Chapter 1

THE PROBLEM AND REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

A. ORIGIN OF THE CONFLICT

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its New People’s Army (NPA)
which is the armed wing of CPP launched their armed struggle against the Philippine
government in 1968. International Crisis Group. (2011). The Communist Insurgency In
The Philippines. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-
asia/philippines/communist-insurgency-philippines-tactics-and-talks.
Jose Maria Sison, a popular former student activist established CPP-NPA within
the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), which was established in 1930. For decades,
the PKP participated in electoral boycotts and used a guerrilla army to fight against the
Japanese colonialism, U.S. colonialism, and Filipino elites. In 1957, Republic Act No.
1700 banned the PKP and any of its successors, from participating in politics. Even after
PKP elites largely gave up on the idea of armed struggle, Sison argued for continuing the
violence. In 1967, in what Sison called the First Great Rectification Movement, he
proposed major changes within the PKP, allegedly to reestablish the Communist
movement properly in the Philippines (Rosca, 2004). Sison who was later forced out of
the PKP for his criticism of its leaders, established the CPP on 1968 (Abinales, 1992).
Also in December 1968, Sison met Bernabé Buscayno, another former activist who had
leaded an armed group during a Communist-led uprising in the 1950s called the Huk
Rebellion. Together with Bernabé Buscayno, Sison created the NPA on March 29, 1969,
in which Buscayno became its first commander, bringing his fighters into the newly
established militant wing. Counterinsurgency operations coupled with an internal split
crippled the organisation and cost it many of its supporters in the early 1990s. By the year
2000, the CPP-NPA had regained strength and has since proved resilient against the
government. International Crisis Group. (2011). The Communist Insurgency In The
Philippines. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-
asia/philippines/communist-insurgency-philippines-tactics-and-talks.

B. Communist Party of the Philippines – New People’s Army

Leadership Leadership

Jose Maria ‘Joma’ Sison whose alias is “Amado Guerrero” founded the CPP-
NPA. Since 1986, he has been exiled in Utrecht, The Netherlands, where his official title
is Chief Political Consultant of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP).
He is believed to still be the leader of the CPP and to have released several policy
documents under the pseudonym Armando Liwanag, claims in which Sison denies
(Zamora, 2006). A number of former NPA leaders have separated from the group,
including former NPA chief Romulo Kintanar, who split from the CPP in 1992 and was
liquidated by the NPA in 2002 (Rosal, 2003). Rodolfo Salas, CPP Chair in
1977–86 and NPA chief in 1976–86, also left the party (Salas, 2003).
Members
During the 1970s and 1980s, thousands of educated and committed youths from
the cities joined the NPA, to be met by similarly well-educated, cosmopolitan, and urban
unit leaders. The composition of the NPA today is different, with the ranks mainly made
up of rural youths, often in their late teens and early twenties. During those protests, held
against then-President Ferdinand Marcos, student leaders demanded constitutional
change. Outrage after the Marcos’ crackdown which is considered to be brutal against the
demonstrations boosted the CPP-NPA’s ranks, with participants joining the CPP-NPA and
causing it to surpass the PKP in popularity (Abinales, 1992). In the present Membership
in the ranks of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) is
now ageing and declining in numbers as they fail to recruit young ones "without coercion
or intimidation" according to the Philippine Government. The CPP claimed in March
2007 that it had 12,000 fully-armed soldiers in 130 guerrilla fronts in 70 of 79 provinces
(Scarpello, 2007).

