Sanlakas Vs. Executive Secretary, 421 SCRA 656, G.R. No.

159085 (3 Feb 2004)

Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP,
acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood
Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal
of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the
PNP Chief.

These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations
took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003,
both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation
of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG
MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is
no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the
same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours
from the proclamation of martial law.

Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of
the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et
al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

Issue:
1. Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
2. Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional.
Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to
its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that
the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for
the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here
have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue
of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of
usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President
by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section
23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this
whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long
as a valid warrantless arrest is present.

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
Issue upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the
foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing to challenge the
subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the
extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.