FRUCTUOSO R. CAPCO vs. MANUEL R.
MACASAET, realized had his stock certificates been promptly given back and the
JACOBO FELICIANO, and CA - September 13, 1990
Facts:
The petitioner was a stockholder, director and executive vice-
president of Monte Oro Mineral Resources, Inc., a local mining
company whose shares were traded in the stock market. He owned
56,588,358 shares of the capital stock of Monte Oro as evidenced by
Stock Certificate No. 002 for 14,159,583 shares and Stock
Certificate No. 026 for 42,428,775 shares. The petitioner indorsed
and delivered Stock Certificates Nos. 002 and 026 to private
respondent Manuel Macasaet, board chairman and President of
Monte Oro, who personally received the said certificate.
The petitioner demanded the return of his stock certificates from
respondent Macasaet who failed to produce them because he had
given them to the other private respondent Jacobo Feliciano, another
officer of Monte Oro, allegedly in connection with a contemplated
joint venture with the group of one Leonilo Esguerra.
Respondent Macasaet replaced the petitioner's Stock Certificate No.
026 with his own Stock Certificate No. 025 covering 42,578,700
shares. The petitioner duly acknowledged the receipt of the said
replacement. Stock Certificate No. 002 was returned by respondent
Macasaet to the petitioner as evidenced by the handwritten receipt
signed by the latter who likewise made a handwritten notation stating
"all cleared" at the left hand margin thereof.
The petitioner filed a complaint for damages against the private
respondents alleging, among others, that at the time he demanded his
Stock Certificate Nos. 002 and 026 from respondent Macasaet the
petitioner had a ready buyer for 0.014 per share for all shares; that
due to the private respondents' failure to return the said stock
certificates upon demand, the petitioner lost P306,115 representing
the difference between the amount of P792,237 which he would have
sum of P486,121, the actual net proceeds from the subsequent sale of
P42,550,000 shares at various prices after respondent Macasaet
delivered his own Stock Certificate No. 025 in exchange for the
petitioners Stock Certificate No. 026; that the aforesaid amount of P
306,115 had long been overdue and unpaid and despite repeated
demands from the private respondents for the payment thereof, the
latter had failed and refused to pay the same to the petitioner's
damage and prejudice; and that due to the private respondents'
intentional, deliberate and malicious acts, moral and exemplary
damages could be awarded to the petitioner.
Respondent Macasaet counter-alleged, among others, that he had in
turn entrusted Stock Certificate Nos. 002 and 026 of the petitioner to
his co-defendant, respondent Feliciano to be shown to a certain
group for the purpose of a joint venture; that respondent Macasaet
had actually made several demands for the return of the said stock
certificates from respondent Feliciano who refused and failed to do
so; that two days after the petitioner made the demand, respondent
Macasaet replaced the petitioner's Stock Certificate No. 026 with his
own Stock Certificate No. 025; that the respondent Macasaet
returned the petitioner's Stock Certificate No. 002 after he recovered
the game from respondent Feliciano; and that the words "ALL
CLEARED" written by the petitioner himself on his
acknowledgment receipt as he received Stock Certificate No. 002
from respondent Macasaet undoubtedly meant to discharge private
respondent Macasaet from any responsibility or liability regarding
the petitioner's stock certificates.
The lower court rendered a judgment favorable to the petitioner. On
appeal by respondent Macasaet, the CA, reversed and set aside the
trial court's judgment for lack of merit and supporting proof.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to damages. - No
Ruling:
tThe petitioner failed to support his claim that he suffered the
claimed damages as a result of respondent Macasaet's failure to
return Stock Certificate Nos. 002 and 026 upon demand. The alleged
"unrealized profits" representing actual and compensatory damages
must be supported by substantial and convincing proof. The records
are bereft of such kind of proof. Mere allegation that there was a
"ready and willing buyer' of all the petitioners shares covered by
Stock Certificate Nos. 002 and 026 for P0.014 per share at the time
the demand for the return of the said certificates was made cannot
suffice to allow the petitioners claim for unrealized profits to
prosper. Such claim is clearly speculative in nature.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of
pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or
occupation, and the same must be proved; otherwise, if the proof is
flimsy and non-substantial, no damages will be given Actual and
compensatory damages require evidentiary proof. They cannot be
presumed.
The good faith of respondent Macasaet is shown by the fact that after
trying to recover the missing certificates, he immediately substituted
Stock Certificate No. 026 with his own Stock Certificate No. 025
which covered more shares than the petitioner's replaced certificate.
The petitioner's other Stock Certificate No. 002 was subsequently
returned and received by the petitioner with the notation "All
Cleared" on the acknowledgment receipt duly signed and personally
written by him. The said notation meant to discharge respondent
Macasaet' together with his co-respondent Feliciano from any
liability with respect to the stock certificates in question as there can
be no other plausible interpretation therefor. He would not have
written "all cleared" if he was unhappy at that time about the
substitution of the higher value certificate for his other certificate.
Other issue and ruling:
It is true that when the petitioner delivered Stock Certificate Nos.
002 and 026 to respondent Macasaet the latter acknowledged
receiving them "in trust and for safekeeping only." This
acknowledgment, however, cannot outweigh the legal effects of the
stock certificates having been "already indorsed". There is no dispute
that respondent Macasaet received the petitioner's certificates in that
condition as evidenced by the same Acknowledgment Receipt.
Certificates of stocks are considered as "quasi-negotiable"
instruments. When the owner or shareholder of these certificates
signs the printed form of sale or assignment at the back of every
stock certificate without filling in the blanks provided for the name
of the transferee as well as for the name of the attorney-in-fact, the
said owner or shareholder, in effect, confers on another all the indicia
of ownership of the said stock certificates. In the case at bar, the
petitioner signed the printed form at the back of both Stock
Certificate Nos. 002 and 026 without filling in the blanks at the time
the said stock certificates were delivered to respondent Macasaet.
Hence, the petitioner's acts of indorsement and delivery conferred on
respondent Macasaet the right to hold them as though they were his
own. On account of this apparent transfer of ownership, it was not
irregular on the part of respondent Macasaet to deliver the stock
certificates in question to respondent Feliciano for consideration in
connection with a contemplated tie-up between two business groups.
At this juncture, it is worth noting that in view of the petitioner's
concurrent positions as director, Executive Vice-President and
General Manager of Monte Oro at the time of the incident under
consideration, he could not have been unaware of the consequences
of the delivery coupled with the indorsement of his two stock
certificates to respondent Macasaet, notwithstanding the tenor of the
Acknowledgment Receipt. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the
petitioner's delivery of the subject stock certificates to respondent
Macasaet was strictly for safe-keeping purposes only because if that
were his real and only intention, there is neither logic nor reason for
the indorsement of the said certificates.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and on behalf
of the minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and
Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy) - April 3, 2000
Facts:
The Provincial Prosecutor Durian filed with the RTC of Isabela an
amended information charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with
reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to
property. Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
On the same occasion, the offended parties (Rosario Dy and minor
children and Angelina M. Balcita and minor son Paolo) made a
reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused arising
from the offense charged. The offended parties actually filed a
complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi delict.
The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the
driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The private
respondents opted to pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw
the civil case quasi ex delicto they filed against petitioner. Private
respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action
against the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the
civil aspect ex delicto in the criminal action. However, they did not
withdraw the separate civil action based on quasi delict against
petitioner as employer arising from the same act or omission of the
accused driver.
The defendant Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation is a domestic
corporation engaged in the business of transporting beer products for
the SMC from the latter's Pampanga plant to its various sales outlets
in Luzon. The White Truck driven by Dunca left Cagayan bound to
Pampanga loaded with 2,000 cases of empty beer "Grande" bottles.
Seated at the front right seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his
truck helper. While the truck was descending at a slight downgrade
along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it approached a
damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck's
right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the
surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to
six inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is
smooth. As narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the
potholes, he and Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming
from the opposite direction. They used to evade this damaged road
by taking the left lance but at that particular moment, because of the
incoming vehicle, they had to run over it. This caused the truck to
bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck
swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As a result,
Dunca's vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left
shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where
it finally stopped. The Nissan was severely damage, and its two
passengers, namely: Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died
instantly.
The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents and held petitioner
subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the respondents in
case of insolvency of the accused. During the pendency of the
appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to another country. The CA
dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case. The CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issues:
1. WON the petitioner as employer may be held subsidiarily liable
for the damages awarded in the criminal case despite the filing of a
separate civil action against it. - no
2. WON the court may award damages to the offended party in the
criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer
of the truck driver. - No
Ruling:
In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1)
an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi
delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once
the choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any
other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for the
same negligent act or omission of the accused. This is the rule
against double recovery.
In other words, "the same act or omission can create two kinds of
liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto,
and civil liability quasi delicto" either of which "may be enforced
against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the offended party can not recover damages under
both types of liability."
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a separate civil
action for damages against petitioner as employer of the accused,
based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Private respondents sued petitioner Rafael Reyes
Trucking Corporation, as the employer of the accused, to be
vicariously liable for the fault or negligence of the latter. Under the
law, this vicarious liability of the employer is founded on at least two
specific provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, which would allow an action predicated on quasi-
delict to be instituted by the injured party against the employer for an
act or omission of the employee and would necessitate only a
preponderance of evidence to prevail. Here, the liability of the
employer for the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and
primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. The enforcement of the judgment
against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not
require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability
of the employer with that of the employee, the two being statutorily
considered joint tortfeasors, is solidary. The second, predicated on
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer
may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his
employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when
the employee is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his
work and is found to be insolvent that renders him unable to properly
respond to the civil liability adjudged.
1. Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused
who has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless
imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing
of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of
the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for
recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the
criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of
damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the
criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against
the driver (accused) and manifested that they would pursue the civil
liability of the driver in the criminal action. However, the withdrawal
is ineffective to reverse the effect of the reservation earlier made
because private respondents did not withdraw the civil action against
petitioner based on quasi delict.
However, petitioner as defendant in the separate civil action for
damages filed against it, based on quasi delict, may be held liable
thereon. Unfortunately private respondents did not appeal from such
dismissal and could not be granted affirmative relief. The Court,
however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to
promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action or
proceeding" or exempted "a particular case from the operation of the
rules."
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in awarding
civil damages in the criminal case and in dismissing the civil action.
Apparently satisfied with such award, private respondent did not
appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. However, petitioner did
appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so that
it may render decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be
warranted by the evidence.
2. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the
criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the
employer. As enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong, "civil indemnity is
not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only issue
brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether
accused Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage to property. The action for
recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but is covered by
the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as employer of
the accused truck-driver.
In this case, accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his
conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused became final
and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in the criminal action
is concerned. The damages awarded in the criminal action was
invalid because of its effective waiver. The pronouncement was void
because the action for recovery of the civil liability arising from the
crime has been waived in said criminal action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the criminal
action exceeded the amount of damages alleged in the amended
information, the issue is de minimis. At any rate, the trial court erred
in awarding damages in the criminal case because by virtue of the
reservation of the right to bring a separate civil action or the filing
thereof, "there would be no possibility that the employer would be
held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement
as to the civil liability of the accused.
Other ruling:
Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide Through
Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle Law (Rep.
Act No. 4136)". There is no such nomenclature of an offense under
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the trial court was misled to sentence
the accused "to suffer two (2) indeterminate penalties of four (4)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as
maximum." This is erroneous because in reckless imprudence cases,
the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willfull crime or crimes committed, but is set in relation to
a whole class, or series of crimes.
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if
erroneous, as it is, because it has become final and executory. Under
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal negligence "is
treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from
willful offenses. It is not a question of classification or terminology.
In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or
imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or
foresight, the imprudencia punible. Much of the confusion has arisen
from the common use of such descriptive phrase as "homicide
through reckless imprudence", and the like; when the strict technical
sense is, more accurately, "reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide"; or "simple imprudence causing damages to property"."
There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation of the offense
without disturbing the imposed penalty for the guidance of bench
and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
G.R. No. 59311, January 31, 1985
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(RCPI) V. HON. JAIME M. LANTIN, THE SHERIFF OF THE
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY AND
RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ
Facts:
This case involves the validity of the orders of the CFI of Rizal,
concurred by the CA, herein public respondent, directing Radio
Communications Philippines Inc and GLOBE Inc to pay actual,
moral, exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees pending appeal
amounting to P213,148.00.
Rufus Rodriguez (Rodriguez), herein private respondent, in his
capacity as president of the World Association of Law Students
(WALS), sent 2 cablegrams overseas through RCPI addressed to
Mohamed Elsir Taha in Khartoum Sudan, and another to Diane
Merger in the US. The cablegrams were in turn relayed to GLOBE
for transmission t other foreign destinations. The telegrams contained
information regarding a conference to be held in Khartoum Sudan
involving the WALS which also involved the pending arrival of
Rodriguez in Khartoum. Thereafter, Rodriguez left the Philippines
for Sudan. After reaching his destination, he discovered that no one
was waiting for him at the airport. Thus Rodriguez had to improvise
with various chairs and was constrained to sleep at the airport.
Thus, Rodriguez filed a complaint for damages against RCPI
involving actual, moral, exemplary damages as well as attorney’s
fees with the CFI. The CFI held for Rodriguez and adjudged RCPI
and Globe liable for P213,148.00 in actual, moral and exemplary
damages, including cost of suit. Thereafter Rodriguez filed a motion
for execution of judgment before expiration of time to appeal,
relying on Rule 39 Section 2 of the Rules of Court. Rodriguez
alleged that the appeal taken by RCPI and GLOBE is clearly dilatory
and the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment against
RCPI and GLOBE illusory and ineffective. The CFI thereafter
granted the motion to execute judgment pending appeal against RCPI
and GLOBE. Thereafter, the sheriff sought to levy on the properties
of RCPI and GLOBE for the satisfaction of judgment rendered
against the both of them. This prompted RCPI and GLOBE to
elevate the case to the CA by filing a petition for certiorari,
mandamus, and prohibition praying for the issuance of an injunctive
writ so as to enjoin the lower court from further hearing the case
against them. The CA dismissed the petition filed by RCPI and
GLOBE. Thus prompting RCPI and GLOBE to elevate the case
before the SC. They contend that the CFI and CA erred in upholding
the execution of judgment against them pending appeal. Hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether the motion for execution of judgment pending appeal is
valid
Ruling:
We qualify. As regards compensatory damages, the same may be
levied upon pending judgment. However, with respect to moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, the same must await
the decision of the case (now pending with the CA) on the merits.
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
"On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party
the court may, in its discretion, order execution to issue even before
the expiration of the time to appeal, upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order. If a record on appeal is filed
thereafter, the motion and the special order shall be included
therein."
The rule specifically vests the court with the exercise of
discretionary power. The requisites for the court's valid exercise of
the discretion to order execution pending appeal are: (1) there must
be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; COURSE. The November 10, 1981 decision and December
2) there must be good reasons for issuing the execution, and (3) the 22, 1981 reso lution of the appellate court are SET ASIDE and
good reasons must be stated in a special order. Considering the a new ORDER is ENTERED authorizing execution pending
nature of the wrongful acts found by the trial court and the amount of appeal of P43,148.00 actual damages upon the private
damages adjudicated as recoverable, both of which are stated in respondent's filing of a bond in the same amount. The
detail in the decisions and various orders of the trial court and the execution of any award for moral damages, exemplary
appellate court, we are constrained to sustain the respondent courts damages, and attorney's fees is enjoined until after final
insofar as the award for actual or compensatory damages are resolution of the issues in the main case.
concerned but to postpone the execution of the awards for moral and SO ORDERED.
exemplary damages until such time as the merits of the cases now on
regular appeal before the Court of Appeals are finally determined.
The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is
dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages
for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a
specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain,
liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as well as
the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution
by the Intermediate Appellate
Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The existence of the factual
bases of these types of damages and their causal relation to the
petitioners' act will have to be determined in the light of the
assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that the petitioners,
after all, while liable for actual damages may not be liable for moral
and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated to the
Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.

