There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical

possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or

stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic
inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry
cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to
acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by
any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution
thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession
of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de
facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such
cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs
merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.[55]

Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its
decision on who had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an
action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore
possession regardless of title or ownership.[56]

We more extensively discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals[57] that:

Ownership or the right to possess arising from ownership is not

at issue in an action for recovery of possession. The parties cannot present
evidence to prove ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the
nature of the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical
possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts the absence of title
over the property. The absence of title over the contested lot is not a
ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment
case.
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment
proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises,
that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does
not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable, or when both
parties intruded into public land and their applications to own the land have
yet to be approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the
actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet
possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence or
terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will
always uphold respect for prior possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the
 character of his possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in time,
he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until a
person with a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue
that the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical
possession.[58] (Emphases ours.)

Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88 erred in ordering

the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings
before the MeTC. At the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88,
the MeTC had only gone so far as holding a hearing on and eventually granting
Muñoz’s prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

Muñoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286 that she had been in
prior possession of the subject property since it was turned-over to her by the
sheriff on January 10, 1994, pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the
RTC-Branch 95 to implement the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The
factual issue of who was in prior possession of the subject property should be
litigated between the parties regardless of whether or not the final judgment in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan. Hence, the pendency of the
latter issue in Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not warrant
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC on the ground of litis
pendentia. The two cases could proceed independently of one another.

Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver that the spouses Chan have never lost
possession of the subject property since acquiring the same from BPI Family in
1990. This is a worthy defense to Muñoz’s complaint for forcible entry, which
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut should substantiate with evidence in the
continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC.

In addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is governed by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 19 whereof provides:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. – The following
pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases covered by
this Rule:
xxxx
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court.

The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an expeditious

and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant
to this objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a number of other
pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of
cases.[59]

x x x."

gr 142676

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

RUBEN C. CORPUZ, represented G.R. No. 183822

by Attorney-in-Fact Wenifreda C.
Agullana,
Petitioner,
Present:
-versus-
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
PEREZ,
Sps. HILARION AGUSTIN and SERENO,
JUSTA AGUSTIN, REYES, and
Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.

Promulgated:

January 18, 2012

x----------------------------------------------------------
-x

DECISION

SERENO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails
the Decision[1] dated 08 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 90645, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City and its Resolution[2] dated 15 July 2008 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, affirmed the
Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Laoag City, which had dismissed
the unlawful detainer case filed by herein petitioner.

The Factual Antecedents

The Court adopts the findings of fact of the CA as follows:
Ruben C. Corpuz (Ruben) filed a complaint for ejectment against
Spouses Hilarion and Justa Agustin on the allegation that he is the
registered owner of two parcels of land located in Santa
Joaquina, Laoag City covered by TCT No. 12980 issued on October
29, 1976 by the Laoag City Register of Deeds and with technical
descriptions as follows:

1) A parcel of land (Lot No. 20 of the Cadastral Survey of

Laoag), with improvements thereon, situated in the barrio
of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded x x x
containing an area of five thousand seven hundred and fifty
nine (5,759) square meters more or less x x x.

2) A parcel of land (Lot No. 11711 of the Cadastral Survey of

Laoag), with the improvements thereon, situated in the
barrio of Santa Joaquina, Municipality of Laoag. Bounded
x x x, containing an area of twenty thousand seven hundred
and forty five (20,745) square meters, more or less x x x.

Aforesaid parcels of land were formerly owned by Elias Duldulao in

whose name Original Certificate of Title No. O-1717 was issued.
Duldulao sold said properties on August 27, 1951 to Francisco D.
Corpuz, father of Ruben C. Corpuz. The elder Corpuz allowed
spouses Agustin to occupy subject properties, the latter being
relatives.

Despite demand to vacate, the Agustins refused to leave the premises.

Ruben alleged further that he has the better right to possess subject
property having acquired the same from his father, Francisco, who
executed a Deed of Quitclaim in his favor on March 15, 1971.

Spouses Agustin, in their Answer, interposed the defense that on June

5, 1971 Francisco Corpuz, Ruben's father, disposed of subject
property by executing a Deed of Absolute Sale in their favor for a
consideration of Eleven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P11,150.00).

The Municipal Trial Court found for the spouses Agustin and
dismissed the complaint.

