[G.R. No. 97817. November 10, 1994.

ARIS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, CONFEDERATION OF FILIPINO WORKERS ARIS
PHILS., WORKERS UNION and ARNEL SANTOS, Respondents.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission ("NLRC"), which affirmed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter, and the NLRC resolution of 14 February 1991, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On 28 September 1988, Arnel Santos, when questioned by Eufemia Bautista, a canteen helper, for his use of somebody else’s
identification card ("ID"), flared up and shouted invectives ("wala kang pakialam! Kung gusto mo, itapon ko itong mga pagkain
ninyo") at her. When he noticed that some people were staring at him rather menacingly, he left the canteen posthaste but
returned a few minutes later to remark challengingly: "Sino ba ang nagagalit?" Forthwith, he began smashing some food items on
display for sale at the canteen. He then slapped Eufemia which caused her to fall and suffer slight contusions. The security officer-in-
charge submitted a report on the incident to the company officials. Eufemia filed, on September 1988, a written complaint with
Jesus Perez, the personnel manager of Aris, against Santos.

Perez issued a memorandum and required Santos to explain in writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him. On 01
October 1989, Santos submitted an explanation. He admitted his misconduct but tried to explain it away by saying that he was under
the influence of liquor at the time of the incident. On 17 October 1988, the personnel manager issued a letter of termination from
employment of Santos for "gross misconduct seriously violative of (the) company rules and regulations."cralaw virtua1aw library

Some time later, Eufemia filed with the "Lupong Tagapayapa" of Barangay Orando, a complaint against Santos. She eventually filed
with the Municipal Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, a complaint charging Santos with slight physical injuries. She, however,
subsequently executed an affidavit of desistance, and the complaint was thereupon dismissed.

Santos and the Confederation of Filipino Workers-Aris Philippines Workers Union (Union) filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. On
21 July 1989, Labor Arbiter Edilberto J. Pangan rendered a decision, the dispositive portions of which read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, respondent Aris Philippines, Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate complainant Arnel Santos to his former position, or
any equivalent one without backwages.

"The period from the date of his dismissal on September 1988 up to his actual reinstatement shall be considered as the penalty for
his misbehavior and/or misconduct. Should he commit any offense and/or any infraction which is punishable by dismissal pursuant
to the Manual of Personnel Policies and Procedures, complainant will accept the penalty, and abide by the respondent’s decision." 1

An appeal was timely interposed with the NLRC. On 28 December 1990, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
NLRC further observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . (T)he slapping/punching incident involving the complainant and Ms. Bautista happened in the canteen. The misconduct of the
complainant, therefore, was not connected with his employment. As a matter of fact, said incident did not, in any way, disrupt the
operations of Respondent. Consequently, the ultimate penalty of dismissal is too severe." 2

Hence, the instant petition on the ground that respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it held that the acts of private
respondent did not constitute serious misconduct that could justify his dismissal from employment.

We must deny the petition.

The just causes of termination of employment are specifically enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code. Hence —

"Art. 282. Termination by employer. — An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following
causes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection
with his work;

"(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

"(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

"(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family
or his duly authorized representative; and

"(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing." (Emphasis supplied.)

It is not disputed that private respondent has done, indeed he has admitted to having committed, a serious misconduct. In order to
constitute a "just cause" for dismissal, however, the act complained of must be related to the performance of the duties of the
employee such as would show him to be thereby unfit to continue working for the employer. 3 While we do not condone the guilt of
private respondent, we, nevertheless, are concluded by the factual finding of the NLRC that his misconduct is not work-related and
did not, in any way, disrupt the operations of the company.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, and the temporary restraining order issued by this Court on 15 April 1991 is now LIFTED. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR No. 168637, Sep 12, 2008 ]

MICHAEL J. LAGROSAS v. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB +

DECISION

586 Phil. 653

QUISUMBING, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated petitions. The first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 168637, filed by Michael J. Lagrosas, assails
the Decision [1] dated January 28, 2005 and the Resolution [2] dated June 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885.
The second petition, docketed as G.R. No. 170684, filed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil., assails the
Resolutions [3] dated August 12, 2005 and October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885.

The facts are undisputed.

Michael J. Lagrosas was employed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil. from January 6, 1997 until March 23,
2000 as Territory Manager in its Medical Sales Force Division. [4]

On February 4, 2000, Ma. Dulcinea S. Lim, also a Territory Manager and Lagrosas' former girlfriend, attended a district meeting of
territory managers at McDonald's Alabang Town Center. After the meeting, she dined out with her friends. She left her car at
McDonald's and rode with Cesar R. Menquito, Jr. When they returned to McDonald's, Lim saw Lagrosas' car parked beside her car.
Lim told Menquito not to stop his car but Lagrosas followed them and slammed Menquito's car thrice. Menquito and Lim alighted
from the car. Lagrosas approached them and hit Menquito with a metal steering wheel lock. When Lim tried to intervene, Lagrosas
accidentally hit her head.

Upon learning of the incident, Bristol-Myers required Lagrosas to explain in writing why he should not be dismissed for assaulting a
co-employee outside of business hours. While the offense is not covered by the Code of Discipline for Territory Managers, the Code
states that "other infractions not provided for herein shall be penalized in the most appropriate manner at the discretion of
management." [5] In his memo, Lagrosas admitted that he accidentally hit Lim when she tried to intervene. He explained that he did
not intend to hit her as shown by the fact that he never left the hospital until he was assured that she was all right. [6]

In the disciplinary hearing that followed, it was established that Lagrosas and Lim had physical confrontations prior to the incident.
But Lagrosas denied saying that he might not be able to control himself and hurt Lim and her boyfriend if he sees them together.

On March 23, 2000, Bristol-Myers dismissed Lagrosas effective immediately. [7] Lagrosas then filed a complaint [8] for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay, attorney's fees, damages and fair market value of his Team Share
Stock Option Grant.

On February 28, 2002, Labor Arbiter Renaldo O. Hernandez rendered a Decision [9] in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99, declaring
the dismissal illegal. He noted that while Lagrosas committed a misconduct, it was not connected with his work. The incident
occurred outside of company premises and office hours. He also observed that the misconduct was not directed against a co-
employee who just happened to be accidentally hit in the process. Nevertheless, Labor Arbiter Hernandez imposed a penalty of
three months suspension or forfeiture of pay to remind Lagrosas not to be carried away by the mindless dictates of his passion.
Thus, the Arbiter ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby [rendered] finding that respondent company illegally dismissed complainant
thus, ORDERING it:

1) [t]o reinstate him to his former position without loss of seniority rights, privileges and benefits and to pay him full backwages
reckoned from [the] date of his illegal dismissal on 23 March 2000 including the monetary value of his vacation/sick leave of 16 days
per year reckoned from July 1, 2000 until actually reinstated, less three (3) months salary as penalty for his infraction;

2) to pay him the monetary equivalent of his accrued and unused combined sick/vacation leaves as of June 30, 2000 of 16 days x 3
years and 4 months - 10 days x P545.45 = P23,636.16 and the present fair market value of his Team Share stock option grant for
eight hundred (800) BMS common shares of stock listed in the New York Stock Exchange which vested in complainant as of 01 July
1997, provisionally computed as 90% (800 shares x US$40.00 per share x P43.20/US$ = P1,244,160.00).

3) to pay him Attorney's fee of 10% on the entire computable amount.

All other claims of complainant are dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. [10]

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) set aside the Decision of Labor Arbiter Hernandez in its
Decision [11] dated September 24, 2002. It held that Lagrosas was validly dismissed for serious misconduct in hitting his co-employee
and another person with a metal steering wheel lock. The gravity and seriousness of his misconduct is clear from the fact that he
deliberately waited for Lim and Menquito to return to McDonald's. The NLRC also ruled that the misconduct was committed in
connection with his duty as Territory Manager since it occurred immediately after the district meeting of territory managers.

Lagrosas moved for reconsideration. On May 7, 2003, the NLRC issued a Resolution [12] reversing its earlier ruling. It ratiocinated that
the incident was not work-related since it occurred only after the district meeting of territory managers. It emphasized that for a
serious misconduct to merit dismissal, it must be connected with the employee's work. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We find this time no reason to alter the Labor Arbiter's Decision of February 28, 2002 and
hereby affirm the same in toto. We vacate our previous Decision of September 24, 2002.

SO ORDERED. [13]

Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration which the NLRC denied in an Order dated February 4, 2004 in NLRC NCR Case No.
00-03-02821-99 (NLRC NCR CA No. 031646-02). [14] Later, Labor Arbiter Hernandez issued a writ of execution. [15] Notices of
garnishment were then served upon the Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc. for the supersedeas bond posted by Bristol-Myers and
the Bank of the Philippine Islands for the balance of the judgment award. [16]

Bristol-Myers moved to quash the writ of execution contending that it timely filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court gave due course to Bristol-Myers' petition and issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) [17] enjoining the
enforcement of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment. Upon the expiration of the TRO, the appellate court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction dated September 17, 2004. [18]

Bristol-Myers then moved to discharge and release the TRO cash bond. It argued that since it has posted an injunction cash bond,
the TRO cash bond should be legally discharged and released.

On January 28, 2005, the appellate court rendered the following Decision:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of May 7, 2003 and the Order of February 4, 2004 in NLRC NCR Case No. [00-
03-02821-99] (NLRC NCR CA No. [031646-02]), are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The public respondent NLRC's Decision dated
September 24, 2002 which reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and in effect sustained the legality of the private respondent's
termination and the dismissal of his claim for the fair market value of the [Team Share] stock option grant
is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the petitioner shall pay the private respondent the monetary equivalent of
his accrued and unused combined sick/vacation leave plus ten (10%) percent thereof, as attorney's fees. The injunction bond and
the TRO bond previously posted by the petitioner are DISCHARGED.

SO ORDERED. [19]

The appellate court considered the misconduct as having been committed in connection with Lagrosas' duty as Territory Manager
since it occurred immediately after the district meeting of territory managers. It also held that the gravity and seriousness of the
misconduct cannot be denied. Lagrosas employed such a degree of violence that caused damage not only to Menquito's car but also
physical injuries to Lim and Menquito.

Lagrosas filed a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.

In the meantime, Bristol-Myers moved to release the TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond in view of the Decision dated January
28, 2005. On August 12, 2005, the appellate court denied the motion as premature since the decision is not yet final and executory
due to Lagrosas' appeal to this Court. [20]

Bristol-Myers filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 28, 2005, the appellate court resolved:

WHEREFORE, the petitioner's Motion [f]or Reconsideration dated September 6, 2005 is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the Resolution of
August 12, 2005 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order cash bond in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00) which was posted by the petitioners on July 19, 2004 is ordered DISCHARGED and RELEASED to
the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. [21]

The appellate court held that upon the expiration of the TRO, the cash bond intended for it also expired. Thus, the discharge and
release of the cash bond for the expired TRO is proper. But the appellate court disallowed the discharge of the injunction cash bond
since the writ of preliminary injunction was issued pendente lite. Since there is a pending appeal with the Supreme Court, the
Decision dated January 28, 2005 is not yet final and executory.

