Reconceptualizing Procedural Knowledge

Author(s): Jon R. Star

Source: Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, Vol. 36, No. 5 (Nov., 2005), pp. 404-
411
Published by: National Council of Teachers of Mathematics
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Research Commentary

ReconceptualizingProceduralKnowledge

JonR. Star,MichiganStateUniversity

Inthisarticle,
I arguefora renewed
focusinmathematics education
research
onproce-
duralknowledge. I makethreemainpoints: (1) Thedevelopment
ofstudents'proce-
duralknowledge hasnotreceived
a greatdealofattentioninrecent (2) one
research;
possibleexplanationforthisdeficiency
is thatcurrent
characterizations
ofconcep-
tualandprocedural knowledgereflect
limiting assumptionsabout
howprocedures are
known; and(3)reconceptualizing
procedural knowledgetoremedythese
assumptions
wouldhaveimportant forbothresearch
implications andpractice.
Keywords:Algorithm;
Conceptual
knowledge;
Flexibility; Procedural
Heuristic;
knowledge

Therespective rolesofprocedural andconceptual knowledge instudents'

learning
ofmathematics continue tobe a topicofanimated conversation inthemathematics
educationcommunity. As a prominent mathematics educator (Sowder,1998)noted
severalyearsago, "Whether developingskillswithsymbolsleads to conceptual
understanding, or whether thepresenceof basic understanding shouldprecede
symbolicrepresentation and skillpractice,is one of thebasic disagreements"
betweentheopposingsidesof theso-calledmathwars.Amongthosewhoargue
againstcurrentreform efforts,thereis a perceptionthatprocedural knowledge acqui-
sitionhasbeende-emphasized anddeemedless important thanconceptual knowl-
edge, withdire consequencesforstudentlearning(e.g., Budd et al., 2005;
Mathematically Correct, n.d.).Although somereformers mightdisagreewiththis
othersarequiteexplicitintheirbeliefthatprocedural
characterization, knowledge
shouldplay a secondary, supporting role to conceptualknowledgein students'
learningofmathematics (e.g.,Pesek& Kirschner, 2000). Somego so faras tostate
thataninstructionalfocusonprocedural knowledge, ratherthanconceptual knowl-
edge,leads to thedevelopment ofisolatedskillsandroteknowledge, andthat"a
rushforprocedural skillwillactuallydo moreharmthangood"(Brown,Seidelmann,
& Zimmermann, n.d.).
Thisissuehas deeprootsin ourfield(e.g.,Brownell,1945;Hiebert& Lefevre,
1986;Skemp,1976);thecurrent mathwarsindicatethatwe stillhavenotreached
consensusontherespective rolesofprocedural knowledge andconceptual knowl-

ThankstoHeatherHill,Deborah
Ball,Magdalene JackSmith,
Lampert, Colleen
James
Seifert, andseveral
Hiebert, anonymousreviewers
forhelpful
comments
on
earlier
versions
ofthisarticle.

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JonR.Star 405

edgein student learning. In fact,theremaybe more(andmorevitriolic) debateon

thistopicnow thanat anytimein therecentpast,particularly withrespectto
procedural skillacquisition. Whyis thatthecase? In thisarticle,I reflect
uponthe
natureoftheconversation aboutprocedures andconceptsbymakingthreepoints.
I claimthatdisagreements
First, ontheroleofprocedural knowledge inmathematics
learning areprimarilyideologicalrather thanempirical:We havenotdevoteda great
deal of attentionin ourresearchto procedural knowledgeand itsdevelopment.
Although we wantstudents touseprocedures "flexibly,
accurately, and
efficiently,
appropriately" (NationalResearchCouncil,2001,p. 116),we do notknowa lot
aboutwhatthisinstructional outcomelookslike,muchlesshowitmightdevelop.
Second,I claimthata reasonfortherelativelackofresearch onprocedural knowl-
edge is thatcurrentcharacterizations of thetermsproceduralknowledgeand
conceptualknowledge arelimiting andarein factimpediments to carefulinvesti-
gations ofthese constructs. I that
Third, argue reconceptualizing procedural knowl-
edge-and making it a renewed focus of research-would have important impli-
cationsforbothresearchandpractice.