Sources of financing and support

The NPA’s support is mostly derived from the ‘revolutionary taxes’ and ‘permits
to campaign’ the armed group collect from politicians campaigning in their “area” during
elections. A government study estimates that the rebels raise about PHP 4 billion a year,
including PHP 1.5 billion collected from companies. (Agence France Presse, 2003;
Mogato, 2003). To attract foreign finance, the group attempted to establish working
relations with the Workers Party of Korea; the Habash, Jebril, and Hawatmeh (Maoist)
factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO); the Japanese Red Army (JRA);
the Nicaraguan Sandinistas; the Communist Party of El Salvador; the Peruvian
Communist Party; and the Algerian military. Some of these groups reportedly provided
financial aid, arms, training, or other types of support to the NPA. Front trading
companies were allegedly set up in Hong Kong, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. The CPP-NPA
also explored solidarity work with Albania, Libya, Tunisia, Tanzania, Poland, Vietnam,
Bulgaria, Romania, Algeria, Panama, Peru, Brazil, and Cuba. The CPP established a unit
in the Netherlands and sent representatives to Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Ireland,
United States, Sweden, and the Middle East. Most of its foreign support was cut
following the CPP split in 1992 and the collapse of Communism worldwide. Even before
the split, its trading companies abroad collapsed because of external pressures
(Revolutionary Workers Party, 1999). In 1976, the CPP-NPA lost the Chinese
government’s support when the Philippines and China normalized their relations after
years of severed ties after the Chinese Communist Party rose to power in 1949 (Benito,
1999) , while aid from the Netherlands ceased in 1993 (Dawson, 1993).

Link with other terrorist groups

In its early years, around the 1970s, the CPP-NPA sought support, weapons,
funds, and training from like-minded groups overseas, including the Japanese Red Army
(JRA), the Maoist factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the
Sandinistas, the Communist Party of El Salvador, and many other organizations; the CPP-
NPA’s efforts were partially successful. The CPP-NPA has been linked to several
Communist or leftist groups in the Philippines through the NDF, which serves as an
umbrella for many organizations, including the Cordillera People’s Democratic Front
(CPDF), the Revolutionary Council of Trade Unions (RCTU), and the Liberated
Movement of New Women (MAKIBAKA). (Santos, 2010)

The CPP-NPA is known to give help to the MILF and MNLF and during the
groups struggle with the governments military forces to “and exploit what it called the
low morale in the military caused by the fighting in Mindanao” as posted in the groups
website but the government denies that there are ties with the two groups and said such
was nothing but a desperate attempt on the part of the CPP-NPA to call on the MNLF and
MILF members to join them according to the Armed Forces information chief Lt. Col.
Bartolome Bacarro in a statement.

C. EFFECTS OF CPP-NPA PRESENCE

Displacement and violence in tribal communities

The militarisation and displacement of communities in upland areas of Surigao del Sur
have attracted national attention. One affected community is barangay Mahaba, located a
45-minute drive on a poorly maintained gravel road into the hills that slope up from
Surigao del Sur’s coast. This lush area is part of the Andap Valley, which spans the
uplands of several municipalities. Several communities in the valley have evacuated
their homes over the last ten years, fearful of encounters between soldiers
and the NPA. Around 90 soldiers from the 36th infantry battalion arrived in barangay
Mahaba in March 2010 and set up camp in various locations: the barangay hall, a day
care and the chapel. Some families let the soldiers stay in their houses. According to a
local activist, the families in the barangay are split between those who back the
government and those who favour the guerrillas.

Economy

Three CPP-NPA units, totaling

approximately two hundred fighters,
attacked three mining companies in
Surigao del Norte. The targeted
companies allegedly had not paid the so-
called revolutionary taxes to the CPP-
NPA. CPP-NPA fighters took four
hostages, who were released shortly, and
caused around $1 billion in damage.
(Serrano, B. (2011, October 03). NPA
rebels attack 3 mining firms in Surigao del
Norte. GMA News Online, Retrieved
from
https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/
regions/234134/npa-rebels-attack-3-
mining-firms-in-surigao-del-norte/story/)
The CPP/NPA/NDFP oppose foreign ownership of Philippine resources; mines,
plantations, logging concessions, construction companies and other foreign owned
business tend to be their targets.

Gold-mining areas in Compostela have become the main funding source for the New
People’s Army, according to military officials.The NPA finances itself through extortion
and protection rackets, dubbed “revolutionary taxation,” while also engaging in small-
scale mining and marijuana cultivation.

The government’s plans to attract $10-billion to $13-billion (U.S.) in investment by 2013

have been hampered by the ongoing conflict with the CPP.

http://ploughshares.ca/pl_armedconflict/philippines-cppnpa-1969-first-combat-deaths/

Bibliography
Abinales, P.N. “Jose Maria Sison and the Philippine Revolution: A Critique of an
Interface.” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies 8.1 (1992). Web. 11
Aug. 2015.
Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed
Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey,
April 2010.
Cordillera People’s Democratic Front. “Message of the Cordillera People’s
Democratic Front on the 42nd NDFP Anniversary.” National Democratic Front of the
Philippines, International Information Office, 14 May 2015.

https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/regions/234134/npa-rebels-attack-3-
mining-firms-in-surigao-del-norte/story/

Lim, Benito. “The Political Economy of Philippines-China Relations.” Philippine APEC

Study Center Network, Sept. 1999. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.
http://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1057935
Rosca, Ninotchka, and Jose Maria Sison. Jose Maria Sison: At Home In the World—
Portrait of a Revolutionary. Greensboro: Open Hand Publishing, LLC, 2004. Print.

Salas, Rodolfo. 2003. ‘RK Was a True Hero of the Masses.’ 2 February.
http://www.philsol.nl/A03a/Kintanar-Salas-feb03.htm

Scarpello, Fabio. 2007. ‘Philippines: “Poverty and Misgovernance” Feeds Communist

Revolt.’21 March. AdnKronos International Southeast Asia Bureau.

The Communist Insurgency In The Philippines. Retrieved from

https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/communist-insurgency-
philippines-tactics-and-talks

Tiglao, Rigoberto. “Days of Shame: August 21, 1971 and 1983.” The Manila Times, 20
Aug. 2013. Web. 11 Aug. 2015.

Zamora, Fe. 2006. ‘GMA War Endgame vs. NPA.’ Philippine Daily Inquirer (Manila). 18
June, pp.A1, A10.
 Chapter 3

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Peace negotiations/talks between the Philippine Government and CPP-NPA-NDF

Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1992)

Peace negotiations between the government and CPP-NPA started during the term
of former President Corazon C. Aquino after the President Ferdinand Marcos was ousted
from presidency when martial law ended. In 1986, the Aquino administration and the
CPP-NPA engaged in a short-lived peace negotiation and ceasefire. In 1990, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and National Democratic Front of
the Philippines (NDFP) have agreed to enter peace negotiations in which such
negotiations can proceed without any prerequisites. The NDPF not wanting to extend the
presence of US Military bases in the Philippines, declared a unilateral ceasefire to
encourage the senate to reject the treaty extending such Military bases. However, Aquino
administration approved the treaty, resulting to the withdrawal of the unilateral ceasefire
by the CPP-NPA. (Curaming, Rommel A. “The End of an Illusion: The Mendiola
Massacre and Political Transition in Post-Marcos Philippines, 2013)

Analysis:

The peace negotiation between the Aquino administration and the CPP-NPA
failed because there was no agreement established between the two parties as to
extending the US Military bases in the Philippines.

Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998)

When President Fidel V. Ramos assumed office, his administration revived the
political negotiations with the CPP-NPA. Peace talks resumed after political settlement
with the group had failed during the Aquino administration.

In 1992, the Hague Joint Declaration was signed by Pres. Ramos and the
representative of National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) Luis Jalandoni. It
served as a framework of the peace negotiations between the government and the NDPF
to obtain a just and lasting peace by holding the negotiations according to the mutually
accepted principles of the parties without any preconditions.

