LLAMANZARES J. Perez As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.

ens.—As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the
V. COMELEC 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987), this Court held that: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.—Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first
place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status,
conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad.” Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.—Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an
international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive
necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence
of a rule of law requiring it. “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a process of reasoning” or judicial
logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal systems generally,” such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and
justice,” and the “general principle against discrimination” which is embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.”
These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Bill of Rights.

The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC)
and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that
no child is stateless.—The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure
that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years
old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is
Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to
have the “nationality of the country of birth,” to wit: Article 14 A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of
birth. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A
foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied) The
1
 second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: Article 2 A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.

Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens.
This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

IN RE: J. Fernando Equal protection guarantee.—To impose an additional burden for the first time to warrant the denaturalization of a citizen whose naturalization was
APPLICATION obtained after the most exacting scrutiny not only by the lower courts but by this Tribunal, and especially so after a long lapse of time, would be clearly
FOR PHILIPPINE to subject him to a risk that certainly the Constitution, with its pledge of equal protection, cannot countenance.
CITIZENSHIP OF
CHAN TECK LAO. Decision of court on matter of citizenship should be given preclusive effect; Reasons.—Recognizing the basic premise, that there must be an end to
CHAN TECK LAO litigations, some authorities recognize that administrative rulings or decisions should have res judicata or preclusive effect. x x x The same observation
vs. REPUBLIC holds true with respect to a decision of a court on the matter of citizenship as a material matter in issue in the case before it which is affirmed by this
Court. For the “effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme requires that their decision have the respect of and be observed by the
parties, the general public and the courts themselves. According insufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard of courts and
their decisions and invites litigation.
REPUBLIC vs. J. Sereno As the agency tasked to “provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services” and “implement the laws governing citizenship and the admission
HARP and stay of aliens,” the DOJ has the power to authorize the recognition of citizens of the Philippines. Any individual born of a Filipino parent is a citizen
of the Philippines and is entitled to be recognized as such. Recognition is accorded by the BI and the DOJ to qualified individuals, provided the proper
procedure is complied with and the necessary documents are submitted. In this case, respondent was accorded recognition as a citizen on 24 February
2000. On 24 October 2000, he was issued Identification Certificate No. 018488, which confirmed his status and affirmed his entitlement to all the rights
and privileges of citizenship.

Deportation; In Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853 (1991), the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated the doctrine that citizens may
resort to courts for protection if their right to live in peace, without molestation from any official or authority, is disturbed in a deportation
proceeding.—It is settled that summary deportation proceedings cannot be instituted by the BI against citizens of the Philippines.

LAMBINO v. J. Carpio The essence of amendments “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
COMELEC people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative
can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if
the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is “directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition” only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the
proposed amendments. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the
petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full
text of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions
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 of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people
SANIDAD v. J. Martin The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as constitutional legislator. The
COMELEC proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will
reduced only into enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed
amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the
authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the
procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.

“Plebiscite” and “Referendum” distinguished.—A “referendum” is merely consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction
to the given issues submitted to the people for their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the
President. It is participated on by all citizens from the age of 15, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex-convicts. A
“plebiscite,” on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those “citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen
years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six
months preceding the election.” Literacy, property, or any other substantive requirement is not imposed.It is generally associated with the amending
process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
SANTIAGO v. J. Davide The system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.—The conclusion then is
COMELEC inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory. Has
1997 Congress “provided” for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents
and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No. 6735. There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act.

R.A. No. 6735; Statutory Construction; Under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6735, the people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative—they can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances,
or resolutions.”—Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. The said section reads: SECTION 2. Statement and Policy.—The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (Italics supplied) The inclusion of the word “Constitution”
therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on
the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to “directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution” through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to “laws, ordinances, or resolutions.”
OPLE v. TORRES J. PUNO National ID System requires a law not a mere administrative order.
1998 Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. x x x An
administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
ANG NARS Joint Resolution No. 4, being a mere resolution, cannot amend or repeal a prior law such as RA 9173 or the Philippine Nursing Act. The same applies to EO 811
PARTYLIST v. which is also not a law, but an executive directive.
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EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY

2019
GALICTO vs. J. Brion Since the issuance of an Executive Order (EO) is not judicial, quasi-judicial or a mandatory act, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect
AQUINO remedy; instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), is the proper recourse.

2012 There is no vested right in salary increase.

LEAGUE OF J. Carpio The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power. Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to
CITIES vs. make laws, and to alter and repeal them. The Constitution, as the expression of the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity,
COMELEC has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general, and comprehensive. The
legislative body possesses plenary powers for all purposes of civil government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is
2008 necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.

Without doubt, the LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to alter or modify it as it did when it enacted
R.A. No. 9009. Such power of amendment of laws was again exercised when Congress enacted the Cityhood Laws. When Congress enacted the LGC in
1991, it provided for quantifiable indicators of economic viability for the creation of local government units—income, population, and land area.
Congress deemed it fit to modify the income requirement with respect to the conversion of municipalities into component cities when it enacted R.A.
No. 9009, imposing an amount of P100 million, computed only from locally-generated sources. However, Congress deemed it wiser to exempt
respondent municipalities from such a belatedly imposed modified income requirement in order to uphold its higher calling of putting flesh and blood to
the very intent and thrust of the LGC, which is countryside development and autonomy, especially accounting for these municipalities as engines for
economic growth in their respective provinces. Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood Laws
amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from
the amendatory R.A. No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself. For this reason, we reverse the November 18,
2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010 Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their exemption clauses, are
not found in the LGC.

Only congress can amend a law.

SILVERIO vs. J. Corona The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification; A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
REPUBLIC
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
2007 thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of
his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name is not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, namely, where the birth certificate is kept.
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 No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment; Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error—it is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
NOGRALES vs. J. Carandang Comelec resolution: Implement the lae 6 months after the conduct of May 2019 elections.
COMELEC
if We were to follow COMELEC's interpretation, an incongruity would result as the winning candidate in COMELEC's special elections would serve a
2019 term less than that provided for in Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

TOLEDO vs. J. Purisima In upholding the validity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, this Court declared that the limitation provided by the said Circular on permissible
COMELEC extensions of service after reaching the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five has a reasonable relationship with or is germane to the purpose of civil
service laws on retirement. And as reiterated in the said case, the policy considerations behind the limitation on the maximum extension of service
1999 allowable for compulsory retirees, as summarized in the dissenting opinion of Justice Griño-Aquino in the case of Cena, were as follows: “x x x
extending the service of compulsory retirees longer than one (1) year would: (1) Give a premium to late-comers in the government service and in effect
discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age (2) Delay the promotion of the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) Prejudice
the chances for employment of qualified young civil service applicants who have already passed the various governmental examinations but must wait
for jobs to be vacated by ‘extendees’ who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their government service to
complete 15 years so they may qualify for old age pension.” Thus, the one-year limitation on the extension of service of a government employee who
has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five imposed under Memorandum Circular No. 27 was held valid and reasonable.
ONG vs. ALEGRE J. Garcia For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned
has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
2006
There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001
elections and serving the July 1, 1995-June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-
2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually
served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that
begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis’s assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule. We hold that such assumption of office
constitutes, for Francis, “service for the full term,” and should be counted as a full term served incontemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the
constitutional and statutory provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same
position.