In sum, considering the evidence of the defendants which

shows that they entered into and occupied Lot No. 20 and
the 9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711 as buyers or
owners, disproving the allegation of the plaintiff that
defendants were merely allowed by Francisco Corpuz to
occupy the subject properties, being his relatives, and
considering further the length of time that the defendants
have been in possession, as owners, of Lot No. 20 and the
9,657 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 11711, and have been
continuously exercising their rights of ownership thereon,
this court is of the view and holds, in so far as this case is
concerned, that the defendants are the ones entitled to the
possession of Lot No. 20 and the 9,657 sq. m. portion of
Lot No. 11711.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this case, is

hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, Branch XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City affirmed

said dismissal, the dispositive portion of said decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit and the JUDGMENT of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 01, Laoag City is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against the plaintiff-
appellant.
 SO ORDERED.[3]

Petitioner assailed the Decision of the RTC, affirming the earlier dismissal of the
case by the MTC, by instituting an appeal with the CA. On 08 January 2008, the
appellate court through its Fourteenth Division dismissed his appeal.[4] It noted
that his father engaged in a double sale when he conveyed the disputed properties
to petitioner and respondents. The Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor
of petitioner was dated 15 March 1971, while the Deed of Sale with respondents
was later, on 15 June 1971; both documents were notarized shortly after their
execution.[5] The Quitclaim, which was subsequently inscribed at the back of
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. O-1717 on 29 October 1976,[6] resulted in
the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-12980 in the name of
petitioner. The Deed of Sale executed with respondents was, however, not
annotated at the back of OCT No. O-1717 and remained unregistered.[7]

Based on the above findings, the CA ruled that petitioner had knowledge of
the sale of the disputed real property executed between Francisco Corpuz,
petitioner's father, and respondents. Due to this conveyance by the elder Corpuz to
respondents, the latter's possession thereof was in the nature of ownership. Thus,
in the context of an unlawful detainer case instituted by petitioner against
respondents, the appellate court concluded that respondents possession of the
property was not by mere tolerance of its former owner petitioner's father but was
in the exercise of ownership.[8]

The CA noted that petitioner had knowledge of his fathers sale of the properties to
respondents as early as 1973. However, despite knowledge of the sale, petitioner
failed to initiate any action to annul it and oust respondents from the subject
properties.[9] The appellate court rejected his contention that, as registered owner
of the disputed properties, he had a better right to possession thereof, compared to
the unregistered Deed of Sale relied upon by respondents in their defense of the
same properties. The CA ruled that the inaction on his part despite knowledge of
the sale in 1973 was equivalent to registration of respondents unregistered
deed.[10] In dismissing his appeal, the CA concluded that respondents possession
was not ... anchored on mere tolerance nor on any of the grounds for forcible entry
or unlawful detainer; hence the complaint for ejectment must fail. [11]The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The decision of Branch
XVI, Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case No. 13293-16 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors in this Petition for Review on Certiorari:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE LEGAL OWNERSHIP
OF PETITIONER ON THE DISPUTED PROPERTY TO CLAIM
BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE ALLEGED SALE IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS TO RULE THAT THEY HAVE
BETTER RIGHT TO POSSESSION.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE CASE OF JACINTO
CO VS. MILITAR, ET AL. (421 SCRA 455) WHICH IS SIMILAR
TO THE INSTANT CASE.

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY

ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW RAISED
BEFORE IT.[13]

Petitioner presents to this Court for resolution the core issue of his Petition: who
between the parties has the right to possession of the disputed properties --
petitioner, who is the registered owner under TCT No. T-12980; or respondents,
who have a notarized yet unregistered Deed of Absolute Sale over the same
properties?

The Court's Ruling

We DENY the Petition.
Although this case does not present a novel question of law, there is a need to
discuss the nature of an ejectment case for the recovery of physical possession in
relation to the Torrens system. A resolution of the issue would be relevant to the
determination of who has the better right to possession in this unlawful detainer
case.

One of the three kinds of action for the recovery of possession of real property
is accion interdictal, or an ejectment proceeding ... which may be either that for
forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful detainer (desahucio), which is a summary
action for the recovery of physical possession where the dispossession has not
lasted for more than one year, and should be brought in the proper inferior
court.[14] In ejectment proceedings, the courts resolve the basic question of who is
entitled to physical possession of the premises, possession referring to
possession de facto, and not possession de jure.[15]

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between the parties has the
better right to possess the property. However, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the ownership issue is not
final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession.
The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an
action between the same parties involving title to the property.[16]

In the instant case, the position of respondents is that they are occupying the
disputed properties as owners, having acquired these from petitioner's father
through a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in 1971. Respondents believe that they
cannot be dispossessed of the disputed properties, since they are the owners and
are in actual possession thereof up to this date. Petitioner, however, rebuts this
claim of ownership, contending that he has registered the disputed properties in his
name and has been issued a land title under the Torrens system. He asserts that,
having registered the properties in his name, he is the recognized owner and
consequently has the better right to possession.

Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of
property ownership, which necessarily includes possession.[17] Petitioner is correct
that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties, he is the rightful owner
and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower courts and the appellate
court consistently found that possession of the disputed properties by respondents
was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In
fact, they have been in continuous, open and notorious possession of the property
for more than 30 years up to this day.

Petitioner cites Jacinto Co v. Rizal Militar, et al.,[18] which has facts and
legal issues identical to those of the instant case. The petitioner therein filed an
unlawful detainer case against the respondents over a disputed property. He had a
Torrens title thereto, while the respondents as actual occupants of the property
claimed ownership thereof based on their unregistered Deeds of Sale. The
principal issue was who between the two parties had the better right to possess the
subject property.

This Court resolved the issue by upholding the title holder as the one who
had the better right to possession of the disputed property based on the following
justification:
We have, time and again, held that the only issue for resolution in an
unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. Moreover, an ejectment suit is summary in nature and is not
susceptible to circumvention by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the

defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the lower courts and the Court of Appeals, nonetheless, have
the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of
ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of Possession.

Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts therein found in a
case between the same parties upon a different cause of action involving
possession.

In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the

parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the property.
Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds of sale in support
 of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court correctly relied on the
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner.

In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the

Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was believed to
be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles
and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized.

It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible and

binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been nullified by a
court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing statutory and decisional
law, the power to pass upon the validity of such certificate of title at the
first instance properly belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct
proceeding for cancellation of title.

As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the possession of

the property, which is one of the attributes of his ownership.
Respondents' argument that petitioner is not an innocent purchaser for
value and was guilty of bad faith in having the subject land registered in
his name is a collateral attack on the title of petitioner, which is not
allowed. A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and
can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. [19]

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual

v. Spouses Coronel[20] and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et
al.,[21] wherein we consistently held the age-old rule that the person who has a
Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.[22]

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted
an unlawful detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for
more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of the
subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere
tolerance of petitioners father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot
simply oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an
ejectment proceeding.

Instructive on this matter is Carbonilla v. Abiera,[23] which reads thus:

 Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled
to its possession. However, the owner cannot simply wrest possession
thereof from whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover
possession, he must resort to the proper judicial remedy and, once he
chooses what action to file, he is required to satisfy the conditions
necessary for such action to prosper.
In the present case, petitioner opted to file an ejectment case
against respondents. Ejectment casesforcible entry and unlawful
detainerare summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious
means to protect actual possession or the right to possession of the
property involved. The only question that the courts resolve in ejectment
proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession de
jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the property is
questionable. For this reason, an ejectment case will not necessarily
be decided in favor of one who has presented proof of ownership of
the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the
particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and
sufficiently proven.
The statements in the complaint that respondents possession of the
building was by mere tolerance of petitioner clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves the persons withholding
from another of the possession of the real property to which the latter is
entitled, after the expiration or termination of the formers right to hold
possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.
A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case
is that possession must be originally lawful, and such possession must
have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess. It
must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis
of such lawful possession must be established. If, as in this case, the
claim is that such possession is by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the
acts of tolerance must be proved. (Emphasis supplied.)

In this case, petitioner has not proven that respondents continued possession
of the subject properties was by mere tolerance of his father, except by a mere
allegation thereof. In fact, petitioner has not established when respondents
possession of the properties became unlawful a requisite for a valid cause of action
in an unlawful detainer case.
 In Canlas v. Tubil,[24] we enumerated the elements that constitute the
sufficiency of a complaint for unlawful detainer, as follows:
Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as
well as the court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations
in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such
statement of facts as to bring the party clearly within the class of cases
for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are
summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real

property from one who illegally withholds possession after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The possession of the defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or
termination of the right to possess.