When the formal peace talks began in 1995, the government and NDFP signed the
Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantee (JASIG) which paved the way for
future peace talks as the said agreement guaranteed a free and safe movement for the
negotiators, consultants, and other personnel who participate in the negotiations without
fear of being searched or arrested. (Sarmiento, 2005)

In 1998, another agreement was signed by the parties, the Comprehensive Agreement
to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) which
assured the protection of the human rights of every citizen. It was designed to protect
civilians from being subjected to violence in the differences between the government and
CCP-NPA. However, political settlement between the two parties failed again after the
signing of CARHRIHL and the conflict escalated during Estrada’s administration. (The
Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks.” International Crisis
Group, 14 Feb. 2011)

Analysis:

The political settlement between the government and CCP-NPA during Ramos
administration failed due to the opposite views and interpretations of the parties and
violations of their agreements. The goverment’s assertion of sole sovereignty has
undermined the possibility of two existing political authorities which violated their
agreement that no preconditions should exist that would negate the character of peace
negotiation.

Joseph Ejercito Estrada (1998-2001)

Former President Joseph Estrada on March 1998 signed the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law (CARHRIHL) for it to be formally approved. Both parties, the Philippine
Government and the CPP-NPA-NDF, acknowledged under this agreement, that respect
for human rights and adherence to the principles of international law are necessary to
achieve just and lasting peace. (Sarmiento 2003, 10-11).

However, the NPA on February 1999, abducted four military officers which leads
to the suspension of peace talks and the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity
Guarantees (JASIG) by former President Estrada. Two months later, the officers were
released for humanitarian considerations and acts of goodwill. The strained peace
negotiations worsen when the senate ratified the Visiting Forces Agreement negotiated by
the Estrada Administration and the US. The NDF recognized it as a de facto termination
by the government of the peace talks for it violates the Philippine sovereignty and
constitution. (Belle & Farahnoosh, 2015)

The Government formally ended the peace talks and terminates the JASIG.
During Estrada’s Administration, formal talks were suspended and peace negotiations
were terminated. (Belle & Farahnoosh, 2015)

Analysis:

The peace negotiations during Estrada’s administration was short-lived because

although both parties agreed towards the attainment of just and lasting peace by
recognizing that respect to human rights and adherence to the principles of international
law is necessary for its achievement, hostile activities were still initiated by the NPA
which caused the government to adopt measures against such movement. Agreement as
to the other aspects of the conflict were not addressed, therefore the Government and the
NPA never reached an absolute agreement that will cover all the considerations that needs
to be highlighted, resulting to suspension and termination of efforts to negotiate
peacefully.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010)

It took nearly a three-year stall from the previous administration

before the government was able to initiate another negotiation. In
March 2001, the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity
Guarantees (JASIG, 2016) was reinstated, which had been
established on February 24, 1995 between the Philippine
Government and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines, to
guarantee immunities and safety of individuals involved in the peace
talks. (Gavilan, 2017) As a consequence thereto, on April 30, 2001,
the Oslo Joint Communique was released. Included therein were
measures to release political prisoners and detainees listed by
human rights organizations and the return of displaced communities
to their ancestral lands.

However, the peace talks took another stall when the United
States of America listed the CPP-NPA as part of its “foreign terrorist
organizations” on August 9, 2002. This had made the CPP-NPA to
desist from conducting further negotiations with the Philippine
Government. It was only on February 10 to 14, 2004 when the first
round of formal peace negotiations took place which discussed the
listing of the CPP-NPA as a terrorist group. Subsequently, two more
rounds of peace talks were held until on August 24, 2004, when the
peace talks took another stall after the United States of America
retained the terrorist tag upon CPP-NPA. In 2006, the administration
set an all-out war against the rebels. Eventually, on February 2010,
the peace talks under the Arroyo Administration took an end when the
said administration failed to accede with the demands of the CPP-
NPA. (Jimenez, 2017)

Analysis:
When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo replaced Estrada in 2001, she
held some negotiations with the CPP-NPA, but those negotiations
stalled after the United States listed the CPP-NPA as a terrorist
organization at Arroyo’s request in 2002. Philippine forces increased
their operations against the organization throughout the 2000s and
claimed in 2010 to have drastically reduced its ranks. (PDI, 2010)

