Sunteți pe pagina 1din 9

King 1

Ryan King

Professor Malcolm Campbell

UWRT H03 1103

31 October 2019

Old Missiles, Dirty Bombs, and Dirtier Tactics: An Exploration of Nuclear Terrorism

It seems fissile material, or material capable of nuclear fission, is blowing up nowadays.

Every government wants in on the action, and it’s an impressive boast: ‘Just try and wipe me off

the map, but know you’re coming with me.’ In theory, mutually assured destruction is working. I

know I – for one – haven’t been struck by any missiles as of late. However, countries have

defined and bombable borders. For a terrorist group operating amorphously across several

countries with connections to nuclear arms, the assured destruction wouldn’t be so mutual. In

other words,: terroriststhey could strike an enemy and be largely protected from a nuclear

retaliation. It’s scary stuff. But how dire is the issue of nuclear terrorism, and what preemptive

measures can be taken to combat the problem?

Countries possess more nuclear weapons than they could ever need. The United States

and Russia, even post-Cold War de-escalation, could destroy the world permanently with their

arsenal many times over (Gorbachev). The number of detonated warheads required to trigger a

climate-destroying ‘nuclear winter’ is only around 100, whereas the United States alone has over

6000 (Kristensen). Overstocking is a major problem when it comes to nuclear terrorism. A

missing nuclear weapon would lead a country into a mass-panic or at least a state of emergency.

Despite this, countries like America keep an overabundant cache of stored weapons for no

practical reason. If we had far fewer nukes there would be a far lower chance that one could go

missing, get stolen, or otherwise. If a person carries around 1000 apples knowing they’ll only eat
King 2

five, it’d irresponsible to keep so many. Especially if a missing apple had such high stakes as a

missing nuclear warhead.

To illustrate my point with a real-world example, take the United States. One of the

simplest and most obvious ways a terrorist could come by nuclear weapons is by stealing a

shipment of them. Supposing we, as a country, want enough to destroy the world entire planet

even if one of our nuclear arsenals is hit;, it’d be generous to say we should have about 500

spread around the country at any given time. Again, that is five times the amount needed to end

life as we know it. With the current stock of 6000 there is a virtually pointless excess of 5500

nukes capable of being stolen that could never be used.

The security around them the bombs isn’t airtight either, particularly in transport. In

Goldsboro, NC, two nuclear bombs fell out of a broken B-52 bomber and left craters in the

ground. The incident occurred in 1961 and was a result of the plane breaking apart in midair due

to seemingly shoddy construction. Despite being ‘armed’, or ready to detonate, neither of the two

bombs went off due to fortunate faults in the wiring. Just two months after the Goldsboro

incident, a similar event happened in California. Twenty-one declassified instances have been

released in which nuclear weapons were dropped, lost, or some other accident occurred in their

transport (Lacey-Bordeaux). All released United States accidents involving nuclear armaments

are thought to involve no foul play from any outside parties, but terrorist groups could’ve seized

any number of these opportunities. There is an increased possibility for error and theft if such a

prodigious excess of these weapons continues to be left scattered around US military bases.

Cutting the number of extraneous nuclear arms would proportionately cut the chance of a

terrorist plot, in both the US and abroad.


King 3

Of course, overstocking is only an issue in theory. An unneeded abundance of stored

weapons leading to proportionally higher amounts of dangerous incidents is only speculation

based on simple probability. The basic idea is that more bombs in transport means more chance

for at least one slip-up to occur. Thankfully, tThere haven’t been any recorded incidences in

which an outside group takes advantage of a failure in transportinfiltrates a country and steals a

nuclear warhead. On top of that, the US and Russia have both been scaling back their respective

stocks of weapons since the end of the Cold War (Kristensen). Slowly but surely, overstocking is

being dealt with in the two countries holding the most nuclear arms. However, the risk taken in

overstocking is still important to consider; one slip-up bomb falling into the wrong hands could

cost the lives of millions of people.

On both a smaller and less hypothetical scale, real-world terrorists have acquired and

attempted to use nuclear material in a makeshift bomb. Chechen separatists protesting Russian

control in 1995 made the first ever dirty bomb, an explosive surrounded in by radioactive

material, that was placed in Moscow, Russia to terrify residents. It was partially buried in a park

when found by authorities, but no source for the radioactive material was ever found. All those

authorities could say regarding the incident is that there was an explosive wrapped in cesium

found somewhere in Ismailovsky Park (Krock).

The danger with this type of nuclear terrorism is how much harder it is to detect before

anything happens. Unlike government-sponsored warhead storages, which are meticulously

counted and inventoried as per international nuclear codes, stores of cesium aren’t always under

careful watch. But they should be, the material is radioactive and therefore dangerous to humans.

The most likely place to find cesium is in a hospital. Because of its’ applications Used in

chemotherapy, it has been a vital part in treating cancer since the late 20th century. Not only that,
King 4

but cesium-137 is also used to sterilize blood and even to check the thickness of steel on a

production line. It’s thought that the Chechen separatists stole their cesium from a hospital, but

none in the area even noticed they had any missing. The problem is, a terrorist only needs a few

milligrams to make a dirty bomb. And furthermore, if they use some form of lead protective gear

there is little danger to a terrorist looking to steal the material. Cesium is less radioactively potent

than uranium and therefore much more easily handled even by an amateur.

A detonation n explosion from a weapon of this kind launches radioactive material in

every direction. Despite how small the particles are, exposure to raw radioactive elements such

as cesium are enough to kill or poison a person well outside of the initial blast radiusexplosion.

And had those Chechen terrorists been successful, the park would become a hazard zone. Unlike

a normal bomb which creates a repairable hole and kills citizens near enough to the explosion,

dirty bombs leave a lasting effect. By expelling nuclear isotopes like shrapnel, even points

beyond their blast radius become peppered with pieces of harmful radioactive material. As if the

problem wasn’t bad enough, those same rRadioactive elements are notoriously difficult to

eradicate.

A bomb of this type is a huge help could be an important asset to groups aiming to spread

their ideals through fear. Multiple bombs in several government buildings could be strategically

detonated in order to radioactively quarantine those areas. Subways, airports, train stations, and

any other major hubs for travel could be cut off in the same way to halt productivity in a city. It

can happen anywhere. Greensboro, North Carolina has already seen nineteen cylindrical cases of

cesium go missing from a hospital (Krock). The reality is, any developed country has radioactive

material in reach of the public. Examples include isotopes found in smoke detectors, the cesium
King 5

in hospitals, and even uranium from a mine down in the earth. All of them can be strapped to a

makeshift explosive to create a devastating radioactive device.

As scary as a dirty bomb may be, there are even more damaging ways to use that very

same radioactive material. According to The Telegraph’s Nic Fleming, hundreds of people could Formatted: Font: Italic

be poisoned and burnt if cesium-137 or another radioactive isotope fell into the wrong hands.

The way this would be inflicted would be by way of food, water, or air. Already a KGB officer

has been killed by ingesting polonium-210 in a cup of tea, but it’s believed a more widespread n

attack of this kind could have a much higher death toll ifbe carried out if a terrorist party had no

specific targetwanted to cause as much damage as possible instead of assassinating an individual.

Radioactive material could be placed into drinking water, into food, dropped from an aircraft,

spread around buildings, and the list goes on. To make matters worse, the human body is far

more susceptible to damaging effects of radioactive substances when they’re inside the digestive

system. Those laced foods or that poisoned water would give an immediate and untreatable

illness. Depending on the targeted city and speed at which information of a poisoning could be

disseminated, there is a potential for thousands of people to die in just one incident alone.

massive loss of life. The Telegraph’s interviewed analysts guarantee at least hundreds of dead Formatted: Font: Italic

civilians from an attack like a contaminated water supply.

It’s clear that limiting the supply of cesium would drastically decrease the chance of a

terrorist attack. However, some believe that the use of cesium is a necessary risk that countries

must stick with. After all, it’s in hospitals to sterilize blood and for use in chemotherapy.

Manufacturing plants use it too on their production lines to test metal thickness or shape. The

argument that cesium and other potentially harmful radioactive materials are impossible to do

away with is factually wrong. All tasks except chemotherapy can be performed just as well
King 6

without the assistance of cesium. X-ray technologies can be used in both blood sterilization and

in manufacturing plants for their desired purposes. Devices called linear accelerators and

photochemical sterilizers are other options for sterilizing blood (Dalnoki-Veress). The truth is,

there are a variety of alternative ways to complete tasks that don’t involve radioactive material

but switching has an upfront cost most American hospitals don’t want to deal with. A possible

solution could be to include a tax benefit for making the switch to safer methods. Much like the

initiatives of green energy, the government could incentivize companies to make a change in

practices worthwhilein order to keep the people happy. The only other major solution to the

problem would be for the government to offer penalties instead of incentives. This route is more

comparable to the Environmental Protection Agency’s business waste regulations, or to the Food

and Drug Administration’s strict oversight of the meatpacking industry’s unsanitary practices.

