DELEGATION OF POWER
G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007 on a trial-run basis, making pre-paid cards and redemption of winnings available at various
ROMEO P. GEROCHI, KATULONG NG BAYAN (KB) and ENVIRONMENTALIST
CONSUMERS NETWORK, INC. (ECN), petitioners
vs
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC),
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
MANAGEMENT GROUP (PSALM Corp.), STRATEGIC POWER UTILITIES GROUP (SPUG),
and PANAY ELECTRIC COMPANY INC. (PECO), respondents.
FACTS:
On June 8, 2001 Congress enacted RA 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Act of 2001.
Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi and company assail the validity of Section 34 of the EPIRA Law
for being an undue delegation of the power of taxation. Section 34 provides for the imposition of
a “Universal Charge” to all electricity end users after a period of (1) one year after the effectively
of the EPIRA Law. The universal charge to be collected would serve as payment for
government debts, missionary electrification, equalization of taxes and royalties applied to
renewable energy and imported energy, environmental charge and for a charge to account for
all forms of cross subsidies for a period not exceeding three years. The universal charge shall
be collected by the ERC on a monthly basis from all end users and will then be managed by the
PSALM Corp. through the creation of a special trust fund.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of the power to tax on the part of the ERC
HELD:
No, the universal charge as provided for in section 34 is not a tax but an exaction of the
regulatory power (police power) of the state. The universal charge under section 34 is incidental
to the regulatory duties of the ERC, hence the provision assailed is not for generation of
revenue and therefore it cannot be considered as tax, but an execution of the states police
power thru regulation.
Moreover, the amount collected is not made certain by the ERC, but by the legislative
parameters provided for in the law (RA 9136) itself, it therefore cannot be understood as a rule
solely coming from the ERC. The ERC in this case is only a specialized administrative agency
which is tasked of executing a subordinate legislation issued by congress; which before
execution must pass both the completeness test and the sufficiency of standard test. The court
in appreciating Section 34 of RA 9136 in its entirety finds the said law and the assailed portions
free from any constitutional defect and thus deemed complete and sufficient in form.
JAWORSKI vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 144463 - January 14, 2004
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a government owned and
controlled corporation existing under PD No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President
Ferdinand Marcos.
On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument denominated as
“Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming,”
which granted Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation (SAGE) the authority to
operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet
Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of
PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and
fairness of the games. On September 1, 1998, PAGCOR, represented by its Chairperson, Alicia
LI. Reyes, and SAGE, represented by its Chairman of the Board, Henry Sy, Jr., and its
President, Antonio D. Lacdao, executed the above-named document. Pursuant to the authority
granted by PAGCOR, SAGE commended its operations by conducting gambling on the Internet
Bingo Bonanza outlets.
Petitioner Senator Robert Jaworski, in his capacity as member of the Senate and Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed the instant petition, praying that
the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified. He maintains that PAGCOR
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not
authorized under its legislative franchise, PD No. 1869, to operate gambling on the internet for
the simple reason that the said decree could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling
since at the time of its enactment on July 11, 1983 the internet was yet inexistent and gambling
activities were confined exclusively to real-space. Further, he argues that the internet, being an
international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the
limitation of PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of PD No. 1869 which provides: “Place. –
The Corporation [i.e., PAGCOR] shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance on land
or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x.”
Moreover, according to petitioner, internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of
the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of PD No. 1869 which grants
PAGCOR the “right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs,
and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction
of the Republic of the Philippines.” He contends that internet gambling could not have been
included within the commonly accepted definition of “gambling casinos,” “clubs” or “other
recreation or amusement places” as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space
where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR is allowed to contract any of its franchise to another entity such as
SAGE.
RULING: No.
A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege
of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for
public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under
such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the
public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be
made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of
conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty
of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and
unequivocal language.
While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management
contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less
grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power
in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest, inasmuch as there is
nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. In Lim v.
Pacquing, the Court clarified that “since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-
alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the
jai-alai in the City of Manila.” By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative
franchise and not “ride on” PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet
gambling
 PHILIPPINE INTERISLAND SHIPPING ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINES v. CA, GR No.
100481, 1997-01-22
Facts:
On February 3, 1986, shortly before the presidential elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
responding to the clamor of harbor pilots for an increase in pilotage rates, issued Executive
Order No. 1088, PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE
SERVICES RENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN ALL PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC PORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage
fees previously fixed by the PPA.