The Philippine military intensified operations under its counter-

insurgency plan, Oplan Bantay Laya. The strategy has been blamed
for the spike in extrajudicial killings of leftist activists. Ostensibly,
Oplan Bantay Laya aimed first to curtail the group’s growth, then
reduce its numbers, firepower and areas of influence and eventually
to dismantle its organisational structure. (Hedman, 2006)
 When Arroyo’s term ended in June 2010, the military claimed to
have reduced the number of NPA fighters to below 5,000. During the
final years of the Arroyo administration, government and military
officials stated publicly that fissures had developed between Sison
and the Philippine-based leadership, Wilma and Benito Tiamzon.
These divisions were blamed for derailing the resumption of formal
talks in August 2009. Norberto Gonzales, Arroyo’s national security
adviser and then acting secretary of defence, claimed Sison, Luis
Jalandoni (the chair of the negotiating panel) and other senior figures
living in the Netherlands had lost the trust of the Philippine-based
CPP-NPA. The leadership in Utrecht issued a rebuttal. There is a
history of internal debate on strategy and tactics. Current tensions lie,
as they have before, in disagreements over dabbling in electoral
politics and pursuing peace talks with the government as opposed to
focusing on the “protracted people’s war” waged from the
countryside. Although Sison reasserted the armed struggle to
consolidate the party in the early 1990s, participating in elections
provides an opportunity for the party to raise funds and build support.
While the Tiamzons and other adherents to CPP orthodoxy believe
elections are only to be use. (CPP Central, 2010)

Benigno Aquino III (2010-2016)

Under the term of President Benigno Aquino III, the government

and the CPP-NPA held a special track meeting which led to the
declaration of a holiday ceasefire from December 20, 2012 until
January 15, 2013. Eventually, the special track meeting had ceased
sometime in February 2013 when the CPP-NPA made demands from
the government which were not complied by the latter. These
demands included the return to barracks of the military and police
forces from Oplan Bayanihan and the recall of the government’s
conditional cash transfer program. On April 27, 2013 the government
formally ended the peace talks with the CPP-NPA as the latter
caused violence with the citizens and other entities. The Aquino
administration failed to make a successful negotiation with the rebel
group. (Jimenez, 2017)

Analysis:
In one article, Alexander Padilla, chair of the government panel
negotiating with the CPP-NPA-NDF, “We cannot wait forever for the
other side if they continually refuse to go back to the negotiating table
without preconditions. The government will be taking a new approach
to pursue peace.” The failure of the CPP-NPA to show sincerity and
political will on their part and the continued violence they are inflicting
on the innocent civilians brought all efforts of negotiations to an end.
(Calonzo, 2013)

The government had always been open to resume formal

negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDF, however, the rebel groups keep
on insisting on preconditions, such as the release of their detained
consultants. Failure by the government to comply with these
preconditions causes the other group to retaliate with violent attacks.
It is on these violent acts which forces the Aquino administration to
end the negotiations with these rebel groups. (Heydarian, 2015)

Rodrigo R. Duterte (2016-present)

On July 18, 2016, President Duterte approved a six-point peace
and development agenda that included a timeline for peace talks.
This was followed on July 25, 2016 a unilateral ceasefire with the
CPP-NPA-NDF but was lifted after five (5) days as the rebel groups
failed to impose a reciprocal ceasefire after the latter had ambushed
the military in Davao del Norte. Although the CPP no longer supports
the Duterte administration’s war on drugs, the peace panel of both
parties were optimistic to reach a peace talk.
 From August 22 to 26, 2016, the Duterte administration
conducts its first round of peace talks with the CPP-NPA-NDF in
Oslo, ending an almost five-year stall. With the Royal Norwegian
Government acting as a third-party facilitator, the round ended with
both parties agreeing to declare unilateral ceasefires. Also agreed
upon at the talks are the reaffirmation of the Hague Joint Declaration
and the reconstitution of the JASIG list, the acceleration of peace
talks, and the early release of prisoners and amnesty proclamation.