Petitioner Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make
him less than a duly elected mayor.—It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, that it was Francis’
opponent (Alegre) who “won” in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it
must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner
Francis’ contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than
a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election
coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as
service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
5
LATASA vs. J. Azcuna It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
COMELEC elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing party’s remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition
for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation. On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that its very heart is
2003 something which this Court considers of paramount interest. This Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was already entertaining
some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible to run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of procedural rules.—Time
and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the
rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside
technicalities in favor of what is fair and just. The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of
procedural rules.

An examination of the historical background of Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution on term limits reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political
power.—As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people. Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. An examination of the historical background of the subject
Constitutional provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of
the people as they were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In fact, they rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo
Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. The members,
instead, adopted the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in
the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the
official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
MARCOS vs. J. Kapunan For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our
COMELEC election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile
Romualdez-
1995
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
ONGSIAKO J. Perez It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the petitioner’s being a Representative of
REYES vs. Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the
COMELEC pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the proceedings
in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of
2013 jurisdiction for grave abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Banc decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation matter than can
go to the HRET.
6
 House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) jurisdiction over the qualification of the
Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC
which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding.―The HRET’s constitutional authority opens,
over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such
membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such,
proceeds de novo unhampered by the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a regular, not
summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no
hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till
termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of cancellation of certificate of candidacy of
petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the
House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
ATONG PALAUM J. Carpio What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different
vs. COMELEC groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and regional
parties are separate from sectoral parties. Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2)
2013 regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral
parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular
sector.

“Political Party” and “Sectoral Party,” Distinguished.—Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a “party” as “either a political party or a sectoral party or a
coalition of parties.” Clearly, a political party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a “political party
refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government.” On the other
hand, Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a “sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in
Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.” R.A. No. 7941 provides different definitions for
a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors. To require
all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” is to deprive and exclude, by judicial
fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in
legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list
system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list
system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be
organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political
party must represent a “marginalized and underrepresented” sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same
ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
ANG LADLAD vs. J. Del Castillo It was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the
COMELEC exclusion of Ang Ladlad.—Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establish-ment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
2010 “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-
7
 establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system.—We hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on
the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.

BAGABUYO vs. J. Brion Municipal Corporations; Congressional Districts; Definition of Legislative Apportionment and Reapportionment.—Legislative apportionment is defined
COMELEC by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative
body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and
2008 voting power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation.

The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of a local government unit; No plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision.—A pronounced
distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local government unit. In contrast,
no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, 239 SCRA 106 (1994), a case that arose
from the division of the congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we confirmed this distinction and the
fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the
course of its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why this happened, the Court ruled that no
plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required
by Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only followed as a consequence. In other words, the
apportionment alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
UMALIS vs. J. Velasco The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is pertinent in the
COMELEC case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature. The framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X
of the Constitution as long as (1) the criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of
2014 the boundaries is subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.

It shall be the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements
prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein. In this
case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 452 of the LGC are complied
with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as highly urbanized once the minimum
8
 requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language “shall” used in the provision
leaves the President with no room for discretion.

The Supreme Court rules that conversion to a Highly Urbanized City (HUC) is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the Local Government Code (LGC).—Verily, the upward
conversion of a component city, in this case Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be gleaned from the above-cited rule that
the province will inevitably suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by Cabanatuan City’s gain of independence. With the city’s
newfound autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province, which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What
once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija stands to lose 282.75 sq.
km. of its territorial jurisdiction with Cabanatuan City’s severance from its mother province. This is equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva
Ecija’s 5,751.3 sq. km. area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be “substantial.” Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries
would necessarily follow Cabanatuan City’s conversion in the same way that creations, divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place
without entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not mutually exclusive, and more often than not, a combination of these acts attends
the reconfiguration of LGUs. In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion to an HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries
governed by Sec. 10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails over Sec. 453 of the LGC.

The issue on who will vote in a plebiscite involving a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time that the Court is asked to resolve
the question. As such, the past plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality or relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that
conversion of said cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or prejudiced in any manner following the operative fact doctrine—that “the
actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.”

In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or
units that desire to participate will be “directly affected” by the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986) and Padilla v.
COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735 (1992) are worth revisiting. We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for the creation of the new
province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be affected are entitled to participate in the
plebiscite.
ALDABA vs. J. Carpio A city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the “immediately following election” after the
COMELEC attainment of the 250,000 population.—The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal
effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based
2010 on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic
projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district
only in the “immediately following election” after the attainment of the 250,000 population.

National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB); Certifications on demographic projection can be issued only if such projections are declared official by
the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB).—First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are declared
official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.

Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the
9
 Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) cited Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes), otherwise
the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.—Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be brushed aside. The OSG, representing
respondent Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No. 135 in its Comment, thus: Here, based on the NSO projection, “the population of the
Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995-2000.” This projection issued by the
authority of the NSO Administrator is recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of Population Sizes),
which states: x x x (d) Certification of population size based on projections may specify the range within which the true count is deemed likely to fall.
The range will correspond to the official low and high population projections. x x x (f) Certifications of population size based on published census
results shall be issued by the Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional Census Officers. Certifications based on projections or estimates, however,
will be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer.” (Emphasis supplied) Any population projection forming the basis for the
creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the
population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
A city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative.—A
city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the “immediately following election.” In short, a city must first
attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in
the present case that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May 2010
elections.
TAN vs. J. Alampay A plebiscite for creating a new province should include the participation of the residents of the mother province for the plebiscite to conform to the
COMELEC constitutional requirements.—We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but
eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No amount of rhetorical flourishes can justify exclusion of the parent
1986 province in the plebiscite because of an alleged intent on the part of the authors and implementors of the challenged statute to carry out what is claimed
to be a mandate to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units. The alleged good intentions cannot prevail and overrule the cardinal
precept that what our Constitution categorically directs to be done or imposes as a requirement must first be observed, respected and complied with. No
one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at
the same time transgress, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof. Respondents would be no different from
one who hurries to pray at the temple but then spits at the idol therein.

When the law says the “plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected” this means that residents of the political entity who stand to be economically
dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have the right to participate in said plebiscite.—It is a well accepted rule that “in ascertaining the
meaning of a particular provision that may give rise to doubts, the intent of the framers and of the people, may be gleaned from the provisions in pari
materia.” Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 which proposed the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte recites in Sec. 4 thereof that “the plebiscite
shall be conducted in the areas affected within a period of one hundred and twenty days from the approval of this Act.” As this draft legislation speaks of
“areas,” what was contemplated evidently are plurality of areas to participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would
be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. This assumption will be consistent with the
requirements set forth in the Constitution.
AQUINO vs. J. Perez The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In other words,
COMELEC while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not
have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional district. There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the
2010 creation of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district
created within a city is not required to represent a population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its creation and regardless of its population.
10
ABAYON vs. HRET J. Mendoza An Election Protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on
the grounds of electoral frauds or irregularities. It aims to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and,
2016 therefore, entitled to hold the office.