The respondent introduced evidence to show that he suffered mental

anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
and social humiliation. The petitioners question the extent of these
sufferings and further aver that their acts claimed to have caused the
injury were not wrongful, deliberate, wanton, and tainted with bad
faith or fraud. Our review of the records constrains us to allow
execution pending appeal of actual but not the moral and exemplary
damages which must await the final determination of the main cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED PARTIAL DUE

G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988
BA FINANCE CORPORATION
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO
YULO, LILY YULO (doing business under the name and style
of A & L INDUSTRIES)
Facts:
Sometime in 1975 Augusto Yulo (Augusto) secured a loan from BA
Finance Corporation (BA) herein petitioner, allegedly for and on
behalf of A & L Industries (A & L). Augusto was armed with a SPA
appointing him as attorney in fact by Lily Yulo (Lily) herein private
respondent, proprietor of A & L Industries and the spouse of
Augusto. So as to induce BA to grant the loan, Augusto allegedly
issued a DOA in favor of BA assigning to BA all the rights, titles and
interests over a construction contract allegedly entered between A &
L and A Sorian Corporation. As the obligation for the loan fell due,
A & L Industries and Lily were unable to pay the loan. Lily alleged
that Augusto left her and their 5 children 5 months prior to the
procurement of Augusto of the loan from BA and that her signature
found in the SPA was a forgery. BA on the other hand alleged that
asides from the loan aforementioned, Lily refused and failed to remit
to BA certain proceeds arising from the DOA entered into between A
& L and BA.
This prompted BA to file a complaint for collection and for the
issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that the SPS Yulo
defrauded BA into entering with them the loan contract despite the
fact they the SPS were unable to pay the same. To this Lily, filed a
counterclaim against BA.
During the pendency of the trial, properties owned by Lily for and on
behalf of the business of A & L were levied by the sheriff of the
court which caused the closure of the said proprietorship.
On the merits, the trial court dismissed the complaint for collection
against Lily. It upheld the counterclaim and adjudged BA liable to
Lily for the amount of Php 660,000.00 as actual dmgs, 500,000.00 as
unrealized profits, 300,000.00 as exemplary dmgs, and 30,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and cost.
This prompted BA to elevate the case to the CA. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court that there was bad
faith on the part of the petitioner as to entitle the private respondent
to damages as shown not only by the fact that the petitioner did not
present the Deed of Assignment or the construction agreement or any
evidence whatsoever to support its claim of fraud on the part of the
private respondent and to justify the issuance of a preliminary
attachment.
Now, BA comes before the SC assailing the decision of the CA. BA
alleges that the award of moral dmgs was incorrect because there is
no evidence showing bad faith on the part of BA in bringing the suit.
And that the award of actual damages was improper considering that
the trial court should have returned the levied properties of A & L
instead of adjudging BA to pay Lily actual damages for the same.
Issues:
1.) Whether there was bad faith on the part of BA in filing suit which
warrants the imposition of moral and exemplary damages
2.) Whether the giving of actual damages was the proper action
instead of the return of the properties taken by garnishment in favor
of A & L
Ruling:
1.) There is no imputable bad faith on the part of BA warranting the
imposition of moral and exemplary damages.