Following the first peace talk, on October 6-10, 2016, the

second round of peace talks took place in Oslo. The government and
the NDF agree on a framework for the Comprehensive Agreement on
Social and Economic Reforms (CASER), with the objective of
reducing poverty and inequality in the Philippines through sustainable
development, upholding social and economic rights, affordable
access to services and utilities, and a fiscal policy aimed towards
development. With both sides tussling over the “outcomes” listed in
CASER, more substantive negotiations are expected in the
succeeding talks.

The third round of peace talks is conducted in Rome, Italy, on

January 19 to 25, 2017, and end with an agreement to continue
unilateral ceasefires. From this talk, the government may move to
remove Sison from the terrorist list group. However, on the month of
February 2017, the NPA ended its unilateral ceasefire as the
government failed to comply with the former’s demands, and
subsequently, the government ended its unilateral ceasefire. On
February 7, 2017, the government cancels JASIG after Duterte
orders the termination of peace talks and the arrest of NPA
consultants who were part of the talks. He declares an “all-out war”
against the NPA. In return, the NPA declares “heightened” armed
resistance.

Following backchannel talks with the NDF, the fourth round of

peace talks is conducted in Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Negotiators forge an Interim Joint Ceasefire they call a milestone.
The parties also agreed to conclude the unfinished distribution of land
and do this for free for the landless and poor farmers, farm workers,
and fisherfolk, with just compensation to owners. Resources for land
acquisition and support services should may come in part from the
recovery of the Marcos hidden wealth, the OPAPP said. The parties
also agreed to form and convene bilateral teams to reconcile
provisions of their CASER drafts.

The fifth peace talk failed to push through as the extension of

Martial Law in Mindanao was in progress. The government and CPP-
NPA-NDF failed to push through a successful peace talk after the
succeeding months. On November 23, 2017, Duterte signs
Proclamation No. 360 which declares the termination of peace talks
with communist rebels, and later on signed a proclamation declaring
the CPP-NPA as a terrorist group. (Jimenez, 2017)

Analysis:
On the part of the CPP-NPA-NDF, they contended that it was
the government who was not cooperative in the negotiation process
as what it only wants is the compliance with the agreement. (Santos,
2010) Contrary to CPP-NPA’s accusations, it is the government, in
fact, who demonstrated sincerity in allowing the communists to
participate in governance by appointing them to sensitive Cabinet
positions. The President also went the extra mile to free incarcerated
CPP/NPA leaders to participate in the peace talks. But in every round
of talks, fresh demands were presented by the Reds while back home
ambuscades, extortion, harassments and murders were taking place.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) even opined that

the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army’s
insincerity, duplicity, and cunning is to be blamed for the failed peace
negotiations and not the military. While the ceasefire and peace
negotiations were ongoing, terrorist NPA members continued to
ambush soldiers. During the supposed lull in the fighting, the NPA
continued with their extortion activities, burning farm implements, and
government’s heavy equipment doing public works projects. The
NPAs also continued with their recruitment, regrouping, and
refurbishing. (Wakefield, 2018)

With the CPP-NPA-NDF’s rebellious acts even with the

existence of ceasefire, the government has no other option but to call
off the peace negotiations as the rebel group had become hostile.

BIBILIOGRAPHY

Jimenez, R. S. (2017, November 24). TIMELINE: The peace talks between

the government and the CPP-NPA-NDF, 1986 – present. Retrieved March 2,
2019, from
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meline-the-peace-talks-between-the-government-and-the-cpp-npa-ndf-
1986-present/story/

GPH-NDFP Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG).

(2016, November 21). Retrieved March 2, 2019, from
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137-154. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/17539151003594301

Heydarian, R. (2015). The quest for peace: The Aquino administration’s

peace negotiations with the MILF and CPP-NPA-NDF. Norwegian
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Hedman, E. E. (2006). The Philippines in 2005: Old Dynamics, New

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Wakefield, F. (2018, October 17). CPP should blame itself for collapse of
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collapse-of-peace-talks-afp/

Calonzo, A. (2013, April 27). PHL govt ends formal peace talks with
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Strive to make a great advance in the People’s War for New Democracy.
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