However, the PPA refused to enforce the executive order on the ground that it had been drawn
hastily and without prior consultation; that its enforcement would create disorder in the ports as
the operators and owners of the maritime vessels had expressed opposition to its...
implementation; and that the increase in pilotage, as mandated by it, was exorbitant and
detrimental to port operations
The UHPAP then announced its intention to implement E.O. No. 1088 effective November 16,
1986. This in turn drew a warning from the PPA that disciplinary sanctions would be applied to
those who would charge rates under E.O. No. 1088. The PPA instead issued Memorandum
Circular
No. 43-86, fixing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in E.O. No. 1088
Consequently, the UHPAP filed on January 7, 1987 a complaint for injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, against the then Minister of Transportation and Communications,
Hernando Perez, and PPA General Manager, Primitivo S. Solis, Jr. It sought a writ of
preliminary... mandatory injunction for the immediate implementation of E.O. No. 1088, as well
as a temporary restraining order to stop PPA officials from imposing disciplinary sanctions
against UHPAP members charging rates in accordance with E.O. No. 1088.
On February 26, 1988, while the case was pending, the PPA issued Administrative Order No.
02-88, entitled IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES ON OPEN PILOTAGE SERVICE. The PPA
announced in its order that it was leaving to the contracting parties, i.e., the shipping lines and
the pilots, the... fixing of mutually acceptable rates for pilotage services, thus abandoning the
rates fixed by it (PPA) under Memorandum Circular No. 43-86, as well as those provided in E.O.
No. 1088. The
Issues: Whether or not E.O 1088 is valid HEREIN PETITIONERS ARE BOUND TO COMPLY
WITH E.O. NO. 1088;
Ruling:
(1) The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.[
On February 3, 1986, when he issued E.O. No. 1088, President Marcos was authorized under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power, just as he was under
the original 1973
Constitution, when he issued P.D. NO. 857... which created the PPA, endowing it with the
power to regulate pilotage service in Philippine ports. Although the power to fix rates for pilotage
had been delegated to the PPA, it became necessary to rationalize the rates of charges fixed...
by it through the imposition of uniform rates.
That is what the President did in promulgating E.O. No. 1088. As the President could delegate
the ratemaking power to the PPA, so could he exercise it in specific instances without thereby
withdrawing the power vested b... by P.D. No.
857, Section 20(a) in the PPA "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates,
charges or fees... for the services rendered by the Authority or by any private organization
within a Port District."
The reason is because E.O. NO. 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its...
legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of
uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all Philippine ports."
Principles:
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) is the government agency which regulates pilotage.
Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 857, it has the power "to supervise, control, regulate . . .
such services as are necessary in the ports vested in, or belonging to the
Authority"[1] and to "control, regulate and supervise pilotage and the conduct of pilots in any
Port District."[2
It also has the power "to impose, fix, prescribe, increase or decrease such rates, charges or
fees. . . for the services... rendered by the Authority or by any private organization within a Port
District."[3
DELEGATION OF TARIFF POWERS to the President
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
GR 101273, 211 SCRA 219 [Jul 3, 1992]
Facts. The Tariff and Customs Code (TCC) states that in the interest of national economy,
general welfare and/or national security, the President, subject to limitations therein provided,
may increase xxx existing protective rates of import duty xxx when necessary. Pursuant to the
TCC, the President issued EO 475 and 478 imposing an additional duty of 9% ad valorem to
imported crude oil and other oil products, and a special duty of P0.95 per liter of imported crude
oil and P1.00 per liter of imported oil products. Rep. Garcia contests the validity of the foregoing
EOs averring that they are violative of Sec 24, Art VI of the Constitution which provides: All
xxx revenue or tariff bills shall originate in the House of Representatives xxx. He also argues
that said EOs contravene the TCC because the latter authorizes the President to, according to
him, impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local industries.
Issue. Are said EOs unconstitutional?
Held. No. There is explicit Constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President to,
“subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose”, fix “within specific limits
tariff rates xxx and other duties or imposts xxx.”54 Moreover, Garcia’s argument that the
“protection of local industries” is the only permissible objective that can be secured by the
exercise of the delegated authority—that which was provided in the TCC to be exercised by the
President in “the interest of national economy, general welfare and/or national security”—is a
stiflingly narrow one. We believe, for instance, that the protection of consumers is at the very
least as important a dimension of the “the interest of national economy, general welfare and
national security” as the protection of local industries. Congress does not unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.
 DELEGATION TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs POEA (ADMINISTRATIVE LAW)
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D.