An unlawful detainer proceeding is summary in nature,

jurisdiction of which lies in the proper municipal trial court or
metropolitan trial court. The action must be brought within one year
from the date of last demand and the issue in said case is the right to
physical possession.
... ... ...
In Cabrera v. Getaruela, the Court held that a complaint sufficiently
alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by

contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;

(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by

plaintiff to defendant of the termination of the latters right of
possession;

(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the

property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof;
and

(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate
the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for
ejectment.
 Based on the above, it is obvious that petitioner has not complied with the
requirements sufficient to warrant the success of his unlawful detainer Complaint
against respondents. The lower courts and the CA have consistently upheld the
entitlement of respondents to continued possession of the subject properties, since
their possession has been established as one in the concept of ownership. Thus, the
courts correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case of petitioner.

We concur in the appellate courts findings that petitioners father engaged in

a double sale of the disputed properties. The records of the case show that it took
petitioner more or less five years from 1971 when he acquired the property from
his father to 1976 when petitioner registered the conveyance and caused the
issuance of the land title registered in his name under the Torrens system.
Respondents, on the other hand, continued their possession of the properties, but
without bothering to register them or to initiate any action to fortify their
ownership.

We cannot, however, sustain the appellate courts conclusion that petitioner's

failure to initiate any action to annul the sale to respondents and oust them from
the disputed properties had the effect of registration of respondents unregistered
Deed of Absolute Sale. We held thus in Ruiz, Sr. v. Court of Appeals [25]:

(But) where a party has knowledge of a prior existing interest

which is unregistered at that time he acquired a right to the same
land, his knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect
of registration as to him. Knowledge of an unregistered sale is
equivalent to registration. As held in Fernandez v. Court of Appeals [189
SCRA 780 (1990)],

Section 50 of Act No. 496 (now Sec. 51 of P.D.

1529), provides that the registration of the deed is the
operative act to bind or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned. But where the party has knowledge
of a prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time
he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that
prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to
him. The Torrens system cannot be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud (Gustillo v. Maravilla, 48 Phil. 442).
[Emphasis supplied.]
 In this case, the Quitclaim executed by the elder Corpuz in favor of
petitioner was executed ahead of the Deed of Sale of respondents. Thus, the sale of
the subject properties by petitioners father to respondents cannot be considered as
a prior interest at the time that petitioner came to know of the transaction.

We also note that, based on the records, respondents do not dispute the existence
of TCT No. T-12980 registered in the name of petitioner. They allege, though, that
the land title issued to him was an act of fraud [26] on his part. We find this
argument to be equivalent to a collateral attack against the Torrens title of
petitioner an attack we cannot allow in the instant unlawful detainer case.

It is settled in jurisprudence that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be the

subject of collateral attack.[27] Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding.[28] It is a well-established doctrine that the title represented by the
certificate cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged, or diminished in a
collateral proceeding.[29]Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein
the sole issue to be decided is possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a
collateral attack by herein respondents on petitioner's title is proscribed.

Our ruling in the present case is only to resolve the issue of who has the
better right to possession in relation to the issue of disputed ownership of the
subject properties. Questions as to the validity of petitioner's Torrens title can be
ventilated in a proper suit instituted to directly attack its validity, an issue that we
cannot resolve definitively in this unlawful detainer case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we deny the instant Petition for

lack of merit. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90645
(dated January 08, 2008), of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil Case
No. 3111-13293-65, as well as of the Municipal Trial Court of Laoag City in Civil
Case No. 3111 -- all dismissing the unlawful detainer case of petitioner
are AFFIRMED.

We make no pronouncements as to attorney's fees for lack of evidence.

SO ORDERED.
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES MANUEL AND G.R. No. 170575

FLORENTINA DEL ROSARIO,
Petitioners,

Present:

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - VELASCO, JR.,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

DEL CASTILLO, and

PEREZ, JJ.