The Constitution no less, grants the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all election contests
involving the members of the House of Representatives, which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or other irregularities
committed before, during or after the elections.—The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ from the power granted to the
COMELEC to declare failure of elections.

The power granted to the HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature.
Thus, the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, may
annul election results if in its determination, fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to warrant the annulment. Because in doing so, it is
merely exercising its constitutional duty to ascertain who among the candidates received the majority of the valid votes cast.

The passage of R.A. No. 7166 cannot deprive the HRET of its incidental power to annul elections in the exercise of its sole and exclusive authority
conferred by no less than the Constitution. It must be remembered that the COMELEC exercises quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative and administrative
functions. In Bedol v. COMELEC, 606 SCRA 554 (2009), the Court expounded, to wit: The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it
by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial
power of the COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-
proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of
rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article
IX-A) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52[c]) authorize the COMELEC to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code. The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of
fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law.

The difference between the annulment of elections by electoral tribunals and the declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC cannot be gainsaid.
First, the former is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in the exercise of the COMELEC’s administrative function.
Second, electoral tribunals only annul the election results connected with the election contest before it whereas the declaration of failure of elections by
the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to
determine who among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other hand, declares a failure of elections with
the objective of holding or continuing the elections, which were not held or were suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When
COMELEC declares a failure of elections, special elections will have to be conducted. Hence, there is no overlap of jurisdiction because when the
COMELEC declares a failure of elections on the ground of violence, intimidation, terrorism or other irregularities, it does so in its administrative
capacity. In contrast, when electoral tribunals annul elections under the same grounds, they do so in the performance of their quasi-judicial functions.
BANAT vs. J. Carpio We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional
COMELEC seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The
2009 continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of
11
 the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”—We therefore strike down the
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The
parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more
than three (3) seats.

The remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats.—In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one
seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party
List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system.—Neither the
Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings.

By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.—By a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections
joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this
ponencia. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs. Commission on Elections, 586 SCRA 210, G.R. No.
179271 April 21, 2009threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
CIPRIANO vs. J. Puno The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.—The Commission
COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his
certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus
2004 Election Code, thus: Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.—The Commission, provincial election supervisor, election
registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy. The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due
course to petitioner’s certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial
in character. While the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question
of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
NAVARRO vs. J. Peralta Gerrymandering is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in
ERMITA power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, defined ‘gerrymandering’ as the formation of one legislative district
out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party
2010
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AMORES vs. HRET J. Carpio A candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee.—As the law states in unequivocal terms that a
Morales nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be that a
2010 candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee. Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-
List System Act, it covers ALL youth sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.

Changes of Political Party and Sectoral Affiliation; A nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party will not only be eligible
for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation of the change has been effected at least six months before the elections.—What is clear is that
the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party since multi-
sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the Philippine party-list system. Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation
within the same party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has been effected at least six months before the
elections. Again, since the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This
is the plain meaning rule or verba legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention.
PHILCONSA vs. J. Regala Republic Act 3836: Increase in emoluments of members of Congress.—Republic Act No. 3836 provides for the retirement benefits for members of
GIMENEZ Congress which, in effect, are increases in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of
the Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all
1965 the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition, in Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
PEOPLE vs J. Concepcion
SATURNINO

1955
POBRE vs. Conduct Unbecoming a Public Official; Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct
SANTIAGO committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.—The lady senator belongs to the
legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official
duties, unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.

It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her anew that the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the
people’s representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the congressional hall.
OSEMENA vs. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS, NOT ABSOLUTE.—While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression
PENDATUM without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall, however, it does not protect
him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For
unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

FAILURE TO CONFORM TO RULES, EFFECT OF.—Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action taken by a deliberate body
when the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.

POWER OF CONGRESS TO DETERMINE DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR OF MEMBERS; SEPARATION OF POWERS.—The House of Representatives is the

13
 judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour. The courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial department
with the legislature.

PERSONAL ATTACK UPON CHIEF EXECUTIVE CONSTITUTES DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR.—The House of Representatives of the United States has taken
the position that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitutes unparliamentary conduct or breach of order. And in several instances, it took action against
offenders, even after other business had been considered.

POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUSPEND ITS MEMBERS.—While under the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend appointive member
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83), at present Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension which the Constitution did not impair.
BELGICA vs. The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the ― Pork Barrel
OCHOA System.―The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel
System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as
the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund — are currently existing and
operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Moot and Academic; Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already ―
abolished the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through
the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality.―As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related
thereto had been rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual controversy between the
parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. Differing from this description, the Court observes that respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the
PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a
declaration of unconstitutionality.

Same; Same; Same; The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that “the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government.”―The “limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies” carries the assurance that
“the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.” Essentially, the foregoing limitation is a restatement of the political question
doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962], applies when there is found, among others, “a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department,” “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it” or “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.” Cast against this light, respondents
submit that the “[t]he political branches are in the best position not only to perform budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of
their constituents” and, as such, “urge [the Court] not to impose a solution at this stage.”

Same; Same; Same; The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of
government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon.―A political question refers to “those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.” The intrinsic constitutionality of
the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution
itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to
exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cannot be any clearer: “The judicial power
14
shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. [It] includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”

Same; Same; Same; When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.―It must
also be borne in mind that “when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature [or the executive], but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution.” To a great
extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully
perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court’s avowed intention that a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other
branches but, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best interest of the people that each great
branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the
Court cannot heed respondents’ plea for judicial restraint.

Same; Same; Same; Taxpayer’s Suit; Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.―“The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the
operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing.” Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert
that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing
“Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law, as in these cases.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Res Judicata; Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis]
which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases.―Res judicata (which means a “matter adjudged”) and stare decisis non quieta et movere ([or simply, stare decisis]
which means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled”) are general procedural law principles which both deal with the effects of previous but
factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings
in Philconsa and LAMP.

Constitutional Law; Pork Barrel System; Words and Phrases; The Court defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern
the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and
Executive branches of government, including its members.―Considering petitioners’ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court
defines the Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily
intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds: First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of
lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects
of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013
GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power; and Second, there
is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its
utilization. For reasons earlier stated, the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.

15
 Same; Separation of Powers; The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government; To
the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the President, belongs the
power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws.―The principle of separation of powers refers
to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139 (1936), it means that the “Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government.” To the legislative branch of government, through Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government,
through the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the
three great powers have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the executive has no authority to make or
construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the law.” The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence
stem from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid
any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of
government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of
government to check the arbitrary or self interest assertions of another or others.

Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional; Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator
participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.―The
Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same
is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget proposals
of the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by
the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and passage
of the GAA, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive’s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur
the constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates
were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that “[f]rom the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress
or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to “any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may
still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must
be confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence,
tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive functions.

Same; Same; Pork Barrel System; Post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution; Towards
this end, the Supreme Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is
merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.―Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project
identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in —
as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and
the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be
overstated — from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority is treated as merely
recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.
Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely
recommendatory and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.
16
 Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court hereby declares the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.―The Court hereby
declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions
11of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to
congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators
have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not
been substantially disputed here.

Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Congress; As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same; It is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of initiative and
referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other; Exceptions.―As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum. Based on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and
the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely
local matters; and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The Supreme Court observes that the 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which ― as settled in Philconsa ― is lodged in Congress.―In the cases at bar, the Court
observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability
since said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which — as settled in Philconsa — is lodged in Congress. That the
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public
revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to
dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the
exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-
delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar
legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

Same; Same; Checks and Balances; Veto Power; A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written
into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.”―A prime example of a
constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress
for approval through a process known as “bill presentment.” The President’s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads
as follows: Sec. 27. x x x. x x x x (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall
not affect the item or items to which he does not object. The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of
17
item-veto, forms part of the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures” for law-passage as specified under the Constitution. As stated
in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the “submission [of the bill] to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required
publication.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation,
impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetary process; It is meant to “increase the chances in favor of
the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design.”―The justification for the President’s item-veto power rests on a variety of
policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling legislation, impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch’s role in the budgetary
process. In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the President’s item-power as “a salutary check upon the legislative
body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a
majority of that body”; phrased differently, it is meant to “increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence,
or design.”

Same; Same; Same; What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of
funding for multiple purposes.―What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a
source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to be
expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation
law already indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would
then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire
appropriation so as not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises non-delegability issues
considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation.
Since the foregoing determinations constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising legislative
prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.

Same; Same; Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of
the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law;
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation ― a matter before another office of government ― renders them susceptible
to taking undue advantage of their own office.―The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel, among
others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested “observers” when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. To a
certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in
which they themselves participate. Also, it must be pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that: Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or
before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or
in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied) Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project
implementation — a matter before another office of government — renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The gauge of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) allocation/division is based
solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the
allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration.―The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal.” In particular, the
Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
18
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine parameters of equality, wherein
economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration. As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives — and in some years, even the Vice-President — who do not represent any locality, receive funding from
the Congressional Pork Barrel as well. These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel’s original intent which is “to make equal the unequal.”
Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator and given unto them on the sole account of their office.

Same; “An appropriation made by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a
16provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose.―“An appropriation made
by law” under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable
amount of money and (b) allocates the same for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very definition
of the word “appropriation,” which means “to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose,” and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the
legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the Constitution “does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization
or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be “made by law,’” an appropriation law may — according to Philconsa — be “detailed and as broad as
Congress wants it to be” for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.

Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); The 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal
appropriation precisely because it contains post-enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations.―It is apropos to note that the
2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-
enactment measures which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual appropriations meant for
enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed, they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real
appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF Article is not the P24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by the
individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article does not constitute an “appropriation made by law” since
it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.

Same; Delegation of Powers; Malampaya Funds; The Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President” under Section 8 of P.D. 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately
determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used.―The Court agrees with petitioners that the
phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in
effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include — or be restricted to — things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first,
the phrase “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated
as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive department has, in fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy
related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government.” Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the policy of energy development is clearly
deducible from its text, the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under the same provision of law should nonetheless be
stricken down as unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This notwithstanding, it must be underscored that
the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government,” remains legally effective
18and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used — as it
19
should be used — only in accordance with the avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.

Same; Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF); Special Allotment Release Order (SARO); Words and Phrases; A Special Allotment Release Order
(SARO), as defined by the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) itself in its website, is “[a] specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur
obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance
with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent authority.”―The Court agrees with petitioners’ posturing for the
fundamental reason that funds covered by an obligated SARO are yet to be “released” under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its website,
is “[a] specific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall
cover expenditures the release of which is subject to compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority.” Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the directive to pay. Practically speaking, the
SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn
under certain circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is brought about by the issuance of the NCA,
which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments.

Same; Same; Same; Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA); Unless a Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds
which have been “released;” The disbursement of 2013 Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) funds which are only covered by obligated Special Allotment
Release Order (SARO), and without any corresponding Notice of Cash Allocation (NCA) issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and
consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund.―Unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been
“released.” In this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and without any corresponding NCAs issued,
must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the
declared unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even though already obligated, else the Court
sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source. This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been
obligated but not released — meaning, those merely covered by a SARO — under the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential Social Fund under the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” pursuant to Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However, these funds should
not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their
corresponding special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.

Same; Operative Fact Doctrine; The operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares the invalidity of a
certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied
with.―It must be stressed that the Court’s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013 PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other
Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c) the phrases (1) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8
of PD 910, and (2) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, must only be treated
as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine. To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate
case, declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled to obedience and respect and should be
properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66 (2013), the
doctrine merely “reflect[s] awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.” “In the language of an American Supreme
Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored.’ ”

Same; Pork Barrel System; The Supreme Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within
which it operates.―The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike
20
 down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to
wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers;
insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects
which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting
wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the
power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are
national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and
again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by
21law for energy-related purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure
development projects,” it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
GUINGONA vs. Constitutional Law; Commission on Appointments; Rule on Proportional Representation; Conversion of fractional membership of a political party into a whole
GONZALES membership amounting to a reduction of the other party's representation in the Commission on Appointments is a clear violation of the Constitutional mandate
requiring membership therein be based on proportional representation of the political parties.—We find the respondents' claim to membership in the Commission on
Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore
violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political
parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to
make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation.

Same; Same; Same; The proportional representatives of each political party in the Commission on Appointments is based on the actual number of members of
each political party at the time of the election of members therein in recognition of changing political alignments at the time of its orgarnization.—Respondents,
however, accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis
thereof is the actual number of members of each political party at the time of election of the members of the Commission on Appointments in the Senate. In fact,
respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the LakasNUCD upheld the doctrine enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, recognizing changes in
alignments of membership in the Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on Appointments.

Same; Same; Same; Compliance with the rule on proportional representation is held mandatory and must prevail over Constitutional mandate requiring election
of twelve Senators in the Commission which merely indicates maximum complement allowable under the Constitution.—We have declared that the Constitution does
not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is
not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the
political parties in the membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of
the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. x x x This interpretation finds support in the case of Tañada vs. Cuenco, where this Court held that the
constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be
elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation
must prevail.

Same; Same; Same; Commission can function even if not fully constituted provided that it has the required quorum.—Even if the composition of the Commission
is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed
by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if
respondent Senator Tañada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still has
representation in the Commission in the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile.
ARNAULT vs. 1. ; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY.—The power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is an essential and
NAZARRENO
21
 appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.

