THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-
This does
appellee,
vs.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL, representing the
Insular Government, et al., defendants-
appellants.
G.R. No. L-6287 December 1, 1911
NATURE
Appeal from a judgment of the CFI Tarlac
dismissing the action before it on motion of the
plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
controversy.
FACTS:
On Dec 1907, Manila Railroad Co. began an
action in CFI Tarlac for the condemnation of
69,910 sq. m. real estate located in Tarlac. This
is for construction of a railroad line "from Paniqui
to Tayug in Tarlac,"
Before beginning the action, Mla Railroad had
caused to be made a thorough search in the
Office of the Registry of Property and of the Tax
where the lands sought to be condemned were
located and to whom they belonged. As a result
of such investigations, it alleged that the lands in
question were located in Tarlac.
After filing and duly serving the complaint, the
plaintiff, pending final determination of the
action, took possession of and occupied the lands
described in the complaint, building its line and
putting the same in operation.
On Oct 4, Mla Railroad gave notice to the
defendants that on Oct. 9, a motion would be
made to the court to dismiss the action upon the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter, it having just been ascertained
by the plaintiff that the land sought to be
condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged
in the complaint. This motion was heard and,
after due consideration, the trial court dismissed
the action upon the ground presented by the
plaintiff.
ISSUES:
WON CFI Tarlac has power and authority to
take cognizance of condemnation of real
estate located in another province
RULING:
YES, Sections 55 and 56[1]of Act No. 136 of the
Philippine Commission confer perfect and
complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these
Islands with respect to real estate. Such
jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality.
There is no suggestion of limitation. The
jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere provided,
that a CFI of one province, regularly sitting in
said province, may not under certain conditions
take cognizance of an action arising in another
province or of an action relating to real estate
located outside of the boundaries of the province
to which it may at the time be assigned.
Procedure does not alter or change that power or
authority; it simply directs the manner in which it
shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in
certain cases, if that power is not exercised in
conformity with the provisions of the procedural
law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it
loses the power to exercise it legally.
not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject
matter. It means simply that he may thereby
lose jurisdiction of the person or that the
judgment may thereby be rendered defective for
lack of something essential to sustain it.
As to the subject matter, nothing can change the
jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate
when it shall attach or when it shall be removed.
That is a matter of legislative enactment which
none but the legislature may change. On the
other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the
person is, in some instances, made to defend on
the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions
of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over
the person, however, may be conferred by
consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may,
by an objection, be prevented from attaching or
removed after it has attached.
WON Sec. 377[2] of the Code of Civil
Procedure and Act. No. 1258[3] are
applicable and so the CFI has no jurisdiction
NO, the terms of section 377 providing that
actions affecting real property shall be brought in
the province where the land involved in the suit,
or some part thereof, is located, do not affect the
jurisdiction of CFI over the land itself but relate
simply to the personal rights of parties as to the
place of trial.
That it had jurisdiction of the persons of all the
parties is indisputable. That jurisdiction was
obtained not only by the usual course of practice
- that is, by the process of the court - but also by
consent expressly given, is apparent. The plaintiff
submitted itself to the jurisdiction by beginning
the action. The defendants are now in this court
asking that the action be not dismissed but
continued. They are not only nor objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court but, rather, are here on
this appeal for the purpose of maintaining that
very jurisdiction over them. Nor is the plaintiff in
any position to asked for favors. It is clearly
guilty of gross negligence in the allegations of its
complaint, if the land does not lie in Tarlac as it
now asserts.
DISTINGUISHED FROM VENUE
The question of venue does not relate to
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter,
it simply granting to the defendant certain rights
and privileges as against the plaintiff relative to
the place of trial, which rights and privileges he
might waive expressly or by implication.
Venue becomes merely a matter of method, of
convenience to the parties litigant. If their
interests are best subserved by bringing in the
Court Instance of the city of Manila an action
affecting lands in the Province of Ilocos Norte,
there is no controlling reason why such a course
should not be followed. The matter is, under the
law, entirely within the control of either party.
The plaintiff's interests select the venue. If such
selection is not in accordance with section 377,
the defendant may make timely objection and, as
a result, the venue is changed to meet the
requirements of the law.
Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not
applicable to actions by railroad corporations to
condemn lands; and that, while with the consent
of defendants express or implied the venue may
be laid and the action tried in any province
selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the
defendants whose lands lie in one province, or
any one of such defendants, may, by timely
application to the court, require the venue as to
their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be
changed to the province where their or his lands
lie. In such case the action as to all of the
defendants not objecting would continue in the
province where originally begun. It would be
severed as to the objecting defendants and
ordered continued before the court of the
appropriate province or provinces. While we are
of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the
decision in the case before us for the reason that
the defendants are not objecting to the venue
and are not asking for a change thereof. They
have not only expressly submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking
that that jurisdiction be maintained against the
efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.
