Beltran vs.

Makasiar

Facts:

Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues
that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by
virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to
be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This
would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or
perjury.

Issues:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel
were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was
still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate
criminal proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Held:

(1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is
negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion
to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by
filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity
to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of
the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound policy dictates this
procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and
deciding cases filed before their courts.

(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is
to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving
the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person. (Beltran vs. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585
November 14, 1988)

In re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of

Benjamin Vergara et. al. vs. Gedorio

Facts:
Petitioners were tenants of Berlito P. Taripe on a certain property located in Parañaque
City. Pending the settlement of the estate of the deceased Anselma Allers,
respondent Eleuteria P. Bolaño included the property leased by Taripe to petitioners
in the inventory of the estate. In the Order dated October 9, 1999, the probate court
directed petitioners to pay their monthly rentals to Bolaño, the duly appointed Special
Administratrix. For failure to comply with the said order, Bolaño filed a motion to cite
petitioners in contempt. The court found petitioners guilty of indirect contempt and
ordered them to pay a fine of P30,000.00 each and to undergo imprisonment until they
comply with the probate court's order for them to pay rentals. Petitioners were then
arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners were temporarily
released but the CA later denied the petition and recalled the release order. Hence,
the appeal.

Issue:

May petitioners be imprisoned for non-payment of rentals made in contravention of the

trial court's order?

Held:

The salutary rule is that the power to punish to contempt must be exercised on the
preservative, not vindictive principle, and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of
punishment. Court must exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with
utmost self-restraint.

Section 20, Article 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution expressly provides that no
person shall be imprisoned for debt. Debt, as used in the Constitution, refers to civil
debt or one not arising from a criminal offense. It means any liability to pay arising out
of a contract, express or implied. In the present case, petitioners, as recognized
lessees of the estate of the deceased, were ordered by the probate court to pay the
rentals to the administratrix. Petitioners did not comply with the order for the principal
reason that they were not certain as to the rightful person to whom to pay the rentals
because it was a certain Berlito P. Taripe who had originally leased the subject
property to them. Clearly, the payment of rentals is covered by the constitutional
guarantee against imprisonment.

Moreover, petitioners cannot be validly punished for contempt under Section 8, Rule
71 of the Rules of Court because herein subject order is not a special judgment
enforceable under Section 11, Rule 39. The order directing the payment of rentals falls
within the purview of Section 9. Until and unless all the means provided for under
Section 9, Rule 39 have been resorted to and failed, imprisonment for contempt as a
means of coercion for civil purposes cannot be resorted to by the courts.

Under Section 9(b), Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, in cases when the execution calls
for payment of money and the obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash,
certified bank check or other mode or payment acceptable to the judgment obligee,
the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and
nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from
execution giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part
thereof may be levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor
does not exercise the option, the officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if
any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to answer
for the judgment. The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real
property of the judgment obligor which has been levied upon. When there is more
property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful
fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy
the judgment and lawful fees. Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other
personal property, or any interest in either real or personal property, may be levied
upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment.

The writ of execution issued by the trial court in this case commanded its sheriff to
collect from petitioners the rentals due from the property, and should they fail to pay,
from petitioners' personal/real properties sufficient to cover the amounts sought to be
collected. It was not addressed to petitioners. It pertained to the sheriff to whom the
law entrusts the execution of judgments, and it was due to the latter's failure that the
writ was not duly enforced. (In RE Habeas Corpuz of Benjamin Vergara et. al. vs.
Gedorio, GR 154037, April 30, 2003)

Sura vs. Martin

Facts:

Vicente S. Martin, Sr. was ordered by the CFI Negros Occidental to recognize his
natural son and to provide him support at P100 per month. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision. A writ of execution was issued but it was returned unsatisfied.
The Sheriff's return of service stated: "The judgment debtor is jobless, and is residing
in the dwelling house and in the company of his widowed mother, at Tanjay, this
province. Debtor has no leviable property; he is even supported by his mother. Hereto
attached is the certificate of insolvency issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides." For failure to satisfy the writ of
execution, plaintiff's counsel prayed that Martin be adjudged guilty of contempt of
court. The trial court granted the prayer and ordered the arrest and imprisonment of
Martin.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the orders of arrest and imprisonment of Martin for contempt of court
for failure to satisfy the decision requiring him to support his natural son due to
insolvency were violative of his constitutional right against imprisonment for debt.

2. Whether or not Martin's failure to satisfy the judgment amounts to disobedience to

be considered indirect contempt.

Held:

1. The sheriff's return shows that the judgment debtor was insolvent. Hence, the orders
for his arrest and imprisonment for failure to satisfy the judgment in effect, authorized
his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution.

2. The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of defendant for contempt for failure to
satisfy a judgment to pay past and future support are illegal because such judgment
is a final disposition of the case and is declaratory of the rights or obligations of the
parties. Under Section 3(b), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the disobedience to a
judgment considered as indirect contempt refers to a special judgment which is
defined in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as that which requires the
performance of any other act than the payment of money, or sale or delivery of real or
personal property which must be enforced by proper contempt proceedings.

Morever, the writ of execution issued on the judgment required "the sheriff or other
proper officer" to whom it was directed to satisfy the amount out of all property, real
and personal, of the judgment debtor. The writ of execution was, therefore, a direct
order to the sheriff or other proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an order to
the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the judgment debtor could not, in the very nature
of things, have committed disobedience to the writ. (Sura vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-
25091, November 29, 1968)

People vs. Linsangan

Facts:

Ambrosio Linsangan was prosecuted for nonpayment of the cedula or poll tax under
section 1439, in connection with section 2718, of the Revised Administrative Code.
After due trial, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 5 days, and to pay the
costs. The case was tried and decided before the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines
took effect but while the appeal was pending, the said Constitution became effective,
and, section 1, clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no person shall be
imprisoned for debt or nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsangan appealed, alleging that
the trial court erred in not declaring said sections of the Revised Administrative Code
unconstitutional and void.

Issue:

Should Linsangan be convicted considering the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution

providing for no imprisonment for nonpayment of a poll tax?

Held:

Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, provides:

All laws of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the
National Assembly, and all references in such laws to the Government or officials of
the Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution.

Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause
12, of Article III of the Constitution, in that, while the former authorizes imprisonment
for nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the
inauguration of the Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the
Revised Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can
be based thereon. (People vs. Ambrosio Linsangan, G.R. No. L-43290, December 21,
1935)

People vs Nitafan

Facts:

Private respondent K.T. Lim was charged with violation of B.P. 22. He moved to quash
the Information of the ground that the facts charged did not constitute a felony as B.P.
22 was unconstitutional and that the check he issued was a memorandum check which
was in the nature of a promissory note, perforce, civil in nature. Judge Nitafan, ruling
that B.P. 22 on which the Information was based was unconstitutional, issued the
questioned Order quashing the Information. Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

Is a memorandum check within the coverage of B.P. 22?

Held:

A memorandum check is in the form of an ordinary check, with the word

"memorandum", "memo" or "mem" written across its face, signifying that the maker or
drawer engages to pay the bona fide holder absolutely, without any condition
concerning its presentment. Such a check is an evidence of debt against the drawer,
and although may not be intended to be presented, has the same effect as an ordinary
check, and if passed to the third person, will be valid in his hands like any other check.

A memorandum check comes within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law which defines a check as "a bill of exchange drawn on a bank payable
on demand. A memorandum check, upon presentment, is generally accepted by the
bank. Hence it does not matter whether the check issued is in the nature of a
memorandum as evidence of indebtedness or whether it was issued is partial
fulfillment of a pre-existing obligation, for what the law punishes is the issuance itself of
a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issuance. The mere act of
issuing a worthless check, whether as a deposit, as a guarantee, or even as an
evidence of a pre-existing debt, is malum prohibitum.

A memorandum check may carry with it the understanding that it is not be presented
at the bank but will be redeemed by the maker himself when the loan fall due.
However, with the promulgation of B.P. 22, such understanding or private arrangement
may no longer prevail to exempt it from penal sanction imposed by the law. To require
that the agreement surrounding the issuance of check be first looked into and
thereafter exempt such issuance from the punitive provision of B.P. 22 on the basis of
such agreement or understanding would frustrate the very purpose for which the law
was enacted — to stem the proliferation of unfunded checks. After having effectively
reduced the incidence of worthless checks changing hands, the country will once
again experience the limitless circulation of bouncing checks in the guise of
memorandum checks if such checks will be considered exempt from the operation of
B.P. 22. It is common practice in commercial transactions to require debtors to issue
checks on which creditors must rely as guarantee of payment. To determine the
reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance,
will greatly erode the faith the public responses in the stability and commercial value
of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking
communities. (People vs. Judge Nitafan, G.R. No. 75954, October 22, 1992)

Lozano vs. Martinez

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22

(Bouncing Check Law). They moved seasonably to quash the informations on the
ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in
one case, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the
case. The parties adversely affected thus appealed.

ISSUES:

1. Does BP 22 is violate the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?

2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection clause?
HELD:

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant
to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a
check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment
of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce
a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of
its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of

money. It is an order addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn, sufficient to ensure
payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of certainty
or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason,
checks have become widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and
commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be perceived as
convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The
basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the
usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished or may
become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be
deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles
and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder,
but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial
papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of
trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into

“lawful” contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides,
we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is
a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check,
but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime
as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee
by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount
to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and
the swindled. The petitioners’ posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause
“equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude classification of
individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419,
December 18, 1986)

Festejo vs. Fernando

FACTS: Carmen Festejo filed a suit against Isaias Fernando, Director of the Bureau
of Public Works, for taking possession of three parcels of land she owned and causing
an irrigation canal to be constructed thereon without obtaining first a right of way,
without her consent and knowledge , and against her express objection. Festejo
demanded the return of the land and its restoration to its former condition.

ISSUE:

Is the Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?

HELD:

Defendant committed acts outside the scope of his authority. When he went outside
the boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its
former condition and usefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from
the duties imposed on him by law. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiff's
land southeasterly of the right of way innocently. Surveys clearly marked the limits of
the land appropriated for the right of way of this trunk highway before construction
began.
Ordinarily the officer or employee committing the tort is personally liable therefor, and
may be sued as any other citizen and held answerable for whatever injury or damage
results from his tortious act.

If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the power conferred
on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent.

It is a general rule that an officer-executive, administrative quasi-judicial, ministerial,

or otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of
law may thereby render himself amenable to personal liability in a civil suit. If he
exceed the power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself by the plea that
he is a public agent acting under the color of his office, and not personally. In the eye
of the law, his acts then are wholly without authority.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; (Festejo vs.
Fernando, G.R. No. L-5156, March 11, 1954)

SEAFDEC-AQD vs NLRC

FACTS: SEAFDEC-AQD is a department of an international organization, the

Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center, organized through an agreement in
1967 by the governments of Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and
the Philippines with Japan as the sponsoring country.

Juvenal Lazaga was employed as a Research Associate on a probationary basis by

SEAFDEC-AQD. Lacanilao in his capacity as Chief of SEAFDEC-AQD sent a notice
of termination to Lazaga informing him that due to the financial constraints being
experienced by the department, his services shall be terminated. SEAFDEC-AQD's
failure to pay Lazaga his separation pay forced him to file a case with the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter and NLRC ruled in favor of Lazaga. Thus SEAFDEC-AQD appealed,
claiming that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case since it is immune from suit
owing to its international character and the complaint is in effect a suit against the
State which cannot be maintained without its consent.
ISSUES:

1. Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over SEAFDEC-AQD?

2. Is SEAFDEC-AQD estopped for its failure to raise the issue of jurisdiction at the first
instance?

HELD:

1. SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public

respondent NLRC. Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its
Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and freedom from control of the
state in whose territory its office is located.

Permanent international commissions and administrative bodies have been created

by the agreement of a considerable number of States for a variety of international
purposes, economic or social and mainly non-political. In so far as they are
autonomous and beyond the control of any one State, they have a distinct juridical
personality independent of the municipal law of the State where they are situated. As
such, according to one leading authority "they must be deemed to possess a species
of international personality of their own."

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local

jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in there operations
or even influence or control its policies and decisions of the organization; besides,
such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to
discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.

2. Respondent Lazaga's invocation of estoppel with respect to the issue of jurisdiction

is unavailing because estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that
has none over a cause of action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none,
no agreement of the parties can provide one. Settled is the rule that the decision of a
tribunal not vested with appropriate jurisdiction is null and void. (SEAFDEC-AQD vs
NLRC, G.R. No. 86773, February 14, 1992)
Liang vs. Peole

FACTS: Petitioner Jeffrey Liang, an economist working with the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) , was charged before the MeTC of Mandaluyong with two counts of grave
oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against a fellow ADB worker.
Liang was arrested but later released. The next day, the judge received an "office of
protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that Liang is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Government. Based on the said protocol communication, the judge,
without notice to the prosecution, dismissed the two criminal cases. The RTC set aside
the MeTC ruling and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier
issued. Liang appealed arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement.

ISSUES:

1. Was the judge correct in dismissing the cases on the basis the protocol
communication without notice to the prosecution?

2. Is Liang covered with immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the
Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government?

HELD:

1. No. Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the
DFA that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain
person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts.
In receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal
cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated.
It should be noted that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of
the alleged utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of
the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.

2. No.

Under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:

a.)....... immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity."

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the
act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioners
case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been
given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to
present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Likewise, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity

agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public
official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.

Moreover, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,

assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity
exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.
As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official
duty. (Liang vs People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000)

Fontanilla vs Maliaman

FACTS: A pick up owned by the National Irrigation Administration and driven officially
by its regular driver, Hugo Garcia, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla,
which resulted in the latter's death. The parents of Francisco filed a suit for damages
against Garcia and the NIA, as Garcia's employer. After trial, the court awarded actual,
moral and exemplary damages to Spouses Fontanilla. NIA appealed. The Solicitor
General contends that the NIA does not perform solely and primarily proprietary
functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions, and
is therefore not liable for the tortious act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its
special agent.

ISSUE:

May NIA, a government agency, be held liable for the damages caused by the
negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent?

HELD:

Yes. NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from
the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body
performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may be held liable for the damages
caused by the negligent act of its driver who was not its special agent. (Fontanilla vs.
Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963 & 61045, February 27, 1991)

RATIO:

■ Section 1 of RA No. 3601 tells us that NIA is a government agency invested with a
corporate personality separate and distinct from the government, thus is governed by
the Corporation Law. Section 2, subsection f of PD 552 provides that NIA also has its
own assets and liabilities and has corporate powers to be exercised by a Board of
Directors. Section 2, subsection b of PD 552 provides that NIA may sue and be sued
in court.

■ Of equal importance is the case of National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority

(NAWASA) vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions, 11 SCRA 766, which propounds the
thesis that "the NAWASA is not an agency performing governmental functions; rather
it performs proprietary functions . . . ." The functions of providing water supply and
sewerage service are regarded as mere optional functions of government even though
the service rendered caters to the community as a whole and the goal is for the general
interest of society.

Like the NAWASA, the National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes
of local government. While it may be true that the NIA was essentially a service agency
of the government aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact
does not make the NIA essentially and purely a "government-function" corporation.
NIA was created for the purpose of "constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and
administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal
and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are
largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these functions are only
incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.

NOTES:

■ The liability of the State has two aspects. namely:

1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is liable for the tortious acts of special
agents only.
2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private enterprises) where it
becomes liable as an ordinary employer. Fontanilla vs. Maliaman, G.R. Nos. L-55963
& 61045, December 1, 1989)

Merritt vs Government of the Philippine

Islands

FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was
bumped by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries
rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457
authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility
for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital,
and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial,
the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the
ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government
to pay the same.

ISSUES:

1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit
or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?

2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?

HELD:

1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject
to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it
pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and
fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a
special official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the
functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable. (Merritt vs
Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21 1916, 34 Phil. 311)

NOTE:

■ The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)

■ The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions
pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed
on the part of the state in the organization of branches of public service and in the
appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)

■ The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it
employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment. The government
does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the officers or agents
whom it employs since that would involve it in all its operations in endless
embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of the public
interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands)

Llamas vs. Executive Secretary

Facts:
Vice-Governor Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative
case against Governor Ocampo III of Tarlac for alleged acts constituting graft and
corruption. After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government found
Ocampo guilty of serious neglect of duty and/or abuse of authority for entering into a
loan contract grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Province and meted a
penalty of suspension for 90 days. Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days,
however, Executive Secretary Orbos, by authority of the President, issued a
Resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo (after finding the relative success
of Ocampo's livelihood loan program) in the sense that the latter's 90-day suspension
is reduced to the period already served. Ocampo reassumed the governorship of the
province, allegedly without any notification made to Llamas. Llamas questioned the
Resolution before the SC.

Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in
criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the members of the Congress.

Petitioner argued that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies
solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or
pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case.

Respondent Governor avers that since under the Constitution discretionary authority
is granted to the President on the exercise of executive clemency, the same
constitutes a political question which is beyond judicial review.

Issues:

1. Is the question on the exercise of executive clemency by the president a political

question?

2. May the President grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

3. Was petitioner's right to due process violated when he was not notified of the grant
of executive clemency?

Held:

1. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's
discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it is also a
settled rule that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review when the issue
involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers
are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. And such review does not
constitute a modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute
interference with the functions of the President. Besides, under the 1987 Constitution,
the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the
decisions of the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether
or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution.

2. Yes. "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos." If the law does not
distinguish, so We must not distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between
which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be
exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the
exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal
offenses. In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason
why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our
considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.

If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged
guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same benefit. In criminal cases,
the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable
doubt, but the Constitution grants to the President the power to pardon the act done
by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor. On
the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere
substantial evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility
of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of
admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will therefore be unjust and unfair for those
found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive
clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to
subserve the interest of the public.

Moreover, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over
all executive departments, may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate,
most especially where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest.
It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant "executive clemency"
but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public
official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in
this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted, after adducing reasons
that subserve the public interest. — "the relative success of . . . livelihood loan
program.

However, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch,
not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

3. Petitioner's argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated is
uruneritorious. Pardon has been defined as "the private, though official, act of the
executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and
not communicated officially to the court. ..." Thus, assuming that petitioner was not
notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. (Llamas
vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)

Santiago vs. CSC

Facts: Customs Commissioner Wigberto Tanada appointed Santiago from Collector

of Customs I to Collector of Customs III. Respondent Jose, a Customs Collector II,
filed a protest with the Merit Systems Promotion Board against Santiago's promotional
appointment mainly on the ground that he was next-in-rank to the position of Collector
of Customs III. The Board decided to revoke Santiago's appointment and directed that
Jose be appointed in his stead. The Civil Service Commission affirmed the Board
Resolution. The Commission ruled that respondent Jose has far better qualifications
in terms of educational attainment, civil service eligibilities, relevant seminars and
training courses taken. It added that the Commission is empowered to administer and
enforce the merit system as mandated by the Constitution and to approve all
appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service. Thus,
Santiago appealed.

Issue:

Should Santiago's promotional appointment be upheld?

Held:

Yes. There is "no mandatory nor peremptory requirement in the Civil Service Law that
persons next-in-rank are entitled to preference in appointment. What it does provide
is that they would be among the first to be considered for the vacancy, if qualified, and
if the vacancy is not filled by promotion, the same shall be filled by transfer or other
modes of appointment."

One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the

higher vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be
appointed. The rule neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial
duty on the appointing authority to promote such person to the next higher position.

The power to appoint is a matter of discretion. The appointing power has a wide
latitude of choice as to who is best qualified for the position. To apply the next-in-rank
rule peremptorily would impose a rigid formula on the appointing power contrary to the
policy of the law that among those qualified and eligible, the appointing authority is
granted discretion and prerogative of choice of the one he deems fit for appointment.

True, the Commission is empowered to approve all appointments, whether original or

promotional, to positions in the civil service and disapprove those where the
appointees do not possess the appropriate eligibility or required qualification.
However, "all the commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the required
qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No
other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when it acts on,
or as the decree says, "approves" or "disapproves" an appointment made by the
proper authorities. ...To be sure, it has no authority to revoke the said appointment
simply because it believed that the private respondent was better qualified for that
would have constituted an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the
appointing authority."

There is no reason to disturb Santiago's promotional appointment. The minimum

qualifications and the standard of merit and fitness have been adequately satisfied as
found by the appointing authority. The latter has not been convincingly shown to have
committed any grave abuse of discretion. (Santiago vs. CSC, G.R. No.
81467, October 27, 1989)

CSC vs. Sojor

Facts: Respondent Sojor was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as

president of the Central Visayas Polytechnic College (CVPC). In 1997, R.A. No. 8292,
or the "Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997" was enacted which mandates
that a Board of Trustees (BOT) be formed to act as the governing body in state
colleges. The BOT of CVPC appointed Sojor as president, with a four-year term
until September 2002. He was appointed president of the institution for a second term,
expiring on September 24, 2006.

On June 25, 2004, CVPC was converted into the Negros Oriental State University
(NORSU). A Board of Regents (BOR) succeeded the BOT as its governing body.

Meanwhile, three (3) separate administrative cases against respondent were filed by
CVPC faculty members before the Civil Service Commission regional office.
Respondent moved to dismiss the first two complaints on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction. The CSC denied his motion to dismiss. Thus, respondent was formally
charged with three administrative cases.

He appealed to CSC proper, arguing that since the BOT is headed by the Committee
on Higher Education Chairperson who was under the Office of the President , the BOT
was also under the OP. Since the president of CVPC was appointed by the BOT, then
he was a presidential appointee. On the matter of the jurisdiction granted to CSC by
virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 80714 enacted in October 1975, respondent
contended that this was superseded by the provisions of R.A. No. 8292, a later law
which granted to the BOT the power to remove university officials.
Issues:

1. Does the Civil Service Commission have jurisdiction over presidents of state
universities or schools with governing boards exclusively granted by their charters the
corporate powers of administration?

2. Does the power to remove faculty members, employees, and officials of a state
university exclusive to the Board of Regents?

3. Does the assumption by the Civil Service Commission of jurisdiction over a

president of a State University violate academic freedom?

4. Does respondent's appointment to the position of president of NORSU, despite the

pending administrative cases against him, served as a condonation by the BOR of the
alleged acts imputed to him?

Held:

1. The Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire civil service. As
defined, the civil service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the government, including every government-owned or controlled
corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career service positions.

The Non-Career Service shall include:

1) Elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);

(3) Chairman and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in

accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished
within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of
direction and supervision from the hiring agency; and

(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.

Respondent, a state university president with a fixed term of office appointed by the
governing board of trustees of the university, is a non-career civil service officer. He
was appointed by the chairman and members of the governing board of CVPC. By
clear provision of law, respondent is a non-career civil servant who is under the
jurisdiction of the CSC.

2. Section 7 of R.A. No. 9299 states that the power to remove faculty members,
employees, and officials of the university is granted to the BOR "in addition to its
general powers of administration." Although the BOR of NORSU is given the specific
power under R.A. No. 9299 to discipline its employees and officials, there is no
showing that such power is exclusive. When the law bestows upon a government body
the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed
that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise
vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have concurrent
jurisdiction over the matter. In this case, the CSC also has jurisdiction to discipline all
members of the civil service, career or non-career. Hence the CSC has concurrent
jurisdictionwith the BOR of the university in the discipline and removal of its officials.

3. The principle of academic freedom finds no application to the facts of the present
case. Contrary to the matters traditionally held to be justified to be within the bounds
of academic freedom, the administrative complaints filed against Sojor involve
violations of civil service rules. He is facing charges of nepotism, dishonesty,
falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. These are classified as grave offenses under civil service
rules, punishable with suspension or even dismissal.

This Court has held that the guaranteed academic freedom does not give an institution
the unbridled authority to perform acts without any statutory basis. For that reason, a
school official, who is a member of the civil service, may not be permitted to commit
violations of civil service rules under the justification that he was free to do so under
the principle of academic freedom.
4. The doctrine this Court laid down in Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Aguinaldo v.
Santos are inapplicable to the present circumstances. Respondents in the mentioned
cases are elective officials, unlike respondent here who is an appointed official.
Indeed, election expresses the sovereign will of the people. Under the principle of vox
populi est suprema lex, the re-election of a public official may, indeed, supersede a
pending administrative case. The same cannot be said of a re-appointment to a non-
career position. There is no sovereign will of the people to speak of when the BOR re-
appointed respondent Sojor to the post of university president. (CSC vs. Sojor, G.R.
No. 168766, May 22, 2008)

Gudani vs. Senga

Facts: Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including
Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan, to appear at a public hearing before the Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security to shed light on the “Hello Garci”
controversy. Gudani and Balutan were directed by AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga, per
instruction of Pres. Arroyo, not testify before said Committee. On the very day of the
hearing, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment from
appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval. However, the two testified
before the Senate, prompting Gen. Senga to issue an order directing Gudani and
Balutan to appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (OPMG) on 3
October 2005 for investigation. The following day, Gen. Gudani was compulsorily
retired from military service. After investigation, the OPMG recommended that the two
be charged with violation of Article of War 65, on willfully disobeying a superior officer.
Thus, Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking that (1)
the order of President Arroyo be declared unconstitutional; (2) the charges against
them be quashed; and (3) Gen. Senga and their successors-in-interest or persons
acting for and on their behalf or orders, be permanently enjoined from proceeding
against them, as a consequence of their having testified before the Senate.

Issue:

1. May the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a
legislative inquiry?
2. How may the members of the military be compelled to attend legislative inquiries
even if the President desires otherwise?

3. Does the court-martial have jurisdiction over Gudani considering his retirement last
4 October 2005?

Held:

1. Yes. The President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. Our ruling that the President could, as a
general rule, require military officers to seek presidential approval before appearing
before Congress is based foremost on the notion that a contrary rule unduly diminishes
the prerogatives of the President as commander-in-chief. Congress holds significant
control over the armed forces in matters such as budget appropriations and the
approval of higher-rank promotions, yet it is on the President that the Constitution
vests the title as commander-in-chief and all the prerogatives and functions
appertaining to the position. Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain
of command mandate that the Presidents ability to control the individual members of
the armed forces be accorded the utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn
between obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Court will without
hesitation affirm that the officer has to choose the President. After all, the Constitution
prescribes that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.

2. At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s
power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not
come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the President
has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the clash
may soon loom or actualize.

We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by
which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if
the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief
Executive’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.

The fact that the executive branch is an equal, coordinate branch of government to the
legislative creates a wrinkle to any basic rule that persons summoned to testify before
Congress must do so. There is considerable interplay between the legislative and
executive branches, informed by due deference and respect as to their various
constitutional functions. Reciprocal courtesy idealizes this relationship; hence, it is only
as a last resort that one branch seeks to compel the other to a particular mode of
behavior. The judiciary, the third coordinate branch of government, does not enjoy a
similar dynamic with either the legislative or executive branches. Whatever weakness
inheres on judicial power due to its inability to originate national policies and
legislation, such is balanced by the fact that it is the branch empowered by the
Constitution to compel obeisance to its rulings by the other branches of government.

3. An officer whose name was dropped from the roll of officers cannot be considered
to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military justice proceedings
were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction has
been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated. Military
jurisdiction has fully attached to Gen. Gudani inasmuch as both the acts complained
of and the initiation of the proceedings against him occurred before he compulsorily
retired on 4 October 2005. (Gudani vs. Senga, GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006)

Legarda vs. De Castro

Facts:

Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright dismissal
but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the correctness of
the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of
correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is a
function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their
functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that since the
authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine the facts
based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the established facts,
it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election returns; that the
averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which are inadequate
to form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations are not supported by facts. He
also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the statements
of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).

Issues:

1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC?

2. Is there a need to resort to revision of ballots?

3. Was the election protest sufficient in form and substance?

Held:

1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President and Vice-
President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.

2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in an election
contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each candidate is involved.
However, we do not find any reason to resort to revision in the first part of the protest,
considering that the protestant concedes the correctness of the ballot results,
concerning the number of votes obtained by both protestant and protestee, and
reflected in the election returns. Protestant merely seeks the correction of manifest
errors, that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and addition of
votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these circumstances, might
only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.

3. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces, municipalities and
cities where she questions all the results in all the precincts therein. The protest here
is sufficient in form and substantively, serious enough on its face to pose a challenge
to protestee's title to his office. The instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts,
not mere conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time.
Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we must again
stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of the allegations. The
protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed and give the protestant the
opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule 61 of the PET Rules. Although said
rule only pertains to revision of ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from
allowing or including the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-
making power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. (Legarda vs De Castro,
P.E.T. Case 0003, March 31, 2005)

Fortun vs. Macapagal-Arroyo

Facts:

On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan
Kudarat, and Cotabato City. Believing that she needed greater authority to put order
in Maguindanao, on December 4, 2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential
Proclamation 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in that province. On December 6, she submitted her report to
Congress. On December 9, the Congress, in joint session, convened to review the
validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12 before
Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 1963, lifting
martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao.
Petitioners brought the present action to challenge the constitutionality of Proclamation
1959.

Issue:

Is there a need for the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in this case, considering the same were lifted within a few days after being
issued and thus Congress was not able to affirm or maintain the same based on its
own evaluation?

Held:

The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable for two
reasons:

One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could fulfill
their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. Section 18, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution state:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside
by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need of
a call.

Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial law or suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such power with the Congress.
Thus:

1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only 60 days;

2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his action in

person or in writing to Congress;

3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within 24 hours of
the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its validity; and
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents proclamation or
suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or extend the same if Congress
deems warranted.

It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in
tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only
the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on
the ground, a power that the President does not have.

Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper
suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers,
which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express
duty to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in
as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands
of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.

Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review.
The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.

Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been
meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the operation and control of
local government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree
affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No
indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the
period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for
habeas corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight
days. The point is that the President intended by her action to address an uprising in
a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was
localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed
government presence.

In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The Congress
itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become moot and academic.

The Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily would have
been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present sufficient basis for the
exercise of the power of judicial review. (Fortun vs Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No.
190293, March 20, 2012)

Ampatuan vs. Puno

Facts:

On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then Pres. Arroyo
issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat
and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency.” She directed the AFP and the
PNP “to undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three
days later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM from the
Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO 273-A, which
amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO 273 was amended to
“delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM by the DILG).

Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy,

petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-Generale,
all ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that
the President’s proclamation and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as
these issuances empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and
to seize the regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the President had
no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred and that
the deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid
exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation
1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President issued
Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace
and order in subject places. She issued the proclamation pursuant to her calling out
power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power
rests solely on her wisdom. The President merely delegated her supervisory powers
over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation
was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killing.

Issues:

1. Whether Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local
autonomy under the Constitution and The Expanded ARMM Act

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she
called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City

3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions

Held:

1. The principle of local autonomy was not violated. DILG Secretary did not take over
control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took the respondent
Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao Massacre,
the ARMM Vice‐Governor, petitioner Adiong, assumed the vacated post on 10 Dec.
2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Sec. 12 Art.VII of RA 9054. In turn,
Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly,
petitioner Sahali‐Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. The DILG Secretary
therefore did not take over the administration or the operations of the ARMM.

2. The deployment is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers as understood

under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers
shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the
three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress
that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority
to exercise the same.

3. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution,
which provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s
exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter.
As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is
clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for
calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is
shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court
will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Thus, the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted
without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation
beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not
easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for
satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible
to the courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to judge
necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also prove
unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be difficult to verify,
or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a
nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence

network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential
or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss
of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the
military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if
it were to have any effect at all. x x x.

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. They simply
alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of
emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary had
no basis too.

The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation
1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and
hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was
movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic
to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the
President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control
the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously
threatened the peace and security in the affected places.

Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court
must respect the President’s actions. (Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R. No. 190259, June 7,
2011)

Municipality of Makati vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private respondent

Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After hearing, the RTC fixed the appraised value
of the property at P5,291,666.00, and ordered petitioner to pay this amount minus the advanced
payment of P338,160.00 which was earlier released to private respondent. It then issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the
petitioner which was deposited in PNB. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied upon execution, for
to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper appropriation
required under the law. The RTC denied the motion. CA affirmed; hence, petitioner filed a
petition for review before the SC.

Issue:

1. Are the funds of the Municipality of Makati exempt from garnishment and levy upon
execution?

2. If so, what then is the remedy of the private respondents?

Held:

1. Yes. In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and
execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More particularly, the properties of a
municipality, whether real or personal, which are necessary for public use cannot be attached
and sold at execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality. Municipal
revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and which are intended primarily and
exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of the
municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the municipal council of
Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding
to the balance due under the RTC decision, no levy under execution may be validly effected
on the public funds of petitioner.

2. Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal
recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of
a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy
of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefor.

For three years now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property
notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation to pay just
compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of the property since the same has
been the site of Makati West High School since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not
condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation
proceedings it had in fact initiated. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised
within the bounds of fair play and justice. (Municipality of Makati vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 89898-
99, October 1, 1990)
Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo

Facts:

The widow of Tan Toco sued the Municipal Council of Iloilo for the amount of P42,966.40
representing the purchase price of a strip of land which was appropriated by the Municipality
to widen a public street. The trial court sentenced the said municipality to pay the amount so
claimed, plus the interest. When the municipality was unable to pay the judgment, the widow
obtained a writ of execution by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks used for
street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile, two police stations, and two markets, including
the lots on which they had been constructed. The provincial fiscal filed a motion praying that
the attachment on the said property be dissolved as being illegal and violative of the rights of
the defendant municipality. CFI granted the motion. Hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the property levied upon is exempt from execution

Held:

Movable and immovable property of a municipality, necessary for governmental purpose, may
not be attached and sold for the payment of a judgment against the municipality. The supreme
reason for this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is devoted.
The necessity for government service justifies that the property of public of the municipality
be exempt from execution just as it is necessary to exempt certain property of private
individuals in accordance with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Even the municipal income is exempt from levy and execution. In volume 1, page 467,
Municipal Corporations by Dillon we find that:

Municipal corporations are instituted by the supreme authority of a state for the public good.
They exercise, by delegation from the legislature, a portion of the sovereign power. The main
object of their creation is to act as administrative agencies for the state, and to provide for the
police and local government of certain designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end
they are invested with certain governmental powers and charged with civil, political, and
municipal duties. To enable them beneficially to exercise these powers and discharge these
duties, they are clothed with the authority to raise revenues, chiefly by taxation, and
subordinately by other modes as by licenses, fines, and penalties. The revenue of the public
corporation is the essential means by which it is enabled to perform its appointed work.
Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of revenue, such a corporation is practically
destroyed and the ends of its erection thwarted. Based upon considerations of this character, it
is the settled doctrine of the law that only the public property but also the taxes and public
revenues of such corporations cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the
treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the proceeds of such
judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not subject to execution unless so declared
by statute. The doctrine of the inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is maintained,
although the corporation is in debt, and has no means of payment but the taxes which it is
authorized to collect. (Viuda de Tan Toco vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, G.R. No. L-24950,
March 25, 1926, 49 Phil. 52)

Pasay City Government vs. CFI Manila

Facts:

In 1964, Isip entered into a contract with the City of Pasay represented by then Mayor
Pablo Cuneta for the construction of a new Pasay City Hall for the contract price of
P4.9 million. Isip proceeded with the construction and accomplished the amount of
work equivalent to P1.7 million. Pasay paid only the total amount of P1.1 million,
leaving a balance of P613,000. Pasay failed to remit the amount, so Isip filed a case
for specific performance with damages before CFI Manila. The parties arrived at a
draft amicable agreement wherein it was stated that Pasay will remit P613,000 to Isip
and that Isip will start the construction work corresponding to the next stage. The
Municipal Board enacted an ordinance which approved the Compromise Agreement.
CFI approved the compromise agreement and subsequently issued a writ of
execution. An application for and notice of garnishment were made and effected upon
Pasay's funds with the PNB. Pasay filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
alleging that the Sheriff has no power to levy or garnish on execution the general funds,
specially the trust funds, of Pasay City. CFI denied the motion and ordered the
enforcement of garnishment. Hence, Pasay filed a petition for review before the SC.

Issue:

Are Pasay City funds deposited with PNB exempt from execution or garnishment?
Held:

All government funds deposited with the PNB by any agency or instrumentality of the
government, whether by way of general or special deposit, remain government funds
and may not be subject to garnishment or levy. But, inasmuch as an ordinance has
already been enacted expressly appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 of payment
to Isip, then the funds may be garnished. (Pasay City Government vs. CFI Manila,
G.R. No. L-32162, September 28, 1984)

Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois

Facts:

The municipality of Paoay leased 6 fishery lots to Francisco V. Duque for a period of
four years but the latter failed to comply with the terms of the lease contract. Thus, the
municipality approved a resolution confiscating said lots and advertised its lease for
public bidding. Teodoro Manaois, being the highest bidder, was awarded the lease.
However, Manaois was not able to exercise his right to possession because Duque
continued to claim possession over the properties and, despite the appeal to the
Municipality of Paoay to put him in possession and the efforts of the municipality to
oust Duque, Duque succeeded in continuing in his possession and keeping Manaois
and his men out.

Manaois filed a case against the Municipality of Paoay to recover the sum paid by him
for the lease of the fishery lots plus damages. The trial court ruled in his favor and a
writ of execution and attachment were issued to enforce the judgment. The
municipality filed a petition asking for the dissolution of that attachment of levy of the
properties but it was denied. Thus, the municipality filed a petition for certiorari with
the writ of preliminary injunction, asking that the order of the trial court be reversed
and that the attachment of the properties of the municipality be dissolved. The
municipality contended that the properties attached by the sheriff for purposes of
execution are not subject to levy because they are properties for public use.

Issue:

May the fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay or its usufruct may be levied
upon and subject to execution? How about the revenue or income derived from the
renting of these fishery lots?
Held:

No. There can be no question that properties for public use held by municipal
corporation are not subject to levy and execution. Properties for public use like trucks
used for sprinkling the streets, police patrol wagons, police stations, public markets,
together with the land on which they stand are exempt from execution. Even public
revenues of municipal corporations destined for the expenses of the municipality are
also exempt from the execution. The reason behind this exemption extended to
properties for public use, and public municipal revenues is that they are held in trust
for the people, intended and used for the accomplishment of the purposes for which
municipal corporations are created, and that to subject said properties and public
funds to execution would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances
destroy said purpose.

Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by municipality in its

proprietary capacity is treated by great weight of authority as the private asset of the
town and may be levied upon and sold under an ordinary execution. The same rule
applies to municipal funds derived from patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been
held that shares of stocks held by municipal corporations are subject to execution. If
this is true, with more reason should income or revenue coming from these shares of
stock, in the form of interest or dividends, be subject to execution.

The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, which had been
parceled out or divided into lots and later let out to private persons for fishing purposes
at an annual rental are clearly not subject to execution. In the first place, they do not
belong to the municipality. They may well be regarded as property of State. What the
municipality of Paoay hold is merely what may be considered the usufruct or the right
to use said municipal waters, granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised
Administrative Code.

Now, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of Paoay over its municipal waters,
subject to execution to enforce a judgment against the town? No. First, it is not a
usufruct based on or derived from an inherent right of the town. It is based merely on
a grant made by the Legislature. These marine waters are ordinarily for public use,
open to navigation and fishing by the people. The municipality of Paoay is not holding
this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to enable it to
dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its property through execution.
The Legislature thru section 2321 of the Administrative Code, as already stated, saw
fit to grant the usufruct of said marine waters for fishery purpose, to the towns
bordering said waters. Said towns have no vested right over said marine waters. The
Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or as a matter of public policy, may at any
time, repeal or modify said section 2321 and revoke this grant to coastal towns and
open these marine waters to the public. Or the Legislature may grant the usufruct or
right of fishery to the provinces concerned so that said provinces may operate or
administer them by leasing them to private parties. All this only goes to prove that the
municipality of Paoay is not holding this usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or
absolute manner so as to enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from
it as its property through execution.

Second, if this were to be allowed and this right sold on execution, the buyer would
immediately step into the shoes of the judgment-debtor municipality. Such buyer
presumably buys only the right of the municipality. He does not buy the fishery itself
nor the municipal waters because that belongs to the State. All that the buyer might
do would be to let out or rent to private individuals the fishery rights over the lots into
which the municipal waters had been parceled out or divided, and that is, after public
bidding. Then, we shall have a situation rather anomalous to be sure, of a private
individual conducting public bidding, renting to the highest bidders fishery lots over
municipal waters which are property of the State, and appropriating the results to his
own private use. The impropriety, if not illegality, of such a contingency is readily
apparent. The situation imagined implies the deprivation of the municipal corporation
of a source of a substantial income, expressly provide by law. Because of all this, we
hold that the right or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its municipal waters is not
subject to execution.

But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the renting of these fishery lots
is certainly subject to execution. It may be profitable, if not necessary, to distinguish
this kind of revenue from that derived from taxes, municipal licenses and market fees
are provided for and imposed by the law, they are intended primarily and exclusively
for the purpose of financing the governmental activities and functions of municipal
corporations. Not so with the income derived from fisheries. In the first place, the
usufruct over municipal waters was granted by the Legislature merely to help or bolster
up the economy of municipal government. This kind of revenue is not indispensable
for the performance of governmental functions. In the second place, the amount of this
income is far from definite or fixed. It depends upon the amounts which prospective
bidders or lessees are willing to pay. In other words, too many municipalities engaged
in this business of letting out municipal waters for fishing purposes, it is a sort of
sideline, so that even without it the municipality may still continue functioning and
perform its essential duties as such municipal corporations.

We call this activity of municipalities in renting municipal waters for fishing purposes
as a business for the reasons that the law itself allowed said municipalities to engage
in it for profit. And it is but just that a town so engaged should pay and liquidate
obligations contracted in connection with said fishing business, with the income
derived therefrom.

In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering about forty in the municipality of
Paoay, mentioned at the beginning of this decision are not subject to execution. For
this reason, the levy and attachment made by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte of
theses fishery lots is void and the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
insofar as it failed to dissolve the attachment made on these lots is reversed. However,
the amount of P1,712.01 in the municipal treasury of Paoay representing the rental
paid by Demetrio Tabije on fishery lots let out by the municipality of Paoay is a proper
subject of levy, and the attachment made thereon by the Sheriff is valid. (Municipality
of Paoay vs. Manaois, G.R. No. L-3485, June 30, 1950)

Quimbo vs. Gervacio

Facts:

Petitioner Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was placed under preventive

suspension without pay after he was administratively charged for harassment and
oppression. The Ombudsman found him guilty of oppression and ordered his
suspension for 8 months without pay. The Court of Appeals, however, found him guilty
of simple misconduct only and penalized him with 2 months suspension without pay.
Quimbo filed a Motion for Modification/Reconsideration praying that he should no
longer be required to serve the penalty of 2 months suspension without pay, he having
priorly served preventive suspension for more than 2 months. He argued that he
should not be punished twice nor be made to suffer the suspension penalty after he
had served the same (although in a preventive suspension).

Issue:
May the period within which one is under preventive suspension be credited to form
part of the final penalty of suspension?

Held:

No. There is a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and

suspension as penalty.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the
accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is
the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24

of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.

SEC. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in

office but is considered to be a preventive measure.

Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule
XIV provides:

SEC. 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under
preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penaltyof suspension
imposed upon the employee found guilty.

Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty.

To rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between,
and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.

Since the law explicitly prescribes the rules on crediting of preventive suspension to
the final penalty of suspension, petitioners invocation of equity may not lie. (Quimbo
vs. Gervacio, G.R. No. 155620. August 9, 2005)

Caniete vs. Secretary of Education

Facts:

Petitioners Caniete and Rosario are public school teachers at the Juan Sumulong High
School in Quezon City. For being absent on 20 and 21 September 1990, they were
charged by then Education Secretary Isidro Cario with alleged participation in the
mass actions/strikes on said dates. Petitioners were placed under preventive
suspension on 21 September 1990. In his Decision, Secretary Cario found petitioners
"guilty as charged" and dismissed them from the service "effective immediately. On
appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found that petitioners were only guilty of
being absent without the necessary leave of absence, and not as charged by
Secretary Cario of participating in the mass actions/strikes on said dates. Accordingly,
petitioners were meted out the penalty of reprimand without payment of back salaries.
CA affirmed the decision. Hence, petitioners appealed.

Issue:

Are petitioners entitled to the payment of back salaries?

Held:

The pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law (Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the
Administrative Code) on preventive suspension are as follows:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.
xxx
(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may
be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which
case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.
xxx
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty
is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an
appeal.

SEC 51. Preventive Suspension.- The proper disciplining authority may preventively
suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are
reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from the service.

SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation.-

When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety
(90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided,
That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.

Thus, there are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are
charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive
suspension pending investigation and (2) preventive suspension pending appeal if the
penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after
review, the respondent is exonerated.

We held in Gloria that the employee who is placed under preventive

suspension pending investigation is not entitled to compensation because such
suspension "is not a penalty but only a means of enabling the disciplining authority to
conduct an unhampered investigation." Upon the other hand, there is right to
compensation for preventive suspension pending appeal if the employee is eventually
exonerated. This is because "preventive suspension pending appeal is actually
punitive although it is in effect subsequently considered illegal if respondent is
exonerated and the administrative decision finding him guilty is reversed.

Given the substantial factual similarities of this case to Gloria, there is clearly no
reason for this Court to rule against the payment of back salaries to herein
petitioners. (Caniete vs. Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 140359. June 19, 2000)

Pablico vs. Villapando

Facts:

An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan

against then Mayor Alejandro Villapando of San Vicente, Palawan for abuse of
authority and culpable violation of the Constitution for entering into a consultancy
agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue
that this amounted to appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-
year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution.

In his answer, Villapando invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the Department of
Justice dated August 21, 1992, stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate
within one year from the election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment
to a government office or position as prohibited by the Constitution.

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found respondent guilty and imposed on him the
penalty of dismissal from service. The Office of the President affirmed the decision.
Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal mayor in place of Villapando.

The Court of Appeals declared the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered
Pablico to vacate the office.

Issue:
May local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President validly impose the
penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local officials?

Held:

Section 60 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provides:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. – An elective local official may be
disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following grounds:
x x x x x x
An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated
above by order of the proper court.

It is clear from the last paragraph of the aforecited provision that the penalty of
dismissal from service upon an erring elective local official may be decreed only by a
court of law. Thus, in Salalima, et al. v. Guingona, et al., we held that “[t]he Office of
the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since such power is
exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph
of the aforequoted Section 60.”

Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, however, adds that – “(b) An elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The grounds
enumerated in Section 60, Local Government Code of 1991] by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion
of the other.” The disciplining authority referred to pertains to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the President.

As held in Salalima, this grant to the “disciplining authority” of the power to remove
elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that
prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation may alter, amend, or
contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. Implementing
rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they implement, for a regulation
which operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a nullity. (Pablico vs.
Villapando, G.R. No. 147870. July 31, 2002)

Socrates vs. Comelec

Facts:

Hagedorn had served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for three consecutive terms:
in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the three-term limit
principle, Hagedorn opted not to ran for the same position in the 2001 elections, in
which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, the incumbent
mayor, Socrates, faced recall proceedings. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor in the recall election. Socrates filed a petition to disqualify Hagedorn on the
ground that the latter cannot run for the said post for his 4th consecutive term having
been elected and having served as mayor for 3 consecutive full terms immediately
prior to the recall election for the same post.

Issue:

Is Hagedorn disqualified to run under the three-term limit rule?

Held:

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states:
"Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected."

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code, which provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official was elected."
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides
that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit
rule. The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary
severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to
form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular
election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any
subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for
two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening
period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

What the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following
three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent
reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end
of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third
consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the
third term.

After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen
until the recall election of September 24, 2002. From June 30, 2001 until the recall
election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During
the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an
interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his
voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. An involuntary interruption
occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke the continuity or
consecutive character of Hagedorn's service as mayor. (Socrates vs. Comelec, G.R.
No. 154512, November 12, 2002)

Tuzon and Mapagu vs. CA and Jurado

Public officers not personally liable for injuries occasioned by performance of
official duty within scope of official authority; erroneous interpretation of
ordinance does not constitute bad faith.

Facts:

In 1977, the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan thought of fund-raising

scheme to help finance the construction of a Sports and Nutrition Center. They
adopted Resolution No. 9 whereby all thresher operators who will apply for a permit to
thresh will be required to donate 1% of all the palay threshed by them.

Private respondent Jurado tried to pay the P285.00 license fee for thresher operators
but Municipal Treasurer Mapagu refused to accept payment and required him to first
secure a mayor’s permit. Mayor Domingo Tuzon, on the other hand, said that Jurado
should first comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the permit
could be issued.

Jurado filed an action for mandamus with the CFI Cagayan to compel the issuance of
the mayor’s permit and license. He filed another petition for declaratory judgment
against the resolution for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure. Named
defendants were the same respondents and all the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Camalaniugan

The trial court upheld the challenged measure. Jurado appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the validity of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing
agreement. Nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu liable to pay actual and moral
damages for acting maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's application
for the mayor's permit and license. As for the Resolution, it was passed by the
Sanggunian in the lawful exercise of its legislative powers granted by Article XI,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which provided that each LGU shall have the power
to create its own source revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitation as may
be provided by law. And also under Article 4, Sec. 29, PD 231: The barrio council may
solicit money, materials, and other contributions from private agencies and individuals.

Issues:

1. WON a resolution imposing a 1% donation is a valid exercise of the taxing power of

an LGU.
2. WON petitioners are liable in damages to private respondent Jurado for having
withheld from him the mayor's permit and license because of his refusal to comply with
Resolution No. 9.

Held:

1. NO. While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that the municipal
government merely intends to "solicit" the 1% contribution from the threshers, the
implementing agreement seems to make the donation obligatory and a condition
precedent to the issuance of the mayor’s permit. This goes against the nature of a
donation, which is an act of liberality and is never obligatory.

If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in
view of the challenge raised by the private respondents to have been enacted in
accordance with the requirements of the Local Tax Code. These would include the
holding of a public hearing on the measure and its subsequent approval by the
Secretary of Finance, in addition to the usual requisites for publication of ordinances
in general. .

2. NO. Petitioners acted within the scope of their authority and in consonance with
their honest interpretation of the resolution in question. It was not for them to rule on
its validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would
have to be presumed. As executive officials of the municipality, they had the duty to
enforce it as long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled
by the courts. xxx As a rule, a pubic officer, whether, judicial, quasijudicial or executive,
is not personally liable to one injured in consequence of an act performed within the
scope of his official authority, and in line of his official duty. xxx It has been held that
an erroneous interpretation of an ordinance does not constitute nor does it amount to
bad faith, that would entitle an aggrieved party to an award for damages. (Philippine
Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu)

The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Article 27 of the New Civil
Code, which reads:
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file
an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act
on the private respondent's application was an attempt to compel him to resort to
bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either that the mayor
and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly negligent
in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.

It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners
singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the
petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayor's permit
and license he needed. The petitioners were not Jurado's business competitors nor
has it been established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary,
the record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in
the municipality without discrimination or preference.

The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners' acts, he was
prevented from operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit
therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he
could have taken the prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later
challenging it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite, he
could have continued to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the
lucrocesante that he now says was the consequence of the petitioners' wrongful act.
He could have opted for the less obstinate but still dissentient action, without loss of
face, or principle, or profit. (Tuzon and Mapagu vs. CA and Jurado, G.R. No. 90107,
August 21, 1992)

Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte

Facts:

Sabas Torralba was employed as a truck driver of the provincial government of Ilocos
Norte. While driving his truck, he ran over Proceto Palafox, resulting to the latter’s
death. Sabas was prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence to which he
pleaded guilty. The heirs of Palafox instituted a civil case against him and the Province.

Issue:
Can the Province of Ilocos Norte be held liable for the death of Palafox?

Held:

NO. The general rule is that local government units are not liable for negligent acts of
its employees while they are performing governmental functions or duties. In this case,
the driver was involved in the construction or maintenance of roads which was a
governmental duty. Therefore, the province cannot be held liable for his negligent act.
However tragic and deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province
no duty to pay monetary consideration. (Palafox vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, 102 Phil
1186)

Torio vs. Fontanilla

Facts:

On October 21, 1978, the municipal council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan passed 2

resolutions: one for management of the town fiesta celebration and the other for the
creation of the Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee. The Executive
Committee, in turn, organized a sub-committee on entertainment and stage with Jose
Macaraeg as Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the cancionan. While
the zarzuela was being held, the stage collapsed. Vicente Fontanilla was pinned
underneath and died in the afternoon of the following day. Fontanilla’s heirs filed a
complaint for damages with the CFI of Manila. The defendants were the municipality,
the municipal council and the municipal council members. In its Answer, defendant
municipality argued that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs
sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its
governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence
of any of its agents. The defendant councilors, in turn, maintained that they merely
acted as agents of the municipality in carrying out the municipal ordinance providing
for the management of the town fiesta celebration and as such they are likewise not
liable for damages as the undertaking was not one for profit; furthermore, they had
exercised due care and diligence in implementing the municipal ordinance. CFI held
that the municipal council exercised due diligence in selecting the person to construct
the stage and dismissed the complaint. CA reversed the decision and held all
defendants solidarily liable for damages.

Issues:

1. Is the celebration of a town fiesta authorized by a municipal council a governmental

or a corporate function of the municipality?

2. Is the municipality liable for the death of Fontanilla?

3. Are the municipal councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the fiesta
committee liable for the death of Fontanilla?

Held:

1. The holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan
was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality.

Section 2282 of the Chatter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code
simply gives authority to the municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if the purpose is to
commemorate a religious or historical event of the town is in essence an act for the
special benefit of the community and not for the general welfare of the
public performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the
celebration, as claimed was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For instance, the
maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the nonetheless it is private
undertaking as distinguished from the maintenance of public schools, jails, and the
like which are for public service. No governmental or public policy of the state is
involved in the celebration of a town fiesta.

Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are two fold. In one
they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the
duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental Their officers and
agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by the are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and
servants of the state. In the other capacity, the municipalities exercise a private,
proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as
public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in
behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the
state or sovereign power.

2. Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is liable for

damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla because the accident was attributable to
the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.
Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . .

Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.

It was found that the stage was not strong enough considering that only P100.00 was
appropriate for the construction of two stages and while the floor of the "zarzuela"
stage was of wooden planks, the post and braces used were of bamboo material. The
collapse of the stage was also attributable to the great number of onlookers who
mounted the stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within
its command to prevent such an occurrence. But they failed take the necessary steps
to maintain the safety of the stage, particularly, in preventing non-participants or
spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage.

Municipality cannot evade ability and/or liability under the fact that it was Jose
Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal
council appointed Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and
in charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely as an
agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior mentioned earlier,
petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his
assigned tasks.

3. The celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a

governmental function. The legal consequence thereof is that the Municipality stands
on the same footing as an ordinary private corporation with the municipal council
acting as its board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a
personality, separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it
and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort or
negligence culpa aquilla committed by the corporation's employees or agents unless
there is a showing of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The records
do not show that municipal councilors directly participated in the defective construction
of the "zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform. Thus, they are absolved from liability. (Torio vs. Fontanilla, GR No. L-29993,
October 23, 1978)

Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme

FACTS: A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for
damages against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party
Complaint against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig.
Municipality filed its answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After
trial, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to
pay jointly and severally the heirs of Baniña.

ISSUES:

1. Are municipal corporations suable?

2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?

HELD:

1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when
they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to
show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing
this, the claimant cannot recover.

In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his
way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the
dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any
liability. (Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme, No. L-52179, April 8, 1991)

City of Manila vs. Teotico

Facts:

In 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos
Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. When a
jeepney came along to a stop, he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney
but he fell inside an uncovered manhole. Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the
manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces thereof to pierce his left
eyelid. Several persons pulled him out of the manhole and one of them brought him to
the hospital, where his injuries were treated. Thereafter, he sued for damages, under
Article 2189 of the Civil Code, the City of Manila, the mayor, the city engineer, the city
health officer, the city treasurer, and the chief of police. CFI Manila ruled against him
but the CA, on appeal, ruled that the City of Manila should pay damages. The City of
Manila assailed the decision of the CA on the ground that the charter of Manila states
that it shall not be liable for damages caused by the negligence of the city officers in
enforcing the charter; that the charter is a special law and shall prevail over the Civil
Code which is a general law; and that the accident happened in national highway.

Issue:

Is the City of Manila liable?

Held:
Yes. It is true that in case of conflict, a special law prevails over a general law and that
the charter of Manila is a special law while the Civil Code is a general law. However,
looking at the particular provisions of each law concerned, the charter of Manila
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or
injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." There is no particular exemption but merely a general exemption. Upon
the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code provides a particular prescription making
"provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury
suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 of the charter of Manila refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article
2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action
is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive
thereon.

The allegation that the incident happened in a national highway was only raised for
the first time in the City’s motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals, hence it
cannot be given due weight. At any rate, even though it is a national highway, the law
contemplates that regardless if whether or not the road is national, provincial, city, or
municipal, so long as it is under the City’s control and supervision, it shall be
responsible for damages by reason of the defective conditions thereof. In the case at
bar, the City admitted they have control and supervision over the road where Teotico
fell when the City alleged that it has been doing constant and regular inspection of the
city’s roads, P. Burgos included. (City of Manila vs. Teotico, G.R. No. L-23052, 29
January 1968)

Abella vs. Municipality of Naga

Facts:

The Municipality of Naga, by a resolution, closed a road which ran through the public
market and Abella’s property and used the closed thoroughfare to expand the market.
Constructions were made along the sidewalk of Abella's property and abutting to said
property, and extending out in the middle of the same street, hence depriving Abella's
property of access to said street. Abella sought damages from the CFI of Camarines
Sur, which ruled in her favor by ordering the municipality to pay P300 pesos for
damages. The municipality appealed to the SC. It contended it is not liable for
damages as it acted and exercised its police power to preserve the peace and good
order of the community and promote the general welfare.

Issue:

Is the municipality liable for damages considering that it merely exercised its police
power to preserve peace and good order of the community and promote general
welfare?

Held:

Yes. The municipality was not charged with any unlawful act, or with invading Abella’s
property rights, it was not found guilty of any such acts. What is in issue in this case is
the liability for damages. Sec. 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
"No municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof shall be closed without indemnifying
any person.”

The stipulation of facts admits that Abella was economically damaged and adversely
affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street into a market. Hence, the municipality
must be held liable for damages. (Abella vs Municipality of Naga, G.R. No. L-3738,
November 20, 1951)

Issue:

1. Has Morales already served his 3 consecutive term?

2. If so, who should then take his position?

Held:

1. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that
he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Respondent Morales was elected for the term 1998-2001. He assumed the position.
He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the
electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (Morales) as mayor (because
the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term).
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat
continuously without any break since 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he
will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. His assumption
of office for the second term constituted “service for the full term” and should
be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by
the constitutional and statutory provisions barring local elective officials from being
elected and serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same position.

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some
safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of consecutive
terms. Therefore, having found respondent Morales ineligible, his Certificate of
Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a candidate, the
votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray votes.

2. The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve
for the remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term. In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has
ruled that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

As a consequence of petitioner’s ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested

office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with
Section 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:

Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor
and Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. (Rivera III vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 167591. May 9, 2007)
Dizon vs. Comelec

Facts:

Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a case with
the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor of Mabalacat on
the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served three previous consecutive
terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local Government Code. Dizon alleged that
Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. Thus, Morales should
not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of Candidacy on March 2007 for the
same position and same municipality.

Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to run as
mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in the 1998
elections. He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998
elections. Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term
should be reckoned from 2001. He added that his election in 2004 is only for his
second term.

COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition. It took
judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9, 2007 where it
was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in 1995, 1998 and 2001
(notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest case that the then
proclamation of Morales was void). The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the
three-term limit under Section 43 of the LGC. Hence, Morales was considered not a
candidate in the 2004 elections, and this failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a
gap and allows him to run again for the same position in 2007 elections.

Issues:

1. WON the period served by Morales in the 2004-2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term

2. WON the 2007-2010 term of Morales is his 5th term

Held:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales
during his fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December
2003. This cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004
elections. The votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.

Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government
Code state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.

There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the

disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms.

In the Rivera case, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four
consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We
disqualified Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the
three-term limit. Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for
the 1998-2001 term was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’
service with respect to the 1998-2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was
promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.

Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office
with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length
of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was
effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our
decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30
June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter
how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus,
Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)

2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales
occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:
1995-1998
1998-2001
2001-2004
2004-2007.

However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for
the 2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for
the full term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’
occupancy of the position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted
as a term for purposes of computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17
May 2007 to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term
for purposes of the three-term limit rule. (Dizon v. Comelec, G.R. No. 182088, January
30, 2009)

Monsanto vs. Factoran

Facts:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant

treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could
be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant
city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of
Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of
a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped
out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date
of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of
her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of
the amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive
Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek
appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:

1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive,
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her
by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with
the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it
is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed
the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past.
It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon
the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since
the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done
or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by
pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss
of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9,
1989)

Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council

Facts:

In 1994, instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added to the JBC
as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House
of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.
Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow
the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is
this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. Respondents argued that
the crux of the controversy is the phrase “a representative of Congress.” It is their
theory that the two houses, the Senate and the House of Representatives, are
permanent and mandatory components of “Congress,” such that the absence of either
divests the term of its substantive meaning as expressed under the Constitution.
Bicameralism, as the system of choice by the Framers, requires that both houses
exercise their respective powers in the performance of its mandated duty which is to
legislate. Thus, when Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution speaks of “a
representative from Congress,” it should mean one representative each from both
Houses which comprise the entire Congress.
Issue:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case?

2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?

3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only
when these conditions sine qua non are present, especially when the constitutionality
of an act by a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing
to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is
true that a “personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not
to say that only official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court
and question the JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise
screens and nominates other members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in
this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts all over the country
may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process
of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy. The
claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of
concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right
to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
2. Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that
the provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its
composition where the regular members are enumerated: a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a representative
from the private sector. On the second part lies the crux of the present controversy. It
enumerates the ex officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a representative of
Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal
and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one
(1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of
a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have
in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the
postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est
recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word
“Congress” used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic
sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House
of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical
purpose, that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided
into half (1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause
disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie
is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered illusory, defeating the
precise mechanism which the Constitution itself createdWhile it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is
sensible to presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break
a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word
“Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so
worded because at the time the said provision was being drafted, the Framers initially
intended a unicameral form of Congress. Then, when the Constitutional Commission
eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress, the Framers, through oversight,
failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary
function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in
Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary
in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot
simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation
because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence,
the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes

no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of
operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally
recognized. They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair play.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when
a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would
put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.3

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and
holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition
of the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez vs. Judicial and
Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012)

Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec

Facts:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for
the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former
President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of
the disqualification cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the
results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of
Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before

the Comelec stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his
conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
(OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President
Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested
upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered
the second highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor
of Manila.

Issue:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been
convicted of the crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?

Held:

Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal
point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by
former President Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it
could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore
former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-
C, provides that the President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant
pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and
remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of

election laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the
favorable recommendation of the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in
which the President may not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases;
(2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving
violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any
act of Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the
President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows
that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are
included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his
civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were
expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in
relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded
in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition
– a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person
who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment
of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon
conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e.,
"[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any
elective position or office," neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate against
the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or
limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as
it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the
statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree
of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the pardon
conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction

to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where
the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand
nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s

promise never to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated
the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make
this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. (Risos-Vidal vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 206666,
January 21, 2015)

Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez

Facts:

Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. Jimenez
was sentenced to life imprisonment while Barrioquinto remained at large. Before the
period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8,
which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized
under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against
persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from
December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the
offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation.
Jimenez decided to apply for amnesty. Barrioquinto, who had then been already
apprehended, did the same. The Amnesty Commission returned the cases of the
petitioners to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding on the case
saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having committed the crime, they
cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

Issue:

Is admission of guilt necessary in amnesty?

Held:

The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on

a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty. Amnesty must be
distinguished from pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence
of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon
looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right
of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and
it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence"; while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September

7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non,
admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege
the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant
or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said
Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits
of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance." Although the
accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the
courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits. For, whether or not he
admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy,
or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is
entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have
rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or not, in accordance with the terms of
the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts
as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms
of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within
their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with
such offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that the accused is entitled to
said benefits. (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949)
Anonymous Letter-Complaint against
Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
MeTC Manila

Facts:

Atty. Morales, Branch Clerk of Court of MeTC, Branch 67, Manila was investigated on
the basis of an anonymous letter alleging that he was consuming his working hours
filing and attending to personal cases, using office supplies, equipment and utilities.
The OCA conducted a spot investigation aided by NBI agents. The team was able to
access Atty. Morales personal computerand print two documents stored in its hard
drive, which turned out to be two pleadings, one filed in the CA and another in the RTC
of Manila, both in the name of another lawyer. Atty. Morales computer was seized and
taken in custody of the OCA but was later ordered released on his motion, but with
order to the MISO to first retrieve the files stored therein.

Atty. Morales, in defense, argues that since the pleadings were acquired from his
personal computer which was confiscated without any valid search and seizure order,
such evidence should be considered as the fruits of a poisonous tree as it violated his
right to privacy.

The OCA disagreed with the report of the Investigating Judge that there was no
evidence to support the charge against Atty. Morales as no one from the OCC
personnel who were interviewed would give a categorical and positive statement
affirming the charges against Atty. Morales, along with other court personnel also
charged in the same case. The OCA recommended that Atty. Morales should be found
guilty of gross misconduct.

Issues:

1. Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales's personal computer admissible in the
present administrative case against him?

2. May the right against unreasonable searches and seizures be invoked in an

administrative case?

3. Was there consented warrantless search in this case?

4. Is there a ground to hold Atty. Morales liable of the charge?

Held:

1. While Atty. Morales may have fallen short of the exacting standards required of
every court employee, the Court cannot use the evidence obtained from his personal
computer against him for it violated his constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

2. As expounded in Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, any violation of the aforestated

constitutional right renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.

3. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred and must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. The burden of proving, by clear and
positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given lies with the State. Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is
not to be presumed and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights. To constitute a valid consent or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it must be shown that (1) the right
exists; (2) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right.

In this case, what is missing is a showing that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to
relinquish his right. While he may have agreed to the opening of his personal computer
and the printing of files therefrom during the spot investigation, it is also of record that
Atty. Morales immediately filed an administrative case against said persons
questioning the validity of the investigation, specifically invoking his constitutional right
against unreasonable search and seizure.

4. And as there is no other evidence, apart from the pleadings, retrieved from the
unduly confiscated personal computer of Atty. Morales, to hold him administratively
liable, the Court had no choice but to dismiss the charges against him for insufficiency
of evidence. (Anonymous Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-08-2520,
November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361)

Lonzanida vs. Comelec

Facts:

Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation
relative to the 1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC
and then by COMELEC null and void on the ground of failure of elections.

On February 27, 1998, or about three months before the May 1998 elections,
Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of
execution it issued. Juan Alvez, Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the
remainder of the term.

In the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His
opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida
had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998,
petitioner Lonzanida was proclaimed winner.

The COMELEC granted the petition for disqualification.

Petitioner Lonzanida challenged the validity of the COMELEC resolution maintaining

that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption
of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying
the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections. He also argued that the COMELEC
ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification after he was proclaimed
winner in the 1998 mayoral elections as the proper remedy is a petition for quo
warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure.

The private respondent maintained that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995
should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of
mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the
next mayoral elections.

Issues:

1. WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May
1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying
the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

2. WON COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification
after petitioner was proclaimed winner.

Held:

1. NO. Two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

“To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.”

The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the
petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May
1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office.

After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the COMELEC itself
declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral
elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid
election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court
that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and while a
proclaimed candidate may assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the
Board of Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to
the final outcome of the election protest. Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 because he was not duly
elected to the post; he merely assumed office as presumptive winner, which
presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided with finality that
Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.

Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The
respondents’ contention that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full
term from May 1995-1998 because he served the greater portion of that term has no
legal basis to support it; it disregards the second requisite for the application of the
disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second
sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, “Voluntary renunciation
of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. “The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and
grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the
three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ
of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office
for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot
be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution
of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998
mayoral elections should therefore be set aside.

2. NO. It was held in the case of Sunga vs. COMELEC that the proclamation or the
assumption of office of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is
pending before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to
continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

“Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.”

The clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing
of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The
outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which
remained unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified
will unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying
tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has been proclaimed.

It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent

the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation
of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed elected
does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and may no longer be
the subject of a separate investigation.” (Lonzanida vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
135150. July 28, 1999)

Montebon vs. Comelec

Facts:

Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of
Tuburan, Cebu in 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections. However, in January 2004, or
during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the position of vice-mayor of
Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When he filed his certificate of
candidacy again as municipal councilor for 2007 elections, a petition for
disqualification was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. In his answer,
Montebon argued that he cannot be disqualified on the ground of the 3-term limit rule
because his second term was interrupted when he assumed the position of vice-mayor
due to the retirement of elected vicemayor Petronilo Mendoza. Petitioners maintained
that Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 should not be
considered an interruption in the service of his second term since it was a voluntary
renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.

Issue:

Was Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an involuntary

severance or interruption?

Held:

Yes. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of

Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become vice mayor.

The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the
vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception.
Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post does
the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple refusal of
the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the contemplation
of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume the office that he
is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so if for some reason
he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post vacated.

Thus, succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not

voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government official,
the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible administrative and
criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the performance of public
functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory rather than voluntary.

In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to the
retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Montebon, being the highest ranking municipal
councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law. Thus, Montebon's assumption of
office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an involuntary severance from his office as
municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It
cannot be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was
by operation of law. (Montebon vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 180444. April 9, 2008)
Note:

● Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post as councilor in order to
assume office as vicemayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot, without more,
be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.

Pimentel vs. Aguirre

Facts:

In 1997, President Ramos issued AO 372 which: (1) required all government
departments and agencies, including SUCs, GOCCs and LGUs to identify and
implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at
least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items
(Section 1) and (2) ordered the withholding of 10% of the IRA to LGUs (Section 4) .
On 10 December 1998, President Estrada issued AO 43, reducing to 5% the amount
of IRA to be withheld from LGU.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering all
LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU'S fiscal autonomy

2. Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision
over local governments

Held:

1. Section 1 of AO 372 does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy
does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of
supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent
with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the
economic and planning agency of the government, primarily responsible for
formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and
economic policies, plans and programs for the entire country. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs
are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private
sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit,
the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of
[the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and
Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the
necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but
in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of
national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year
x x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2)
consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of
Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance,
Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any
adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the
collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the
current one.

Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the
issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to
show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector
deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different
leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority
to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment.

AO 372, however, is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent
with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only to advise all
government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that
will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is facing economic
difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being
merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the
President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized
as an exercise of the power of control.

2. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is

the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies
further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5)
days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback
that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose." As a rule, the
term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning. The
provision is, therefore, imperative. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19,
2000)

People vs. Salle

Facts:

In 1991, Salle and Mengote were convicted of the compound crime of murder and
destructive arson before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote appealed their
case to SC on March 24, 1993.

In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court required Salle's
counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the
voluntariness of the motion.

Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel
on his misimpression that the motion was necessary for his early release from the New
Bilibid Prison following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on December
9, 1993. She also stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon and that
he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She prayed that the Court
grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.

On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion. Mengote, however, did not file
a motion to withdraw appeal.

After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which provides
that the President may, except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise provided in
the Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1)
the Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-appellants to submit their
memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional pardon and (2) the
Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court
why it recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the
pendency of the appeal.

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the conditional
pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because the judgment of
conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this Court of his appeal.

On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the conditional pardon
extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it
argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was
deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon
which resulted in the finality of his conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

Held:

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of
all the Members of the Congress.

Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may be

exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It is, of course,
entirely different where the requirement is " final conviction," as was mandated in the
original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by
final judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of
conviction becomes final.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably perfected,

(b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when the right to appeal
is expressly waived in writing, except where the death penalty was imposed by the
trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to
appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be
granted to the appellant.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present
Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused
during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by the trial court. Any application
therefor, if one is made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant
should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or
instrumentalities of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused
that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such
proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court or the appellate
court, as the case may be.

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the
appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence,
or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those responsible therefor
administratively liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely
rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused from confinement.

WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby

given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted
the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such
withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau
of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody the said
appellant, for which purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National
Police or the National Bureau of Investigation. (People vs. Francisco Salle, Jr. and
Ricky Mengote, G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995)
In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Wilfredo S. Torres

Facts:

Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of two counts of estafa.
The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000. In 1979, a conditional
pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition he would
"not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines." Torres accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. In 1986, upon
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the President cancelled the
conditional pardon because Torres had been charged with 24 of estafa and convicted
of sedition.

The wife and children of Torres filed before the SC a petition for habeas corpus praying
for the immediate release of Torres from prison on the ground that the exercise of the
President's prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to
determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of
pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence,
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Is a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee a requirement for the

President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a
conditional pardon?

Held:

A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the
Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the
latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon,
he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an
additional one. By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the
pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or
his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms
and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such
person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his
pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this
jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny. The
determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his
liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the power that has granted it,
cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the findings may be upon
which his recommitment was ordered.

It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the
three criminal cases filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that
the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right
to a speedy trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially
adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres
remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which
had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond
judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until
November 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive
author of the conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to
reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the
subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no authority to
interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been
our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is
not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a
breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts
to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the
exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office. (In Re:
Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Torres, G.R. No. 122338, December 29,
1995)

People vs. Casido

Facts:

In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-appellants

William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for pardon, as well as for amnesty before
the National Amnesty Commission. They were granted conditional pardon during the
pendency of their appeal. Their applications for amnesty were also favorably acted
upon.

Issue:

Whether or not the pardon and amnesty was valid

Held:

The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty
granted them and not by the pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice
thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence
of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon
looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that
reason it does nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it
in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward
and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency
of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the
first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which
accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This
Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress. (People vs. Casido, G.R.
No. 116512, March 7, 1997)

People vs. Patriarca

The person released under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal
Code, provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the
penalty and all its effects are thus extinguished.

Facts:

Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo Arevalo before
RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also charged with
murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under
Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively. The RTC
found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.

Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty
to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed
Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political
Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty
Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political beliefs.

Issue:

What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-appellant?

Held:

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty
stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.

Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose
N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the
appeal.

Patriarca was acquitted of the crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 2773 while
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672 were ordered dismissed.(People vs. Patriarca,
Jr. G.R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000)

Pormento vs. Estrada

Facts:

Estrada was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 1998
elections. He sought the presidency again in the May 2010 elections. Pormento
opposed Estrada’s candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification. COMELEC
(Division) denied his petition as well as his subsequent Motion for Reconsideration (En
Banc). Pormento then filed the present petition for certiorari before the Court. In the
meantime, Estrada was able to participate as a candidate for President in the May 10,
2010 elections where he garnered the second highest number of votes.

Issue:

Is Estrada disqualified to run for presidency in the May 2010 elections in view of the
prohibition in the Constitution which states that: "[t]he President shall not be eligible
for any reelection?

Held:

Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran. Since the issue
on the proper interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be premised on a persons
second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is
in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may
conclusively be decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the
parties herein. As such, one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review, the existence of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this
case.

As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies.The Court is
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare
principles or rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the
case before it. In other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.

An action is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy

because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in
dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention
unless the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for
the court to resolve as the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent
events.

Assuming an actual case or controversy existed prior to the proclamation of a

President who has been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the same is no
longer true today. Following the results of that elections, private respondent was not
elected President for the second time. Thus, any discussion of his reelection will simply
be hypothetical and speculative. It will serve no useful or practical purpose. (Pormento
vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 191988, August 31, 2010)

Manalo vs. Sistoza

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the
ranks in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National
Police. Thus, directors and chief superintendents of the PNP do not fall under
the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.

Facts:
On December 13, 1990, former President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Republic
Act 6975, creating the Department of Interior and Local Government. The said Act
states that the PNP Chief, Chief Superintendent and Director General shall be
appointed by the President subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Pursuant thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin
S. Drilon, promoted 15 police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National
Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took
their oath of office and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the
Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M.
Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of
subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contents that: (1) RA
6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior
superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where
the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent
Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers
despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or
in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation

2) Whether or not the PNP is akin to the AFP
3) Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional

Held:

1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of officers of
the government to be appointed by the President:

First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first group require
the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The appointments of
respondent officers who are not within the first category, need not be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress
cannot by law expand the power of confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
and require confirmation of appointments of other government officials not mentioned
in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.

The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of
the 1987 Constitution, “The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a
citizen armed force which shall undergo military training and service, as may be
provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the security of the State.”

On the other hand, Section 6 of the same Article of the Constitution ordains that: “The
State shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law.”

The police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks
in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors
and chief superintendents of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers,
do not fall under the first category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments.

3. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on

Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose appointments are
not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are unconstitutional. The rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law declared void
are severable from the main statute and the removal of the unconstitutional provisions
would not affect the validity and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute
remains valid without its voided sections. (Manalo vs. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369,
August 11, 1999)