1. 2.ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY.—The Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the Congress of the United
States or a State Legislature, and the field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It is difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its
inquiry can be bounded. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of legislative power.

1. 3.ID.; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A WlTNESS FOR CONTEMPT.—No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness
before either House unless his testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.

1. 4.ID. ; ID.—Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to
require a witness to answer any question pertinent to the subject of the inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.

1. 5.ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE QUESTION.—The materiality of a question that may be propounded to a witness is determined by its direct relation to
the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation.

1. 6.ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY.—Where the immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a
witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the Court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. Although the legislative body has the power to make
the inquiry, the Court is empowered to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.

1. 7.ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE COURT TO INTERFERE WITH LEGISLATIVE ACTION.—Since the Court has no power to determine what legislation
to approve or not to approve, it cannot say that the information sought from a witness which. is material to the subject of the legislative inquiry is immaterial
to any proposed or possible legislation. It is not within the province of the Court to determine or imagine what legislative measures Congress may take after
the completion of the legislative investigation.

1. 8.ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO COMMIT A WlTNESS FOR CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD OF LEGISLATIVE
SESSION.—There is no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish. for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of the
last session terminating the existence of that body. While the existence of the House of Representatives is limited to four years, that of the Senate is not so
limited. The Senate is a continuing body which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted.

1. 9.ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL OF WITNESS TO ANSWER.—Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is
equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.

1. 10.ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER QUESTION is INCRIMINATORY.—It is not enough for the witness to say that the answer
will incriminate him, as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general 'Conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the
province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some
fanciful excuse, for protection against an. imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person.

1. 11.ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION OF A CITIZEN.—It is the duty of every citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent
authority. His constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, unless clearly established, must yield to that duty. When a specific right and a specific
obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must yield to the latter. The right to
22
 live is one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life
of others

BENGZON vs. Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.—The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
SENATE BLUE conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. xxx The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, xxx, absolute or
RIBBON unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the aforequoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be “in aid of
legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected”. It
follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to
testify against one’s self.

Same; Same.—As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be
material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member. Under Sec. 4 of the
aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment
requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech
or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.

Same; Judicial power.—It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decided to conduct its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint
in Civil Case No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action
against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez. Since the
issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioners’ respective answers thereto, the issue sougth to be investigated by the
respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted by that court. To
allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee’s judgment were to be reached before that of the
Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted. In fine, for the
respondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much earlier set in.

Same; Rights of accused; Right against self-incrimination.—One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against
self-incrimination. This right construed as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case; but it may be
invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them. xxx Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, the Court
reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in
criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit.
NERI vs. SENATE Presidency; Executive Privilege; Separation of Powers; Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; There is a recognized presumptive presidential
BLUE RIBBON communications privilege; The presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the Constitution.—Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential communications privilege is
mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 (1995), affirmed that
the presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
Even Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the
claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), 299 SCRA 744
23
(1998) and Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002). The Court articulated in these cases that “there are certain types of information which the government may withhold
from the public,” that there is a “governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security
matters;” and that “the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the separation of powers, by which the
Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; When an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure,
there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this situation
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.—Respondent Committees’ observation that this Court’s Decision reversed the “presumption that
inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure” arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The Court has repeatedly held that in
order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its
entirety. Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), which declared void
Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision in the said case reads: From the above discussion on the
meaning and scope of executive privilege,both in the United States and in this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against
Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional
concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the
exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Obviously,
the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the “exemption” being claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O.
No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of
E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to invoke executive privilege given by the President to said
executive official, such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Quintessential” and “Non-Delegable,” Defined; The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another
entity does not make such power less executive; “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance; “Non-
delegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor; The fact that the President has
to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign
loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.—The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less
executive. “Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance. On the other hand, “non-delegable” means
that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an executive agreement is
in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a
complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of “Operational Proximity”; The doctrine of “operational proximity” was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the
presidential communications privilege.—It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational proximity” was laid down in In re: Sealed Case, No. 96-3124, June 17,
1997, 121 F.3d 729, 326 U.S. App. D.C. 276, precisely to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a
limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and
then only to White House staff that has “operational proximity” to direct presidential decision-making.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Organizational Test”; In determining which test to use—whether the Operational Proximity Test or the Organizational
Test—the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function,
but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure.—In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege “to a large swath of the
executive branch” (a fear apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly within the term
“advisor” of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this
24
Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 365 F 3d. 1108, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 183, 64
Fed. R. Evid. Serv.141. This goes to show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In determining which test
to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their
function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executive’s organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the scope of the privilege would be
unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to protect.—It must be stressed that the President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized
interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified presidential communications privilege in relation
to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated: The context in which executive privilege is
being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of
China. Given the confidential nature in which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis supplied) Even in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), it was held that
Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant
to protect. This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with
a foreign nation, with more reason, the Court is wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the
President but even her confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need.—Considering
that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the President’s dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is
wary of approving the view that Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her confidential and informal
discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee
unwanted consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and great publicity. No Executive can
effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the President’s decision-making process, which
inevitably would involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.

Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Right to Information; Accountability and Transparency; The constitutional right of the people to information and the
constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency are the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government.—There is no
debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are
the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power
has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the policies on public accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words
if access to such information of public concern is denied. In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did
not in any way curb the public’s right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and transparency.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to information is not an absolute right—that there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of such
information covered by executive privilege is a recognized principle in other democratic States.—This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the
NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could
continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes
from the scope of respondents’ investigation the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be compelled to
appear before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized
public interest in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to information is not an absolute
right. Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information. By their wording, the intention of the
Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is unmistakable.

25
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress and neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government
officials.—The right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid of legislation, not the people’s right to public
information. This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006),
“the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued
by Congress” and “neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.” As pointed out, these rights belong to
Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no
prior request for information on the part of any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the Legislature’s right to
information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public’s right to information.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the
course of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of the Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or
pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance—the presumption of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for
disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.—It must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent Committees’ inquiry into
the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees’ power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot
uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the legislative
purpose of respondent Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a
whole may have relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege can only be
overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for
facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies.—The need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the
compelling or demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the bare standard of
“pertinency” set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate
Branches of the Government.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches
is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege.—Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting
claims between the Executive and the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege. This is conceded even
in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which states: A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified
presumption in favor of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other
related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al. v. Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent
cases all recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a
presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the
presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft
legislation—for sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislative bodies can come up with relevant legislation unlike in the
adjudication of cases by courts of law.—The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn the
presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft
legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference
to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could not be determined without the said information sought by the three (3) questions. As
correctly pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion: …If respondents are operating under the premise that the
president and/or her executive officials have committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the
26
answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such legislation. They could easily presume the worst
of the president in enacting such legislation. For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up
with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Oversight Function; Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for
information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature—curbing graft and corruption is
merely an oversight function of Congress.—Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees’ need for information in the
exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is
merely an oversight function of Congress. And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may
even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or
oversight function of Congress, respondent Committees’ investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials, including the President,
in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to perform—the role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a
crime or wrongdoing.—The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President. While it may be a worthy
endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the
Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the
Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Congress; There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.—No matter how noble the intentions of
respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or
illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with
conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law
enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and “punish” those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional
power to expose for the sake of exposure.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman; Courts; The Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to
preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor, and the same holds true for our courts upon which the
Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality.—It is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed
against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our Constitution, it is the Ombudsman who has the duty “to investigate
any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.” The
Office of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true
and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules
of procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and
witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.

Same; Same; Congress; The Legislature’s need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the
confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege.—Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of
their investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of government. Thus, the Legislature’s need for information
in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege. As
discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.

Same; Same; Same; Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to arrive at accurate factual
27
findings to which to apply the law; Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.—Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to
arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that
“technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee.” Court rules which
prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from
the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.

Same; Congress; An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses.—Respondent Committees’ second
argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006), requiring invitations or subpoenas to contain the “possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry” along with the “usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof” is not provided for
by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum. On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements. An unconstrained
congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses. Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been
abused (or has the potential for abuse) have been raised many times. Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the Executive to
function effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not unduly limit Congress’ power. The legislative inquiry must
be confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the “roving commissions” referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880). Likewise,
witnesses have their constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to
prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too little political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-
à-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry.

Same; Courts; Judicial Review; While it is true that the Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of
government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith.—Anent the third argument,
respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (the “Rules”) are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true
that this Court must refrain from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a constitutional requirement exists,
the Court has the duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.

Same; Same; Contempt; The Court does not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish, and this is
especially true where what is involved is the contempt power; It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated to benefit legislative committees—more than
anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the Rules.—Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the
issuance of the contempt order is flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order was prepared
and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the
proceedings that took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order were present during the January 30, 2008
deliberation when the matter was taken up. Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that: The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied) All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness’ settled expectation. If the
limitations are not observed, the witness’ settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members in attendance are not enough to
arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has been
fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated in such
proceeding. We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is
involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest
stake in the proper observance of the Rules.

Senate; Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in
the composition of its members, but in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the
Congress before it.—On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
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institution is “continuing,” as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its
day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this
when it states: RULE XLIV UNFINISHED BUSINESS SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same
status. All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for
the first time. (emphasis supplied) Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the
Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to
take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering
that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business, then pending matters will not
be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

Same; Rules on Legislative Inquiries; It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.—
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of
the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall begin their term. However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules
are intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply
state “(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.” The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed
that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business. The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress
or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put
public on notice. If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted
the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Same; Same; Not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void—only those that result in violation of the rights of
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution.—Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules
are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to
protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid and
effective.

Separation of Powers; Checks and Balances; In a free and democratic society, the interests of these Executive and Legislative branches inevitably clash, but each
must treat the other with official courtesy and respect.—On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political
branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the other with official courtesy and
respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we preserve the
constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different branches of government.

Same; Same; Accountability and Transparency; There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity, but the best
venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches of government—the customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules on evidence
are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.—While this Court finds
laudable the respondent Committees’ well-intentioned efforts to ferret out corruption, even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate
or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of government. There is no question that any story of
government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of transparency and
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 public accountability. The recent clamor for a “search for truth” by the general public, the religious community and the academe is an indication of a concerned
citizenry, a nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches of government.
The customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the
test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. We believe the people deserve a more exacting “search for truth” than the process here in question, if that is its
objective.
SAGUISAG vs. The President has the inherent power to enter into agreements with other states, including the prerogative to conclude binding executive
OCHOA agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence.—As the sole organ of our foreign relations and the constitutionally assigned
chief architect of our foreign policy, the President is vested with the exclusive power to conduct and manage the country’s interface with
other states and governments. Being the principal representative of the Philippines, the Chief Executive speaks and listens for the nation;
initiates, maintains, and develops diplomatic relations with other states and governments; negotiates and enters into international
agreements; promotes trade, investments, tourism and other economic relations; and settles international disputes with other states. As
previously discussed, this constitutional mandate emanates from the inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other
states, including the prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate concurrence. The existence of
this presidential power is so well-entrenched that Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution, even provides for a check on its exercise.
As expressed below, executive agreements are among those official governmental acts that can be the subject of this Court’s power of
judicial review: (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

Executive Agreements; Words and Phrases; In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351 (1961), executive
agreements are defined as “international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and
traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.”—In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3
SCRA 351 (1961), executive agreements are defined as “international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-
established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.” In Bayan Muna v.
Romulo, 641 SCRA 244 (2011), this Court further clarified that executive agreements can cover a wide array of subjects that have various
scopes and purposes. They are no longer limited to the traditional subjects that are usually covered by executive agreements as identified in
Eastern Sea Trading.
KULAYAN vs. TAN There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic—this means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.—As early as Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil.
451 (1939), it has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic. This
means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. As
emphasized by Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena: With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is
one purpose which is crystal-clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the
enunciation of the principle that “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.” This means that the President of
the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who
is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as

30
 the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII thereof.

Same; Calling-Out Powers; By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is
bestowed upon the President alone.—The power to declare a state of martial law is subject to the Supreme Court’s authority to review the
factual basis thereof. By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the power to declare martial law, is
bestowed upon the President alone. As noted in Villena, “(t)here are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive
of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those
powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law x x x.

Calling-Out Powers; Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding; the
calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.—Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with
the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when
he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
ESTRADA vs. Presidency; Resignation; Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction—it is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
DESIERTO resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.—The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and
its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.

Same; Same; Same; Totality Test; Whether erstwhile President Estrada resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after
January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.—In the cases
at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacanang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the
oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. Using this totality
test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court holds that, the resignation of former President Estrada cannot be doubted—it was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang.—
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement,
(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the
Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind
of inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to
serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has
given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit
of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner’s valedictory, his final act of farewell. His
presidency is now in the past tense.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Former President Estrada’s resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of changing caprice nor of a whimsical will, especially if

31
 the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people.—To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases
at bar did not discuss, nay even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances
during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be
sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release that
he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the
presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal significance. Petitioner’s
resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will, especially if the resignation is the result of his repudiation by the
people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to petitioner’s letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
MACALINTAL vs. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was
PET defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review.—Although there are
recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which
tribunal he had ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with
his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper
invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.

Same; Statutory Construction; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election
protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.—Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court
involving constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003), cannot claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution; and (2) the unanimous
holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 424 SCRA 277 (2004), is that the Supreme Court has
original jurisdiction to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an independent Electoral Tribunal.
CIVIL LIBERTIES The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
vs. EXECUTIVE employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.—Evidently, from this move as well as in the different phraseologies of the constitutional provisions in
SECRETARY question, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or
employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section 13, Article VII when other provisions of the Constitution on the
disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment.—Moreover, such intent is underscored by a comparison of Section
13, Article VII with other provisions of the Constitution on the disqualifications of certain public officials or employees from holding other offices or employment.
Under Section 13, Article VI, “(N)o Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government . . .”. Under
Section 5(4), Article XVI, “(N)o member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries.” Even Section 7 (2), Article IX-B, relied upon by respondents
provides “(U)nless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the
Government.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office
or employment.—It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or
employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII
which states that “(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure.” In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the phrase “in the Government.”
The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The all-embracing prohibition imposed on the President and his official family are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution
32
 to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.—Going further into Section 13, Article VII, the second sentence provides: “They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries.” These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on
other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their
tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself.—Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government
during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only
when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it allows Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold multiple
offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so.—In the light of
the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23, 1987 is
unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary
position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise
provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
CALDERON vs. The Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII
CARALE whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.—Indubitably, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the second sentence
of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more specifically under the “third groups” of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII
whose appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
MATIBAG vs. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee
BENIPAYO has qualified into office—the fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.—An ad
interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified
into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad
interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides as follows: “The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.” (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying that it
can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the President. The fear that the President can withdraw or revoke at any time and for any reason an ad interim appointment is
utterly without basis.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad interim appointment takes effect
immediately; In case of an appointment made by the President when Congress is in session, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on
Appointments may the person thus named assume office, while with reference to an ad interim appointment, it takes effect at once, and the individual chosen may thus
qualify and perform his function without loss of time.—The Constitution imposes no condition on the effectivity of an ad interim appointment, and thus an ad
interim appointment takes effect immediately. The appointee can at once assume office and exercise, as a de jure officer, all the powers pertaining to the office.
In Pacete vs. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, this Court elaborated on the nature of an ad interim appointment as follows: “A distinction is thus made
33
 between the exercise of such presidential prerogative requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments when Congress is in session and when it is in recess.
In the former, the President nominates, and only upon the consent of the Commission on Appointments may the person thus named assume office. It is not so with
reference to ad interim appointments. It takes effect at once. The individual chosen may thus qualify and perform his function without loss of time. His title to such
office is complete. In the language of the Constitution, the appointment is effective ‘until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment
of the Congress.’ ”

Same; Same; Same; Same; The term “ad interim appointment,” as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made
by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess.—The term “ad interim appointment”, as used in letters of appointment signed by the President, means a
permanent appointment made by the President in the meantime that Congress is in recess. It does not mean a temporary appointment that can be withdrawn or revoked
at any time. The term, although not found in the text of the Constitution, has acquired a definite legal meaning under Philippine jurisprudence. The Court had again
occasion to explain the nature of an ad interim appointment in the more recent case of Marohombsar vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court stated: “We have already
mentioned that an ad interim appointment is not descriptive of the nature of the appointment, that is, it is not indicative of whether the appointment is temporary or in an
acting capacity, rather it denotes the manner in which the appointment was made. In the instant case, the appointment extended to private respondent by then MSU
President Alonto, Jr. was issued without condition nor limitation as to tenure. The permanent status of private respondent’s appointment as Executive Assistant II was
recognized and attested to by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. 12. Petitioner’s submission that private respondent’s ad interim appointment is
synonymous with a temporary appointment which could be validly terminated at any time is clearly untenable. Ad interim appointments are permanent but their terms
are only until the Board disapproves them.” (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office, and the withdrawal or
revocation of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, as any withdrawal or revocation
thereafter is tantamount to removal from office.—An ad interim appointee who has qualified and assumed office becomes at that moment a government employee and
therefore part of the civil service. He enjoys the constitutional protection that “[n]o officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law.” Thus, an ad interim appointment becomes complete and irrevocable once the appointee has qualified into office. The withdrawal or revocation
of an ad interim appointment is possible only if it is communicated to the appointee before the moment he qualifies, and any withdrawal or revocation thereafter is
tantamount to removal from office. Once an appointee has qualified, he acquires a legal right to the office which is protected not only by statute but also by the
Constitution. He can only be removed for cause, after notice and hearing, consistent with the requirements of due process.

Same; Same; Same; An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution—first, by the disapproval of his ad interim
appointment by the Commission on Appointments, and, second, by the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment.—
An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the Constitution. The first cause is the disapproval of his ad interim appointment by the
Commission on Appointments. The second cause is the adjournment of Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on his appointment. These two
causes are resolutory conditions expressly imposed by the Constitution on all ad interim appointments. These resolutory conditions constitute, in effect, a Sword of
Damocles over the heads of ad interim appointees. No one, however, can complain because it is the Constitution itself that places the Sword of Damocles over the heads
of the ad interim appointees.

Same; Same; Same; Security of Tenure; An appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity is the kind of appointment that the Constitution
prohibits the President from making to the three independent constitutional commissions.—While an ad interim appointment is permanent and irrevocable except as
provided by law, an appointment or designation in a temporary or acting capacity can be withdrawn or revoked at the pleasure of the appointing power. A temporary or
acting appointee does not enjoy any security of tenure, no matter how briefly. This is the kind of appointment that the Constitution prohibits the President from making
to the three independent constitutional commissions, including the COMELEC.
GONZALES III vs. The independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain characteristics — they do not owe their
OFFICE OF THE existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy.—Under the Constitution, several constitutional
PRESIDENT bodies have been expressly labeled as “independent.” The extent of the independence enjoyed by these constitutional bodies however varies and is to be interpreted
with two significant considerations in mind: first, the functions performed or the powers involved in a given case; and second, consistency of any allowable interference
34
 to these powers and functions, with the principle of checks and balances. Notably, the independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional
Commissions shares certain characteristics — they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself; additionally, they all
enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these “independent” bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that
the absence of “independence” would result in the impairment of their core functions.
Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself.—In more concrete terms, we rule
that subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject
to the Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the
Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately,
intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the
independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an
Ombudsman office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as
independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer
still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770
(providing that the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.

Same; The Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd
situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can remove or suspend its
members.—The statements made by Commissioner Monsod emphasized a very logical principle: the Executive power to remove and discipline key officials of the
Office of the Ombudsman, or to exercise any power over them, would result in an absurd situation wherein the Office of the Ombudsman is given the duty to
adjudicate on the integrity and competence of the very persons who can remove or suspend its members. Equally relevant is the impression that would be given
to the public if the rule were otherwise. A complainant with a grievance against a high-ranking official of the Executive, who appears to enjoy the President’s favor,
would be discouraged from approaching the Ombudsman with his complaint; the complainant’s impression (even if misplaced), that the Ombudsman would be
susceptible to political pressure, cannot be avoided. To be sure, such an impression would erode the constitutional intent of creating an Office of the Ombudsman as
champion of the people against corruption and bureaucracy.
ARIAS vs All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase
SANDIGANBAYAN supplies or enter into negotiations; Case at bar.—We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have proved records, inspected documents,
received procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally do all these things in all
vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department
secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each
guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into
the reimbursement voucher’s accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher
in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be
signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The
number in bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.
REPUBLIC vs. The failure of respondent to exercise his functions diligently when he recommended for approval documents for emergency repair and
ARIAS purchase in the absence of the signature and certification by the end- user, in complete disregard of existing Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH) rules, constitute gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct which undoubtedly resulted in loss of public funds
thereby causing undue injury to the government.—The failure of respondent to exercise his functions diligently when he recommended for
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 approval documents for emergency repair and purchase in the absence of the signature and certification by the end-user, in complete
disregard of existing DPWH rules, constitute gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct which undoubtedly resulted in loss of public funds
thereby causing undue injury to the government. In sum, this Court finds substantial evidence to hold respondent administratively liable.
DRILON vs. LIM Where the Secretary of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax measure enacted by a local government unit to determine if the officials
performed their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers under the Local Government Code, the same is an act of mere supervision, not control.—Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of
Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the
local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own
version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say
that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if
the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax
ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control
but of mere supervision.
ARANETA vs.
GATMAITAN
DEMEGILLO vs. Constitutional Law; Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency; The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine,
TIDCORP was introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1939).—The doctrine of qualified political
agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451
(1939). In said case, the Department of Justice, upon the request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and
found him guilty of bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then recommended to the President the suspension
from office of Mayor Villena. Upon approval by the President of the recommendation, the Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena.
Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his suspension, asserting that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to suspend him from office
because there was no specific law granting such power to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who was empowered
to suspend local government officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his suspension, holding that the doctrine of
qualified political agency warranted the suspension by the Secretary of Interior.

Same; Same; The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various executive departments are the
alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the
President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts.—The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that
the heads of the various executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such heads in the
performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the President himself should disapprove such acts. This
doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief
Executive; that the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the multiple executive
functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out
of practical necessity, considering that the President cannot be expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive
office.
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HONTIVEROS vs. The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that, save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President
REGULATORY to act personally, executive and administrative functions are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose
BOARD acts are presumptively the acts of the President unless disapproved by the latter.—The doctrine of qualified political agency declares that,
save in matters on which the Constitution or the circumstances require the President to act personally, executive and administrative
functions are exercised through executive departments headed by cabinet secretaries, whose acts are presumptively the acts of the President
unless disapproved by the latter. As explained in Villena v. Executive Secretary, 67 Phil. 451 (1939), this doctrine is rooted in the
Constitution: x x x With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal clear and is readily
visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of
Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that “The executive
power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” This means that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an
advisory capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, “should be of the President’s bosom confidence,” and, in the language of
Attorney-General Cushing, “are subject to the direction of the President.” Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief
Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, “each head of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters
of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority.” Secretaries of departments, of course, exercise certain
powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a
matter of executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by mere concession of the
executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he
assumes the corresponding responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints
him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries.

Same; Same; There can be no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter.—There can be
no question that the act of the secretary is the act of the President, unless repudiated by the latter. In this case, approval of the ASTOA by
the DOTC Secretary had the same effect as approval by the President. The same would be true even without the issuance of E.O. 497, in
which the President, on 24 January 2006, specifically delegated to the DOTC Secretary the authority to approve contracts entered into by
the TRB.
GLORIA vs. CA Presidential Immunity from Suit; The doctrine of presidential immunity has no application where the petition for prohibition is directed not
against the President himself but against his subordinates; Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave
abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.—Petitioners theorize that the present petition for
prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
Petitioners’ contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The
questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts
where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

SAMIO vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN
37
 LAGMAN vs. Martial Law; Writ of Habeas Corpus; The initial declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is determined
MEDIALDEA solely by the President, while the extension of the declaration and/or suspension, although initiated by the President, is approved by
Congress.—Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution provides that “the President x x x may, for a period not exceeding sixty days,
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. x x x Upon the initiative of
the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.” From the foregoing, it is clear that the President’s
declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is effective for 60 days. As aptly described by
Commissioner Monsod, “this declaration has a time fuse. It is only good for a maximum of 60 days. At the end of 60 days, it automatically
terminates.” Any extension thereof should be determined by Congress. The act of declaring martial law and/or suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus by the President, however, is separate from the approval of the extension of the declaration and/or suspension by
Congress. The initial declaration of martial law and/or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is determined solely by the President, while
the extension of the declaration and/or suspension, although initiated by the President, is approved by Congress.

Same; Same; Same; Sufficiency of Factual Basis; The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.—We held that “the parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as
follows: 1) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause
for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.” Moreover, we stated in the assailed Decision that “the phrase
‘sufficiency of factual basis’ in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution should be understood as the only test for judicial review of the
President’s power to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.” Requiring the Court to determine the
accuracy of the factual basis of the President contravenes the Constitution as Section 18, Article VII only requires the Court to determine
the sufficiency of the factual basis. Accuracy is not the same as sufficiency as the former requires a higher degree of standard.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or evidence showing that more likely
than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed.—“The President only needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or
evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was committed or is being committed.” The standard of proof of probable cause does
not require absolute truth. Since “martial law is a matter of urgency x x x the President x x x is not expected to completely validate all the
information he received before declaring martial law or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.” Notably, out of the several
facts advanced by the President as basis for Proclamation No. 216, only five of them were being questioned by the petitioners. However,
they were not even successful in their refutation since their “counter--evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the
internet, with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. It was not even shown that efforts were made
to secure such affirmation albeit the circumstances proved futile.” Even granting that the petitioners were successful in their attempt to
refute the aforesaid five incidents, there are other facts sufficient to serve as factual basis for the declaration of martial law and suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
FORTUN vs.
ARROYO
KULAYAN vs. TAN
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MONSATO vs Pardon, Effects of; Administrative Law; Public Officers; Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily
FACTORAN relinquished or forfeited by reason of such conviction.—Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring
back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and
purpose of the privilege. Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the
commonly-held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by
reason of the conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for appointment to that office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The pardon granted to petitioner resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment, but to regain her former post, she must reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.—For
petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities referred to that when
her guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may apply
for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considerins her qualifications and suitability for the
public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she
can once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
reapply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability, Extinction Of; The pardon granted to herein petitioner did not extinguish the civil liability arising from
the crime she has been convicted of.—Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her
by the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner’s civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing
due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
Same; Same; Same; Acceptance of Pardon; Petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal when she accepted the pardon granted to
her.—The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that
clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner’s unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in the
High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. But be that as it
may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the
result would still be the same. Having accepted the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her unreversed
conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of finality.

SABELLO vs. Absolute disqualification from office forms part of punishment prescribed under the Penal Code; Although pardon restores a person’s
DECS eligibility to a public office, it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement.—-In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., this Court held that the
absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and
that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Although such pardon
restores his eligibility to a public office it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply for reappointment to said office.
Administrative Law; Reinstatement of employee as Principal I, as no circumstances warrant diminution in his rank.—As there are no
39
 circumstances that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate that he be returned to his former position of
Elementary School Principal I and not to that of a mere classroom teacher.
PALATINO vs.
PELOBELLO
SAGUISAG vs.
OCHOA
BELGICA vs.
OCHOA

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