GERRY ROXAS FOUNDATION, INC.,

Promulgated:
 Respondent. June 8, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for are the determinants
of the nature of the action[1] and of which court has jurisdiction over the action.[2]

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 26, 2005 Decision[3] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87784 which dismissed the Petition for Review
before it.Also assailed is the CA Resolution[4] dated November 15, 2005 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

The controversy between petitioners Manuel and Florentina Del Rosario

and respondent Gerry Roxas Foundation Inc. emanated from a Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer filed by the former against the latter, the surrounding circumstances relative
thereto as summarized by the CA in its assailed Decision are as follows:

The petitioner Manuel del Rosario appears to be the registered owner

of Lot 3-A of Psd-301974 located in Roxas City which is described in and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397 of the Registry of Deeds
for the City of Roxas.
 Sometime in 1991, the respondent, as a legitimate foundation, took
possession and occupancy of said land by virtue of a memorandum of
agreement entered into by and between it and the City of Roxas. Its
possession and occupancy of said land is in the character of being lessee
thereof.

In February and March 2003, the petitioners served notices upon the
respondent to vacate the premises of said land. The respondent did not heed
such notices because it still has the legal right to continue its possession and
occupancy of said land.[5]

On July 7, 2003, petitioners filed a Complaint[6] for Unlawful Detainer against the
respondent before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Roxas City, docketed as
Civil Case No. V-2391. Said complaint contains, among others, the following significant
allegations:

3. Plaintiffs are the true, absolute and registered owner[s] of a parcel

of land, situated at Dayao, Roxas City and covered by and described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18397 issued to the plaintiffs by the Register
of Deeds for Roxas City as evidenced by a xerox copy thereof which is hereto
attached as Annex A.

4. Sometime in 1991, without the consent and authority of the

plaintiffs, defendant took full control and possession of the subject property,
developed the same and use[d] it for commercial purposes.

xxxx
 7. Plaintiffs have allowed the defendant for several years, to make use
of the land without any contractual or legal basis. Hence, defendants
possession of the subject property is only by tolerance.

8. But [plaintiffs] patience has come to its limits. Hence, sometime in

the last quarter of 2002, plaintiffs made several demands upon said
defendant to settle and/or pay rentals for the use of the property.

xxxx

10. Notwithstanding receipt of the demand letters, defendant failed

and refused, as it continues to fail and refuse to pay reasonable monthly
rentals for the use and occupancy of the land, and to vacate the subject
premises despite the lapse of the fifteen-day period specified in the said
demand letters. Consequently, defendant is unlawfully withholding
possession of the subject property from the plaintiffs, who are the owners
thereof.[7]

Upon service of summons, respondent filed its Answer[8] dated July 31, 2003
where it averred that:

3. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 4 of

the Complaint to the effect that the defendant took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and has been using
the premises in accordance with its agreements with the City of Roxas and
the purposes of the defendant corporation without any objection or
opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over twenty-two long
years; the defendant specifically DENIES the allegations contained in the last
part of this paragraph 4 of the Complaint that the defendant has used the
property leased for commercial purposes, the truth of the matter being that
the defendant has used and [is] still using the property only for civic non-
profit endeavors hewing closely to purposes of the defendant Gerry Roxas
Foundation Inc., inter alia, devoted to general welfare, protection, and
upliftment of the people of Roxas City, Capiz, and in Panay Island, and
elsewhere in the Philippines; that the Foundation has spent out of its own
funds for the compliance of its avowed aims and purposes, up to the present,
more than P25M, and that all the improvements, including a beautiful
auditorium built in the leased premises of the Foundation shall accrue to the
CITY (of Roxas), free from any compensation whatsoever, upon the
expiration of this Lease (Memorandum of Agreement, Annex 2 hereof),
eighteen (18) years hence;

xxxx

5. The defendant specifically DENIES the allegations set forth in

paragraph 7 of the Complaint, the truth being that the defendant took
possession of the subject property by virtue of Memorandums of Agreement,
photo-copies of which are hereto attached as Annexes 1 and 2 and made
integral parts hereof, entered into by defendant and the City of Roxas, which
is the true and lawful owner thereof; thus, the possession of the subject
property by the defendant foundation is lawful, being a lessee thereof;

xxxx

8. The defendant ADMITS the allegations set forth in paragraph 10 of

the Complaint that defendant refused to pay monthly rental to the plaintiffs
and to vacate the premises, but specifically DENIES the rest of the allegations
thereof, the truth being that defendant has no obligation whatsoever, to the
plaintiffs, as they are neither the owners or lessors of the land occupied by
defendant;

xxxx

As and by way of

AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

The defendant repleads the foregoing allegations, and avers further

that:

