MODAL INSTITUTION (OBLIGATES BUT DOES NOT SUSPEND)

G.R. No. 113725 June 29, 2000

Rabadilla vs CA

Facts:

In a Will of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner,
Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee. The said will provide:

I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the rights which I
shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and spouse of Jorge
Rabadilla.

Jorge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, 100 piculs of sugar, until she dies.

Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir shall have the obligation

in the event that the one to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease,
mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver
yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, until Maria Marlina
shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in
this my addition (Will), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392
from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic)

should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near descendants
and my sister.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint against the
above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject Will. The Complaint
alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the Will, in that:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in
disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants
and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of sugar to
plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Will which provided that in case of the sale,
lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to
deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to reconvey/return-Lot
No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of
the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the
surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the
herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs,
arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to
deliver one hundred piculs of sugar.

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial
delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint and
disposing as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is prematurely filed
as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of plaintiff.

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court;

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering defendants-
appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with its fruits and
interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the
testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be
substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein
private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can
be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the
substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near descendants"
without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and therefore, under
Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable
because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the
testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of
sugar to private respondent.

Issue:

1. W/N respondent has a cause of action

2. W/N the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of
Article 882 or a substitution
3. W/N the private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property
4. W/N the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable
settlement and not the seizure of subject property

Held:

1. No. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the
petitioner.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law.
Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings.

Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person, not extinguished by his death..

Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the
said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot
involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation corresponds to the right of private
respondent over the usufruct. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner.

2. No.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or
heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either:

(1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the
original heir should PREDECEASE, RENOUNCE, INCAPACITATED (Simple substitution)
(2) leave his property to one person with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently
to another (fideicommissary substitution).

The Will sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of
incapacity, predecease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Will do
not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix's near descendants would substitute him. What the Will provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Will, the property referred to shall be
seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly
mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir. In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Will to alienate the property provided the
negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of
a fideicommissary substitution is lacking. Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is
not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the
obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the
second heir must not be beyond one degree from the first heir. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. In the case under scrutiny,
the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Will is in
the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 applies.

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by the
testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it appears that such
was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted heir or his
heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return of anything he or
they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article cannot
take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a manner most
analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of
succession as a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states

(1) the object of the institution

(2) the purpose of the property left by the testator, or

(3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir.

A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights
to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must
happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator.

The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.

To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

From the provisions of the Will litigated upon, it can be gleaned that:

a) testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

b) the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir.

However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance dependent on the performance of
the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall
be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Will is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without,
however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed upon the
heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself that such was the
intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.

3. No. The right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

The will provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena
Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The
sanction for non-fulfillment of the obligation is clearly imposed not only on the instituted heir but also
on his successors-in-interest.

4. No. A Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property,
to take effect after his death. The wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a
Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very
purpose of making a Will.

PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AT THE SAME TIME (NEITHER INHERITS)

Joaquin vs Navarro

Facts:

the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Joaquin Navarro,
Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be
applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:

Survivorship cannot be established by proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that there must
be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Now in this case before us, the
testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly
after the living the German Club. All we can decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her
aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding
that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory
presumption. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would be
precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must
be deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age
(Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).

"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether she
and her deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the
only guide is the occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of
Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to be
regarded as perishing in the same calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can
( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the same battle, some may die from wounds,
other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law disregards episodic details, and treats the
battle as an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.

"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met
their end is as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother
Angela Joaquin; then the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father
Joaquin Navarro, Sr."

Issue:

1. W/N Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa
2. W/N the case is a question of law

Held:

1. Yes.

Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

When two person perish in the same calamity and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are no (2)
particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes.

Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:

Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would inherent
one from the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the
absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights
from one to the other shall take place.

It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that
the evidence of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential.
Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls.

The testimony of the surviving witness contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of
survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died
before his mother.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son cannot be ruled out, it must be noted that this
possibility is entirely speculative.

Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases are decided, this inference
ought to prevail.

2. Yes. The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be
invoked is a question of law.

The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions
supported by substantial evidence. Findings grounded entirely on speculations come within the
exception to the general rule.

EFFECT OF VALID SALE OF ESTATE ON LEGITIME

Manongsong vs Estimo

Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, among them, Enriqueta
Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents ("Jumaquio sisters"); (3) Victor Lopez, married to
respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of respondents Narciso, Celestino,
Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to
respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito,
all surnamed dela Cruz, and of Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente
Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong ("Manongsong").
The records do not show that the Property is registered under the Torrens system. The Property is
particularly described in Tax in the name of "Benigna Lopez, et al".4 However, the improvements on the
portion of the Property were separately declared in the name of "Filomena J. Estimo" under Tax
Declaration No. 90-001-02145.

Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners") filed a Complaint alleging that Manongsong and
respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil Code,
petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the
Property.

Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarra’s death, her
children inherited the Property. Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there were only five
children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including Vicente Lopez, the father of
Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez’ sole surviving heir, Manongsong
claims her father’s 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation.

There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of Guevarra’s children and their
offspring, have been in possession of the Property for as long as they can remember.

Most respondents entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. petitioners and the Ortiz and
Dela Cruz families agreed that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property.

The Jumaquio sisters contended that

1. Justina Navarro ("Navarro"), supposedly the mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarra’s
daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
a. presented provincial Tax Declaration for the year 1949 in the sole name of Navarro.
b. presented a notarized KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA.
2. Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their portion of the Property for
more than thirty years, they also invoked the defense of acquisitive prescription against
petitioners, and charged that petitioners were guilty of laches.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

ruled in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because the property
conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was solely a
paraphernal property. The compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic) cases
expressly specified by law like for instance disinheritance for cause.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

reversed the decision of the trial court

The Court of Appeals held the property is paraphernal property. It is a settled rule that the party who
invokes the presumption that all property of marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must first
prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property was acquired
by Justina Navarro during her marriage.

To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was declared, for taxation purposes
under the name of Justina Navarro alone. This indicates that the land is the paraphernal property of
Justina Navarro.

Issue:
1. W/N the Kasulatan was void because the Property was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to
Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.
2. W/N the sale would deprive the compulsory heir of their legitimes
Held:

1. No. The trial court’s conclusion that the Property was conjugal was not based on evidence, but
rather on a misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.

As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code
applies only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of the conjugal partnership.

There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her
marriage. There is no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the
present case. On the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the
Property was declared solely in Navarro’s name. This tends to support the argument that the
Property was not conjugal.

2. No. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish
the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of
the estate but merely a substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent
monetary consideration.
Issue:

1. w/n a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law

2. w/n Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in
question final as against the said widow

Held:

No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation.

Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares.

Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead, survive, the
former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of representation, and if any one
of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions.

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower
shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of
her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her
mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. If the legislature intended to
make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the
Civil Code.

The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving
spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.

Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.

By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support petitioner's
claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the
estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings
in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the
estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.

The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil
Code, viz —

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the representative is raised
to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person represented.
The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom the person represented
would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)

Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of his
blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented) who
predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have succeeded.
Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with her
mother-in-law.

Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an
inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said
right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who
succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father,
Carterio Rosales.

On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the
second question posed by the petitioner.

Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir
of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against
the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION (not transmissible)

Lapuz vs Euphemio

Facts:

Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging

1. that they were married in 1934

2. that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her;
3. that they had no child
4. that they acquired properties during their marriage
5. and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman on 1949.

She prayed that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.

respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to
Chinese law and customs.

Trial proceeded but petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died.

Respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2) grounds, namely:
that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of
the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.

Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

Issue:
1. W/N the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action?
2. W/N the abatement applies even if the action involves property rights

Held:

1. Yes. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation
of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100,
by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself.

When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage is dissolved.

For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in holding that the death of either party to a divorce
proceeding, before final decree, abates the action.

2. Yes.

Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:

From this article it is apparent that the

1. right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of
property),
2. no right by the offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community
3. no right to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse
4. no right to inherit by will from the innocent spouse

are all rights and disabilities that are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; not transmissible.

Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" by death to warrant
continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.

Rule 2, Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted.

The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or against
administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court.

Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the
enumeration.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to
Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the latter,
and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically
dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by
either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed dead,
still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons involved had
died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for annulment should
be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore, the liquidation of any
conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must be carried out "in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided in Section 2 of the
Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

ESTRANGED WIFE IS STILL AN HEIR

Baritua vs CA

Facts:

Bienvenido died due to vehicular accident.

As a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter negotiated by the petitioners and the
bus insurer — Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated (PFICI for brevity) — Bienvenido
Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount
she received:

1. Alicia executed a "Release of Claim"

2. Alicia executed an affidavit of desistance

about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November 7, 1979, the private
respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for damages against the
petitioners. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that they shall be indemnified for the
death of their son. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise and instead negotiated and
settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son.

After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment to the widow and her
child, extinguished any claim against the defendants.

The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge the
liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in their own
capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not have
validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the one who
suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court said that
the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they were the
ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden of proof of
such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11 Anent the funeral expenses, "(T)he
expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was
never contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants,
therefore, the reimbursement must accrue in their favor.

Issue: W/N the petitioners are still liable to pay the private respondents despite the agreement of
extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.

Held:

No. Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment.

Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:

(1) By payment or performance;

(2) By the loss of the thing due;

(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;

(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;

(5) By compensation;

(6) By novation.

There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the accident that
occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the one
who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.

Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment to extinguish
an obligation should be made.

Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or
his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.

Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in
interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment.

Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:

1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;

2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their legitimate children
and decendants;

3. The widow or widower;

4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;

5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.

Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.

It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a
legitimate descendant. As it has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they
begot a child, the private respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not
(primary) compulsory heirs. The petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with
Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from Bienvenido. Mere
estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as an heir of the
deceased spouse.

Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and compensation
from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to Bienvenido the
purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral, the said purchase
price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased son. These money claims
are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the agreement of the
extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and
heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a
"Release Of Claim" in favor of the petitioners.

Macadangdang vs CA

Facts:

The records show that respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin
Anahaw. She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang. She also alleges that due
to the affair, she and her husband separated in 1967. (7 months or 210 days following the illicit
encounter), she gave birth to a baby boy who was named Rolando Macadangdang in baptismal rites.
respondent (then plaintiff) filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then
defendant) with the Court of First Instance

In its decision rendered on February 27, 1973, the lower court dismissed the complaint,.

the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision (p. 47, and thus declared minor Rolando to be
an illegitimate son of Antonio Macadangdang

Issue:

1. Whether or not the child Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate issue of the spouses
Elizabeth Mejias and Crispin Anahaw;

2. Whether or not the wife may institute an action that would bastardize her child without giving her
husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

Held:

The finding of the Court of Appeals that respondent and her husband were separated in 1965 cannot
therefore be considered conclusive and binding on this Court. It is based solely on the testimony of
respondent which is self-serving. Nothing in the records shows that her statement was confirmed or
corroborated by another witness and the same cannot be treated as borne out by the record or that
which is based on substantial evidence. It is not even confirmed by her own husband, who was not
impleaded.

In the case of Tolentino vs. De Jesus (L-32797, 56 SCRA 167 [1974], this Court restated that the findings
of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise, and conjectures; (2) the inference
made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings
are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts
of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on
record [Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation vs. Yap, L-36232, December 19, 1974; Roque vs. Buan,
L-22459, 21 SCRA 642 (1967); Ramos vs. Pepsi-cola Bottling Company of the Philippines, L-225533, 19
SCRA 289 (1967); emphasis supplied].

Again, in Roque vs. Buan, supra, this Court reiterated the aforestated doctrine adding four more
exceptions to the general rule. This case invoked the same ruling in the previous case of Ramos vs. Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Company, etc., supra.
In the recent case of Francisca Alsua-Betts, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. (L-46430-31, July 30, 1979),
which petitioner aptly invokes, this Court thus emphasized:

... But what should not be ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle that the
"findings of fact" described as "final" or "conclusive" are those borne out by the record or those which
are based upon substantial evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not declare
the absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals. There are exceptions to
the general rule, where we have reviewed the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals ... (emphasis
supplied).

The following provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court should be borne in mind:

Art. 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
to be legitimate.

Against this presumption, no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of
the husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three
hundred which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

(1) By the impotence of the husband;

(2) By the fact that the husband and wife were separately, in such a way that access was not possible;

(3) By the serious illness of the husband.

Art. 256. The child shall be presumed legitimate, although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

Art. 257. Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there
was no physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth in article 255, the child
is prima facie presumed to be illegitimate if it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the
child is that of the husband. For the purposes of this article, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a
criminal case.

Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy —

(a) Children born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and before
three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed
legitimate.
Against presumption no evidence be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband's having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

[1] By the impotence of the husband

[2] By the fact that the husband and the wife were living separately, in such a way that access was not
possible;

[3] By the serious illness of the husband;

(b) The child shall be presumed legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy
or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

(c) Should the wife commit adultery at or about the time of the conception of the child, but there was no
physical impossibility of access between her and her husband as set forth above, the child is presumed
legitimate, unless it appears highly improbable, for ethnic reasons, that the child is that of the husband.
For the purpose of the rule, the wife's adultery need not be proved in a criminal case. ... (Rule 131, Rules
of Court).

Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to the resolution of
the status of the child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred
twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even
substantial proof was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and
her spouse.

From the foregoing and since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, the
fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other. As has already been pointed
out, respondent's self-serving statements were never corroborated nor confirmed by any other
evidence, more particularly that of her husband.

The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after
March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took
place, and also, seven months from their separation (if there really was a separation). The birth of
Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage
and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses.

Under the aforequoted Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be
the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.

The fact that the child was born a mere seven (7) months after the initial sexual contact between
petitioner and respondent is another proof that the said child was not of petitioner since, from
indications, he came out as a normal full-term baby.

The baby Rolando could have been born prematurely. But such is not the case. Respondent underwent a
normal nine-month pregnancy.

In Our jurisprudence, this Court has been more definite in its pronouncements on the value of baptismal
certificates. It thus ruled that while baptismal and marriage certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of the sacraments on the dates therein
specified — but not the veracity of the states or declarations made therein with respect to his kinsfolk
and/or citizenship .

The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the
spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is
actually quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the physical
impossibility of access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded
the birth of the child.

Thus, in the case of Andal vs. Macaraig (89 Phil. 165), this Court ruled that just because tuberculosis is
advanced in a man does not necessarily mean that he is incapable of sexual intercourse. There are cases
where persons suffering from tuberculosis can do the carnal act even in the most crucial stage of health
because then they seemed to be more inclined to sexual intercourse. The fact that the wife had illicit
intercourse with a man other than her husband during the initial period, does not preclude cohabitation
between said husband and wife.