SACO, respondents.
FACTS:
The private respondent in this case was awarded the sum of P192,000.00 by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for the death of her husband. The decision is
challenged by the petitioner on the principal ground that the POEA had no jurisdiction over the
case as the husband was not an overseas worker.
ISSUE:
Whether Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violative of the principle of non-delegation of
legislative power.
RULING:
Yes, The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive
Order No. 797, reading as follows:
... The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as hereunder provided shall promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the
Administration (POEA).
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of
legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test,
the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that
when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. 13 Under the
sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. 14
Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative regulation. The model contract
prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant number of the cases without challenge by
the employer. The power of the POEA (and before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring
the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the
exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which,
in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA), MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, HEARING
OFFICER ABDUL BASAR and KATHLEEN D. SACO, respondents.
G.R. No. 76633 October 18, 1988
Facts: Vitaliano Saco, husband of the respondent was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris
when he was killed in an accident in Tokyo Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for
damages under Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. Thus
she was awarded the sum of P192,000 by the POEA.
Issues: 1) Whether or not the POEA has jurisdiction over the case, as the husband was not
an overseas worker as contended by the petitioner?
2) Is Memorandum Circular No.2 of the POEA which prescribed a standard contract to
be adopted by both foreign and domestic shipping companies in hiring of Filipino seamen for
overseas employment violative of the principle of non-delegation of powers?
3) Has the petitioner been denied due process because the same POEA that issued
Memorandum Circular No. 2 has also sustained and applied it?
Rulings: 1) Yes. Saco was an overseas employee of the petitioner at the time he met with the
fatal accident in Japan, for he died while under a contract of employment with the petitioner and
alongside petitioner’s vessel while in a foreign country. Overseas employment as defined under
the 1985 Rules and Regulations on Overseas Employment is employment of a worker outside
the Philippines, including employment in board vessels plying international water, covered by a
valid contract.
2) Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative regulation, which has the force
and effect of law. The power of the POEA in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as
there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegated in the exercise of the said authority. It is
discoverable in the executive order itself which in creating the POEA mandated it to protect the
rights of overseas Filipino workers to fair and equitable employment practices.
3) No. Administrative agencies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative
and the quasi-judicial. The first enables them to promulgate implementing rules and regulations,
and the second enables them to interpret and apply such regulations. Such an arrangement has
been accepted as a fact of life of modern governments and cannot be considered violative of
due process as long as the cardinal rights laid down by Justice Laurel in the landmark case
of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations are observed.
Tablarin v. Gutierrez
No. L-78164, 152 SCRA 730 [Jul 31, 1987]
Facts. Petitioners Tablarin et al. sought admission into schools of medicine for SY 1987-1988.
However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission
Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education thereby rendering them
nqualified/disqualified for admission to medical school under RA 2382 (Medical Act of 1959).
Petitioners contest the constitutionality of said RA as amended averring, among others, that it
unduly delegated legislative power to the Board of Medical Education.
Issue. Is the Medical Act of 1959 an invalid delegation of legislative powers?
Held. No. The necessary standards are set forth in Sec 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the
standardization and regulation of medical education” and xxx the body of the statute itself.
These considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle. Petition dismissed.
The completeness test and sufficient standard test must be applied
concurrently, not alternatively.
G.R. No. 115381 December 23, 1994
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JESUS B. GARCIA, JR., the LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND
REGULATORY BOARD, and the PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In 1990, DOTC Sec. Oscar Orbos issued Memo Circular to LTFRB Chair Remedios Fernando
to allow provincial bus to change passenger rates w/in a fare range of 15% above or below the
LTFRB official rate for a 1yr. period. This is in line with the liberalization of regulation in the
transport sector which the government intends to implement and to make progress towards
greater reliance on free market forces.
Fernando respectfully called attention of DOTC Sec. that the Public Service Act requires
publication and notice to concerned parties and public hearing. In Dec. 1990, Provincial Bus
Operators Assoc. of the Phils. (PBOAP) filed an application for across the board fare rate
increase, which was granted by LTFRB. In 1992, then DOTC Sec. Garcia issued a memo to
LTFRB suggesting a swift action on adoption of procedures to implement the Department Order
& to lay down deregulation policies. Pursuant to LTFRB Guideline, PBOAP, w/o benefit of public
hearing announced a 20% fare rate increase.
Petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) opposed the move and filed a petition before LTFRB w/c
was denied. Hence the instant petition for certiorari w/ urgent prayer for a TRO, w/c was readily
granted by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the authority granted by LTFB to provincial buses to set a fare range above existing
authorized fare range is unconstitutional and invalid.
HELD:
The grant of power by LTFRB of its delegated authority is unconstitutional. The doctrine of
Potestas delegate non delegari (what has been delegated cannot be delegated) is applicable
because a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate thru instrumentality of his own judgment. To delegate this power is a negation of the
duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge such duty. Also, to
give provincial buses the power to charge their fare rates will result to a chaotic state of affairs
ad this would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who can increase their
rates arbitrarily whenever it pleases or when they deem it necessary.
Emergency powers of the President are necessarily fixed in the law itself. It
is unconstitutional for its duration to be dependent on arbitrary will of either
Congress or the President.
Rodriguez v. Gella
No. L-6266, 92 PHIL 603 [Feb 2, 1953]
Facts. Notwithstanding the ruling in Araneta v. Dinglasan, Pres. Quirino continued to exercise
his emergency powers under CA 671, promulgating EOs 545 and 546 appropriating public
funds for public works and the relief of victims of calamities. Petitioners seek to invalidate said
EOs.
Issue. Are the foregoing EOs invalid?
Held. Yes. More or less the same considerations that influenced the pronouncements in
Araneta v. Dinglasan are and should be controlling in the case now. [Reiterating], to be
constitutional, CA 671 must be construed to be for a limited period fixed or implied therein.
Express repeal of the same is unnecessary; otherwise it would be unconstitutional since it
may never be repealed by Congress, or if Congress attempts to do so, the President may wield
his veto. This in fact happened when the President vetoed House Bill 727, repealing all
Emergency Powers Acts. This is a clear repugnance of the Art. VI, Sec 26 (now 23) which
expressed such power to be limited in period, necessarily fixed in the law itself and not
dependent upon the arbitrary will of either the Congress or the President. The President cannot
set aside funds for special purposes, since the Congress has been approving appropriation
acts. If the President had ceased to have powers with respect to general appropriations, none
can remain in respect of special appropriations; otherwise he may do indirectly what he
cannot do directly.
DELEGATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS to the President
[Art VI, Sec 23(2)]
Any law passed in virtue of the emergency powers of the President should be for a limited
period only. An emergency is necessarily temporary otherwise it cannot be an emergency.
Araneta v. Dinglasan
GR L-2044, 84 Phil 368 [Aug 26, 1949]
Facts. In view of the state of world war in 1941, CA 671 (Emergency Powers Act) was enacted
by the National Assembly (NA) which authorized the President to promulgate rules and
egulations to meet such emergency.
CA 671 did not expressly fix the term of its effectiveness, although Sec 3 thereof provides “the
President x x x shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the Congress x x x report
thereto all the rules and regulations promulgated by him under the powers herein granted.”
Then Pres. Quezon later wrote in his autobiography describing the circumstances obtaining
when he called the NA for a special session and recommended the enactment of CA 671: “[I
issued the call for a special session of the NA] when it became evident that we were completely
helpless against air attack, and that it was most unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold
its next regular session which was to open on January 1, 1942.” True enough, Congress met in
regular session only on May 25, 1946.
Subsequently, by authority vested by CA 671, then Pres. Roxas issued EO 62 which provided
for the regulation of the rentals of residential lots and buildings. By the same authority, his
successor, Pres. Quirino issued EOs 192, 225 and 226 providing for the appropriation of public
funds in the operation of the national govt and the conduct of the 1949 elections, and the control
of exports. Petitioners, being prosecuted under the foregoing EOs, question the validity of the
same averring that CA 671, by virtue of which said EOs were issued, has ceased to have any
force and effect.
Issue. Has CA 671 ceased to have force and effect?
Held. Yes. CA 671 became inoperative when Congress met in regular session, thus EOs 62,
192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law. Art VI, Sec 26 (now Sec 23) of the
Constitution, provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be “for a limited period.”
These words are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration. An emergency xxx
“must be temporary or it cannot be said to be an emergency.” More anomalous is that fact that
there would be two legislative bodies operating to legislate concurrently and xxx mutually
nullifying each other’s actions. Furthermore, it is clear from the language of Sec 3 of CA 671
that the legislature intended to limit the duration of the Act when it provided that there was to be
only one meeting of Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship.