Disposition
The judgment must be REVERSED and the case
REMANDED to the trial court with direction to
proceed with the action according to law.
Supporting American jurisprudence
1. First National Bank of Charlotte vs.
Morgan (132 U.S., 141):
The exemption of national banks from suits in
State courts in counties other than the county in
which the association was located was a personal
privilege which could be waived.
This exemption of national banking associations
from suits in State courts, (aside from principal
office) wasprescribed for the convenience of
those institutions. However, the defendant did
notchoose to claim immunity from suit in that
court. It made defense upon the merits, and,
having been unsuccessful, and in the latter
tribunal, for the first time, claimed the immunity
granted to it by Congress.
2. Ex parte Schollenberger (96 U.S.,
369):
The Act of Congress prescribing the place where
a person may be sued is not one affecting the
general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in
the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a
defendant, and it is one which he may waive.
Here, the defendant companies have provided
that they can be found in a district other than
that in which they reside, if a particular mode of
proceeding is adopted, and they have been so
found.
3. St. Louis and San Francisco Railway
Co. vs. McBride (141 U.S., 127):
The right to insist upon suit only in the one
district is a personal privilege which he may
waive, and he does waive it by pleading to the
merits.
4. Chouteau vs. Allen (70 Mo., 290):
Though the suit was brought in the county in
which the plaintiff resided, and service had upon
the defendant in the county of his residence,
unless a plea in abatement to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant, was
interposed in the first instance, the objection on
the score of lack of jurisdiction could not
subsequently be successfully raised.
It is not meant to convey the idea that the mere
failure to plead to the jurisdiction of the court
would have the effect to confer jurisdiction where
none existed before; for it is well settled that
even consent of parties cannot confer
jurisdiction. But all circuit courts have a general
jurisdiction over the foreclosure of mortgages.
5. De La Vega vs. Keague (64 Texas,
205):
Every district court in the State has cognizance of
such suits; the requirement as to the county in
which the suit may be brought is a mere personal
privilege granted to the parties, which may be
waived like any other privilege of this character.
Supporting Spanish jurisprudence
1. He who by his own acts submits himself to
the jurisdiction of a court shall not
thereafter be permitted to question such
jurisdiction. (Judgment of December
30, 1893, 29 Civ. Jur., 64.)
2. According to article 305 (of the Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Civil) the plaintiff shall be
presumed to have tacitly submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
the mere act of filing his complaint
therein, and in the case of the defendant
where the latter after appearing in the
action takes any step therein other than
to object to such jurisdiction. (Judgment
of September 21, 1878, 40 Civ. Jur.,
232.)
3. In order that a tacit submission based
upon the mere act filing the complaint
may be valid the court must be one of
ordinary jurisdiction as provided in article
4 of the Ley de Ebjuiciamiento Civil.
(Judgment of August 27, 1864, 10 Civ.
Jur., 14.)
Supporting English jurisprudence
1. The Earl of Halsbury's Laws of
England (vol. 1, p. 50):
The old distinction between 'local' and 'transitory'
actions, though of far less importance than it was
before the passing of the judicature acts, must
still be borne in mind in connection with actions
relating to land situate outside the local
jurisdiction of our courts. 'Transitory' actions
were those in which the facts in issue between
the parties had no necessary connection with a
particular locality, e.g., contract, etc.; whilst
"local" actions were those in which there was
such a connection, e.g., disputes as to the title
to, or trespasses to, land.
In the case of local actions the plaintiff was
bound to lay the venue truly, i.e., in the county
(originally in the actual hundred) in which the
land in question lay. In the case, however of a
transitory action, he might lay it wherever he
pleased, subject to the power of the court to alter
it in a proper case. Local venues have now been
abolished, and, therefore, so far as actions
relating to land in England are concerned, the
distinction may be disregarded.
It is, however, important from another point of
view, viz, that of jurisdiction as distinct from
procedure. In the case of real actions relating to
land in the colonies or foreign countries the
English courts had, even before the judicature
acts, no jurisdiction; and, therefore, the removal
by those acts of a difficulty of procedure viz, the
rule as to local venue which might have stood in
the way, if they had and wished to exercise
jurisdiction, did not in any way confer jurisdiction
in such cases.
The lack of jurisdiction still exists, and our courts
refuse to adjudicate upon claims of title to
foreign land in proceedings founded on an alleged
invasion of the proprietary rights attached
thereto, and to award damages founded on that
adjudication; in other words, an action for
trespass to, or for recovery of, foreign land can
not be maintained in England, at any rate if the
defendant chooses to put in issue the ownership
of such land.