12. The plaintiffs have no cause of action against defendant.

The leased property does not belong to the plaintiffs. The property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18397, [is] occupied by the
[defendant] as [lessee] of the City of Roxas since 1991, the latter having
acquired it by purchase from the plaintiffs way back on February 19, 1981, as
evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale which is hereto attached as Annex 3
and made an integral part hereof. While, admittedly, the said certificate of
title is still in the name of the plaintiffs, nevertheless, the ownership of the
property covered therein has already transferred to the City of Roxas upon its
delivery to it. Article 1496 of the Civil Code provides that, ownership of the
thing sold is acquired by the vendee from the moment it is delivered to him in
any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner
 signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred from the vendor to
the vendee. It is also provided under Article 1498 of the Civil Code that, when
the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing, which is the object of the contract, if
from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. Upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale (Annex 3), the
plaintiffs have relinquished ownership of the property subject thereof in
favor of the vendee, City of Roxas. Necessarily, the possession of the property
subject of the said Deed of Absolute Sale now pertains to the City
of Roxas and the plaintiffs have no more right, whatsoever, to the possession
of the same. It is defendant foundation by virtue of the Memorandums of
Agreement (Annexes 1 and 2 hereof), which has the legal right to have
possession of the subject property;[9]

After the MTCC issued an Order setting the case for preliminary conference,
respondent filed on October 20, 2003 a Motion to Resolve its Defenses on Forum
Shopping and Lack of Cause of Action. Records show that before the instant case was
filed, the City of Roxas had already filed a case against petitioners for Surrender of
Withheld Duplicate Certificate Under Section 107, [Presidential Decree No.] 1529
docketed as Special Case No. SPL-020-03 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Roxas City. Subsequently, on October 27, 2003, petitioners filed their Opposition to
the said Motion.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

On November 24, 2003, the MTCC issued an Order[10] resolving the respondents
Motion. In the said Order, the MTCC held that:

The plaintiffs [have] no cause of action against herein defendant. The

defendant is the lessee of the City of Roxas of the parcel of land in
question. There has been no previous contractual relationship between the
plaintiffs Del Rosarios and the defendant Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc.
affecting the title of the land leased by the [Gerry] Roxas Foundation. The
Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. has not unlawfully withheld the possession of
the land it is leasing from its lessor. Its right to the physical possession of the
land leased by it from the City of Roxas subsists and continues to subsist until
the termination of the contract of lease according to its terms and pursuant
to law.

The defendant had presented as its main defense that the property
was already sold by the plaintiffs to the present lessor of the property, the
City of Roxas thru a Deed of Absolute Sale dated February 19, 1981 executed
by herein [plaintiff] spouses as vendors.

Plaintiffs had not directly and specifically shown that the purported
Deed of Absolute Sale does not exist; rather, they contend that said
document is merely defective. They had not even denied the signatories to
the said Contract of Sale; specifically the authenticity of the spouses-plaintiffs
signatures; all that plaintiffs did merely referred to it as null and void and
highly questionable without any specifications.

When the parties pleadings fail to tender any issue of fact, either
because all the factual allegations have been admitted expressly or impliedly;
as when a denial is a general denial; there is no need of conducting a trial,
since there is no need of presenting evidence anymore. The case is then ripe
for judicial determination, either through a judgment on the pleadings (Rules
of Court, Rule 34) or by summary judgment under Rule 35, Rules of Court.

In the instant case, plaintiffs alleged that sometime in 1991, without

the consent and authority of the plaintiffs, defendant took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and use[d] it for
commercial purposes. x x x for so many years, plaintiffs patiently waited for
someone to make representation to them regarding the use of the subject
property, but the same never happened.Plaintiff[s] have allowed the
defendant for several years, to make use of the land without any contractual
or legal basis. Hence, defendants possession of the subject property is only by
tolerance.

xxxx

Defendant admits the allegations of the plaintiffs that the defendant

took full control and possession of the subject property, developed the same
and has been using the premises in accordance with its agreements with the
City of Roxas and the purposes of the defendant corporation without any
objection or opposition of any kind on the part of the plaintiffs for over
twenty-two long years.

That the defendants possession of the subject property is by virtue of

a contract of lease entered into by the defendant foundation with the City of
Roxas which is the true and lawful owner, the latter having acquired said
property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale as early as February 19, 1981,
long before the defendant foundations occupation of the property. In Alcos v.
IAC 162 SCRA 823 (1988), Buyers immediate possession and occupation of
the property was deemed corroborative of the truthfulness and authenticity
of the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, although this Court finds the defense on forum

shopping interposed by the defendant to be untenable and unmeritorious,
and hence, denied; this Court still finds the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs-
 spouses to be without a cause of action and hence, dismisses this instant
complaint. With cost against the plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.[11]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On appeal, the RTC of Roxas City, Branch 17 rendered a Decision[12] dated July 9, 2004
affirming the MTCC Order.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Review. However, the CA, in
a Decision[13] dated April 26, 2005, dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed
Decision of the RTC.

Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration[14] which was, however,

denied in a Resolution[15] dated November 15, 2005.

Issues

Still undaunted, petitioners now come to this Court on a Petition for Review
on Certiorari raising the following issues:
 I. Whether x x x in determining if there is a case for unlawful detainer, a court
should limit itself in interpreting a single phrase/allegation in the
complaint; and,

II. Whether x x x there exists an unlawful detainer in this case.[16]

Our Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

The allegations in petitioners Complaint

constitute judicial admissions.

Petitioners alleged in their Complaint before the MTCC, among others, that: (1)
sometime in 1991, without their consent and authority, respondent took full control and
possession of the subject property, developed the same and used it for commercial
purposes; and (2) they allowed the respondent for several years, to make use of the land
without any contractual or legal basis. Petitioners thus conclude that respondents
possession of subject property is only by tolerance.

Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. x x x

A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial

as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary to dispense with
some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with.[17] Correspondingly,
facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon
him.[18] The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive
as against the pleader.[19]

In this case, petitioners judicially admitted that respondents took control and
possession of subject property without their consent and authority and that respondents
use of the land was without any contractual or legal basis.

Nature of the action is determined by the

judicial admissions in the Complaint.

In Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo,[20] citing Caiza v. Court of

Appeals,[21] this Court held that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
court has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the
relief sought.

This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals,[22] differentiated the distinct causes of

action in forcible entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit:

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue
is who has the prior possession de facto. In unlawful detainer, possession was originally
lawful but became unlawful by the expiration or termination of the right to possess and
the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the
party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause of action is the termination of the
defendant's right to continue in possession.[23]

The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall include every
situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property
and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom.[24] The foundation of the
action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has
entered without right.[25]

The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom
necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all that is
necessary.[26] The employment of force, in this case, can be deduced from petitioners
allegation that respondent took full control and possession of the subject property without
their consent and authority.

Stealth, on the other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid
discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without
permission,[27]while strategy connotes the employment of machinations or artifices to
gain possession of the subject property.[28] The CA found that based on the petitioners
allegations in their complaint, respondents entry on the land of the petitioners was by
stealth x x x.[29] However, stealth as defined requires a clandestine character which is not
availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into the property appears to be
with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitioners allegation in their
complaint that [c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendant foundation and
considering further that it is plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor, and now the Mayor
of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal or contractual
right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with the activities of
the foundation using their property.[30] To this Courts mind, this allegation if true, also
illustrates strategy.

Taken in its entirety, the allegations in the

Complaint establish a cause of action for
forcible entry, and not for unlawful detainer.

In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of any land or building by

means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.[31] [W]here the defendants
possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the summary action for forcible entry
(detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession.[32]

In their Complaint, petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and
control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis.[33] Assuming that
these allegations are true, it hence follows that respondents possession was illegal from
the very beginning. Therefore, the foundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible
entry that is the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who has entered
without right.[34] Thus, and as correctly found by the CA, there can be no tolerance as
petitioners alleged that respondents possession was illegal at the inception.[35]

Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as alleged in

petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, this
Court finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible
Entry and not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.

Petitioners should have filed a Complaint for

Forcible Entry within the reglementary one-
year period from the time of dispossession.

Petitioners likewise alleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and
occupancy of subject property in 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must
be filed within one year from the time of dispossession,[36] the action for forcible entry
has already prescribed when petitioners filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence,
the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action against the respondent.

In fine, the MTCC properly dismissed the Complaint, and the RTC and the CA
correctly affirmed said order of dismissal.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated April 26, 2005 and
the Resolution dated November 15, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
87784 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice