Abortion

People of the Philippines v. Jesus Paycana, Jr., G.R. No. 179035 (April 16, 2008)
Facts: On November 26, 2002, at around 6:30 in the morning, appellant Jesus Paycana
Jr., who worked as a butcher, came home from the slaughter house carrying his tools
of trade, a knife, a bolo and a sharpener. His seven-month pregnant wife, Lilybeth
Balandra-Paycana, was preparing their children for school and was waiting for him
to come home from his work. For reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his
wife 14 times. Tito, whose house is at back of appellants house, heard his daughter
shouting for help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the
door and her feet were trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he stepped
back. Angelina told Tito by the window that appellant had held her mothers neck and
stabbed her.
Appellant however claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she
stabbed him first.
Issue: Whether or not appelant is guilty of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion.
Held: Appellant is convicted of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion in the killing of his seven-month pregnant wife. Appellant's claim of
self-defense was belied by the eyewitness testimony of his own daughter Angelina,
which was corroborated by the testimony of his father-in-law Tito, and the medical
findings.
Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of parricide is
committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship
of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best
proof of the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the
marriage certificate. The testimony of the accused of being married to the victim,
in itself, may also be taken as an admission against penal interest.
As distinguished from infanticide, the elements of unintentional abortion are as
follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such
pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is
intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies,
either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of
infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is,
capable of independent existence. However, even if the child who was expelled
prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to
the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable. In the
present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth
several times.
The case is governed by the first clause of Article 48 because by a single act,
that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of parricide as
well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion.

People of the Philippines v. Filomeno Salufrania, G.R. No. L-50884 (March 30, 1988)

Facts: Filomeno Salufrania and his 8-month pregnant wife Marciana Abuyo quarreled
at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of December 3, 1974, in their small house at a
far away sitio in barrio Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte. During said quarrel,
Salufrania boxed his wife on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, he
strangled her to death. As a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together
with the foetus in her womb.

Pedro Salufrania, their 13 years old son, was allowed to testify against his
father. Pedro testified that after killing his mother, the accused-appellant went
out of the house to get a hammock; that he and his brother Alex were the only
eyewitnesses to the crime committed by their father; that their father arrived
early the next morning with the hammock and after placing their dead mother on the
hammock, the accused carried her on his shoulder and brought the cadaver to the
house of his sister Conching, located at a populated section of Tigbinan; that from
Tigbinan, the corpse was transferred to Gabon, Talisay, Camarines Norte for burial.

The lower court found the accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of
parricide with intentional abortion.

Issue: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the complex crime of parricide with
intentional abortion.

Held: The Court finds that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been
sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the
immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an
intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill
the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion.

The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows:

1. That there is a pregnant woman.
2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion.
3. That the violence is intentionally exerted.
4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after
having been expelled therefrom.

The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused
Filomeno Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by
the same violence that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being
voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused should be punished
with the penalty corresponding to the more serious crime of parricide, to be
imposed in its maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987
Constitution which has abolished the death penalty, appellant should be sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People of the Philippines v. Manolo Villanueva, G.R. No. 95851 (March 1, 1995)

Facts: On January 14, 1989, between 5:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. at their house, accused
Manolo Villanueva and his 6-month pregnant wife Nora quarreled with the former
slapping the latter in the presence of Isidro Magpantay who later on left them.
Accused then also left and went to his hangout. At 6:30 P.M., accused returned and
in the presence of his friends, was slapped by his wife. Between 7:30 P.M. and 8:00
P.M., accused mauled his wife by giving her several fist blows, thereby causing her
to fall and hit her head on the cemented floor. Also between the same period of
time, accused left their house and attended a concert with his friend, Nick
Dalisay. At 3:00 A.M. of January 15, 1989, accused found the lifeless body of his
wife on the cemented floor in the bedroom of their house. At 9:15 A.M.,

The accused alleged that his wife had poisoned herself but it was negated by the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the autopsy report of Dr. Nida
Glorioso. Dr. Glorioso conducted an autopsy on the cadaver and found contusions on
the different parts of the body notably, on the left cheek and eye.
The Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty of parricide with unintentional
abortion.

Issue: Whether or not the accused is guilty of parricide with unintentional

abortion.

Held: The Supreme Court affirms the conclusion of the trial court that accused
Manolo Villanueva is guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion, for a husband
who with violence kills his pregnant wife, occasioning the death of the fetus, is
guilty of parricide with unintentional abortion.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to which the lower court has given
full faith lead to a fair and reasonable inference that the accused was indeed
responsible for the death of the victim. Isidro Magpantay narrated that he
witnessed the misunderstanding between his daughter and her husband who was then
reeking with liquor, which the latter even admitted on cross-examination. Abigail
Bandoy was an eyewitness to the altercation between the spouses which led to the
fatal mauling of the victim. And Dr. Nida Glorioso, after examining the deceased
and taking into consideration the result of the tests, concluded that the cause of
death was "shock due to cerebral concussion secondary to a severe blow on the
head," contrary to the submission of the accused that his wife had poisoned
herself. Certainly, the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain leading
to a logical conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, perpetrated
the crime.

Applying Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code which in part provides that "[w]hen a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies . . . the penalty
for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period," accused should be sentenced to death, the maximum period of the penalty
for parricide which is the more serious crime. However, in view of Sec. 19, par.
(1), Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, which proscribes the imposition of the
death penalty, and the inapplicability of R.A. 7659 which restores the death
penalty, considering that the act charged was committed prior to the effectivity of
said statute, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, which is the proper
penalty as prescribed by The Revised Penal Code, and not life imprisonment as
erroneously imposed by the trial court.

Facts: Lydia Gelig and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos were public school
teachers at the Nailon Elementary School. Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of
Gemma at the time material to this case.
On July 17, 1981, at around 10 in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after
learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a sissy while in class. Lydia slapped
Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall
divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her
maxillary area, as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo
General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and
started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted
in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have
suffered incomplete abortion.
The trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion.
On appeal, the CA ruled that Lydia can only be held guilty of slight physical
injuries. Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since her purpose was not
to defy the authorities but to confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her
son. Lydia cannot also be held liable for unintentional abortion since there was no
evidence that she was aware of Gemma's pregnancy at the time of the incident.
Issue: Whether or not Lydia is guilty of slight physical injury or direct assault
with unintentional abortion.
Held: Direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in
two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated
in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or
persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in
the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.
The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of
assault. Its elements are:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted
by reason of the past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority
or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.
On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance
of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and
looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to
which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom and
accused Gemma of calling her son a sissy. Lydia refused to be pacified despite the
efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the
victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principals office but Lydia followed and
resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall
divider. The violent act resulted in Gemmas fall to the floor.
Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority
expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.