Moreover, giving much weight on the statements of Pres. Quezon in his autobiography
(considering his part in the passage and in the carrying out of the law), it was held that CA 671
was enacted with the specific view of the inability of the NA to meet. Hence, the sole raison
d’être for the enactment of CA 671 was the inability for the Congress to function; such
emergency period should thus end with the convening of that body.
TESTS OF DELEGATION
A law must have a sufficient standard to guide the exercise of the delegated
legislative power.
A law delegating legislative power must be complete. Nothing must be left
to the judgment of the delegate.
 People v. Vera
No. 45685, 65 Phil 56 [Nov 16, 1937]
Facts. Respondent Unjieng was convicted. Under the Probation Act (Act No. 4221), he later
applied for probation. Judge Vera granted the probation. Petitioners filed this action to the end
that Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in accordance with the final judgment of
conviction. Petitioners aver, among others, that said Act is unconstitutional as it is an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards. The challenged provision thereof reads:
“[t]his Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for
provincial fiscals x x x”
Issue. Does the Probation Act constitute an invalid delegation of legislative powers?
Held. Yes. Act No. 4221 is thereby unconstitutional and void. The effectivity of the Act was
made to depend upon an act to be done by the provincial boards, that is, the appropriating of
funds for the salary of the probation officer. But the Act does not xxx fix and impose upon the
provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of this discretionary power. What is
granted is a “roving commission” xxx. It thus leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the
Act upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to them.
Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court
No. L-74457, 148 SCRA 659 [Mar 20, 1987]
Facts. Petitioner Ynot had transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo when they were
confiscated by the police station commander for violation of EO 626-A which prohibits
interprovincial movement of carabaos and carabeef. The EO also provides for the forfeiture of
the carabao/carabeef unlawfully transported and its subsequent disposition to charitable
institutions. Ynotnow petitions for review averring that said EO is unconstitutional for, among
others, invalid delegation of legislative powers
. President to transfer any fund appropriated for different departments to any program, project or
Issue. Is EO 626-A an invalid delegation of legislative powers?
Held. Yes. EO 626-A authorized the property seized “to be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may
see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.” The phrase “may see fit” is xxx extremely
generous and dangerous xxx. One searches in vain for the usual standard xxx, the limitations
that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Definitely,
there is here a “roving commission” xxx, a clearly xxx invalid delegation of powers.
DEMETRIA V ALBA
G.R. No. 71977 | February 27, 1987
Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget
Reform Decree of 1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties
with general interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary
grounds that Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of
public moneys, amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President
to override the safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the
petitioners and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another,
coordinate branch in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged
that the petition has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of
the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under
consideration was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President…may by law be authorized to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.”
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by
empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the
Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations
Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to
an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to
naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has
assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say
that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the
judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.
Demetria vs Alba GR No 71977 27 February 1987
Facts: Demetrio Demetria filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction in the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177, otherwise known as the “Budget Reform Decree of 1977.” The said PD authorizes the
activity of any department. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss,
stating that the nullity of Section 16 (5) Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
Constitution of March 25, 1986 has allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic.
Issue: Whether or not Budget Reform Decree is constitutional.
Decision: Instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of
the government. There are times when although the dispute has disappeared it still ought to be
resolved. Justice demands that the Court act not only for the vindication of the one’s right but
also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical
under the 1973 Constitution. PD 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16 (5) Article VIII. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes
beyond its tenor. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
 LOZANO v. MARTINEZ G.R No. L-63419. December 18, 1986 (CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case, the petition arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses
under the BP 22 also known as Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these case moved
seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an
offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial
court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No. 75789, wherein the trial court
declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have
come to the court for remedy. Those who question the constitutionality of the said statute insist
the following ground:
1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt;
2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the interim Batasan violated the
constitutional provision prohibiting to a bill on Third Reading.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is unconstitutional.
RULING: No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of Police power and is
not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be
constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment of debt ex
contractu, but certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe certain
acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not only acts which
the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not
malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police
power.
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated
by the imposition of penal sanctions.
LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; NO.L-63419; 18 DEC 1986]
Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was
made, contending that no offense wascommitted, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion
was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief.
The Solicitor General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the
Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it
justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.
Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the
State.
Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment fordebt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation
which the lawpunishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the
community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do
this in the exercise of its police power.
Congressman Chiongbian v. Exec. Secretary Orbos (1992)
Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed a law creating the ARMM composed of the 4
provinces which through a plebiscite expressed their votes that they wanted to be included in
the said region. A total of 13 provinces and 9 cities participated in the plebiscite. As the said
law that created ARMM also allowed the President (Aquino) to merge the provinces who voted
NOT to be included in the ARMM to be merged into existing regions, EO 429 was issued
transferring certain provinces to other regions.