Hence, the instant petitions.

In G.R. No. 168637, Lagrosas assigns the following errors:

I.

...THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN DECLARING THAT THE TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT OF THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT
WAS LEGAL HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LABOR LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE
AND DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT'S POWER OF REVIEW AND/OR SUPERVISION.

II.

...THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF DISMISSAL, BEING A PENALTY TOO HARSH IN THIS CASE,
DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LABOR LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE AND DEPARTED
FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS, AS TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT'S
POWER OF REVIEW AND/OR SUPERVISION. [22]

In G.R. No. 170684, Bristol-Myers raises the following issue:

[WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DISALLOWING THE RELEASE AND DISCHARGE OF PETITIONER'S INJUNCTION BOND. [23]

Simply put, the basic issues in the instant petitions are: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in finding the dismissal of Lagrosas legal? and
(2) Did the Court of Appeals err in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash bond?

On the first issue, serious misconduct as a valid cause for the dismissal of an employee is defined simply as improper or wrong
conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. To be serious within the meaning and intendment of the
law, the misconduct must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. However serious such
misconduct, it must, nevertheless, be in connection with the employee's work to constitute just cause for his separation. The act
complained of must be related to the performance of the employee's duties such as would show him to be unfit to continue working
for the employer. [24]

Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, it (a) must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance
of the employee's duties; and (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. [25]

Tested against the foregoing standards, it is clear that Lagrosas was not guilty of serious misconduct. It may be that the injury
sustained by Lim was serious since it rendered her unconscious and caused her to suffer cerebral contusion that necessitated
hospitalization for several days. But we fail to see how such misconduct could be characterized as work-related and reflective of
Lagrosas' unfitness to continue working for Bristol-Myers.

Although we have recognized that fighting within company premises may constitute serious misconduct, we have also held that not
every fight within company premises in which an employee is involved would automatically warrant dismissal from service. [26] More
so, in this case where the incident occurred outside of company premises and office hours and not intentionally directed against a
co-employee, as hereafter explained.

First, the incident occurred outside of company premises and after office hours since the district meeting of territory managers
which Lim attended at McDonald's had long been finished. McDonald's may be considered an extension of Bristol-Myers' office and
any business conducted therein as within office hours, but the moment the district meeting was concluded, that ceased too. When
Lim dined with her friends, it was no longer part of the district meeting and considered official time. Thus, when Lagrosas assaulted
Lim and Menquito upon their return, it was no longer within company premises and during office hours. Second, Bristol-Myers itself
admitted that Lagrosas intended to hit Menquito only. In the Memorandum [27] dated March 23, 2000, it was stated that "You got
out from your car holding an umbrella steering wheel lock and proceeded to hit Mr. Menquito. Dulce tried to intervene, but you
accidentally hit her on the head, knocking her unconscious." [28] Indeed, the misconduct was not directed against a co-employee who
unfortunately got hit in the process. Third, Lagrosas was not performing official work at the time of the incident. He was not even a
participant in the district meeting. Hence, we fail to see how his action could have reflected his unfitness to continue working for
Bristol-Myers.

In light of Bristol-Myers' failure to adduce substantial evidence to prove that Lagrosas was guilty of serious misconduct, it cannot use
this ground to justify his dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of Lagrosas' employment was without factual and legal basis.

On the second issue, it is settled that the purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable
injury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve
the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. [29]

A preliminary injunction may be granted only when, among other things, the applicant, not explicitly exempted, files with the court
where the action or proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court,
to the effect that the applicant will pay such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction or
temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto. Upon approval of the
requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. [30]

The injunction bond is intended as a security for damages in case it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have been
granted. Its principal purpose is to protect the enjoined party against loss or damage by reason of the injunction, and the bond is
usually conditioned accordingly. [31]

In this case, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the writ of execution and
notices of garnishment "pending final resolution of this case or unless the [w]rit is sooner lifted by the Court." [32]
By its Decision dated January 28, 2005, the appellate court disposed of the case by granting Bristol-Myers' petition and reinstating
the Decision dated September 24, 2002 of the NLRC which dismissed the complaint for dismissal. It also ordered the discharge of the
TRO cash bond and injunction cash bond. Thus, both conditions of the writ of preliminary injunction were satisfied.

Notably, the appellate court ruled that Lagrosas had no right to the monetary awards granted by the labor arbiter and the NLRC, and
that the implementation of the writ of execution and notices of garnishment was properly enjoined. This in effect amounted to a
finding that Lagrosas did not sustain any damage by reason of the injunction. To reiterate, the injunction bond is intended to protect
Lagrosas against loss or damage by reason of the injunction only. Contrary to Lagrosas' claim, it is not a security for the judgment
award by the labor arbiter. [33]

Considering the foregoing, we hold that the appellate court erred in disallowing the discharge and release of the injunction cash
bond.

WHEREFORE, the two consolidated petitions are GRANTED. In G.R. No. 168637, filed by Michael J. Lagrosas, the Decision dated
January 28, 2005, and the Resolution dated June 23, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885 are REVERSED. The
Resolution dated May 7, 2003, and the Order dated February 4, 2004 of the NLRC in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-03-02821-99 (NLRC NCR
CA No. 031646-02) are REINSTATED and hereby AFFIRMED.

In G.R. No. 170684, filed by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil., the Resolutions dated August 12, 2005 and
October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83885 are REVERSED. The injunction cash bond in the amount of SIX
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000) which was posted by Bristol-Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc./Mead Johnson Phil. on September
17, 2004 is hereby ordered DISCHARGED and RELEASED to it.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 187605 : April 13, 2010

TECHNOL EIGHT PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND DENNIS
AMULAR, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

For resolution is the present Petition for Review on Certiorari1cЃa addressing the decision2cЃa and resolution3cЃa of the Court of
Appeals (CA) of November 18, 2008 and April 17, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 100406.4

THE ANTECEDENTS

The facts are summarized below.

The petitioner Technol Eight Philippines Corporation (Technol), located at 127 East Main Avenue, Laguna Technopark, Biñan, Laguna,
manufactures metal parts and motor vehicle components. It hired the respondent Dennis Amular (Amular) in March 1998 and
assigned him to Technol's Shearing Line, together with Clarence P. Ducay (Ducay). Rafael Mendoza (Mendoza) was the line's team
leader.

On April 16, 2002 at about 5:30 p.m., Mendoza went to the Surf City Internet Café in Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. As Mendoza was
leaving the establishment, he was confronted by Amular and Ducay who engaged him in a heated argument regarding their work in
the shearing line, particularly Mendoza's report to Avelino S. De Leon, Jr. (De Leon), Technol's Production Control and Delivery (PCD)
assistant supervisor, about Amular's and Ducay's questionable behavior at work. The heated argument resulted in a fistfight that
required the intervention of the barangay tanods in the area.

Upon learning of the incident, Technol's management sent to Amular and Ducay a notice of preventive suspension/notice of
discharge dated May 18, 20025cЃa advising them that their fistfight with Mendoza violated Section 1-k of Technol's Human Resource
Department (HRD) Manual. The two were given forty-eight (48) hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them for the incident. They were placed under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days, from May 19, 2002 to June 17, 2002 for
Ducay, and May 21, 2002 to June 20, 2002 for Amular. Amular submitted a written statement on May 20, 2002. 6cräläwvirtualibräry

Thereafter, Amular received a notice dated June 8, 2002 7cЃa informing him that Technol management will conduct an administrative
hearing on June 14, 2002. He was also given two (2) days to respond in writing to the statements attached to and supporting the
notice. A day before the hearing or on June 13, 2002, Amular filed a complaint for illegal suspension/constructive dismissal with a
prayer for separation pay, backwages and several money claims, against Technol. Amular failed to attend the administrative hearing.
On July 4, 2002, Technol sent him a notice of dismissal. 8cЃa

Before the Labor Arbiter, Amular alleged that in the afternoon of April 16, 2002, while he and his co-employee Ducay were walking
around the shopping mall in Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, they "incidentally" saw Mendoza with whom they wanted to discuss some
personal matters. When they approached Mendoza, the latter raised his voice and asked what they wanted from him; Amular asked
Mendoza what the problem was because Mendoza appeared to be always angry at him (Amular). Mendoza instead challenged
Amular and Ducay to a fistfight and then punched Amular who punched Mendoza in return. Thereafter, a full-blown fistfight ensued
until the barangay tanods in the area pacified the three.

Amular further alleged that he was asked by his immediate supervisor to submit a report on the incident, which he did on April 18,
2002.9cЃa Subsequently, Amular, Mendoza and Ducay were called by Technol management to talk to each other and to settle their
differences; they agreed and settled their misunderstanding.

THE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION DECISIONS

On November 18, 2003, Executive Labor Arbiter Salvador V. Reyes rendered a decision 10cЃa finding that Amular's preventive
suspension and subsequent dismissal were illegal. He ruled that Amular's preventive suspension was based solely on unsubscribed
written statements executed by Mendoza, Rogelio R. Garces and Mary Ann Palma (subscribed only on August 8, 2002) and that
Mendoza, Amular and Ducay had settled their differences even before Amular was placed under preventive suspension. With
respect to Amular's dismissal, the Arbiter held that Technol failed to afford him procedural due process since he was not able to
present his side because he had filed a case before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) at the time he was called to a
hearing; Technol also failed to substantiate its allegations against Amular; the fistfight occurred around 200 to 300 meters away
from the work area and it happened after office hours. Arbiter Reyes awarded Amular separation pay (since he did not want to be
reinstated), backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay and attorney's fees in the total amount of P158,987.70.

Technol appealed to the NLRC. In its decision promulgated on March 30, 2005, 11cЃa the NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter's ruling. It
found that Amular was unfairly treated and subjected to discrimination because he was the only one served with the notice to
explain and placed under preventive suspension; his co-employee Ducay who was also involved in the incident was not. Technol
moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the motion in a resolution rendered on May 30, 2007. 12cЃa Technol thereafter
sought relief from the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.13cЃa
 THE CA DECISION

In its decision promulgated on November 18, 2008, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when it
affirmed the labor arbiter's ruling that Amular was illegally dismissed. While the appellate court noted that Amular was dismissed on
the ground of serious misconduct, a just cause for employee dismissal under the Labor Code, 14cЃa it opined that Technol failed to
comply with the jurisprudential guidelines that misconduct warranting a dismissal: (1) must be serious; (2) must relate to the
performance of the employees duties; and (3) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.15cЃa

The appellate court pointed out that the mauling incident occurred outside the company premises and after office hours; it did not
in any manner disrupt company operations nor pose a threat to the safety or peace of mind of Technol workers; neither did it cause
substantial prejudice to the company. It explained that although it was not condoning Amular's misconduct, it found that "the
penalty of dismissal imposed by Technol on Amular was too harsh and evidently disproportionate to the act committed."16cЃa The CA
denied the motion for reconsideration Technol subsequently filed;17cЃa hence, the present petition.18

THE PETITION

Technol posits that the CA gravely erred in ruling that Amular was illegally dismissed, contending that Amular was discharged for
violation of Section 1-k of its HRD Manual which penalizes the commission of a crime against a co-employee. It submits that Section
1-k of the HRD Manual is a reasonable company rule issued pursuant to its management prerogative. It maintains that the case
should have been examined from the perspective of whether the company rule is reasonable and not on the basis of where and
when the act was committed, or even whether it caused damage to the company. It adds that the manual does not distinguish
whether the crime was committed inside or outside work premises or during or after office hours. It insists that if the rule were
otherwise, any employee who wishes to harm a co-employee can just wait until the co-employee is outside the company premises
to inflict harm upon him, and later argue that the crime was committed outside work premises and after office hours. It submits that
the matter assumes special and utmost significance in this case because Amular inflicted physical injuries on a supervisor. In any
event, Technol argues that even if the misconduct was committed outside company premises, the perpetrator can still be disciplined
as long as the offense was work-related, citing Oania v. NLRC19cЃa and Tanala v. NLRC20cЃa in support of its position.

Technol bewails the CA's appreciation of the implication of Amular's misconduct in the workplace, especially the court's observation
that it did not cause damage to the company because it did not disrupt company operation, that it did not create a hostile
environment inside the company, and that the fight was "nipped in the bud by the timely intervention of those who saw the
incident."21cЃa Technol insists that it had to order Amular's dismissal in order to uphold the integrity of the company rules and to
avoid the erosion of discipline among its employees. Also, it disputes the CA's conclusion that the fact that Amular's liability should
be mitigated because the fight "was nipped in the bud." It submits that Mendoza had already sustained grave injuries when the
mauling was stopped.

Further, Technol maintains that the CA gravely erred in going beyond the issues submitted to it, since the NLRC decision only
declared Amular's dismissal illegal on the ground that he was the only one subjected to disciplinary action and that the company
merely relied on the written statements of Amular's co-employees.

On the rejection by the CA of the statements of Amular's co-employees regarding the incident, Technol contends that the
statements of the witnesses, together with Amular's admission, constitute substantial evidence of guilt. It points out that the
statement of Mendoza on the matter submitted during the company investigation and before the labor arbiter was not a "stand
alone" statement; Mendoza's statement was corroborated by the statements of Rogelio R. Garces and Mary Ann Palma, verified
under oath in the reply22cЃa it submitted to the arbiter. The statements were all in their handwriting, indicating that they were
not pro forma or prepared on command; a medical certificate23cЃa and a barangay report24cЃa were likewise submitted.

Technol likewise disputes the NLRC's conclusion that Amular was discriminated against and unfairly treated because he was the only
one preventively suspended after the mauling incident. It maintains that from the records of the case and as admitted by Amular
himself in his position paper,25cЃa his co-employee Ducay was also preventively suspended.26cЃa That Mendoza was not similarly
placed under preventive suspension was considered by Technol as an exercise of its management prerogative, since the
circumstances surrounding the incident indicated the existence of a reasonable threat to the safety of Amular's co-employees and
that Mendoza appeared to be the victim of Amular's and Ducay's assault.

THE CASE FOR AMULAR

In his Comment filed on August 12, 2009, 27cЃa Amular asks that the petition be dismissed for "utter lack of merit." He admits that
the mauling incident happened, but claims however that on April 18, 2002, the Technol's management called Mendoza, Ducay, and
him to a meeting, asked them to explain their sides and thereafter requested them to settle their differences; without hesitation,
they agreed to settle and even shook hands afterwards. He was therefore surprised that on May 18, 2002, he received a
memorandum from Technol's HRD charging him and his co-employee Ducay for the incident. Without waiting for an explanation,
Technol's management placed him under preventive suspension, but not Ducay. Adding insult to injury, when Amular followed up
his case while on preventive suspension, he was advised by the HRD manager to simply resign and accept management's offer
of P22,000.00, which offer was reiterated during the mandatory conference before the labor arbiter.

Amular particularly laments that his employment was terminated while the constructive dismissal case he filed against the company
was still pending. He posits that his employment was terminated first before he was informed of the accusations leveled against him
- an indication of bad faith on the part of Technol.
Amular asks: if it were true that the mauling incident was a serious offense under company policy, why did it take Technol a month
to give him notice to explain the mauling incident? He submits that the memorandum asking him to explain was a mere
afterthought; he was dismissed without giving him the benefit to be informed of the true nature of his offense, thus denying him his
right to be heard.

Finally, Amular questions the propriety of the present petition contending that it only raises questions of fact, in contravention of
the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.28cЃa He points out that the findings of facts of
the labor tribunals and the CA are all the same and therefore must be given respect, if not finality. 29cЃa

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The Procedural Issue

We find no procedural impediment to the petition. An objective reading of the petition reveals that Technol largely assails the
correctness of the conclusions drawn by the CA from the set of facts it considered. The question therefore is one of law and not of
fact, as we ruled in Cucueco v. Court of Appeals.30cЃa Thus, while there is no dispute that a fight occurred between Amular and
Ducay, on the one hand, and Mendoza, on the other, the CA concluded that although Amular committed a misconduct, it failed to
satisfy jurisprudential standards to qualify as a just cause for dismissal - the conclusion that Technol now challenges. We see no legal
problem, too, in wading into the factual records, as the tribunals below clearly failed to properly consider the evidence on record.
This is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunals that the CA failed to appreciate.

The Merits of the Case

The CA misappreciated the true nature of Amular's involvement in the mauling incident. Although it acknowledged that Amular
committed a misconduct, it did not consider the misconduct as work-related and reflective of Amular's unfitness to continue
working for Technol. The appellate court's benign treatment of Amular's offense was based largely on its observation that the
incident happened outside the company premises and after working hours; did not cause a disruption of work operations; and did
not result in a hostile environment in the company. Significantly, it did not condone Amular's infraction, but it considered that
Amular's dismissal was a harsh penalty that is disproportionate with his offense. It found support for this liberal view from the
pronouncement of the Court in Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Philippines, Inc., 31cЃa that "where a penalty less punitive would suffice,
whatever missteps may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe."

The record of the case, however, gives us a different picture. Contrary to the CA's perception, we find a work-connection in Amular's
and Ducay's assault on Mendoza. As the CA itself noted,32cЃa the underlying reason why Amular and Ducay confronted Mendoza
was to question him about his report to De Leon - Technol's PCD assistant supervisor - regarding the duo's questionable work
behavior. The motivation behind the confrontation, as we see it, was rooted on workplace dynamics as Mendoza, Amular and Ducay
interacted with one another in the performance of their duties.

The incident revealed a disturbing strain in Amular's and Ducay's characters - the urge to get even for a perceived wrong done to
them and, judging from the circumstances, regardless of the place and time. The incident could very well have happened inside
company premises had the two employees found time to confront Mendoza in the workplace as they intimated in their written
statements.33cЃa Having been the subject of a negative report regarding his work must have rankled on Amular that he resolved to
do something about it; thus, he confronted Mendoza.

From the records, Ducay appeared to have cooperated with Amular in the violent confrontation with Mendoza. Ducay, however,
resigned on June 7, 2002 a week before the filing of the complaint. 34cЃa Hence, Technol did not act against him - a move that is
within its prerogative to make.

In an obvious effort to mitigate his involvement in the mauling incident, Amular claimed in the administrative proceedings that while
he and Ducay were walking around the shopping mall in Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna, they "incidentally" saw their co-employee
Mendoza "with whom they wanted to clear some personal matters."35cЃa We find this claim a clear distortion of what actually
happened. Again, based on their written statements, 36cЃa Amular and Ducay purposely set out for the Balibago commercial area on
April 16, 2002 looking for Mendoza. It was not an incidental or casual encounter. They sought Mendoza out and confronted him
regarding what they perceived as Mendoza's negative attitude towards them or "pamamarako" as Mendoza described
it.37cЃa Considering the subject Amular and Ducay raised with Mendoza, it is not surprising that they had a heated verbal exchange
(mostly between Amular and Mendoza) that deteriorated into a fistcuff fight, with Mendoza at the losing end as he suffered injuries
from the blows he received.

Amular and Ducay point to Mendoza as the proximate cause of the fight because he challenged them to a one-on-one (isa-isa lang)
bout.38cЃa Looking back at the reason why Amular and Ducay were at the mall in the first place, this attributed causation hardly
makes sense. To reiterate, they were purposely there to confront Mendoza about their work-related problem. They waited for him
at the place where they expected him to be. When Mendoza appeared, they accosted him and put into motion the entire sorry
incident.

Under these circumstances, Amular undoubtedly committed a misconduct or exhibited improper behavior that constituted a valid
cause for his dismissal under the law39cЃa and jurisprudential standards.40cЃa The circumstances of his misdeed, to our mind,
rendered him unfit to continue working for Technol; guilt is not diminished by his claim that Technol's management called the three
of them to a meeting, and asked them to explain their sides and settle their differences, which they did. 41cЃa Mendoza significantly
denied the alleged settlement, maintaining that while they were summoned by De Leon after the incident, he could not shake hands
and settle with Amular and Ducay since they did not even apologize or ask forgiveness for what they did.42cЃa We do not find
Mendoza's denial of Amular's claim unusual as Mendoza would not have stood his ground in this case if a settlement had previously
been reached. That a meeting had taken place does not appear disputed, but a settlement cannot be inferred simply because a
meeting took place.

Neither do we believe that Amular was discriminated against because he was not the only one preventively suspended. As the CA
itself acknowledged, Ducay received his notice of preventive suspension/notice of charge 43cЃa on May 19, 2002 while Amular
received his on May 21, 2002. These notices informed them that they were being preventively suspended for 30 days from May 19,
2002 to June 17, 2002 for Ducay, and May 21, 2002 for Amular.44cЃa

Thus, Amular was not illegally dismissed; he was dismissed for cause.

The Due Process Issue

The labor arbiter ruled that Technol failed to afford Amular procedural due process, since he was not able to present his side
regarding the incident; at the time he was called to a hearing, he had already filed the illegal dismissal complaint. 45cЃa The NLRC, on
the other hand, held that the memorandum terminating Amular's employment was a mere formality, an afterthought designed to
evade company liability since Amular had already filed an illegal dismissal case against Technol. 46cЃa

We disagree with these conclusions. The notice of preventive suspension/notice of discharge served on Amular and Ducay required
them to explain within forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for their involvement in the
mauling incident.47cЃa Amular submitted two written statements: the first received by the company on May 19, 200248cЃa and the
other received on May 20, 2002.49cЃa On June 8, 2002, Technol management sent Amular a memorandum informing him of an
administrative hearing on June 14, 2002 at 10:00 a.m., regarding the charges against him. 50cЃa At the bottom left hand corner of the
memorandum, the following notation appears: "accept the copy of notice but refused to receive, he will study first." A day before
the administrative hearing or on June 13, 2002, Amular filed the complaint for illegal suspension/dismissal 51cЃa and did not appear
at the administrative hearing. On July 4, 2002, the company sent Amular a notice of dismissal. 52cЃa

What we see in the records belie Amular's claim of denial of procedural due process. He chose not to present his side at the
administrative hearing. In fact, he avoided the investigation into the charges against him by filing his illegal dismissal complaint
ahead of the scheduled investigation. Under these facts, he was given the opportunity to be heard and he cannot now come to us
protesting that he was denied this opportunity. To belabor a point the Court has repeatedly made in employee dismissal cases, the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard; it is the denial of this opportunity that constitutes violation of due
process of law.53cЃa

In view of all the foregoing, we find the petition meritorious.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint for illegal dismissal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against respondent AMULAR.

SO ORDERED.
 G. R. No. 152329 - April 22, 2003

ALEJANDRO ROQUERO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Brought up on this Petition for Review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing Alejandro Roquero as an employee of the
respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc.

Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL for brevity). From
the evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed possessing and using Methampethamine
Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM personnel.

The two alleged that they did not voluntarily indulge in the said act but were instigated by a certain Jojie Alipato who was introduced
to them by Joseph Ocul, Manager of the Airport Maintenance Division of PAL. Pabayo alleged that Alipato often bragged about the
drugs he could smuggle inside the company premises and invited other employees to take the prohibited drugs. Alipato was
unsuccessful, until one day, he was able to persuade Pabayo to join him in taking the drugs. They met Roquero along the way and he
agreed to join them. Inside the company premises, they locked the door and Alipato lost no time in preparing the drugs to be used.
When they started the procedure of taking the drugs, armed men entered the room, arrested Roquero and Pabayo and seized the
drugs and the paraphernalia used.1 Roquero and Pabayo were subjected to a physical examination where the results showed that
they were positive of drugs. They were also brought to the security office of PAL where they executed written confessions without
the benefit of counsel.2

On March 30, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo received a "notice of administrative charge" 3 for violating the PAL Code of Discipline. They
were required to answer the charges and were placed under preventive suspension.

Roquero and Pabayo, in their "reply to notice of administrative charge,"4 assailed their arrest and asserted that they were instigated
by PAL to take the drugs. They argued that Alipato was not really a trainee of PAL but was placed in the premises to instigate the
commission of the crime. They based their argument on the fact that Alipato was not arrested. Moreover, Alipato has no record of
employment with PAL.

In a Memorandum dated July 14, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. 5 Thus, they filed a case for illegal dismissal.6

In the Labor Arbiter's decision, the dismissal of Roquero and Pabayo was upheld. The Labor Arbiter found both parties at fault PAL
for applying means to entice the complainants into committing the infraction and the complainants for giving in to the temptation
and eventually indulging in the prohibited activity. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter awarded separation pay and attorney's fees to the
complainants.7

While the case was on appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), the complainants were acquitted by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 114, Pasay City, in the criminal case which charged them with "conspiracy for possession and use
of a regulated drug in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425," on the ground of instigation.

The NLRC ruled in favor of complainants as it likewise found PAL guilty of instigation. It ordered reinstatement to their former
positions but without backwages.8 Complainants did not appeal from the decision but filed a motion for a writ of execution of the
order of reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion but PAL refused to execute the said order on the ground that they
have filed a Petition for Review before this Court.9 In accordance with the case of St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC and Bienvenido
Aricayos,10 PAL's petition was referred to the Court of Appeals.11

During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, PAL, and Pabayo filed a Motion to Withdraw/Dismiss the case with
respect to Pabayo, after they voluntarily entered into a compromise agreement.12 The motion was granted in a Resolution
promulgated by the Former Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals on January 29, 2002. 13

The Court of Appeals later reversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter insofar as it upheld the
dismissal of Roquero. However, it denied the award of separation pay and attorney's fees to Roquero on the ground that one who
has been validly dismissed is not entitled to those benefits. 14

The motion for reconsideration by Roquero was denied. In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, he raises the
following issues:

1. Whether or not the instigated employee shall be solely responsible for an action arising from the instigation perpetrated by the
employer;

2. Can the executory nature of the decision, more so the reinstatement aspect of a labor tribunal's order be halted by a petition
having been filed in higher courts without any restraining order or preliminary injunction having been ordered in the meantime?
3. Would the employer who refused to reinstate an employee despite a writ duly issued be held liable to pay the salary of the
subject employee from the time that he was ordered reinstated up to the time that the reversed decision was handed down?15

There is no question that petitioner Roquero is guilty of serious misconduct for possessing and using shabu. He violated Chapter 2,
Article VII, section 4 of the PAL Code of Discipline which states:

"Any employee who, while on company premises or on duty, takes or is under the influence of prohibited or controlled drugs, or
hallucinogenic substances or narcotics shall be dismissed." 16

Serious misconduct is defined as "the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." 17 For serious misconduct to warrant the
dismissal of an employee, it (1) must be serious; (2) must relate to the performance of the employee's duty; and (3) must show that
the employee has become unit to continue working for the employer. 18

It is of public knowledge that drugs can damage the mental faculties of the user. Roquero was tasked with the repair and
maintenance of PAL's airplanes. He cannot discharge that duty if he is a drug user. His failure to do his job can mean great loss of
lives and properties. Hence, even if he was instigated to take drugs he has no right to be reinstated to his position. He took the drugs
fully knowing that he was on duty and more so that it is prohibited by company rules. Instigation is only a defense against criminal
liability. It cannot be used as a shield against dismissal from employment especially when the position involves the safety of human
lives.

Petitioner cannot complain he was denied procedural due process. PAL complied with the twin-notice requirement before
dismissing the petitioner. The twin-notice rule requires (1) the notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is being sought along with the opportunity for the employee to air his side, and (2) the subsequent
notice of the employer's decision to dismiss him. 19 Both were given by respondent PAL.

II

Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code20 as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715,21 and Section 2 of the NLRC
Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code, 22 provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor
Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal. The rationale of the law has been explained in Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs. NLRC:23

"In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or
separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working man.

xxx - xxx - xxx

These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal
intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.

xxx - xxx - xxx

. . . In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its
execution pending appeal.

xxx - xxx - xxx

. . . Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending
appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily
since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the
dismissed or separated employee and his family."

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee
entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of
execution.24 Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of
reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or
reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from
the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court.

We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory
manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. 25 Hence, even if the order of reinstatement
of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been
reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to
reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the dismissal of petitioner Roquero is AFFIRMED, but respondent PAL is ordered to pay the wages to which
Roquero is entitled from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the finality of this decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 106341 September 2, 1994

DELFIN G. VILLARAMA, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GOLDEN DONUTS, INC., respondents.

Rogelio R. Udarbe for petitioner.

Armando V. Ampil for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

Sexual harassment abounds in all sick societies. It is reprehensible enough but more so when inflicted by those with moral
ascendancy over their victims. We rule that it is a valid cause for separation from service.

First, the facts. On November 16, 1987, petitioner DELFIN VILLARAMA was employed by private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC.,
as its Materials Manager. His starting salary was P6,500.00 per month, later increased to P8,500.00.

On July 15, 1989, petitioner Villarama was charged with sexual harassment by Divina Gonzaga, a clerk-typist assigned in his
department. The humiliating experience compelled her to resign from work. Her letter-resignation, dated July 15, 1989, reads:

MR. LEOPOLDO H. PRIETO

President
Golden Donuts, Inc.

Dear Sir:

I would like to tender my resignation from my post as Clerk Typist of Materials Department effective immediately.

It is really my regret to leave this company which has given me all the opportunity I long desired. My five (5)
months stay in the company have been very gratifying professionally and financially and I would not entertain the
idea of resigning except for the most shocking experience I have had in my whole life.

Last Friday, July 7, 1989, Mr. Delfin Villarama and Mr. Jess de Jesus invited all the girls of Materials Department for
a dinner when in (sic) the last minute the other three (3) girls decided not to join the groupp anymore. I do (sic) not
have second thought(s) in accepting their invitation for they are my colle(a)gues and I had nothing in mind that
would in any manner prompt me to refuse to what appeared to me as a simple and cordial invitation. We went to
a restaurant along Makati Avenue where we ate our dinner. Mr. Villarama, Mr. Olaybar and Mr. Jess de Jesus were
drinking while we were eating and (they) even offered me a few drinks and when we were finished, they decided
to bring me home. While on my way, I found out that Mr. Villarama was not driving the way to my house. I was
wondering why we were taking the wrong way until I found out that we were entering a motel. I was really
shock(ed). I did not expect that a somewhat reputable person like Mr. Villarama could do such a thing to any of his
subordinates. I should have left the company without any word but I feel that I would be unfair to those who might
be similarly situated. I hope that you would find time to investigate the veracity of my allegations and make each
(sic) responsible for is own deed. (emphasis ours)

Thank you very much and more power.

The letter prompted Mr. Leopoldo Prieto, President of Golden Donuts, Inc., to call petitioner to a meeting on August 4, 1989.
Petitioner was then required to explain the letter against him. It appears that petitioner agreed to tender his resignation. Private
respondent moved swiftly to separate petitioner. Thus, private respondent approved petitioner's application for leave of absence
with pay from August 5-28, 1989. It also issued an inter-office memorandum, dated August 4, 1989, advising "all concerned" that
petitioner was no longer connected with the company effective August 5, 1989. 1 Two (2) days later, or on August 7, 1989, Mr. Prieto
sent a letter to petitioner confirming their agreement that petitioner would be officially separated from the private respondent. The
letter reads:

Dear Mr. Villarama:

This is to officially confirm our discussion last Friday, August 4, 1989, regarding your employment with us. As per
our agreement, you will be officially separated from the company effective August 23, 1989.

May I, therefore, request you to please submit or send us your resignation letter on or before the close of business
hours of August 22, 1989.

Please see the Personnel & Industrial Relations Office for your clearance.

Very truly yours,

 (SGD). LEOPOLDO H. PRIETO, JR.
President

In the interim, petitioner had a change of mind. In a letter dated August 16, 1989, petitioner sought reconsideration of the
management's decision to terminate him, viz.:

DEAR SIR:

MAY I REQUEST FOR A RECONSIDERATION ON THE DECISION HANDED DURING OUR MEETING OF AUGUST 4, 1989,
TERMINATING MY SERVICES WITH THE COMPANY EFFECTIVE AUGUST 5, 1989.

THE SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION OF THE MATERIALS DEPARTMENT, WHICH I HAD BEEN HEADING FOR THE PAST
21 MONTHS, TO THE PERFORMANCE OF THE COMPANY FAR OUTWEIGHS THE ERROR THAT I HAD COMMITTED. AN
ERROR THAT MUST NOT BE A BASIS FOR SUCH A DRASTIC DECISION.

AS I AM STILL OFFICIALLY ON LEAVE UNTIL THE 29th, OF THIS MONTH, MAY I EXPECT THAT I WILL RESUME MY
REGULAR DUTY ON THE 29th?

ANTICIPATING YOUR FAVORABLE REPLY.

VERY TRULY YOURS,

(SGD.) DELFIN G. VILLARAMA

For his failure to tender his resignation, petitioner was dismissed by private respondent on August 23, 1989. Feeling aggrieved,
petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case 2 against private respondent.

In a decision dated January 23, 1991, Labor Arbiter Salimar V. Nambi held that due process was not observed in the dismissal of
petitioner and there was no valid cause for dismissal. Private respondent GOLDEN DONUTS, INC. was ordered to: (1) reinstate
petitiner DELFIN G. VILLARAMA to his former position, without loss of seniority rights, and pay his backwages at the rate of
P8,500.00 per month from August 1989, until actual reinstatement; (2) pay petitioner the amount of P24,866.66, representing his
unused vacation leave and proportionate 13th month pay; (3) pay petitioner P100,000.00, as moral damages, and P20,000.00, as
exemplary damages; and (3) pay the attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the entire monetary award.

Private respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. On July 16, 1992, public respondent reversed the decision
of the labor arbiter. The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and a new one entered
declaring the cause of dismissal of complainant as valid; however, for the procedural lapses, respondent (Golden
Donuts, Inc.) is hereby ordered to indemnify complainant (petitioner) in the form of separation pay equivalent to
two month's (sic) pay (for his two years of service, as appears (sic) in the records), or the amount of P17,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this petition where the following arguments are raised:

THE ALLEGED IMMORALITY CHARGED AGAINST PETITIONER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON
RECORD.

THE MERE ADMISSION OF THE VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS ENTITLES PETITIONER TO REINSTATEMENT.

IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO HIS SALARIES FROM RECEIPT BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE
DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER ON 4 FEBRUARY 1991 TO (sic) AT LEAST THE PROMULGATION OF THE ASSAILED
RESOLUTION ON (sic) 16 JULY 1992.

IN ANY EVENT, PETITIONER IS ALSO ENTITLED TO HIS UNUSED VACATION LEAVE AND PROPORTIONATE 13TH
MONTH PAY IN THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF P24,866.66, ADJUDGED BY THE LABOR ARBITER.

THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES BY THE LABOR ARBITER IS JUSTIFIED.

We affirm with modification the impugned Resolution.

At the outset, we note that the Petition was not accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed July 16, 1992 NLRC
Resolution, 3 in violation of Revised Circular No. 1-88. Neither was there any certification under oath that "petitioner has not
commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different
Divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, and that to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different Divisions thereof or any other tribunal or agency," as required under Circular
No. 28-91. It is settled that non-compliance with the provisions of Revised Circular No. 1-88 and Circular No. 28-91, would result in
the outright dismissal of the petition. 4

In addition, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, the special civil action for certiorari is available in cases where the
concerned "tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In Antonio
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 5 we held that the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law is a motion for
reconsideration of the assailed decision, and the resolution thereof, which is not only expected to be but would actually have
provided adequate and more speedy remedy than a petition for certiorari. The rationale for this requirement is to enable the court
or agency concerned to pass upon and correct its mistakes without the intervention of a higher court. 6 In this case, the assailed July
16, 1992 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission was received by petitioner's counsel on July 23, 1992. 7 Petitioner
did not file a motion for reconsideration, instead, he commenced this special civil action for certiorari. Be that as it may, we allowed
the petition to enable us to rule on the significant issues raised before us, viz.: (1) whether or not petitioner's right to procedural due
process was violated, and (2) whether or not he was dismissed for a valid or just cause.

The procedure for terminating an employee is found in Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against
dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article
283 of this Code the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written
notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his counsel if he so desires in accordance with company rules
and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any
decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity or
legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. . . .
(emphasis supplied)

This procedure protects not only rank-and-file employees but also managerial employees. Both have the right to security of tenure
as provided for in Section 3, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. In the case at bench, petitioner decided to seek reconsideration of
the termination of his service thru his August 16, 1989 letter. While admitting his error, he felt that its gravity did not justify his
dismissal. Considering this stance, and in conformity with the aforequoted Article 277 (b) of the Labor Code, petitioner should have
been formally charged and given an opportunity to refute the charges. Under the facts in field, we hold that petitioner was denied
procedural due process.

We now come to the more important issue of whether there was valid cause to terminate petitioner.

Petitioner claims that his alleged immoral act was unsubstantiated, hence, he could not be dismissed. We hold otherwise. The
records show that petitioner was confronted with the charge against him. Initially, he voluntarily agreed to be separated from the
company. He took a leave of absence preparatory to this separation. This agreement was confirmed by the letter to him by Mr.
Prieto dated August 7, 1989. A few days after, petitioner reneged on the agreement. He refused to be terminated on the ground
that the seriousness of his offense would not warrant his separation from service. So he alleged in his letter to Mr. Prieto dated
August 16, 1989. But even in this letter, petitioner admitted his "error" vis-a-vis Miss Gonzaga. As a manager, petitioner should know
the evidentiary value of his admissions. Needless to stress, he cannot complain there was no valid cause for his separation.

Moreover, loss of trust and confidence is a good ground for dismissing a managerial employee. It can be proved by substantial
evidence which is present in the case at bench. As further observed by the Solicitor General:

. . . assuming arguendo that De Jesus and Gonzaga were sweethearts and that petitioner merely acceded to the
request of the former to drop them in the motel, petitioner acted in collusion with the immoral designs of De Jesus
and did not give due regard to Gonzaga's feeling on the matter and acted in chauvinistic disdain of her honor,
thereby justifying public respondent's finding of sexual harassment. Thus, petitioner not only failed to act
accordingly as a good father of the family because he was not able to maintain his moral ascendancy and authority
over the group in the matter of morality and discipline of his subordinates, but he actively facilitated the
commission of immoral conduct of his subordinates by driving his car into the motel.

(Comment, April 29, 1993, p. 9)

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by a more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to this higher standard of
responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his
subordinate, he provides justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the duty of
every employer to protect its employees from over sexed superiors.

To be sure, employers are given wider latitude of discretion in terminating the employment of managerial employees on the ground
of lack of trust and confidence. 8
We next rule on the monetary awards due to petitioner. The public respondent erred in awarding separation pay of P17,000.00 as
indemnity for his dismissal without due process of law. The award of separation pay is proper in the cases enumerated under
Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, 9 and in cases where there is illegal dismissal (for lack of valid cause) and reinstatement is no
longer feasible. But this is not to state that an employer cannot be penalized for failure to give formal notice and conduct the
necessary investigation before dismissing an employee. 10 Thus, in Wenphil vs. NLRC 11 and Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Alonzo, 12 this Court
awarded P1,000.00 as penalty for non-observance of due process.

Petitioner is not also entitled to moral and exemplary damages. There was no bad faith or malice on the part of private respondent
in terminating the services of petitioner. 13

Petitioner is entitled, however, to his unused vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay, as held by the labor arbiter.
These are monies already earned by petitioner and should be unaffected by his separation from the service.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolution of public respondent is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the
award of separation pay is DELETED. Private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P1,000.00 for non-observance of
due process, and the equivalent amount of his unused vacation/sick leave and proportionate 13th month pay. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74187 January 28, 1988

STANFORD MICROSYSTEMS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and HENRY TRINIO, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

This special civil action of certiorari concerns the appropriateness or commensurateness of the penalty imposed by an employer on
an employee found guilty, after due investigation, of breaches of company regulations.

Henry Trinio was employed by Stanford Microsystems, Inc. as "security coordinator," to exercise supervision over all guards assigned
to secure the latter's premises by an agency with which Stanford had a security agreement.

He was dismissed from employment on July 12, 1982, after an investigation conducted by Stanford established that he had
committed serious breaches of company rules in the night of July 4, 1982. It appears that on that night, at about 11 o'clock, Trinio
allowed two female security guards, Vicky Magaling and Excelsa Mina to come inside the Security Office; he caused the introduction
of intoxicating liquor into the premises of which he imbibed; he invited and allowed a guard on duty, Marcelino Medrana, to partake
of the liquor when the latter entered the office; and thereafter he, a married man, had sexual intercourse with Guard Mina, a
married woman, on top of the desk of the Security Head, while Magaling pretended to be asleep during all the time that the lustful
act was commenced and consummated.

Professing innocence, Trinio lost no time in haling his employer before the Ministry of Labor and Employment. He filed a complaint
for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal against Stanford on July 16, 1982. After due proceedings, judgment was rendered
thereon by the Labor Arbiter on September 30, 1983, as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the charge of unfair labor practice is hereby dismissed for lack of factual basis. As
regards the charge of illegal dismissal, respondent exceeded its disciplinary authority when it terminated the
services of complainant. In accordance wit its rules, a mere suspension should issue and that suspension should
not last for more than thirty (30) days. Effective August 13, 1982, the suspension lapses and complainant becomes
entitled to backwages and other fringe benefits thereafter. The computation of said monetary award is hereby
ordered until complainant is finally reinstated.

Stanford seasonably brought the case to the National labor Relations Commission on appeal The Commission however declined to
sustain Stanford's contention that the Arbiter had committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that it had "exceeded its disciplinary
authority when it terminated ... (Trinio's) services" notwithstanding said Arbiter's own findings that Trinio had indeed committed
serious misconduct and violations of company rules and regulations, including what he characterized as an act "repulsive to
morality." By judgment dated March 10, 1986, the Commission affirmed the Arbiter's direction for Trinio's reinstatement but
modified the award of back wages by limiting the same to two(2) years, without deduction or qualification of any kind.

In the special civil action of certiorari instituted by it in this Court, Stanford maintains that the NLRC was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter in light of the latter's patent errors —

(1) in ordering reinstatement of Trinio despite his factual finding that Trinio was guilty of serious misconduct and other
infringements of Company rules and regulations; and

(2) in holding the Company to be bound by its own rules and regulations prescribing penalties corresponding to specific offenses as
to estopped to discharge an employee on grounds provided in the Labor Code.

There is merit in the petition, warranting its concession. The writ of certiorari prayed for will issue.

That there is sufficient evidence proving the acts ascribed to Trinio is not seriously in dispute. Trinio did violate his employer's rules:
he allowed women into the Security office; he allowed liquor to be brought in; he drank that liquor and invited another security
guard to drink it, too; he and his lady friend, both being married but no to each other, satisfied their carnal passion in a business
office and the known presence of another person. This last act was, to be sure, one "repulsive to morality," as the Labor Arbiter has
put it.

The issue does not theretofore lie in the facts, or the sufficiency of the evidence in proof thereof. The issue posed, rather, is whether
or not under the established facts, the penalty of dismissal is merited, instead of merely that of suspension for not more than 30
days — which is what the company rules by their literal terms indicate. The respondent Commission, in the Comment submitted in
its behalf by the Solicitor General, concedes that the formulation and promulgation by an employer of rules of conduct and
discipline for its employees, inclusive of those deemed to constitute serious misconduct, cannot and should not operate to
altogether negate his prerogative and responsibility to determine and declare whether or not facts not explicitly set out in the rules
may and do constitute such serious misconduct as to justify the dismissal of the employee or the imposition of sanctions heavier
than those specifically and expressly prescribed. The concession is dictated by logic; otherwise, the rules, literally applied, would
result in absurdity: grave offenses, e.g., rape, would be penalized by mere suspension; this, despite the heavier penalty provided
therefor by the Labor Code, or otherwise dictated by common sense.

But said public respondent would minimize the gravity of Trinio's acts, by pointing out that the latter was only seen to be kissing his
lady friend while embracing her tightly, and that there was no clear showing that he had been drinking to excess, and hence, the
commensurate penalty for such "first offense" is not separation from employment but suspension and forfeiture of backwages. The
public respondent theorizes that while it was in truth morality wrong for Trinio to have done what he did, it was not sufficient cause
for the company to lose trust and confidence in him. Implicit in the argument is the acknowledgment that if the facts were really as
described by the employer's proofs and as found by the Labor Arbiter the penalty of dismissal from the service would be otherwise
appropriate.

The evidence has been misread by public respondent. The evidence does establish the commission by Trinio of the acts with which
he was charged: drinking liquor on company time in company premises; openly and deliberately sanctioning breach of company
rules by persons under his superintendence; public performance of adulterous act of sexual intercourse on company time and in
company premises. Here was no mere tolerance or disregard of infringement of company rules for the enforcement of which Trinio
was particularly charged, which would be bad enough. Here was an open invitation by him for others to violate those rules, and a
transgression even by him of those same rules in a manner that could not but expose his personal depravity, and betray his
contempt and scorn of those rules as well as the lightness with which he held the responsibility entrusted to him to protect his
employer's premise, chattels, interest, reputation and integrity. The offenses cannot be excused upon a plea of their being "first
offenses," or have not resulted in prejudice to the company in any way. No employer may rationally be expected to continue in
employment a person whose lack of morals, respect and loyalty to his employer, regard for his employer's rules, and appreciation of
the dignity and responsibility of his office, has so plainly and completely been bared.

That there should be concern, sympathy, and solicitude for the rights and welfare of the working class, is meet and proper. That in
controversies between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the former's favor, is not an
unreasonable or unfair rule. But that disregard of the employer's own rights and interests can be justified by that concern and
solicitude is unjust and unacceptable. 1

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated March 10, 1986 and that of the Labor Arbiter dated
September 30, 1983 are annulled and set aside, and the complaint of Henry Trinio against the petitioner for unfair labor practice and
illegal termination of employment, dismissed for lack of factual and legal basis. The judgment is immediately executory, and no
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration thereof will be entertained.

Teehankee, C.J., Cruz, Paras * and Gancayco. JJ., concur

G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.

Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation that the marriage of
herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years her junior, was considered by the school
authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.

Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had been employed therein as
a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was
enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such
instructions in school by petitioner. 1 In the course thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a
civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo. 2 Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age
but Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs. Concepcion
Ong.3 Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at
Bacolod City on January 10, 1976. 4

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application
for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground: "For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming
of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high
moral values, of the school." 5

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. 6 Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr. of the National
Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for resolution, required the parties to submit their
position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits 7 were submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner,
"defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her
advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." 8 More specifically, private respondent raised issues on the fact
that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door
allegedly locked and the other slightly open.

On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal hearing, rendered an "Award" in
NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner. It was held
therein that —

The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent pointed out that before the
marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and during her employment with petitioner,
an amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed written
testimonies of several witnesses convincingly picture the circumstances under which such amorous relationship
was manifested within the premises of the school, inside the classroom, and within the sight of some employees.
While no direct evidences have been introduced to show that immoral acts were committed during these times, it
is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during
these times. . . . 9

Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to. 10

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial of due process for not having
been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She further contended that there was nothing
immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful
wedlock with her student.11

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's decision and ordered
petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings:

Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student desk inside a classroom
after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No statements whatever were
sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.

xxx xxx xxx

 Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we could not
deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after classes with lights on and
with the door open.

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by immoral acts which did not
lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct by
herein appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed the the
sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua up to
the date of the filing of the present application for clearance in search of evidence that could have proved
detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none has come to our attention. . . . 12

The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed the decision of the National
Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as financial assistance. 13

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines. 14 After the corresponding
exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision
reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual
reinstatement. 15

Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would think that this decision of public
respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a
motion for reconsideration 16 of herein private respondent and despite opposition thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the
aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner
as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment filed on August 14, 1979 in
this Court in the present case:

That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went further to view the matter from
the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and educating of children whose interest must
be held paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it wise to uphold the judgment
and action of the school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher whose actuations and behavior, in the
belief of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious doubts on her integrity, a situation
which was considered by them as not healthy for a school campus, believing that a school teacher should at all
times act with utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond reproach and above suspicion; 19

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid resolution of public
respondent, viz.:

1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to the contrary, was actually
based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.

2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay affidavits of Laddy
Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in evidence without
presenting the affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine them.

3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached the trust
reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article
282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment. 20

We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree. There is no denial of due process
where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by which issues are resolved based on position
papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is recognized as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have
insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-examine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously because she was convinced that the
case involves a question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the proceedings before the Ministry
of Labor.

Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the teachers and to strengthen the
educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher constitute serious misconduct, if not an
immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and, thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It
argues that as a school teacher who exercises substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had
moral ascendancy over Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it
charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of which states that a
"school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or student." 21
On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there is nothing wrong with a teacher
falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him. She argued that she was dismissed because
of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was sustained in the aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
thus:

. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance was filed only after
more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated
application for clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The alleged immoral
acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified conduct that triggered the intended
separation, then why was the present application for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged
demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive?22

After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of the legality of the dismissal
hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the antecedent facts which culminated in the
marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the
circumstances of each particular case must be holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and
the applicable law. Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual question, the
resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.

Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual conclusions arrived at by public
respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the same is tainted by absence or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not
bound thereby.23

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed by him in his original
decision:

Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records referred to are the affidavits
attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the arbitration
proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many question
unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off school
hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But the records
of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was
the most convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of
specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very important at that,
the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but the disciplinenary
action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed only
in August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied
upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The action pursued by appellee in dismissing
appellant over one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral acts committed even much earlier, is
open to basis of the action sought seriously doubted; on the question. The basis of the action sought is seriously
doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that appellee had certain selfish, ulterior and
undisclosed motives known only to itself. 24

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show that immoral acts were
committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it is however enough for a sane and credible
mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those times." 25 In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations
Commission observed that the assertions of immoral acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support
such claim, 26 a finding which herein public respondent himself shared.

We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt the volte-face in the questioned resolution, which we hereby
reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is revealing however, is that the reversal of his original
decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in this
wise:

. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the classroom it
seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the
classrom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which
confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place during those times of the day. . . . 27

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged violation of the Code
of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of
her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only
lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this
gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage
from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being unnecessarily bannered
to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and should not be capitalized on to defeat the security
of tenure granted by the Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified.

The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent,
however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that
it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three
(3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

 G.R. No. 194884, October 22, 2014

IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. RAMONCHITO T. ALCON AND JOANN S. PAPA, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this petition for review on certiorari1 the challenge to he June 9, 2010 decision2 and the December 22, 2010
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 110327. This CA decision nullified the December 24, 2008 decision4 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC CA No. 043915-05 (NLRC CASE No. RAB IV-12-1661-02-L). The NLRC ruling, in
turn, affirmed the December 10, 2004 decision5 of the Labor Arbiter (LA), dismissing the illegal dismissal complaint filed by
respondents Ramonchito T. Alcon and Joann S. Papa (collectively referred to as respondents).

The Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of auto seat-
recliners and slide-adjusters. It hired the respondents as manual welders in 2001.

On October 5, 2002, the respondents reported for work on the second shift - from 8:00 pm to 5:00 am of the following day. At
around 12:40 am, Cyrus A. Altiche, Imasen's security guard on duty, went to patrol and inspect the production plant's premises.
When Altiche reached Imasen's Press Area, he heard the sound of a running industrial fan. Intending to turn the fan off, he followed
the sound that led him to the plant's "Tool and Die" section.

At the "Tool and Die" section, Altiche saw the respondents having sexual intercourse on the floor, using a piece of carton as
mattress. Altiche immediately went back to the guard house and relayed what he saw to Danilo S. Ogana, another security guard on
duty.

On Altiche's request, Ogana made a follow-up inspection. Ogana went to the "Tool and Die" section and saw several employees,
including the respondents, already leaving the area. He noticed, however, that Alcon picked up the carton that Altiche claimed the
respondents used as mattress during their sexual act, and returned it to the place where the cartons were kept. Altiche then
submitted a handwritten report6 of the incident to Imasen's Finance and Administration Manager.

On October 14, 2002, Imasen issued the respondents separate interoffice memoranda7 informing them of Altiche's report on the
October 5, 2002 incident and directing them to submit their individual explanation. The respondents complied with the directive;
they claimed that they were merely sleeping in the "Tool and Die" section at the time of the incident. They also claimed that other
employees were near the area, making the commission of the act charged impossible.

On October 22, 2002, Imasen issued the respondents another interoffice memorandum8 directing them to appear at the formal
hearing of the administrative charge against them. The hearing was conducted on October 30, 2002, 9 presided by a mediator and
attended by the representatives of Imasen, the respondents, Altiche and Ogana. Altiche and Ogana reiterated the narrations in
Altiche's handwritten report.

On December 4, 2002, Imasen issued the respondents separate interoffice memoranda10 terminating their services. It found the
respondents guilty of the act charged which it considered as "gross misconduct contrary to the existing policies, rules and
regulations of the company."

On December 5, 2002, the respondents filed before the LA the complaint 11 for illegal dismissal. The respondents maintained their
version of the incident.

In the December 10, 2004 decision,12 the LA dismissed the respondents' complaint for lack of merit. The LA found the respondents'
dismissal valid, i.e., for the just cause of gross misconduct and with due process. The LA gave weight to Altiche's account of the
incident, which Ogana corroborated, over the respondents' mere denial of the incident and the unsubstantiated explanation that
other employees were present near the "Tool and Die" section, making the sexual act impossible. The LA additionally pointed out
that the respondents did not show any ill motive or intent on the part; of Altiche and Ogano sufficient to render their accounts of
the incident suspicious.

The NLRC"s ruling

In its December 24, 2008 decision,13 the NLRC dismissed the respondents' appeal14 for lack of merit. In affirming the LA's ruling, the
NLRC declared that Imasen substantially and convincingly proved just cause for dismissing the respondents and complied with the
required due process.

The respondents filed before the CA a petition for certiorari15 after the NLRC denied their motion for reconsideration16 in its May 29,
2009 resolution.17cralawred

The CA's ruling

In its June 9, 2010 decision,18 the CA nullified the NLRC's ruling. The CA agreed with the labor tribunals' findings regarding the
infraction charged - engaging in sexual intercourse on October 5, 2002 inside company premises - and Imasen's observance of due
process in dismissing the respondents from employment.

The CA, however, disagreed with the conclusion that the respondents' sexual intercourse inside company premises constituted
serious misconduct that the Labor Code considers sufficient to justify the penalty of dismissal. The CA pointed out that the
respondents' act, while provoked by "reckless passion in an inviting environment and time," was not done with wrongful intent or
with the grave or aggravated character that the law requires. To the CA, the penalty of dismissal is not commensurate to the
respondents' act, considering especially that the respondents had not committed any infraction in the past.

Accordingly, the CA reduced the respondents' penalty to a three-month suspension and ordered Imasen to: (1) reinstate the
respondents to their former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and (2) pay the respondents backwages
from December 4, 2002 until actual reinstatement, less the wages corresponding to the three-month suspension.

Imasen filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration 19 in the CA's December 22, 2010
resolution.20cralawred

The Petition

Imasen argues in this petition that the act of engaging in sexual intercourse inside company premises during work hours is serious
misconduct by whatever standard it is measured. According to Imasen, the respondents' infraction is an affront to its core values
and high ethical work standards, and justifies the dismissal. When the CA reduced the penalty from dismissal to three-month
suspension, Imasen points out that the CA, in effect, substituted its own judgment with its (Imasen's) own legally protected
management prerogative.

Lastly, Imasen questions the CA's award of backwages in the respondents' favor. Imasen argues that the respondents would virtually
gain from their infraction as they would be paid eight years worth of wages without having rendered any service; eight (8) years, in
fact, far exceeds their actual period of service prior to their dismissal.

The Case for the Respondents

The respondents argue in their comment21 that the elements of serious misconduct that justifies an employee's dismissal are absent
in this case, adopting thereby the CA's ruling. Hence, to the respondents, the CA correctly reversed the NLRC's ruling; the CA, in
deciding the case, took a wholistic consideration of all the attendant facts, i.e., the time, the place, the persons involved, and the
surrounding circumstances before, during, and after the sexual intercourse, and not merely the infraction committed.

The Issue

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether the respondents' infraction — engaging in sexual intercourse inside company
premises during work hours — amounts to serious misconduct within the terms of Article 282 (now Article 296) of the Labor Code
justifying their dismissal.

The Court's Ruling

We GRANT the petition.

We find that the CA reversibly erred when it nullified the NLRC's decision for grave abuse of discretion the NLRC's decision.

Preliminary considerations:
tenurial security vis-a-vis
management prerogative

The law and jurisprudence guarantee to every employee security of tenure. This textual and the ensuing jurisprudential commitment
to the cause and welfare of the working class proceed from the social justice principles of the Constitution that the Court zealously
implements out of its concern for those with less in life. Thus, the Court will not hesitate to strike down as invalid any employer act
that attempts to undermine workers' tenurial security. All these the State undertakes under Article 279 (now Article 293) 22 of the
Labor Code which bar an employer from terminating the services of an employee, except for just or authorized cause and upon
observance of due process.

In protecting the rights of the workers, the law, however, does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the
employer.23 The constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice cannot be understood to mean that every labor dispute
shall automatically be decided in favor of labor.24 The constitutional and legal protection equally recognize the employer's right and
prerogative to manage its operation according to reasonable standards and norms of fair play.

Accordingly, except as limited by special law, an employer is free to regulate, according to his own judgment and discretion, all
aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, tools to be used,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, worker supervision, layoff of workers
and the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.25 As a general proposition, an employer has free reign over every aspect of its
business, including the dismissal of his employees as long as the exercise of its management prerogative is done reasonably, in good
faith, and in a manner not otherwise intended to defeat or circumvent the rights of workers.

In these lights, the Court's task in the present petition is to balance the conflicting rights of the respondents to security of tenure, on
one hand, and of Imasen to dismiss erring employees pursuant to the legitimate exercise of its management prerogative, on the
other.

Management's right to dismiss an

employee; serious misconduct as just
cause for the dismissal

The just causes for dismissing an employee are provided under Article 28226 (now Article 296)27 of the Labor Code. Under Article
282(a), serious misconduct by the employee justifies the employer in terminating his or her employment.

Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. 28 To constitute
a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning of Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employee's misconduct must be
serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.29cralawred

Additionally, the misconduct must be related to the performance of the employee's duties showing him to be unfit to continue
working for the employer.30 Further, and equally important and required, the act or conduct must have been performed with
wrongful intent.31cralawred

To summarize, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, the following elements must concur: (a) the
misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has become
unfit to continue working for the employer; 32 and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent.

The respondents' infraction amounts to

serious misconduct within the terms of
Article 282 (now Article 296) of the
Labor Code justifying their dismissal

Dismissal situations (on the ground of serious misconduct) involving sexual acts, particularly sexual intercourse committed by
employees inside company premises and during work hours, are not usual violations33 and are not found in abundance under
jurisprudence. Thus, in resolving the present petition, we are largely guided by the principles we discussed above, as applied to the
totality of the circumstances that surrounded the petitioners' dismissal.

In other words, we view the petitioners' act from the prism of the elements that must concur for an act to constitute serious
misconduct, analyzed and understood within the context of the overall circumstances of the case. In taking this approach, we are
guided, too, by the jurisdictional limitations that a Rule 45 review of the CA's Rule 65 decision in labor cases imposes on our
discretion.34cralawred

In addressing the situation that we are faced with in this petition, we determine whether Imasen validly exercised its prerogative as
employer to dismiss the respondents-employees who, within company premises and during work hours, engaged in sexual
intercourse. As framed within our limited Rule 45 jurisdiction, the question that we ask is: whether the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in finding that the respondents' act amounted to what Article 282 of the Labor Code textually considers as serious
misconduct to warrant their dismissal.

After due consideration, we find the NLRC legally correct and well within its jurisdiction when it affirmed the validity of the
respondents' dismissal on the ground of serious misconduct.

Sexual acts and intimacies between two consenting adults belong, as a principled ideal, to the realm of purely private relations.
Whether aroused by lust or inflamed by sincere affection, sexual acts should be carried out at such place, time and circumstance
that, by the generally accepted norms of conduct, will not offend public decency nor disturb the generally held or accepted social
morals. Under these parameters, sexual acts between two consenting adults do not have a place in the work environment.

Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse inside company premises and during work hours. These circumstances,
by themselves, are already punishable misconduct. Added to these considerations, however, is the implication that the respondents
did not only disregard company rules but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could reflect adversely on the status of ethics and
morality in the company.

Additionally, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse in an area where co-employees or other company personnel have ready
and available access. The respondents likewise committed their act at a time when the employees were expected to be and had, in
fact, been at their respective posts, and when they themselves were supposed to be, as all other employees had in fact been,
working.

Under these factual premises and in the context of legal parameters we discussed, we cannot help but consider the respondents'
misconduct to be of grave and aggravated character so that the company was justified in imposing the highest penalty available —
dismissal. Their infraction transgressed the bounds of socially and morally accepted human public behavior, and at the same time
showed brazen disregard for the respect that their employer expected of them as employees. By their misconduct, the respondents,
in effect, issued an open invitation for others to commit the same infraction, with like disregard for their employer's rules, for the
respect owed to their employer, and for their co-employees' sensitivities. Taken together, these considerations reveal a depraved
disposition that the Court cannot but consider as a valid cause for dismissal.
In ruling as we do now, we considered the balancing between the respondents' tenurial rights and the petitioner's interests - the
need to defend their management prerogative and to maintain as well a high standard of ethics and morality in the workplace.
Unfortunately for the respondents, in this balancing under the circumstances of the case, we have to rule against their tenurial rights
in favor of the employer's management rights.

All told, the respondents' misconduct, under the circumstances of this case, fell within the terms of Article 282 (now Article 296) of
the Labor Code. Consequently, we reverse the CA's decision for its failure to recognize that no grave abuse of discretion attended
the NLRC's decision to support the respondents' dismissal for serious misconduct.

WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the decision dated June 9, 2010 and the
resolution dated December 22, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110327 and REINSTATE the decision dated December
24, 2008 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC CA No. 043915-05 (NLRC Case No. RAB IV-12-1661-02-L).

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 212054, March 11, 2015

ST. LUKE’S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., Petitioner, v. MARIA THERESA V. SANCHEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated November 21, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated April 4, 2014
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 which affirmed the Decision4 dated November 19, 2012 and the
Resolution5 dated January 14, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 06-001858-12, declaring the
dismissal of respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez (Sanchez) illegal.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

On June 29, 2009, Sanchez was hired by petitioner St. Luke’s Medical Center, Inc. (SLMC) as a Staff Nurse, and was eventually
assigned at SLMC, Quezon City’s Pediatric Unit until her termination on July 6, 2011 for her purported violation of SLMC’s Code of
Discipline, particularly Section 1, Rule 1 on Acts of Dishonesty, i.e., Robbery, Theft, Pilferage, and Misappropriation of
Funds. 6cralawred

Records reveal that at the end of her shift on May 29, 2011, Sanchez passed through the SLMC Centralization Entrance/Exit where
she was subjected to the standard inspection procedure by the security personnel. In the course thereof, the Security Guard on-
duty, Jaime Manzanade (SG Manzanade), noticed a pouch in her bag and asked her to open the same. 7 When opened, said pouch
contained the following assortment of medical stocks which were subsequently confiscated: (a) Syringe 10cl [4 pieces]; (b) Syringe
5cl [3 pieces]; (c) Syringe 3cl [3 pieces]; (d) Micropore [1 piece]; (e) Cotton Balls [1 pack]; (f) Neoflon g26 [1 piece]; (g) Venofix 25 [2
pieces]; and (h) Gloves [4 pieces] (questioned items). 8 Sanchez asked SG Manzanade if she could just return the pouch inside the
treatment room; however, she was not allowed to do so.9 Instead, she was brought to the SLMC In-House Security Department
(IHSD) where she was directed to write an Incident Report explaining why she had the questioned items in her possession.10 She
complied11 with the directive and also submitted an undated handwritten letter of apology 12 (handwritten letter) which reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To In-House Security,

I am very sorry for bringing things from [SLMC] inside my bag. Pasensya na po. Taos-puso po akong humihingi ng tawad sa aking
pagkakasala, Alam ko po na ako ay nagkamali. Hindi ko po dapat dinala yung mga gamit sa hospital. Hindi ko po alam kung [paano]
ako magsisimulang humingi ng patawad. Kahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong makapag uwi ng gamit. Marami pang gamit dahil
sa naipon po. Paisa-isa nagagawa kong makakuha pag nakakalimutan kong isoli. Hindi ko na po naiwan sa nurse station dahil naisip
kong magagamit ko rin po pag minsang nagkakaubusan ng stocks at talagang may kailangan.

Humihingi po ako ng tawad sa aking ginawa. Isinakripisyo ko ang hindi pagiging “toxic” sa pagkuha ng gamit para sa bagay na alam
kong mali. Inaamin ko na ako’y naging madamot, pasuway at makasalanan. Inuna ko ang comfort ko keysa gumawa ng tama.
Manikluhod po akong humihingi ng tawad.

Sorry po. Sorry po. Sorry po talaga.13cralawlawlibrary

In a memorandum14 of even date, the IHSD, Customer Affairs Division, through Duty Officer Hernani R. Janayon, apprised SLMC of
the incident, highlighting that Sanchez expressly admitted that she intentionally brought out the questioned items.

An initial investigation was also conducted by the SLMC Division of Nursing 15 which thereafter served Sanchez a notice to
explain.16cralawred

On May 31, 2011, Sanchez submitted an Incident Report Addendum17 (May 31, 2011 letter), explaining that the questioned items
came from the medication drawers of patients who had already been discharged, and, as similarly practiced by the other staff
members, she started saving these items as excess stocks in her pouch, along with other basic items that she uses during her
shift.18 She then put the pouch inside the lowest drawer of the bedside table in the treatment room for use in immediate procedures
in case replenishment of stocks gets delayed. However, on the day of the incident, she failed to return the pouch inside the
medication drawer upon getting her tri-colored pen and calculator and, instead, placed it inside her bag. Eventually, she forgot
about the same as she got caught up in work, until it was noticed by the guard on duty on her way out of SMLC’s premises.

Consequently, Sanchez was placed under preventive suspension effective June 3, 2011 until the conclusion of the investigation by
SLMC’s Employee and Labor Relations Department (ELRD)19 which, thereafter, required her to explain why she should not be
terminated from service for “acts of dishonesty” due to her possession of the questioned items in violation of Section 1, Rule I of the
SLMC Code of Discipline.20 In response, she submitted a letter21 dated June 13, 2011, which merely reiterated her claims in her
previous May 31, 2011 letter. She likewise requested for a case conference, 22 which SLMC granted.23 After hearing her side, SLMC,
on July 4, 2011, informed Sanchez of its decision to terminate her employment effective closing hours of July 6, 2011. 24 This
prompted her to file a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 07-11042-11.
In her position paper,25 Sanchez maintained her innocence, claiming that she had no intention of bringing outside the SLMC’s
premises the questioned items since she merely inadvertently left the pouch containing them in her bag as she got caught up in
work that day. She further asserted that she could not be found guilty of pilferage since the questioned items found in her
possession were neither SLMC’s nor its employees’ property. She also stressed the fact that SLMC did not file any criminal charges
against her. Anent her supposed admission in her handwritten letter, she claimed that she was unassisted by counsel when she
executed the same and, thus, was inadmissible for being unconstitutional. 26cralawred

For its part,27 SLMC contended that Sanchez was validly dismissed for just cause as she had committed theft in violation of Section
1,28 Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline,29 which punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., robbery, theft, pilferage, and misappropriation of
funds, with termination from service.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The LA Ruling

In a Decision30 dated May 27, 2012, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that Sanchez was validly dismissed 31 for intentionally taking the
property of SLMC’s clients for her own personal benefit, 32 which constitutes an act of dishonesty as provided under SLMC’s Code of
Discipline.

According to the LA, Sanchez’s act of theft was evinced by her attempt to bring the questioned items that did not belong to her out
of SLMC’s premises; this was found to be analogous to serious misconduct which is a just cause to dismiss her. 33 The fact that the
items she took were neither SLMC’s nor her co-employees’ property was not found by the LA to be material since the SLMC Code of
Discipline clearly provides that acts of dishonesty committed to SLMC, its doctors, its employees, as well as its customers, are
punishable by a penalty of termination from service.34 To this, the LA opined that “[i]t is rather illogical to distinguish the persons
with whom the [said] acts may be committed as SLMC is also answerable to the properties of its patients.”35 Moreover, the LA
observed that Sanchez was aware of SLMC’s strict policy regarding the taking of hospital/medical items as evidenced by her
handwritten letter,36 but nonetheless committed the said misconduct. Finally, the LA pointed out that SLMC’s non-filing of a criminal
case against Sanchez did not preclude a determination of her serious misconduct, considering that the filing of a criminal case is
entirely separate and distinct from the determination of just cause for termination of employment.37cralawred

Aggrieved, Sanchez appealed38 to the NLRC.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The NLRC Ruling

In a Decision39 dated November 19, 2012, the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling, and held that Sanchez was illegally
dismissed.

The NLRC declared that the alleged violation of Sanchez was a unique case, considering that keeping excess hospital stocks or
“hoarding” was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric Unit which had been tolerated by SLMC management for a
long time.40 The NLRC held that while Sanchez expressed remorse for her misconduct in her handwritten letter, she manifested that
she only “hoarded” the questioned items for future use in case their medical supplies are depleted, and not for her personal
benefit.41 It further held that SLMC failed to establish that Sanchez was motivated by ill-will when she brought out the questioned
items, noting: (a) the testimony of SG Manzanade during the conference before the ELRD of Sanchez’s demeanor when she was
apprehended, i.e., “[d]i naman siya masyado nataranta,”42 and her consequent offer to return the pouch;43 and (b) that the said
pouch was not hidden underneath the bag.44 Finally, the NLRC concluded that the punishment of dismissal was too harsh and the
one (1) month preventive suspension already imposed on and served by Sanchez was the appropriate penalty. 45 Accordingly, the
NLRC ordered her reinstatement, and the payment of backwages, other benefits, and attorney’s fees. 46cralawred

Unconvinced, SLMC moved for reconsideration 47 which was, however, denied in a Resolution48 dated January 14, 2013. Thus, it filed
a petition for certiorari49 before the CA.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The CA Ruling

In a Decision50 dated November 21, 2013, the CA upheld the NLRC, ruling that the latter did not gravely abuse its discretion in finding
that Sanchez was illegally dismissed.

It ruled that Sanchez’s offense did not qualify as serious misconduct, given that: (a) the questioned items found in her possession
were not SLMC property since said items were paid for by discharged patients, thus discounting any material or economic damage
on SLMC’s part; (b) the retention of excess medical supplies was an admitted practice amongst nurses in the Pediatric Unit which
was tolerated by SLMC; (c) it was illogical for Sanchez to leave the pouch in her bag since she would be subjected to a routine
inspection; (d) Sanchez’s lack of intention to bring out the pouch was manifested by her composed demeanor upon apprehension
and offer to return the pouch to the treatment room; and (e) had SLMC honestly believed that Sanchez committed theft or pilferage,
it should have filed the appropriate criminal case, but failed to do so. 51 Moreover, while the CA recognized that SLMC had the
management prerogative to discipline its erring employees, it, however, declared that such right must be exercised humanely. As
such, SLMC should only impose penalties commensurate with the degree of infraction. Considering that there was no indication that
Sanchez’s actions were perpetrated for self-interest or for an unlawful objective, the penalty of dismissal imposed on her was grossly
oppressive and disproportionate to her offense. 52cralawred

Dissatisfied, SLMC sought for reconsideration,53 but was denied in a Resolution54 dated April 4, 2014, hence, this
petition.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 The Issue Before the Court

The core issue to be resolved is whether or not Sanchez was illegally dismissed by SLMC.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

The right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, aptly called “management prerogative,” gives employers the
freedom to regulate, according to their discretion and best judgment, all aspects of employment, including work assignment,
working methods, processes to be followed, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers and
the discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.55 In this light, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions of
employers. In fact, labor laws discourage interference in employers’ judgment concerning the conduct of their business. 56cralawred

Among the employer’s management prerogatives is the right to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations necessary or proper for
the conduct of its business or concern, to provide certain disciplinary measures to implement said rules and to assure that the same
would be complied with. At the same time, the employee has the corollary duty to obey all reasonable rules, orders, and instructions
of the employer; and willful or intentional disobedience thereto, as a general rule, justifies termination of the contract of service and
the dismissal of the employee.57 Article 296 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code provides:58cralawred

Article 296. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or his representative in
connection with his work;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

x x x xcralawlawlibrary

Note that for an employee to be validly dismissed on this ground, the employer’s orders, regulations, or instructions must be:
(1) reasonable and lawful, (2) sufficiently known to the employee, and (3) in connection with the duties which the employee has
been engaged to discharge.”59cralawred

Tested against the foregoing, the Court finds that Sanchez was validly dismissed by SLMC for her willful disregard and disobedience
of Section 1, Rule I of the SLMC Code of Discipline, which reasonably punishes acts of dishonesty, i.e., “theft, pilferage of hospital or
co-employee property, x x x or its attempt in any form or manner from the hospital, co-employees, doctors, visitors, [and] customers
(external and internal)” with termination from employment.60 Such act is obviously connected with Sanchez’s work, who, as a staff
nurse, is tasked with the proper stewardship of medical supplies. Significantly, records show that Sanchez made a categorical
admission61 in her handwritten letter62 – i.e., “[k]ahit alam kong bawal ay nagawa kong [makapag-uwi] ng gamit”63 – that despite
her knowledge of its express prohibition under the SLMC Code of Discipline, she still knowingly brought out the subject medical
items with her. It is apt to clarify that SLMC cannot be faulted in construing the taking of the questioned items as an act of
dishonesty (particularly, as theft, pilferage, or its attempt in any form or manner) considering that the intent to gain may be
reasonably presumed from the furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another. 64 Note that Section 1, Rule 1 of the SLMC
Code of Discipline is further supplemented by the company policy requiring the turn-over of excess medical supplies/items for
proper handling65 and providing a restriction on taking and bringing such items out of the SLMC premises without the proper
authorization or “pass” from the official concerned,66 which Sanchez was equally aware thereof.67 Nevertheless, Sanchez failed to
turn-over the questioned items and, instead, “hoarded” them, as purportedly practiced by the other staff members in the Pediatric
Unit. As it is clear that the company policies subject of this case are reasonable and lawful, sufficiently known to the employee, and
evidently connected with the latter’s work, the Court concludes that SLMC dismissed Sanchez for a just cause.

On a related point, the Court observes that there lies no competent basis to support the common observation of the NLRC and the
CA that the retention of excess medical supplies was a tolerated practice among the nurses at the Pediatric Unit. While there were
previous incidents of “hoarding,” it appears that such acts were – in similar fashion – furtively made and the items secretly kept, as
any excess items found in the concerned nurse’s possession would have to be confiscated. 68 Hence, the fact that no one was caught
and/or sanctioned for transgressing the prohibition therefor does not mean that the so-called “hoarding” practice was tolerated by
SLMC. Besides, whatever maybe the justification behind the violation of the company rules regarding excess medical supplies is
immaterial since it has been established that an infraction was deliberately committed. 69 Doubtless, the deliberate disregard or
disobedience of rules by the employee cannot be countenanced as it may encourage him or her to do even worse and will render a
mockery of the rules of discipline that employees are required to observe.70cralawred

Finally, the Court finds it inconsequential that SLMC has not suffered any actual damage. While damage aggravates the charge, its
absence does not mitigate nor negate the employee’s liability.71 Neither is SLMC’s non-filing of the appropriate criminal charges
relevant to this analysis. An employee’s guilt or innocence in a criminal case is not determinative of the existence of a just or
authorized cause for his or her dismissal. 72 It is well-settled that conviction in a criminal case is not necessary to find just cause for
termination of employment,73 as in this case. Criminal and labor cases involving an employee arising from the same infraction are
separate and distinct proceedings which should not arrest any judgment from one to the other.

As it stands, the Court thus holds that the dismissal of Sanchez was for a just cause, supported by substantial evidence, and is
therefore in order. By declaring otherwise, bereft of any substantial bases, the NLRC issued a patently and grossly erroneous ruling
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion, which, in turn, means that the CA erred when it affirmed the same. In consequence, the
grant of the present petition is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 21, 2013 and the Resolution dated April 4, 2014 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129108 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Labor Arbiter’s Decision dated May 27, 2012 in NLRC Case
No. NCR 07-11042-11 finding respondent Maria Theresa V. Sanchez to have been validly dismissed by petitioner St. Luke’s Medical
Center, Inc. is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary