January 19, 1990; pp. 13-19, tsn, February 9, 1990; pp. 5-8, tsn, March 9,
1990).
After divesting Rodriguez of his P100,000.00 cash and other personal belongings,
the pirates fatally shot him. Whereupon, the pirates left, after warning the crew
members of "M/B Kali" not to move, accompanied by a warning shot (pp. 11-12,
tsn, January 19, 1990; pp. 19-21, tsn, February 9, 1990; pp. 8-9, tsn, March 9,
1990).

As soon as the pirates left, the crew members of "M/B Kali" stood up, and learned
that their boss, Modesto Rodriguez, was fatally shot at the back of his head. They
also found out that the pirates divested their boss of his money and personal
belongings, and took with them the two (2) telescopes used by the crew members
(pp. 12-14, tsn, January 19, 1990; pp. 21-31, tsn, February 9, 1990; pp. 9-10, tsn,
March 9, 1990).

That same afternoon, the incident was reported to the Navotas Police Force (p. 14,
tsn, January 19, 1990), which immediately sent a team to conduct a "spot"
investigation. When the policemen arrived at the Navotas Fish Port where "M/B
Kali" was moored, they saw the lifeless body of the victim Modesto Rodriguez with a
gunshot wound at the back of his head. From the crew members who did not know
the identities of the pirates, albeit could recognize them if they saw them again, the
policemen took down the description of the suspects (pp. 5-8, tsn, January 5,
1990; pp. 23-27, tsn, February 28, 1990).

On the basis thereof, the Navotas Police Force continued to "follow-up" the case
until they received information from the Philippine Coast Guard as to the identities
and/or whereabouts of some of the suspects. Fortwith, the Philippine Coast Guard
and the Navotas Police Force organized a team to the effect the arrest of the four
(4) appellants, and the confiscation from appellant Timon of a shotgun which he eas
allegedly carrying wrapped in a "maong" jacket at the time of his arrest (pp.9-25,
tsn, January 5, 1990).

At the Navotas Police Headquarter[s] where the four (4) suspects were brought,
they were positively identified by the crew members of "M/B Kali" as among those
who boarded their boat, and at gun point forced them to lie face down (pp.38-44,
tsn, February 28, 1990).”

Version of the Defense [8]

The defense posits denial and alibi. Appellant Sampiton, a fisherman, denied
participation in the commission of the offense. In the morning of September 20,
1989, Sampiton mended fishing nets; in the afternoon, he stayed at his house in
Davila St., Tabing Dagat, Navotas, which was thirty meters away from that of
Appellant Raya. As he did not have a boat of his own, he usually went fishing with
Timon. On that day, however, Sampiton averred that he did not go fishing with
Timon because of strong waves at sea.[9]

Victor Timon claimed that on September 20, 1989 he was mending fishing nets with
Sampiton and Raya in Davila St. Timon’s boat was dry-docked even the day before.
It was only about 6:00 p.m. of September 20, 1989 when they took down the boat
to where it was usually moored in preparation for the next morning.[10] Timon’s
friend and neighbor, Rogelio Anieves, corroborated his story. Anieves testified that
he worked on the fishing nets owned by Timon on said day.[11]

For his part, Appellant Jesus Lagaras claimed that from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. of
September 20, 1989, he was at Cesar Casoy’s house in Davila St., merely a house
away from his. He was playing a card game called cuajo with a certain Carding and
a certain Deling. After the game, Appellant Lagaras went outside the house where
he heard people discussing the M/L Kali’s plunder. He joined the conversation and
left about 7:00 p.m.[12]

When Lagaras reached home, his brother, Julito, alias Boy Muslim, admitted
complicity in said crime which he allegedly committed with a certain Felix Duran,
alias Rudy, and one known only as Toto. Julito informed Jesus that he was leaving
the place to evade arrest and advised the latter to do the same. According to Jesus
Lagaras, he looked like his brother Julito; thus, he posits that the authorities
mistook him for the real culprit. Believing in his innocence, Appellant Lagaras did
not heed his brother’s advice to flee.[13]

Cesar Casoy, a fisherman and good friend of Jesus Lagaras, corroborated the
latter’s story. He added that after the card game, they went to a nearby place
called bukid where they first heard of the crime.[14] Casoy, the team leader of the
area’s barangay tanod, related that while he was cooking in the morning of
September 27, 1989, Navotas policemen, including Patrolman Mabbun, came to his
house. They were looking for “Rudy, Felix, Boy Muslim and the Chief Engineer” who
were the suspects in a crime. Casoy accompanied the police to the house of Rudy
but the latter was absent. Thereafter, the police left and he headed for home.[15]

Casoy’s assistance was again sought about 4:00 a.m. of October 4, 1989 by
Yolanda Lagaras, the wife of Appellant Jesus. She apprised him of her husband’s
arrest. They went at once to the police station and told Policeman Mabbun that
Jesus Lagaras “was not involved” but the policeman allegedly replied, “Just follow
the case in court because Lagaras was being pointed to (as) Boy Muslim.”[16]

Yolanda Lagaras, on the other hand, testified that about 4:00 a.m. of October 4,
1989, she was awakened by the sound of “strong successive knocks” on their door,
accompanied by voices identifying themselves as the police. She woke her husband
and told him to open the door. As he did, a policeman immediately pointed a gun at
her husband, saying, “Ikaw na nga si Boy Muslim.” Her husband answered, “hindi
po”; while she said, “Hindi iyan si Boy Muslim, kapatid iyon ng asawa ko.” Another
policeman, carrying a picture, arrived and said, “Pare, ito na nga ang hinahanap ko
si Boy Muslim.” The same policeman told her, “Misis, dadalhin ko ang asawa mo sa
detensiyon.”[17]

Immediately after her husband’s arrest, she asked the help of Cesar Casoy who
accompanied her to the police station where her husband was detained. At 11:00
a.m., her husband was brought to a small room. She then heard him shout, “Hindi
po ako si Boy Muslim kapatid ko po ang gumawa.” She tried to report this to two
policemen but they ignored her. It was 4:00 p.m. when her husband was brought
back to the detention cell.[18]

About 7:00 p.m., the policemen asked her “to point [Boy Muslim] to them” so that
they could “set free” her husband. Acceding to them, she accompanied three
policemen to the house of Julito Lagaras or Boy Muslim at North Bay Boulevard, but
they did not find him. She returned to the police station two hours thereafter.[19]

Finally, appellants alleged that they were arrested without a warrant, then
maltreated and tortured. They also accused the police of attempting to extort
money from them.

The Trial Court's Ruling

After “examining the testimony of prosecution witnesses” who “clearly identified all
the accused,” and “clearly narrated the participation” of Lagaras, Raya, Sampiton
and Timon [20] vis-a-vis appellants’ denial and alibi, the court a quo rendered its
decision finding the four appellants guilty of the “crime charged” in Criminal
Case No. 8492-MN but acquitting Timon in Criminal Case No. 8493-MN.

Errors Assigned

All four accused appealed to this Court. In their brief, Appellants Timon, Sampiton
and Raya assigned the following “errors”:

“I

The court a quo blatantly erred in decreeing that the accused-appellants were
positively identified as the authors of the crime charged when even a cursory
reading of the evidence adduced by the prosecution will unveil the unreliability and
dubiousness of such identification.

II

The court a quo grievously erred in not holding that the accused-appellants’
warrantless arrest effected through the highly irregular identification made by an
unnamed source was illegal.

III

The court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty of the crime charged
in the face of the prosecution’s failure to establish their guilt by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.”[21]

Appellant Lagaras filed a separate brief, alleging the following errors:

“The court a quo gravely erred in finding that the guilt of the accused-appellant
Jesus Lagaras was proved beyond reasonable doubt despite
I. the obviously flawed and highly irregular investigative process that brought to
naught his constitutionally protected rights;

II. the fact that the evidence on record is replete with factual antecedents showing
that he was a victim of mistaken identity.”[22]

This case hinges on (1) the admissibility and (2) the credibility of the evidence
pointing to appellants’ identification, but the Court will also rule on the (3)
objections to the alleged illegal arrest, (4) appellants’ alibi and (5) the proper
penalty.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is not meritorious

1. Admissibility of Identification

Appellants Timon, Sampiton and Raya argue that their identification during the
police investigation constituted a violation of their constitutional rights.[23] Claiming
that they were subjected to “malicious pinpointing,” they argue that the police line-
up was improperly used against them as there were no other “suspects” presented
to the witnesses. Additionally, Appellant Lagaras alleges that the police
“investigative process was fraught with unprofessionalism and prejudice” which “did
violence to the constitutionally protected rights of the former.”[24] The Court is not
persuaded.

In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,[25] the Court, through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno,
explained the procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine the
admissibility of such identification. It listed the following ways of identifying the
suspects during custodial investigation: show-ups, mug shots and line-ups. The
Court there ruled:

“x x x. Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is

done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown
to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure
its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process.
In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time: (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.”[26]
Applying this “totality of circumstances” test to the case at bar, the Court finds the
out-of-court identification of appellants (which is a show-up) admissible and not in
any way violative of their constitutional rights. This is borne out by the following
salient facts. Police Officer Manalo testified that while the crew was unable to give
the names of the suspects, they nonetheless gave him their assurance that they
would be able to identify the pirates “if they see them again.”[27] In addition, the
crew of the M/B Kali described the appellants to the police. This description,
coupled with information obtained from the Philippine Coast Guard and police
“assets,” all contributed to the identification and the arrest of accused-appellants.
Pat. Manalo testified thus:

“ATTY. ZAPANTA

Q I understand Mr. Witness that you are the officer on case and you were the
first person as member of the Navotas Police Station to arrive at the scene and you
also (sic) the very first member of said station being an officer of this case to talk
to the memvers (sic) of the crew of MB Kali and I got from you during the direct
examination that not one of the crew members were able to give the identity of the
suspects, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact not one of the members of the crew gave you the description of the
suspects?

A No, sir. They described the suspects.

Q What kind of description did they give you?

A Physical description.

Q What in particular?

A The face, the attire or the wearings (sic) of the suspects.

Q In the interview conducted by you on the person of the crew members, do I

gather or get right that they also gave you the description of the weapons used in
the commission of the piracy?

A They gave me the description of the firearms which they were armed.

Q They did not give you the specific type of the firearm?
A Yes, sir. Because they do not know what kind of firearms.”[28] (Underscoring
supplied.)
Evidently, while the crew members w

ere not able to name the pirates, they were able to identify them and to give their
accurate descriptions. This is best shown in Eyewitness Virgilio Adreser’s sworn
statement dated October 4, 1989 that he could not forget one of the suspects who
had a scar between the eyes (“hindi ko makakalimutan iyong pilat niya sa pagitan
ng mata”).[29] Said suspect later turned out to be Appellant
Sampiton.[30] Significant, too, is the prosecution witnesses’ conscious effort to look
at and observe the pirates. Note that the crime was committed on board the M/B
Kali in broad daylight. The eyewitnesses’ attention was naturally intense as they
were in an extremely tense situation and their very lives were threatened. Appellant
Raya pulled Adreser’s collar to wake him up.[31] Raya’s companion, who has
remained at large since this incident, pointed a short gun at Nuña;[32] while
Appellant Lagaras pointed a gun at Rojo[33] and Mabiliran and then kicked
them.[34] Oftentimes, an attacker’s image is indelibly etched in the victim’s memory,
and what the latter has observed is not easily effaced therefrom.[35] The fact that
the other witnesses -- aside from Prosecution Witness Rojo who described Lagaras
as “mataas” -- had not described the appellants in their sworn statements is
of no moment. It is clear that they positively and certainly identified the appellants
in the police headquarters barely two weeks after the commission of the crime
when the incident was still fresh in their minds, and subsequently during trial. That
the sworn statements of the three witnesses did not contain a description of the
pirates’ physique merely shows that the same were incomplete; this, however, does
not in any way detract from the overall veracity of their testimonies or their
identification of accused-appellants. [36]

Furthermore, appellants’ allegation of suggestiveness in the identification is

unsubstantiated. The identification of accused-appellants was effected through the
zealous investigation of the police. Because the appellants’ allegations of
irregularity, maltreatment and torture have not been proven adequately, the
investigators are presumed to have performed their duties regularly and in good
faith. We note that the identities of the accused-appellants were established after a
week of intensive police investigation.[37] We note further that each of the
eyewitnesses could identify only some, not all, the accused-appellants; Rojo, for
instance, identified only Appellant Lagaras. If the police had manipulated the
identification process, all the eyewitnesses would have identified all the appellants.
That Rojo failed to identify the other appellants indicates that the identification
process was done freely, with no suggestion or coercion from the police.

That appellants were not linedup with other “suspects” is not a bar to or
inconsistent with their proper identification. We reiterate that “(t)here is no law
requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. Identification can be
made in a room in a police station even if it were not a police line-up as long as the
required proprieties are observed x x x.”[38] In fine, no irregularity was shown to
have attended the police work which led to the identification of appellants at the
police station. Hence, applying the totality of circumstances test, we rule that
appellants’ out-of-court identification is admissible; appellants were not
“misidentified” nor their constitutional rights violated.

Even assuming arguendo the appellants’ out-of-court identification was defective,

their subsequent identification in court cured any flaw that may have initially
attended it. We emphasize that the “inadmissibility of a police line-up identification
x x x should not necessarily foreclose the admissibility of an independent in-court
identification.”[39] We also stress that all the accused-appelllants were positively
identified by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.

Appellant Lagaras insists that it was his brother Julito, also known as “Boy Muslim,”
who was involved in the piracy. He argues that the policemen were looking for “Boy
Muslim” when they arrested him. He was taken into police custody simply because
he had “deceptively similar facial features” as his brother Julito.[40] At the trial, he
presented as witnesses his friends Casoy and Anieves and his wife Yolanda to show
that he cooperated with the efforts of the police to apprehend his brother.

Appellant Lagaras’ claim that he was improperly identified would have acquired
persuasive weight had he presented independent evidence to prove that he and his
brother Julito looked identical and that one could easily be mistaken for the other in
broad daylight. However, Lagaras failed to present such evidence to bolster his
defense of mistaken identification. Although he presented the testimonies of his co-
accused Sampiton, friend Cesar Casoy, his neighbor Rogelio Anieves, and his wife,
the Court notes that not one of them talked on the alleged identical features of the
brothers; they merely concluded that Appellant Lagaras and his brother, who were
not even twins, [41] were “deceptively similar” in appearance although Appellant
Lagaras was taller than his brother. [42]

Such self-serving conclusion, by itself, cannot be given greater weight than the
prosecution eyewitnesses’ positive identification of Appellant Lagaras as one of the
pirates. Appellant’s stance is equivalent to a denial which, being unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, is inherently weak -- a negative self-serving claim
that cannot be given evidentiary value greater than that accorded to the affirmative
testimony of credible witnesses.[43] Astutely observed by the trial court is the fact
that Lagaras did not even submit a photograph to prove the alleged similarity of his
facial features with those of his brother Julito.[44]

The fact that the police looked for Julito Lagaras or “Boy Muslim” when they went to
Appellant Lagaras’ house does not prove Julito’s complicity in the crime of piracy or
disprove that of appellant. The insinuation of Lagaras that the police arrested him
to force him to produce his brother Julito or to compel Julito to surrender[45] is
merely an unsubstantiated conjecture that cannot prevail over appellant’s positive
identification. Verily, the accuracy of Appellant Lagaras’ identification is beyond
doubt. The prosecution eyewitnesses categorically testified that they saw Appellant
Lagaras for the first time during the incident,[46] thereby precluding the probability
that they mistook or confused said appellant for his brother Julito. As noted earlier,
Nelson Rojo, in his sworn statement of October 4, 1989, stated he recognized only
Appellant Lagaras:

“10 T: Dito sa apat na ito (referring to Jesus, Claro, Victor and Jose) at sa kasama
nilang apat (4) pa na wala ngayon dito sa loob ng himpilang ito, si Jesus Laragas
lang ba ang nakikilala mo?

S: Oho, iyong mataas na iyan lang (pointing to Jesus Laragas) dahil sa hiwa-
hiwalay kami ng pwesto (sa) lantsa ng mga kasama ko ng umakyat sila at nag-
kani-kaniya sila ng pagtutok sa amin.”[47]

That Appellant Lagaras was accurately identified by the prosecution’s eyewitnesses

is evident from his highly visible and active participation in the commission of the
crime, considering that the crime was committed at 1:00 p.m. in sunlit areas of the
M/L Kali, where visibility was thus very clear.[48] The defense failed to show any ill
motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses to falsely accuse appellants of so
serious a crime as piracy with homicide. Even Appellant Lagaras himself could not
think of any reason for Prosecution Eyewitnesses Mabiliran, Adreser and Nuña to
falsely accuse him.[49] In the absence of evidence or any indicium that the
prosecution’s main witnesses harbored ill motives against the accused, the
presumption is that they were not so moved and that their testimonies were
untainted with bias.[50]

Appellant Lagaras’ assertion that he could not have committed the crime because
he did not follow his brother’s advice to leave his residence, by itself, is not proof of
his nonparticipation in the crime charged. “Non-flight is not conclusive proof of
innocence.”[51]

2. Credibility of Witnesses

All told, the issue of whether or not appellants were in fact identified by the
prosecution eyewitnesses is anchored on credibility. Anent this issue,
“(j)urisprudence teaches us that the findings of the trial court judge who tried the
case and heard the witnesses are not to be disturbed on appeal unless there are
substantial facts and circumstances which have been overlooked and which, if
properly considered, might affect the result of the case. The trial judge’s evaluation
of the witness’ credibility deserves utmost respect in the absence of
arbitrariness.”[52] “The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.”[53] After a thorough review of
the records in this case, the court finds no reversible error or arbitrariness in the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. As aptly
stated by the trial court, it “could not help but note that they clearly identified all
the accused in these cases as among the six (6) armed pirates who boarded the
M/B (sic) Kali and robbed and killed its owner.”[54]

3. Waiver of Objections to Illegal Arrest

The defense assails the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants. The

circumstances of the present case do not fall under any of the instances in Section
5, Rule 113[55] of the Rules of Court, which recognizes warrantless arrest.

We note that the crime was committed on September 20, 1989; appellants were
arrested fourteen days later on October 4, 1989 by police officers who were
nowhere near the crime scene. Clearly, said police officers had no personal
knowledge to effect the warrantless arrest allowable under paragraph (b) of Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules. Neither can the police invoke paragraph (a) thereof as
regards the arrest of Appellant Victor Timon who, when arrested, allegedly hid an
unlicensed firearm in a maong jacket; as found by the trial court such accusation
was doubtful in view of the prosecution’s non-presentation of the maong jacket and
appellant’s allegation that said firearm was produced from the police
locker.[56] However, appellants’ warrantless arrest cannot help them in this appeal
because they are deemed to have waived the illegality of such police action. They
did not raise such question before their plea to the offense charged. Neither did
they move to quash the information on that ground before the trial court.[57] In
People v. Nazareno,[58] where the police, also without a warrant, arrested the
accused fourteen days after the commission of the crime, this Court ruled:

“x x x. (The accused) waived objections based on the alleged irregularity of their

arrest, considering that they pleaded not guilty to the charges against them and
participated in the trial. Any defect in their arrest must be deemed cured when they
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. For the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused.
Consequently, if objections based on this ground are waived, the fact that the
arrest was illegal is not a sufficient cause for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after a trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render
subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty
when all the facts on record point to the culpability of accused.”[59]

Appellant Timon’s application for bail[60] likewise constitutes a waiver of his right to
question whatever irregularities and defects attended his arrest.[61]

4. Weakness of Appellants’ Alibi

To sustain alibi, the defense must prove that it was physically impossible for the
accused-appellants to have been at the crime scene during its commission.[62] This,
the defense miserably failed to do. More significantly, it is well-settled that the
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by an
eyewitness who had no motive to falsely testify, like the prosecution’s eyewitnesses
in this case. [63] In view of such positive identification, appellants’ alibi is unavailing
and remains weak and impotent.[64]

5. Proper Penalty

In passing, we should state that the penalty of “life imprisonment or reclusion

perpetua” imposed by the trial court is wrong because the two are not the same.
This Court had occasion to differentiate the two penalties as early as May 24, 1948
in People vs. Mobe,[65] and recently in People vs. Layno [66] where we noted the
following distinction:

“The Code (Revised Penal Code) does not prescribe the penalty of life imprisonment
for any of the felonies therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for
serious offenses penalized not by the x x x Code but by special law. Reclusion
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least (30) years, after which the convict
becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it accessory penalties, namely:
perpetual special disqualification, etc. It is not the same as life imprisonment which,
for one thing, does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another does
not have any definite extent or duration.”

We also have to mention that burial expenses, which are by nature actual damages,
must be proved. Since no proof of burial expenses was ever presented in the
instant case, its award will not be allowed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Joint Decision convicting Appellants Victor Timon, Jose
Sampiton, Jesus Lagaras and Claro Raya of the crime of piracy with homicide,
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering the payment to
the victim’s heirs of the sum of P100,000.00 representing the amount taken from
the deceased is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications: (1) the civil
indemnity is hereby increased to P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence,
and (2) the words “life imprisonment or” in the dispositive portion thereof and (3)
the unproved amount of P70,000.00 awarded for burial expenses are deleted. Costs
against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

[ G.R. No. 178552, October 05, 2010 ]

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., ON BEHALF OF

THE SOUTH-SOUTH NETWORK (SSN) FOR NON-STATE ARMED GROUP
ENGAGEMENT, AND ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., PETITIONERS, VS.
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism," otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,[1] signed into law
on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner Southern

Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty.
Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even
date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-
Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights
(CTUHR), represented by their respective officers[3] who are also bringing the action
in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality,
Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for
Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE),
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers
(SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng
Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT),
Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their
respective officers,[4] and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John
Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry
Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes,
Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.

On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,

Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa
Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
Promotion of Church People's Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
respective officers[5] who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.

On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio
Osmeña III, and Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional

chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,[7] and
individuals[8] followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised
in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism

Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice
Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as
members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the
National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau
of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money
Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP
intelligence and investigative elements.

The petitions fail.

Petitioners' resort to
certiorari is improper

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.--When any tribunal, board or

officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as
law and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity

how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting

requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.[10]

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the
most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.

Petitioners lack locus standi

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.[11]

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary[12] summarized the rule
on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and
personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is
invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to
be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to
be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show

that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected

"communist fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual
petitioners invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers.

While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses

with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality
of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful
conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus
standi.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners

in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to "close security
surveillance by state security forces," their members followed by "suspicious
persons" and "vehicles with dark windshields," and their offices monitored by "men
with military build." They likewise claim that they have been branded as "enemies
of the [S]tate."[14]

Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show
any connection between the
purported "surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,

Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-
organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents' alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National
People's Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the
effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.[15] The
petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must
be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it
must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by
public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact
must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications,
are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters
of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact
which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of
which the court has no constructive knowledge.[16] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial

notice. Petitioners' apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their
plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against
them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of
their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554,
who merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result
in direct injury to their organization and members.

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the
United States of America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have both
classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist
organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration
would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist
organizations.[19] Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed
before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations
as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA
9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July 2007 up to the present,
petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any
threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list

Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano and
Luzviminda Ilagan,[20] urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the
NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of
designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations.
Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration[21] of resuming peace
talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the
judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.

More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and
specific interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of recent development is the
filing of the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the
Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu
Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to
the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution

under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them.

In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in
2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of
Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino
Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were
petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita
Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front
organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU,
BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.[26]
The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For
one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and
dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the
Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the
enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a
person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.

Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to

prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years
after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.

Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on
their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA
9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however,
suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.[27] The IBP failed to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against
its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not
pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.

Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the
subject of "political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the
veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the Court finds
that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA
9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto
Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being respectively a
human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these
gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.

Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman

Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise
are of transcendental importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-
reaching implications," without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under
which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human
rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus
standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct
injury as a result of the law's enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt
the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by
the general public.

Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners

as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise
of the spending or taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen standing must rest
on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.[29]

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.

It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of

a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal
interest is key.

Petitioners fail to
present an actual
case or controversy

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC[33] cannot be

more emphatic:

[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy

scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must
be justiciable--definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial
thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely a
theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of

Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on
uncertain, contingent events.[34] Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an
application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or
granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely
wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35]

The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on

Elections[36] for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on
Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission
on Elections,[37] to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners
based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim
Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real
litigants.

The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory

grounds goes on ad infinitum.

The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of

a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however,
is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the
Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38]

Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law

Project,[39] allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and
"should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole
means of seeking relief."[40] The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal
court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C.
§2339B (a) (1),[41] proscribing the provision of material support to organizations
declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed
that they intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of
two such organizations.

Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an

anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the
conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a
justiciable controversy.[42]

Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that
the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has
been established, much less a real and existing one.

Petitioners' obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly

being tagged as "communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible
threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render
an advisory opinion, which is not its function.[43]
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory
actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official
are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44]

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law
may be abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before
courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.

A facial invalidation of a
statute is allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition
of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies
with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness

and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply
only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to

outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.

Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting

the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly
cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[48]

The Court clarifies.

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in

Section 5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness
doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases," and are "not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes."[50] It added that, at any rate,
the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not
vague.[51]
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,[52] the
Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the
therein subject election offense[53] under the Voter's Registration Act of 1996, with
which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.[54]

The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion[55] of Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law
(Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of
the crime of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the
concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He
basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do
not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring
Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the
main Estrada decision, reads:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is

overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes
with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished
is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws
against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application

only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this
reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the
vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only
if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some
conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are

analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment
cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal
statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom
application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like
overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to
a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim
that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely
on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose
activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case
and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and

requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative
remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-
by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they
might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"
and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is
charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.)

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of

the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-
applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process
of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of
speech and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily
broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.[58]

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes

that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain
from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.[59]

A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts

affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the
parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.[60]

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount
a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at
all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain
penal statutes that generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially
harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading
the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.[63]

The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute
may be challenged" and "underscored that an `on-its-face' invalidation of penal
statutes x x x may not be allowed."[64]

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case
may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The
rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the
prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A
strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if
the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a
facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the State's ability to
deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused
from defeating the State's power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied
to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the
law is clear as applied to him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth

doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts
as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an

exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her;
if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law
by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can
only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way;
challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for"; so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal
adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of
those third parties.[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least
two cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an
overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,[68] and
that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v.
Hicks,[70] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed
against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-
related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression."[71]

Since a penal statute may only be

assailed for being vague as applied
to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of
"terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an
actual or imminent charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the
operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein
petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face
and in its entirety."[72] It stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."[73]

American jurisprudence[74] instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve

the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at
hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity."

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants' claims
that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as
"among the most important guarantees of liberty under law."[75]

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In
at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an
ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of
illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the
petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed
penal statute, unlike in the present case.

There is no merit in the

claim that RA 9372 regulates
speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA
9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under
any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate
crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of
terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.

The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first
element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component
of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech.

Petitioners' notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it

unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender
like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the
amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An
analogy in one U.S. case[78] illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on
discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a
sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be analyzed
as one regulating speech rather than conduct.

Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor
the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a
fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable
incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.

[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most
instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct
illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried
out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive
interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it
practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade
as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to
society.[79] (italics and underscoring supplied)

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they
merely evidence a prohibited conduct.[80] Since speech is not involved here, the
Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of
the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as
they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness
grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed
penal statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein
plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to
await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a

credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness
analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The
Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative
counseling on a statute's future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the
courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008

FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and
Other Law Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director,
DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer, SPO4
RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1 VALENTINO RUFANO, and PO1
FEDERICO BALOLOT, respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court are the October 30, 2003 Resolution1 of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices - Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal
complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, filed by Feliciano
Galvante2 (petitioner) against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1
Eddie Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot (private
respondents) for arbitrary detention, illegal search and grave threats; and the
January 20, 2004 Ombudsman Order3 which denied his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are of record.

In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del
Sur, private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38
automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live
ammunitions.4 The confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum
Receipt dated September 2, 1999.5

Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an

Information6 for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to
Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 5047, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.

Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private
respondents an administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-
020007 for Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII,
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG);7 and a criminal case,
docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave
Threats, before the Ombudsman.8

In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner narrated
how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him,
arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock in
the afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy. Kapatungan, Trento,
Agusan del Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire about the
retirement procedure for policemen;

2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together
with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a ride
from the highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down of the
jeep but before I could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my
way;

3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido
PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company, Regional
Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP
members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan,
Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their long firearms ready to fire [at] me,
having heard the sound of the release of the safety lock;

4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying,

"ANG IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which
I answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm,"
showing my waistline when I raised my T-shirt;

5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their
arms and showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in
civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which
Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his house told them not to harass me
as I am also a former police officer but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's
statements;

6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin
Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I
asked them if they have any search warrant;

7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my
jeep and asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long
arms were still pointed to us, I searched my wallet and gave the asked [sic]
document;

8. That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without

saying anything bringing with them the firearm;

9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento
Police Station where I saw a person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked
on his waist, to which I asked the police officers including those who
searched my jeep to apprehend him also;
 10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to
apprehend the armed civilian person so I went to the office of Police Chief
Rocacorba who immediately called the armed civilian to his office and when
already inside his office, the disarming was done;

11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said
person by Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;

12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing
cases of Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against
SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1
Velantino Rufano, PO1 Federico Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran.9

Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo Sanoria and
Percival Plaza.

Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002, where he
interposed the following defenses:

First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of

Police/Officer-in-Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered
the detention. Petitioner himself admitted this fact in his own Complaint-
Affidavit;11 and

Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle,12 but admits that even though he
was not armed with a warrant, he searched the person of petitioner as the latter, in
plain view, was committing a violation of Comelec Resolutions No. 3258 and No.
3328 by carrying a firearm in his person.

Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-Affidavit
dated March 25, 2002, which contradicts the statements of private respondent
Conde, viz:

1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where

we stated among other things, that "we saw Feleciano "Nani" Galvante
armed with a handgun/pistol tucked on his waist;"

2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that
the said handgun was taken by SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who was acting
as our team leader during the May 14, 2001 Elections, from the jeep of Mr.
Galvante after searching the same; and

3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated

August 28, 2001 after we have already affixed our signatures thereon.13
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with
both the IAS and Ombudsman, absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran,
Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private respondent Conde alone be
prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases.14

On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No. IASOB-
020007, finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct but penalized
them with suspension only. The IAS noted however that private respondents were
merely being "[enthusiastic] in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty." 15

Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the
Warrant of Arrest.16 The RTC granted the same in an Order17 dated August 17,
2001. Upon reinvestigation, Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation
with Motion to Dismiss" dated November 22, 2001, recommending the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 5047 on the ground that "the action of the policemen who
conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances
justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his
property."18 Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano Pag-ong approved said
recommendation.19

The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order20 dated January
16, 2003.

Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047, Ombudsman

Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B,
the October 30, 2003 Resolution, to wit:

After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable

cause for any of the offenses charged against above-named respondents.

The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the
complaint, it appearing from the records that the incident stemmed
from a valid warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an affidavit
of desistance by the complainant rendered the complaint even more
uncertain and subject to doubt, especially so since it merely exculpated some
but not all of the respondents. These circumstances, coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, negates any criminal
liability on the part of the respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the

above-captioned case be dismissed for lack of probable cause.21 (Emphasis
supplied)

Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy

Ombudsman for the Military Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman) approved
the October 30, 2003 Resolution.22
In his Motion for Reconsideration,23 petitioner called the attention of the
Ombudsman to the earlier IAS Decision, the Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss
of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC Order, all of which declared the
warrantless search conducted by private respondents illegal,24 which are
contradicted by the October 30, 2003 Ombudsman Resolution declaring the
warrantless search legal.

The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that
the latter offered "no new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the
reversal or modification"25 of its October 30, 2003 Resolution.

Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro,

Director Blancaflor and Prosecutor Garcia (public respondents) the following acts of
grave abuse of discretion:

I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when, in their Resolution dated October 30, 2003, public respondents found
that the incident upon which petitioner's criminal complaint was based
stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest and dismissed petitioner's complaint
despite the fact that:

A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the

private respondents was made without a valid warrant, nor does it fall
under any of the instances of valid warrantless searches.

B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was

arrested and detained by the private respondents.

II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when, in their Order dated January 20, 2004, public respondents denied the
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a capricious, whimsical, despotic
and arbitrary manner. 26

In its Memorandum,27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public
respondents acted within the bounds of their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-
0109-B given that private respondents committed no crime in searching petitioner
and confiscating his firearm as the former were merely performing their duty of
enforcing the law against illegal possession of firearms and the Comelec ban
against the carrying of firearms outside of one's residence.

Private respondent Conde filed a Comment28 and a Memorandum for

himself.29 Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their
separate Letter-Comment dated June 25, 2004.30

The petition lacks merit.

The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there
exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts.31 The Court respects the relative autonomy
of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute, and refrains from interfering when
the latter exercises such powers either directly or through the Deputy
Ombudsman,32 except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.33

Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to

perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when judgment
rendered is not based on law and evidence but on caprice, whim and
despotism.34 This does not obtain in the present case.

It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman
charges private respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave
threats.

The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of
a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two
forms of searches:

Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of
those legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender
for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not
exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or
employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or, having
legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary
severity in executing the same.

Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty

of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon
a public officer or employee who, in cases where a search is proper, shall
search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person, in the
absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without
the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.

Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his
Affidavit-Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search
on his vehicle without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while
lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.

The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is
civil,35 under Article 32, in relation to Article 221936 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code,
which provides:
 Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly
or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs
any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to
the latter for damages:

xxxx

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

xxxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.

and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975.37

To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a

complaint for damages with the regular courts38 or an administrative case with the
PNP/DILG,39 as petitioner did in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, and not a
criminal action with the Ombudsman.

Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which
petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore
proper, although the reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint
are rather off the mark because they relied solely on the finding that the
warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the
Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his
complaint.40 Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal
complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal
offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a
groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the
RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public
respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is
completely hypothetical under the circumstance.

The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by
public respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be
shown that (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender
detained the complainant, and (c) the detention is without legal grounds.41 The
second element was not alleged by petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed
out by private respondent Conde in his Comment42 and Memorandum,43 petitioner
himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief Rocacorba who
caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private
respondents effected his detention, or were in any other way involved in it.44 There
was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary
detention against private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly
pointed out that the same is based merely on petitioner's bare allegation that
private respondents aimed their firearms at him.45 Such bare allegation stands no
chance against the well-entrenched rule applicable in this case, that public officers
enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance of their official function.46 The
IAS itself observed that private respondents may have been carried away by their
"enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty."47 Petitioner expressed the
same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private
respondents may have been merely following orders when they pointed their long
firearms at him.

All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the criminal complaint against private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 119574. March 19, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. ROBERT GUNGON

y SANTIAGO and VENANCIO ROXAS y ARGUELLES, accused,ROBERT
GUNGON y SANTIAGO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

For a direct automatic review by this Court, conformably with Article 47 of

the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No.
7659, is the decision, dated 15 February 1995, of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96, convicting accused-appellant Roberto
Gungon Y Santiago of the crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with frustrated murder, of carnapping and of robbery in three
separate Information filed against him and two other persons.1 The
informations averred

In Criminal Case No. 94-54285 for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal

Detention with Frustrated Murder

That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there by means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and at
gunpoint, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kidnap, carry away and
detain AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a female, thereby depriving her of her liberty,
and thereafter bring her to an uninhabited place in Barangay Bagong Pook,
San Jose, Batangas and then and there, with intent to kill and with
treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot her in the face with a hand gun, thus
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
MURDER as consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the accused , that is, the able
and timely medical assistance given to said Agnes Guirindola which
prevented her death, resulting to her utmost grief, sorrow, sufferings and
sleepless night, compensable in actual, moral and exemplary damages in
such amounts as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry

In Criminal Case No. 94-54286 for Carnapping

That on or about January 12, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and intimidation of
person and at gunpoint, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, take and carry away one Nissan Sentra Model 1993 with Plate
No. TKR-837, then driven by Agnes Guirindola in such amount as may be
awarded to them under the Civil Code of the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3cräläwvirtualibräry

- and -

In Criminal Case No. 94-54287 (amended) for Robbery

That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and intimidation of
person and at gunpoint, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, while on board the motor vehicle of AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a
1993 Nissan Sentra with Plate No. TKR-837, and in the course of its trip,
divested and robbed said Agnes Guirindola of the following cash, check and
personal belongings, to wit:

Cash P1,000.00

Check 3,000.00

Pieces of jewelry valued at 34,000.00

and in the course of execution thereof, shoot and fatally wounded Agnes
Guirindola with a handgun, which is clearly unnecessary in the commission
of the crime, to the damage and prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola, in such
amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court gave a full account of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution that led to the indictments.

It was about 3:30 in the afternoon of 12 January 1994. Agnes Guirindola, a

20-year old De La Salle University student, was driving a red Nissan Sentra
car with Plate No. TKR-837 along Panay Avenue, Quezon City, on her way
to a bookstore, and thereafter, to fetch her mother, Mrs. Elvira Guirindola,
from work when a man, passing himself off as a traffic enforcement officer
and wearing a PNP reflectorized vest, flagged her down and motioned her
to execute a U-turn towards him. She complied. Lowering the right front
window of her car, she asked the man, whose name she later learned to be
Venancio Roxas, what traffic violation she had committed. Roxas replied
that she had wrongly traversed a one-way street where, barely two days
ago, a little girl had figured in an accident. Agnes surrendered her drivers
license. Roxas, giving her what appeared to be a ticket, remarked, Miss,
kunwari pirmahan mo ito,5 but seeing that it was not the usual traffic
ticket, she merely put a check sign and returned it. Roxas told her to open
the door. He came on board the car and directed Agnes to proceed to the
next intersection where Roxas motioned her to turn left. After executing a
left turn, she stopped and handed over to him a fifty pesos (P50.00) bill
which he accepted. He then returned her license.

Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him off, instead, he suddenly
pointed a gun at her and switched off the engine, saying, Miss kailangan ko
lang ito,6 referring to the car. Agnes started to cry. She pleaded with Roxas
to let her go and not harm her. Instead, Roxas unlocked the rear door to
let another man in. The man, identified in open court as accused-appellant
Roberto Gungon, immediately reclined her seat and pulled her over to the
back seat by her arms while Roxas promptly slid into the drivers seat. She
was told that they were taking her to Philcoa but, after glancing at his
beeper, Gungon, told Roxas, Boss, negative Philcoa.7 Roxas nodded. After a
while, Gungon spoke to Roxas, Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati at doon na
natin i-s.8 to which Roxas again simply nodded his head without a word.

Agnes, now really scared, took out a rosary from her bag and prayed.
Momentarily, Roxas pulled over and alighted from the vehicle while
Gungon held Agnes and poked a gun at her. When Roxas returned, he had
with him a bottle of softdrink and skyflakes which he offered to Agnes.
Agnes refused to drink after seeing some tablets floating inside the bottle.
Gungon tried to persuade Agnes to take the drink, advising her, Sige na,
makakatulong ito sa iyo.9 The car stopped a second time to load gas at a
gasoline station. Escape was nil; Guirindola made sure of that. The car
thereafter proceeded southwards and on to the South Superhighway.
Roxas took time out from the wheel at a deserted area to allow him and
Gungon to relieve themselves one after the other. Back on the road, Roxas
told Gungon to have Agnes partake of the softdrink but she continued to
resist. Agnes took out her wallet to get a prayer leaflet Gungon saw a
picture and asked Agnes who it was in the photograph. She replied that it
was her sister. Gungon then also took out some pictures from his wallet to
show to her, identifying one photograph as that of his niece and two others
as those of his girlfriend and of Roxas and his girlfriend and child. Once
again, Gungon insisted that she take the drink. Fearing his menacing look
and the gun pointed at her, she took a sip from the bottle. She was, still
later, also forced to swallow two tablets which Roxas gave to Gungon. She
took the tablets but had them under her tongue.

When asked what she wanted to eat, she said she would prefer a
McDonalds sandwich. The car stopped at a bakery shop, where she noticed
the address on the signboard reading, Sto Tomas Batangas. Roxas went
out and returned with a taisan cake which he handed over to Agnes but
she just held it. Time passed, and somehow she lost consciousness. It was
about 9:30 p.m. when she found herself lying at the back seat with her
legs on the lap of Gungon. She noticed that her pieces of jewelry,
bracelets, earrings, ring, necklace and a wristwatch, as well as cash, were
missing and that her pair of shoes had been removed. She was told that
the items were just being meanwhile kept for her. The pair of shoes,
however, were returned to her. By this time, a third man was already
seated in front of the car with Roxas.

When it was her turn to relieve herself, Roxas stopped the car at a
deserted area. Gungon escorted her to a place not far away from the car.
Just as she was getting up, after relieving herself, she saw a white spark
to her right and she fell. She was shot. Feeling weak and unable to get up,
she was still able to get a glance at Roxas walking back to the car. Then
she passed out.

When she came to, Roxas, Gungon, and the third man, as well as the car,
were nowhere insight. She managed to get up and slowly walked down the
road until she reached a small house. Inside were two kids and a teenager,
who, apparently shocked by her appearance, hurriedly left. She was
bleeding profusely from the neck and face. She looked around the house
but not finding anyone, she went to the sala to lie down. People soon
arrived on a vehicle. She again lost consciousness and regained it only at
the Batangas Regional Hospital.10 The hospital, which was ill equipped to
give full medical treatment advised her to transfer to a Manila hospital. The
medical certificate described the gunshot wound:

Gunshot wound, POE, Zygomatic area (R), POX Sub-mandibular area (L);
Fx, zygomatic arch & condylar area, (R) Sec to GSW; Submandibular Gland
Involvement with sinus tract.11cräläwvirtualibräry
Recounting the circumstances that paved the way for the ultimate arrest of
Gungon, the trial court narrated:

xxx. The crimes charged herein could have easily remained unsolved
because the victim did not know any of her tormentors. That she was
abandoned in a dark and far away place strange to her, having been saved
from the claws of sure death only by her abductors false belief of having
already done her in with a single gunshot, would have made the escape of
the criminals irreversible. Fate had it that her survival spelled the
beginning of her tormentors undoing, for her ordeal was immediately
brought to the attention of the NBI which moved and investigated without
delay and hesitation. Cartographic sketches drawn from the recollections
of the victim later started the procedure to identify the unknown
perpetrators. The alacrity, coordination, and ingenuity of NBI agents
Regner Feneza and Miralles led to the success of the procedure.

Feneza recounted that on January 17, 1994 he met at the NBI offices in
Manila with Miralles, who was earlier assigned to the case of Agnes,
because Miralles had left word that he wanted to consult with Feneza. It
seems that Feneza was the agent handling the Virginia Samaniego Villena
case, another kidnapping case where the modus operandi had striking
similarities with the kidnapping of Agnes. In their meeting, Miralles
showed and lent to Feneza the cartographic sketches in the Agnes
kidnapping. Feneza referred to his Villena files and discovered a distinct
similarity of a cartographic sketch to some of the Villena suspects with
pictures in his files. With Miralles permission, Feneza met with and talked
to Agnes at the V. Luna Medical Center, and showed her about 3 or 4
pictures from his files.

As Feneza testified: When I gave the pictures to her, she looked at them
and she positively identified one in the pictures to be one of her abductors,
she nearly fainted at that time. Agnes had thereby positively identified
Roberto Gungon, whom Feneza had already met in October or November,
1992 in connection with the Villena case. He reported this breakthrough to
his superiors, who immediately authorized the search for Gungon.

Gungon could not be arrested sooner. Based on information given to the

NBI, he and his live-in partner had left Manila by car on a Wednesday,
passed through Catbalogan Samar, and were bound for Davao. According
to Feneza, an informant provided the information about Davao being the
final destination; he testified: Before he left, he left his pocket bell to
somebody whom he was able to talk to. At the same time; they were
calling a person and they told this person that they were in Legaspi about
to board a ferry boat going to Davao. The information, Feneza disclosed
how the NBI discovered the informant. It seems that Manila Prosecutor
Alice Vidal had been approached by a certain Mrs. Atencio, supposedly
Gungons mother-in-law, to confide Gungons whereabouts and to seek
help; Prosecutor Vidal, in turn, notified the Makati Police Department,
which happened to be collaborating with the NBI on the case. The Makati
Police Department relayed the developments to NBI, which sent agents to
meet with Mrs. Atencio in the office of Prosecutor Vidal, and it was there
where Mrs. Atencio disclosed the destination of Gungon and his partner.
The pocketbell beeper was subsequently delivered my Mrs. Atencio to
Feneza in Cubao, under a receipt.

Feneza and fellow agent Arnold Lazaro flew to Davao on the following
Friday, still in January, but Gungon and his partner could arrive there only
on Saturday. On Sunday evening, the agents located the arrested him and
detained him at their Regional Office in Davao. They flew him back to
Manila of the first available flight on Monday. At the lineup held on
February 1, 1994 at the NBI offices in Manila, Agnes picked Gungon out
and positively identified him as one of her kidnappers.

After the lineup identification, the NBI checked the contents of the blue
bag that Gungon had brought along from Davao and found therein, among
others, a Nissan key chain with a key; a picture of a woman, another
picture of a man (Venancio Roxas), woman, and child; and a rosary. These
articles were turned over to the NBI evidence custodian and were later
presented in court. Feneza and Lazaro prepared their joint affidavit and
other papers before transmitting the matter to the Department of Justice.
Feneza readily identified and pointed to Gungon in open court during
trial.12cräläwvirtualibräry

The defense version varies materially from that given by the prosecution.

Roberto Gungon, an employee of the Metropolitan Manila Authority,

testified that between 3:30 and 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of 12 January
1994, he had just come from a friends house and was waiting for a taxicab
along Panay Avenue, Quezon City, when a car stopped in front of him. It
was Venancio Roxas, an acquaintance he once met at a New Years party,
who asked him where he was going. Gungon replied that he was waiting
for a taxicab to get him to Cubao. Roxas, who was with a lady companion,
opened the door of the car and said, Halika na, at idadaan ka na namin. He
boarded and sat at the rear. Roxas drove towards Cubao. Gungon alighted
at the foot of the underpass in Cubao, only to again board the car when
Roxas invited him to go with them to Batangas.

Roxas proceeded to the South Superhighway with Agnes in the front right
seat. On the way, Agnes reminded Roxas that her mother was waiting for
her. Agnes took out her wallet and showed Gungon her ID, her picture, and
her sisters picture, and in turn, he, too, drew out his wallet from his pocket
and showed Agnes his wifes picture. The car stopped at a bakery in Sto.
Tomas, Batangas, where Agnes and Roxas alighted to buy a piece of cake
and some softdrinks. Tired, after along drive, Gungon and Agnes had both
fallen asleep. She awoke after some time and requested that the car stop
to allow her to relieve herself. Gungon later learned from an investigator
that the place was somewhere in Batangas City. Roxas accompanied
Agnes. Gungon was left alone in the car. After about 3 to 5 minutes, he
heard a gunshot and felt that something untoward had happened. He
lowered the car window to look, and he saw someone, whom he presumed
to be Roxas, coming towards his direction, holding a gun. Agnes was not
with him. Out of apprehension, he alighted from the car, ran away, and hid
in the nearby trees until Roxas finally drove away. He took a bus back to
Manila, reaching home at about 10:30 that evening.13cräläwvirtualibräry

In its decision, promulgated on 15 February 1995, the RTC, Hon. Lucas P.

Bersamin presiding, concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered finding the accused ROBERTO

GUNGON y SANTIAGO guilty beyond reasonable doubt:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285, for kidnapping and serious illegal

detention with frustrated murder, and sentencing him to death.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286, for carnapping, and sentencing him to

suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment form eighteen (18)
years, as minimum, to twenty five (25) years, as maximum; and,

3. In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287, for robbery, and sentencing him to

suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision correctional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years of prison mayor, as maximum.

The accused shall be credited with the entire period of his preventive
imprisonment in accordance with Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, provided he
is qualified thereof pursuant to said legal provision.

The accused Gungon is further ordered to pay to Agnes Guirindola, as

offended party, moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00, actual
damages of P36,161.83, representing her hospitalization and surgical
expenses, and P35,000.00, representing the value of the lost personal
valuables and cash, with interest on all the sums at the legal rate from the
filing of the informations herein until full payment; and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; to Mrs. Elvira Guirindola, as owner of the Nissan
Sentra car involved in the carnapping case, the sum of P218,757.90, plus
interest at the legal rate from the filing of the information until full
payment; and double cost of suit.

These cases shall be archived as far as they concerned Venancio Roxas y

Arguelles.14cräläwvirtualibräry

In the instant appeal, Gungon has continued to assert his innocence,

assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
 I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT GUNGON

AND ROXAS CONSPIRED TO COMMIT THE CRIMES SUBJECT OF THE
INSTANT APPEAL.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT GUNGON

OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION WITH FRUSTRATED MURDER.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT GUNGON

OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT GUNGON

OF THE CRIME OF VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6539 OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT.15cräläwvirtualibräry

Appellants challenges, in essence, would revolve on the issue, once again,

of credibility of witnesses. In monotone, this Court has constantly ruled
that in the determination of the veracity of testimony, the assessment by
the trial court is accorded the highest degree of respect and will not be
distrubed of appeal unless, of course, it is seen to have acted arbitrarily or
with evident partiality. Contrary to appellants contention, however, it is
the Courts view that the trial court has taken due care in evaluating the
testimonies given at the witness stand. This much would easily be
apparent from the following excerpts of the appealed decision.

Upon thorough consideration of the evidence, the Court finds the

testimony and version of Agnes to be the truth of what transpired on
January 12, 1994 and that there was no credible fact or circumstance
presented in the entire course of the trial, including her cross-examination
by the Defense, by the which the neutral objective, and uninvolved mind
could reasonably doubt her sincerity and trustworthiness. The complainant
and the accused were subjected to the closest personal observation during
their stints as witnesses. There were contrasts in their demeanors on the
one hand, the victim was firm, sincere, and collected when she narrated
even the most painful parts of her ordeal, easily impressing the Court by
her straightforward manner and strong recall of the details; while, on the
other hand, although Gungon tried very much to appear cool and
composed, he could not deceive the Court by hiding behind the veneer of
his feigned expressions and concealing what happened by a clever faade of
denials.
xxx xxx xxx

Gungon failed the test of credibility by relying on an implausible defense

and on mere denials. To decide issues of credibility, the testimonies of
witnesses are tested for their plausibility of probability, i.e., whether they
were contrary to the natural course of things, or to common observation,
experience, and common sense, or to contrary to natural laws, or exhibit
incredible coincidences. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such
as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human
testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation, and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and
is outside of judicial cognizance.16cräläwvirtualibräry

The defense, verily anchors itself on the bare denial of appellant of the
specific acts imputed by the prosecution against him. Certainly, this
negative assertion cannot prevail over the unimpeached testimony of the
victim describing in sufficient detail the active participation of appellant in
the commission of the crimes charged. In the face of the clear and positive
declaration of the victim herself, the defense of denial hardly assumes
probative value and sinks down the drain even further with the absence of
any evidence of a sinister or nefarious motive on the part of the
complainant to impute a crime so grave a wrong as that made out in the
Information.

The argument that the finding of conspiracy between appellant and

Venancio Roxas to commit the crimes charged has been based by the trial
court merely on inferences, conjectures and presumptions is bereft of
merit. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.17 The proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence;18 the
agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties disclosing
a common understanding among them relative to the commission of the
offense.19 Jurisprudential account tells us consistently that the conduct of
the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime may be
considered to show an extant conspiracy.20cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court, exhibiting keen perception on the whole bulk of evidence
before it, has come up with a number of observations not only to prove
conspiracy but likewise to establish appellants own part therein.

1. Gungons presence on Panay Avenue and his meeting with Roxas were
not purely coincedental and by chance but intentional and prearranged.
Roxas was representing himself to Agnes as a traffic officer by his wearing
of the PNP reflectorized vest while Gungon was employed by the MMA,
which had a direct connection with the functions assumed by Roxas. Roxas
and Gungon were associated with each other far longer than the latter has
admitted.

xxx xxx xxx

2. Gungons insistence that Roxas was only a casual acquaintance is

rejected as devoid of truth because it is inconsistent with and contrary to
the established facts and circumstances. The records already showed that
Gungon knew several personal circumstances about Roxas, including the
fact that Roxas was formerly employed at MMA and that Roxas was
unemployed when the incident tool place, but was the president of a
homeowners association in Commonwealth Avenue. Moreover, Gungons
conduct in relation to Roxas during the entire duration of the trip from
Panay Avenue to Batangas City, be it judged from Agnes point of view or
from Gungons own, exhibited a deeper and closer familiarity and
association that Gungon would admit. He called Roxas boss, an appellation
of familiarity, if not also subordination. He never protested his being
invited to the unplanned Batangas trip. He never asked who Agnes was,
not where Roxas and Agnes had come from.

In any case, even assuming that Gungon, indeed, just happened to be on

Panay Avenue that afternoon, implying thereby that he had no prior
understanding with Roxas to meet thereat and also indicating thereby that
their acquaintance was merely casual, the Court is still puzzled: (a) why
Roxas on his part, should have stopped for him; should have offered to
convey him to wherever he was going; and should even invite him to go on
the unplanned trip to distant Batangas without notice to the latters family,
unless they were more familiar and closer, and (b) why Gungon, on his
part, should have agreed to go to Batangas unless he was in on the plans
of Roxas. The unbelievable unnaturalness of Gungons disavowal of his
connection with Roxas rendered his testimony suspect and implausible.

xxx xxx xxx

4. Another inconsistency was detected between Gungons allegations, on

one hand, that he concealed himself in the nearby trees from the returning
Roxas after the shooting of Agnes and allowed Roxas to leave in the Nissan
car without him, so that he returned to Manila by bus, and, on the other
hand, that the Nissan keychain and the key of the bar lock were recovered
from his blue bag. If he was to be believed, how did he come into the
subsequent possession of the keychain and the key unless he and Roxas
had met after the shooting?

xxx xxx xxx

6. On account of his admitted presence during the trip, although protesting

his innocence, the Court has also carefully analyzed Gungon's conduct
following the criminal incidents and found such conduct indicative of guilt
rather than innocence. Despite his insistence to the contrary, he knew that
at least one serious crime had been perpetrated because he had heard a
shot and had seen Roxas returning with a firearm at hand but without
Agnes. Yet, he never reported the incidents to anyone else, most of all to
the authorities, despite his allegations that he thereafter continued to
report to work at MMA. The civic-minded and dedicated public servant that
he alleged himself to be notwithstanding, he did not impress the Court that
he was truly guiltless because of his unexplained failure to report to the
authorities.

On the matter of the Davao land trip being taken on January 28, 1994, the
Court must have to consider it as positively indicative of flight. It should
first be mentioned, as a premise for this conclusion, that Gungon
inextricably contradicted himself on this point, since, in his direct
testimony, he cited the calls made by somebody about two or three days
before to the office of Ms. Atencio asking her to meet a person near the
Makati Police Department about an alleged estafa case in relation to a
roofing transaction as justification for the trip, implying that it was sudden
and unplanned; whereas, in the cross-examination, he stated that he and
his wife had planned the Davao trip for vacation purposes even before New
Years Day, 1994. Aside from negatively reflecting of Gungons testimonial
integrity, such self-contradiction, not being a merely minor or
inconsequential development in the Defenses presentation, exposed the
Davao trip to be for what is was the flight of a guilty
man.21cräläwvirtualibräry

It would defy logic and common sense to conclude that the above
circumstances and events implicating appellant to the crime were all
purely coincidental.

Nor did the trial court err in convicting appellant of the crime of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code defines
the felony thus:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.

1. If kidnapping of detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was

committed for the purposes of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person, even if none of the circumstances abovementioned were
present in the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is

raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No.
7659).(Underscoring ours.)

The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention consists not only in
placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining that person or
depriving him in any manner of his liberty.22cräläwvirtualibräry

Actual restraint of the victims liberty was evident in the instant case from
the moment Agnes was taken at gunpoint from Panay Avenue to a remote
place in Batangas. The victim testified, thus:

Q. What did he do with the P50.00 bill?

A. He received it.
Q. After receiving the P50.00 bill, what did he do next?
A. He gave my license back.
Q. After getting back your license, what happened?
A. He immediately poked a gun at me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. After Venancio Roxas pointed a gun at you, what happened next?
A. He switched off the engine and then told me, Miss, kailangan ko lang ito.
Q. After that, what happened?
A. I was so terrified, I cried and then pleaded to him to let me go, to take
anything but not to harm me.
Q. Did he heed your plea?
A. No, sir.
Q. What happened next?
A. After some minutes, he opened the back door of the car and then
someone entered, another guy entered the car.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. After that second guy entered the car, what happened?
A. He reclined the seat and he took my arm and pulled me to the back seat.
Q. While the second guy who entered the car reclined your seat, and pulled
your arm towards the back seat, what was Roxas doing?
A. He was sitting at the passenger seat and when I was at the back seat
already, he tool the drivers seat.

Q. This second guy who boarded the car and pulled you towards the back
seat, is he inside the courtroom?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Will you please point to him?

xxx xxx xxx

Court
(Witness tapping a person in the first row)
Will the person tapped please rise?
Do you wish to give your name?
A. Yes, your honor.
Court
What is your name?
A. Roberto Santiago Gungon, your honor.
xxx xxx xxx
State Pros. Agcaoili
You said that after you refused to drink the bottle of softdrink being
offered by Roxas, Roxas handed the bottle over to Gungon?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. After Gungon took the bottle, what happened next?
A. He forced me to drink it, sabi niya, sige na, makakatulong ito sa iyo.
xxx xxx xxx
State Pros. Agcaoili
And what was your reaction to that remark of Gungon?
A. Of course, I still refused to drink.
Q. And when you refused, what happened next?
A. He was still holding the bottle, and then he continued to drive and then
stopped to a nearby gas station.
"Q. what did you do at the gas station if you did anything?
"A. He gassed up
"Q. After gassing up, what else happened?
"A. During that time, I was trying to escape but I cannot escape since
Gungon was holding me and from time to time poking a gun at
me.23cräläwvirtualibräry
"Q. Going back to your earlier testimony, Madam Witness, you testified
earlier that along the way, Mr. Roxas alighted from the car and bought
Sprite and skyflakes, how about you and Mr. Gungon when Mr. Roxas
alighted from the car?
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. What was Mr. Gungon doing while Mr. Roxas was buying softdrinks and
skyflakes?
xxx xxx xxx
"A. Gungon and I were still inside the car and he was holding me and from
time to time poking a gun at me.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q. You also testified earlier that along the way Roxas stopped somewhere
at the South Expressway and took a leak, what was Mr. Gungon doing
while Mr. Roxas was taking a leak?
"A. The same thing when Roxas left the car.
"Q. What about when it was Mr. Gungons turn to take a leak, what was Mr.
Roxas doing?
"A. Roxas held me and he was holding the door and checking if it was
locked and poking a gun at me.24cräläwvirtualibräry
The evidence would likewise show, ineluctably, the commission of
frustrated murder. Not rebutted was the medical finding that the gunshot
wound sustained by the victim would have resulted in the death of the
victim had it not been for the proper medical attention given to
her.25cräläwvirtualibräry

The trial court has, too, properly appreciated the attendance of treachery
in the commission of the offense. Treachery exists when the offender
employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might take.26 It bears
stressing that the unsuspecting and defenseless victim had sustained the
gunshot wound while still trying to get up after relieving herself.

The idea of killing the victim was likewise premeditated; Agnes testified:

State Pros. Agcaoili

After this second guy who pulled you to the back seat whom you just
identified as accused Roberto Gungon pulled you towards the back seat,
what happened next?

"A. I was asked where they are taking me.

"Q. What was their reply if any?

"A. They said they are taking me to Philcoa.
"Q. After telling you that they are taking you to Philcoa, what else
happened?
"A. Gungon got his beeper and then he read it, then told Roxas, boss,
negative Philcoa.
"Q. And what was the reaction of Roxas?
"A. He just nodded.
"Q. And what else happened?
"A. After that, Gungon said, Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati at doon na
natin i-S.
"Q. And how did Roxas react to that remark of Gungon?
"A. The same, he just nodded.27cräläwvirtualibräry

The perpetrator of the premeditated killing, albeit frustrated was hatched

from the moment the accused and his co-conspirator took the victim in
Quezon City until she was ultimately executed in Batangas to insure
impunity to the perpetrators by eliminating the only witness.
Murder is punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with the attendant
circumstances, among other circumstances, of treachery and evident
premeditation.28 When the crime is frustrated,f a penalty lower by one
degree or, in this case, prision mayor to reclusion temporal is imposed.

The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention has been correctly
complexed by the trial court with frustrated murder. A complex crime is
committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other.29cräläwvirtualibräry

In a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.30 Since the
kidnapping and serious illegal detention is the more serious crime, the
proper penalty under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, should be applied in its maximum period.

The Court finds merit, however, in appellants third assigned error.

Appellant would have it that the trial court erred in convicting him of
robbery considering that the taking of the victims jewelry and cash were
perpetrated while the latter was asleep. The victim herself testified that
shortly after the car had proceeded from Sto. Tomas, Batangas, she lost
consciousness and regained it only at about 9:30 that evening. She then
found herself lying at the back seat minus her personal belongings with a
total value of P38,000.00.31cräläwvirtualibräry

Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code defines robbery to be one committed
by any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property
belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything xxx. Robbery may thus be committed
two ways: (a) with violence, or intimidation of persons32 and (b) by the
use of force upon things.33 To be then liable for robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons, the following elements must concur.

1) that there be personal property belonging to another;

2) that there is unlawful taking of that property;

3) that the taking must be with intent to gain; and

4) that there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of

force upon things.

It would appear that the taking of the victims jewelry and cash came only
by way of an afterthought on the part of the appellant. The taking was not
attended by violence or intimidation upon the person of Agnes. The
absence, however, of violence or intimidation did not exculpate appellant
from liability for the crime of theft, punishable by Article 308, in relation to
Article 309, of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent to gain but without violence against, or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latters consent.

Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum ans medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the things stolen exceed the latter
amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in
this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but
the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years.

The Information in Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287 contains sufficient

allegations, adequately proven by the prosecution during the trial, to
warrant a conviction of appellant for the crime of theft. Section 4, Rule
120, of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides on this score; thus:

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the
offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged
included in that which is proved.

Since the value of the personal property taken from the victim amounted
to P38,000.000 the penalty imposable is the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by Article 309 which is the maximum
of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods plus one year for the
additional ten thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty for this particular offense of
theft that may thus be imposed is anywhere from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correctional minimum period to six (6)
years of prision correccional maximum period, as minimum, to anywhere
from eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor medium period, plus one (1) for the additional P10,000.00
in excess of P22,000.00 value of the property taken, or eleven (11) years
of prision mayor maximum period, as maximum.

Lastly, appellant contends that he should not have been convicted of

violation of Republic Act No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-
Carnapping Act, because the taking of the subject motor vehicle. Roxas
had already acquired effective possession of the subject vehicle. This
argument would have been consequential had there been no finding of
conspiracy between appellant and Venancio Roxas. In conspiracy, to once
again stress it, the act of the other co-conspirator and, therefore it is of no
moment that an accused had not taken part in the actual commission of
every act constituting the crime,34 each of the conspirators being held in
the same degree of liability as the others.

WHEREFORE, the Court sustains the appealed decision of the trial court,
dated 15 February 1995, except for appellants conviction for the crime of
ROBBERY in Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287 which is hereby MODIFIED to
one of THEFT of which offense appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and sentenced to a prison term of from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum to eight (8)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor plus one (1) year
for the additional P10,000.00 in excess of P20,000.00 value of the property
taken or a total of nine (9) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
maximum. The decision of the court a quo with respect to Criminal Case
No. Q-94-54285 and Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286 is AFFIRMED. In
Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285, four members of the Court, although
maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions expressed in People
vs. Echegaray (G.R. No. 117472, 07 February 1997) that Republic Act No.
7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional
nevertheless, bow to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote that the
law is unconstitutional and that the death penalty should be according be
imposed.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No, 7659, amending Article

83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records
of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of the pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 154130 : August 20, 2004]

BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming petitioner's

conviction by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner now
seeks a reconsideration of our Decision.

The facts are briefly restated as follows:

Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan,
Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional Special
Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres
B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police Regional
Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence operations on possible illegal logging activities. At around 4:30-5:00
p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in
breadth being constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner
Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner of the boats.
A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner
called for reinforcements and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some
wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to
petitioner's house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at
2:00 a.m.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted of
Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986. On Petition
for Review , we rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No., dated July 5, 2001 finding
petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality on
January 12, 2004.1 Petitioner then filed an "Urgent Motion for Leave to File Second
Motion for Reconsideration"2 with attached "Motion for Reconsideration,"3 wherein
he makes the following submissions:

1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETAINING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES;

2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS INSISTED ON LEAVING

THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE DETAINED;
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE INNOCENCE OF
THE PETITIONER;

4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY WANTING IN THE

INSTANT CASE.4

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for

Reconsideration.5

The prosecution was required to comment on petitioner's second Motion for

Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.

We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-taken.6

While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited

pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided
it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served
thereby.

The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in the
dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn
of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought
to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance, technicalities take a
backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is
always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its
operation.7

The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.8

The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual physical

restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no proof
that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended parties.

Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo
Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their mission. On
the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being then a municipal mayor, merely
extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR Team in his house. SPO1
Capoquian testified thus:

ATTY. JUMAMIL:

q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in

Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we saw a
boat being constructed there so we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod (sic).

q And you arrived at 5:00 o'clock?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Yes sir.

q And you left at 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September

2?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Yes sir.

q And you ate dinner between 5:00 o'clock to 2:00 o'clock in the morning of
September 2, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner.

q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had

dinner?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Yes sir.

q And of course you also partook of wine?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ NARIO:

q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 o'clock Mayor Astorga was
with you having dinner?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Yes Your Honor.

q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters, the
complainants here?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ PALATTAO:

q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this
laughter?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Probably they were talking of something humorous.9

The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint imposed
on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that they were
free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore, he admitted
that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner prevented the
team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to travel by boat.

ATTY. JUMAMIL:

q It was raining at that time, is that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Yes sir it was raining.

q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time
that you were in Lucoblucob, Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.

q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in
Lucoblucob?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at that
time.

q But it was raining the whole day?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.

q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 o'clock in the morning is
that correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a A little bit hard I don't know when the rain stopped, sir.

q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 o'clock in the morning of
September 2?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a I don't remember sir.

xxx xxx xxx

AJ PALATTAO:

q Were you told not to go away from the place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a No Your Honor.

q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go
somewhere?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a They did not say anything sir.

q Where did you go after that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Just down until it rained.

q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part, was
there somebody prevented you to go to another place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a I don't know Your Honor.

q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent you
to go somewhere else?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to
leave the barangay.

q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not supposed
to leave that barangay, is this Barangay Daram?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.

q On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in your
impression you cannot leave the barangay. How about the other companions like
Mr. Simon, Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave the place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a No Your Honor.

q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case of
those I have enumerated they cannot, why?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.10

Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness stand on
August 16, 2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-chief due to lack of material
time. His testimony only covered preliminary matters and did not touch on the
circumstances of the alleged detention.11

On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon,
Moises de la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and Wenefredo Maniscan,
executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance stating, in pertinent part:

xxx xxx xxx;

6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation aggravated by
the exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores of the small islands of Samar for
several days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have also been confronted with the same
predicament, hence our confrontation resulted to a heated argument and the
eventual misunderstanding;

7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of Daram,

Samar our respect for him prevailed when he ordered us to take dinner with him
and other local residents thereat, so we capitulated whose invitation was
misinterpreted by us;

8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team and
the group of Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we were eventually allowed to
leave Daram, Samar;

9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the incident
to our supervisors who required us to submit our affidavit;

10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both parties
had already express apologies and are personally no longer interested to pursue the
case against the Mayor, hence, this affidavit of desistance;

xxx xxx xxx.12

Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to testify.
This notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3
Cinco, the police escorts of the DENR Team.

The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian's testimony negate the element of

detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily
subjective.13 Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested by
any hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the perception
and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.14 As such, SPO1 Capoquian
and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify on whether or not
fear existed in the minds of the private offended parties herein. It was thus error
for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their testimonies in convicting petitioner.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a reasonable

doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against their consent. The
events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two interpretations. While it may
support the proposition that the private offended parties were taken to petitioner's
house and prevented from leaving until 2:00 a.m. the next morning, it is equally
plausible, if not more so, that petitioner extended his hospitality and served dinner
and drinks to the team at his house. He could have advised them to stay on the
island inasmuch as sea travel was rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate
together with the private offended parties and even laughed with them while
conversing over dinner. This scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation
between the parties. Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic
drinks, it is not at all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the
following morning.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.15 He is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty
only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.16

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven with
moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be sustained
and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the prosecution's evidence
must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.17 Furthermore, where the evidence for
the prosecution is concededly weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak,
the accused must be duly accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the
constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys. When the
circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which
is consistent with the presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with
guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is
better to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man.18

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1, 2003

is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The appealed judgment of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito Astorga
is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 116488 : May 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AARON FLORES @

RONITO, SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ SULPING and EDGAR VILLERAN y
MAGBANUA, accused-appellants.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7 th Infantry Brigade detailed

at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the local
Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his supervision, namely,
Aaron Flores alias Ronito, Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias Sulping and Edgar Villeran
y Magbanua, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros
Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The
Information charged as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with high powered firearms
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap,
detain and keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda.
Shangrella (sic), Brgy. Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring the latter
to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint and against his will, without
proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then
up to the present.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1cräläwvirtualibräry

All the four accused pleaded Not Guilty when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based on
the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found the following antecedent
facts to be undisputed.

On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer
at the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros
Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran
were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their table.
Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the store and walked towards
the direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left the
store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing
coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters. 2 That was the last time
Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayams mother and
relatives, he has not been found.

It was the prosecutions contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused
hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the
detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the
prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. All
the accused, however, vehemently denied committing the acts charged.

The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the
prosecution failed to show an apparent common design by and among the accused
to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus, the trial court
proceeded to determine the individual liabilities of the four accused based on the
degree of their participation in the commission of the offense charged.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions evidence that Samson Sayam was
seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the
detachment headquarters by accused Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar
Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the
trial court held that the three accused were responsible for the formers
disappearance.

As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the
three (3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of
Samson Sayam. Notably, none of the prosecution witnesses specifically or
categorically mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively participated in
bringing Samson Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who
are natives of the place of the incident, Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as
Detachment Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-motive
was attributed to him by the trial court. Likewise, the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Nelson Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the
other hand, conflict as to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While
Golez stated that he was armed with an Armalite rifle, 3 Manlangit testified that
Tampioc was armed with a short firearm. 4cräläwvirtualibräry

More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of
the perpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that
Nelson Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29, 1992, 5 the original
complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ilog Candoni, dated
October 21, 1992, which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit,
did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the respondents. The said affidavits
merely mentioned an unidentified member of the 7 th IB, Philippine Army, assigned
at Brgy. Tabu, detachment. At the time of the execution of the affidavits, the
witnesses could have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he was
the commander of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and emphatic
manner in which Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial courts
mind. 6cräläwvirtualibräry

On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores, Edgar
Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; and there being no proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered
to pay him jointly and severally, or, in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.

The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused
ordered confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED.7cräläwvirtualibräry

Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio
Silpao raised the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SULPECIO

SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION,
UNDER ARTICLE 267, REVISED PENAL CODE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU

SULPECIO SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM
TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND
RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON SAYAMS DISAPPEARANCE.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO

SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a
joint appeal based on the sole error that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON FLORES

AND EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court, we
find that accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against
them.

The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
The elements of the offense are:

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of
his liberty.

3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are
present:

(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;

(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;

 (c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or

(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public

officer.8cräläwvirtualibräry

Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of

Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is
that the offender must be a private individual. In the case at bar, accused-
appellants were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was
committed.

The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of
complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality. 9 It was
composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and order in
their localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As such, they
were provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention
of individuals. 10cräläwvirtualibräry

The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-
appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the
appellants are not private individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor
General submits that, under the facts alleged, accused-appellants can only be liable
for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other
elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed
against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime.

Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without

legal grounds, detains a person. 11 Since it is settled that accused-appellants are
public officers, the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not the
evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily
detained by accused-appellants.

As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag, 12 it was held that in the crime of illegal
or arbitrary detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction
of the person of the offended party. The deprivation of liberty must be
proved, 13 just as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty must
also be established by indubitable proof. 141 In the more recent case of People v.
Fajardo, 15 this Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be
uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as well as
actual confinement or restriction.

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in

any manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. 16 A careful review of the
records of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Samson
Sayam was detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution
witnesses testified that accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam
toward the direction of the detachment headquarters, there is no shred of evidence
that he was actually confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam
has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants
does not prove that he was detained and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution,
however, argues that Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-
appellants forced him to go with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos
and brought him to the detachment headquarters.

We assayed the testimonies of the prosecutions main witnesses, namely, Carlito

Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangits testimony was offered to
prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the store and that the latter
tried his best to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to
was that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a
certain Moleng; that the four accused, who were armed, followed Sayam and asked
for his residence certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam and
brought him to the detachment headquarters; and that he went home after he saw
Samson Sayam talking to the accused. 17cräläwvirtualibräry

It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangits testimony failed to prove the stated
purpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment
headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that Samson Sayam was pulled,
dragged, or coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither did he say that Samson
Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that
Samson Sayam tried his best to free himself from the clutches of accused-
appellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not
conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam being
apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically
explained why Carlito Manlangit just went home, 18 instead of doing anything to
help Samson Sayam. He admitted that he did not immediately report the incident
to the authorities. 19 More telling is the absence of testimony to the effect that
Samson Sayam was being taken to the detachment headquarters against his will,
that he was protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for help, considering
that there were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most damaging is
Carlito Manlangits statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment
headquarters with any or all of the accused. 20 In fine, Carlito Manlangits testimony
failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or deprived of his
liberty.

Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the proseuction. According to him,
he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on
September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way home, they
passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four
accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to
show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron
Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila,
located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he
told his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson.
He also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the
detachment headquarters. 21cräläwvirtualibräry

The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime
of arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his
father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see
any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see
if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay
clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay
evidence, 22 which has no probative value. 23 In summary, Jerry Manlangits
testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary
detention.

The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the
four accused as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry
Cabrillos. He also stated that following a heated argument, the accused and
Samson Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of the detachment
headquarters. He said that the accused were holding and pulling Samson Sayam
towards the road. Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed
by rapid firing. 24cräläwvirtualibräry

On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement
that the accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument. Rather,
he said he did not hear them arguing as they were leaving the store. Although
Nelson Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while the accused were
dragging him, he did not do anything to help Samson Sayam, who happened to be
his cousin. 25cräläwvirtualibräry

Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golezs testimony. First of
all, he was unsure of his assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that
Samson Sayam was being dragged towards the road does not constitute arbitrary
detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his
liberty such that he could not free himself from the grip of the accused, if he was
indeed being held against his will. The incident transpired in a public place, where
there were people milling about, many of whom were his friends. It is puzzling that
Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if
indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No one else came forward to
corroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez.

The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on material

points, even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative
evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez.

It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may be
convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although
the findings of fact made by trial courts are generally not disturbed on appeal, if
there are substantial facts which were overlooked but which may alter the results of
the case in favor of the accused, such facts should be taken into account by the
appellate court. 26 And where it appears that the trial court erred in the appreciation
of the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings of the trial court may
be reversed. 27cräläwvirtualibräry

After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial
evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the
evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a conviction. Again, the
fact of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly established by
credible evidence. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up,
restrained of his freedom, or prevented from communicating with anyone. Likewise,
there was no proof that there was actual intent on the part of accused-appellants to
arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be
a purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or
with force, because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or
arbitrary detention. 28cräläwvirtualibräry

The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial,
sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. It cites the following
circumstances:

1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 oclock in the evening, accused-

appellants, together with their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU
Sulpecio Silpao, were seen with Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-
appellants were having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a heated
argument.

2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants

by holding and pulling him towards the road. From another angle, another
prosecution witness saw accused-appellants on the road arresting Samson.

3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of

Brgy. Tabu.

4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the
detachment followed by rapid firing.

5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard

from.29cräläwvirtualibräry

As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by

clear and convincing evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the
combination of all these circumstances would still not be able to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind, the totality of these
circumstantial evidence do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing to the fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants
are guilty, and inconsistent with the possibility that they are innocent. 30 Thus:

Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if:

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt.31cräläwvirtualibräry

The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in
complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the
accused. 32 It is admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with accused-
appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that there was a
heated argument among them, and that the accused-appellants held and pulled
Samson Sayam to the road and brought him towards the direction of the
detachment headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant
testimony.

Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no
relevancy to the case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots
came from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The witnesses who
testified that they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from the
center of the barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself was also some
distance from the barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas when all is quiet,
loud sounds such as gunshots reverberate and would seem to come from every
direction. An ordinary person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the
exact location where the gunshots would be coming from. That would otherwise be
attributing expertise on such matters to the prosecution witnesses.

That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for
the trial court to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has
no bearing in this case because it is not one of the elements of the crime of
arbitrary detention. Consequently, only one relevant circumstance was proved, i.e.,
that accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However,
said circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him,
then arbitrarily detained him. 33cräläwvirtualibräry

Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of
accused-appellants alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict
them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the required quantum of evidence. 34 An
uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction
when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. 35 The prosecution was not able to
prove a possible motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson
Sayam. In sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the
conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of circumstantial
evidence do not fulfill the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a
judgment or conviction, the Court must acquit the accused. 36cräläwvirtualibräry

In the recent case of People v. Comesario, 373

we had occasion to rule that:

Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence.

To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than
one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of events
that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion
of all others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is purely
circumstantial that there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with
vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense
and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of
the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads
to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.

Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved.

In the case at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the prosecution
and the trial court to support a conviction have failed to overcome the constitutional
precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants. Among other grounds,
not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their guilt, there is
a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been committed.

There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution
bears the onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed
by accused-appellants. 38 It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case
with that degree of proof which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an
unprejudiced mind. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
merits for it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. 39 Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed to prove the guilt
of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has
often and consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict
an innocent one. 40cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Accused-

appellants are ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason,
accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED immediately. The Director of Prisons is
DIRECTEDto inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the date and
time when accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-37007. July 20, 1987.]

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of

Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ, Petitioners, v. ANGELITO C. SALANGA,
in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, SR., Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ARBITRARY DETENTION; ELEMENTS. — Arbitrary Detention is

committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. The
elements of this crime are the following: 1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee. 2. That he detains a person. 3. That the detention is without legal
grounds.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2. ID.; ID.; BARANGAY CAPTAIN, VESTED WITH AUTHORITY TO DETAIN PERSONS.

— The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are
the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors. Long before
Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later
named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as persons in
authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and
convicted them of Arbitrary Detention. One need not be a police officer to be
chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like
judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this
crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they
are similar to those of a barrio captain except that in the case of the latter, his
territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and
order, both must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention.
Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that
with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of
petitioner Valdez. From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like
private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; MUST BE

RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. — We
have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot consider
facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the
face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical
admission of the facts alleged in the information. Matters of defense cannot be
proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where the Rules expressly
permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. In
the case of U .S. v. Perez, this Court held that a motion to quash on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only
different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule
admits of only one exception and that is when such facts are admitted by the
prosecution.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

4. ID.; ID.; DOUBLE JEOPARDY; WILL NOT ATTACH WHERE DISMISSAL WAS
SECURED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ACCUSED. — Private respondent claims that
by the lower court’s granting of the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached
in his favor on the ground that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. Respondent’s contention holds no water.
An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not
merely interlocutory and is therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot
claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at
his instance.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 entitled "The People
of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., Et Al.," granting the motion to quash the
information filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein Respondent. The issue is
whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.

The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of the crime
of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 21st day of April, 1973, at around 10:00 o’clock in the
evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with
the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and
one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns
and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, with deliberate
intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, Accused Barrio
captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members
of the police force of Mangsat Pangasinan, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and
lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for
about eleven (11) hours. (Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.

Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.

(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA

Assistant Provincial Fiscal"

All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded
not guilty.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced at the
investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition thereto.

Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be
charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga granted
the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.

Hence, this petition.

Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds,

detains a person. 1 The elements of this crime are the following:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds. 2

The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the
information which was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, 3 that is, that the facts alleged in the information do not
constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.

The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl.
Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag,
Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the
municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two elements of the crime are
present.

The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, is a public officer
who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.

The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to
detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public officers are
the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors. 4

Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such
public officer when the former made this finding in the questioned
order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6)
hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is not in any
way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was
Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he who detained and jailed
him because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of
Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan." 5

In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent
Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly sustained for the following
reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain
petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain; 6 (2) That he is neither a peace officer
nor a policeman, 7 (3) That he was not a public official; 8 (4) That he had nothing
to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez; 9 (5) That he is not connected directly
or indirectly in the administration of the Manaoag Police Force; 10 (6) That barrio
captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as persons in authority and that
it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio
Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in
authority; 11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary
Detention. 12

We disagree.

Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who
were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were recognized as
persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in
authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In U .S. v. Braganza, 13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a

municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was in his church.
They made him pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the
municipal building. There, they told him that he was under arrest. The priest had
not committed any crime. The two public officials were convicted of Arbitrary
Detention. 14

In U .S. v. Gellada, 15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of

Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at around
6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during
the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was ordered released
by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime, Gellada was
convicted of Arbitrary Detention. 16

Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the
powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the
maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the
municipal councilor in charge of the district in the performance of their duties in
such barrio; 17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio; 18 to enforce all laws
and ordinances which are operative within the barrio; 19 and to organize and lead
an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of
peace and order within the barrio. 20

In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M.

Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a Barrio
Captain, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in
the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.

"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to
disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first
resorts to peaceful measures. He may take preventive measures like placing the
offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where possible, to behave well,
but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.

"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in
authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons within legal limits." 21
(Emphasis supplied.)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is

accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with abuse of
their functions, may be guilty of this crime. 22 A perusal of the powers and function
vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain 23
except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the
same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be and are given the
authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a
barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez. 24

From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent
Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.

Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly
granted as the facts and evidence on record show that there was no crime of
Arbitrary Detention; 25 that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag
Police Force; 26 and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to town for the
latter’ s personal safety. 27

Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the
trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly held
that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those
alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the information.
This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in
the information. 28 Matters of defense cannot be proved during the hearing of such
a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal
liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. 29 In the case of U .S. v. Perez, 30 this
Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically
opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception
and that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution. 31

Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court’s granting of the motion to
quash jeopardy has already attached in his favor 32 on the ground that here, the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad

Respondent’s contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash,

unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is therefore
immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal
was secured not only with his consent but at his instance. 33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside.
Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113685 June 19, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
THEODORE BERNAL, JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, accused-appellants.

ROMERO, J.:

Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose

identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the crime of
kidnapping in Criminal Case No. 26658-92 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 10, under an information1 dated July 13, 1992, which reads as follows:

That on or about August 5, 1991, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused,
armed with hand guns, conspiring, confederating and cooperating together
and helping one another, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and
threat, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously grabbed and kidnapped one
Bienvenido Openda, Jr., while the latter was drinking liquor with his friends
 as Bolton Isla, this City and was brought, handcuffed and carried away using
the PU then fled together with Bienvenido Openda, Jr., thereby depriving the
said Bienvenido Openda, Jr. of his liberty against his will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

A plea of not guilty having been entered by Bernal during his arraignment, trial
ensued. The prosecution presented four witnesses.2 On the other hand, Theodore
Bernal testified for his defense.

The materials facts and events as found by the court a quo are:

It appears that on August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto
Racasa and Openda, Jr. were engaged in a drinking spree, they invited Bernal, who
was passing by, to join them.

After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was
going to fetch his child. Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and
asked the latter if he was "Payat."3 When he said yes, one of them suddenly pulled
out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him "not to run because
they were policemen" and because he had an "atraso" or a score to settle with
them. They then hastily took him away. Racasa immediately went to the house of
Openda, Jr. and informed the latter's mother of the abduction.

The theory of the prosecution, as culled from the testimony of a certain Salito
Enriquez, tends to establish that Openda, Jr. had an illicit affair with Bernal's wife
Naty and this was the motive behind the former's kidnapping. Until now, Openda,
Jr. is still missing.

On the other hand, the defense asserts that Openda Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested
by the police on August 5, 1991, and hence, was never kidnapped.4

On December 10, 1993, the court a quo rendered judgment5 finding Bernal "guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and
disappearance of Bienvenido Openda Jr. under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby sentences him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify his mother
Teresita Openda in the amount of P50,000.00 for her mental anguish and moral
suffering."6

Bernal assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the prosecution
witnesses' allegedly illusory testimonies and for convicting him when his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

We find no compelling reason to overturn the decision of the lower court.

The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found.
This, however, does not preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In
Kidnapping, what is important is to determine and prove the fact of seizure, and the
subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused from
prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by the
simple expedient of disposing of their victim's bodies.

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:

Art. 267. — Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. —

Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other
manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person
kidnapped or detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public

officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person,
even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.

For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim's liberty,
which is the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at
bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other unknown individuals
"as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community
of purpose."7 Proof of conspiracy is perhaps most frequently made by evidence of a
chain of circumstances only.8 The circumstances present in this case sufficiently
indicate the participation of Bernal in the disappearance of Openda, Jr.

The prosecution has profferred sufficient evidence to show that, indeed, Bernal,
together with his two companions, abducted Openda, Jr. on August 5, 1991. A
certain Adonis Sagarino, a childhood friend and neighbor of the victim, testified that
he saw Bernal at the billiard hall at about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and
overheard him dispatching one of them to "Tarsing's Store" to check if a certain
person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that
after the latter's presence was confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall.
Minutes later, Openda, Jr., already handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with
Bernal's companions.
Equally important is the testimony of Roberto Racasa, a resident of Bucana, Davao
City who knew both Bernal and the victim, the former being his neighbor
and compadre. He narrated that he and the victim were drinking at "Tarsing's
Store" on that fateful day when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After
a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which, two men came to the store and
asked for "Payat." When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed "Payat," hew
was handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men.

Likewise, a certain Salito Enriquez, a tailor and a friend of Openda, Jr., testified that
sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal's wife
Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which
they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty "not to do it again because she
(was) a married woman.9 Undoubtedly, his wife's infidelity was ample reason for
Bernal to contemplate revenge.

Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the

perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence of facts from which it
may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction.10 Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding
his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to
Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. — The declaration made by a person

deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary
to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received
in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
persons.

With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been
expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or
even penal.11

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to

wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration
the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
true."12

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to
testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his own interest,
since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence13 because no
sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.14
In his brief, Bernal highlights supposed inconsistencies in Sagarino's testimony. He
alleges that the latter could not have seen the actual handcuffing because
"Tarsing's Store" could not be seen from the billiard hall. Sagarino's testimony
shows that after Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back
with Openda, Jr., already handcuffed.

Q The three of them together?

A Yes, sir.
Q And what about you, where did you stay?
A I just stayed in the billiard hall.
Q While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did
you see next?
A The two came back.
Q Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back?
A The companions of Bernal.
Q And what did these two men do?
A They apprehended Jun-jun Openda.15

From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda,
Jr. arrested. The lower court correctly rejected this argument by holding that:

But Sagarino has not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of Openda, Jr.
at the Tarsing or Tarcing store. On the contrary, he says that he had not
known who the person was that Bernal referred to when he requested one of
this two companions to go see if that person was still there at the store, and
that he came to know that he was Openda, Jr. only after he saw Openda, Jr.
pass by the billiard hall already handcuffed, with the two unidentified
companions of Bernal with him, on their way out to the main road.16

If one had a direct view of "Tarsing's Store" from the billiard hall, Bernal would not
have requested his companion to check if Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with
Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed out by Bernal arose from the testimonies of
Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-examination, stated:

Q After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned
(sic) with his child, is that correct?
A Yes, sir, because I was still in the store.17

On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:

Q When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long (sic) were you
able to see him again?
A Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions
came back and proceeded to Tarcing Store and arrested Jun-jun
Openda. When these two men brought out Jun-jun Openda,
fifteen minutes later, Bernal came.
Q Do you know where this Bernal from? (sic)
A He was coming from outside.
 Q He has with him his son?
A He was with nobody, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q He was alone?
A Yes, sir.18
The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each
other as to be irreconcilable. Considering the proximity of the store from the billiard
hall, there is a possibility that when Racasa saw Bernal with his son at the store,
the latter could have already brought home his son before proceeding alone to the
billiard hall where he was seem by Segarino.19
Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarino's testimony by imputing revenge as
his motive for testifying. He alleges that on July 29, 1991, or six days before the
alleged kidnapping, five policemen arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol car
asking for Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza, Dansoy Madelo and Dagoy
Balagan. He replied that they were residents of the place and staying at the billiard
hall and mahjong house. The policemen departed and went to the places he
mentioned.
Q Minutes later do you know what happened?
A They came back.
Q What did you do after they came back?
A I asked these police officers if they found these (sic) persons
they were looking (for) ?
Q What was their answer?
A They answered in the negative.
Q Since the answer is in the negative, what did you do ?
A I asked the police officers why they were looking for these
persons.(?)
Q What was the answer of the policemen?
A The police officer said that those people were wanted by them
because accordingly (sic) they were marijuana pushers.20

Bernal's position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an
arrest was made by pursuing policemen. This contention is quite improbable, if not
highly preposterous.

The trial court correctly appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from
any ill-motive against Bernal. If the latter's allegations were true, then Sagarino
should have been arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony in court.
No such arrest was, however, made.

The court a quo committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa
and Sagarino sufficient to convict Bernal. The court said that Sagarino's forthright
answers to the questions of the prosecutor and defense counsel clearly establish
the participation of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping or Openda, Jr. Evidence,
to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself.21 This Court once again finds occasion to reiterate the
established rule that the findings of fact of a trial court carry great weight and are
entitled to respect on appeal, absent any strong and cogent reason to the contrary,
since it is in a better position to decided the question of credibility of witnesses.22

We note that after a lapse of a considerable length of time, the victim has yet to
resurface. Considering the circumstances, it is safe to assume that Openda, Jr. is
already dead.

Finally, the Solicitor General, pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,

recommended to this Court the penalty of seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum. The maximum penalty
must be determined in accordance with rules and provision of the Revised Penal
Code. With respect to the minimum penalty, however, "it is left entirely within the
discretion of the court to fix it anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower
without reference to the periods into which it may be subdivided."23 Consistent with
this ruling, this Court imposes reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, as the
minimum penalty, to reclusion perpetua, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the
appealed decision dated November 18, 1993, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against accused-appellant Theodore Bernal.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 120988 August 11, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROSEMARIE DE LA CRUZ y NIEVA, accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:

Accused-appellant Rosemarie de la Cruz was caught holding a seven-year old

schoolgirl by the hand and leading her out of the school grounds. Charged with
kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor, she was convicted, and
accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of no less than reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant contends that her guilt has not been established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt and that the entire case is nothing but an overreaction to the
situation.

The Information charged:

That on or about September 27, 1994, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual and
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
 feloniously kidnap, detain or in any manner deprive one WHIAZEL
SORIANO y CRUZ, seven years of age, of her liberty, against her will
and consent.

Contrary to law.

(p. 5, Rollo)

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-139168 before the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Branch 35, Manila). After accused-
appellant entered a plea of not guilty, trial commenced. The testimony of the
principal witnesses for the prosecution may be summarized in the following
manner:

Cecilia Caparos, a neighbor of Whiazel Soriano, the victim, testified that on

September 27, 1994, at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning, she waiting for her
two children inside the compound of the Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School when
she saw Whiazel held on the hand and being led away by a woman later identified
as accused-appellant. Knowing that Whiazel was enrolled in the afternoon class, she
went after them and asked accused-appellant where she was going with Whiazel.
Accused-appellant answered that she asked Whiazel to bring her to Rowena
Soriano, the child's mother. Cecilia then turned to Whiazel and asked her why she
was with accused-appellant. Whiazel answered that accused-appellant requested
her to look for the latter's child. Cecilia grew suspicious because of the inconsistent
answers, Whiazel's terrified look, and the scratches on the child's face. She told
accused-appellant that she will bring accused-appellant to a teacher because she
did not trust accused-appellant. Accused-appellant was "surprised and reasoned
out", but just the same agreed to go to a teacher (pp. 3-9, 11-13, tsn, April 3,
1995).

The victim, Whiazel Soriano (sometimes referred to in the record as Reazel or

Rhiazel), at the time of the incident, was a Grade 1 pupil at the Aurora A. Quezon
Elementary School in Malate, Manila. She testified that she voluntarily went with
accused-appellant after being asked for help in looking for the school dentist.
Whiazel also mentioned that accused-appellant asked for her assistance in looking
for accused-appellant's child in a place far away from school. She was neither
threatened nor hurt in any way by accused-appellant. She was not led out of the
school; in fact they never got out of the school compound. When Cecilia Caparos
saw them, Whiazel told accused-appellant that she wanted to go. Accused-appellant
refused, and held Whiazel's hand. Whiazel did not try to escape. She did not even
cry; well, not until they went to a teacher (pp. 3-9, tsn, April 7, 1995).

For the defense, Eufemia Magpantay, guidance teacher at Aurora A. Quezon

Elementary School, testified that on September 27, 1994, at around noontime,
accused-appellant, Whiazel, her teacher Mrs. Rioganes, and Cecilia Caparos went to
her office. The incident was related to her. Asked what she was doing with Whiazel,
accused-appellant said she wanted the child's help in looking for the school dentist.
Accused-appellant reiterated this before the assistant principal to whom they all
later went. This witness testified that the school allows patients who are not
connected with the school to consult at the clinic. Further, she also mentioned that
the students of the Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School, the same being a public
school, come mostly from low to average income families (pp. 4-9, tsn, April 28,
1995).

Accused-appellant's mother-in-law, Gorgonia Nieva, testified that on the day prior

to the incident, accused-appellant had asked her to look for Dr. Luisa Medina, a
dentist. Accused-appellant's daughter was then sick. Her inquiries showed that the
dentist no longer had her clinic at her house; instead she may be found at the
Aurora A. Quezon Elementary School. Thus, the next day, he went with accused-
appellant to Manila to look for the dentist. They parted ways when they arrived at
the school at around 11 o'clock in the morning (pp. 3-12, tsn, April 24, 1995).

Accused-appellant testified that when she got to the school, she asked; guard
where the clinic was. The guard gave her directions, and told her to pass through
the same gate on her way out. When she got to the clinic, no one was there so she
left. On her way out, a girl, later identified as Whiazel, walked with her at arm's
length (nakasabay). She did not hold the child; she did not look at the child; they
did not talk; not even smiles were exchanged. Before she could get out of the
school, a woman (Cecilia Caparos) called her; hurled invectives at her, and accused
her of kidnapping Whiazel. Accused-appellant got mad but nevertheless offered no
resistance when Caparos dragged her and brought her to the office of the guidance
counselor. There, Caparos repeated her charges against accused-appellant, which
accusations the latter denied. Whiazel was asked by the guidance counselor if
accused-appellant was really going to kidnap her, she answered no. Very much the
same things were said later at the principal's office ( pp. 2-8, tsn, April 21,1995).
At the request of the principal, five policemen later came and brought accused-
appellant to Station No. 5 of the Western Police District (pp. 14-15, Rollo).

Lending credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court
rendered the appealed decision finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor, as:

It has been established with moral certainty that with neither legal
reason nor just cause, the accused took hold of the child Whiazel by
the hand, and led her towards the gate of the school compound
against her will, evidently to bring her out of the school perimeter. But
before they could actually exit through that gate, the child saw a
neighbor (obviously Cecilia Caparos) and told the accused that she
wanted to go to her neighbor. The accused, however, refused and did
not agree to let the child go and continued to hold her, for which
reason, she was not able to get away from the accused . . .

That the accused did not employ any physical force on Whiazel Soriano
in detaining and restraining her freedom provides no significant
consequence to relieve the former from the resultant effects of her
consummated criminal act, for it cannot be denied that she had
 exerted sufficient moral intimidation on the child which effectively
controlled and influenced her will . . . At such tender age and
immature mind she can easily be awed and cowed by a person such as
the accused.

(pp. 21-26, Ibid.)

Accordingly, accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua, and to pay the victim, through her parents, P50,000 as moral damages
(p. 26, Ibid.).

Accused-appellant interposed the instant appeal, contending that her act of holding
the child by the hand and leading her out of the school premises cannot be
considered an act of kidnapping without leaving room for reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant points out that Whiazel did not categorically state that accused-
appellant tried to kidnap her. On the contrary, the child testified that she voluntarily
went with accused-appellant and that she was neither forced nor intimidated into
accompanying accused-appellant. Also, it is said, accused-appellant's excuse for
going to Whiazel's school to look for Dr. Medina is buttressed by the fact that she
had a tooth extracted in jail sometime in November 1994; and that contrary to
Whiazel's statement, the guidance teacher, Eufemia Magpantay, testified that even
persons not connected with the school are allowed to consult Dr. Medina at the
school's dental clinic. Accused-appellant thus contends that she had a valid reason
for being at the school premises, as indeed, she did not run away and instead faced
her accuser. All these circumstances, accused-appellant submits, constitute
reasonable doubt as to her guilt which, therefore, necessitate her acquittal (pp. 4-
8, Accused-Appellant's Brief; pp. 53-57, Rollo).

The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argue that Whiazel was
deprived of her liberty, no matter how short a time, the moment accused-appellant,
a person unknown to Whiazel, prevented her from going over to her neighbor,
Cecilia Caparos. Under the circumstances, considering that she is of such tender
age, deprivation of liberty was consummated even in the absence of force or
threats upon the victim. (pp. 6-7, Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief).

In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of
the latter's liberty, in any manner, needs to be established by indubitable proof
(People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85 [1993]). The acts held by the trial court, and
maintained by the People, as consummating the crime of kidnapping in this case
are those when accused-appellant held the victim's hand and refused to let go when
the victim asked to go over to her neighbor, who by then already saw what was
happening. This happened for only a very brief span of time and the evidentiary
record shows that there were a good number of people present at that time, that a
guard was stationed at the gate, and that there was at least a teacher nearby. The
child could have just as easily shouted for help. While it does not take much to
scare the wits out of a small child like Whiazel, under the attendant circumstances,
we cannot say with certainty that she was indeed deprived of her liberty. It must
further be noted that up to that brief moment when Cecilia saw them, and the child
asked to be let go, the victim had gone with accused-appellant voluntarily. Without
any further act reinforcing the inference that the victim may have been denied her
liberty, even taking cognizance of her minority, the Court hesitates to find that
kidnapping in the case at bar was consummated. While it is a well-entrenched rule
that factual findings of trial courts, especially when they concern the appreciation of
testimony of witnesses, are accorded great respect, by exception, when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, as we perceive in the case at bar,
the Court may choose to substitute its own findings (People vs. Padua, 215 SCRA
266 [1992]).

To our mind, the felony committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a
minor in the attempted stage only. The attempted phase of a felony is defined as
when the offender commences the commission of a felony, directly by overt acts,
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance
(Article 6, Revised Penal Code). The overt act must be an external one which has
direct connection with the felony, it being "necessary to prove that said beginning
of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of
the offender, will logically and necessarily ripen to a concrete offense"
(Padilla. Criminal Law: Revised Penal Code Annotated, vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 141
citing People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil 703).

In the case at bar, accused-appellant already commenced her criminal scheme by

taking hold of Whiazel by the hand and leading her out of the school premises. As
mentioned earlier, these do not sufficiently establish that kidnapping had been
consummated. However, considering other attendant facts and circumstances, it
does reveal that accused-appellant had less than noble intentions with the victim.
Firstly, the child was led to believe that accused-appellant wanted to see the
dentist. It is not clear, however, that there really was a Dr. Medina employed by
the school as dentist. Not even the guidance counselor who testified for the defense
made any specific mention of the doctor. Secondly, if accused-appellant wanted to
see the dentist, why was she on her way out? If it is true she had already gone to
the clinic and found no one there and that she then decided to leave, what else was
she doing with the child? Thirdly, accused-appellant did not simply ask for
directions; she wanted the victim to accompany her. That seems suspicious
enough. And of all people, why ask a seven-year old? Fortunately, the further
progress and completion of accused-appellant's felonious design was thwarted by
the timely intervention of Cecilia Caparos, the victim's neighbor.

The Court thus holds that the felony committed by accused-appellant in the case at
bar is not kidnapping and serious illegal detention of a minor in the consummated
stage, but rather in its attempted stage.

Nevertheless, we believe that the trial court erred in granting moral damages in the
amount of P50,000 despite the absence of any evidence on record that the victim
suffered sleepless nights, serious anxiety, fright, or similar injury. All that the
record reveals is that the victim cried when they were at the guidance counselor's
office, nothing more. Inasmuch as moral damages are granted not to enrich, but
rather to compensate the victim for the injury suffered (Bautista vs. Mangaldan
Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16 [1994]), proof of moral suffering must be
introduced, failing in which, such an award is not proper (People vs. Manero, Jr. et.
al., 218 SCRA 85 [1993]).

Since the crime is only in its attempted stage, the penalty imposable under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, which is reclusion
perpetua to death, has to be lowered by two degrees (Article 51, Revised Penal
Code). Two degrees lower from reclusion perpetua to death would be prision
mayor, which has to be imposed in its medium period in the absence of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance (Article 64, Revised Penal Code). Applying
further the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty would range
from prision correccional, as the minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period,
as the maximum.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that

accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempted kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. Accordingly, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
The award for moral damages in the amount of P50,000 is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 105954-55. September 28, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRENEO FAJARDO,

SIMPLICIO ATIENZA, DOMINGO HINGGAN, GUILLERMO PANGANIBAN,
JULIAN TERCERO, EUSTACIO ONATE, RUPERTO FAJARDO, BENIGNO
LUMBRES, BONIFACIO DEMAPILIS, TIRSO MARANAN, QUINTIN FAJARDO,
BEN NATIVIDAD and several JOHN DOES, Accused, IRENEO FAJARDO,
RUPERTO FAJARDO, Accused-Appellants.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

For review before this Court is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna in Criminal Case No. 4371-B 1 dated December 20, 1991 convicting herein
appellants to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellants were
charged and convicted for the crimes of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal
detention.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto
Fajardo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as co-principals of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom, defined and penalized in Art. 267 of the Revised Penal
Code, as Amended, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of use of motor
vehicles without any mitigating circumstances to offset the same. In view however,
of the constitutional provision which proscribes the death penalty (Sec. 19[1] 1987
Constitution) the Court hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories provided for by law plus the proportionate
costs.

The amount of $3,000,000.00 extorted from the victim or friends of the victim shall
be restored, as it is hereby ordered returned.

For insufficiency of evidence, the accused Simplicio Atienza is hereby declared

acquitted. The bailbond posted by him for his provisional liberty is ordered canceled
and his surety is relieved of the said undertaking.

Both accused having been declared guilty of the crime charged, they are hereby
ordered immediately committed to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro
Manila.

SO ORDERED.

Biñan, Laguna."cralaw virtua1aw library

Accused Ireneo Fajardo, Simplicio Atienza, Domingo Hinggan, Guillermo

Panganiban, Julian Tercero, Eustacio Onate, Ruperto Fajardo, Benigno Lumbres,
Bonifacio Demapilis, Tirso Maranan, Quintin Fajardo, Ben Natividad and several
John Does were charged in an information for "Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious
Illegal Detention." 2 Of the aforementioned accused, only Ireneo Fajardo,
Simpliciano Atienza and Ruperto Fajardo were arraigned and tried. 3 All the other
accused remained at large.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

Accused Bonifacio Dimapilis died during the pendency of the case and the
indictment against him was dismissed. Since the other accused were still at large,
the trial court declared that it had no jurisdiction over them. 4 Accused Simpliciano
Atienza was acquitted by the trial court. 5

Hence this appeal interposed by Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo.

The undisputed facts are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the early morning of November 15, 1986 several Japanese executives of Mitsui &
Co. and other Japanese companies left Makati, Metro Manila to enjoy a game of golf
at the Canlubang Golf Club, Canlubang, Laguna. Nobuyuki Wakaoji headed the
group of executives. The group arrived at the Golf Club in a convoy of five cars. The
drivers of the executives parked at the Golf Club car park while the executives
played golf. The round of golf lasted for about four hours, after which the
executives had lunch at the Clubhouse. It was already 3:00 p.m. when the
executives left the Golf Club. The convoy of five cars was led by the car driven by
Emiliano Ordona. In it was Nobuyuki Wakaoji. Meanwhile, the fourth car was driven
by prosecution witness Ernesto Escobar. Escobar testified that five minutes later,
the convoy was overtaken by two cars. The two cars, one of them a blue Toyota
Cressida, blocked the lead car. Two men came out of one car and approached the
lead car. A third man, allegedly appellant Ireneo Fajardo, remained standing near
the door of the blue Cressida. The two men forcibly took Wakaoji out of the car and
shoved him in the blue Cressida. The Cressida then sped away in the direction of
the highway. 6

To support its finding of "detention" the trial court relied on the testimonies of Mario
Palig and Jimmy Lasam. Lasam testified that while looking for a grass cutting job in
Aya, Talisay, Batangas at around 2:00 p.m. of November 25, 1986, he saw Wakaoji
being escorted by three armed men (supposedly accused Maranan, Dimapilis and
appellant Ruperto Fajardo) from the house of accused Lumbres to a waiting white
car. He described Wakaoji as being blindfolded with his hands tied behind his back.
7

On the other hand, Palig testified that at around 2:00 p.m., on November 25, 1986
he was at Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas when he saw appellant Ruperto Fajardo in
the house of accused Lumbres. Palig testified that a helicopter boarded by Japanese
nationals arrived. The Japanese nationals alighted, talked to Lumbres and took
some pictures. He stated that Wakaoji was escorted by appellant Ruperto
Fajardo, Accused Lumbres and Maranan to a white car, which they boarded. Both
witnesses testified that three other unidentified armed men boarded a passenger
jeep and followed the white car. 8

From these testimonies the trial court concluded that,." . . another set of
kidnappers consisting of the group of Ruperto Fajardo moved their victim from
Barangay Tarangka, Talisay, Batangas to Barangay Suplang, Tanauan, Batangas, in
a wise move to evade from the clutches of the law . . ." 9

The appellants raise the following assignment of errors: 10

I.

THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THE COMMISSION OF THE

CRIME CHARGED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF TESTIMONIES OF PROCURED,
PERJURED AND REHEARSED WITNESSES AND STATEMENTS OF PERSONS WHO
WERE NEVER PRESENTED AS WITNESSES FOR THE STATE.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

II.

THE LOWER COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE WRITTEN

STATEMENTS OF PERSONS WHO WERE NEVER PRESENTED AS WITNESSES, AND
DRAWING CONCLUSIONS, SURMISES AND PRESUMPTIONS EXTENSIVELY
THEREFROM.

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY BETWEEN

THE APPELLANTS, OR WITH OTHERS, ON THE BASIS OF INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.

IV.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING AND RULING THAT THE IDENTITIES OF THE
APPELLANTS WERE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS MERELY OF THE HIGHLY
INCREDIBLE, PERJURED, PROCURED, MANUFACTURED AND UNRELIABLE
TESTIMONIES FOR THE PROSECUTION.

V.

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DISCREDITING ENTIRELY THE TESTIMONIES OF THE

WITNESSES FOR THE DEFENSE, PARTICULARLY THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI.

VI.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR LEAVE FILED BY THE
APPELLANTS FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF MATERIAL AND NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE TENDING TO SHOW THAT SOME OTHER PERSONS CONFESSED TO THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.

VII.

FINALLY, THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING THE APPELLANTS GUILTY,

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.

The appeal is without merit.

As its first assignment of error, appellants would have us believe that the
prosecution witnesses, Ernesto Escobar, Mario Palig and Jimmy Lasam were
"procured, perjured, and rehearsed." Appellants’ bare statements without the
presentation of evidence will not sway us. No proof was presented to substantiate
their claim that Escobar, Palig and Lasam were motivated to falsely testify against
appellants. It is a basic rule that mere allegations are not equivalent to proof. 11
Each party must prove his affirmative allegations. 12 Appellants failed to do so in
this case. Accordingly, there being nothing in the record to show that witnesses
were actuated by any improper motive, their testimony shall be entitled to full faith
and credit. 13

As to the second and third assignments of error, we note that even assuming that
the trial court erroneously considered statements which were inadmissible in
evidence, the convictions should still be sustained on the basis of other evidence
which are admissible. This evidence consists of the testimonies of Escobar, Palig
and Lasam.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

We likewise reject appellants’ fourth assignment of error. We find that appellants

were positively identified. It is true that the trial court may have erred in
determining Ireneo Fajardo’s actual participation in the crime, nonetheless, Ireneo
Fajardo’s presence during Wakaoji’s abduction and kidnapping was sufficiently
established by prosecution witness Escobar.

While we agree with appellants that the trial court’s finding that the most
"prominent among" the conspirators was Ireneo Fajardo is without basis, 14
however, the records show that Ireneo Fajardo stood by the car as two other
identified men pull Wakaoji out of the first car and push him to the back seat of the
Toyota Cressida car. Ireneo Fajardo drove the Toyota Cressida. Ireneo Fajardo
stood as a look out.

On direct examination Escobar stated: 15

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court what you saw was happening in front?

A: I saw that there were three (3) men carrying arms.

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court, what were these three (3) bearing arms
doing when you saw them?

A: Two men were approaching the car driven by Emiliano Ordona and one (1) man
was standing just near the door of the car.

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court what did these two (2) armed men who
approached the car of Emiliano Ordona did, if they did anything?

A: What I saw they were just holding the door of the car, sir.

Q: And, other than holding the front door of the car, what else did you see if
anything?

A: A man was standing near the steering wheel of the Cressida car, sir.
x x x

Q: Now, you said you saw one (1) person standing beside the door near the
steering wheel of the Cressida car and there were two (2) armed men who
approached the vehicle driven by Emiliano Ordona, can you tell this Honorable
Court if you know these three (3) men you saw?

A: I only recognized one (1), sir.

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court who was that person you said you can
identify?

A: Yes, sir, I can point.

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court who was that person?

A: Ireneo Fajardo, sir.

x x x

It must be remembered that a witness who testifies categorically, spontaneously,

frankly and consistently is a credible witness. 16 In this case, we find that Escobar
testified in such a manner.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

In disputing the positive identification of Ireneo Fajardo by Escobar, appellants

insist that Escobar "admitted emphatically that he had never met Ireneo Fajardo at
anytime in his life prior to the investigation on January 12, 1987." 17 We note that
the fact that they did not meet is not a deterrent to affirming the trial court’s
finding of positive identification. There is nothing in the law and jurisprudence
which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that in order for there to be a positive
identification by a prosecution witness of a felon, he must first know the latter
personally. 18

Appellants also posit that since Escobar was twenty meters away from the Toyota
Cressida car, it is unlikely that he would have been able to identify Ireneo Fajardo.
19 We are not convinced. In People v. Castillo, 20 we held that a "distance of forty
to forty-five meters away from the scene of the crime may, by itself," lead the
Court to entertain doubts on the accuracy of what a witness has observed, "but
once a witness has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an
easy task even from a considerable distance." In the case at bar, we find that
Escobar was able to gain familiarity with Ireneo Fajardo while they were in the
parking lot of the Canlubang Golf and Country Club, where he observed Ireneo
Fajardo surveying the area for a couple of hours prior to the abduction. 21

We also find that Palig and Lasam categorically identified Ruperto Fajardo. Both
Palig and Lasam testified that Ruperto Fajardo was one of the armed men who
escorted Wakaoji from the house of Benigno Lubres to the white car. 22 The
conditions of visibility on that day of November 25, 1986 in Tarangka, Talisay,
Batangas have not been open to serious doubt. In People v. Fabregas, 23 we held
that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witness does not appear to
be biased, his assertion as to the identity of the malefactors should normally be
accepted.

Neither can the fifth assignment of error be given serious consideration. Since
appellants were positively identified, their defenses of alibi cannot prevail. We have
held time and time again that alibi is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the accused by a prosecution witness. 24 Positive
identification, where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-
motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi
and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.25cralaw:red

The sixth assignment of error also cannot hold water. We agree with the Solicitor
General that the trial court correctly denied appellants’ motion to re-open the case
for the introduction of "newly discovered evidence" consisting of newspaper reports
which contained "confessions" of different persons as to their participation in the
Wakaoji kidnapping. 26 Such are not newly discovered evidence. Given that the
appellants have been positively identified, the admission of the newspaper accounts
will not if introduced and admitted "change the judgment." 27 Moreover such
newspaper reports are incompetent and inadmissible for being hearsay.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

The seventh assignment of error is also unmeritorious. We find that the appellants’
guilt has been established beyond reasonable doubt. It is axiomatic that all
elements of the crime charged must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 28 The
law requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 29

The crime charged in this case is kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
elements of serious illegal detention are: 30

(1) that the offender is a private individual;

(2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter
of his liberty;

(3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and

(4) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances are
present:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 5 days;

(b) that it is committed simulating public authority;

(c) that any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill him are made; or

(d) that the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.

In the early case of U.S. v. Cabanag, 31 it was held that it is essential in the crime
of illegal detention that there be actual confinement or restriction of the person of
the offended party. This rule has not changed.

Indeed, for the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim’s
liberty, which is the essential element of the offense, must be duly proved. 32 In a
prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of the
latter’s liberty needs to be established by indubitable proof. 33

In this case, we find that detention was established by the fact that one month
after the abduction, the victim Wakaoji was seen by Palig and Lasam being
transferred, blindfolded, with his hands tied, from Benigno Lumbres’ house to a
waiting white car.

While the trial court erroneously relied on the testimony of Ernesto Escobar that
"the Japanese paid the kidnappers $3,000,000.00 ransom money for the release of
the victim which was delivered by Luis Santillan at the designated drop point
somewhere in a cemetery in Angeles City," 34 the crime is still qualified as "serious
illegal detention" since the transfer of Wakaoji was witnessed a month after the
abduction, and there is testimony that Wakaoji was released only after four
months. Here, there is proof that the kidnapping or detention definitely lasted for
more than five days.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that appellants Ireneo Fajardo and Ruperto Fajardo
are found guilty of kidnapping and serious illegal detention defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code with the attendant aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicles, without any mitigating circumstances to
offset the same, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
the accessories provided for by law. The order to return the amount of
$3,000,000.00 to the victim or friends of the victim is DELETED.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad

No costs.

G.R. No. L-13484 May 20, 1960

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DOMINADOR CAMERINO, MANUEL PAKINGAN, CRISANTO SARATAN,
BIENVENIDO OSTERIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Actg. Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Eriberto D. Ignacio for
appellant.
Avelino A. Velasco for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Dominador Camerino and eighty-six others were accused before the Court of First
Instance of Cavite of the crime of sedition, said to have been committed on or
about and during the period comprised by and between the months of October,
1953, to November 15, 1953 and for sometime prior thereto; under an information
charging conspiracy among the said accused in having allegedly perpetrated for
political and social ends, insistent, repeated and continuous acts of hate, terrorism
and revenge against private persons, leaders, members and sympathizers of the
Nacionalista Party in the town of Bacoor, Cavite, and frustrating by force, threats
and violence, and intimidation the free expression of the popular will in the election
held on November 10, 1953. The information described in detail the manner in
which the alleged seditious acts were performed, specifying the dates and the
places where they were committed and the persons who were victims thereof,
under fourteen different overt acts of sedition. Before arraignment, forty-eight of
the
eighty-seven accused, headed by Dominador Camerino, filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground of double jeopardy, claiming in support thereof that they
had been previously convicted or been in jeopardy of being convicted and/or
acquitted of the offense charged in other cases of the same nature before the court.

The Assistant Provincial Fiscal filed written opposition to the motion, saying that
although it was alleged in the information that the accused had been charged with
various crimes under different and separate informations, that would not place
them in double jeopardy, because those previous charges were being specified in
the information only as a bill of particulars for the purpose of describing in detail
the offense of sedition, but not to hold the defendants liable for punishment under
said separate and different specifications; in other words, the specifications
describing separate crimes were alleged in the information merely to complete the
narration of facts which constitute the crime of sedition.

Later, all the accused filed a supplemental motion to quash, raising as additional
grounds that more than one offense was charged, and that the criminal action or
liability of said defendants had been extinguished.

On March 14, 1956, the trial court issued an order sustaining the reasons of the
motion to quash and dismissing the information on the grounds:(1) that the
information charged more than one offense, (2) that it was vague, ambiguous and
uncertain, (3) that it described crimes for which some of the accused had either
been convicted or acquitted, and (4) some violation of the election law described in
the specification had already prescribed. A motion for reconsideration filed by the
Fiscal was denied. The Government is appealing from that order of dismissal, as
well as the order denying the motion for reconsideration.

In determining the present appeal, we deem it necessary to discuss only the first
ground of the dismissal of the information by the trial court, namely, multiplicity of
offenses, that is to say, that the information allegedly charged more than one
offense. We agree with the Provincial Fiscal and the Solicitor General representing
the Government that the accused herein were being charged only with one offense,
namely, that of sedition, defined in Article 139 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 202, and penalized under Article 140 of the
same code. the fourteen different acts or specifications charging some or all of the
accused with having committed the offenses charged therein, were included in the
information merely to describe and to narrate the different and specific acts the
sum total of which constitutes the crime of sedition. Different and separate acts
constituting different and separate offenses may serve as a basis for prosecuting
the accused to hold them criminally liable for said different offenses. Yet, those
different acts of offenses may serve merely as a basis for the prosecution of one
single offense like that of sedition. For instance, one may be accused of sedition,
and at the same time be prosecuted under another information for murder or
homicide as the case may be, if the killing was done in pursuance of and to carry
out the acts constituting sedition. In case of the People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 64,
this Tribunal said:

The nearest analogy to the two crimes of murder and sedition growing out of
practically the same facts, which can be found in the American authorities,
relate to the crimes of assault and riot or unlawful assembly. A majority of
the American courts have held that the offense of unlawful assembly and riot
and the offense of assault and battery are distinct offense; and that
conviction or an acquittal for either does not bar a prosecution for other
offense, even though based on the same acts. (Freeland vs. People (1855),
16 Ill., 380; U.S. vs. Peaco (1835), 27 Fed. Cas., 477; People vs. Vasquez
(1905), 9 Puerto Rico, 488; contra, State vs. Lindsay (18868), 61 N.C., 458.)

It is merely stating the obvious to say that sedition is not the same offense
as murder. Sedition is a crime against public order; murder is a crime against
persons. Sedition is a crime directed against the existence of the State, the
authority of the government, and the general public tranquility; murder is a
crime directed against the lives of individuals. (U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil.,
437.) Sedition in its more general sense is the raising of commotions or
disturbances in the state; murder at common law is where a person of sound
mind and discretion unlawfully kills any human being, in the peace of the
sovereign, with malice aforethought, express or implied.

The offenses charged in the two informations for sedition and murder are
perfectly distinct in point of law however nearly they may be connected in
point of fact. Not alone are the offenses eonomine different, but the
allegations in the body of the informations are different. The gist of the
information for sedition is the public and tumultuous uprising of the
constabulary in order to attain by force and outside of legal methods the
object of inflicting an act of hate and revenge upon the persons of the police
force of the city of Manila by firing at them in several places in the city of
Manila; the gist of the information in the murder case is that the
Constabulary, conspiring together, illegally and criminally killed eight persons
and gravely wounded three others. The crimes of the murder and serious
physical injuries were not necessarily included in the information for sedition;
and the defendants could not have been convicted of these crimes under the
first information.
In the case of U.S. vs. Cernias, 10 Phil., 682, this Court held that while it is true
that each of those acts charged against the conspirators was itself a crime, the
prosecutor in setting them out in the information did no more than to furnish the
defendants with a bill of particulars of the facts which it intended to prove at the
trial, not only as a basis upon which to be found an inference of guilt of the crime of
conspiracy but also as evidence of the extremely dangerous and wicked nature of
that conspiracy.

The charge is not defective for duplicity when one single crime is set forth in
different modes prescribed by law for its commission, or the felony is set
forth under different counts specifying the way of its perpetuation, or the
acts resulted from a single criminal impulse. Neither is there duplicity when
the other offense described is but an ingredient or an essential element of
the real offense charged nor when several acts are related in describing the
offense. (Padilla: Criminal Procedure Annotated, 1959 ed., p. 101).

In the case of People vs. Bacolod, 89 Phil., 621, the defendant therein was
convicted on a plea of guilty of physical injuries through reckless imprudence.
Based on the same facts, he was also accused of having caused public disturbance.
The plea of double jeopardy interposed by the accused was rejected on the ground
that the two offenses were not the same, although they arose from the same act.

Following the reasoning of the trial court that more than one offense was charged,
the trial court should have ordered that the information be amended, or if that was
not possible, that a new information be filed.

Under section 2 of this Rule, the Court may deny or sustain the motion to
quash but may not defer it till the trial of the case on the merits. In
sustaining the motion, the court may order the filing of a new information or
may dismiss the case. In the new information, the defects of the previous
information may be cured. For instance, if the motion to quash is sustained
on the ground that more than one offense is charged in the information, the
court may order that another information be filed charging only one offense.
But the court may or may not issue such order in the exercise of its
discretion. The order may be made if the defects found in the first
information may be cured in a new information. If the order is made, the
accused, if he is in custody, should not be discharged, unless otherwise,
admitted to bail. But if no such order is made, or, having been made, the
prosecuting attorney fails to file another information within the time specified
by the court, the accused, if in custody must be discharged, unless he is also
in custody for another charge, or if is out on bail, the bail must be
exonerated. In such event, however, the fiscal is free to institute another
criminal proceeding since such ground of objection is not a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
1957 ed., Vol. II, pp. 778-779).

In conclusion, we hold that the information filed in this case did not charged more
than one offense but only that of sedition; that in specifying the separate and
different criminal acts attributed to the defendants, it was not the purpose or
intention of the Government to hold them criminally liable in the present
proceedings, but merely to complete the narration of facts, though specifying
different offenses which as a whole, supposedly constitute the crime of sedition.
Consequently, we believe that the information is valid.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised in the appeal.

In view of the foregoing, the appealed orders are hereby set aside and the case is
hereby remanded to the trial court of further proceedings, without pronouncement
as to costs.

G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Silvestre L. Tagarao for appellant Pablito Domasian.

Lino M. Patajo for appellant Dr. Samson Tan.

CRUZ, J.:

The boy was detained for only about three hours and was released even before his
parents received the ransom note. But it spawned a protracted trial spanning all of
8 years and led to the conviction of the two accused.1

The victim was Enrico Paulo Agra, who was 8 years old at the time of the incident in
question. The accused were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a
resident physician in the hospital owned by Enrico's parents. They were represented
by separate lawyers at the trial and filed separate briefs in this appeal.

The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11, 1982,
while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of
Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in
getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and
rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the
man went into a building to get the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and
started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a
minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to
stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at
Gumaca, they took another tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from
where they walked to the market. Here the man talked to a jeepney driver and
handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. The two
then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente, with the man still firmly holding
Enrico, who continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of the driver, Alexander
Grate, who asked the man about his relationship with the boy. The man said he and
the boy were brothers, making Grate doubly suspicious because of the physical
differences between the two and the wide gap between their ages. Grate
immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers
alighted from the tricycle. Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the
man dragging the boy. Noticing that they were being pursued, the man told Enrico
to run fast as their pursuers might behead them. Somehow, the man managed to
escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep
when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already
looking for him.2

At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received
an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the
release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought
the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in
the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for
examination.3

The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan.4 On the other hand,
Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so be could identify the
man who had detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito
Domasian.5 Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon.6

The defense of both accused was denial and alibi. Domasian claimed that at the
time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and later
went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses.7 Dr. Tan
for his part said he was in Manila.8

After trial Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas found both accused guilty as charged and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all accessory
penalties. They were also required to pay P200,000.00 to Dr. and Mrs. Enrique Agra
as actual and moral damages and attorney's fees.

In the present appeal, the accused-appellants reiterate their denial of any

participation in the incident in question. They belittle the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and submit that their own witnesses are more believable.
Tan specifically challenges the findings of the NBI and offers anew the opposite
findings of the PC/INP showing that he was not the writer of the ransom note. He
maintains that in any case, the crime alleged is not kidnapping with serious illegal
detention as no detention in an enclosure was involved. If at all, it should be
denominated and punished only as grave coercion. Finally, both Domasian and Tan
insist that there is no basis for the finding of a conspiracy between them to make
them criminally liable in equal degree.
First, on the credibility of the witnesses. This is assessed in the first instance by the
trial judge, whose finding in this regard is received with much respect by the
appellate court because of his opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of the
witnesses on the stand.

In the case at bar, Judge Lanzanas relied heavily on the testimony of the victim
himself, who positively identified Domasian as the person who detained him for
three hours. The trial court observed that the boy was "straight-forward, natural
and consistent" in the narration of his detention. The boy's naivete made him even
more believable. Tirso Ferreras, Enrico's classmate and also his age, pointed to
Domasian with equal certainty, as the man who approached Enrico when they were
walking together that morning of March 11, 1982. Grate, the tricycle driver who
suspected Enrico's companion and later chased him, was also positive in identifying
Domasian. All these three witnesses did not know Domasian until that same
morning and could have no ill motive in testifying against him. By contrast, Eugenia
Agtay, who testified for the defense, can hardly be considered a disinterested
witness because she admitted she had known Domasian for 3 years.

The defense asks why Domasian openly took Enrico to several public places if the
intention was to kidnap and detain him. That is for Domasian himself to answer. We
do no have to probe the reasons for the irrational conduct of an accused. The more
important question, as we see it, is why Domasian detained Enrico in the first place
after pretending he needed the boy's help. That is also for Domasian to explain. As
for Enrico's alleged willingness to go with Domasian, this was manifested only at
the beginning, when he believed the man sincerely needed his assistance. But he
was soon disabused. His initial confidence gave way to fear when Domasian, after
taking him so far away from the hospital where he was going, restrained and
threatened him if he did not stop crying.

Domasian's alibi cannot stand against his positive identification by Enrico, Grate
and Ferreras, let alone the contradictions made by his corroborating witness, Dr.
Irene Argosino, regarding the time he was in the optical clinic and the manner of
his payment for the refraction.9 Tan's alibi is not convincing either. The
circumstance that he may have been in Manila at the time of the incident does not
prove that he could not have written the ransom note except at that time.

Concerning the note, Rule 132, Section 22, of the Rules of Court provides as
follows:

The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who

believes it to be the handwriting of such person and has seen the
person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged and has thus acquired knowledge
of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting
may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court
with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against
whom the evidence is offered or proved to be genuine to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Two expert witnesses were presented in the case at bar, one from the NBI, 10 who
opined that the ransom note and the standard documents were written by one and
the same person, and another from the PC/INP 11 who expressed a contrary
conclusion. The trial court chose to believe the NBI expert because his examination
and analysis "was more comprehensive than the one conducted by the PC/INP
handwriting expert, who virtually limited his reliance on the perceived similarities
and dissimilarities in the pattern and style of the writing, thereby disregarding the
basic principle in handwriting identification that it is not the form alone nor anyone
feature but rather a combination of all the qualities that identify."

We have held that the value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not
upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the
assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. 12 The test of
genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not the formation of letters in some
other specimens but to the general character of writing, which is impressed on it as
the involuntary and unconscious result
of constitution, habit or other permanent course, and is, therefore itself
permanent. 13

Presented with the conflicting opinions of the witnesses in the case at bar, the Court
feels that the scales should tilt in favor of the prosecution. Significantly, the NBI
opinion was bolstered by the testimony of Agra, who believed that the ransom note
was written by Tan, with whose handwriting he was familiar because they had been
working in the hospital for four years and he had seen that handwriting every day
in Tan's prescriptions and daily reports. 14

Cesar v. Sandiganbayan 15 is not applicable because that case involved a forgery or

the deliberate imitation of another person's signature. In the case before us, there
was in fact an effort to disguise the ransom note writer's penmanship to prevent his
discovery.

As for the nature of the crime committed, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
provides as follows:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private

individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner
deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five

days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained; of if threats to kill him shall have been
made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a

public officer.

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was

committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any
other person; even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned
were present in the commission of the offense.

Contrary to Tan's submission, this crime may consist not only in placing a person in
an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his
liberty. 16 In the case at bar, it is noted that although the victim was not confined in
an enclosure, he was deprived of his liberty when Domasian restrained him from
going home and dragged him first into the minibus that took them to the municipal
building in Gumaca, thence to the market and then into the tricycle bound for San
Vicente. The detention was committed by Domasian, who was a private individual,
and Enrico was a minor at that time. The crime clearly comes under Par. 4 of the
above-quoted article.

Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom
note was an impossible crime which he says is not punishable. His reason is that
the second paragraph of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal
liability shall be incurred "by any person performing an act which would be an
offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means." As the crime alleged is not against persons or property but against liberty,
he argues that it is not covered by the said provision.

Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly
applies to him, thus:

Art. 4. Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful

act done be different from that which he intended.

xxx xxx xxx

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious
illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an
impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment
or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom
note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already
been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of
the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death
under the last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been
possible under the new Constitution.

On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it, whether they act through physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or
collectively. 17

It is settled that conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interests. 18 In the instant case, the trial court correctly
held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the
writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These
acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the
common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom of P1 million in exchange for
Enrico's life.

The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan
approached him six days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at
least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not
believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really
wanted to help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and
demand P1 million for his release.

The constitutional issues raised by Domasian do not affect the decision in this case.
His claim that he was arrested without warrant and then tortured and
held incommunicado to extort a confession from him does not vitiate his conviction.
He never gave any confession. As for the allegation that the seizure of the
documents used for comparison with the ransom note was made without a search
warrant, it suffices to say that such documents were taken by Agra himself and not
by the NBI agents or other police authorities. We held in the case of People vs.
Andre Marti, 20 that the Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private
individuals, being directed only against the government and its law-enforcement
agencies and limitation on official action.

We are satisfied that Tan and Domasian, in conspiracy with each other, committed
the crime of kidnapping as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code and so deserve the penalty imposed upon them by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the accused-
appellants.

Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Commission on Human Rights for
investigation of the alleged violation of the constitutional rights of Pablito
Domasian.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 154130. October 1, 2003.]

BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July
5, 2001, 1 as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.

On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following Information
against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his men for
Arbitrary Detention:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent
thereto, at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer,
being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with
unidentified persons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES,
who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz,
Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the
Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave the place, without any legal
and valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty
for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 2

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban
City sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence
gathering and forest protection operations in line with the government’s campaign
against illegal logging. The team was composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz,
Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker
Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law
Enforcement Section, as team leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B.
Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian. 3chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where
they saw two yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting with the local
barangay officials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael
Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the time, the team left Brgy.
Bagacay. 4

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats
being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between
4:30–5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and
Militante disembarked from the DENR’s service pump boat and proceeded to the
site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with
the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at the
request of Mayor Astorga. 5

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian,
approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their mission, Simon
was suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who
exclaimed, "puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka
maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede
kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make you swim back to Tacloban. Don’t
you know that I can box? I can box. Don’t you know that I can declare this a
misencounter?) 6 Mayor Astorga then ordered someone to fetch "reinforcements,"
and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between 5:00–6:00 p.m., a banca arrived
bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were
armed with M-16 and M-14 rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns
pointed at the team members. 7 At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the
purpose of his team’s mission. 8 He then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying
that he was going to contact his people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform them
of the team’s whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simon’s
radio, saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisiga kon
hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin Wig." (It’s better if you have no radio so
that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for
help). 9 Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong
siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samara kay diri kamo puwede ha
akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not
tolerate it here.) 10 Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go
home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that they would not be allowed to go home
and that they would instead be brought to Daram. 11 Mayor Astorga then
addressed the team, saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko.
Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko
liwat ipadakop an akon." (If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with
the big-time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will
surrender mine.) 12 Simon then tried to reiterate his request for permission to
leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said, "Diri kamo
maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya."
(You cannot go home now because I will bring you to Daram. We will have many
things to discuss there.) 13

The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served
dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table,
and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m. 14 After dinner, Militante, Maniscan
and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave the
barangay. 15 On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until
2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to leave. 16

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor

Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the above-quoted Information.

Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not
guilty to the offenses charged. 17 At the trial, the prosecution presented the
testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint Affidavit. 18
However, the presentation of Simon’s testimony was not completed, and none of
his fellow team members came forward to testify. Instead, the members of the
team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 19

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused

BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional as
maximum.

SO ORDERED. 20

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 2001 21 which was
denied by the Sandiganbayan in a Resolution dated September 28, 2001. 22 A
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated October 24, 2001 23 was also filed, and
this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002. 24

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for
review:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary
Detention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code,
based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding
the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses wherein
the latter categorically declared petitioner’s innocence of the crime
charged.25cralaw:red

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, 26 especially in light of the fact that the
private complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 27 Petitioner asserts
that nowhere in the records of the case is there any competent evidence that could
sufficiently establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons of the
team members. 28 Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of armed men
at the scene does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact
instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that they would feel
compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. 29

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without

legal grounds, detains a person. 30 The elements of the crime are:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds. 31

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor
of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention,
that the offender is a public officer or employee, is undeniably present.

Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts
were spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted that his acts
were motivated by his "instinct for self-preservation" and the feeling that he was
being "singled out." 32 The detention was thus without legal grounds, thereby
satisfying the third element enumerated above.

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually
detained.

In the case of People v. Acosta, 33 which involved the illegal detention of a child,
we found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of
evidence to show that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim.
However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to
leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned, he was practically a
captive in the sense that he could not leave because of his fear to violate such
instruction. 34

In the case of People v. Cortez, 35 we held that, in establishing the intent to

deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be kept
within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue,
the offended party in said case was found outside talking to the owner of the house
where she had been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave the
premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to kill her
should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers
knew where she resided and they had earlier announced that their intention in
looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has
been known to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an
individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of
actual force or violence. 36

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the

curtailment of the victim’s liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the
victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in
the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim
is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes
of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his
will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas,
the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner to go home. 37
This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen
"reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the
team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. 38 Given such
circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it was not
"safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders. 39 It was not just the presence of the
armed men, but also the evident effect these gunmen had on the actions of the
team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team
members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The
intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will
is thus clear.

Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants,

suffice it to say that the principles governing the use of such instruments in the
adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it
was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress
the defenses of the accused, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal.
There must be other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or
desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at
the trial and accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances. 40
Indeed, the belated claims made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the
allegations that the incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that the
team acceded to Mayor Astorga’s orders "out of respect," are belied by petitioner’s
own admissions to the contrary. 41 The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private
complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in
the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of
interest of private complainants to pursue the case. This conclusion is supported by
one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and
improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive and other official of
Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and project can be effectively implemented
through the support of the local officials for the betterment of the residence living
conditions who are facing difficulties and are much dependent on government
support. 42

Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing
out that the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is
misplaced, for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private
complainants in the case. 43 He also makes much of the fact that prosecution
witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly privy to, and knowledgeable of,
what exactly transpired between herein accused and the DENR team leader Mr.
Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged confrontation,’ until they left Barangay Lucob-
Lucob in the early morning of 2 September 1997." 44

It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court’s factual findings are conclusive
and binding upon appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. 45 Nothing in
the case at bar prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1
Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither
penal law nor the rules of evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively
supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore,
Mayor Astorga’s claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to what
transpired between Simon and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian
testified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk to petitioner. 46
He heard all of Mayor Astorga’s threatening remarks. 47 He was with Simon when
they were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14
rifles. 48 In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances which led to the
Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor Astorga.

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from
leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to "while away the
time" and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused. 49 On the
contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were simply
"whiling away the time" between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their
departure early the following morning. 50 SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony,
saying that they did not use the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and
their departure early, the following morning to "enjoy the place" and that, given a
choice, they would have gone home. 51

Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge",
because the ponente of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate and
advocate when he propounded "very extensive clarificatory questions" on the
witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during
a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the
truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be assailed on the ground that
clarificatory questions were asked during the trial. 52

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that, where the detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall
be arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, which has a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and
four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to
a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month
and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in
imposing the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in his
concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by
public officials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for the
intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by

government officers form part of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect during
the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued in
effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not
repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and
sovereign Republic of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints
often heard of violations of said provisions, it is very seldom that prosecutions
under them have been instituted due to the fact that the erring individuals
happened to belong to the same government to which the prosecuting officers
belong. It is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and
that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders the
complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal detention.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton
trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible officials
should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees’ right to the indemnity to
which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental rights.
53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding
petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of
prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948

MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL,
BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto
Lazaro for respondents.

FERIA, J.:

Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having

committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of
Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against
them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition
for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained
or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts justice.

This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient
number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the
Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We
have not until now an official information as to the action taken by the office of the
city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. But
whatever night have been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we have
to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for
the information and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.

The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide

whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the
following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the
provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the
next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who
shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person
to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."

Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article,
the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of
Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the
words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or
confinement of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is,
"the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law".
(Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of
the old Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a public
officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person
upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial authority
within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial
authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered by law,
after a proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the
person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers, who are not
authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which complements said section
202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and
medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial
officer who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal
procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such
prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon
which the same is based."

Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not
been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words judicial
authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by the mere
omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be
violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination under oath or
affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this
constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty, except by warrant
of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination
of the complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person
arrested by a public officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or
judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional
detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter.
Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than
six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.

Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which,
referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides that "a
person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within
the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the
proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and by
section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his
delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed
against him. He shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence
presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or
evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses
need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing
and subscribed by him.

And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court. According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas
corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a court
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario
sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the person detained
shall be released.

The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not
be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because
they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement
of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without
warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13;
Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214).
The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary
investigation proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all
person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces
are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of
filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper
municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation
so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the
defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the
preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious
prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City
of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.

The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary

investigation in case of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and the
auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the
municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of
the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and
section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct
under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding
paragraph.

Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense
cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or the Court of
First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or
conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed
with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants,
makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the accused,
but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if
the result of the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant
of arrest or commitment of the accused.

When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or
person making the arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take
or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a
preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or
judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace
court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court
of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.

In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal
court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest without
warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter
shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding
information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so
that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the temporary detention of
the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation
forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them to do so, because the
testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such
cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either
release the person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal
has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense
charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or
evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a
longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making
or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against
him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course,
for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person
for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as
the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the
investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.

To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person arrested
without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any process
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due
investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the
person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for
days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases
expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to
file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace
courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no
authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due
investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the
accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and
detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or
other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the
responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for
the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut
ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article
125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and
the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually
detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city
fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and
their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process
issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.

[G.R. NOS. 153524-25. January 31, 2005]

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, Petitioners, v. HON. ANIANO

DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military,
P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO
B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1
JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO
PAREL, Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary
investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies
absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on their part.

Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the
public respondents herein - officers of the Office of the Ombudsman - gravely
abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private
respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the
Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.

From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be
indubitable:

1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day
before the 14 May 2001 Elections3), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by
respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition;

2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a
crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the
penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6]
years);

3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol
UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;

4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos
Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was
identified by one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;

5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election
day), petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica
Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a 'Joint-Affidavit against them was
subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers
brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
and there at about 6:00 p.m. the 'Joint-Affidavit was filed and docketed;

6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner
Soria was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite
preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to
be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Soria's
detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already
elapsed;

7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought
before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of
Temporary Release was issued thereafter;

8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner
Bista's arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon
of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against
petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At
5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N
and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur;

9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in
Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code against herein private respondents.

11. After considering the parties' respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002
dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack
of merit; andcralawlibrary

12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which
was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code

states:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities.
- The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the
public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period
of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention
and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with
his attorney or counsel.

It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was
arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their
equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper
judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the
alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours
without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the proper judicial
authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36
periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted
for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing Article
1254 as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the
periods prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to
the proper judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory
construction has it that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without any attempts at interpretation.5 Public
respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco,
Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of 7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to bolster their
position that Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation
of the periods provided in Article 125,9 hence, the arresting officers delivered
petitioners well within the allowable time.

In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner

Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court against
petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The information was filed
at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were issued by the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08
June 2001. They argued that based on law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed
by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the arresting officer must release
the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article 125.10 Public respondents
countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the
informations with the proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v.
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12 ςrνll

From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that
public respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable
cause the complaint against private respondents.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on

the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law,
or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.13 ςrνll

No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public

respondents. Their disposition of petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it
was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated
thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is
concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special
holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law
for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it
being a 'no-office day. (Medina v. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while
it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court
and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30
p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about
6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria].
Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code to speak of.14 ςrνll

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that -

.. . The arresting officer's duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper
judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is
that he was not released. From the time of petitioner's arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m.
on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for
murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8
was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official
holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look
for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to
have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the
case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and
the uncertainty of locating those officers and employees could very well compound
the fiscal's difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from
declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court
on the very first office day following arrest.

And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of 16

--

.. . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer

detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code,
the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other circumstances,
such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the
investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.

As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has
already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in
ruling thus:ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for
Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-
hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the
time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing
warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at
about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release.
Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal
case requiring his continuous detention.

The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes 'G and 'I',
Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only on
June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes 'J
and 'K', Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person
to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in the
negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of
justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above.
The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the
complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the
judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).17 ςrνll

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military,18 wherein we ordained that -

.. . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the
intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person
is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the
court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of
the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release
upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly
served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position of
the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the
period prescribed in said Article.

All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice
but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsman's determination that the facts on hand
do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.

As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and

prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy
is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We are mindful
that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a
wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside
pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of
the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not
be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman,
using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall
respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the
same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the
latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the
Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-01-1472. June 26, 2003

ADRIANO V. ALBIOR, complainant, v. DONATO A. AUGUIS, Clerk of Court

II, 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Talibon-Getafe,
Bohol, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Respondent Donato Auguis, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Branch 4, Talibon-Getafe1, Talibon, Bohol, is charged by Adriano Albior, of
usurpation of judicial function and negligence in the performance of official duties.
According to complainant, respondent usurped judicial functions when he issued the
order for the detention of one Edilberto Albior, the son of complainant. Further,
complainant alleged that respondent committed negligence when he failed to inform
Acting Presiding Judge Avelino N. Puracan of that court regarding the filing of cases
that necessitated issuance of the detention order.

The antecedent facts of this administrative matter are as follows:

On January 25, 1999, two complaints for rape2 were filed against Edilberto Albior
before the MCTC, Branch 4 in Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol. As clerk of court of
the said court, respondent Auguis received and filed the complaints which were
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9144 and 9145. The following day, respondent
issued a detention order3 to the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) in
San Jose, Talibon, Bohol, for the commitment of the accused Edilberto Albior. On
January 27, 1999, the BJMP duly issued a receipt of detainee4 for the person of the
accused.

According to complainant, said order was issued without a prior preliminary

investigation and without a warrant of arrest. Neither was there any record in the
Police Blotter of the accuseds apprehension, or of his surrender. Nor was there
proof that he signed a waiver for his detention. Whats more, the respondent failed
to inform Acting Municipal Judge Avelino Puracan regarding the filing of the
complaints for rape before his sala.5cräläwvirtualibräry

On February 23, 1999, counsel for the accused then filed an urgent motion to
release the accused.6 Two days later, respondent issued a subpoena, directing the
accused to submit counter-affidavits for the preliminary investigation of the charges
of rape. But no further action was taken by the court. Accused through counsel filed
a second motion7 on March 1, 1999. Again, the motion was not acted upon.

Having no other recourse to regain his liberty, the accused filed a petition
for habeas corpus on March 15, 1999, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
Branch 52. During the habeas corpus proceedings,8 the respondent testified that
this was not the first time he issued a detention order without a warrant of arrest.
He testified that he has done this action many times already9 in the past, upon the
request of the Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police in Talibon. He
reasoned out that it was in the best interest of the detainees to be transferred from
the PNP jail to the BJMP because the former did not have meal provisions for
detainees.

After due hearing, the RTC Judge Zeta V. Villamayor issued an order10 on
March 25, 1999, finding that the accused was being illegally restrained of his liberty
and ordering his immediate release from confinement. On the same day, the MCTC
conducted a preliminary examination of the prosecutions witnesses and issued an
Omnibus Order11 confirming the arrest of the accused.

On April 12, 1999, counsel for the accused filed a motion for reinvestigation12 with
the Department of Justice, assailing the validity of the Omnibus Order. He
maintained that no warrant of arrest was ever issued against his client and as such,
no confirmation of such arrest may be undertaken.

On June 2, 1999, the father of the accused, herein complainant Adriano Albior, filed
a letter-complaint13 with the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. Complainant
charged respondent of usurpation of judicial functions and negligence in the
performance of duties, in connection with the detention of his son, Edilberto Albior.

In a resolution dated June 3, 1999,14 the Deputy Ombudsman referred the letter-
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action. On
May 8, 2000, the Ombudsman issued a resolution15 dismissing the criminal
complaint for usurpation of judicial function as defined under Article 241 of the
Revised Penal Code.16 However, he recommended the filing of an information with
the proper court for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.17cräläwvirtualibräry

Acting on the letter-complaint, the OCA required respondent to file a comment to

the complaint. Respondent filed his counter-affidavit.18 Respondent claims that he
issued the detention order only after the PNP Chief and PNP Trial Officer of Talibon
repeatedly requested him to do so. The respondent asserts that it was out of honest
conviction that he was only helping the accused and his relatives. He was merely
sparing them the trouble of having to bring meals to the accused, as the municipal
jail where the latter was detained did not serve food to its prisoners.

Respondent also appended the affidavit19 of Police Senior Inspector Lecarion P.

Torrefiel, the PNP Chief of Police of Talibon. In it the Police Chief stated that he
personally requested the respondent to immediately issue a detention order in
order to transfer the accused to the BJMP jail, where he is ensured of three square
meals a day. The Chief explained that the municipality did not have a budget for
meals of detainees at the PNP jail, hence, it is alleged that respondents action was
intended purely for humanitarian reasons. Nothing is said, however, why the local
government unit allows this inhumane practice. The Chief of Police himself appears
blissfully ignorant of the human rights aspects of the matter for which his command
could be held accountable.

On January 29, 2001, the OCA issued its report.20 It found respondents defense
unconvincing and held him administratively liable for issuing the said detention
order prior to a preliminary investigation conducted by a judge and before a
warrant of arrest was issued against the accused. It recommended that the case be
re-docketed as an administrative matter and that a fine in the amount of P3,000.00
be imposed upon respondent with a warning that the commission of the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

We then required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the pleadings filed.21 The respondent subsequently
manifested his conformity.22cräläwvirtualibräry

The main issue for our resolution is whether the respondent should be held
administratively liable for the issuance of a detention order resulting in the actual
detention of the accused under the abovementioned circumstances.

The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not empowered to issue
the questioned detention order. The duties of a clerk of court in the absence of the
judge are defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In the
absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in receiving
applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all orders and
notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and may also, when
directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of executors, administrators,
guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence relating to them, or to the
settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to guardianships, trusteeships, or
receiverships, and forthwith transmit such reports, accounts, and evidence to the
judge, together with his findings in relation to the same, if the judge shall direct
him to make findings and include the same in his report.

Indeed nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an order of
detention, as such function is purely judicial. In fact, we already had occasion to
rule that a clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has no power to order the
commitment of a person charged with a penal offense.23cräläwvirtualibräry

The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas aptly pointed out that where a judge is not
available, the arresting officer is duty-bound to release a detained person, if the
maximum hours for detention provided under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
had already expired. Failure to cause the release may result in an offense under the
Code, to wit:

ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding articles shall be imposed
upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light
penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent.

Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the accused and
his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware that by issuing such
detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human right of the accused.
Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent, the accused Edilberto
Albior was deprived of liberty without due process of law for a total of 56 days,
counted from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999 until the issuance of the
appropriate order of commitment by the municipal judge on March 25, 1999.

Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation committed by
the respondent. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution mandates:

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Underscoring
ours)

Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected with an
office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk
of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of responsibility.24 Their
conduct at all times must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
above all else must be in accordance with the Constitution and the law. A clerk of
court, such as herein respondent, is a ranking and essential officer in the judicial
system. His office is the hub of activities. He performs delicate administrative
functions essential to the prompt and proper administration of
justice.25cräläwvirtualibräry

Respondent needs no reminder that as an important officer in the dispensation of

justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold the fundamental law of the land. His
defense that he is not a lawyer or law graduate and so is excusably ignorant of the
legal implications of his detention order, deserves scant consideration. Ignorance of
the law excuses no one from compliance therewith, especially a clerk of court who
ought to know better than an ordinary layman.

This Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act which tends to
undermine the faith and trust of the people in the judiciary.26 The Court cannot
countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norms of public accountability and
diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the
judiciary.27cräläwvirtualibräry

The respondents issuance of the detention order not only deprived the accused of
liberty, it also considerably diminished the peoples faith in the judiciary. For the
very officer of the court on whom they depended to safeguard their human and
constitutional rights was also the one who violated these rights. Respondent should
be mindful of his ineluctable duty, as a ranking officer in the judicial system, to
ensure that basic rights are protected.

In conclusion, we agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is liable as
charged administratively. But we disagree with its recommendation that respondent
be merely meted out the penalty of a fine. We cannot treat lightly the actions of the
respondent for he has admitted doing them repeatedly, in fact many times in the
past. The implication of his action as an official of the court is not only disturbing
but shocking, for it involves no less than a violation of the constitutional right to
liberty. We hold that respondents unauthorized issuance of the detention order and
his failure to inform the Presiding Judge about said order constitute not merely
gross neglect of duty but outright grave misconduct.

Misconduct is a violation of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly unlawful behaviour as well as gross negligence by the public officer. To
warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be serious, important,
weighty, momentous and not trifling. It must also have direct relation to, and
connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties of
the office.28 Because of the order for the arrest of the accused and resultant
confinement in police custody, the respondent unduly usurped the judicial
prerogative of the judge, and such usurpation is equivalent to grave
misconduct.29cräläwvirtualibräry

In a previous case, we found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct for issuing
a Release Order without the knowledge and signature of the Presiding Judge
concerned.30 In another, we ruled that the respondent was guilty of grave
misconduct warranting dismissal from the service when he issued a warrant of
arrest without any order coming from the court that caused the accused to be
illegally confined for three (3) days.31 In both cases we held that though the
respondents might have been moved by compassion and might have acted in good
faith, the respondents actuations could not be condoned, for the committed acts
constituted a serious infringement of, and encroachment upon, judicial authority.

In our view, the present case cannot be treated with leniency, especially in light of
the fact that respondent herein admitted he issued detention orders countless times
in the past. In accordance with precedents and Civil Service Commission
Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999,32 the appropriate penalty to be
imposed on respondent is dismissal from the service.

WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, MCTC, Branch 4 at

Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol, is hereby found administratively liable for issuing
the assailed detention order without lawful authority, as well as failing to inform the
Presiding Judge of that court regarding such order, thus committing GRAVE
MISCONDUCT in the discharge of official functions. He is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits and privileges, except earned leave
credits if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government including
government owned and controlled corporations.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-27331 : July 30, 1981.]

ELISEO ALIMPOOS, CIRIACA ALIMPOOS, SGT. MILLARDO M. PATES, PEDRO
BACLAY, CATALINO YAMILO, RAFAEL CAPANGPANGAN, DALMACIO YGOT
and EUFROCINA ESTORES, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE MONTANO A. ORTIZ, REYNALDO MOSQUITO
and MATILDE ABASTILLAS MOSQUITO, Respondents.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Petitioner-spouses, Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos, shall hereinafter be called

the Offended Parties. Petitioners Pedro Baclay, Catalino Yamilo, Rafael
Capangpangan, Dalmacio Ygot, Eufrocina Estores and Sgt. Millardo M. Pates may
hereinafter be referred to as the Witnesses.
Respondent Reynaldo Mosquito will hereinafter be called the Accused. Respondent
Matilde A. Mosquito is the Accused’s wife. Respondent Court of Appeals will be
termed the Appellate Tribunal; respondent Judge Montano A. Ortiz, as respondent
Trial Judge, and the Municipal Judge, as such.
In this Petition for Certiorari, the Offended Parties and the Witnesses seek the
reversal of the Decision of the Appellate Tribunal, upholding the disallowance of the
Offended Parties’ appeal by the Court of First Instance of Agusan cranad(the Trial
Court, for short) in Civil Case No. 1088, entitled “Reynaldo Mosquito, et al. vs.
Eliseo Alimpoos, et al,” wherein respondent Trial Judge granted the Accused’s
petition for Habeas Corpus and declared his detention illegal. He also enjoined the
prosecution of Criminal Case No. 458 of the Municipal Court of Bayugan,
Agusan cranad(hereinafter called Criminal Case) where the Accused had been
arrested.
The Accused was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan, by virtue of a
Warrant of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal Case, which was a
prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. The place allegedly
robbed belonged to the Offended Parties. Contending that the Warrant was issued
without the observance of the legal requirements for the issuance thereof, the
Accused, then detained, and his wife instituted the Habeas Corpus case before the
Trial Court. Named as defendants in the original complaint were the Offended
parties and the Witnesses cranad(as witnesses for the prosecution) all of whom are
residents of Agusan. In an amended complaint, the two arresting policemen, the
Chief of Police, and the Municipal Judge were added as co-defendants.
The Complaint of the Accused was premised on the alleged violation of Article
32 cranad(4), cranad(8), cranad(15), cranad(16), cranad(17) and cranad(19) of
the Civil Code, and Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code, by defendants therein
who were said to have been instrumental in causing the detention and arrest of the
Accused. It prayed for the Accused’s release from detention, as well as for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Offended Parties and the
Witnesses, and the Municipal Judge and/or their representatives, from proceeding
with the Criminal Case. Actual, moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and
costs were also prayed for.
The Offended Parties and the Witnesses, except Sgt. Pates, were represented by
the law firm of Seno, Mendoza and Associates, with offices located in Cebu City.
They contended that they had nothing to do with the Accused’s detention and
arrest. The Municipal Judge, the Chief of Police, and Patrolmen Libres and Galimba,
who were represented by the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Butuan City, alleged that
the Warrant of Arrest was validly issued. Sgt. Pates was represented by Capt.
Igualdad Cunanan, and reiterated substantially the same defense.
After due hearing in the Habeas Corpus case, respondent Trial Judge issued the
appealed Order cranad(the ORDER, for short), dated March 26, 1966, declaring the
detention of the Accused illegal and granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as
the Preliminary Injunction prayed for upon the filing of the required bond. The
dispositive portion of the ORDER reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring illegal the detention of
plaintiff Reynaldo Mosquito by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued without the
observance of the fundamental legal requirements prior to the issuance of
said Writ. The petition for habeas corpus is therefore granted and it is hereby
ordered that said detention prisoner be forthwith released from custody, and
set at liberty and that upon the filing of the bond in the amount of P1,000.00
a writ of preliminary injunction issue restraining the Municipal Judge of
Bayugan, Agusan, defendant Vicente Galicia and the rest of the defendants,
their attorneys, agents or representatives from proceeding with Criminal
Case No. 458 entitled ‘The People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo
Mosquito et als.’, for the crime of Robbery with Less Serious Physical
Injuries, with costs against the defendants in these habeas corpus and
preliminary injunction proceedings.
SO ORDERED.” 1
The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Agusan received copy of said ORDER on March 31,
1966, and on April 1, 1966, moved for extension of time within which to appeal, but
eventually desisted from doing so.
On April 4, 1966, counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses mailed from
Cebu City a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals stating that:
“Undersigned counsel received a copy of the order only today cranad(April 4,
1966) which copy was handed to him by defendant cranad(petitioner) Eliseo
Alimpoos.”
The appeal was opposed by the Accused on the ground that it was filed beyond the
48-hour reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in Habeas Corpus
proceedings.
On April 23, 1966, over the Offended Parties’ objections, respondent Trial Judge
dismissed their appeal thus:
“The notice of appeal of the Provincial Fiscal or of Atty. Seno for the
defendants, having been filed out of time the Order of March 26, 1966
granting the habeas corpus is now final and executory. The urgent ex-parte
motion to grant extension to file notice of appeal does not interrupt the
running of the period fixed by law for filing an appeal which is forty-eight
hours from receipt of the order.” 2
No reconsideration was prayed for by the Provincial Fiscal.
The Offended Parties, however, resorted to a Mandamus proceeding before the
Court of Appeals seeking to compel respondent Trial Judge to give due course to
said appeal.
On January 11, 1967, the Appellate Tribunal, 3 in CA-G.R. No. 37781-R, denied
Mandamus stating in part:
“As the records show that copy of the questioned Order was received by
counsel on March 30, 1966, the notice of appeal was not filed within the 48-
hour limit. Petitioners’ appeal was therefore filed out of time and the
judgment has become final.
“In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby denied. Costs against
petitioners.”
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, filed on March 13, 1967, praying that the
Decision of the Appellate Tribunal be set aside and the appeal interposed by the
Offended Parties in the Habeas Corpus case be allowed.
We gave due course to the Petition on March 31, 1967, and after the filing of the
respective Briefs, the case was considered submitted for decision on April 19, 1968.
The Offended Parties and the Witnesses pose the following Assignments of Error:
“I
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘counsel,’ however, has
not presented a shred of proof to bolster his claim of actual receipt of the
order, Annex ‘B’ on April 4, 1966, save of his own self-serving assertions,
which cannot prevail over the court record, cranad(Annex 1 of Answer)
certified to by the Clerk of Court, bearing the true actual date when the
parties and counsel herein received their corresponding copies. The same
certified true copy of the order shows that the law office of herein counsel
received its copy on March 30, 1966 not on April 4, 1966;
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that ‘respondent Judge was
fully justified in relying on its own record to determine the date on which
petitioners’ counsel received copy of the order, without any proof thereof,
 because courts will take judicial notice of its records and of the facts which
the same records establish and which are known to judges by reason of their
judicial functions.’
III
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘as the records show
that copy of the questioned order was received by counsel on March 30,
1966, the notice of appeal was not filed within the 48-hour limit.’
IV
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘petitioners’ appeal was,
therefore, filed out of time and the judgment has become final.’
V
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration without requiring the adverse party to answer the said
Motion for Reconsideration.
VI
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in failing to pass upon the issues raised
in the lower court and in the Court of Appeals.”
The technical issue of timeliness of the appeal will first be considered. Counsel for
the Offended Parties alleges that he received a copy of the ORDER only on April 4,
1966 from the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, who handed him the copy in Cebu
City. The latter had received it on March 31, 1966. Counsel contends that the
reglementary period to appeal can not be reckoned from the latter date because,
under the Rules, when a party is represented by counsel, notice should be sent, not
to the party, but to his counsel of record. Counsel for the Offended Parties and the
Witnesses further maintains that the period from which to reckon the period of
appeal should actually be April 14, 1966 when he actually received, through the
mails, his copy of the ORDER, as shown by the rubber stamp of his office appearing
on the upper right hand corner of a duplicate copy of the ORDER. 4
Respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal alike found the foregoing
assertion self-serving and relied instead on the last page of the ORDER, 5
purportedly showing that the law office of counsel for the Offended Parties and the
Witnesses received its copy on March 30, 1966 and not on April 4, 1966, hence the
disallowance of the appeal by respondent Trial Judge, and its affirmance by the
Appellate Court.
The crucial last page is reproduced hereunder exactly as it appears:
“CIVIL CASE NO. 1088
ORDER
—5—
and preliminary injunction proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Done this 26th day of March, 1966 at the City of Butuan.
(SGD.) MONTANO A. ORTIZ
JUDGE
 MAO-bb.
Recd.
31/3/66 cranad(initial)
Received:
(Sgd.) Illegible Mun. Judge cranad(Sgd.) Illegible 3/30/66 7:00 evening
3/31/66 cranad(Sgd.) B. Galimba 3/30/00 7:00
cranad(Sgd.) Eliseo Alimpoos
Received copy March 31, 1966 8:00 A.M.
Ciriaco Alimpoos
Pedro Baklay
Catalino Yamilo
Rafael Capangpangan
Dalmacio Ygot
Eufrocina Estores

By: cranad(Sgd.) Eliseo Alimpoos

March 31, 1966
(Sgd.) Illegible
cranad(Sgd.) Illegible
For the Chief of Police 3-30-66
TO ATTYS. SENO, MENDOZA,
RUIZ & ASS. & CAPT. CUNANAN
BY REG. MAIL #11633 & #11634
A certified true copy:
(s) MACARIO C. CONDE
(t) MACARIO C. CONDE
Clerk of Court” 6 cranad(emphasis supplied)
Obviously, copies of the ORDER intended for “Attys. Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz & Ass. &
Capt. Cunanan” were sent by registered mail with Receipts Nos. 11633 and 11634.
Receipt No. 11633 is the registry number corresponding to the copy for the law
office, and Receipt No. 11634 that for Capt. Cunanan. This is borne out by the
envelope 7 from the “Office of the Clerk of Court Butuan City” addressed to “Seno,
Mendoza, Ruiz and Associates, Cor. Magallanes-D Jakosalem Sts., Aboitiz Bldg.,
Cebu City” with the following markings:
On the face of the envelope lower left hand corner:
“REGISTERED
CITY OF BUTUAN
PHILIPPINES
March 31, 1966
Superimposed on it in ink is “No. 11633”
On the back of the envelope appears a big diagonal stamp “FOR OFFICIAL
USE ONLY” and two post office stamp marks:
“REGISTERED
CITY OF BUTUAN
PHILIPPINES
March 31, 1966
“CEBU CITY
 Received
April 11, 1966
Philippines
Since the registered mail was received in Cebu City only on April 11, 1966, it is not
unlikely that the law office and addressee, as alleged by it, received the mail only
three days after, or on April 14, 1966.
The notation
“(Sgd.) Illegible
3-30-66”
appearing above the following note:
“To Attys. Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz & Ass. &
Capt. Cunanan by reg. mail #11633 & #11634”
can not refer to personal receipt by the said law office for the obvious reason that
its office being at Cebu City, personal service would not have been possible in
Agusan.
It is apparent then that both respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal
committed error in holding that the Offended Parties’ appeal was interposed beyond
the reglementary period. Service on the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, on March
31, 1966 cannot be deemed as notice in law to his counsel. 8 Under the
circumstances, therefore, reliance may be placed on the assertion of counsel that
the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, had given him a copy of the ORDER only on
April 4, 1966, which must be deemed as the date of notice to said counsel of the
ORDER. Counsel lost no time in mailing his Notice of Appeal on the same day, April
4, 1966 from Cebu. 9 Procedurally, the appeal was seasonably filed.
Although the Appellate Tribunal had committed error in its appreciation of the date
when the lawyers of the Offended Parties were served notice of the ORDER, we
believe it would not be justifiable to reverse and to direct respondent Trial Judge to
allow the Offended Parties to appeal. Instead, we are opting to render a practical
judgment.
1. The original and amended complaints filed by the Offended Parties with the Trial
Court contained three causes of action, principally for Habeas Corpus and for
damages. However, the proceedings were conducted purely as a Habeas Corpus
case. The original complaint was filed on February 22, 1966, and resolved on March
26, 1966, in keeping with the “speedy and effectual” character of Habeas Corpus
proceedings. 10
The ORDER treated the case as exclusively a Habeas Corpus proceeding, ignoring
the Accused’s prayer for damages. The lawyers of the Offended Parties attempted
to appeal from the ORDER in accordance with Section 19 of Rule 41, captioned
“who may appeal in Habeas Corpus cases.” The Appellate Tribunal resolved in the
mandamus case as relating to a Habeas Corpus case.
2. Because the proceedings before the trial Court was a Habeas Corpus case, the
complaint filed was obviously defective. A Habeas Corpus proceeding is not a suit
between parties.
“Not a suit between the parties. — While the issuance of the writ is to all intents
and purposes the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet technically the
proceedings by Habeas Corpus is in no sense a suit between private parties. It is an
inquisition by the government, at the suggestion and instance of an individual,
most probably, but still in the name and capacity of the sovereign. It may be
analogized to a proceeding in rem and instituted for the sole purpose of fixing the
status of a person. The person restrained is the central figure in the transaction.
The proceeding is instituted solely for his benefit. As it is not designed to obtain
redress against anybody, and as no judgment can be entered against anybody, and
as there is no real plaintiff and defendant, there can be no suit in the technical
sense.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Forrest G. Ferris
& Forrest G. Ferris, Jr., p. 28)
The Accused, therefore, should have limited his complaint against the Chief of
Police of Bayugan, the person having him in alleged illegal custody. That is the clear
implication in the following provisions of Section 3, Rule 102, which enumerates
what should be set forth in a petition for Habeas Corpus:
“SEC. 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application for the writ shall be
by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is
intended, or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned
or restrained of his liberty;
(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or
restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person
may be described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is
served with the writ shall be deemed the person intended;
(c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
(d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it
can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if
the imprisonment or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact
shall appear.”
The Accused’s allegation as to, and prayer for, damages was out of place. In
Habeas Corpus cases, the judgment in favor of the applicant cannot contain a
provision for damages. It has to be confined to what is provided for in Section 15,
Rule 102, which reads:
“SEC. 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. — When the court or Judge
has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is
satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith
order his discharge from confinement, but such discharge shall not be
effective until a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person
detaining the prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does
not desire to appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.”
It will be observed that there is no provision for serving copy of the discharge on
any other private party defendant, nor for an award of damages.
As it has been held:
“The sole function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and
ordinarily it cannot properly be used for any other purpose. Thus it has been
held that the writ cannot properly be used: To enforce a right to service; to
determine whether a person has committed a crime; in determine a disputed
interstate boundary line; to punish respondent or to afford the injured person
redress, for the illegal detention; to recover damages or other money award;
. cra .” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(emphasis supplied) cranad(Vt — In re St.
Onge, 108 A203, 93 Vt. 373; NY — People vs. Prior, 182 NYS 577, 112 Misc.
208 [39 C.J.S. 430]).
3. The Accused has challenged the personality of the Offended Parties to interpose
the appeal, premised on Section 19 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:
SEC 19. Who may appeal in habeas corpus cases. — The appeal in habeas
corpus cases may be taken in the name of the person detained or of the
officer or person detaining him. But if the detention is by reason of civil
proceedings the party in interest or the person who caused the detention
shall be entitled to control the appeal; and if, by virtue of criminal
proceedings, the provincial fiscal or the city fiscal as the case may be, is
entitled to control the appeal on behalf of the government, subject to the
right of the Solicitor General to intervene” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Rule
41).
It is indisputable that the Habeas Corpus case arose by virtue of criminal
proceedings in the Criminal case. Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore,
it was the Provincial Fiscal who was entitled to control the appeal on behalf of the
Government. In this case, although the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan, filed a “Motion
for Extension of Time to Perfect Appeal” on April 1, 1966, he had nevertheless
abandoned the same. Neither did he take steps for the reconsideration of
respondent Trial Judge’s Order of April 23, 1966 dismissing the appeal. The inaction
of the Fiscal may be deemed to have been an admission on his part of the
unmeritoriousness of an appeal. As in criminal proceedings, his sound discretion on
the matter should be deemed controlling, and it has to be held that the Offended
Parties were bereft of personality to prosecute the appeal.
Noteworthy is the fact that in the instant case, the Offended Parties had alleged in
their Answer 11 that they were not detaining the Accused and had nothing to do
with the Warrant of Arrest issued against him. With all the more reason then that
they had no personality to interpose an appeal from a judicial Order granting the
Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the release of a person detained.
4. It has been noted that the ORDER contains a provision enjoining the prosecution
of the Accused in the Criminal Case. That is error. If the Accused was illegally
detained because he was arrested without a preliminary examination, what should
have been done was to set aside the warrant of arrest and order the discharge of
the Accused, but without enjoining the Municipal Judge from conducting a
preliminary examination and afterwards properly issuing a warrant of arrest.
Habeas Corpus proceedings are not meant to determine criminal responsibility. This
principle was enunciated in Lee Ching v. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil.
329 cranad(1916) where it was said:
“Proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from the main case
from which the proceedings spring. They rarely, if ever, touch the merits of
the case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto.”
When a preliminary investigation is not held, or is improperly held, the procedure is
not to dismiss the case, or enjoin its prosecution, but to have the preliminary
investigation conducted. As stated in People v. Figueroa, 27 SCRA, 1239,
1247 cranad(1969):
“Assuming that the trial court felt that the accused should have been given
more ‘ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
investigation,’ then what it could properly have done, since in its own Order
it recognized that Fiscal Abaca had conducted a preliminary investigation
although ‘hurriedly’ in its opinion, was not to dismiss the information but to
hold the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the
fiscal to hold a reinvestigation. This Court, speaking through now Mr. Chief
Justice Concepcion in People vs. Casiano, had stressed this as the proper
procedure, pointing out that ‘the absence of such investigation did not impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did
it affect the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the present case.’“
5. As a matter of fact, Habeas Corpus was not the proper remedy for the Accused.
In a case where a warrant of arrest was assailed for an alleged improper
preliminary examination, this Court, in Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA, 310,
323 cranad(1968), said:
“At any rate, we believe that, if at all, the remedy available to the petitioner
herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a
petition for reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or
by the Provincial Fiscal.”
It is the general rule that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there is
another remedy available.
“As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief
may be had or could have been procured by resort to another general
remedy, such as appeal or writ of error. But the existence of another remedy
does not necessarily preclude a resort to the writ of habeas corpus to obtain
relief from illegal detention, especially where the other remedy is deemed not
to be as effective as that of habeas corpus.” 12
Time and again, it has been explained that Habeas Corpus cannot function as a writ
of error. 13
6. It has further been noted that respondent Trial Judge erred in adjudging “costs”
against defendants in the Habeas Corpus case. “When a person confined under
color of proceedings in a criminal case is discharged, the costs shall be taxed
against the Republic” 14
7. The Accused was charged with Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries in
early 1966. Through the error of the Municipal Judge in issuing the warrant of
arrest without conducting a preliminary examination, the Accused was able to
institute the Habeas Corpus case which has pended to this date, or for fifteen years.
The error of the Municipal Judge has considerably retarded the turning of the
wheels of justice. It should be meet to reiterate the following admonition made in
the aforecited Luna-Plaza case:
“We wish to stress, however, that what has been stated in this opinion is
certainly not intended to sanction the return to the former practice of
municipal judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that
are made to accompany the complaints that are filed before them, in
determining whether there is a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest. That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by the
amendment of Section 87 cranad(c) of Republic Act 296 cranad(Judiciary Act
of 1948) which requires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of
arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by
examining the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under
oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers.
It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment is to prevent the issuance
of a warrant of arrest against a person based simply upon affidavits of
witnesses who made, and swore to, their statements before a person or
persons other than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. We
wish to emphasize strict compliance by municipal or city judges of the
provision of Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by
Republic Act 3828, in order to avoid malicious and/or unfounded criminal
prosecution of persons.”
In view of the foregoing considerations, it should be practical to resolve this case in
a manner that will not further protract the matter brought to this instance. It will
not do merely to reverse and set aside the appealed decision of the Appellate
Tribunal, for it will leave the ORDER of respondent Trial Judge outstanding with its
injunction against the further prosecution of the Criminal Case.
WHEREFORE, in the distinct understanding that this Court has not acted in a proper
Habeas Corpus proceeding, the Warrant of Arrest issued against Reynaldo Mosquito
in Criminal Case No. 458 of the Municipal Court of Bayugan, Agusan, the Order of
March 26, 1966 issued in Civil Case No. 1088 of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan, as well as the Decision of the Court of Appeals in its case CA-G.R. No.
37781-R, are hereby set aside; and the proceedings in the last two cases
mentioned are invalidated.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

July 25, 2017

G.R. No. 232413

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS WITH PETITION FOR RELIEF INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES PANGASINAN LEGAL AID and JAY-AR R. SENIN, Petitioners
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, BUREAU
OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE, Respondents

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for the issuance of writ of habeas corpus with a petition for
declaratory relief filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Pangasinan
Chapter Legal Aid, pursuant to its purpose, as stated in "In the Matter of the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines," issued by the Supreme Court on January
9, 1973, and the provisions under Guidelines Governing the Establishment and
Operation of Legal Aid Offices in All Chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (Guidelines on Legal Aid).

The petition claims that as a result of jail visitations participated in by the IBP Legal
Aid Program, as well as a series of consultations with the Philippine National
Police (PNP) on the extant condition of detention prisoners, it was discovered that
several detention prisoners had been languishing in jail for years without a case
being filed in court by the prosecutor's office and without definite findings as to the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause.

DOJ Issuances

The petition considers such condition of several detention prisoners as an alarming

situation brought about by several Department of Justice (DOJ) issuances, namely:

1. DOJ Circular (D.C.) No. 12, series of 2012, which provided that the dismissal of
all drug-related cases involving violations for which the maximum penalty is
either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is subject to automatic review by the
Justice Secretary whether such case has been dismissed on inquest, preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation. It also stated that [ t ]he automatic review shall be
summary in nature and shall, as far as practicable, be completed within 30 days
from receipt of the case records, without prejudice to the right of the respondent to
be immediately released from detention pending automatic review, unless the
respondent is detained for other causes;

2. D.C. No. 22, series of 2013, entitled Guidelines on the Release of Respondents/
Accused Pending Automatic Review of Dismissed Cases Involving Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165; and
3. D.C. No. 50, series of 2012, entitled Additional Guidelines on the Application of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as Amended (RPC).1

For the IBP, it is the height of injustice when innocent persons are left to suffer in
jail for years without a fixed term. Contending that it is their duty to defend the
Constitution and protect the people against unwarranted imprisonment and
detention, the IBP is requesting the Court to act on the amendment of the Rules on
Preliminary Investigation, by way of a letter, which has been forwarded to the
Committee on Revision. Pending the desired amendment, however, the IBP urges
the Court to act on the urgent and imperative need to release from detention those
who are wrongfully imprisoned despite the absence of probable cause.

The IBP represents in this case its client, Jay-Ar Senin (Senin). Senin's rights were
allegedly violated because he has been detained for at least eight months without
any finding of probable cause or a case having been filed in court.

Senin's case started when a complaint against him and other unidentified persons
was indorsed on February 9, 2015, by Police Chief Inspector Crisante Pagaduan
Sadino of the San Fabian Police Station, Pangasinan to the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office. He was arrested while engaged in the sale of illegal drugs during a buy-bust
operation. Thereafter, he executed a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
RPC. After the preliminary investigation, the prosecutor resolved to dismiss the
case. Pursuant to the then prevailing DOJ Circular, the case was forwarded to the
DOJ for automatic review.

The IBP claims that the waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest the DOJ,
Provincial Prosecutor's Office (PPO), Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP), and the PNP, the unbridled right to detain Senin indefinitely
subject only to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ.
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that preliminary
investigation must be terminated within 15 days from its inception if the person
arrested had requested for a preliminary investigation and had signed a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125.2 It follows, therefore, that the waiver of Article 125
must coincide with the 15-day period of preliminary investigation. The detention
beyond this period violates Senin's constitutional right to liberty. The review of the
investigating prosecutor's resolution has been pending with the DOJ for more than
eight months. The IBP concludes that Senin must be released from detention and
be relieved from the effects of the unconstitutional issuances of the DOJ.

Thus, the petition prays that the Court:

a) declare that pursuant to A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, the petitioner is

exempt from the payment of filing fees;

b) issue a writ of habeas corpus directing the release of Senin;

c) declare the aforementioned issuances of the DOJ as

unconstitutional;
 d) immediately set the case for hearing due to its urgency; and

e) issue a writ of kalayaan directing the release of all detention

prisoners in a similar plight.

Department Circular No. 50

On December 18, 2015, D.C. No. 50 was issued by then Secretary of

Justice (SOJ), now Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa of this Court. In
brief, D.C. No. 50 stated that a person with a pending case for automatic review
before the DOJ shall be released immediately if the review is not resolved within a
period of 30 days, to wit:

9. All cases subject to automatic review shall be resolved by the Office of the
Secretary within thirty (30) days from the date the complete records are elevated
to this Department in order to give the concerned signatory of the review resolution
sufficient time to study the case, the reviewing prosecutor to whom the case is
assigned is mandated to submit his recommendation to the concerned signatory ten
(10) days before the thirty (30) day deadline. The docket section of this
Department is also directed to monitor compliance with the periods prescribed
herein.

If the case subject of the automatic review is not resolved within thirty (30) days,
then the respondent shall be immediately released from detention pending
automatic review, unless the respondent is detained for other causes.

D.C. No. 50 also directed all heads of prosecution offices to immediately issue
corresponding release orders in favor of respondents, whose cases are still pending
automatic review before the Office of the Secretary, beyond the 30 day period,
unless they are detained for other causes.

Department Circular No. 003

On January 13, 2016, however, D.C. No. 003 was issued revoking DC No. 50 and
reinstating D.C. No. 012, series of 2012.

Reversal of the Order of Dismissal

Meanwhile, on February 10, 2016, the Information against Senin for Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs was finally filed by Prosecutor Marcelo C. Espinosa.
Later, the RTC, Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC), issued a commitment order
directing Senin's detention during the pendency of the case against him.

On February 16, 2016, the IBP filed a manifestation with motion informing the
Court that to their surprise, Senin signed a Motion for Issuance of Order of Release;
that such motion was filed before the R TC, Branch 43, and was later on set for
hearing; that to protect the interest of Senin, the IBP filed a motion to intervene in
the said proceeding; that no case has been filed before the said trial court; that any
action the R TC would take might pre-empt the Court in resolving this case; and
that Senin remains incarcerated despite the issuance of D.C. No. 50. With all these
events, the IBP prays for the issuance of an order directing BJMP to release Senin
from detention unless detained for some other lawful causes.

An Amended Information, dated February 22, 2016, was subsequently filed before
the RTC, Branch 43.

Department Circular No. 004

On January 4, 2017, the incumbent Secretary of Justice, Vitaliano N. Aguirre II,

issued D.C. No. 004, series of 2017, the pertinent provisions of which read:

In the interest of the service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, the
dismissal of all cases whether on inquest, preliminary investigation, reinvestigation
or on appeal, filed for violation of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and involving the maximum penalty of reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be subject to automatic review by the
Secretary of Justice.

The entire records of the case shall be elevated to the Secretary of Justice, within
three (3) days from issuance of the resolution dismissing the complaint or appeal,
as applicable, and the parties involved shall be notified accordingly.

Notwithstanding the automatic review, respondent shall be immediately released

from detention unless detained for other causes.

This Department Circular shall apply to all pending cases and to those which have
been dismissed prior to the issuance hereof, if such dismissal has not yet attained
finality as of the the effectivity of this Circular.

This Department Order revokes all prior issuances inconsistent herewith and shall
take effect immediately until revoked.

For strict compliance.

Position of the IBP on the

effect of the amendments on
the DOJ issuances

The IBP concedes that the present detention of Senin had been overrun by the
issuance of D.C. No. 50, the resolution of the DOJ reversing the dismissal order of
the PPO and the eventual filing of the February 22, 2016 Amended Information. It
remains firm, however, that despite these circumstances, the dismissal of this
petition is not in order as the writ of habeas corpus for the immediate release of
Senin is but one of the three reliefs being sought from the Court. The IBP reiterates
that the constitutionality of DC No. 12, series of 2012, DC No. 22, series of 2013
and DC No. 50 is still being questioned. Likewise, it emphasizes that the issuance of
a writ of kalayaan is one of the reliefs prayed for in order to protect those similarly
situated as Senin.

The IBP pleads for the Court not to dismiss the petition outright and resolve the
issue on the constitutionality of the DOJ issuances in order to prevent the executive
department from issuing orders which tend to violate basic constitutional rights.

It appears that the IBP is unaware of the issuance of D.C. No. 004 as no
manifestation has been filed with the Court regarding the same circular.

Position of the BJMP

According to the BJMP, Senin has been confined in its facility through a valid
commitment order issued by the court and cannot be released without an order
directing the same. It asserts that it has not disregarded or violated any existing
laws or policy at the expense of Senin's rights. The BJMP cites Agbay v. Deputy
Ombudsman3 and its 2007 Revised BJMP Manual,4 wherein it is provided that court
order is required before a prisoner can be released. It insists that the continuous
detention of Senin is legal considering that the RTC has already issued a
commitment order, which has not been recalled or revoked.

The BJMP avers that D.C. No. 50 does not vest it unbridled discretion to release
prisoners because a court order is always required. It opines that the filing of an
Information against Senin for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs mooted the
question on the legality of the latter's detention.

Position of the OSG

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that the remedy of habeas
corpus availed of by the IBP and Senin is not appropriate considering that as of
February 10, 2016, the SOJ has found the existence of probable cause for the filing
of information in court. For said reason, the OSG deems it unnecessary for the
Court to determine the constitutionality of the DOJ issuances as the question on the
legality of Senin's detention has already been put to rest. In other words, the OSG
points out that the constitutional question is not the very lis mota of the case, thus,
precluding this Court from exercising its power of judicial review.

Reply of the IBP

The IBP seeks to nullify the DOJ issuances for the alleged violation of the detainee's
rights. It asserts that the DOJ issuances requiring the automatic review of
dismissed cases involving drug-related cases for which the maximum penalty is
either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, permit the indefinite confinement of
a pre-trial detainee who has waived Article 125 of the RPC in order to undergo
preliminary investigation. The IBP believes that a person who has requested the
conduct of a preliminary investigation can only be detained for a maximum period
of 15 days because the Rules require that the preliminary investigation be
terminated within such period despite waiver of Article 125. It also claims that
those persons whose cases were dismissed initially by the investigating prosecutor
should be released even if the dismissal is still subject to re-investigation or to the
SOJ's automatic review.

History of the DOJ Issuances

D. C. No. 46, dated June 26, 2003

The process of automatic review of dismissed drug cases was first instituted in 2003

Due to numerous complaints about illegal drug cases being whitewashed or

dismissed due to sloppy police work, former SOJ Simeon Datumanong issued D.C.
No. 46, empowering the DOJ to automatically review dismissed cases filed in
violation of R.A. No. 9165 and involving the maximum penalty of life imprisonment
or death.

The circular also applied to cases which had been dismissed prior to its issuance if
such dismissal had not yet attained finality as of the date of the circular.

D.C. No. 12, dated February 13, 2012

D.C. No. 46 was followed by D.C. No. 12 in which former SOJ Leila M. De Lima, for
the most part, reiterated the provisions of the first circular but added that
automatic review of dismissed drug cases shall be without prejudice to the right of
the respondent to be immediately released from detention pending automatic
review, unless respondent is detained for other causes.

D.C. No. 22, dated February 12, 2013

A year after, SOJ De Lima revised the guidelines directing the continued detention
of some respondents accused of violating R.A. No. 9165. She reasoned that cases,
where the maximum imposable penalty reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, are
presumably high-priority drug cases whose alleged perpetrators should remain in
custody.

In this circular, the only respondents who may be released, pending automatic
review of their cases by the SOJ, are those whose cases were dismissed during
inquest proceedings on the ground that the arrest was not a valid warrantless
arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, or that no
probable cause exists to charge respondents in court.

The respondents shall remain in custody, pending automatic review of the dismissal
of their cases, in the following instances as provided for under the circular:
1. When during inquest proceedings, respondent elects to avail of a regular
preliminary investigation and waives in writing the provisions of Article 125 of the
RPC;

2. When an information is filed in court after inquest proceedings and the accused
is placed in the custody of the law, but the court allows the accused to avail of a
regular preliminary investigation, which results in the dismissal of the case, the
handling prosecutor shall insist that the accused shall remain in the custody of the
law pending automatic review by the SOJ, unless the court provides otherwise, or
until the dismissal is affirmed by the SOJ and the corresponding motion to dismiss
or withdraw information is granted by the court;

3. When an information is filed in court after preliminary investigation proceedings

and the accused is placed in the custody of the law, but the court allows the
accused to avail of reinvestigation, which results in the dismissal of the case, the
accused shall remain in custody of the law pending automatic review by the SOJ,
unless the court provides otherwise, or until the dismissal is affirmed by the SOJ
and the corresponding motion to dismiss or withdraw information is granted by the
court; and

4. When the case against respondent is dismissed after due reinvestigation, if the
case was commenced as an inquest case but was converted to a regular preliminary
investigation after respondent elected the same and waived the provisions of Article
125 of the RPC.

D.C. No. 50, dated December 18, 2015

In order to address the problem of delay in the disposition of cases subject to

automatic review and the prolonged detention of drug suspects without any case
filed against them, then SOJ Caguioa issued D.C. No. 50, directing all heads of
prosecution offices to immediately issue corresponding release orders in favor of
respondents whose cases are still pending automatic review before the SOJ beyond
the 30-day period prescribed in the subject circular, unless respondents are
detained for some other causes.

D. C. No. 003, dated January 13, 2016

In view of the considerable number of petitions for habeas corpus filed against the
DOJ by accused languishing in jail for years while their cases were pending
automatic review by the DOJ, then SOJ Caguioa revoked D.C. No. 50 dated
December 18, 2015 and D.C. No. 22, dated February 12, 2013.

SOJ Caguioa then reinstated D.C. No. 12, dated February 13, 2012, mandating
immediate release of respondents pending automatic review, unless respondents
are detained for other causes.

D.C. No. 004, dated January 4, 2017

SOJ Vitaliano Aguirre, in this latest circular, reiterated the provisions of D.C. No. 3,
dated January 13, 2016, in so far as it orders the respondent/s to be immediately
released from detention, pending automatic review, unless detained for other
causes.

Petition is moot and academic

The Court agrees with the OSG that this controversy has become moot and
academic. First, the DOJ already issued D.C. No. 004, series of 2017, which
recognizes the right of a detainee to be released even if the dismissal of the case
on preliminary investigation is the subject of automatic review by the
SOJ. Second, records show that the order of dismissal was reversed; that upon
filing of the information with the court, there was judicial determination of probable
cause against Senin; and that following such judicial determination, the court
issued a warrant of arrest and a commitment order.

The rule pertaining to pre-trial

detainees whose cases are under
preliminary investigation, or
whose cases have been dismissed
on inquest, preliminary
investigation but pending appeal,
motion for reconsideration,
reinvestigation or automatic
review

Although the latest circular of Secretary Aguirre is laudable as it adheres to the

constitutional provisions on the rights of pre-trial detainees, the Court will not
dismiss the case on the ground of mootness. As can be gleaned from the ever-
changing DOJ circulars, there is a possibility that the latest circular would again be
amended by succeeding secretaries. It has been repeatedly held that "the Court will
decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount
public interest are involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;
and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.5 All four (4)
requisites are present in this case.

As the case is prone to being repeated as a result of constant changes, the Court,
as the guardian and final arbiter of the Constitution6 and pursuant to its prerogative
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights,7 takes this opportunity to lay down controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar and the public on the propriety of the continued detention of an arrested
person whose case has been dismissed on inquest, preliminary investigation,
reinvestigation, or appeal but pending automatic review by the SOJ.

The rule is that a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to the
proper judicial authorities8 within the periods provided in Article 125 of the RPC,
otherwise, the public official or employee could be held liable for the failure to
deliver except if grounded on reasonable and allowable delays. Article 125 of the
RPC is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a person without
informing him of his offense and without allowing him to post bail. It punishes
public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground but
fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods
prescribed by law. In case the detention is without legal ground, the person
arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention under Article 124
of the RPC. This is without prejudice to the possible filing of an action for damages
under Article 32 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines.

Article 125 of the RPC, however, can be waived if the detainee who was validly
arrested without a warrant opts for the conduct of preliminary
investigation.1âwphi1 The question to be addressed here, therefore, is whether
such waiver gives the State the right to detain a person indefinitely.

The Court answers in the negative.

The waiver of Article 125 of the RPC does not vest upon the DOJ, PPO, BJMP, and
PNP the unbridled right to indefinitely incarcerate an arrested person and subject
him to the whims and caprices of the reviewing prosecutor of the DOJ. The waiver
of Article 125 must coincide with the prescribed period for preliminary investigation
as mandated by Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Detention beyond this
period violates the accused's constitutional right to liberty.

Stated differently, the waiver of the effects of Article 125 of the RPC is not a license
to detain a person ad infinitum. Waiver of a detainee's right to be delivered to
proper judicial authorities as prescribed by Article 125 of the RPC does not trump
his constitutional right in cases where probable cause was initially found wanting by
reason of the dismissal of the complaint filed before the prosecutor's office even if
such dismissal is on appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation or on automatic
review. Every person's basic right to liberty is not to be construed as waived by
mere operation of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The fundamental law
provides limits and this must be all the more followed especially so that detention is
proscribed absent probable cause.

Accordingly, the Court rules that a detainee under such circumstances must be
promptly released to avoid violation of the constitutional right to liberty, despite a
waiver of Article 125, if the 15-day period (or the thirty 30- day period in cases of
violation of R.A. No. 91659 ) for the conduct of the preliminary investigation lapses.
This rule also applies in cases where the investigating prosecutor resolves to
dismiss the case, even if such dismissal was appealed to the DOJ or made the
subject of a motion for reconsideration, reinvestigation or automatic review. The
reason is that such dismissal automatically results in a prima facie finding of lack of
probable cause to file an information in court and to detain a person.

The Court is aware that this decision may raise discomfort to some, especially at
this time when the present administration aggressively wages its "indisputably
popular war on illegal drugs." As Justice Diosdado Peralta puts it, that the security
of the public and the interest of the State would be jeopardized is not a justification
to trample upon the constitutional rights of the detainees against deprivation of
liberty without due process of law, to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved and to a speedy disposition of the case.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared, and ruled, that all detainees whose pending
cases have gone beyond the mandated periods for the conduct of preliminary
investigation, or whose cases have already been dismissed on inquest or
preliminary investigation, despite pending appeal, reconsideration, reinvestigation
or automatic review by the Secretary of Justice, are entitled to be released
pursuant to their constitutional right to liberty and their constitutional right against
unreasonable seizures, unless detained for some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one
which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be
expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after
all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our
minds the basic principles of popular government, and if we give expression to the
paramount purpose for which the courts, as an independent power of such a
government, were constituted. The primary question is — Shall the judiciary permit
a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in the
Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which

might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts
are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons,
to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which
had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between
October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept confined to their houses in
the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city authorities quietly
perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,
Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At
any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from
the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo
Lukban, descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons,
and placed them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were
given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation. They
had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They had not
been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were
received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a
detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling
passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were
landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of
Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and
the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the city of
Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges growing
out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the
disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women
married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went
to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared,
and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and
the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a
considerable number of the deportees presented an application for habeas
corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the application, through
stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the women who were sent
away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them all, the
application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the
salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were
illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown
parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court. The city fiscal appeared
for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain facts relative to
sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted
because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have
been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and
Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody
or control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of
the city of Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the
170 women were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of
Yñigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question
of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without
their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that directed
Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named,
alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their
own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken
before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named
in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ
was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been shown that
three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through their own efforts,
were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before the court. The
fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand
taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the
Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer
thereto, and telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the
attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that
the women were contained with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to
Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the
order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control,
because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had
married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging that
he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was
impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on
December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the
respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the court
nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of the women
not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales,
and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that
court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some
other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the
question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be
decided and the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the
women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of
Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner
and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity.
On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically presented before the Court the
women who had returned to the city through their own efforts and eight others who
had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by
their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for
all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that
the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in
bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were
found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila,
transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine
had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all efforts to find
them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners and the city
fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to
find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of
the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force
of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in
contempt of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los
recurridos, (reply to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck
from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ
of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and seventy
women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and
without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were
forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite
the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily and gladly, that such
was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence of the police and the
constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law chose the
shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By
authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in
deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within the
Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an
Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens
after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and
section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the
conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any person who is a common
prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any citizen of the United States,
who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New York and other
States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of
women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health
authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person
in the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can
search in vain for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the
Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the
Philippine Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of
society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from
Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or
regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so
important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the
American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded
in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even
the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power
than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or
express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts within
a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their
mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the
citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other
municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take
to themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any
official can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do
so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one
locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over
the head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman shall
be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free
customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass
upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man either justice
or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No
official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the forum which
functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors. "The
law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man
who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound
to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon
the exercise of the authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196,
220.) "The very idea," said Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another
case, "that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or
any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another,
seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the
essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this
explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we
said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should
permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the
Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies
of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may
recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such
an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such
situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands
provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a

general character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a
place more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it
be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not
less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand
two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation

of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person
to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a
fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting
officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these
prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they
have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a
crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be proceeded against, is no bar to the
instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in a case which will later
be referred to — "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application
by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued
indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow
process of criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416,
434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only
sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left
untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual
at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three
specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that
there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a
assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained of their
liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor
and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city limits and that
perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were
relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the
city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus.
It was consequently proper for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law,
in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge
to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that within the court's
jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no
application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had
standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of
First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is
a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and
inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the nearest
judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. The writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge thereof
enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 79;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable
before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the
Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it
was not shown that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the
women had any means by which to advance their plea before that court. On the
other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their attorneys, and the two
original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case
involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the
women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown
that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and
decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to
consider the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial
of the benefits of the writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When
the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were
under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the
jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond the city
limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination, acceptance of
such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the writ of habeas
corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of

liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from
Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties, who
deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion
just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of
going when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila
continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until
they freely and truly waived his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The
chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take
a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and
then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and
claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no
jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be
that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power
to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he
should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no
reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to
Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them
from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be
permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her
domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has
lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may
not thus be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for
decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the
authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable
courts are however very persuasive in nature.

A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early
date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme
Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor
child under guardianship in the State, who has been and continues to be detained
in another State. The membership of the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was
notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and
Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was equally divided.
Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-
writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since
the opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception
of the English decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have
taken a contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of
Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue
the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six
centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers
of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke
could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was
such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its
benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for
the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole
 instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy,
as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. .
..

The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the
case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in
England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right,
but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon

this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined,
but his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The
officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the
prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to
release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the
respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the
purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode
of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only
auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not
important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that
by the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The
difficulty of affording redress is not increased by the confinement being
beyond the limits of the state, except as greater distance may affect it. The
important question is, where the power of control exercised? And I am aware
of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)

The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other
courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo.,
117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had
been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by
the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband
directing the defendant to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave
defendant until a certain date to produce the child, but he did not do so. His return
stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had been handed over by him
to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it was
impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal,
the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22.
That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a
judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the
receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and
detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be
 obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the
nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of his having
lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the writ,
the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an
answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the
child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the
writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift
the question of contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing
that what was done at some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But
the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ. The
question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was
issued by not producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The
Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the same effect the
Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was
directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia
three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the
writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of
Washington; that, as he believed, they were removed beyond the District of
Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and that they were then
beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis
had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ
of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that
Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and
refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the
marshall until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due
course of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the
production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and been
lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of the
term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926.
See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p.
170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered
by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ
of habeas corpus.

There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two
orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found
that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court
on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents
were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far
as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of
November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao.
According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram
of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-
hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought
before the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or
(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or
their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was
granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present
writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few
stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with
their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were
appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of
the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated
to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that about this number either
returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing by the
respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in
sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-
production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein
pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what exactitude
a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case, supra, the
Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the
consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child
back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must
advertise in America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do
everything that mortal man could do in the matter; and that the court would only
accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of excuse." In other words,
the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made
by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was
because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash
between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the
respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their
wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have
become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined
in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was
provided. While charges and counter-charges in such a bitterly contested case are
to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of
literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial
compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular
individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of
separate habeas corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance
with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the
city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano
Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration of
justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a
certain person and does not do so, and does not offer a valid excuse, a court must,
to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to be guilty of contempt, and
must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to produce the body
of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is
a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal.,
156; In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible
exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition
to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only
followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this
does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a powerful mitigating
circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been drawn into the case
through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city
fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as
the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any
disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the
memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable
position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses,
the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered
the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the steamers and
the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate
the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the
city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His
methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court
was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance
thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as
P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal
with him as for a contempt. Some members of the court are inclined to this stern
view. It would also be possible to find that since respondent Lukban did comply
substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged his contempt of the
first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view. Between
the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent
Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the
administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered
only as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect
without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.

In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is

necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo, and Diaz
are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt
of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five
days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of
Manila to strike from the record the Replica al Memorandum de los Recurridos of
January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against respondents. So
ordered.

[G.R. No. L-8474. September 30, 1955.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. PEDRO DE LA PEÑA,

OSMUNDO RAMOS and HON. RAMON SAN JOSE, Respondents.

Jose G. Lucban, Special Prosecutor, Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla,

Assistant Solicitor General Jaime de los Angeles and Solicitor Meliton G.
Soliman for Petitioner.

Enrique Javier and Federico Roy for respondent Osmundo Ramos.

Leodegario Alba for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. SEARCH WARRANTS; EVIDENCE; ILLEGAL PROCUREMENT OF SEARCH

WARRANTS, HOW ESTABLISHED. — The motive of the person accused of illegal
procurement of search warrants may be established, not only by acts preceding, or
coetaneous with, the commission of the offense charged, but, also by acts posterior
to the issuance of the process, such as, an attempt to extort money as a condition
precedent to the release of the complaint.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to set aside certain resolutions of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. However, considering the allegations and the ultimate purpose
of the petition, the same will be regarded as one for mandamus, in accordance with
the doctrine laid down in Guzman v. Lichauco (42 Phil. 291) and People v.
Concepcion (55 Phil. 485, 492).

Respondents, Pedro de la Peña and Osmundo Ramos, are accused, in Criminal

Cases Nos. 24746 to 24755 and 24824 to 24833 (20 cases) of said court, of illegal
procurement of search warrants, in violation of Article 129 of the Revised Penal
Code. In the information filed in case No. 24750 — the language of which is
analogous to that of the information filed in the nineteen (19) cases, except as
regards the names and addresses of the respective complaining witnesses — it is
averred:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1951, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
accused Pedro de la Peña, being then the Chief of the Special Investigating Team,
and the accused Osmundo Ramos being then an agent, of the Military Intelligence
Service G-2, Armed Forces of the Philippines, and therefore public officers or
employees, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other,
and pursuant to a common intent, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously procure a search warrant without a just cause, by then and there
applying for the same and filing a deposition of witness in support of the application
for search warrant before the Court the Court of First Instance, this City; and by
that reason and on account of said application and deposition the said accused
succeeded in procuring from the said court a search warrant against Ty Kong Tek of
142 V. Mapa St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, where a search was actually made or caused to
be made by the said accused, both knowing fully well that the statements and
allegations contained in the said application as well as in the said deposition were
false." (Record, p. 4.)

At the joint hearing of said twenty (20) cases, before Branch IV of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, presided over by respondent Judge, Honorable Ramon San Jose,
the prosecution placed on the witness stand, the offended party in said case No.
24750, namely, Ty Kong Tek, who testified that, while he was in his house at 142
V. Mapa Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, on March 1, 1951, at about 2:00 a.m., Pedro de
la Peña, one of the respondents herein, and one of the defendants therein, came,
accompanied by several persons, including two Chinese named Koa San and Tan
Tek; that De la Peña and his companions, who were provided with a search
warrant, searched the house, stating that they were looking for firearms and U.S.
dollars, none of which were found in the premise; that they found, however, two
(2) books of account of Ty Kong Tek for the years of 1948 and 1949; that at 6:00
a.m., De la Peña took Ty Kong Tek for investigation to Camp Murphy, where he was
urged to confess that he had been engaged in the exchange business and had been
handling U.S. dollars, which the witness refused to admit; and that, later, in the
afternoon, De la Peña arrested the son and a nephew of the witness. At this
juncture, the prosecution inquired whether he knew why his and nephew were
arrested, but, the defense objected thereto upon the ground that the question
referred to an act subsequent to the issuance of the aforementioned search warrant
and, hence, immaterial to the issue. Although the prosecution explained that it
sought to establish the motive of De la Peña in securing the search warrant,
respondent Judge sustained the objection. Thereupon, the prosecution asked Ty
Kong Tek whether he knew whether or not his above mentioned son and nephew
had anything to do with the reason for the search made, in their house, by the
party headed by De la Peña. The defense objected to the question upon the same
ground, and the court sustained the objection.

Ty Kong Tek further stated, on the witness stand, that De la Peña investigated him
six (6) times at Camp Murphy; that during the investigation, De la Peña in the
afternoon of March 1, 1951; that thereafter, one of the members of the party led
by De la Peña, who made a search in complainant’s house, namely, Koa San,
approached the (witness’) nephew would be released if he (Ty Kong Tek) gave him
(Koa San) and De la Peña the sum of P20,000. On motion of the defense
respondent Judge ordered the last statement of Ty Kong Tek stricken from the
record.

Ty Kong Tek, likewise, declared that Koa San was sometimes present during the
investigation of the former in Camp Murphy; that after the first investigation of Ty
Kong Tek by De la Peña, the former was sent to his quarters in said camp; and that
Koa San then came to see Ty Kong Tek and talked to him. This statement was,
also, ordered stricken out, on the motion of defense. Moreover, the latter made of
record its general objection to all questions relative to events which occurred
subsequently to the issuance of the search warrant aforementioned. Although the
prosecution explained that it was trying to prove the unlawful motive with which the
search warrant had allegedly been obtained, respondent Judge hold that "anything
that happened after that (issuance of the search warrant) will be immaterial" (p.
28, t.s.n.) Thereupon, on the motion of herein petitioner, Jose G. Lukban, Director
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), who, as Special Prosecutor handled
the case for the Government, in collaboration with Assistant City Fiscal, Guillermo
Dacumos, respondent Judge suspended the hearing, in order that the prosecution
could bring the matter to this Court, for the determination of the propriety of
introducing evidence of acts performed by the accused after the issuance of the
search warrant in question. Hence, the present case.

Respondents herein maintain that the alleged illegal procurement of the

aforementioned search warrant may be established only by proof of acts either
preceding, or coetaneous with, the commission of offense charged, not by acts
performed subsequently thereto. Upon the other hand, petitioner herein contends
that the motive of the accused may be established by the posterior acts, such as,
for instance, an attempt to extort money as a condition precedent to the release of
the complainant.

It is clear to our mind that said attempt to extort money, even if effected after the
issuance of the search warrant, but prior to the release of the complainant, is
relevant to the question whether or not said was illegally procured, owing to the
obvious tendency of the aforementioned circumstance, if proven, to establish that
the accused was prompted by the desire to get money from the said complainant.
The relevancy would be more patent if a similar attempt had been made in other
nineteen (19) cases or in some of them. It is likewise, apparent that evidence of
the intent of party who obtained said warrant or warrants is not only relevant, but
very material, where the accused are charged with having "willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously procured" said process, "pursuant to a common intent," as alleged in the
informations filed in the cases under consideration.

Respondents insist, however, that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Our Supreme Court, in the case of People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil., 667, ruled that
— malicious procurement of a search warrant under Article 129 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed by a public officer who procures search warrant without
just cause, and that such just cause consist of such facts and circumstances
antecedent to the issuance of the warrant and not to facts subsequent (Italics
ours)." (Respondent’s memorandum, p. 2).

This statement is misleading. The accused in the Sy Juco case, cited by

respondents, was not charged with illegal procurement of a search warrant. The
main issues in said case was the validity of a search warrant based upon affidavits
showing, on the face thereof, that the statements therein contained were hearsay.
This Court answered the question in the negative. Referring to the issuance of a
valid search warrant, we declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . It has likewise been held by this court that by probable cause are meant such
facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant, that are in
themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in
pursuance thereof." (64 Phil., 667, 674)

The words "facts and circumstance antecedent to the issuance of the warrant" had
no relation whatsoever with, and were not meant to qualify, the evidence
admissible to prove the illegal procurement of a search warrant, in violation of
Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code, which was not in issue in the case. Said
expression merely referred to the norm that should guide a Judge in determining
whether or not the process should be ordered issued. It is not concerned, either
with the liability of the person procuring the warrant, or with the competency of the
evidence to establish his guilt.

In this connection, it may not be amiss to stress, one more, the need of adhering to
the policy enunciated in the case of Prats & Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co. (52 Phil.,
807,816-817) from which we quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is most effectively
and expeditiously administered in the courts where trivial objections to the
admission of proof are received with least favor. The practice of excluding evidence
on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to the form of the
questions should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge
of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with
any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication
of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as rule
safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into
error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in
fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out,
the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds embarrassed and possibly unable to
correct the effects of the error without returning the case for new trial - a step
which the Court is always very oath to take. On the other hand, the admission of
proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form, materiality, or
relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either litigant, because the
trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is duty upon final consideration of
the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme
Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it necessary to make
a correct judgment." (Italics supplied.)

Inasmuch as the prosecution was entitled to introduce the evidence in question and
respondent Judge was, consequently, "under obligation by reason of his office" to
admit said evidence, "and in refusing to do so . . . he failed to perform his judicial
duty’ — in the language used by this Court in the case of People v. Concepcion
(supra) — it follows that said respondent Judge should be, as he is hereby, ordered
— in line with the rule laid down in said case — to allow petitioner herein to prove
the motive of the accused in obtaining the search warrant in question, even if the
evidence therefor should refer to acts posterior to the issuance of said process, and
that the resolutions of the lower court sustaining the objections to the questions
above refers to, propounded by petitioner herein, and directing that portions of the
testimony of Ty Kong Tek be stricken from the record, should be, as said orders are
hereby, reversed and set aside, with costs against respondents, Pedro de la Peña
and Osmundo Ramos.

It is ordered.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984

JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR., BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS
MEDIA SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF,
PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL
SECURITY COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada, Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker

P. Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2] search warrants
issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, Executive
Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the
premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were searched, and
office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other
articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory

injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents,
"particularly the Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security Command, the Judge
Advocate General, AFP, the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their representatives,
assistants, subalterns, subordinates, substitute or successors" be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and
the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1

In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983, respondents were required to answer the
petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction was set for
hearing on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983, on motion of the Solicitor
General in behalf of respondents.

At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor General, while opposing petitioners'
prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, manifested that respondents
"will not use the aforementioned articles as evidence in the aforementioned case
until final resolution of the legality of the seizure of the aforementioned articles.
..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition on the ground that
petitioners had come to this Court without having previously sought the quashal of
the search warrants before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners, before
impugning the validity of the warrants before this Court, should have filed a motion
to quash said warrants in the court that issued them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and
urgency of the constitutional issues raised not to mention the public interest
generated by the search of the "We Forum" offices, which was televised in Channel
7 and widely publicized in all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this special
circumstance justifies this Court to exercise its inherent power to suspend its rules.
In the words of the revered Mr. Justice Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de
Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the power of the court [Supreme Court] to
suspend its rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the
purposes of justice require it...".

Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches.

Considerable stress is laid on the fact that while said search warrants were issued
on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on
June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time

to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
it or declined to assert it. 5

Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply, explained the reason for the delay in the
filing of the petition thus:

Respondents should not find fault, as they now do [p. 1, Answer, p. 3,

Manifestation] with the fact that the Petition was filed on June 16,
1983, more than half a year after the petitioners' premises had been
raided.

The climate of the times has given petitioners no other choice. If they
had waited this long to bring their case to court, it was because they
tried at first to exhaust other remedies. The events of the past eleven
fill years had taught them that everything in this country, from release
of public funds to release of detained persons from custody, has
become a matter of executive benevolence or largesse

Hence, as soon as they could, petitioners, upon suggestion of persons

close to the President, like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a letter to President
Marcos, through counsel Antonio Coronet asking the return at least of
the printing equipment and vehicles. And after such a letter had been
sent, through Col. Balbino V. Diego, Chief Intelligence and Legal
Officer of the Presidential Security Command, they were further
encouraged to hope that the latter would yield the desired results.
 After waiting in vain for five [5] months, petitioners finally decided to
come to Court. [pp. 123-124, Rollo]

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial
system, We find no ground to punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On
the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate
the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the
seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.

Respondents also submit the theory that since petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used
and marked as evidence some of the seized documents in Criminal Case No. Q-
022872, he is now estopped from challenging the validity of the search warrants.
We do not follow the logic of respondents. These documents lawfully belong to
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases with them, within
legal bounds. The fact that he has used them as evidence does not and cannot in
any way affect the validity or invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this
petition.

Several and diverse reasons have been advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an

examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as
mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126
of the Rules of Court .6 This objection, however, may properly be considered moot
and academic, as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9,
1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col.
Abadilla and his witnesses.

2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20- 82[b] were used to search two
distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection is interposed to the
execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that
the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road
3, Project 6, Quezon City. This assertion is based on that portion of Search Warrant
No. 20- 82[b] which states:

Which have been used, and are being used as instruments and means
of committing the crime of subversion penalized under P.D. 885 as
amended and he is keeping and concealing the same at 19 Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City.

The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to
search two distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and illogical for respondent
judge to have issued two warrants intended for one and the same place. Besides,
the addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the
application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which
executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of
the typographical error is more apparent than real. The fact is that the place for
which Search Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, which address appeared in the opening
paragraph of the said warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that respondent
judge had in mind when he issued Warrant No. 20-82 [b].

In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be

searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's
prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would
seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose
affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the
warrant intended the building described in the affidavit, And it has also been said
that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve
an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 8

3. Another ground relied upon to annul the search warrants is the fact that although
the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles b belonging to
his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media
Services, Inc. were seized.

Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that
may be seized under a search warrant, to wit:

Sec. 2. Personal Property to be seized. — A search warrant may be

issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:

[a] Property subject of the offense;

[b] Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

[c] Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The above rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by
the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be
owned by him. In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-quoted Section 2, one of
the properties that may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily, stolen property
must be owned by one other than the person in whose possession it may be at the
time of the search and seizure. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it
is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized, as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was
alleged to have in relation to the articles and property seized under the warrants.

4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion that real properties were seized
under the disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said
industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v.
Castillo9 where this legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the
tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the
agent of the owner.

In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or
building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property
susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

5. The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon

application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of the P.C.
Metrocom.10 The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M.
Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members of the Metrocom Intelligence and
Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises
prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982.

It is contended by petitioners, however, that the abovementioned documents could

not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a
warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which provides:

SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

We find petitioners' thesis impressed with merit. Probable cause for a search is
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And
when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or
editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at
bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,
stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is
intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement
in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or has in his control
printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and other
documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements
of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the
existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance
of a search warrant and it was a grave error for respondent judge to have done so.

Equally insufficient as basis for the determination of probable cause is the

statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U.
Tango, "that the evidence gathered and collated by our unit clearly shows that the
premises above- mentioned and the articles and things above-described were used
and are continuously being used for subversive activities in conspiracy with, and to
promote the objective of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire Movement,
Movement for Free Philippines, and April 6 Movement." 13

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, ... after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution requires no
less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon
which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable
cause." As couched, the quoted averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of sufficiency established by this Court in
Alvarez case.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration

constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants. The
search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:

1] All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo

(equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/recording
equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used and/or
connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper and any and
all documents communication, letters and facsimile of prints related to
the "WE FORUM" newspaper.

2] Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other

publication to promote the objectives and piurposes of the subversive
organization known as Movement for Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement; and,

3] Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE

FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,

1] Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969

3] A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 524;

4] TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665; and,

5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 427 with marking "Bagong
Silang."

In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search warrant which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings
and other written instruments concerning the Communist Party in Texas," was
declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner,
directions to "seize any evidence in connectionwith the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant which
authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec.
54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. 17 The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in question
cannot be characterized differently.

In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the
English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to
search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of dissent
both Catholic and Puritan Reference herein to such historical episode would not be
relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or
publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no clear and
imminent danger to state security.

As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and printing offices
of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the
search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further
result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the

freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a
virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of
being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and
even militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the
citizenry.

Respondents would justify the continued sealing of the printing machines on the
ground that they have been sequestered under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No.
885, as amended, which authorizes "the sequestration of the property of any
person, natural or artificial, engaged in subversive activities against the
government and its duly constituted authorities ... in accordance with implementing
rules and regulations as may be issued by the Secretary of National Defense." It is
doubtful however, if sequestration could validly be effected in view of the absence
of any implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.

Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of the Daily Express, it was reported that
no less than President Marcos himself denied the request of the military authorities
to sequester the property seized from petitioners on December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request flied by government prosecutors for

sequestration of the WE FORUM newspaper and its printing presses,
according to Information Minister Gregorio S. Cendana.

On the basis of court orders, government agents went to the We

Forum offices in Quezon City and took a detailed inventory of the
equipment and all materials in the premises.

Cendaña said that because of the denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19

That the property seized on December 7, 1982 had not been sequestered is further
confirmed by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo to the letter dated
February 10, 1983 of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed to President
Marcos, expressing alarm over the "WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:

2. Contrary to reports, President Marcos turned down the

recommendation of our authorities to close the paper's printing
facilities and confiscate the equipment and materials it uses. 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued
by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are hereby declared null and void and
are accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction for the
return of the seized articles is hereby granted and all articles seized thereunder are
hereby ordered released to petitioners. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE
LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA
and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE
AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David
for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico
P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D.
Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 —

hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42
search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they
were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-
named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to
seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,

ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense,"
which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening
the Constitution and the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not
describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the
courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on
March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the
effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases
already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered
quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to
petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the
documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search

warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the
defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in
any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.

On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in
the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially
lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the
offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was
maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the
residences of petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those
found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action
to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in
pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their
respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of
them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may
be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by
the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices
and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the
admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers
in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging

to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants.
If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights
of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not
the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been
invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the
privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any,
 was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the
admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789,
Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect,
restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions
need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the
searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if
the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents,
papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of
general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority
there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate,

namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In
other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction
of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this
case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"
— as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any
determinate provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely
one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would
place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and
correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This
is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above
quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels
that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the

disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule
122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the
Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification,
the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested
search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to
be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence,

receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the
petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus
openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to
be seized be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major
objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors
maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were
unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in
evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are
unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the
criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages
against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search,
their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and
such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and
eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical
means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as

such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the
action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection
enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will
that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already
declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and
their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are
not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on
the same Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court
held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of

the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its
dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse
of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against
that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used
 against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that
rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and
so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through
the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had
steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included
the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf
"stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion
of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was logically
and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential
part of the right to privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient
of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the
new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure.
To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege
and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing
the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people
rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional
in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic
rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded
on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which
honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity
so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the
spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.
To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to
establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against
whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not
comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he
has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition
is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to
protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that
violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for,
certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do
not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually — but,
understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not
lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen
Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street,
and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill,
Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore,
the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under
their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United
States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of

and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged
"personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended
petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the
Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the
Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration,
or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or
allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said
motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and
other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the
facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to
warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any
rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to
leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is
hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of
herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and
void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers
and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made
permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers
and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that
the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-
nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.

Crispin Oben for appellant.

Guillermo B. Guevarra for defendants-appellees.
No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This appeal was given due course by the Court of First Instance of Laguna by virtue
of a writ of mandamus issued by this court in G.R. No. 45780. The facts are the
following: In the justice of the peace court of the municipality of Lumban, Province
of Laguna, a complaint was filed of the following tenor:

The undersigned Parish Priest of the Roman Catholic Church in the parish and
municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, upon being duly sworn, charges
Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with an offense
against religion committed as follows:

That on April 14, 1937, at about 9 o'clock a.m., in this municipality of

Lumban, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this court, the aforesaid accused, while holding the funeral of one who
in life was called Antonio Macabigtas, in accordance with the rites of
religious sect known as the "Church of Christ", willfully, unlawfully, and
criminally caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact passed, through the
chruchyard fronting the Roman Catholic Church, which churchyard
 belongs to the said Church, which churchyard belongs to the said
Church and is devoted to the religious worship thereof, against the
opposition of the undersigned complainant who, through force and
threats of physical violence by the accused, was compelled to allow the
funeral to pass through the said churchyard. An act committed in
grave profanation of the place, in open disregard of the religious
feelings of the Catholics of this municipality, and in violation of article
133 of the Revised Penal Code.

(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES

Parish Priest
Complainant

(Here follow the affidavit and the list of witnesses.)

The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the preliminary investigation. Before the
case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Laguna, the complainant filed a
sworn statement regarding other points so that the provincial fiscal may have full
knowledge of the facts and of the witnesses who could testify thereon. Upon the
remand of the case to the court, the fiscal, instead of filing the corresponding
information, put in the following motion for dismissal:

The complainant is the parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church of

Lumban, Laguna. The said priest charges the accused with having caused,
through force, intimidation and threats, the funeral of one belonging to the
Church of Christ to pass through the churchyard of the Church. Apparently,
the offense consists in that the corpse was that of one who belonged to the
Church of Christ.

The undersigned is of the opinion that the fact act imputed to the accused
does not constitute the offense complained of considering the spirit of article
133 of the Revised Penal Code. At most they might be chargeable with
having threatened the parish priest, or with having passed through a private
property without the consent of the owner. Justice Albert, commenting on
the article, has this to say: "An act is said to be notoriously offensive to the
religious feelings of the faithful when a person ridicules or makes light of
anything constituting a religious dogma; works or scoffs at anything devoted
to religious ceremonies; plays with or damages or destroys any object of
veneration by the faithful." The mere act of causing the passage through the
churchyard belonging to the Church, of the funeral of one who in life
belonged to the Church of Christ, neither offends nor ridicules the religious
feelings of those who belong to the Roman Catholic Church.

Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by an order of August 31, 1937,
dismissed the case, reserving, however, to the fiscal the right to file another
information for the crime found to have been committed by the accused.
From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which appeal was denied but thereafter
given due course by the court by virtue of an order of this court.

The appealed order is based upon the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. This
officer questions the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint, but omits an
essential part thereof, to wit, that the churchyard belongs to the church, and is
devoted to the religious services of said church, and it is through this churchyard
that the accused, over the objection of the parish priest and through force and
intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of one under the rites of the religious sect
known as the Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not omitted this essential part, he
would not have come to the conclusion that the acts complained of do not
constitute the crime defined and penalized by article 133 of the Revised Penal Code.

Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion, denies that the unlawful act
committed by the accused had offended the religious feelings of the Catholics of the
municipality in which the act complained of took place. We believe that such ground
of the motion is indefensible. As the fiscal was discussing the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny any of them, but must admit them,
although hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion raises a question of law,
not one of fact. In the second place, whether or of the act complained of is
offensive to the religious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of fact which must
be judged only according to the feelings of the Catholics and not those of other
faithful ones, for it is possible that certain acts may offend the feelings of those who
profess a certain religion, while not otherwise offensive to the feelings of those
professing another faith. We, therefore, take the view that the facts alleged in the
complaint constitute the offense defined and penalized in article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an information alleging the said facts and a
trial be thereafter held at which the said facts should be conclusively established,
the court may find the accused guilty of the offense complained of, or that of
coercion, or that of trespass under article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may be
proper, pursuant to section 29 of General Orders, No. 58.

The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal is ordered to comply with his duty
under the law, without pronouncement as to the costs. So ordered.