The transfer of these provinces was questioned, they alleged that Art. XIX, §13 of R.A. No.
6734 is unconstitutional because
1) it unduly delegates legislative power to the President by authorizing him to "merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions" or at any rate provides no standard for
the exercise of the power delegated and
2) the power granted is not expressed in the title of the law.
ISSUES:
 whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative or executive in character? -
EXECUTIVE
 whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid because it contains no standard to guide the President's
discretion - to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to
pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the
transaction of the public business.
HELD:
First issue:
 Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial
organization of
administrative regions in 1972.
 PD 742 restructured the regional organization of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi
 PD. No. 773 further restructured the regional organization of Mindanao
 PD1555 transferred the regional center of Region IX from Jolo to Zamboanga City.
 The choice of the President as delegate is logical
 division of the country into intended to facilitate administration of local governments, direction
of executive departments which the law requires should have regional offices.
 In Abbas, we said that power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in
the Constitution
o BUT it is a power traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, §4 of the Constitution]."
o Regions not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays
 but a "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes."
 "administrative in nature"
Second issue:
 Legislative standard may be expressed or implied
 Need not be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the
same subject as that of the challenged legislation
 As regards the questioned law, the standard is found in another law - R.A. No. 5435 of the
power to reorganize the Executive Department
 The standard is "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it
to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic
development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business."
 Hence, while non-assenting provinces and cities are to remain in the regions as designated
upon the creation of the Autonomous Region, they may nevertheless be regrouped with
contiguous provinces forming other regions as the exigency of administration may require
The completeness test and sufficient standard test must be applied
concurrently, not alternatively.

Pelaez v. Auditor General

No. L-23825, 15 SCRA 569 [Dec 24, 1965]
Facts. The President, purporting to act pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code
(RAC), issued EOs 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating 33 municipalities. Soon after, VP
Pelaez, instituted the present special civil action challenging the constitutionality of said EOs on
the ground, among others, that Sec 68 of the RAC relied upon constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power to the President. The challenged Sec 68 provides: “the President x x x may
by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince,
municipality, [township] municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or
diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more
subprovinces, separate any political division x x x into such portions as may be required, merge
any of such subdivisions or portions with another x x x”

Issue. Does Sec 68 of the RAC constitute an undue delegation of legislative power?

Held. Yes. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. Sec
68 of the RAC, insofar as it grants to the President the power to create municipalities does not
meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy xxx, there would be no means to
determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the
scope of his authority.58 It is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that the law: (a) be complete in itself x x x and (b) x x x fix a standard to which the
delegate must conform x x x.

US v. Ang Tang Ho
GR 17122, 43 Phil 1 [Feb 27, 1922]

Facts. The Phil. Legislature passed Act No. 2868 “An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding
of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General xxx to issue the necessary
rules and regulations therefor xxx”. Pursuant thereto, the Gov-Gen issued EO 53 fixing the price
at which rice should be sold. Defendant Ang Tang Ho who sold rice at a price greater than that
fixed by EO 53 was found guilty of violation thereof. He contested the validity of said law
verring that it constituted invalid delegation of legislative power.57

Issue. Did Act No. 2868 invalidly delegate legislative power to the Gov-Gen?

Held. Yes. A law must be complete in all its terms and provision. When it leaves the legislative
branch of the government, nothing must be left to the judgment of the delegate of the
legislature. The Legislature does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for
what reasons the Gov-Gen shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued “for any
cause,” and leaves the question as to what is “any cause” to the discretion of the Gov-Gen. The
Act also says it may be issued “…whenever… conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise
in the price of palay, rice or corn.” The Legislature does not specify or define what is “an
extraordinary rise.” The Act also says that the Gov-Gen, “with the consent of the Council of
State,” is authorized to issue and promulgate “temporary rules and emergency measures for
carrying out the purposes of this Act.” It does not specify or define what is a temporary rule or
an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or emergency measures shall
remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That is to say, the Legislature itself
has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for the order, but has left it to the sole
judgment and discretion of the Gov-Gen to say what is or what is not “a cause,” and what
is or what is not “an extraordinary rise in the price, and as to what is a “temporary rule” or an
“emergency measure” for the carrying out the purposes of the Act.