Existing Ph Jurisprudence Not Applicable
1. Serrano vs. Chanco (5 Phil. Rep., 431)
The matter before the court was the jurisdiction
of the CFI over the actions and proceedings
relating to the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons. The determination of that
question required the consideration of section
602 of the code of Civil Procedure rather than
section 377. The argument of the court touching
the last-named section, is inapplicable.
2. Molina vs. De la Riva (6 Phil. Rep., 12)
The issue was WON an agreement between
parties to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of
a particular court to the exclusion of the court
provided by law as the appropriate court in the
premises could be enforced.
3. Molina vs. De la Riva (7 Phil. Rep.,
302)
The court was not discussing or deciding the
question WON an action could be maintained in
the CFI Manila to foreclose a mortgage on real
estate located in Albay; but, rather, whether or
not an action could be maintained in the CFI of
the city of Manila to foreclose a mortgage on
personal property located in the Province of
Albay. The remark of the court that perhaps the
former action could not be maintained was not
intended to be decisive and was not thought at
the time to be an indication of what the decision
of the court might be if that precise case were
presented to it with full argument and citation of
authorities.
4. Castano vs. Lobingier (9 Phil. Rep.,
310)
Jurisdiction of the CFI to issue a writ of
prohibition against a justice of the peace holding
his court outside the province in which the CFI
was sitting at the time of issuing the writ. The
determination of the question presented different
considerations and different provisions of law
from those which rule the decision of the case at
bar.
Special Laws Relating to The Condemnation
Of Land By Railroad Companies
1. Act No. 1258, SEC. 3. Whenever a
railroad corporation is authorized by law,
to exercise the power of eminent domain
and has not obtained by agreement with
the owners thereof the lands necessary
for its purposes as authorized by law, it
may in its complaintshall be instituted in
the CFI of the province where the lands is
situated.
These special laws contain nothing which in any
way indicates an intention of the legislature to
alter the nature or extent of the jurisdiction of
CFIs granted by Act No. 136. As we said in
discussing the provisions of section 377 of
theCode of Civil Procedure, we cannot hold that
jurisdiction to be limited unless by express
provision or clear intendment.
We have thus far drawn an analogy between
section 377 of the code of Civil Procedure and
section 3 of Act No. 1258, asserting that neither
the one nor the other was intended to restrict,
much less deprive, the CFIs of the jurisdiction
over lands in the Philippine Islands conferred
upon them by Act No. 136.
[1] SEC. 55. Jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance. The jurisdiction of Courts of First
Instance shall be of two kinds: 1. Original; and 2.
Appellate.
SEC. 56. Its original jurisdiction. Courts of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction:
2. In all civil actions which involve the title to or
possession of real property, or any interest
therein, or the legality of any tax, impost, or
assessment, except actions of forcible entry into,
and detainer of lands or buildings, original
jurisdiction of which is by this Act conferred upon
courts of justice of the peace.
[2]SEC. 377. Venue of actions. Actions to confirm
title to real estate, or to secure a partition of real
estate, or to cancel clouds, or remove doubts
from the title to real estate, or to obtain
possession of real estate, or to recover damages
for injuries to real estate, or to establish any
interest, right, or title in or to real estate, or
actions for the condemnation of real estate for
public use, shall be brought in the province were
the lands, or some part thereof, is situated;
actions against executors, administrators, and
guardians touching the performance of their
official duties, and actions for account and
settlement by them, and actions for the
distribution of the estates of deceased persons
among the heirs and distributes, and actions for
the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the
province in which the will was admitted to
probate, or letters of administration were
granted, or the guardian was appointed. And all
actions not herein otherwise provided for may be
brought in any province where the defendant or
any necessary party defendant may reside or be
found, or in any province where the plaintiff,
except in cases were other special provision is
made in this Code. In case neither the plaintiff
nor the defendant resides within the Philippine
Islands and the action is brought to seize or
obtain title to property of the defendant within
the Philippine Islands and the action is brought to
seize or obtain title to property of the defendant
within the Philippine Islands, the action shall be
brought in the province where the property which
the plaintiff seeks to seize or to obtain title to is
situated or is found: Provided, that in an action
for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real
estate, when the service upon the defendant is
not personal, but is by publication, in accordance
with law, the action must be brought in the
province where the land lies. And in all cases
process may issue from the court in which an
action or special proceeding is pending, to be
enforced in any province to bring in defendants
peaches and to enforce all orders and decrees of
the court. Thefailure of a defendant to object to
the venue of the action at the time of entering
his appearance in the action shall be deemed a
waiver on his part of all objection to the place or
tribunal in which the action is brought, except in
the actions referred to in the first sixteen lines of
this section relating to real estate, and actions
against executors, administrators, and guardians,
and for the distribution of estates and payment of
legacies.

[3]Special law covering rail roads