LACK OF RECENT RESEARCH ON THE

DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE

A surveyofjournalsandpubliclyavailabledatabasesindicatesthatthedevel-
opmentofstudents' procedural knowledgehasnotbeena recentfocusofresearch
in mathematics education.A key word searchof the EducationalResources
Information Center(ERIC) databaseforproceduralfluency,a termrecently
promoted bytheNationalResearchCouncil(2001) inAddingIt Up,yieldedno
articles.Perhapsgiventhenewnessoftheterm,thisvoidmaynotbe surprising.
ERIC also indicates,however,thattheratioofjournalarticlesin mathematics
educationthatuse thetermsconceptualknowledge orconceptualunderstanding
to thosethatuse thetermsproceduralknowledge orproceduralskillis approxi-
mately4:1. Similarly,an ERIC key wordsearchof thepast 10 yearsof the
JournalforResearchinMathematics Education(JRME)forprocedureoralgo-
rithmyieldedsix articles,onlyfourof whichwereevenperipherally relatedto
students'knowledgeofprocedures. Perhaps mostconvincingly, of theapproxi-
mately100empiricalarticlesrelatedtothedevelopment ofK-12 students'math-
ematicalcontent knowledgepublishedoverthepastdecadeintheJRME,inonly
11 didtheresearchers carefully thedevelopment
investigate ofstudents'knowl-
edge ofprocedures. Althoughthissurveyis farfromexhaustive, itsuggeststhat
thewaysthatstudents cometo know,use, and understand mathematical proce-
dureshavenotbeena prominent focusofmathematics educationresearchforat
least 10 years.
Procedureswerewidelystudiedin the 1980s,whenmanystudiesfocusedon
students' errors(e.g.,Brown& VanLehn,1980;Matz,1980).In addi-
procedural
tion,a largeamountofliteratureonprocedural existsincognitive
skillacquisition
psychology(e.g., Anderson, Fincham,& Douglass, 1997), and therelationship

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406 Procedural
Reconceptualizing Knowledge

betweenprocedural andconceptualknowledgecontinues tobe a topicofresearch

in developmental psychology (e.g., Siegler,& Alibali,2001). But
Rittle-Johnson,
forat least thepast 10 years,mathematics educationresearchers have largely
avoideddetailedandcarefulstudiesofthedevelopment ofprocedural skill.
Why is that the case? It is perhaps no coincidence thatthe relativelack of
researchon procedures has occurredin a timeofpoliticalstrife formathematics
educators.As alludedto above,thedevelopment ofproceduralskillanditsrole
in K-12 instruction havebeenparticularly contentiousissuesin themathwars,
whichmightexplainsomeresearchers' reluctanceto pursuethistopic.In addi-
tion,and politicalreasonsnotwithstanding, someresearchers maybelievethat
proceduralknowledgeshouldnotbe a focusof researchor instruction, perhaps
becauseofa perception thatskillsareno longerofsufficient instructionalimpor-
tance(comparedwithconceptualknowledge)tojustifystudiesof interventions
primarily designedtoimproveprocedural knowledge.Otherresearchers mayfeel
thatthewidespreadavailability oftechnologicaltoolshas reducedoreliminated
theneedto studypedagogicaland cognitiveissuesassociatedwiththelearning
ofproceduralskills.Thereis evidence,however,thatmanymathematics educa-
torscontinueto believethatproceduralskillplaysa fundamental and vitalrole
instudents' learning ofmathematics (Ballheim,1999;NationalResearchCouncil,
2001). NotethatI amnotclaimingthatprocedural knowledgeis moreimportant
thanconceptualknowledge.Rather,I claimthatbotharecriticalcomponents of
students'mathematical proficiency and thusmeritcarefulstudy.
I proposea complementary explanation forthelackofmathematics education
research onthedevelopment ofprocedural knowledge-namely, thatcurrent char-
acterizations ofconceptualandprocedural knowledgereflect implicitandlargely
unfounded assumptions abouthowconceptsandprocedures areknown.

CURRENT CHARACTERIZATIONS OF
CONCEPTUAL AND PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE

The widespread use ofthetermsconceptualknowledge andproceduralknowl-

edge can be attributed
to theseminalbookeditedbyHiebert(1986), particularly
theintroductory chapterby Hiebertand Lefevre(1986). Theydefineconceptual
knowledgeas
knowledge that
isrichinrelationships.
Itcanbethoughtofasa connected
webofknowl-
edge,a network
inwhich thelinking areasprominent
relationships asthediscrete
pieces
ofinformation.
Relationshipspervadetheindividual
factsandpropositions
sothatall
piecesofinformationarelinkedtosomenetwork.(pp.3-4)
Procedural
knowledgeis definedas follows:
Onekindofprocedural
knowledgeis a familiarity
withtheindividual
symbols ofthe
systemandwiththesyntactic
conventionsforacceptable ofsymbols.
configurations
Thesecondkindofprocedural
knowledge ofrulesorprocedures
consists forsolving
mathematical Manyoftheprocedures
problems. thatstudents
possessprobablyare
chainsofprescriptions
formanipulatingsymbols.(pp.7-8)

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JonR. Star 407

A close lookattheseexcerpts revealsthatconceptual knowledgeis notdefined

as knowledgeofconceptsorprinciples, as a parsingofthephrasemightsuggest.
Rather, itis defined intermsofthequalityofone'sknowledge ofconcepts-partic-
the of
ularly richness theconnections inherent in suchknowledge. Thisdefinition
is a critical
departure frompsychological viewsofconcepts, especiallyinitsdepic-
tionofconceptual knowledge as richinrelationships. Thetermconceptdoesimply
connected knowledge, whether oneis speaking ofmathematical concepts(e.g.,limit,
slope) or conceptsmorebroadly(e.g., furniture, bicycle).But psychologically
speaking, knowledgeofa conceptis notnecessarily richin relationships(Medin,
1989):Theconnections inherent ina conceptmaybe onlylimitedandsuperficial,
ortheymaybe extensive anddeep.'Forexample,a veryyoungchild'sconceptual
knowledgeofdog maybe less deep,sophisticated, andconnectedthanan adult's
(Gelman,Star,& Flukes,2002); a similarpointcouldbe madeaboutthedifference
betweena 6thgrader'sandan 11thgrader'sconceptualknowledgeof slope.The
pointis thatmathematics educatorswho strictly adhereto HiebertandLefevre's
(1986) definition implicitlyreferonlyto a particular subsetofconceptualknowl-
edge:thatwhichis richlyconnected ordeep.
Whataboutproceduralknowledge?Hiebertand Lefevre(1986) definethis
termessentiallyas knowledgeof procedures:knowledgeof thesyntax,steps,
conventions, andrulesformanipulating symbols.In termsofthequalityofknowl-
edgeimplicit in the Hiebert
definition, and Lefevre(1986) suggestthattherela-
in
tionshipspresent procedural knowledgeare primarily sequential:A stepin a
procedure is connectedtothenextstep.By thisdefinition, procedural knowledge
is superficial; itis notrichin connections. As was thecase above,thisdefinition
is a significant departure frompsychologicalperspectives on procedures. There
aremanydifferent kindsofprocedures, andthequalityoftheconnections within
a procedure varies(Anderson,1982). Some procedures are algorithms,meaning
thatifone executestheprocedure'sstepsin a predetermined orderand without
error, oneis guaranteed toreachtheproblem'ssolution. Algorithms areapparently
whatHiebertandLefevrehadinmindwhentheycrafted theirdefinitionofproce-
duralknowledge; inalgorithms, itis thecase thatsequentialrelationshipspredom-
inate.Butotherprocedures areheuristics, meaningrulesofthumbor somewhat
generaland moreabstractprocedures thatmaybe helpfulin solvinga problem.
Heuristicproceduresare tremendously powerfulassets in problemsolving
(Schoenfeld,1979). The executionofheuristics requiresthatone makechoices;
wise choicescan indicatequitesophisticated anddeepknowledge.Mathematics
educatorswho strictly adhereto Hiebertand Lefevre'sdefinition of procedural
knowledgearereferring onlytoknowledgeofalgorithms; forthissubsetofproce-

1 Deep-levelknowledge hasbeenstructuredandstoredinmemory in a waythatmakesitmaximally

usefulfortheperformance oftasks,whereassurface-orsuperficial-level
knowledgeis associatedwith
rotelearning,inflexibility, and trialanderror(Glaser,1991). Deep-levelknowledgeis
reproduction,
associatedwithcomprehension, abstraction, criticaljudgment,
flexibility, andevaluation(De Jong&
Ferguson-Hessler,1996).

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408 Procedural
Reconceptualizing Knowledge

dures,itis reasonable todepictalgorithmic knowledge as typicallysuperficial,

fully
compiled, or rote (Anderson,1992).Heuristics, however, areprocedures too,and
theHiebertandLefevredefinition does notaccountforthem.2
Hiebertand Lefevre's(1986) definitions ofprocedural andconceptualknowl-
edgewerequiteinfluential inproviding mathematics educators witha well-defined
terminology torefer tostudents'knowledge ofmathematics. However, thepreceding
discussionillustrates thattheseterms sufferfroma entanglement ofknowledge type
andknowledge quality(De Jong& Ferguson-Hessler, 1996;Star,2000) thatmakes
theiruse somewhatproblematic, especiallyforprocedural knowledge.The term
conceptualknowledge hascometoencompassnotonlywhatis known(knowledge
ofconcepts)butalso one waythatconceptscan be known(e.g.,deeplyandwith
richconnections). Similarly,theterm procedural knowledge indicates
notonlywhat
is known(knowledge ofprocedures) butalso onewaythatprocedures (algorithms)
can be known(e.g.,superficially andwithout richconnections).
If knowledgetypeand knowledgequalityhave becomeconflated, thenwhat
woulditmeanto disentangle them?Considerthe2 x 2 matrixshownin Table 1.
The matrixsuggeststhatforbothknowledgetypes(knowledgeof conceptsand
knowledge ofprocedures), onecanhaveknowledge thatis either ordeep.
superficial
The current usage of theterms and
conceptualknowledge proceduralknowledge
makesitdifficult toconsider(orevenname)theknowledge thatbelongsinthedeep
procedural knowledge cell.3Deep procedural knowledge would be knowledgeof
procedures thatis associatedwith comprehension, flexibility,andcritical
judgment
andthatis distinct from(butpossiblyrelatedto)knowledge ofconcepts.Separating
theseindependent characteristics
ofknowledge (typeversusquality)allowsforthe
of
reconceptualizationprocedural knowledgeas potentially deep.

Table1
Typesand QualitiesofProceduraland ConceptualKnowledge
Knowledge
quality
Knowledge
type.
Superficial Deep
Procedural Common
usageof 9
proceduralknowledge
Conceptual 9 Common
usageof
conceptualknowledge

2 HiebertandLefevre(1986) acknowledge thattheirdefinitions

ofprocedural andconceptual knowl-
edgedo notaccountforheuristics. Theywrite,"No soonerthanwe proposedefinitions forconceptual
andprocedural knowledge andattempt toclarify
them,we mustbackup andacknowledge thatthedefi-
nitionswe havegivenandtheimpressions theyconveywillbe flawedin someway.As we havesaid,
notall knowledge fitsnicelyintooneclassortheother.Someknowledge liesattheintersection.
Heuristic
strategiesforsolvingproblems, whichthemselves areobjectsofthought, areexamples"(p. 9).
3 Thecellforsuperficialconceptualknowledge was alludedtointhepreceding discussionofconcep-
tualknowledge. Knowledgeofconceptscertainly involvesrelationships,
butthoserelationshipsarenot
necessarilydeep or rich.A learner'sinitialknowledgeof a conceptis typicallyquitesuperficialand
fragile,butovertimetherelationships can deepenandbecomericher.

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JonR.Star 409

Whatdoes deepprocedural knowledgelooklike?Inspiration forthisenhanced

viewofprocedural knowledge can be found in researchfrom the 1980sandearly
1990s(e.g.,Davis, 1983; Ohlsson Rees, 1991;VanLehn,1990). Forexample,
&
VanLehnproposedthata student can haveteleologicalunderstanding ofa proce-
or
dure,meaningknowledgeofitsdesign justification foritsuse. Similarly, Davis
writesofknowledgeofprocedures thatmightincludesuchthingsas theorderof
steps,thegoals and subgoalsof steps,theenvironment or typeof situationin
whichtheprocedure is used,theconstraints imposedupontheprocedure bytheenvi-
ronment or situation,and anyheuristics or commonsense knowledgethatare
inherent in theenvironment or situation. Bothoftheseexamplesillustrate proce-
duralknowledgethatis richinrelationships.
My own workon thedevelopment of proceduralflexibilityprovidesa more
concreteand recentexample(Star,2000, 2002a, 2001/2002b;Star& Seifert, in
press).Whenstudents useformal methods tosolvelinearequationsinalgebra,they
haveavailablea verylimited setofactions:addingtoorsubtracting from bothsides,
combining liketerms,distributing or factoring, andmultiplying or dividingboth
sides.Yetdespitethatlimitation, thereis a widearray ofproblem types.Skilledequa-
tionsolvershavetheabilityto use theequation-solving actionsflexibly, so thata
maximally efficient
solution can be for
generated anyproblem type. I consider flex-
ibilityto be an indicatorof deepprocedural knowledge.
Flexibilityis a nontrivial and oftenoverlookedcompetency. Considerthree
relatively simple(and superficially quitesimilar)linearequations:(a) 2(x + 1) +
3(x+ 1) 10; (b) 2(x 1) 3(x 1) 11;and(c) 2(x + 1) + 3(x + 2) = 10.Although
= + + + =
each oftheseequationscan be solvedwiththesame sequenceof steps(usinga
standard algorithm forsolvinglinearequations),themostefficient strategy may
notbe thestandardalgorithm. Furthermore, whatis meantbythemostefficient
strategy is quitenuanced.Is themostefficient strategytheonethatis thequickest
oreasiesttodo,theone withthefeweststeps,theone thatavoidstheuse offrac-
tions,or the one thatthe solverlikes the best? Thereare subtleinteractions
amongtheproblem'scharacteristics, one's knowledgeofprocedures, andone's
problem-solving goals thatmightlead a solverto implement a particular series
of proceduralactions.Someonewithonlysuperficial knowledgeof procedures
likelyhasnorecoursebuttouse a standard technique,whichmayleadtolesseffi-
cientsolutionsorevenan inability tosolveunfamiliar problems.Buta moreflex-
ible solver-one witha deepknowledgeofprocedures-cannavigatehisorher
way through thisproceduraldomain,usingtechniquesotherthanones thatare
overpracticed, toproducesolutionsthatbestmatchproblemconditions orsolving
goals.I considerthiskindofflexibleknowledgetobe bothprocedural anddeep.
Flexibilityis notwell explainedor even accountedforin typicaldefinitions of
conceptualandproceduralknowledge.

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410 ProceduralKnowledge
Reconceptualizing

THE IMPLICATIONS OF RECONCEPTUALIZING

PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE

Reconceptualizing proceduralknowledgeas describedabove has important

implications forbothresearch andpractice.
Firstandforemost,recognizing theexis-
tenceof deepprocedural knowledgesuggeststheneedforresearchon whatitis,
howitdevelops,andwhatitsrelationship is toothertypesofdesiredmathematical
knowledge. Broadening thedefinitionofprocedural knowledge couldbringproce-
duresback ontotheresearchagendaof mathematics educators-including those
on both"sides"ofthemathwars.Second,accompanying thesenewavenuesfor
researchis a needto broadencurrent waysof studying and assessingprocedural
knowledge.Methodsforassessingstudents' proceduralknowledgearesomewhat
impoverished atpresent,
withprocedural knowledge oftenmeasured simplybywhat
a student can or cannotdo. Researchmethodscan insteadfocuson howstudents
can andcannotdo andon thecharacter oftheknowledgetheyhave(includingits
depth),whichsupports theirabilitytoperform procedures.Andthird, deepproce-
duralknowledge shouldbe consideredaninstructional
goalatalllevelsofschooling.
If so, additionalresearchwouldbe neededto developand evaluateinstructional
interventions andcurricula thatmightachievethisgoal,as wellas todeterminethe
kindsofcontent for
knowledge teaching thatcould the of
support development deep
procedural knowledge.

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Author

East Lansing,MI
JonR. Star,513 EricksonHall, Collegeof Education,MichiganStateUniversity,
48824;jonstar@msu.edu

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