By harming a company’s profit or regulating their decisions via oversight, the government would

effectively force hospitals to stop using cesium altogether.

Nuclear terrorism comes in many forms. It’s a complex issue with a lot of hypothetical

risks and fortunately few incidences. Given the odds, governments have arguably done a

goodfantastic job of regulating and maintaining security over radioactive material;. hHowever,

there are major improvements that should be made, and the issue should be taken more

seriouslythe continued presence of cesium in hospitals shows this issue isn’t being taken as

seriously as it should be. September 11th’s suicide attacks happened – in part – because of lax

security at airports. Mitigating risks when dealing with potentially harmful subjects materials or

contraptions such as planes, radioactive isotopes, and nuclear arms is essential to the safety and

security of citizens. Ideally, governments would start solving problems proactively instead of

reactively. As an example, airport security ramps up because of the potential danger posed by
King 7

plane hijacking versus the strengthening of airport security after a plane finally gets hijacked.

Solving a possible problem before anyone gets hurt is feasible if we see the danger coming, and

we already know how dangerous nuclear materials are. Nevertheless, I predict there will be at

least a small-scale nuclear terrorist attack of some sort in the United States before any major

restrictions are imposed on radioactive material. The US has the most widespread use of cesium-

137, and has taken no substantial measures, as other nations have done, to limit its’ use (Dalnoki-

Veress). From my research, it seems most likely that this attack would come in the form of

radioactive dispersion. Terrorists will disperse the material either by water or by air. Because

there are some security measures in place in the form of police and terrorist whereabout

documentation, they probably won’t be able to gather enough for a large-scale attack of several

cities. Nonetheless, it’s a dire issue that should – and will likely not – be solved before

something terrible happens.


King 8

Works Cited

Dalnoki-Veress, Ferenc, and Miles Pomper. “Dealing with the Double-Edged Sword of Cesium

Blood Irradiation.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 29 June 2017,

https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/dealing-double-edged-sword-cesium-blood-

irradiation/. Accessed 7 Nov. 2019.

Fleming, Nic. “Hospital Cesium Is 'Terror Chemical' Says Expert.” The Telegraph, 3 Aug. 2007,

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1559288/Hospital-cesium-is-terror-chemical-

says-expert.html. Accessed 4 Nov. 2019.

Gorbachev, Mikhail. “The Madness of Nuclear Deterrence.” Wall Street Journal, 29 Apr. 2019,

http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-madness-of-nuclear-deterrence-11556577762. Accessed

15 Oct. 2019.

Iliopulos, Ioanna, and Christopher Boyd. “Preventing a Dirty Bomb: Case Studies and Lessons

Learned.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 3 Oct. 2019. Accessed 4 Nov. 2019.

Kristensen, Hans M. “Status of World Nuclear Forces.” Federation of American Scientists,

Federation of American Scientists, May 2019, https://fas.org/issues/nuclear-

weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/. Accessed 4 Nov. 2019.

Krock, Lexi, and Rebecca Deusser. “Dirty Bomb | Chronology of Events.” Nova, Public

Broadcasting Service, Feb. 2003,

https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/dirtybomb/chrono.html. Accessed 7 Nov. 2019

Lacey-Bordeaux, Emma. “Declassified Report: Two Nuclear Bombs Nearly Detonated in North

Carolina.” CNN, AT&T, 12 June 12AD, https://www.cnn.com/2014/06/12/us/north-

carolina-nuclear-bomb-drop/index.html. Accessed 4 Nov. 2019.


King 9

Naseer, Rizwan, and Musarat Amin. “Nuclear Terrorism: Hype, Risks and Reality-A Case of

Pakistan.” South Asian Studies, Vol. 34, no. Issue 2, 1 July 2019, pp. 383–399.

search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=138601284&authtype=shib

&site=ehost-live&scope=site. Accessed 15 Oct. 2019

S-ar putea să vă placă și