2.) Yes, the giving of actual damages in lieu of the return of the
taken properties by levy is the proper recourse.
Both the trial and appellate courts found that there was bad faith on
the part of the petitioner in securing the writ of attachment. We do
not think so. "An attachment may be said to be wrongful when, for
instance, the plaintiff has no cause of action, or that there is no true
ground therefore, or that the plaintiff has a sufficient security other
than the property attached, which is tantamout to saying that the
plaintiff is not entitled to attachment because the requirements of
entitling him to the writ are wanting.
Although the petitioner failed to prove the ground relied upon for the
issuance of the writ of attachment, this failure cannot be equated
with bad faith or malicious intent. The steps which were taken by the
petitioner to ensure the security of its claim were premised, on the
firm belief that the properties involved could be made answerable for
the unpaid obligation due it. There is no question that a loan in the
amount of P591,003.59 was borrowed from the bank.
We, thus, find that the petitioner is liable only for actual damages
and not for exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Respondent Lily
Yulo has manifested before this Court that she no longer desires the
return of the attached properties since the said attachment caused her
to close down the business. From that time she has become a mere
employee of the new owner of the premises. She has grave doubts as
to the running condition of the attached machineries and equipments
considering that the attachment was effected way back in 1975. She
states as a matter of fact that the petitioner has already caused the
sale of the machineries for fear that they might be destroyed due to
prolonged litigation. We, therefore, deem it just and equitable to
allow private respondent Lily Yulo to recover actual damages based
on the value of the attached properties as proven in the trial court, in
the amount of P660,000.00. In turn, if there are any remaining
attached properties, they should be permanently released to herein
petitioner.
We cannot, however, sustain the award of P500,000.00 representing
unrealized profits because this amount was not proved or justified
before the trial court. The basis of the alleged unearned profits is too
speculative and conjectural to show actual damages for a future
period. The private respondent failed to present reports on the
average actual profits earned by her business and other evidence of
profitability which are necessary to prove her claim for the said
amount
The judgment is therefore set aside insofar as it holds the petitioner
liable for P500,000.00 actual damages representing unrealized
profits, P150,000.00 for exemplary damages and P20,000.00 for
attorney's fees. As stated earlier, the attached properties, should be
released in favor of the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE and the petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent
Lily Yulo the amount of SIX HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P660,000.00) as actual damages. The remaining properties
subject of the attachment are ordered released in favor of the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22590 March 20, 1987
SOLOMON BOYSAW and ALFREDO M. YULO, JR.,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
INTERPHIL PROMOTIONS, INC., LOPE SARREAL, SR., and
MANUEL NIETO, JR., defendants-appellees.
Facts:
Solomon Boysaw (Boysaw), herein petitioner, and his then manager
Willie Ketchum, signed with Interphil Promotions Inc. (Interphil)
represented by Lope Sarreal Sr (Lope), herein respondents, to engage
Gabriel “Flash Elorde in a boxing match against Boysaw for the
junior lightweight championship of the world to be held on
September 30 1961 or not less than 30 days thereafter in case there
should be a postponement mutually agreed upon by the parties.
The contract entered into in May 1 1961 stipulated that neither
Boysaw nor Elorde would engage in any other contest without the
written consent of Interphil. However, on June 19, 1961 Boysaw,
without prior written consent from Interphil, fought and defeated
Louis Avila in a ten round no title bout held in Las Vegas, Nevada,
in contravention to the contract entered prior thereto.
Furthermore, the contract stipulated that the parties’ boxer cannot
change managers prior to fight night without the written approval of
the other party. To this Boysaw and his current manager Alfredo
Yulo (Yulo) herein petitioner, contravened. During the pendency of
the contract and before fight night, Boysaw changed managers from
Willie Ketchum to Amado Araneta and ultimately to Yulo, all
without written consent from Interphil.
Thereafter upon discovering the change of manager with Boysaw,
Interphil wrote a letter to Manuel Nieto (Nieto), herein petitioner, of
the Games and Amusement Board (GAB) expressing its concern
over the sudden change of management over Boysaw. This resulted
into having the fight night postponed from September 30, 1961 to
November 4 of the same year. Yulo refused to accept the change in
the fight date. As a result, the fight contemplated in the contract
never materialized.
This prompted Boysaw and Yulo to sue Interphil, Sarreal and Nieto
before the trial court for damages on the ground of breach of contract
entered into by the parties. Interphil, Sarreal and Nieto interposed
their counterclaim against Boysaw and Yulo. The trial court
dismissed the complaint of Boysaw and Yulo and upheld the
counterclaim of Interphil, Sarreal and Nieto which adjudged Boysaw
and Yulo liable for actual, and moral damages as well as attorney’s
fees.
This prompted Boysaw et al to elevate the case to the SC. Among
others, they assail the decision of the trial court as regards the
allegedly excessive damages adjudged by the trial court.
Issue:
WON the trial court erred in holding Boysaw and Yulo liable for
actual, aand moral damages as well as attorney’s fees.
Ruling:
We qualify. The trial court is correct insofar as to the granting actual
damages and attorney’s fees. But the same erred in granting moral
damages against Boysaw and Yulo.
On the issue pertaining to the award of excessive damages, it must be
noted that because the appellants wilfully refused to participate in the
final hearing and refused to present documentary evidence after they
no longer had witnesses to present, they, by their own acts prevented
themselves from objecting to or presenting proof contrary to those
adduced for the appellees.
On the actual damages awarded to appellees, the appellants contend
that a conclusion or finding based upon the uncorroborated testimony
of a lone witness cannot be sufficient. We hold that in civil cases,
there is no rule requiring more than one witness or declaring that the
testimony of a single witness will not suffice to establish facts,
especially where such testimony has not been contradicted or
rebutted. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the award of
P250,000.00 as and for unrealized profits to the appellees.
On the award of actual damages to Interphil and Sarreal, the records
bear sufficient evidence presented by appellees of actual damages
which were neither objected to nor rebutted by appellants, again
because they adamantly refused to participate in the court
proceedings.
The award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00 in favor of
defendant-appellee Manuel Nieto, Jr. and another P5,000.00 in favor
of defendants-appellees Interphil Promotions, Inc. and Lope Sarreal,
Sr., jointly, cannot also be regarded as excessive considering the
extent and nature of defensecounsels' services which involved legal
work for sixteen [16] months.
However, in the matter of moral damages, we are inclined to uphold
the appellant's contention that the award is not sanctioned by law and
well- settled authorities. Art. 2219 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following
analogous cases:
1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
2) Quasi-delict causing physical injuries;
3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts;
4) Adultery or concubinage;
5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
6) Illegal search;
7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
8) Malicious prosecution;
9) Acts mentioned in Art. 309.
10) Acts and actions referred to in Arts., 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
32, 34 and 35.
The award of moral damages in the instant case is not based on any
of the cases enumerated in Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. The action
herein brought by plaintiffs-appellants is based on a perceived breach
committed by the defendants-appellees of the contract of May 1,
1961, and cannot, as such, be arbitrarily considered as a case of
malicious prosecution.
Moral damages cannot be imposed on a party litigant although such
litigant exercises it erroneously because if the action has been
erroneously filed, such litigant may be penalized for costs.
The grant of moral damages is not subject to the whims and caprices
of judges or courts. The court's discretion in granting or refusing it is
governed by reason and justice. In order that a person may be made
liable to the payment of moral damages, the law requires that his act
be wrongful. The adverse result of an action does not per se make the
act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages.
The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate; such right is so precious that moral damages may not be
charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. For these the law
taxes costs.
WHEREFORE, except for the award of moral damages which is
herein deleted, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
Bachrach Motor vs Esteva and Teal Motor
Facts:
The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendants the
sum of P54,749.41, for 22 promissory notes executed by the
defendant Esteva in favor of Teal Motor, and endorsed by the latter
in favor of the plaintiff, with interest of 12%, plus P13,687.35 as
attorney's fees, equivalent to 25 per cent of the amount due.
Teal Motor answered the complaint, practically acquiescing in the
allegations. Esteva filed his re-amended answer and by way of
counterclaim and cross-complaint against the plaintiff and the co-
defendant, alleged that a liquidation of his account with the latter
company showed that he was then indebted to it in the sum of
P64,500; that to secure the payment of said obligation he executed in
favor of the Teal Motor a mortgage on 14 autotrucks, 11 trailers and
1 Buick automobile.
To facilitate the payment, he agreed with the manager that he would
organize "Insular Express Company", which would assume all the
obligation; that while the incorporation papers were under
preparation, Teal Motor, in connivance with the plaintiff and its then
manager, E. M. Bachrach, foreclosed the mortgage executed by him,
thereby illegally depriving him of the possession of such.
That the value of said motor vehicles was P105,730, and that the
business in which he was engaged yielded an annual profit of not
less than P20,000; and that the motor vehicles seized and sold could
still be used for eight consecutive years from which he could have
obtained profits in the amount of P160,000 which, added to the sum
of P72,957.06 paid by him on account of the price of said vehicles,
makes a total of P232,957.06, representing all the damages suffered
by him as a result of the foreclosure.
The plaintiff and Teal Motor objected to the admission, and the trial
court denied the admission. Esteva excepted to the order and filed
another motion praying that the accompanying cross-complaint
against the plaintiff, Teal Motor and E. M. Bachrach, be admitted. In
said cross-complaint the defendant made the same allegations.
Teal Motor objected and the trial court admitted the pleading, not as
a cross-complaint but as a part of the special defense. Trial court
rendered its decision in the case ordering Esteva and Teal Motor
jointly and severally, to pay the sum of P34,749.41 and an additional
sum of P3,483.72 as penalty. Teal Motor was likewise ordered to pay
the sum of P20,000 and the further sum of P2,000, as penalty.
Esteva appealed from said decision and this court reversed the
appealed decision and remanded said case to the trial court for new
trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortgage/foreclosure was valid (NO)
Whether or not Esteva is entitled to damages due to the
wrongful foreclosure
Held:
First Issue:
In its answer to the cross-complaint filed by Jose Esteva, the
plaintiff alleged as a special defense that the foreclosure proceedings
of the mortgage executed by Esteva were valid because he consented
thereto and voluntarily delivered all the mortgaged motor vehicles,
and it likewise alleged that the decision rendered by this court
declaring illegal and void said proceedings neither bound the
plaintiff, nor resolved definitely the controversy because the same
was not raised or squarely submitted in the appeal.
In the decision rendered in the first appeal, G.R. No. 40233 (59
Phil., 490-495), this court made the following rulings:
Our Chattel Mortgage Law, section 3, defines a chattel mortgage as
a conditional sale of personal property as security for the payment of
the debt, or the performance of some other obligation specified
therein." Section 5 of the law sets forth the form of a chattel
mortgage, which form was substantially followed in the present
instance.
In the law of chattel mortgages the debt is the principal thing. The
mortgage is but an incident to the debt. Separated from the debt, the
mortgage has no determinate value. Customarily the foreclosure of
the mortgage accompanied as it is by the debt follows in due course
without mishap. Ordinarily also, the transfer of the debt carries with
it the mortgage. So a sale and delivery of notes secured by a chattel
mortgage, although unaccompanied by an assignment of the
mortgage itself, authorizes the purchaser to act as the mortgagee's
agent and to do whatever he could have done to enforce the
mortgage. So likewise, whatever discharges the debt discharges the
mortgage. All this unless there be an agreement to the contrary.
In the instant case, the mortgage cannot be impliedly found to have
passed as an incident of the debt because there was an agreement to
the contrary. The Teal Motor Co., Inc., retained the mortgage and
foreclosed it, while the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., received the
promissory notes and sued upon them. What was the legal effect of
this unique arrangement knowing entered into? As to the mortgage, it
ceased to exist because there was no debt to which it could attach.
The foreclosure proceedings were as a consequence a nullity. As to
the debt, the promissory notes unpaid, they were obligations of
Esteva to the Teal Motor Co., Inc., which assigned its rights to the
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. The latter, as a holder of the notes, could
sue upon them. But what cannot be countenanced is the separation of
the notes from the mortgage and both the foreclosure of the mortgage
and suit on the notes.
The rights of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., are as above indicated and
include the privilege of securing payment from Esteva of all that is
due on the promissory notes. The rights of Esteva, who has been
injured by an illegal foreclosure of the mortgage, consist in securing
damages from the entities who caused him these damages.
The corresponding obligations of the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., the
Teal Motor Co., Inc., and Jose Esteva will necessarily have to be
determined at a new trial, at which the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., can
establish the debt due from Esteva and the latter can set off against
the debt whatever damages he can prove at the trial.
Obviously, after the said decision, the plaintiff could not again
discuss the validity of the mortgage inasmuch as this court has
declared the same inexistent and the judicial proceedings for the
foreclosure thereof null and void.
Second Issue:
Trial court found that only Teal Motor Co., Inc., was liable for
damages suffered by Jose Esteva, absolving therein the plaintiff. This
part of the decision is the subject of the third assignment of error. We
believe that the contention of the appellant Esteva is well-founded.
The rights of Esteva, who has been injured by an illegal foreclosure
of the mortgage, consist in securing damages from the entities who
caused him these damages. In this connection it may be said that the
evidence is sufficient to establish the interlocking relationship
between the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.
The action of Esteva would, therefore, lie against both corporations.
This conclusion is the more evident when we realize that to hold
otherwise might simply result in permitting Esteva to prove damages
against the Teal Motor Co., Inc., a corporation with possibly no
visible assets. The corresponding obligations of the Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc., the Teal Motor Co., Inc., and Jose Esteva will necessarily
have to be determined at a new trial, at which the Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc., can establish the debt due from Esteva and the latter can set
off against the debt whatever damages he can prove at the trial.
This conclusion arrived at by the court clearly means that for the
damages occasioned to Esteva, the plaintiff and Teal Motor Co., Inc.,
should be held jointly and severally liable, and that Esteva may set
off the amount of said damages against the judgment which the
plaintiff may obtain against him for the amount of the unpaid
promissory notes. The trial court, therefore, erred in not ordering
both the plaintiff and Teal Motor Co., Inc., to pay said damages, and
in limiting the liability to the codefendant Teal Motor Co., Inc.
Radio Communications of the Philippines (RCPI) vs CA and
Yabut Freight, David and Olaivar
Facts:
In Civil Case No. C-2247 (same parties) The freight company
claimed that due to "utter, patent, and wanton carelessness, gross
negligence and unpardonable fault" of the personnel of RCPI, the
latter transmitted erroneously a telegram which should have read "
No truck available " but instead read " Truck available ".
As a consequence, the freight company suffered damages, and
prayed for an award of P100,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00
as moral damages, exemplary or corrective damages in the discretion
of the Court, and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Petitioner elevated the case to us for review on the following
grounds:
First: The respondent court erred in finding that the suit
was predicated on quasi-delicti.
Second: The respondent court erred in virtually ruling
that the petitioner's acts were the proximate cause of
the alleged damage.
Third: The respondent court erred in awarding
compensatory in addition to actual damages.
Fourth: The respondent court erred in condemning the
petitioner to pay corrective damages and attorney's
fees plus costs and litigation expenses.
Fifth: The respondent court erred in not finding that
private respondent had committed negligence which
was the proximate cause of the alleged damage or at
least, amounted to contributory negligence
warranting reduction of the award.
We gave due course to the Petition only in so far as the aspect of
damages is concerned, having found that respondent Court correctly
concluded that the error in the transmission of the telegram was due
to the gross negligence of RCPI employees and not to atmospheric
disturbances as it claimed, and that there was no contributory
negligence on the part of the freight company.
In respect of compensatory and actual damages, it is not-entirely
erroneous to grant both items of damages. True, compensatory and
actual damages are dealt with in the Civil Code under the same
Chapter 2 thereof and that the two terms are used therein as
equivalent to one another.
However, as provided for in Article 2200 of the Civil Code, which
is part of the aforementioned Chapter 2, indemnification for damages
shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, or actual
damages ("damnum emergens"), but also that of the profits which the
obligee failed to obtain, or compensatory damages ("lucrum
cessans"). In other words, t here are two components to actual or
compensatory damages.
In this particular case, the value of the actual loss suffered by Yabut
has been proven to be P132.12. This is compensable. Compensatory
damages were also awarded for injury to Yabut's "business
reputation or business standing", "loss of goodwill and loss of
customers or shippers who shifted their patronage to competitors".
The grant thereof is proper under the provisions of Article 2205,
which provides that damages may be recovered "for injury to the
plaintiff's Business standing or commercial credit." And even if not
recoverable compensatory damages, they may still be awarded in the
concept of temperale or moderate damages.
There are cases were from the nature of the case,
definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered,
although the court is convinced that there has been
such loss. For Instance, injury to one's commercial
credit or to the goodwill of the business firm is often
hard to show with certainty in terms of money.
Should damages be denied for the reason? the judge
should be empowered to calculate moderate damages
in such cases, rather than that the plaintiff should
suffer, without redress from the defendant's wrongful
act.
  Exemplary damages were likewise properly imposed. In
contracts and quasi-contracts, exemplary damages may be
awarded if the defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, opressive or malevolent manner.
There was gross negligence on the aprt of the RCPI personnel in
transmitting the wrong telegram, for which RCPI personnel in
transmitting the wrong telegram, for which RCPI must be held liable.
Gross carelessness or negligence constitutes wanton misconduct.
punitivee damages may be recovered for wilful or
wantonly negligent acts in respect of messages, even
though those acts are neither authorized nor ratified
The award of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is likewise
deemed just and equitable.
But while the assessment of damages, except liquidated ones, is
generally left to the discretion of the Court according to the
circumstances of each case, we find that the damages and attorney's
fees awarded are excessive and should be reduced.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court is hereby
modified and the damages awarded hereby reduced to P3,000.00 as
actual and compensatory damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary or
corrective damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses, Costs against petitioner.
[G.R. No. 126389. July 10, 1998]
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO,
EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO,
FACTS:
The Dimaanos are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay
City, while Southeastern College owns a four- storey school
building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at
about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon Saling hit Metro
Manila.
The roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown
away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
respondents’ house.
Engineer’s report on ocular inspection of Southeastern:
Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason for the dislodging
of the roofings structural trusses is the improper anchorage of the
said trusses to the roof beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded
on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss anchorage are not
bolted nor nailed to the trusses. Still, there are other steel bars which
were not even bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not
anchored at all to the roof beams.
In their Complaint for damages based on culpa aquiliana, Dimaanos
alleged that the damage to their house rendered the same
uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others houses. And
so they sought to recover from petitioner P117,116.00, as actual
damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as
exemplary damages and P100,000.00, for and as attorneys fees; plus
costs.
CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO,
respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
Petitioner averred that the school building had withstood several
devastating typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its
roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss
in its responsibility to see to it that said school building, which
houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is in tip-
top condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of God
and therefore beyond human control such that petitioner cannot be
answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence
on its part.
TC: In favor of plaintiffs. The damage to private respondent’s house
could have been avoided if the construction of the roof of petitioner’s
building was not faulty.
The following damages were awarded:
a) P117,116.00, as actual damages, plus litigation
expenses;
b) P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
c) P100,000.00 as attorneys fees;
d) Costs of the instant suit.
The claim for exemplary damages was denied as Southeaster College
did not act in a wanton fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.
CA: Affirmed TC with modification. Moral damages reduced from
P1M to P200K
ISSUE: WON the damage on the roof of private respondents was to
fortuitous event?
HELD: Yes. Southeastern is NOT liable, mainly because the
Dimaanos were not able to prove the former’s liability by sufficient
evidence.
The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the
Partidas which defines it as an event which takes place by accident
and could not have been foreseen. Escriche elaborates it as an
unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor
resisted.
Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that [f]ortuitous events may be
produced by two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes,
storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. and (2) by the act of man, such
as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions,
robbery, etc.
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from
liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous
negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have
been occasioned. An act of God cannot be invoked for the
protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in
not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a
person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage
or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or
injury was a fortuitous event.
The lower courts misappreciated the evidence proffered.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a
natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite
any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt
from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered
thereby, there should have been no human participation amounting to
a negligent act. In other words, the person seeking exoneration from
liability must not be guilty of negligence.
At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person claiming damages
for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence
of fault or negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence, not merely by presumptions and
conclusions without basis in fact. The Dimaanos merely relied on
the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular
inspection of petitioners school building after the typhoon. What is
visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause
behind. For instance, one who hears a gunshot and then sees a
wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third
person shot the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused
accidentally by a stray bullet. The relationship of cause and effect
must be clearly shown.
In the present case, other than the said ocular inspection, no
investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the
partial unroofing of petitioners school building.
Engr. Reyna (city building official) admitted that it was a legal
requirement before the construction of any building to obtain a
permit from the city building official. After construction of the
building, a certification must be secured from the same official
attesting to the readiness for occupancy of the edifice. Having
obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy, these are,
at the very least, prima facie evidence of the regular and proper
construction of subject school building.
Vice president for finance and administration of petitioner testified
that an annual maintenance inspection and repair of subject school
building were regularly undertaken.
The city building official, who has been in the city government
service since 1974, admitted in open court that no complaint
regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged
before his office prior to the institution of the case at bench. It is a
matter of judicial notice that typhoons are common occurrences in
this country. If subject school buildings roofing was not firmly
anchored to its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long
years and several typhoons even stronger than Saling.

In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and convincing evidence to

sustain the judgment of the appellate court. We thus hold that
petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
construction and maintenance of its school building in question and
that typhoon Saling was
the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private
respondents house.

Respondents’ claim for actual and moral damages as well as

attorney’s fees must fail. Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a
purely fortuitous event. More so because no bad faith or willful act to
cause damage was alleged and proven to warrant moral damages.

Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and competent proof

of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred. It is not enough that the
damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved with a
reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford
a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne.
[G.R. No. 119380. August 19, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellee, vs.
FEDERICO LOPEZ @ AMBOY LOPEZ, accused appellant.
FACTS:
On November 15, 1991, Mario Seldera, 11, his father Rogelio
Seldera, and his cousin Rodolfo Padapat worked in a riceland in
Barangay Nancalabasaan, Umingan, Pangasinan from 6 pm until
around 9 pm when they started for home taking a trail alongside the
Banila river. The three walked along the trail single file with
Rogelio, being the oldest, leading the way, followed by his son
Mario and by Rodolfo who was last. As they reached a sloping
portion in the trail, accused-appellant Federico Lopez appeared
armed with a shotgun. Lopez had a companion, a dark man who was
unarmed.
Without uttering a word, Lopez fired at the three. The companion
went near the bodies of the victims and rolled them over with his
foot to make sure they were dead.
However, Mario was not killed, although he had been wounded in
the back. He walked to the house of his uncle, Alfredo Padapat
(Rodolfo’s father) to report the matter.
Mario positively identified Lopez as the assailant. He testified that
accused-appellant wore a white, long-sleeved shirt, blue jeans and
white slippers, while his companion had a black t-shirt, black jeans
and brown slippers on. He was able to recognize Lopez and his
companion because the moon was brightly shining. He knew Lopez
very well, as the latter used to play cards with his father. Mario also
used to buy cigarettes from Lopez’s store. As to the gun used, he
stated that it was similar to those used by security guards.
Lopez’s defense was alibi. He said that at around 5 pm of November
15, 1991, he was in the house of his uncle, Asterio Sonaco, another
barangay of Umingan in Pangasinan, about 3 km from
Nancalabasaan. He had a round of drinks with 4 friends after a dish
of dog meat (huhuhu  ). At 11 pm that night, he went home. He
presented Daniel Fortunato and Mario Sonaco to corroborate his
statements.
Fortunato: stated that he was with Lopez from 4pm to 11 pm on Nov.
15, 1991 and they were drinking with about 13 other people. On
cross examination, he estimated that the distance between
Caurdanetaan to Banila River where the incident happened to be
about 1 ½ km which can be covered in 20 mins by walking and 11
mins by running.
Sonaco: Admitted that Lopez is his nephew. He estimated that
Lopez’s house was less than 2 km from the Banila River.
TC: Lopez is GUILTY of DOUBLE MURDER WITH
FRUSTRATED MURDER.
Penalties: Reclusion perpetua for the treacherous killing of Seldera;
pay the heirs the sum of 50k as compensatory damages, 30k as moral
damages. Reclusion perpetua for the treacherous killing of Rogelio
Padapat; pay his heirs 50k compensatory and 30k for moral
damages; pay civil liability or actual expenses incurred during the
wake and burial and other expenses in the amount of 14k; Prision
mayor from 6 yrs and 1 day to 12 yrs for the crime of Frustrated
Homicide for the injuries sustained by Mario Seldera; pay the widow
of the late Rogelio Seldera 20k as moral damages, 10k as exemplary
damages and P300 as actual damages in the form of medical
expenses.
ISSUE (related to torts and damages): Was the award of damages
proper?
HELD: NO.
Certain modification should also be made with respect to the award
of damages. The lower court awarded P50,000.00 for compensatory
damages and P30,000.00 for moral damages to each set of heirs of
Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat in addition to the P14,000.00
actual damages to be divided among them. The P50,000.00 should be
treated as civil indemnity, which under prevailing jurisprudence, is
fixed at P50,000.00, to be awarded without need of further proof
other than the death of the victim. Further, in accordance with our
rulings in other cases, the amount of moral damages should be
increased to P50,000.00.
With regard to the amount of actual damages, Leonida Seldera and
Alfredo Padapat testified that they could not present any receipt for
their funeral expenses because the funeral agency refused to issue
one in view of an unpaid balance. They have likewise allegedly lost
the receipts for their joint expenses for the wake. Under the Civil
Code (Art. 2199), a party is entitled to compensation only for such
pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. However,
under Art. 2224, temperate damages may be recovered if it is shown
that such party suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount thereof
cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. As the
heirs of the two victims clearly incurred funeral expenses, an award
of P5,000.00 for each set of heirs by way of temperate damages
should be awarded, to be divided equally by the heirs of Seldera and
Padapat.
For the injuries sustained by Mario Seldera, the court a quo awarded
P10,000.00 moral damages, P20,000.00 exemplary damages and
P300.00 actual damages for medical expenses. The first item should
be disallowed for lack of evidence to support it. The second item
should likewise be deleted as under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages are awarded when the crime is committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. There was no aggravating
circumstance in this case other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. As to the actual damages of P300.00, as the prosecution
failed to present any documentary proof for such, its award is
improper. However, the amount of P200.00 as temperate damages
may be made in its place.
Actual damages representing unearned income of Rogelio Seldera
and Alfredo Padapat should also be awarded. Leonida Seldera
testified that her husband was 43 years old when he was killed and
that he earned P13,000.00 a year as a farmer. On the other hand,
Alfredo Padapat testified that his son, Rodolfo, was then 25 years old
when he died and that he was earning P5,000.00 a year also as a
farmhand. The formula for the computation of unearned income is:
net life gross living earning (x) = expectancy x annual less expenses
capacity income (50% of gross annual income)
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the formula: 2/3 x
[80 - age of deceased]
Accordingly, Rogelio Selderas unearned income is:
X = 2 [80 - 43] x P13,000 - P6,500
3
= 24.67 x P6,500
= P160,355
Rodolfo Padapats unearned income is:
X = 2[80 - 25] x P5,000 - P2,500
3
= 36.67 x P2,500
= P91,675
RE: Lopez’s guilt
HELD: Lopez was guilty of two counts of murder and one count of
attempted murder.
1. Lopez questions credibility of Mario as it was unbelievable that
the latter was able to observe even the minute details such as the
length, color of the shirts, etc. considering that the shooting took
place suddenly and unexpectedly. The contention has no merit. As
the Solicitor General points out, Mario Seldera went through a
harrowing experience. In fact, he suffered three gunshot wounds and
was given up for dead by the assailant. The memory of the massacre
was etched deeply in his memory. As this Court has many times
held, the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive
to notice the appearance of their
assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed.
It is argued that Mario could not have recognized accused-appellant
because it was very dark on the night of November 15, 1991. This is
not true. According to PAGASA, there was 60% illumination from
the moon over Umingan, Pangasinan at 9:00 in the evening of
November 15, 1991. In People v. Pueblas, we held that a moon disc
62% full provides sufficient illumination in sustaining the
identification of the accused and convicting him of murder.
2. The defense of alibi will be sustained where the evidence of the
prosecution is weak. However, accused-appellant himself said that
Caurdanetaan is just three kilometers from Nancalabasaan. On the
other hand, his witnesses themselves testified that accused-appellants
house is less than two kilometres from the scene of the crime and
that the distance could be negotiated in 30 minutes by foot and even
less if one runs. For alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must show
that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission. Thus, assuming that he was
indeed at the party in Asterio Sonacos house, he could have easily
slipped out of the party, come back to the group, and then be at home
in time for the police to find him there.
Lopez’s alibi is not only weak; it is also filled with inconsistencies.
He said in his counter affidavit that he went home at 8:00 in the
evening of November 15, 1991, a full hour before the shooting
occurred but, in his testimony in court, he said he went home at
11:00 in the evening. His witnesses, Daniel Fortunato and Mario
Sonaco, said there were at least ten persons in the party at the house
of Asterio Sonaco on November 15, 1991, but accused-appellant
stated that there were only five.
3. The Information is formally defective as it charged more the one
offense in violation of Rule 110, 13 of the Revised Rules of Court.
However, because of his failure to file a motion to quash, accused-
appellant is deemed to have waived objection based on the ground of
duplicity.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision finds accused-
appellant guilty of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, but
sentences him for two separate counts of murder and one count of
frustrated homicide. We hold that accused-appellant was guilty of
two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder. Under Art.
48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime is committed only
when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies. As the victims in this case were successively shot by
accused-appellant with a shotgun, each shot necessarily constitutes
one act. Accused-appellant should thus be held liable for three
separate crimes.
The lower court correctly appreciated treachery as having qualified
the killings of Rogelio Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat. The essence of
treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim
without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Here, it
was clearly established that the victims, when shot, were unarmed
and were peacefully walking along a trail when accused-appellant
suddenly opened fire on them. The swiftness of the shooting left
them helpless to put up any form of defense.
The lower court however erred in convicting accused-appellant of
frustrated homicide for the injuries inflicted on Mario Seldera.
Although it correctly appreciated the intent to kill, which can be
inferred from the weapon used, the proximity of the assailants and
the location of the injuries, it should have appreciated treachery in
the attack. Treachery attended the shooting not only of Rogelio
Seldera and Rodolfo Padapat but also of Mario Seldera. But, with
respect to Mario Seldera, the crime was not frustrated, but only
attempted murder. For the injuries sustained by Mario Seldera were
not life threatening. Dr. Santos, the attending physician, certified that
Marios injuries would heal in seven days. In fact, he was not
confined at the hospital.
12. ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC
BROADCASTING CORP, VIVA PRODUCTION, INC., and
VICENTE DEL ROSARIO, respondents.
January 21, 1999
Facts:
 In 1990, ABS-CBN and Viva executed a Film Exhibition
Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS-CBN an exclusive
right to exhibit some Viva films. Sometime in December
1991, in accordance with paragraph 2.4 of said agreement
stating that — 1.4 ABS-CBN shall have the right of first
refusal to the next twenty-four (24) Viva films for TV
telecast under such terms as may be agreed upon by the
parties hereto, provided, however, that such right shall be
exercised by ABS-CBN from the actual offer in writing.
 Viva, through defendant Del Rosario, offered ABS-CBN,
through its vice-president Charo Santos-Concio, a list of
three film packages (36 title) from which ABS-CBN may
exercise its right of first refusal under the afore-said
agreement.
 ABS-CBN, however through Mrs. Concio, "can tick off only
ten (10) titles" (from the list) "we can purchase" and
therefore did not accept said list. The titles ticked off by
Mrs. Concio are not the subject of the case at bar except
the film ''Maging Sino Ka Man."
 On February 27, 1992, defendant Del Rosario approached
ABS-CBN's Ms. Concio, with a list consisting of 52
original movie titles (i.e. not yet aired on television)
including the 14 titles subject of the present case, as well
as 104 re-runs (previously aired on television) from which
ABS-CBN may choose another 52 titles, as a total of 156
titles, proposing to sell to ABS-CBN airing rights over
this package of 52 originals and 52 re-runs for
