COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

Professor: Atty. Norman Clarence Lasam
(FROM VOIDABLE MARRIAGES UP TO RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF HUSBAND AND WIFE)
LAW 1A, 1ST SEM, AY 2018-2019

“Coming together is the beginning.

Keeping together is progress.
Working together is success.”

-Henry Ford
NO. CASE TITLE PERSON ASSIGNED
1 Katipunan v. Tenorio, 38 OG 172, 1937 Gabilo, Christian Jay
2 Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760, 1998 Tolentino, Angelica
3 Teves v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180363, 2009 Luyun, Nicole
4 Buccat v. Buccat, G.R. No. 47101, 1941 Acacio, Mark
5 Aquino v. Delizo, 109 Phil 21, 1960 Pingad, Rezy
6 Anaya v. Palaroan, 36 SCRA 97, 1970 Pamittan, Rachel
7 Ruiz v. Atienza, 40 OG 1903, 1941 Dela Cruz, Jackie Mark
8 Sarao v. Guevara, 40 OG 15 Supp 263, 1940 Bassig, Margarita
9 Jimenez v. Republic, 109 Phil 273, 1960 Caranguian, Romeo
10 Tsoi v. CA, supra Angeles, Ceslhee
11 Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937) Serrano, Justine
12 SSS v. Jarque, G.R. No. 165545, March 26, 2006 Dela Cruz, Carl Mark
13 Valdez v. Republic, G.R. No. 189863, 2009 Eboy, Apolinario
14 Republic v. Granada, G.R. No. 187512, 2012 Bangayan, Cristy
15 Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, 2016 Garcellano, Honey
16 Yu v. Yu, 484 SCRA 485 (2006) Guittu, Mark
17 Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998) Pingad, Rezy
18 Munoz v. Del Barrio, 51 OG 5217 (1955) Go, Shahanie
19 Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong, 505 SCRA 76 (2006) Manuel, Jessa
20 People v. Zapata and Bondoc, 88 Phil 688 (1951) Garcellano, Honey
21 Gandionco v. Penaranda, 155 SCRA 725 (1987) Constantino, Camille
22 Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz, 22 SCRA 333 (1968) Dela Cruz, Jackie Mark
23 Lapuz v. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177 (1972) Bassig, Margarita
24 Ocampo v. Florenciano, 107 Phil 35 (1960) Iringan, Michael
25 Bugayong v. Ginez, 100 Phil 616 (1956) Cardenas, Renier
26 Matubis v. Praxedes, 109 Phil 789 (1960) Ignacio, Grachel
27 People v. Sensano and Ramos, 58 Phil 73 (1933) Aguedan, Jazmin
28 Llave v. Republic, G.R. No. 169766, 2011 Bunagan, Kristel
29 Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil 168, 1957 Agbayani, Redentor
30 Contreras v. Macaraig, 33 SCRA 222 (1970) Bunagan, Kristel
31 Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr, 46 SCRA 110 (1972) Palatan, Roselyn
32 De La Vina v. Villareal, 41 Phil 13 (1920) Guittu, Mark
33 Reyes v. Ines-Luciano, 88 SCRA 803 (1979) Go, Shahanie
34 Banez v. Banez, 374 SCRA 340 (2002) Constantino, Camille
35 Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, 2012 Angeles, Ceslhee
36 Matute v. Macadaeg, 99 Phil 340 (1956) Manuel, Jessa
37 Laperal v. Republic, 6 SCRA 357 (1962) Balubal, Joy
38 Arroyo v. Vasquez-Arroyo, G.R. No. L-17014 (1921) Bangayan, Cristy
39 Lacson v. San Jose, G.R. No. L-23482 (1968) Luyun, Nicole
40 Estrada v. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1 (2006) Lucena, Gerard
41 Banaag v. Espeleta, A.M. No. P-11-2011 (2011) Lucena, Gerard
42 Santos, Sr. v. CA, G.R. No. 113504 (1995) Agatep, Ron-ron
43 Sy v. CA, G.R. No. 124518 (2007) Serrano, Justine
44 Perez v. CA, 255 SCRA 661 (1996) Cardenas, Renier
45 Salientes v. Abanilla, G.R. No. 162734 (2006) Malsi, Sarah
46 Techavez v. Escano, 17 SCRA 674 (1966) Apostol, Corina
47 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 139 SCRA 139 (1985) Dadhwal, Raamah
48 Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116 (1989) Dumocloy, Jesa
49 Republic v. Obrecido, 472 SCRA 114 (2005) Aguedan, Jazmin
50 Quita v. Dandan, 300 SCRA 406 (1998) Llanto, Karl
51 Llorente v. CA, 345 SCRA 592 (2000) Pamittan, Lawrence
52 Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001) Eboy, Apolinario
53 Corpuz v. Sto Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010) Soriano, Lerma
54 Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049 (2013) Palatan, Roselyn
55 Medina v. Koike, G.R. No. 215723 (2016) Balubal, Joy
56 Yasin v. Sharia District Court, 241 SCRA 606 (1995) Santos, Laurean
57 Garcia v. Santiago, supra Pallay, Realyn
58 Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil 252 (1916) Galamgam, Ruchelle
59 People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495 (2014) Aragon, Celine
60 Garcia v. Drilon and Jaype-Garcia, G.R. No. 179267 (2013) Ignacio, Grachel
61 Go-Tan v. Tan, G.R. No. 168852 (2008) Pallay, Realyn
62 Pelayo v. Lauron, 12 Phil 453 (1909) Mamauag, Mitz Anne
 CASE NO. 1
KATIPUNAN vs. TENORIO
38 OG 172
September 29, 1973

FACTS:
On October 12, 1934, Marcos Katipunan (plaintiff) brought an action to the CFI of
Manila against Rita Tenorio (defendant), praying for the annulment of their marriage, on
the ground that the latter was not of sound mind when he married her.

In the case at bar, the plaintiff alleged that he was not aware of the defendant’s
insanity at the time of the marriage and such only became apparent after the celebration of
the marriage. The defendant, however, denied the plaintiff’s claim and alleged that she was
mentally sound when she married the plaintiff and she did so freely and voluntarily.

More so, both the plaintiff and the defendant had been living together as husband
and wife since their marriage in 1919 until 1926 when the defendant, after her 4th delivery
of birth, had so severe an attack of madness to warrant hospitalization until declared
incurable.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the defendant was mentally sound at the time of her marriage.
2. Whether or not being diagnosed as having unsound mind after the marriage can
be a ground for annulment.

HELD:
1. Yes, the defendant is presumed to be of sound mind at time of her marriage. It is of
legal principle that all men are presumed to be sane and normal and subject to be
moved by substantially the same motive. The burden to prove an allegation of
insanity is on the person making it. Correspondingly, once insanity has existed, it is
sought to be proved that a subsequent act of its subject was done in a lucid interval.
In the case at bar, the (1) admittance of plaintiff that during the nuptial
ceremony, he did not have the least suspicion that his bride was suffering from
insanity and (2) coupled with the witness’ testimony indubitably show that at the
time the defendant married the plaintiff, she was mentally sound.

2. No, being diagnosed as having unsound mind after the marriage does not
constitute a cause for nullity. Article 45 of the Family Code specifically requires that
the grounds/causes of annulment be existing at the of the marriage.

PREPARED BY: GABILO, CHRISTIAN JAY

 CASE NO. 2

SUNTAY V. COJUANCO-SUNTAY
G.R. No. 132524
December 29, 1998
FACTS:
On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel CojuancoSuntay got married at
the Portuguese Colony of Macao. After 4 years, their marriage got sour that in 1962, Isabel
filed a criminal case allegedly for parricide against her husband before the Court of First
Instance (CFI). In retaliation, Emilio filed a Complaint for Legal Separation on the ground of
Isabel’s infidelity and praying for the custody of their children.
From February to December 1965, Emilio was confined in the Veterans Memorial
Hospital. Although, during the trial of the criminal case against him, he was already out, he
remains under observation and treatment. According to Dr. Aramil, Emilio suffers from
schizophrenia.
On October 3, 1967, the trial court rendered a decision declaring their marriage null
and void but made no pronouncement as to the custody of the children.
Petitioner maintains that since the marriage between Respondent’s parents is void,
she is an illegitimate child, thus, she has no right nor interest in her grandmother’s estate.
On the other hand, it is the contention of the Respondent that in an action for annulment of
a marriage, the court either sustains the validity of marriage or nullifies it and that the
status of the marriage under Art. 85 before the declaration of nullity is only “voidable.”
ISSUE: Whether or not, the marriage between Respondent’s parents is void.
HELD: The Supreme Court held that a reading of the pertinent portions of the decision of
the CFI would lead to the conclusion that their marriage is only voidable. Article 85 of the
Civil Code which provides that a marriage may be annulled when at the time of the
marriage, either of the parties is of unsound mind, unless, after coming into reason, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife.Giving weight and credence to the opinion of
Dr. Aramil, the CFI found Emilio to be one suffering from schizophrenia. Furthermore, it is
also his opinion that even though the plaintiff has shown progress, he remains bereft of
understanding of right and wrong.Furthermore, findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling
shows that he really lives more in fancy that in realitywhich is a strong indication of
schizophrenia.
ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT NOTES:
Distinction between Void and Voidable marriage:
A VOID marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. AVOIDABLE marriage
is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of
a competent court in an action for annulment.
Essential Requisites to avail Certiorari as Special Civil Action:
(a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess or
jurisdiction; and
(b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.

PREPARED BY: TOLENTINO, ANGELICA C.

 CASE NO. 3
TEVES VS COMELEC
G.R. NO. 180363
APRIL 28, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd legislative
district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On March 30, 2007,
respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to disqualify2 petitioner on the ground that
in Teves v. Sandiganbayan,3 he was convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that
petitioner is disqualified from running for public office because he was convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office.4
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner’s violation of Section 3(h), R.A. No. 3019 involves moral
turpitude
RULING
No. The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the
issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation
Center is "not well-founded." This it based, and rightly so, on the additional finding that
only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in
the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1
January 1992, it is the Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the
establishment, operation, and maintenance of cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the
Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken
part in his official capacity in the issuance of a cockpit license during the material time, as
alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the Sangguniang Bayan.16
Thus, petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or power to
gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did he intentionally hide his
interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the management thereof to his wife
considering that the said transfer occurred before the effectivity of the present LGC
prohibiting possession of such interest. The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum
to a lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s violation was
not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals but due to his lack of
awareness or ignorance of the prohibition. Suffice it to state that cockfighting, or sabong in
the local parlance, has a long and storied tradition in our culture and was prevalent even
during the Spanish occupation.19 While it is a form of gambling, the morality thereof or the
wisdom in legalizing it is not a justiciable issue.

PREPARED BY: LUYUN, NICOLE

 CASE NO: 4
BUCCAT vs. BUCCAT
G.R. No. 47101
April 25, 1941

FACTS:
Godofredo Buccat (plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon De Buccat (defendant) met on
March 1938 and got engaged on September 19 of that same year. They got married on
November 26, 1938 in Baguio City. On the 89th day of their marriage on February 23, 1939,
the defendant gave birth to a child. The plaintiff left the defendant and filed a request for
annulment of their marriage on the grounds of fraud by assuring the plaintiff that she was
still a virgin which made him agreed to marry her. The lower court ruled in favor of the
defendant. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
WON the act of the defendant constitutes fraud and concealment to be a ground for
annulment of their marriage?

HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It is unlikely that the plaintiff, a
first-year law student, would not notice the state of the defendant’s body given the fact that
during their marriage, she was already on the advance state of pregnancy where in all
manifestations of the said condition may already occur. In this case, the court finds no
proof that there was a fraudulent act on the part of the defendant that may become a
ground for the annulment of their marriage. Marriage is a very sacred institution. To cancel
it, clear and reliable evidence is necessary.

PREPARED BY: ACACIO, MARC ROYGINALDI B.

 CASE NO: 5
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, vs.CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
L-15853
July 27, 1960
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud
against ConchitaDelizo, alleging that at the date of their marriage on December 1954, the
respondent concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man. Sometime in April
1955, about four months after their marriage, respondent gave birth to a child. During the
trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent collusion.
Only the petitioner testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed
by the CA thus a petition for certiorari to review decisions.
ISSUES:
WON concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the petitioner constitutes as fraud and
sufficient basis for annulment of marriage.
RULING:
Since the respondent was naturally plump, the petitioner could not have known that
the former was pregnant at the time of marriage. Based on medical opinion, the
enlargement of a woman’s abdomen only becomes apparent on the sixth month of
pregnancy. Evidences presented: Affidavit of Cesar Aquino who admitted as the father of
the respondent’s first born and the petitioner’s brother, birth cert of the child showing it
was born within 180 days after the date of marriage.
The court ruled that the concealment of the respondent of the fact that she was pregnant at
the time of the marriage with another man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of marriage.
The court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
Related Provisions:
Art 46 par 2 of Family Code
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband;

PREPARED BY: PINGAD, REZY JOY

 CASE NO: 6

Anaya vs. Palaroan

L-27930 36 SCRA 97

FACTS:
Aurora and defendant Fernando were married on 4 December 1953. Defendant Fernando
filed an action for annulment of the marriage on 7 January 1954 on the ground that his
consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Complaint was dismissed upholding
the validity of the marriage and grants Aurora's counterclaim.

Par IV: While the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated "to settle the
judgment," Fernando had divulged to Aurora that several months prior to their marriage he
had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. The Plaintiff herein from going
thru the marriage that was solemnized between them constituted 'FRAUD' in obtaining her
consent. She prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral damages.

Defendant denied the allegation in paragraph IV of the complaint and denied having had
pre-marital relationship with a close relative. He averred that under no circumstance
would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the day
following their marriage on 4 December 1953, that he denied having committed any fraud
against her.

He counterclaimed for damages for the malicious filing of the suit. Defendant Fernando did
not pray for the dismissal of the complaint but for its dismissal "with respect to the alleged
moral damages."

Plaintiff Aurora filed a reply with answer to the counterclaim, wherein she alleged:

That prior to their marriage, he paid court to her, and pretended to shower her with love
and affection. That he contracted the marriage for the reason intimated by him, and not
because he loved her, he secretly intended from the very beginning not to perform the
marital duties and obligationand made up his mind not to live with her; and that the
foregoing intentions intimated by him were prematurely concretized for him.

Failing in its attempt to have the parties reconciled, the court set the case for trial on 26
August 1966 but it was postponed. Thereafter, while reviewing the expendiente, the court
realized that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her
marriage, and, on the authority of Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168.

Court issued an order, dated 7 October 1966, for the dismissal of the complaint; it also
denied reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital

relationship with another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

2. Did the lower court erredin ignoring the allegations of the plaintiff’s reply?

RULING:

1. No. The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman was
not one of those enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph providing that “No other misrepresentation or
deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage”.(Article 85 par 4 of Civil Code and Article
86)

Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not warrant an
annulment of marriage.

2. No. his second set of averments which were made in the reply is an entirely new and
additional "cause of action." According to the plaintiff herself, the second set of allegations
is "apart, distinct and separate from that earlier averred in the Complaint. Said allegations
were, therefore, improperly alleged in the reply, because if in a reply a party-plaintiff is not
permitted to amend or change the cause of action as set forth in his complaint (Calo vs.
Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). There is more reason not to allow such party to allege a new and
additional cause of action in the reply. Otherwise, the series of pleadings of the parties
could become interminable.

On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is enough to point out that any secret intention
on the husband's part not to perform his marital duties must have been discovered by the
wife soon after the marriage: hence her action for annulment based on that fraud should
have been brought within four years after the marriage. Since appellant's wedding was
celebrated in December of 1953, and this ground was only pleaded in 1966, it must be
declared already barred. Appealed order is hereby affirmed. No costs.

PREPARED BY: PAMITTAN, RACHEL

 CASE NO. 7
Ruiz vs. Atienza
G.R. No. 5986
March 18, 1941

FACTS:
This case is an appeal from a decision of the Manila Court of Instance denying a
plaintiff’s demand for the annulment of his marriage with defendant contracted on
November 15, 1938, with all the outward legal formalities.
Previous to February 1938, Pelagia Atienza had a sexual intercourse with her
sweetheart Jose Ruiz which led to her as an unmarried mother. Her father Jose Atienza and
a lawyer cousin-in-law named Atty. Villavicencio along with three others convinced Ruiz to
marry Pelagia.
With his cousin, he went with Jose and companions to Pelagia’s residence for a party
then they went to the Aglipayan Church, proceeded to secure a marriage license, and went
back to the church for the wedding celebration.
Four days later, he alleged he had been forced into wedlock saying he was
“convinced” to marry her due to (1) her father’s threat supported by his “balisong”; (2) the
unveiled intimidation of the lawyer that he would have difficulty taking the Bar as he said
many have been rejected admission to bar due to immorality; and (3) the assurance by the
lawyer that he would be physically safe if he would go with them.

ISSUE: Whether or not a man who married under the threat to obstruct his admission to
the Bar by filing charges immorality charges against him can demand the annulment of his
marriage?

HELD: No.
First, Ruiz hasn’t sufficiently established that Atienza had a balisong but only a one-
and-a-half-inch knife was found in his possession by the policemen.
Second, The threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar by filing criminal charges
against him is not a duress as to constitute a reason for nullifying a marriage.
Third, the lawyer’s pronouncements that he would not be safe if he did not follow
them was intended to eliminate his fear that he might be harmed in retaliation for the
dishonor inflicted upon her family.
Fourth, he had many occasions to escape as he had companions in the house whom
he could have asked for help, there were even policemen.
The Court presumes strongly the validity of marriage once the formal ceremonies
have been completed. The provisions under sec 30, Act No. 3613 of the Marriage Law
referring to “force” or “violence” does not seem to include mere intimidation, at least where
it does not in legal effect amount to force or violation.
The Court upheld the judge’s conclusion of fact that neither violence nor duress
attended the wedding celebration.

Judgment affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

PREPARED BY: DELA CRUZ, JACKIE MARK

 CASE NO.: 8
Sarao v. Guevara
40 OG 15 Supp 263
1940
FACTS:
On the same day the plaintiff and defendant got married, plaintiff tried to have
carnal knowledge of defendant. Guevara complained of pains in her private part later that night
although Sarao found the orifice of his wife’s vagina sufficiently large for his organ. Because
she always complained of pains in her genital organs, every Sarao’s attempt to have carnal access to
his wife proved to be useless.
Due to the presence of a tumor and upon the advice of a physician, Guevara’s uterus
and ovaries were removed with the consent of his husband. The removal of said organs
made the defendant incapable of procreation. Plaintiff declared that from the time he witnessed the
operation, he lost all the desire to have access with his wife and thus filed this complaint for annulment of
marriage on the ground of impotency.

ISSUE
1. WON their marriage can be annulled on the ground of physical impotency

RULING
1. NO.
Impotency, as ground for annulment is not the inability to procreate but the inability to copulate.
Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase ‘physically incapable of entering into the married
state’ as with the capacity to procreate. Defect must be one of copulation and not
of reproduction. Bareness will not invalidate the marriage.
The removal of the organs rendered her sterile but it by no means made her unfit for sexual
intercourse. It would appear that it was the memory of this first unpleasant experience with her that made
him gave up the idea of having carnal knowledge of her. Defendant was not impotent at the time
she married the plaintiff for the existence of tumor did not necessarily render her incapable of
copulation. Plaintiff also contends that his consent of the marriage was procured through fraud in that
the defendant did not reveal to him that she was afflicted with a disease in her sex organs. According to the
Court, this contention in untenable since fraud is not alleged in the complaint and has not
been proved at the trial.
Wherefore, petition denied.

PREPARED BY: BASSIG, MARGARITA

 CASE NO. 9
JIMENEZ V. REPUBLIC
G.R NO. L-12790
August 31, 1960
FACTS:
 Plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 upon the ground that the orifice
of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ or
penis for copulation;
 The condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and
one day after they had been married.
 On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and served with a copy of the complaint.
She did not file an answer.
 On 29 September 1956, pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the
Court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was
collusion between the parties and, if there was no collusion, to intervene for the
State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or
fabricated.
 On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant to submit
to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her physical
capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the order, a
medical certificate on the result thereof.
 On 14 March 1957 the defendant was granted additional five days from notice to
comply with the order of 17 December 1956 with warning that her failure to
undergo medical examination and submit the required doctor’s certificate would be
deemed lack of interest on her part in the case and that judgment upon the evidence
presented by her husband would be rendered.
 After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court
entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant;
 On 26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree
thus entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant’s impotency has
not been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been
physically examined because she had refused to be so examined; that instead of
annulling the marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court
and compelled her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical
certificate; and that the decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to
married couples, who want to end their marriage to collude or connive with each
other by just alleging impotency of one of them.

ISSUE:
 WON the marriage in question may be annulled on the strength only of the lone
testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that his wife was and is
impotent.

HELD
 No. "Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The
presumption is in favor of potency."
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.
 The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties. The
law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established.
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.

PREPARED BY: ROMEO G. CARANGUIAN, JR.

 CASE NO: 10
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, supra
G.R. No. 119190
January 16, 1997
FACTS:
This is a case for the declaration of nullity of marriage. Gina Lao-Tsoi (the
wife) filed the petition against her husbandin the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial
Court's decision on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.
The wife claims that her husband, Chi Ming Tsoi,was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations.She claimed that his failure to do
the deed during their ten (10) months of being husband and wife is due to the fact
that he was probably impotent. To refute her claim, he submitted himself to physical
examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of
finding out whether he is impotent. As a result, thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his
Doctor’s Medical Report. It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency
and he is capable of erection. In fact, Dr. Alteza found out that from the original size
of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, his penis lengthened by one (1) inch and
one centimeter (soft erection). ||But, still is capable of further erection, and that
with his soft erection, he is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
ISSUE(S):
(I) WONthe marriage between the parties should be declared null and void on
the ground of psychological incapacity

RULING:
YES. In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that refusal of one party to consummate
the marriage is a sign of psychological incapacity and hence, a ground for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Indeed, the Supreme Court declared the marriage
between Chi Ming Tsoi and his wife as null and void. Since it was proven that Chi
Ming Tsoi was not impotent, it was clear that he simply refused to have sex with his
wife. Thus, according the Supreme Court:

“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is ‘to
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children
through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.’ Constant non- fulfillment
of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage.
In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.”

PREPARED BY: ANGELES, CESLHEE

 CASE NO. 11
ANGELITA JONES, petitioner, appellant- appellee
v.
FELIX HORTIGUELA as administrator, widower and heir, oppositor appellant
appellee
G.R. NO. L-43701
March 6, 1937
FACTS:
In December 1914, Marciana Escano married Arthur W. Jones in the suburban
catholic church of San Nicolas, Province of Cebu. With such marriage, Angelita Jones was
born. On January 20 1918, Arthur Jones secured a passport in order to go abroad and
thereafter nothing was ever heard of him.
In October 1919, Marciana Escano instituted in the Court of First Instance of Maasin
Leyte a proceeding to have her husband (Jones) judicially declared an ABSENTEE. On the
25th of the same month, the court issued an order declaring Arthur W. Jones an absentee
from the Philippine Islands pursuant to the provisions of Article 186 of the Civil Code with
the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence would not take effect until six months
after its publication in the official newspapers. Said order directed the publication thereof
in the Official Gazette and in the newspaper "El Ideal". Pursuant thereto, said order was
published in the Official Gazette during the month of December, 1919, and January,
February, March, April, May and June, 1920. On April 23, 1921, the court issued another
order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been
made in the Official Gazette and in "El Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Felix Hortiguela and
Marciana Escaño were married before the justice of the peace of Malitbog, Leyte, and they
signed the certificate of marriage.
As Marciana Escaño had died intestate, her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed
judicial administrator of her entire estate, and in an order issued on May 9, 1932, Angelita
Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, and Felix Hortiguela, her widower by her second
marriage, were declared her only heirs. In a motion filed with the conformity of the
guardian of the heiress Angelita Jones, Felix Hortiguela, as administrator, prayed that his
fees, as such, be fixed at P10,000 which was granted by the court in its order of January 10,
1933. The administrator later presented an inventory of the properties left by said
deceased Marciana Escaño, a final account of his administration, and a project of partition
of the intestate estate wherein he adjudicated to himself a part of the estate in payment of
his share of the conjugal properties and his usufructuary right, and the remaining part to
Angelita Jones. The latter, who was a minor, was represented in the proceedings by her
guardian Paz Escaño de Corominas. The project of partition and final account were
approved in an order of June 26, 1933, and the properties were turned over to the
respective grantees by virtue thereof.
On May 3, 1934, the heiress Angelita Jones, then married to Ernesto Lardizabal, filed
a motion alleging that she was the only heir of her mother, the deceased Marciana Escaño;
that there never was a valid marriage between her mother and Felix Hortiguela or that had
such marriage been celebrated, it was null and void; and even granting that it were valid,
Felix Hortiguela was not entitled to a share in usufruct of one-third of the inheritance; that
the petitioner was a minor and that during the hearing of the intestate proceedings she had
not been assisted by counsel but was represent by the same attorney of Felix Hortiguela;
that during said proceedings there had been committed many errors and inaccuracies
which impaired her rights and that the fees of P10,000 charged by the administrator were
highly unreasonable and unconscionable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Felix Hortiguela's alleged marriage to Marciana Escaño was validly
celebrated.
RULING:
Yes. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the
necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the
celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse
present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is
generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the
celebration of the marriage (section III, paragraph 2, General orders, No. 68).
In accordance with the foregoing legal provision, the absence of Marciana Escaño's
former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news
concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than
nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.
Furthermore, Marciana Escaño believed Arthur W. Jones to be dead when she
contracted her second marriage. Her daughter Angelita Jones herself was of the same belief,
since she lived with her mother after the latter had married Hortiguela, treated Hortiguela
as her true stepfather, and lived and traveled with him together with her mother. She
certainly would not have behaved so if she had not believed her father to be dead. Still
furthermore, according to section 334, No. 24, of the Code of Civil Procedure, a person not
heard from in seven years is presumed to be dead.