P60,000,000.00 of which P30,000,000.00 will be in cash
and P30,000,000.00 worth of television spots.
 On April 2, 1992, defendant Del Rosario and ABS-CBN
general manager, Eugenio Lopez III, met at the Tamarind
Grill Restaurant in Quezon City to discuss the package
proposal of Viva. What transpired in that lunch meeting is
the subject of conflicting versions.
 Mr. Lopez testified that he and Mr. Del Rosario allegedly
agreed that ABS-CRN was granted exclusive film rights
to fourteen films for a total consideration of P36 million;
that he allegedly put this agreement as to the price and
number of films in a "napkin'' and signed it and gave it to
Mr. Del Rosario.
 On the other hand, Del Rosario denied having made any
agreement with Lopez regarding the 14 Viva films; denied
the existence of a napkin in which Lopez wrote
something; and insisted that what he and Lopez discussed
at the lunch meeting was Viva's film package offer of 104
films (52 originals and 52 re-runs) for a total price of P60
million.
 ABS-CBN granted films right to 53 films and contains a
right of first refusal to "1992 Viva Films." The said
counter proposal was however rejected by Viva's Board of
Directors in the evening of the same day, as Viva would
not sell anything less than the package of 104 films for
P60 million pesos and such rejection was relayed to Ms.
Concio.
 On April 29, 1992, after the rejection of ABS-CBN and
following several negotiations and meetings defendant
Del Rosario and Viva's President Teresita Cruz, in
 consideration of P60 million, signed a letter of agreement
dated April 24, 1992 granting Republic Broadcasting
Corporation RBS the exclusive right to air 104 Viva-
produced and/or acquired films including the fourteen (14)
films subject of the present case.
 On 27 May 1992, ABS-CBN filed before the RTC a
complaint for specific performance with a prayer for a
writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order against private respondents RBS, Viva
Production and Vicente Del Rosario.
 RTC issued a TRO enjoining private respondents from
proceeding with the airing, broadcasting, and televising of
the fourteen VIVA films subject of the controversy.
 RTC issued an order dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction upon the posting by RBS of a P15 million
counterbond to answer for whatever damages ABS-CBN
might suffer by virtue of such dissolution.
 Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration, ABS-
CBN filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
challenging the RTC's Orders, CA however dismissed the
appeal being premature
 In the meantime the RTC received the evidence thereafter
rendered a decision in favor of RBS and VIVA and
against ABS-CBN
 According to the RTC, there was no meeting of minds on the
price and terms of the offer. The alleged agreement
between Lopez III and Del Rosario was subject to the
approval of the VIVA Board of Directors, and said
agreement was disapproved during the meeting of the
Board on 7 April 1992. Hence, there was no basis for
ABS-CBN's demand that VIVA signed the 1992 Film
Exhibition Agreement. Furthermore, the right of first
refusal under the 1990 Film Exhibition Agreement had
previously been exercised per Ms. Concio's letter to Del
Rosario ticking off ten titles acceptable to them, which
would have made the 1992 agreement an entirely new
contract.
 Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that the contract
between ABS-CBN and VIVA had not been perfected,
absent the approval by the VIVA Board of Directors of
whatever Del Rosario, it's agent, might have agreed with
Lopez III.
 Accordingly, respondent court sustained the award of actual
damages consisting in the cost of print advertisements and
the premium payments for the counterbond, there being
adequate proof of the pecuniary loss which RBS had
suffered as a result of the filing of the complaint by ABS-
CBN.
 As to the award of moral damages, the Court of Appeals
found reasonable basis therefor, holding that RBS's
reputation was debased by the filing of the complaint and
by the non-showing of the film "Maging Sino Ka Man."
 Respondent court also held that exemplary damages were
correctly imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good in view of the filing of the complaint despite
petitioner's knowledge that the contract with VIVA had
not been perfected.
 It also upheld the award of attorney's fees, reasoning that
with ABS-CBN's act of instituting Civil Case was
"unnecessarily forced to litigate." The appellate court,
however, reduced the awards of moral damages to P2
million, exemplary damages to P2 million, and attorney's
fees to P500, 000.00.
 On the other hand, respondent Court of Appeals denied
VIVA and Del Rosario's appeal because it was "RBS and
not VIVA which was actually prejudiced when the
complaint was filed by ABS-CBN."
 Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was a perfected contract between
ABS and VIVA.
2. Whether or not award of damages were improper.
Ruling:
1. NO.
 The contention that ABS-CBN had yet to fully exercise its
right of first refusal over twenty-four films under the 1990
Film Exhibition Agreement and that the meeting between
Lopez and Del Rosario was a continuation of said
previous contract is untenable. As observed by the trial
court, ABS-CBN right of first refusal had already been
exercised when Ms. Concio wrote to VIVA ticking off ten
films
 Thus:The subsequent negotiation with ABS-CBN two (2)
months after this letter was sent, was for an entirely
different package. Ms. Concio herself admitted on cross-
examination to having used or exercised the right of first
refusal. She stated that the list was not acceptable and was
indeed not accepted by ABS-CBN.
 Even Mr. Lopez himself admitted that the right of the first
refusal may have been already exercised by Ms. Concio
(as she had). Del Rosario himself knew and understand
[sic] that ABS-CBN has lost its rights of the first refusal
when his list of 36 titles were rejected.
1. YES.
 However, the Court finds for ABS-CBN on the issue of
damages.
 First, on actual damages. Chapter 2, Title XVIII, Book IV of
the Civil Code is the specific law on actual or
compensatory damages. Except as provided by law or by
stipulation, one is entitled to compensation for actual
damages only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as
he has duly proved.The indemnification shall comprehend
not only the value of the loss suffered, but also that of the
profits that the obligee failed to obtain.
 In contracts and quasi-contracts the damages which may be
awarded are dependent on whether the obligor acted with
good faith or otherwise, It case of good faith, the damages
recoverable are those which are the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation and which
the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time of the constitution of the obligation. If
the obligor acted with fraud, bad faith, malice, or wanton
attitude, he shall be responsible for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of
the obligation.
 In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for
all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of,
whether or not such damages has been foreseen or could
have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
 Actual damages may likewise be recovered for loss or
impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or
permanent personal injury, or for injury to the plaintiff's
business standing or commercial credit.
 The claim of RBS for actual damages did not arise from
contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-delict. It arose
from the fact of filing of the complaint despite ABS-
CBN's alleged knowledge of lack of cause of action.
 Needless to state the award of actual damages cannot be
comprehended under the above law on actual damages.
RBS could only probably take refuge under Articles 19,
20, and 21 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
 Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
 Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for tile same.
 Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
 It may further be observed that in cases where a writ of
preliminary injunction is issued, the damages which the
defendant may suffer by reason of the writ are recoverable
from the injunctive bond.
 In this case, ABS-CBN had not yet filed the required bond;
as a matter of fact, it asked for reduction of the bond and
even went to the Court of Appeals to challenge the order
on the matter, Clearly then, it was not necessary for RBS
to file a counterbond. Hence, ABS-CBN cannot be held
responsible for the premium RBS paid for the
counterbond.
 Neither could ABS-CBN be liable for the print
advertisements for "Maging Sino Ka Man" for lack of
sufficient legal basis. The RTC issued a temporary
restraining order and later, a writ of preliminary injunction
on the basis of its determination that there existed
sufficient ground for the issuance thereof. Notably, the
RTC did not dissolve the injunction on the ground of lack
of legal and factual basis, but because of the plea of RBS
that it be allowed to put up a counterbond.
 As regards attorney's fees, the law is clear that in the absence
of stipulation, attorney's fees may be recovered as actual
or compensatory damages under any of the circumstances
provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
 The general rule is that attorney's fees cannot be recovered
as part of damages because of the policy that no premium
should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be
awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the
court to award attorney's fees under Article 2208 demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification. Even when
claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney's fees
may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad
faith could be reflected in a party's persistence in a case
other than erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his
cause.
 As to moral damages the law is Section 1, Chapter 3, Title
XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. Article 2217 thereof
defines what are included in moral damages, while Article
2219 enumerates the cases where they may be recovered,
Article 2220 provides that moral damages may be
recovered in breaches of contract where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith. RBS's claim for moral
damages could possibly fall only under item (10) of
Article 2219, thereof which reads:
 (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
 Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered. and
not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
 The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the
expense of the defendant, but to enable the injured party to
obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to
obviate then moral suffering he has undergone. It is aimed
at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante, and should be proportionate to
the suffering inflicted.
 The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
corporation because, being an artificial person and having order, or public policy, and (3) and it is done with intent to
existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, injure.
no emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience  Verily then, malice or bad faith is at the core of Articles 19,
physical suffering and mental anguish, which call be 20, and 21. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and
experienced only by one having a nervous system. intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
 The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber purpose or moral obliquity. Such must be substantiated by
Co. v. PNB that a corporation may recover moral damages evidence.
if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in  There is no adequate proof that ABS-CBN was inspired by
social humiliation" is an obiter dictum. On this score alone malice or bad faith. It was honestly convinced of the
the award for damages must be set aside, since RBS is a merits of its cause after it had undergone serious
corporation. negotiations culminating in its formal submission of a
 The basic law on exemplary damages is Section 5, Chapter draft contract. Settled is the rule that the adverse result of
3, Title XVIII, Book IV of the Civil Code. an action does not per se make the action wrongful and
 These are imposed by way of example or correction for the subject the actor to damages, for the law could not have
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. If
compensatory damages. They are recoverable in criminal damages result from a person's exercise of a right, it is
cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was damnum absque injuria.
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances;
in quasi-contracts, if the defendant acted with gross
negligence; and in contracts and quasi-contracts, if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
oppressive, or malevolent manner.
 It may be reiterated that the claim of RBS against ABS-CBN
is not based on contract, quasi-contract, delict, or quasi-
delict, Hence, the claims for moral and exemplary
damages can only be based on Articles 19, 20, and 21 of
the Civil Code.
 The elements of abuse of right under Article 19 are the
following: (1) the existence of a legal right or duty, (2)
which is exercised in bad faith, and (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the
general sanction for all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for their own sanction; while
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the
following elements; (1) there is an act which is legal, (2)

13. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. FELICISIMO MEDROSO, JR., accused-appellant.
Facts:
 On August 6, 1971, the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur
filed with the CFI accusing the appellant, Felicisimo
Medroso Jr., of "Homicide through reckless imprudence"
alleged to have been committed as follows:
 That on or about the 16th of May, 1971, in the barrio of San
Roque, municipality of Bombon, province of Camarines
Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused without any license to
drive motor vehicles issued by competent authority, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully manage and
operate a BHP dump truck bearing Plate No. 7329, S.
1969 and with BHP truck No. 14-H3-12P and while
passing along the said barrio in a negligent, careless and
imprudent manner, without due regard to traffic laws,
rules and regulations to prevent accident to persons and
damage to property, caused by such negligence and
imprudence, said truck driven and operated by him to
bump and hit one Iñigo Andes thereby causing his death.
 The case was called for trial which the appellant with the
assistance of his counsel pleaded guilty to the charge with
two mitigating circumstances in his favor, viz: plea of
guilty and voluntary surrender, to which the prosecuting
fiscal offered no objection.
 In its decision, the trial court, after appreciating the above-
mentioned mitigating circumstances and considering as an
aggravating circumstance the fact that appellant drove the
vehicle in question without a license, sentenced the
accused to suffer the penalty of, from TWO YEARS,
FOUR MONTHS and ONE DAY, as minimum, to SIX
YEARS, as maximum, of prision correccional and ordered
to pay the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P12,000.00
as actual damages, P4,000.00 as moral damages and
P4,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the cost of
this proceeding.
 Not content with the penalty imposed, accused appealed to
the CA which it certified the case to the SC on the ground
that the appeal covers pure questions of law.
Issue: Whether or not the judgment (penalty and damages) rendered
by the Trial Court is correct.
Ruling: YES.
As to penalty:
 Appellant contends that inasmuch as he has two mitigating
circumstances in his favor without any aggravating
circumstance, as driving without a license is not to be
considered such, he is entitled to a penalty one degree
lower than that prescribed by law.
 Appellant's proposition would indeed be correct if he were
charged with any of the offenses penalized in the Revised
Penal Code other than Article 365 thereof, But because
appellant is accused under Article 365, he is not entitled as
 a matter of right to the provisions of Article 64 of the
Code.
 Paragraph 5 of Article 365 expressly states that in the
imposition of the penalties provided for in the Article, the
courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard
to the rules prescribed in Article 64.
 The rationale of the law can be found in the fact that in
quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the
carelessness, imprudence or negligence which
characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one
situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting
consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and
just application of the penalty, the courts must have ample
discretion in its imposition, without being bound by a
mathematical formula provided for in Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code.
 Thus, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of
Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two
mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating
circumstance to offset them.
 The penalty imposed by the trial court is well within the
periods we have given above except for the one day
excess in the minimum thereof. The minimum of the
indeterminate sentence given by His Honor the trial Judge
should have been "two years and four months of prision
correccional" instead of "two years, four months and one
day", because with the addition of one day the minimum
term fell within the range of the penalty prescribed for the
offense in contravention of the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
As to damages:
 No reversible error in the judgment awarding to the heirs of
the deceased P4,000.00 as moral damages and another
P4,000.00 as exemplary damages in addition to
P12,000.00 byway of actual damages.
 Moral damages compensate for mental anguish, serious
anxiety and moral shock suffered by the victim or his
family as the proximate result of the wrongful act, and
they are expressly recoverable where a criminal offense
result in physical injuries as in the instant case before Us
which in fact culminated in the death of the victim.
 The determination of the amount which would adequately
compensate the victim or his family in a criminal case of
this nature is left to the discretion of the trial judge whose
assessment will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is
a manifest showing that the same is arbitrary or excessive,
for it has been said that "(T)here can be no exact or
uniform rule for measuring the value of a human life and
the measure of damages cannot be arrived at by precise
mathematical calculation, but the amount recoverable
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each
case."
 With respect to the exemplary damages, the same are
justified by the fact that the herein appellant without
having been issued by competent authority a license to
drive a motor vehicle, wilfully operated a BHP dump
truck and drove it in a negligent and careless manner as a
result of which he hit a pedestrian who died from the
injuries sustained by him. Exemplary damages are
corrective in nature and are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good (Art. 2229, Civil Code),
and the present situation calls for the imposition of this
kind of damages to deter others from taking into their
hands a motor vehicle without being qualified to operate it
on the highways thereby converting the vehicle into an
instrument of death
 WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED
in that the minimum term is reduced by one day.
G.R. No. 90255 January 23, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO M. RODRIGUEZ, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused, Alberto M. Rodriguez, was convicted by the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig of the crime of Murder and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. He now seeks a reversal of said
judgment.
At around six o'clock in the morning of December 19, 1987, the dead
body of Reynaldo Osal, 20 years old, a security guard, was found
lying dead by the roadside at Morgan St., Phase I, Rancho Estate
Subdivision, Barangay Concepcion, Marikina. The body bore a
gunshot wound on the head. It was when the victim's aunt, Leticia
Osal, executed a written sworn statement implicating the accused,
Alberto Rodriguez, as the culprit, that the accused was arrested and
thereafter charged with Murder.
In substance, the testimonies of the following persons, among others,
were presented by the prosecution:
Leticia Osal – the aunt of the victim, testified that the accused and
the victim were once her tricycle drivers. Upon discovery by the
victim that she was carrying on an illicit relationship with the
accused, she sold all her tricycles after which both the accused and
the victim left her place. The accused looked for another tricycle to
drive while the victim was employed as one of the three security
guards at the Rancho Estate Subdivision.
On December 18, 1987, at around 9:30 in the evening, Leticia was at
the house of the accused chatting with the latter's wife, who was her
friend. A little later, she requested the accused to take her home.
Along the way, the accused informed her of his intention to talk to
her nephew, the victim, who was then guarding Gate 4 of the Rancho
Estate Subdivision at Champagnat Street. Upon being summoned by
her, Reynaldo went out of his post and it was then when the accused
suddenly held Reynaldo by the arms and dragged him to a darker
portion of the area, about twenty meters away from her. At that point
in time she could not see them anymore because of the darkness.
Subsequently, she heard a gunshot coming from the direction where
the two had proceeded. Frightened, she immediately went home. It
was the following day when she learned of the death of her nephew.
PaquitoPelaria — a jeepney driver. He declared that while driving
home on December 18, 1987 at around 10:00 in the evening, he saw,
through the light of his vehicle, a half-naked man being pulled and
pacified by a woman who was shouting "Huwag, huwag!" That man,
however, released himself from her hold and proceeded towards
Gate 4 of the subdivision where he saw a security guard. When
shown pictures of the victim, he identified the latter as the person
guarding said gate that night. He narrated that instead of passing
through Gate 4, since the man and the woman were in the middle of
Champagnat Street, he passed through the Marist School. When he
returned using the same route, he saw the man, now wearing a T-
shirt, and the woman sitting beside him on a gutter and talking to
each other at the corner of Molave Street. On being presented with a
line-up when he executed his sworn statement and also during the
trial, he positively identified the accused as the man he was referring
to. During the trial, he also identified Leticia as the woman in the
company of the man that evening.
Amado Perez — also a security guard at the same subdivision,
testified that the latter had related to him his knowledge of the illicit
relationship between the accused and his aunt. On December 18,
1987, they had the same shift, from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. The
victim proceeded to Gate 4 located at Champagnat Street while he
stayed at his post at Colt Street. At around 9:00 in the evening, he
noticed that the victim was not around, having failed to appear at the
main gate after closing the gates as was usually done. He tried to
look for the victim in the area but failed to locate him. The next day,
he learned of his friend's death. He also testified that each security
guard was given a.38 caliber service gun.
Patrolman Efren Jota — the police investigator, arrived at the
conclusion that the victim was dragged to the place where his dead
body was found a half kilometer away from Gate 4 because the shoes
were off the victim's feet.
For the defense, it tried to recall Leticia Osal to the stand as its own
witness but when it appeared to the Court a quo that she was making
untruthful statements, she was barred from testifying further. She
attempted to recant her previous testimony as a prosecution witness
by denying that she and the accused ever went to the Rancho Estate
Subdivision on that fateful night or that she was involved in any
illicit relationship with the accused.
The defense also tried to establish alibi through the testimonies of
several witnesses, namely:
Rosalia de Guzman — who declared that she was at the house of the
accused purposely to seek financial help from the latter's wife. There
she saw Leticia Osal, IsabelitaMagpayo and Oscar Magpayo. The
latter was outside the house helping the accused repair his tricycle.
She left the house at around 11:00 in the evening together with
Leticia Osal.
Oscar Magpayo&IsabelitaMagpayo —neighbors of the accused
testified that on the night of December 18, 1987, they assisted the
accused in repairing the latter's tricycle from 7:00 to about 11:00 in
the evening. When they left, the accused was still repairing his
tricycle.
On the basis of circumstantial evidence since there was no witness to
the actual occurrence, the Trial Court meted out conviction after
appreciating the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
and the generic aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, sentenced
the accused to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify the
heirs of Reynaldo Osal in the amount of P30,000.00, to pay the sum
of P7,000.00 as expenses incident to the burial, and the further sum
of P10,000.00 as moral damages.
RULING:
We find that credence was properly given to Leticia's testimony for
the prosecution rather than to her recanted declarations for the
defense. Her testimony that she and the accused had gone to the
crime scene is corroborated by another prosecution witness,
PaquitoPelaria, when the latter positively identified the accused and
Leticia as the ones he saw near Gate 4 in the evening of December
18, 1987. Further, Leticia's testimony that the accused had dragged
the victim to the site of the crime was also affirmed by Patrolman
Efren Jota's declaration that the victim was, indeed, dragged since
the latter's shoes were found removed from his feet. Her testimony
regarding the place where the victim was dragged approximates the
site where the body was found. There is sufficient evidence,
therefore, to buttress Leticia's testimony for the prosecution
compared to her bare denials for the defense.
The accused further maintains that the Trial Court committed grave
injustice when it prevented Leticia from retracting her earlier
testimony as a prosecution witness. What actually transpired,
however, was that she was recalled and allowed to testify for the
defense but was cut short by the Trial Court because of her
"untruthful statements." Note should be taken of the fact that the
recall of a witness is discretionary with a Trial Court.It was in the
exercise of that discretion that the Trial Court barred her from
continuing further with her testimony for the defense as in the mind
of said Court, her untruthful statements were prejudicial to the
interests of justice. The rule remains that a testimony solemnly given
in Court should not be lightly set aside and that before this can be
done, both the previous testimony and the subsequent one should be of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 consonant with recent
carefully compared. This task the Trial Court had aptly discharged. case law; to pay the sum of P7,000.00 as expenses incident to the
burial of the victim; and to pay the costs.
The defense further submits that Paquito's testimony to the effect that
the accused and Leticia were blocking the street and that he saw
them approximately half an hour later conversing near the scene of
the crime, is contrary to human experience. That is not necessarily
so. Leticia's act in trying to hold back the accused from inflicting
harm on her nephew is understandable. That it happened in a public
street is neither improbable. Incidents like this are not of uncommon
occurrence. That the accused and Leticia were seen by Paquito
seated on a gutter conversing approximately half an hour later
neither affects the latter's credibility as the two could have been so
overcome themselves that they sat limp in disbelief. It cannot be
construed therefrom that they had intentionally lingered in the
vicinity of the crime scene, thereby proving the accused's innocence.

The admission by Paquito that he did not actually see the victim that
night neither affects his credibility. As satisfatorily explained by him,
he used to see the victim guarding Gate 4 prior to December 17,
1987 whenever he customarily passed through the same, such that
when shown pictures of the victim, he readily identified the latter as
the person usually guarding that post.

While the records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual
killing, the circumstantial evidence attendant and relied upon by the
Trial Court is sufficient for conviction. There is more than one
circumstance. The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven. The combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt

WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment of the Court a quo, the

accused, Alberto A. Rodriguez, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify the heirs
G.R. No. 121203. April 12, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellee
vs.
DOMINADOR ASPIRAS alias "BOY", accused-appellant.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta, Pangasinanin a Criminal Case convicting accused-
appellant DominadorAspiras of the crime of MURDER qualified by
treachery.
At the time of the incident, appellant DominadorAspiras was a Police
Officer 3 (PO3), assigned at Pilar Village Detachment in Las Pinas,
Metro Manila. The victim, Renato Lumague, was a crusher general
supervisor of the Northern Cement Corporation and a supporter of
NPC-KBL political party.
In the evening of April 6, 1992, the NPC-KBL party held a political
rally at the plaza of Bonapal, Bobonan, Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. The
candidates for mayor and vice mayor, Artemio R. Saldivar and
Felimon Reyes, respectively, were present together with the eight
candidates for councilors, as well as Victor Juguilon,Juanito
Caballero, and Renato Lumague, who were supporters of the party.
Between ten and eleven oclock in the evening, Renato Lumague, was
on stage, delivering a speech. Suddenly, a man appeared in front of
Renato Lumague and shot him three times. He died instantly.
On April 9, 1992, Gilda Lumague, the widow of the victim, filed a
complaint with the Philippine National Police of
PozorrubioPangasinan, against appellant DominadorAspiras for the
death of her husband. Juanito Caballero executed an affidavit to
support the complaint.
At the hearing of the case, the prosecution presented Juanito
Caballero and Victor Juguilon, the two eyewitnesses; Dr. Francisco
Llamas, the medico-legal who conducted the autopsy;
CasianoCabalan, the Personnel Manager of the Northern Cement
Corporation; and Geraldine Lumague, the victims daughter who
testified in place of her mother.
Juanito Caballero and Victor Joguilon, who were both spectators and
seated near the stage, stated that they witnessed the shooting
incident. They categorically identified the appellant who shot the
victim, Renato Lomague, who was three (3) meters away. The
accused went directly infront of the stage where the victim was
speaking and pulled the trigger.
To rebut the version of the prosecution, appellant presented his
evidence, which included his own testimony and those of Gabriel
Viernes, GavinoSababan Jr., SegundinoPalisoc, Maj. Lazaro Lim,
and Josephine Terry.
Appellant testified that during the whole day of April 6, 1992, he
was on tour of duty with SPO2 GavinoSababan, Jr., and PO2
Esteban Liu as team leader and driver, respectively, at Las Pinas. He
claimed that he usually stood-by at the Shell Station, in Almanza,
Las Pinas, which is considered a "choke point". Here the police
usually stood-by for police visibility.
He said that on the morning of April 6, they arrived from their
detachment, about one (1) kilometer away from the "choke point",
and they proceeded to the Shell Station to start their tour of duty. At
12:00 noon, they took their lunch at the detachment, then they
returned to their "choke point" assignment where they stood-by up to
midnight.
Their activities on that particular date, April 6, were recorded on a
Record Book. Appellant filled up the entries in the logbook but it
was signed by the team leader, SPO2 GavinoSababan. These were
facts corroborated by GavinoSababan, SPO3 SegundinoPalisoc and
Chief Inspector Major Lazaro Lim, all members of the PNP, Las Pias
Police Station, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
According to appellant, one week after April 6, 1992, he learned that
he was a suspect when he read about it in a tabloid newspaper.
Appellant was called by his superior regarding the incident and was
directed to submit an affidavit. Witness Juanito Caballero, according
to appellant, had a motive to implicate him in the crimes as they had
a fistfight the first week of January 1991, in Pangasinan over some
parcels of land.
On April 24, 1995, the trial court promulgated its decision, disposing
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused
DOMINADOR ASPIRAS alias
"boy" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of MURDER qualified by treachery and there
being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA with all its accessory
penalties, and for the death of the victim RENATO
LOMAGUE, to pay the heirs of said deceased as
follows:
1. PhP 50,000.00 for indemnity;
2. PhP 50,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages;
3. PhP 82,250.00 for actual damages;
4. PhP 1,421,200.00 for expected or future income;
and
5. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED."
RULING:
Here we take particular note of the fact that prosecution witnesses
Juanito Caballero and Victor Joquilon testified that they personally
saw the person who shot the victim they identified the appellant as
that triggerman. Thus we find in the transcript of stenographic notes.
It has been established at the trial that the two eyewitnesses were
familiar with the appellant. Juanito Caballero knew him for the
former grew up with the latter’s family.Victor Juguillon also knew
him well, for Victor used to visit the barrio where appellant lived,
while the latter frequently visited the town proper where Victor
resided. Furthermore, Victors cousin was married to one of the
Aspirases. During the actual shooting incident, both eyewitnesses
were seated at the eastern side of the stage, where they had a good
view of the people in the basketball court. They were only about 3 to
5 meters away from the assailant, and could easily see the assailants
face. Lastly, there were seven to eight electric bulbs illuminating the
meeting area. With the use of a sketch, Victor showed that there was
one bulb at the middle of the stage, one at the center of the basketball
court, and "others from the center connecting the bulb." With this
illumination, considering where the victim and the assailant were,
Victor and Juanito could clearly see appellants face.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. Llamas, the medico-legal officer,
corroborated the testimony of the two eyewitnesses. Dr. Llamas said
that there were three bullets that entered the body of the victim.This
supports the testimony of Juanito and Victor that they heard three
gun reports.
Dr. Llamas said that he could not determine whether the assailant
fired the gun at close range because of the absence of powder burns.
However, he estimated the distance between the assailant and the
victim to be more than 30 inches. This concurs with the testimony of
Juanito and Victor that appellant was more or less three meters away
from the victim when the former shot the latter.
Appellants alibi was that on April 6, 1992, between 10 and 11 p.m.,
he was at Almanza Shell station, Pilar Village, Las Pinas performing
his duty as police officer.To support this, he submitted the police
logbook to show his whereabouts and activities on the said date.
Further, he presented his fellow police officers to corroborate his
testimony.
Alibi may be appreciated if the following requisites are present: a)
proof of his presence at another place at the time of the perpetration
of the offense, and b) impossibility for him to be at the scene of the
crime. But the inconsistencies between the entries in the logbook and
the testimony of the four police officers, cast doubt on appellants
alibi. First, SPO3 Palisoc and Major Lim testified that on April
6,1992, between 10 and 11 p.m., they conducted an inspection to
check on the police personnel manning the Almanza choke
point. This was not in the logbook. Palisoc claimed that this was
entered in the journal; however, defense did not care to present the
journal in court. Secondly, Palisoc testified that it was standard
operating procedure for the mobile crew to make periodic calls to
inform the base of their whereabouts. If they dont call after thirty
minutes, Palisoc would make the call himself. No such calls were
entered in the logbook. Thirdly, Palisoc also testified that on the
evening of April 6, at 7 p.m., the members of Pilar Detachment,
including appellant had dinner with Barangay Councilman Arthur
Tanjuanco. However this was not entered in the logbook. If it were
true that they had dinner, this would have appeared in the logbook,
like when the crew had lunch.
In People vs. Domenden, 6 SCRA 343, we observed that because of
the close relationship and camaraderie that developed among the
accused and his witnesses as members of the same police force, the
latter could not be expected to testify truthfully.
In our view, appellant failed to prove convincingly that he was at the
Almanza "choke point" at Las Pinas, Metro Manila, on the night of
April 6,1992. Note that it was not physically impossible for him to
be at the scene of the crime, especially since Pozorrubio, Pangasinan,
is only 4 hours away from Manila. Pertinently, in People vs.
Mallari, G.R. No. 104891, 311 Phil. 133 (1995), this Court did not
appreciate the defense of alibi where the killing took place in
Olongapo City, though the accused was allegedly in Baguio City.
Appellant questions the credibility and impartiality of the two
eyewitnesses: First, he avers prosecution eyewitness Juanito
Caballero was biased because bad blood existed between them.
Second, he claims Juanito and Victor had conflicting testimonies on
the demeanor of the assailant when leaving the scene of the crime.
Third, he posits it was unbelievable that Juanito and Victor only
stayed in their benches and did not seek any cover or protection
despite their proximate location from the assailant. Last, he states it
was improbable that no policeman arrived after the incident.
Indeed, as testified to by appellant and corroborated by Josephine
Terry, a defense witness, on January 1991, appellant and Juanito
Caballero had a fist fight over a piece of land. In that fight appellant
had outboxed and mauled the latter. But in People vs. Sadiangabay,
220 SCRA 551 (1993), we held that the credibility of a witness could
not be affected by an alleged grudge where said witness was not
discredited on cross-examination. In this case, appellant failed to
touch upon the alleged grudge, during the cross-examination of
Juanito Caballero. The matter was only mentioned by Dominador
and Josephine during their direct examination.
Appellant also suggests that Juanito Caballeros testimony conflicts
with that of Victor Juguillon. Juanito testified that the assailant
walked calmly, while Victor said that the assailant walked fast. But
this inconsistency is on minor and insignificant point. Sometimes
such minor inconsistencies even enhance the veracity of the
testimony of a witness as they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed income, in the absence of proof showing the deceased’s living
declaration. expenses. Hence, we find that:

Likewise appellant suggests that the testimony of the eyewitnesses net earning capacity.......=.......2(80 - 48) x (P129,320
that they only stayed in their benches and did not seek any cover or 64,660)
protection, diminishes their reliability. However, different people
react differently to a given type of situation and there is no standard ...................................................3
form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a startling,
strange or frightful experience. It is true that most of the people at .....................................=....... 2(32)....... x 64,660
the political rally scampered away when they heard the gunshots, but
it was also true that others, like Juanito Caballero and Victor ..................................................3
Juguillon, did not run away.
.....................................=.......21.33 x 64,660
Lastly, we now focus on the award of civil indemnity and other
damages in favor of the heirs of the deceased. .....................................=.......P1,379,197.80
Only actual expenses duly supported by receipts may be The award of P1,421,200 should therefore be reduced to
granted. Among the actual expenses allegedly incurred by the family P1,379,197.80 only.
of the victim, only those for funeral expenses (P17,000.00), materials
for gravestone (P1,308.00) and the funeral mass (P250.00) were
supported by receipts. Further, it was shown that the funeral
expenses were shouldered by Northern Cement
Corporation. Consequently, the award to the heirs concerning actual
expenses must be limited only to those they incurred for gravestone
and mass services, amounting to P1,558.00.

As to the computation of expected or future income by multiplying

the years for which the victim could have worked with his employer
were it not for his death (11 years) by his annual gross earnings, we
find that the correct formula for computing the loss of earning
capacity is follows: 2/3 x (80 - age of victim at the time of death) x
(reasonable portion of the annual net income which would have been
received as support by heirs). The age of the victim at the time of his
death was 48. He was receiving a monthly salary of P7,610.00, and
yearly benefits in the amount of P38,000.00. Hence, his annual gross
income is P129,320.00. Net income is 50% of the gross annual