PREPARED BY: SERRANO, JUSTINE

 CASE NO. 12
SSS v. Jarque
G.R. No. 165545
March 24, 2006
FACTS:
On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon and Alice P. Diaz contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon. On October 9, 1970, more than 15 years later, Bailon filed before the
Court of First Instance(CFI) of Sorsogon a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death
which was granted on December 10, 1970. Close to 13 years after his wifeAlice was
declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon contracted marriage
withTeresitaJargue in Casiguran, Sorsogon. She was designated as Social Security System
(SSS) beneficiary of Bailon. SSS cancelled the claim of respondent TeresitaJarque of her
monthly pension for death benefits on the basis of the opinion rendered by its legal
department that her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted during the
subsistence of Bailon’s marriage with Alice. Teresita protested the cancellation of her
monthly pension for death benefits asserting that her marriage with Bailonwas not
declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful. Hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes.
ISSUE:
WON the subsequent marriage of Clemente Bailon and respondent TeresitaJarque
may terminate by mere reappearance of the absent spouse of Bailon
RULING:
The second marriage contacted by a person with an absent endures until annulled.
It is only the competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of
the Civil Code and upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for
annulment may be filed. The two marriages involved here falls under the Civil Code. Under
the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable, it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the
spouses in the subsequent marriage. Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to
annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus, Article 42 thereof provides the
subsequent marriage shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous
marriage or declaring it void ab initio. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to
terminate the subsequent marriage, either by affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s
mere reappearance will not terminate such marriage. Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption
continues inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance. In the case at bar, as no step was
taken to nullify Bailon and Jarque’s marriage, Teresita is proclaimed to be rightfully the
dependent spouse-beneficiary of Bailon.

PREPARED BY: DE LA CRUZ, CARL MARK

 CASE NO.: 13
Valdez v. Republic
GR NO.: 180863
September 8, 2009

FACTS:

Angelita Valdez married SofioPolborosa on January 1971.They have only one child,
Nancy. Angelita and Sofio argued constantly because the latter was unemployed and did
not bring home any money. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Angelita and
Nancy waited for him to return but, finally, in May 1972, they decided to go back to the
home of Angelita’sparents. Three years passed without any word from Sofio until in
October 1975, he showedup and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that
effect. That was the last time Angelita saw him.

Believing that Sofio was already dead, Angelita married Virgilio Reyes on June
1985.Subsequently, however, Virgilio’s application for naturalization filed with the United
States Department of Homeland Security was denied because Angelita’s marriage to Sofio
was subsisting. Hence, on March 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of
Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.The RTC rendered
its Decision on November 2007, dismissing the Petition for lack of merit. The RTC held that
Angelita was not able to prove the well-grounded belief that her husband SofioPolborosa
was already dead. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration to which the RTC denied.

ISSUE(S):
WON declaration of presumptive death of Sofiobe granted.
WON the subsequent marriage of Angelita with Virgilio is legal and valid.

RULING:

The Supreme Court affirmed the RTC Decision in dismissing the Petition but on
grounds different from those cited in the RTC Decision.The RTC erred in applying the
provisions of the Family Code and holding that petitioner needed to prove a well-founded
belief that Sofio was already dead. The RTC applied Article 41 of the Family Code. It is
readily apparent, however, that the marriages of petitioner to Sofio and Virgilio on January
1971 and June 1985, respectively, were both celebrated under the auspices of the Civil
Code. The pertinent provision of the Civil Code is Article 83.Also, Article 390 of the Civil
Code states, ‘after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee
still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.’For
the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse
judicially declared an absentee. Further, the Court explained that presumption of death
cannot be the subject of court proceedings independent of the settlement of the absentees’
estate.

A judicial pronouncement that a petitioner’s husband is presumptively death, even if

final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is
for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it
is the only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to
pass.

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court
declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken
place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October
1982.Consequently, at the time of Angelita’s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no
impediment to petitioner’s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under the Civil
Code.

PREPARED BY: EBOY, APOLINARIO JR. B.

 CASE NO. 14
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs . YOLANDA CADACIO
GRANADA, respondent.
G.R. No. 187512
June 13, 2012

FACTS:
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus Granada
(Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines where both were then working. The two eventually
got married on 3 March 1993.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went
to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she had not received
any communication from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother
testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter's whereabouts, to no
avail.
After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda led a Petition to have Cyrus declared
presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to RTC Branch 85, Lipa City.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as presumptively
dead.
The OSG, led a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision.
Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and
thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. However, in an Order
dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Elevated the case to the CA, presumably under Rule 41, Section 2 (a) of the Rules of
Court. Yolanda led a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over
the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on
Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolanda's Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by the CA
in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the Petition on the ground that the
Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to
ordinary appeal.
2. Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTC's grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article 41 of the Family Code based on the
evidence that respondent presented.

HELD:
1. Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino the appellate court noted that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial
proceeding under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final
and executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the same
Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the attempt to question
it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.
 Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence ofa previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance
where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of
Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
Since its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage,
petitioner's action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code,
rather than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering that this
action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to le a record on appeal
when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari
withthe CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed
graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA,
theaggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via a petition for review on
certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republic's Notice
of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for Declaration
ofPresumptive Death of respondent's spouse was immediately final and executory
and,hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.

2. Petitioner also assails the RTC's grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the
evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already
dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code.
Petitioner cites Republic v Nolasco. As noted by the Court in that case, the four
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as follows:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse les a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a
"well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court in Nolasco cited
United States v. Biasba which it found to be instructive as to the diligence required in
searching for a missing spouse.
Under Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. The spouse present is,
thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not dene what is meant by a well-
grounded belief.
 The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent
spouseand whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or
not thespouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the absent
spousedepends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
natureand extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
Respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner
argues that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular
Office or assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She
could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to
explain these omissions.
The Court, constrained to deny the petition. The RTC ruling on the issue of whether
respondent was able to prove her "well founded belief" that her absent spouse was already
dead prior to her ling of the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and
can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, "[n]othing is more settled in law than that
when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The
same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct
what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."

PREPARED BY: BANGAYAN, CRISTY

 Case No. 15
Republic v. Tampus
G.R. No. 214243
September 4, 2016

FACTS:
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29,
1975. Three days thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left
respondent and went to Jolo, Sulu where he was assigned. The couple had no children.
Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She tried everything to locate him, but her
efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a petition to declare Dante
as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse of thirty-
three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he
is already dead.
ISSUE:
WON Dante should be declared presumptively dead
RULING:
No. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be
shown that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of
the Philippines, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive
death: (1) that the absent spouse has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two
(2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under
the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that the present spouse
wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well- founded belief that the absentee
is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The ‘well-founded belief’ in the absentee’s death requires the present spouse to
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the
absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort,
not a passive one. As such, the mere absence of the house for such periods prescribed
under the law, lack of any news that such absentee spouse is still alive, failure to
communicate, or general presumption of the absence under the Civil Code would not
suffice.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante’s disappearance, she tried to locate him
by making inquiries with his parents, relatives and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but
unfortunately, they also did not know where to find him. Other than making said inquiries,
however, Nildamade no further efforts to find her husband. She could have called or
proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband, but failed to
do so. She did not even seek the help of authorities or the AFP itself in finding him.
Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission
to Jolo, Sulu, at the the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired form AFP on the
status of the said mission, or from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To
Courts mind therefore, Nilda failed to actively look for her missing husband and her
purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante’s parents, relatives and friends did
not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create a ‘well-founded
belief’ of his death.
The ruling rendered by Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside. The
petition of respondent Nilda B. Tampus to have her husband, Dante L. Del Mundo , declared
presumptively dead is denied.

PREPARED BY: GARCELLANO, HONEY GRACE

 CASE NO. 16
ERICJONATHAN YU v. CAROLINE T. YU
G.R. No. 164915
MARCH 10, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA against respondent for
unlawfully withheld the custody of their child with prayer that such custody be awarded to
him. Subsequently, the respondent filed before the RTC of Pasig City a declaration for
nullity of marriage and dissolution of property with prayer of custody of their child.
The CA awarded the custody to the petitioner with visitation rights of respondent wherein
it was jointly approved by the parties upon their motion.
Later on, the respondent filed a motion to modify the Interim Visitation Agreement (IVA)
which was countered by the petitioner citing respondent for contempt and forum
shopping. The CA ordered respondent to amend her petition for nullity of marriage before
the Pasig RTC which she complied but later move to dismiss the same which the Pasig RTC
granted after motion.
Petitioner then filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig
RTC with prayer of custody subjected to the petition of habeas corpus filed before the CA
which the later court dismissed for being moot and academic.
On the part of respondent, she filed before the Pasay RTC petition of habeas corpus with
prayer of custody, replicating and reiterating the IVA as approved by the CA.
The Pasay RTC issued a writ, a HDO and summons addressed to petitioner and ordered the
same to file motion dismissing his previous petition in the Pasig RTC on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action, forum shopping and litispendentia.
Subsequently, the Pasay RTC declared the manner of custody and visitation rights of the
parties which the petitioner argued, upon motion, that the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue
the same.
Meanwhile, the respondent filed her counter-petition before Pasig RTC with prayer for the
awarding of sole custody of the child. As a result, the Pasig RTC asserted jurisdiction
granting the custody to the petitioner and directed parties to comply with the provisions of
IVA unless new agreement will be form before the court.
In the meantime, the Pasay RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of
forum shopping. The petitioner then elevated the case before the CA but the same was
denied on the same grounds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the question of custody over the child should be litigated before the Pasay
RTC or before the Pasig RTC.
RULING:
The court ruled that since the petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage was filed
before the Pasig RTC therefore the same court is the appropriate court that will determine
the issue in view of the express provision of the second paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code which in line with the policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.
The court decide which actions to be terminated applied the elements of litis pendentia, to
wit: a) identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions;
b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which party is successful, amount
to res judicata in the other,are present.
Therefore, by petitioners filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage before
the Pasig RTC,they automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an
incident thereof. After the appellate court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case,
there was no need for petitioner to replead his prayer for custody for, as Article 49 and 50
of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a declaration of nullity case is deemed
pleaded.

PREPARED BY: GUITTU, MARK

 CASE NO: 17
Tamano vs. Ortiz
GR NO: 126603
June 29, 1998
FACTS:
In 1958, Senator Tamano married private respondent Zorayda in civil rites. Prior to his
death, particulary in 1993, Tamano also married petitioner EstrellitaTamano in civl rites in
Malabang, Lanaodel Sur.
In 1994, Zorayda joined by her son Adib, filed a Complaint of Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage of Tamano and Estrellita on the ground that it was bigamous. She claimed that
Tamano and Estrellita misrepresented themselves as divorced and single, thus making the
entries in the marriage contract false and fraudulent.
Estrellita filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the RTC of Quezon City has no jurisdiction
over the case arguing that only a party to a marriage can file an action for annulment.
Estrellitaalso alleged that since both parties are Muslim, the Shari’a courts are vested with
the exclusive jurisdiction to try and hear case pursuant to Art 155 of the Code of Muslim
and personal Laws,
CA, then ruled that under Judiciary Reorganization act of 1980, RTC has jurisdiction of all
actions involving marriages and contracts, and such action may be commences where
plaintiffs or respondent resides.
Petitioners then argues that Shari’a Courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to Art
13 of PD 1083 (Code of Muslim and Personal Laws) which states that the code have
jurisdiction over the marriage and divorce where either parties or both are muslim; or
other party is non-muslim, and marriage is solemnized not in accordance with the Muslim
Code, Civil Code shall apply.

ISSUE:
WON Shari’s courts have exclusive jurisdiction over the case at bar?
RULING:
NO.
As alleged in the complaint, petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the
Civil Code. Hence, contrary to the position of petitioner, the Civil Code is applicable in the
instant case. Assuming that indeed petitioner and Tamano were likewise married under
Muslim Laws, the same would still fall under the general original jurisdiction of the RTC.
Article 13 of PD No. 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married
both in Civil and Muslim rites. Consequently, the Shari’s courts are vested with original and
exclusive jurisdiction when it comes to marriages celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Consequently, the RTC are not divested of their general original jurisdiction under
Sec. 19 (6) of BP Blg. 192 which provides-
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – RTC shall exercise exclusive original Jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quaqi-judicial functions.
Doctrine: In matters which govered by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.

PREPARED BY: PINGAD, REZY

 CASE NO. 18
FELICIDAD P. MUÑOZ, petitioner vs. JOSE DEL BARRIO, respondent
G.R. No. 12506-R
April 15, 1955

FACTS

Felicidad P. Muñoz and Jose del Barrio were married civilly before Judge Natividad Almeda
Lopez of the Municipal Court of Manila.
Since their marriage the couple lived together as husband and wife for the ensuing six
months inathe house of the husband’s father at Rizal Avenue, Manila, and then moved their
residence to the municipality of Maycawayan, Bulacan. Out of this union were born Felix
Luis del Barrio and Maria Teresa del Barrio who must be actually 11 and 9 years old,
respectively.
It seems that during their married life this couple had frequent quarrels, on which
occasions the husband maltreated his wife by deed, they unceremoniously separated, the
wife staying in Meycawayan and the husband in the house of his father
Notwithstanding this separation of dwellings they met each other in the City of Manila, and
the wife claims that in December, 1950, or January, 1951, and in September of the latter
year she was again maltreated by her husband.
This moved her to institute the present action alleging in the petition filed on October 26,
1951, in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, among other things, that the system of
conjugal partnership of gains governs her marriage to the respondent; that no property has
been acquired during the marriage of the petitioner and respondent except a portion of a
residential land located in Meycawayan, Bulacan, from which no rentals are derived; that
respondent has made several attempts on the life of the herein petitioner which compelled
her to live separately and apart from the respondent since 1947; and that respondent has
not provided support for petitioner and their children.
Respondent filed his answer to the petition denying the averments made in his wife’s
pleading and prayed the court that the petition be denied and dismissed for lack of merit, it
being contrary to moral and good customs and not authorized or sanctioned by statute,
praying further for such other relief as provided by law, with costs de oficio.
the court, in compliance with the provisions of Article 98 of the new Civil Code, took every
feasible step towards the reconciliation of the spouses, but His Honor failed in his purpose
by reason of the determined refusal of the wife to yield to the efforts of the Judge to that
end. Hence the case proceeded with the intervention of the office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Bulacan.

ISSUES

1. In not finding that respondent-appellee had made attempts on the life of petitioner-
appellant;
2. In not decreeing legal separation and in dismissing petitioner-appellant’s action
without cost

HELD
In the case at bar the alleged maltreatments to the wife by the husband occurred before
their separation a mensa et thoro in 1947 must not have amounted to said husband’s
attempts on the life of his wife, since the latter did not institute any action for the legal
separation from him upon the effectivity of the Civil Code on August 30, 1950, and this case
was only brought to court on October 26, 1951, after the alleged maltreatment of
September 1951 had taken place. Therefore, in this appeal we only have to determine
whether the maltreatments that appellant suffered at the hands of the respondent after
their separation of dwelling, furnish ground for the legal separation applied for under
paragraph 2 of Article 97 of the Civil Code.

The maltreatment referred to by Jovita Faustino consisted merely in appelle’s giving a fist
blow on the face of appellant. Patrolman Mallari did not witness the maltreatment on
which he testified, for he was called by appellant to intervene in the quarrel between the
spouses when it was already over, and the only thing he noticed was that she was crying
and that there were certain scratches on her brow and cheeks and on certain points of the
neck which were blackened (ecchymosis). About the quarrel spoken of by Attorney Macias,
the latter declared that appelle boxed his wife on the abdomen, pulled her hair and had also
twisted her neck.

An attempt on the life of a person implies that the actor in the attempt is moved by an
intention to kill the person against whom the attempt is made, and after a careful
examination of the evidence produced by appellant we cannot make up our mind to declare
that the alleged maltreatments of respondent to his wife were moved by such intent to kill.

“In the prosecutions for frustrated or attempted homicide, the intention to take life must be
proved with the same degree of certainty as is required with respect to other elements of
the crime, and the inference of such intent should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intention beyond reasonable doubt (People vs.
Villanueva, 51 Phil., 448). It is absolutely necessary that the homicidal intent be evidenced
by adequate acts which at the time of their execution were unmistakably calculated to
produce the death of the victim, since the crime of frustrated or attempted homicide is one
in which, more than in any other case, the penal law is based upon the material results
produced by the criminal act. It is not proper or just to attribute to the delinquent a specific
intent to commit the higher crime in the absence of proof to justify such a conclusion (U.S.
vs. Taguibao, 1 Phil., 16). Conformably to this rule, therefore, an accused who, upon seeing
a man plowing the land which was the subject matter of a dispute, immediately attacks the
latter, inflicting blows upon his neck with the back of the bolo, must be convicted of
physical injuries, and not of frustrated homicide, because the mere fact that the assault was
committed with the back instead of the cutting edge of the bolo negatives the idea of
homicidal intent and precludes the crime from constituting frustrated homicide.” (U.S. vs.
Taguibao, 1 Phil., 16).

In the case of U.S. vs. Reyes et al., 30 Phil., 551, the Highest Tribunal of the land said the
following:

“Homicide; Criminal intent. – When the case affords no good reason for holding that the
assailants positively intended to kill the injured party in spite of the persistent and
repeated beatings they gave him, however much they plainly demonstrated their intention
of doing him injury, by striking him in an inhuman manner on various parts of his body, it is
improper to classify the crime as either frustrated or attempted homicide. A personal
assault must be punished according to its consequences and the harm done to the victim,
for the penal law in this class of crimes is only concerned with the material results
produced by the transgression, unless the perverse intention of taking the victim’s life be
clearly manifested.”
In the maltreatments complained of in this case, the respondent only used at most his bare
fists or hands and desisted from giving further chastisement after the first blows were
given at the spur of the impulse. it must be established with clear and convincing evidence,
and that in the case at bar said intent has not been proved by such evidence. Petitioner-
appellant herself should not have been so sure of her evidence when instead of the present
action she dared not cause the prosecution of her husband for attempted parricide as a
means of establishing her right to secure the legal separation she applies for in this case.

PREPARED BY: GO, SHAHANIE

 CASE NO. 19
ONE ENG KIAM a.k.a. WILLIAM ONG,petitioner vsLUCITA ONG,
respondent
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita
filed a complaint for Legal separation under Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code.
Lucita alleged that since their third year of marriage, her husband William subjected
her to physical violence like slapping, kicking and pulling her hair and bang her head
against the concrete wall.and been violent towards their three children. He would scold
them using his belt buckle to beat them. One day after a violent quarrel wherein William hit
Lucita on several different parts of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave
the house which she did.
Lucita’s statements about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her
sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita consulted the day after she left her
conjugal home also testified about her injuries.
The trial court granted Lucitas petition for legal separation which the CA affirmed
William then filed this petition for review on certiorari
On the decision denying all of Lucita’s allegations and that he never inflicted
physical harm on her or their children.
He also argued that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the complaint is
to deprive him of his control and ownership over his conjugal properties with Lucita.
That the CA overlooked some facts of the case which warrant an exception to the
general rule that questions of fact cannot be the subject for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The CA erred in relying on the testimonies of Lucita her sister and their parents’
doctor Dr. ElinZano since their testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud and
since Lucita abandoned the family home she has also given a ground for legal separation
and therefore should NOT- be granted one pursuant to Art. 56 par. 4 of The family code –
Where both parties have given ground for legal separation

ISSUE: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on legal separation

HELD:
Lucita should be granted a decree of legal separation
The claim that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take
control of the conjugal properties is absurd. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. That the physical violence and grossly
abusive conduct were brought to bear upon Lucita have been duly established. He can
derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of her family at the expense
of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and children

The assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses is given great
respect. Relationship alone is not enough to discredit and label a witness’ testimony as
biased and unworthy of credence. Witnesses Linda Lim and Dr. Elinzano gave detailed and
straightforward testimonies the court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.
 The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year. Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct,
such does not constitute abandonment contemplated in the said provision

PREPARED BY: MANUEL, JESSA

 Case No. 20
People v. Zapata and Bondoc
G.R. No. L-3047 88 Phil. 688
May 16, 1951

FACTS:
A complaint of adultery was filed on March 1947 by Andres Bondoc against
Guadalupe Zapata his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for cohabiting and having
repeated sexual intercourse from the year 1946 to March 14, 1947. Dalmacio Bondoc
knows his co-defendant to be a married woman. Petitioner’s wife entered a plea of guilty
and was sentence to suffer 4 months in which she served. In the same Court, On September
1948, the petitioner filed another complaint for adulterous acts committed by his wife and
her paramour from the year 1947 to 1948; each of the defendants filed a motion to quash
the complaint of the ground that they would be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. The Trial Court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed the
second complaint.
ISSUE:
WON the second complaint be quashed for double jeopardy.
RULING:
No. Adultery is a crime of result and not tendency. It is an instantaneous crime
which is consummated or exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union.
Therefore, each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery. There’s no
constitutional or legal provision which bars the filling of as many complaints for adultery as
there were adulterous acts committed, each constituting one crime. According to Article
55(8) of the Family Code, every sexual infidelity or perversions such is a ground for legal
separation.
Thus, the order appealed from, which quashed the second complaint for adultery, is
hereby reversed and set aside, and the trial court directed to proceed with the trial of the
defendants.

PREPARED BY: GARCELLANO, HONEY GRACE

 CASE NO. 21
Gandionco vs. Peñaranda
G.R. No. 79284
November 27, 1987

FACTS:
The legal wife of petitioner, Gandionco, filed a complaint against him for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage with a petition for support and payment of
damages presided over by respondent judge Peñaranda and later on filed another
complaint for concubinage. She also applied for the provisional remedy of support pendent
lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation. The respondent charge ordered
the payment of support pendente lite.

ISSUE:
- Whether or not the civil action for legal separation and the incidents thereto, such as
application for support pendete lite, should be suspended in view of the criminal
case for concubinage filed against the petitioner.

RULING:
No. The action for legal separation is not to recover civil liability but is intended to
obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof, such as the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support and
disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse among others.Thus, the civil
action in this case may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with a criminal action for
concubinage because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the
offenses even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same
offense. It should also be noted that a conviction for concubinage is not necessary before an
action for legal separation can prosper because a decree of legal separation, on the ground
of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for
legal separation.

PREPARED BY: CONSTANTINO, CAMILLE G.

 CASE No. 22
De la Cruz vs. De la Cruz
G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968

FACTS: Spouses Severino and Estrella de la Cruz are legally married with six children.
During their converture, they acquired seven parcels of land of the Bacolod Cadastre and
three parcels of the Silay Cadastre.

They were also engaged in varied business ventures such as their Philippine Textboard
Factory, Top Service Inc., Beverly Hills Subdivision, Golden Acres Subdivision, and a lot and
building from the money they’ve borrowed from the Manufacturer’s Bank and Trust
Company. The husband and wife, in addition, were indebted to the Philippine National
Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines for loans obtained to which they
mortgaged some of their businesses.

On July 22, 1958, plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental alleging her husband of not only abandoning her but
mismanaging their conjugal properties, and praying for:

● Separation of property,
● Monthly support of Php2,500 during the pendency of the action, and
● Payment of Php20,000 as attorney’s fees and costs

Estrella said Severino ha not only lived in their conjugal home but hand lived in his office
and later on lived in Manila with his concubine Nenita Hernandez, supported by the notes
and letters Nenita had written which Estrella found hidden in her husband’s polo short and
then in his iron safe thereafter.

Severino denied having maintained a mistress in Manila and claimed he never saw the
alleged notes before the trial, reasoned that he had always visited the conjugal home and
had provided support for the family despite his frequent absences going to Manila to
supervise the expansion of their business, showed evidence from the allowance drawings
of the wife in amounts of Php1,000 to Php1,500 from the office, and financing the education
of their children. He said his wife is always badly in need of cash due to her gambling,
which the wife admitted but reasoned out it was due to the infidelity of her husband.

Estrella said her husband refused to inform her of the progress of their various business
concerns, thus abusing his administrative powers regarding the conjugal partnership
properties. Although she did not allege, much less prove her husband had dissipated the
conjugal property, she averred nevertheless that her husband might squander and dispose
of the properties in favor of his concubine, seeking the urgency of separation of property.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute
abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties.
(2) Whether or not the defendant’s failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state
of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal
partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets.

HELD: (1) No, the defendant is not guilty of abandonment. The Court held that the
plaintiff’s prayer that her plea for separation of conjugal partnership properties under
Articles 167 and 178 of the new Civil Code requires a presentment of real abandonment
and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but
also amount to financial and moral desertion. Physical separation alone is not the full
meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from
the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor
ceases to give support to his wife. The Court further believed that the defendant did not
intend to leave his wife and children permanently despite his absence from the conjugal
home, as shown by the evidence on record that he continued to give support to his family.
Furthermore, the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favour as to whether
Severino kept Nenita as a concubine. Credible evidence is needed, which the plaintiff failed
to show and is negatived by her testimony that she had not seen Nenita’s handwriting
before.

(2) No. The defendant is not guilty of abusing his powers of administration over the
conjugal partnership properties. There is no evidence on the record to show that he has
squandered the conjugal assets. The refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of
the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses does
not constitute in abuse.

PREPARED BY: DELA CRUZ, JACKIE MARK

 CASE NO. 23
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ V.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY
G.R. No. L-30977

January 31, 1972

FACTS:

Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an
order, dated 29 July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its
Civil Case No. 20387, dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death
of the therein plaintiff, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the
case, abated the cause of action as well as the action itself. The dismissal order was issued
over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the deceased plaintiff (and petitioner
herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case prosecuted to final
judgment.

Carmen O. Lapuz Sy and Eufemio S. Eufemio were married civilly on September 21,
1934 and canonically on September 30, 1934. On August 18, 1953, Carmen filed a petition
for legal separation against her husband She prayed for issuance of a decree of legal
separation which among others would order that her husband should be deprived of his
share of the conjugal partnership profits. Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of
nullity ad initio of this marriage with LapuzSy on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo
Hiok.

Before the trial could be completed petitioner Carmen O. LapuzSy died in a vehicular
accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
Respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two (2)
grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year
period provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated
the action for legal separation. Counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the
deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.

ISSUE(S)

1. Whether or not the death of the plaintif before final decree, in an action for legal
separation abate the action
2. Whether or not abatement will also apply if the action involves property rights
RULING
1. YES.
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board
separation of the spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes
this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to claim legal
separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their reconciliation,
stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself — action personalis moritur cum person.
2. YES.
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that
they are solely the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they cannot survive the
death of the plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil
Code provides.
 From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains (or of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the
offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, or his
disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation
of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made by the innocent one, are
all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested
exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such claims and
disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said
rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17,
Rule 3, of the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of
the deceased party.

A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the
plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree
of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not
come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in
expectation.
Accordingly, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic
Relations is hereby affirmed.

PREPARED BY: BASSIG, MARGARITA

 CASE No.: 24
OCAMPO VS FLORENCIANO, 107 PHIL 35 (1960)
L-13553
FEBRUARY 23, 1960

FACTS:
Jose De Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano was married in April 5, 1938 in Nueva
Ecija and lived there as husband and wife. In 1951, Ocampo discovered that his wife was
betraying his trust by maintaining an illicit relationship with Jose Arcalas. He sent his wife
to manila to study yet again still having illicit relationship with another man. After
Florenciano finished her studies he left her husband and since then they lived separately. In
1955, Ocampo surprised his wife in the act of having illicit relationship with Nelson
Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a petition for legal separation, to which
defendant manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action.
In July 5, 1955, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separationon the ground of
adultery. The court of first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, stating that adultery with Jose Arcalas had prescribed because action was not
filed within one year from the discovery. (Article 102, CC) and as for the adultery with
Nelson Orzame, Florenciano admitted her sexual relations with Nelson. Interpreting the
admission of Florenciano virtually to mean a confession of judgment the Appellate Court
declared that under Art. 101 of the CC, legal separation could not be decreed. *
ISSUE:
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of
judgement disallowed by the NCC.
RULING:
No, The admission of Florenciano was practically a confession of judgment,
inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree
may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon
evidence presented by Ocampo. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or
mainly on defendant's confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any
defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to
prevent it. It must also be taken into consideration here that the wife left him. Hers was the
obligation to return.
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband's petition we hereby
reverse the appealed decision and decree a legal separation between these spouse, all the
consequent effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina Florenciano. So ordered.
* ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts
or by confession of judgment.
In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney
to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for
the plaintiff is not fabricated.
NOTE: PROVISIONS USED IN THIS CASE WAS BEFORE THE FAMILY CODE

PREPARED BY: IRINGAN, MICHAEL VINCENT

 Case No. 25
Benjamin Bugayong, plaintiff-appellant Vs. LeonilaGinez, defendant-
appellee
GR. No. L-10033
December 28, 1956

FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, the plaintiff, a serviceman in the U.S. Navy, was married to
defendant LeonilaGinez. The couple lived with the sister of the plaintiff after their marriage.
After some time, defendant left the dwelling place of her sister-in-law and informed her
husband that she had gone to reside with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan.
Plaintiff began receiving letters informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
Plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan and sought for his wife whom he met in the house of
her godmother. She came along and both proceeded to the house of Pedro Bugayong,
where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1 day as husband and wife. Then they repaired
to the plaintiff’s houe and again passed the night therein as husband and wife. On the
second day, plaintiff tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received
but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as
confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed to her. After that and despite such belief,
plaintiff exerted efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to Bacarra, Ilocos Norte
to “soothe his wounded feelings.
Plaintiff file on November 18, 1952 a complaint for legal separation against his wife
but the court dismissed the action.
ISSUE:
Whether there was condonation between the plaintiff and defendant that may serve
as a ground for dismissal of the action.
RULING:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation. It is also the conditional forgiveness or remission by a husband or wife of a
marital offense which the latter committed.
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there
has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage(Article 100 of the
Civil Code). A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff clearly shows that there
was condonation on the part of the husband of the supposed “acts of infidelity amounting
to adultery” committed by the defendant wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was
effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter persuading herto come along
with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of
Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one
night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house
likewise as husband and wife – all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this
court than that of a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a
condonation of the wife by the husband.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by the wife, the Court
agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated despite
his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any
action for legal separation against the offending wife, because his said conduct comes with
the restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.

PREPARED BY: REINER P CARDENAS

 CASE NO: 26
Matubis v. Praxedes,
109 Phil 789
1960

FACTS:

Plaintiff Socorro Matubis and defendant Zoilo Praxedes were legally married on January
10, 1943 at Iriga, Camarines Sur. For failure to agree on how they should live as husband
and wife, the couple, on May 30, 1944, agreed to live separately from each other. On April 3,
1948, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement (Exhibit B), the significant
portions of which are hereunder reproduced:

1. That both of us relinquish our right over the other as legal husband and wife.
2. That both without any interference by any of us, nor either of us can
prosecute the other for adultery or concubinage or any other crime or
suit arising from our separation.
3. That I, the, wife, is no longer entitled for any support from my husband or
any benefits he may receive thereafter, nor I the husband is not entitled for
anything from my wife.
4. That neither of us can claim anything from the other from the time we
verbally separated, that is from May 30, 1944 to the present when we made
our verbal separation into writing.

In January, 1955, defendant began cohabiting with one Asuncion Rebulado who eventually
gave birth to their child. It was shown also that defendant and Asuncion deported
themselves as husband and wife and were generally reputed as such in the community.

Alleging abandonment and concubinage, plaintiff, filed with the CFI of Camarines Sur, on
April 24, 1956, a complaint for legal Separation and change of surname against her
husband.

ISSUES:

1. WON the court a quo erred in dismissing the petition because the period to bring the
action has already elapsed.
2. WON the court a quo erred in dismissing the petition because there was consent on
the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage.

RULING:

1. NO. Article 102 of the new Civil Code provides:

An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from
and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause and
within five years from after the date when cause occurred.

The complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above
Article. By the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground
(concubinage) for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the
complaint only on April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even
press this matter in her brief.

2. NO. Article 100 of the new Civil Code provides that the legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage. As shown in Exhibit B, the plaintiff has
consented to the commission of concubinage by her husband. Having consented to
the concubinage, the plaintiff cannot claim legal separation.
The law specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the
adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing, the
plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.

PREPARED BY: IGNACIO, GRACHEL S.

 Case No. 27
Case Title: The People of the Philippines v. Ursula Sensano and Marcelo
Ramos
G.R. No. L-37720
March 27, 1933

Facts:
Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on April 29, 1919. Shortly after
the birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the Province of Cagayan where he
remained for three years without writing to his wife or sending her anything for the
support of herself and their son. Then, she met the accused Marcelo Ramos who took her
and the child to live with him. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge
against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and both were sentenced to four months
and one day of arresto mayor. The court, in its decision, stated the following: "In the
opinion of the court, the husband of the accused has been somewhat cruel in his treatment
of his wife having abandoned her as he did." After completing her sentence, the accused left
her paramour. She thereupon appealed to this municipal president and the justice of the
peace to send for her husband so that she might ask his pardon and beg him to take her
back and she promised to be a faithful wife if he would take her back. He refused to pardon
her, to live with her and he said she could go where she wished, that he would have nothing
more to do with her, and she could do as she pleased. Abandoned for the second time, she
and her child went back to her co-accused Marcelo Ramos and they have lived with him
ever since. The husband, knowing that she resumed living with her codefendant in 1924,
did nothing to interfere with their relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly
thereafter, he left for the Territory of Hawaii where she remained for seven years
completely abandoning his said wife and child. On his return to these Islands, he presented
the second charge of adultery here involved with the sole purpose, as he declared, of being
able to obtain a divorce under the provisions of Act No. 2710.

Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraphs 1 and 2, are as follows:

Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and

acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be
prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the
guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.

Issue:
WON the second charge of adultery will prosper.

Held:

No. Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, the Court have come to the
conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the inference that he
consented to the adulterous relations existing between the accused and therefore he is not
authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.

The Supreme Court cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that the seven
years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is explained by his absence
from the Philippine Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take any
action against the accused. There is no merit in the argument that it was impossible for the
husband to take any action against the accused during the said seven years.

PREPARED BY: AGUEDAN, JASMIN ZYRA M.

 CASE NO. 28
Lllave v. Republic

FACTS:
When Sen. Tamano was alive, he married herein petitioner Estrellita Lllave
twice – 1st under the Islamic Laws and Tradition on May 27, 1997 and subsequently
under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge in Lanao Del Sur on June 2, 1993.
In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as 'divorced.’
On November 23, 1994 Haja Zorayda and Adib Zorayda herein respondents as
children of Tamano with Zorayda filed a complaint with the RTC for the declaration
of nullity of their father’s marriage with Estrellita for being bigamous under Article
35 (4) of the Family Code. They further contend that Zorayda and Sen Tamano were
never divorced because their marriage was never deemed, legally and factually
contracted under the Muslim law since they did not register their mutual desire to
be thus covered by the Muslim Law P.D. 1083.

The RTC ruled in favor of the respondents finding that the marital ties of Sen.
Tamano and Zorayda were never severed, declared Sen. Tamano's subsequent
marriage to Estrellita as void ab initio for being bigamous under Article 35 of the
Family Code of the Philippines and under Article 83 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. The CA affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:

a. WON the marriage between Sen. Tamano and Estrellita was bigamous hence
void ab initio;
b. WON Zorayda and Adib have the legal standing to have Estrellita’s marriage void
ab initio.

HELD:
a. YES. The Civil Code governs the marriage of Zorayda and the late Sen. Tamano;
their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano's subsequent
marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio. As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen.
Tamano's prior marriage to Zorayda has been severed by way of divorce under
PD 1083, 52 the law that codified Muslim personal laws. However, PD 1083
cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13 (1) thereof provides that the law
applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein
only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines." But we already
ruled in G.R. No. 126603 that "Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a
situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites."

Even granting that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to
be considered as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of
mutual consent between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as
both are Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim
laws. Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal
status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage. In
view of Sen. Tamano's prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as void
ab initio.

YES. Zorayda and Adib, as the injured parties, have the legal personalities to file
the declaration of nullity of marriage. A.M.No. 02-11-10-SC, which limits to only the
husband or the wife the filing of a petition for nullity is prospective in application and
does not shut out the prior spouse from filing suit if the ground is a bigamous
subsequent marriage. Indeed, Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC precludes the son
from impugning the subsequent marriage. But in the case at bar, both Zorayda and Adib
have legal personalities to file an action for nullity. Albeit the Supreme Court Resolution
governs marriages celebrated under the Family Code, such is prospective in application
and does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003.
Zorayda and Adib filed the case for declaration of nullity of Estrellita's marriage
in November 1994. While the Family Code is silent with respect to the proper party
who can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, it has been held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and
cannot be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply, Adib, as one of the
children of the deceased who has property rights as an heir, is likewise considered to be
the real party in interest in the suit he and his mother had filed since both of them stand
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit.

PREPARED BY: BUNAGAN, KRISTEL

 CASE NO: 29
Brown v. Yambao
G.R. No. L-10699
October 18, 1957

FACTS: On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed suit in the Court of First Instance of
Manila to obtain legal separation from his lawful wife Juanita Yambao on the ground that
his wife was engaged in adulterous relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a
baby girl that Brown learned of his wife’s misconduct only in 1945.
Upon petition of the plaintiff, the court subsequently declared the wife in default, for failure
to answer in due time, despite service of summons; and directed the City Fiscal to appear at
the trial, and cross-examined plaintiff Brown. On the cross examination it was revealed that
Brown had lived maritally with another woman and had begotten children by her.
Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the legal separation asked, on the ground
that,both parties have given grounds for Legal Separation and because Brown's action had
prescribed since the evidence showed that the learned of his wife's infidelity in 1945 but
only filed action in 1955.
ISSUES:
(1) WON, The court erred in permitting the Assistant Fiscal Rafel Jose of Manila
to act as counsel for the defendant, who defaulted.
(2) WON, The court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
RULING:
(1) NO. The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the intervention of the
state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a social institution in which the
state is vitally interested, so that its continuation or interruption cannot be made
depend upon the parties. It is consonant with this policy that the injury by the Fiscal
should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate whether the
proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified or not.

(2) NO. Brown's cohabitation with a woman other than his wife bars him from claiming
legal separation since both of them have given grounds for legal separation by
express provision of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
The court below also found, and correctly held that the appellant's action was
already barred, because Brown did not petition for legal separation proceedings
until ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which was upon his release
from internment in 1945. Under Article 102 of the new Civil Code, action for legal
separation cannot be filed except within one (1) year from and after the plaintiff
became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when
such cause occurred.
It is true that the wife has not interposed prescription as a defense. Nevertheless,
the courts can take cognizance thereof, because actions seeking a decree of legal
separation, or annulment of marriage, involve public interest and it is the policy of
our law that no such decree be issued if any legal obstacles thereto appear upon the
record.
Comments:
1. Civil Code will apply on this case because at the time the action was instituted (July
14, 1955), the Civil Code (August 30, 1950) was in effect.
2. There are two grounds for the dismissal of this case, to wit: Mutual Guilt and
Prescription. Though, one of the following causes may suffice for the dismissal of
action for Legal Separation.
3. Mutual Guilt: Both parties are in default (pari delicto), there is no offended spouse
who deserves to bring action. “He who comes into equity must come with clean
hands”
4. Prescription:Although prescription should ordinarily be alleged, this is not so in
legal separation or annulment proceedings. Therefore, the court even by itself can
take cognizance of prescription of the case because said action involves Public
interest.

PREPARED BY: AGBAYANI, RED

 CASE NO. 30
CONTRERAS V. MACARAIG
FACTS:
Elena Contreras and Cesar Macaraig were married on March 16, 1952 and begot
three children in their marriage. "Sometime in 1958, the couple acquired rights, as lessee
and purchaser under a conditional sale agreement, to own a house and lot, in Quezon City
which they transferred in favor of their three children on October 29, 1958. Installment
payments were made by Elena’s father and the spouses own no other conjugal property.
After the elections in May 1961 he started to be away often and do come home very late.
Upon Elena’s inquiry, he explained that he was out on a series of confidential missions. In
1962, Elena started hearing rumors about Cesar having an affair with another woman
name Lily Ann and refused to verify from him as it would ensue or drive anger and fight.
After Elena received reports that Lily Ann Alcala had given birth to a baby, she sent Mrs.
Felicisima Antioquia, her father's employee, to verify the reports. Mrs. Felicima saw Cesar
carrying a baby in his arms when she went to verify Elena’s report. Cesar did not want to be
separated from Lily Ann despite advices from his father or sister. Elena then instituted on
December 14, 1963 an action for legal separation.
The RTC dismissed the action finding that although the infidelity of the husband is
apparent, yet the case will have to be dismissed. Article 102 provides that an action for
legal separation cannot be instituted except within one year after plaintiff 'became
cognizant of the cause.
ISSUE:
Whether the period of one year provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should
be counted, as far as the instant case is concerned, from September 1962 or from December
1963

HELD:
Computing the period of one year from the former date, it is clear that plaintiff's
complaint filed on December 14, 1963 came a little too late, while the reverse would be
true if said period is deemed to have commenced only in the month of December 1963. The
period of "five years from after the date when such cause occurred" is not here involved.
Upon the undisputed facts it seems clear that, in the month of September 1962,
whatever knowledge appellant had acquired regarding the infidelity of her husband, that is,
of the fact that he was then living in Singalong with Lily Ann Alcala, was only through the
information given to her by Avelino Lubos, driver of the family car. Much as such hearsay
information had pained and anguished her, she apparently thought it best — and no
reasonable person may justifiably blame her for it — not to go deeper into the matter
herself because in all probability even up to that time, notwithstanding her husband's
obvious neglect of his entire family, appellant still cherished the hope — however forlorn
— of his coming back home to them. Indeed, when her husband returned to the conjugal
home the following October, she purposely refrained from bringing up the matter of his
marital infidelity "in her desire not to anger nor drive defendant away" — quoting the very
words of the trial court. True, appellant likewise heard in April 1963 rumors that her
husband was seen with a woman on the family way on Dasmariñas street, but failed again
to either bring up the matter with her husband or make attempts to verify the truth of said
rumors, but this was due, as the lower court itself believed, because "she was so happy that
defendant again returned to the family home in May 1963 that she once more desisted
from discussing the matter with him because she did not wish to precipitate a quarrel and
drive him away." As a matter of fact, notwithstanding all these painful informations —
which would not have been legally sufficient to make a case for legal separation —
appellant still made brave if desperate attempts to persuade her husband to come back
home. In the words of the lower court, she "entreated her father-in-law, Lucilo Macaraig, to
intercede with defendant and to convince him to return to his family" and also "requested
the cooperation of defendant's older sister, Mrs. Enriqueta Majul" for the same purpose, but
all that was of no avail. Her husband remained obdurate.
From all the foregoing the court concludes that it was only on the occasion
mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her that he was
living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his legitimate family that
appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether to sue or not to sue for
legal separation, and it was only then that the legal period of one year must be deemed to
have commenced.

PREPARED BY: BUNAGAN, KRISTEL

 Case No. 31
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr, 46 SCRA 110
L-34132
July 29, 1972

FACTS:
Petitioner Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed an action for Legal Separation against
respondent Clemente Ramos on the ground of concubinage and an attempt by the latter
against the former’s life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and
exclusive property. Respondent Ramos opposed to this alleging that if the motion asking
for preliminary mandatory injunction were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the
spouses would become even more dim. Respondent Judge granted the motion of
respondent Ramos. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
WON Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise
preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied
for as an ancillary remedy to such suit.
RULING:
No. The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 (now Art. 58 of
the FC) is to remain passive. It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded
from hearing the suit. There is then some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an
ancillary motion such as one for preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If
it were otherwise, there would be a failure to abide by the literal language of such codal
provision. That the law, however remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial
power to assert itself is discernible from what is set forth in the following article. It reads
thus: “After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled
to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The
husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court
deems it proper, in which case the administrator shall have same rights and duties as
a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except
in accordance with the orders of the court.” There would appear to be then a
recognition that the question of management of their respective property need not be left
unresolved even during the six-month period. An administrator may even be appointed for
the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute limitation from
which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. There is justification
then for the petitioner’s insistence that her motion should not be ignored by the lower
court. Also, from the time of issuance of the order complained of on August 4, 1971, more
than six months certainly had elapsed. Thus, there can be no more impediment for the
lower court acting on the motion of petitioner for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
Petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the respondent court suspending
the hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is set aside.

PREPARED BY: PALATAN, ROSELYN

 CASE NO. 32
DIEGO DE LA VIÑA v. ANTONIO VILLAREAL and NARCISA GEOPANO
G.R. No. L-13982
July 31, 1920)
FACTS:
Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of the Province of
Iloilo against Diego De La Viña alleging: that she was a resident of Iloilo and the petitioner a
resident of Oriental Negros; that she was the legitimate wife of petitioner and had lived as
husband and wife with nine children; that during their marriage properties has been
acquired; that the petitioner committed acts of adultery with Ana Calog; that the petitioner
ejected the wife from the conjugal home which obliged her to live in Iloilo; that the wife has
no means of support therefore prays for a decree of divorce, partition of conjugal property
and alimony pendent lite.
The complaint was later amended by respondent adding that a preliminary
injunction be issued against petitioner restraining and prohibiting him to alienate and
encumber the properties belonging to the conjugal partnership.
The petitioner opposed the issuance of preliminary injunction and demurred the
complaint but the respondent judge overruled and granted the preliminary injunction thus
the former filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a married women acquire residence or domicile separate from that
of her husband during the existence of the marriage?
2. Whether or not a preliminary injunction will be obtain against the husband
restraining and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering any part of the
conjugal property during the pendency of the action?
RULING:
1. Based on the general rule, the domicile of the wife follows that of her husband
because of the theoretic identity of person and of interest between the husband and
the wife and the presumption that, from the nature of relation, the home of the one
is that of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen and secure their interests
in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail. But this is
not an absolute rule. The wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that
of her husband where the theorical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by
the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for
divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent
separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel
treatment on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the
wife of the benefit of the husband’s domicile. Thus, the court ruled that a married
woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband,
during the existence of the marriage, where the husband has given cause for
divorce.
2. Yes. Under Section 164 of Act No. 190 which provides that “A preliminary injunction
may be granted, in the manner hereinafter provided, to the satisfaction of the judge
granting it:
a. That the plaintiff is entitle to the relief demanded and such relief, or any part
thereof, consists in the restraining the commission or continuance of the acts
complained of either for a limited period or perpetually;
b. That the commission or continuance of some act complained of during the
litigation would probably work injustice to the plaintiff;
 c. That the defendant is doing, or threatens, or is about to do, or is procuring or
suffering to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights,
respecting the subject of the action, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.
The court rule that the case was covered or contemplated by the said statute and
that the petitioner is restrained from alienating or encumbering the conjugal
properties for it affects the interest of his wife which is her right to share in the
conjugal properties.

PREPARED BY: GUITTU, MARK

 CASE NO. 33
MANUEL J. C. REYES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEONOR INES-LUCIANO, as Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court, Quezon City, COURT OF APPEALS and CELIA ILUSTRE-
REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. L-48219
February 28, 1979
FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
06928-SP entitled "Manuel J. C. Reyes, petitioner, versus, The Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano as
Judge of the Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court (Quezon City) and Celia Ilustre-Reyes,
Respondents", dismissing the petition to annul the order of the respondent Judge directing
the petitioner to give support pendente lite to his wife, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, private
respondent herein, in the amount of P4,000.00 a month.

Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City a
complaint against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the ground that
his husband had attempted to kill her.

The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The defendant,
petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that his
wife had committed adultery with her physician.

The respondent granting plaintiff's prayer for alimony pendente lite in the amount of
P5,000.00 a month.

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that his wife is not entitled to
support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging that even if she entitled, the amount
awarded was excessive. The respondent Judge reduced the amount from P5,000.00 to
P4,000.00 a month.

Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals asking that the order
granting support pendente lite to private respondent. Celia Ilustre-Reyes, be annulled, that
the respondent Judge, Leonor Ines-Luciano, had committed a grave abuse of discretion or
that said order be modified inasmuch as the amount awarded as support pendente lite is
excessive was dismissed.

ISSUES

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN A MANNER AMOUNTING IT CAN

ERROR IN
*AFFIRMING THE ORDERS FOR SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE

*THAT THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE JUDGE DID NOT COMMIT ANY ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN ISSUING SAID ORDERS

HELD

IN ACTIONS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION THE WIFE IS ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE
HUSBAND DESPITE THE FACT THAT A CASE FOR ADULTERY HAD BEEN FILED BY THE
HUSBAND AGAINST HER.

The allegation that the wife has committed adultery will not bar her from the right to
receive support pendente lite.It must be established by competent evidence. Adultery is a
good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action, the petitioner did
not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, private respondent Celia
Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.
In Quintana vs. Lerma, the action for support was based on the obligation of the husband to
support his wife.

IN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE, IT IS ENOUGH THAT THE

COURT ASCERTAIN THE KIND AND AMOUNT OF EVIDENCE EVEN BY AFFIDAVITS ONLY
OR OTHER DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE APPEARING IN THE RECORDS.

In fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000,00, the respondent judge
did not act capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the amount of
P5,000.00 a month, the respondent Judge considered the following:

that she is presently unemployed and without funds, thus, she is being supported by her
father with whom she resides.

that the petitioner had been maltreating her and tried to kill her.

that all their conjugal properties are in the possession of the petitioner who is also
president, Manager and Treasurer of their corporation

To secure some of the said Agreement of Counter-Guaranty Mortgage with Real Estate, and
Real Estate Mortgage were undertaken by petitioner of their properties outside of other
accommodations; and that she needs of P5,000.00 a month for her support in accordance
with their station in life.

The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children
are in the custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him.
It is thus seen that the respondent judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the
amount of support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month.

The private respondent has submitted documents showing that the corporations controlled
by the petitioner have entered into multi-million contracts in projects of the Ministry of
Public Highways.

Considering the high cost of living due to inflation and the financial ability of the petitioner
as shown by the documents of record, We find that the amount of P4,000.00 a month
granted by the respondent Judge as alimony pendente lite to the private respondent is not
excessive. There is no showing that the respondent Judge has committed a grave abuse of
discretion in granting said support.

PREPARED BY: GO, SHAHANIE

 CASE NO. 34
Aida P. Bañez v. Gabriel B. Bañez
G.R. No. 132592
January 23, 2002
FACTS:
The RTC of Cebu decreed legal separation between Aida and Gabriel on the ground
of sexual infidelity. Dissolution of conjugal property and division of net conjugal assets; the
forfeiture of Gabriel’s half share in the net assets in favor of common children; the payment
of 100,000 as attorney’s fees to be taken from petitioner’s sharre in the net assets; and the
surrender of a Mazda car and small residential house to petitioner and common children
15 days from receipt of decision was also decreed by the same court. Respondent appealed.
Aida filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The RTC gave due course to
execution pending appeal and issued a writ of execution commanding the sheriff to order
the respondent to vacate the house and surrender the Mazda car. It also ordered the
petitioner to post bond to answer for all damages that respondents may suffer.
The CA set aside the judgment. Upon motion, Aida prayed that she and her children
be allowed to occupy the house for she did not have the chance to occupy it and besides,
she posted a bond for damages that respondent may suffer. Respondent on the other hand,
argued that Aida chose not to live in the house for she owned two houses in the United
States where she resides.

ISSUE:
1 – Whether or not the execution pending appeal is justified.
2 – Whether or not an action for legal separation is one where multiple appeals allowed.

RULING:
1 – No. Execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding
urgency outweigh the damages that may result from issuance of writ. Otherwise, instead of
being an instrument of solicitude and justice, the writ may become a tool of oppression and
inequity. In this case, considering the reason of Aida, there is no superior or urgent
circumstances that outweigh the damages which the respondent would suffer if he were
ordered to vacate the house. She did not refute the respondent’s allegations that she did
not intend to use the house for she owned 2 other houses in the United States where she is
a permanent resident, while petitioner had none at all. Merely, putting up a bond is not
sufficient to justify her plea for execution pending appeal.
2 – No. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital
relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live
separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.They are not
separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or
apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal
separation. Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals.

PREPARED BY: CONSTANTINO, CAMILLE G.

 CASE NO: 35
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO v. RITA C. QUIAO
G.R. No. 176556
July 4, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioner BrigidoQuiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977, from
which marriagefour children were born. They had no separate properties prior to
their marriage.

In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for
cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005
declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55, thereby
awarding the custody of their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the
innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between

them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share
of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of
their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted
by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the
writ was partially executed.

After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking
the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the trial court held that the
phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the
separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision
stating that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article
102 of the Family Code. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside
the last ruling.

ISSUE(S):

I. What law governs the dissolution and liquidation of the common

properties of a couple who got married in 1977 (before the Family
Code was enacted) and obtained a decree of legal separation when the
Family Code is already in effect?
II. WON the Family Code should be given retroactive effect for purposes
of determining the net profits to be forfeited as a result of the decree
of legal separation without impairing vested rights acquired under the
Old Civil Code

III. WON Brigido acquired vested rights over half of the properties of the
CPG pursuant to Art. 143 of the Old Civil Code

RULING:

I. Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code

Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties' property
relation is governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of
gains.Petitioner and respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the
time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the
property relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains. Under this property relation, “the husband
and the wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry.” The husband and wife also own in common all the
property of the conjugal partnership of gains.

At the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the respondent's marriage the
operative law is already the Family Code, the same applies in the instant case, and the
applicable law, in so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and
liabilities is concerned, is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of
the Family Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of
the Family Code “this Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other law.”

II. YES.As a general rule, it cannot be given retroactive effect if it will impair vested
rights. However, the Family Code applies in the instant case because there is no
vested right that will be impaired. (based on Art. 256 of the Family Code which
provides for retroactivity except when vested rights will be impaired).

The concept of “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of

due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and
natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from
new obligations created after the right has become vested. When the Decision
was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court’s ruling
forfeiting what the trial court termed as “net profits,” pursuant to Article 129(7)
of the Family Code. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being deprived of his right
to due process.

Article 102(4) of the Family Code expressly provides that for purposes of
computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2) and
Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits “shall be
the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.”

Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of
the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
Code. The difference lies in the processes used under the dissolution of the
absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the
processes used under the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under
Article 129 of the Family Code.

III. No, he did not.The Decision dated October 10, 2005 has become final and
executory at the time the Motion for Clarification was filed on July 7, 2006. From
the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the RTC’s
Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never raised a
single issue until the decision had already been partially executed. Thus at the
time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the trial court’s decision has
become final and executory. A judgment becomes final and executory when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such
period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself
appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became final.

When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under

Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund
the fruits of their separate property and income from their work or industry, and
divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.” The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of
the separate properties of the spouses and the products of their labor and
industry.

From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts
or properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation
of capitals. In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial court
that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of
them. The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership.
Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the listed properties should be divided equally
between the spouses and/or their respective heirs.

However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share
from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. So, as not to be
confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the
guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate
property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

PREPARED BY: ANGELES, CESLHEE

 CASE NO. 36
ROSARIO MATUTE, TRINIDAD MATUTE, CARLOS MATUTE, MATIAS
MATUTE and RAMON MATUTE, Petitioners v. HON. HIGINO MACADAEG
and HON. MAGNO GATMAITAN, Judges of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch X, and AMADEO MATUTE
FACTS:
In an action for legal separation brought by Armando Medel against Rosario Matute,
upon the ground of adultery committed with his brother and her brother-in-law, Ernesto
Medel
Decision was rendered finding Rosario guilty of the charge against her, decreeing
said legal separation, and awarding to Armando the custody of their four (4) minor
children, Florencia, Manuel, Carmelita and Benito, all surnamed Medel, then 12, 10, 8 and 4
years of age, respectively. Thereafter, Armando went to the United States, leaving the
children in the City of Davao under the care of his sister Pilar Medel, in whose house
Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her offspring. Armando returned to the
Philippines late in 1954. At the close of the then current school year, during which the
children were enrolled in a school in Davao, they joined their father in Cebu. With his
permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila in to attend the funeral of her father.
Armando alleges that he consented thereto on condition that she would return the children
to him within two (2) weeks. However, Rosario did not do so. Instead, she filed, in said civil
case, a motion the praying that after due hearing, the court is to issue an order awarding
the custody of the children to their mother, in deference to the preference expressed by the
children (Sec. 6, Rule 100, Rules of Court); and to order Armando Medel, father of the said
minor children, to support the children by paying their school fees and giving them a
reasonable allowance both items in an amount not less than P200 a month.”
Said motion was based upon the ground that the children three (3) of whom,
namely, Florencia, Manuel and Carmelita, were then 16, 14 and 12 years of age,
respectively do not want to go back to their father, because he “is living with a woman
other than” their mother. Armando opposed this motion and countered with a petition to
declare and punish Rosario for contempt of court, in view of her failure and alleged refusal
to restore the custody of their children to him. After due hearing the Court issued an
absolving Rosario from the charge of contempt of court, she having secured Armando’s
consent before bringing the children to Manila, but denying her motion for their custody
and ordering her to deliver them to Armando within twenty-four (24) hours from notice.
DOCTRINE: 2. HUSBAND AND WlFE; CUSTODY OP MlNOR CHILDREN; GlVEN TO WIFE BY
HUSBAND'S PERMISSION; ITSEFFECT.
—
Since petitioner merely obtained the husband's permission to bring the minor children to
Manila, for the purpose of attending the funeral of their maternal grandfather, petitioner
obtained and has the physical possession of the minors in a precarious manner. She holds it
in the name, on behalf and by authority of husband, whose agent she, in effect, is. He may,
therefore, demand their return at any time, and she is bound to comply immediately with
such demand. She cannot even question his authority to make it, although she is free to
seek a review of the order or decision awarding the custody of minors to him, and to ask
that they be placed under her charge.

PREPARED BY: MANUEL, JESSA

 CASE NO. 37
Laperal vs. Republic
GR No: 6 SCRA 357
October 30,1962

FACTS:
The petitioner’s maiden name is EliseaLaperal. On March 24,1939 she married
Enrique R. Santamaria, that during her marriage she naturally used, instead of her maiden
name, that of Elisea L. Santamaria.
In a partial decision entered on January 18, 1958 Enrique Santamaria he was given
a degree of legal separation from her which later on became final. Aside from the legal
separation from her husband, petitioner ceased to him with him for many years.
In a view of the fact that she has been legally separated from her husband and
ceased to live with him for many years, petitioner asked that she be allowed to change her
name and be permitted to resume her maiden name as EliseaLaperal.
The petition was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that the
same violates the provisions of Article 370(should be 372) of the Civil Code, and that it is
not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The court denied the petition for the reason that
Article 372 of the Civil Code requires the wife, even after she is decreed legally separated
from her husband, to continue using the name and surname she employed before the legal
separation. Upon petitioner’s motion, however, the court, treating the petition as a change
of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition on the ground that to allow the
petitioner, who is a businesswoman decreed legally separated from her husband, to
continue using her married name would arise to confusion in her finances and the eventual
liquidation or the conjugal assets.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in reversing its decision and thereby allowing the
petitioner to use her maiden name.

RULING:
YES
The contention of the Republic finds support in the provisions of Article 372 of the
New Civil Code which states:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even after the separation
that has been decreed, shall continue using her name and surname employed before the
legal separation. This is because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there
being no severance of the vinculum.
The appellee contends that the petition is substantially a change of her name from
Elisea L. Santamaria to EliseaLaperal. Though the procedure in Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court for change of name has been observed, legal separation as the only basis for the
petition, it is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of name, for to hold otherwise
would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Article 372
 As to the petitioner’s contention that the continued use of her husband surname
may cause undue confusion in her finances and the liquidation of the conjugal assets, the
Court finds the argument is without basis. First, these were not the causes upon which the
petition was based, hence, no evidence to this effect had been adduced. And secondly, with
the issuance of the degree of legal separation in 1958, Article 106(2) of the Civil Code says
that the conjugal partnership between the petitioner and her husband had automatically
been dissolved and liquidated; hence there could be no more occasion for an eventual
liquidation of the conjugal assets.
The order of the lower court granting the petition is set aside and petition
dismissed without costs.

PREPARED BY: BALUBAL, JOY

 CASE NO. 38
MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs . DOLORES C. VAZQUEZ
DEARROYO, defendant-appellee
G.R. No. 17014
August 11, 1921
FACTS:
Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vazquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of
wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of
separation, they have lived together as man and until July 4, 1920, when the wife went
away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her
husband. The wife went away from their common home with the intention of living
thenceforth separate from her husband.
After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume
marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the
matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting
the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she
averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by
cruel treatment on the part of her husband.
ISSUES:
1. WON the abandonment of the wife of the marital home has sufficient justification.
2. WON the husband maybe granted the restitution of conjugal rights or absolute
order or permanent mandatory injunction?
HELD:
1. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of
the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal
wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become
involved and would have little significance apart from themorbid condition exhibited by
the wife.he judgment must therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the
marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.
The interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should
move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the
wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state
which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration
it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife
unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and
separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

2. Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province
of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. The property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an
action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction
the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personalright of consortium. At best such an order can be effective
for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the
experience of those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to compel the
cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely
questionable.
We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled tothe
unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile which is
sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a
judicial declaration that his wife has absented herself without sufficient cause and that it is
her duty to return.
PREPARED BY: BANGAYAN, CRISTY
 Case No. 39
Lacson vs Jose-Lacson
G.R. No. L-23482
August 30, 1968
FACTS
On January 9, 1963 the respondent spouse left the conjugal home in Santa Clara
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and commenced to reside in Manila. She filed on March 12, 1963
a complaint docketed as civil case E-00030 in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila (hereinafter referred to as the JDRC) for custody of all their children as well as
support for them and herself. However, the spouses, thru the assistance of their respective
attorneys, succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children,
support, and separation of property. On April 27, 1963 they filed a joint petition dated April
21, 1963, docketed as special proceeding 6978 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (hereinafter referred to as the CFI).
ISSUE
Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties and the judgment
of the CFI grounded on the said agreement, are conformable to law.
RULING
Yes. In the case at bar, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation
of property and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It does not appeal that they
have creditors who will be prejudiced by the said arrangements. It is likewise undisputed
that the couple have been separated in fact for at least five years - the wife's residence
being in Manila, and the husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore,
inasmuch as a lengthy separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing
their financial and proprietary interests is manifest. However, in so approving the regime
of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership,
this Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the
spouses. We agree with the Court of Appeals, however, that the CFI erred in depriving the
mother, the respondent spouse, of the custody of the two older children (both then below
the age of 7). The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article 363
that "No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reasons for such measure." The use of the word shall2 in article 363
of the Civil Code, coupled with the observations made by the Code Commission in respect
to the said legal provision, underscores its mandatory character. It prohibits in no
uncertain: terms the separation of a mother and her child below seven years, unless such
separation is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court. The order dated
April 27, 1963 of the CFI, in so far as it awarded custody of the two older children who
were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, in effect sought to separate them from
their mother. To that extent therefore, it was null and void because clearly violative of
article 363 of the Civil Code. Art 365 of the NCC grants to every child rights which are not
and should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and caprices, of his
parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents' say-so or mutual agreement
alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step
in to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the right granted to him
by law. The need, therefore, to present evidence regarding this matter, becomes
imperative. A careful scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was introduced
in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual agreement of the spouses-parents.
To be sure, this was not a sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the
custodian of the children. Besides, at least one of the children — Enrique, the eldest — is
now eleven years of age and should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live with.
This is the clear mandate of sec. 6, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court Although the spouses have
agreed upon the monthly support of P150 to be given by the petitioner spouse for each
child, still this Court must speak out its mind on the insufficiency of this amount. We, take
judicial notice of the devaluation of the peso in 1962 and the steady skyrocketing of prices
of all commodities, goods, and services, not to mention the fact that all the children are
already of school age. We believe, therefore, that the CFI may increase this amount of P150
according to the needs of each child.

PREPARED BY: LUYUN, NICOLE

 CASE NO: 40
Estrada v. Escritor
AM NO. P-02-1651
June 22, 2006

FACTS:
This admin case was remanded to the Office of the Court Administrator in 2003.
Now, respondent Soledad Escritor, a Jehovah’s Witness believer, invokes her religious
freedom to save her livelihood and family united without the benefit of legal marriage.
Escritor is a court interpreter who was living for 20 years with a man not her
husband, Luciano Quilapio, Jr. They have a child together.
She was filed an admin case by her neighbot Alejandro Estrada for disgraceful and
immoral conduct. Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that
tarnishes the image of the court.
Yet, Escritor said she was already a widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999.
As members of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, they
executed in 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which their elders recognize. This
allows members who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations
provided that no legal impediments are present and they contract with good faith.
The state now seeks to wield its power to regulate her behavior and protect its
interest in marriage and family and the integrity of the courts where respondent is an
employee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the conjugal arrangements of Escritor anchored on here right to

religious freedom be an exemption from the state’s function to protect its interest in
marriage and integrity of the courts, following the benevolent neutrality approach and via
the compelling state interest test.

RULING:
The administrative complaint is denied. Escritor cannot be penalized as her case is
an exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.
All versions of our constitution manifest adherence to the benevolent neutrality
approach that requires accommodations in interpreting religion clauses.
Philippine jurisprudence shows that the Court has allowed exemptions from a law of
general application, interpreting our religion clauses to cover both mandatory and
permissive accommodations.
Applying the compelling state interest test, the court found that the OSG in its
evidence failed to demonstrate the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests which
could limit or override respondents’ fundamental right to religious freedom.
Other than two exhibits, no iota of evidence was presented to prove that a
compelling state interest was present and that it used the least intrusive means possible so
that the free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate
goal of the state.
The Solicitor General failed to appreciate that benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.
 In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the Infinite.

PREPARED BY: GERARD JOSEF LUCENA

 CASE NO: 41
Banaag v. Espeleta
AM NO. P-11-3011
December 16, 2011

FACTS:
Evelina C. Banaag filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) a
complaint charging Olivia C. Espeleta, a court interpreter in Quezon City, with Gross
Immorality and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for engaging in an
illicit and immoral relationship with her husband, Avelino C. Banaag. The three met in a
meeting when Avelino was introduced to Olivia.
Evelina claimed that she learned about the affair the following year, 2006, when her
husband asked to withdraw P180,000.00 from their joint bank account to lend to his
brother, Reynaldo, who was then confined in the hospital. The latter's wife, Ana Fe, said
Avelino gave Reynaldo only P80,000.00.
In one confrontation, Avelino admitted the romantic involvement.
Evelina discovered that her husband, using their conjugal funds, had been
depositing money to Olivia's Landbank account from 2006 to 2009, to the Metrobank
account of Olivia’s daughter, Ana Kharmela E. Rules, and to the Landbank accounts of
Olivia's co-employees.
Evelina claimed that more than P3 Million were deposited to Olivia's account but
she was able to retain in her possession deposit slips amounting only to P1.429 Million,
having lost the others in a scuffle with her husband, who tore them to pieces and flushed
them in the toilet.
The OCA, after serving three unanswered complaints from Olivia, found out that she
has already resigned and that she left for the United States.
The OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular administrative
complaint against Olivia C. Espeleta, that she be found GUILTY of Gross Immoral Conduct,
and be ORDERED to pay a FINE in the amount of P50,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Olivia C. Espeleta is guilty of immoral conduct.

RULING:
The court finds Olivia guilty of Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct under Section
46(b)(5), Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Section 1 of CSC Resolution on Revised Rules on the Administrative Offense of
Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct defines this as an act which violates the basic norm of
decency, morality and decorum abhorred and condemned by the society and conduct
which is willful, flagrant or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the
opinions of the good and respectable members of the community.
The deposit slips credited both directly and indirectly to Olivia's account prove that
she had been receiving substantial amounts of money from Avelino, in callous disregard of
his family. This proves that they were indeed in an intimate relationship.
 In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence (amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion) is
required.
The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to
believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.
The image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of
the personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court
employees have been enjoined to adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency
in their professional and private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity
of courts of justice.
Resignation should not be used either as an escape or as an easy way out to evade
an administrative liability or an administrative sanction. Had respondent not resigned from
the service, she would have been suspended for six months and one.
The Court adopts the OCA's recommended fine in the amount of P50,000.00 not
exceeding respondent's six months' salary, which may be deducted from her accrued leave
credits, if sufficient.

PREPARED BY: GERARD JOSEF LUCENA

 Case No. 42
Santos v. CA
G.R. No. 113054
March 16, 1995

FACTS:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a nurse by
profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union beget only one child, Leouel
Santos, Jr. From the time the boy was released from the hospital until sometime thereafter,
he had been in the care and custody of his maternal grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia
Bedia. Leouel and Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary custody of the Julia's
parents. The latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the subsequent
support of the boy because Leouel could not afford to do so.
Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in May 1988 to work. Respondents
claim that although abroad, their daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them
for her son. On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers visited the Bedia
household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was staying. Respondents contend that through
deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and secretly spirited him away to
his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.

The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor
Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as
respondent. After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued an order on
the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo
and Ofelia Bedia.

Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals.In its decision dated April 30,
1992, respondent appellate court affirmed the trial court's order. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied,petitioner now brings the instant petition for review
for a reversal of the appellate court's decision. The Court of Appeals erred, according to
petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his grandparents and not to himself. He
contends that since private respondents have failed to show that petitioner is an unfit and
unsuitable father, substitute parental authority (Patria Potestas) granted to the boy's
grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.Art. 214. In case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into
account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the
authority.

ISSUE: WON the custody over the child can be awarded to Leouel Sr.

RULING: Yes. The minor should be given to the legitimate father. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what
is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Only in case of the parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent.
The court held the contentions of the grandparents are insufficient as to remove
petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have custody over the minor.
Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the
legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents.
 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof
that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to support the boy. While petitioner's
previous inattention is inexcusable, it cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of
the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only child in his custody
may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award him custody
would help enhance the bond between parent and son.
The Court also held that his being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him
custody over the boy. So many men in uniform, who are assigned to different parts of the
country in the service of the nation, are still the natural guardians of their children.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest custody from him.
The petition was granted. The Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded
to his legitimate father.

PREPARED BY: AGATEP, RON RON

 CASE NO. 43

WILSON SY, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, and
MERCEDES TAN UY-SY, Respondents.

G.R. No. 124518

December 27, 2007

FACTS:
On 19 January 1994, respondent Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas
corpus against petitioner Wilson Sy before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48.
Respondent prayed that said writ be issued ordering petitioner to produce their minor
children Vanessa and Jeremiah before the court and that after hearing, their care and
custody be awarded to her as their mother.
In his answer, petitioner prayed that the custody of the minors be awarded to him
instead. Petitioner maintained that respondent was unfit to take custody of the minors. He
adduced the following reasons: firstly, respondent abandoned her family in 1992; secondly,
she is mentally unstable; and thirdly, she cannot provide proper care to the children.
After trial, the trial court caused the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and
awarded custody of the children to respondent. Furthermore, the Court orders the
respondent to pay by way of monthly support for the minors, the amount of ₱50,000.00
payable to petitioner from [the] date of judgment for failure on the part of respondent to
show by preponderance of evidence that the petitioner is unfit to the custody of the minor
children who are only 6 and 4 years old.

As the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals found no
merit in the appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals did not
find any reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court, particularly petitioner’s failure
to prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent was unfit to take custody over the
minor children.

ISSUE/S:

1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the custody of the minor children
solely to respondent.

2. WON the Court of Appeals erred in awarding the support to the children without the
demand from the petitioner.

RULING:

1. No. There is no merit in the petition regarding the question of care and custody of the
children.
The applicable provision is Section 213 of the Family Code which states that:

Section 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be

exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account
all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
In case of legal separation of the parents, the custody of the minor children shall be
awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of
the minor children. But when the husband and wife are living separately and apart from
each other, without decree of the court, the court shall award the care, custody, and control
of each child as will be for his best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent he
prefers to live with if he is over seven (7) years of age unless the parent so chosen be unfit
to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost
consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned,
taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the
contending parents.
However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody
of her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also
have the advantage and benefit of a mother’s love and devotion for which there is no
substitute.16 Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be replaced by
another and are worth more to a child of tender years than all other things combined. The
Civil Code Commission, in recommending the preference for the mother, explained, thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother
has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother
who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
"compelling reasons" for the good of the child: those cases must indeed be rare, if the
mother’s heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty
of imprisonment and the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment
for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect upon the baby who is as
yet unable to understand the situation.
2. No. Article 203 of the Family Code states that the obligation to give support is
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
Though the respondent did not asked for support before the trial, she already
demanded the need for support during the trial court when she testified regarding the need
for support for the children’s education and other necessities.

Since the issue of support was tried with the implied consent of the parties, it should
be treated in all respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. And since there was
implied consent, even if no motion had been filed and no amendment had been ordered, the
Court holds that the trial court validly rendered a judgment on the issue. Thus, the lower
courts did not err in awarding the support to the respondent.

PREPARED BY: SERRANO, JUSTINE

 Case No. 44
Nerissa Z. Perez, petitioner
Vs.
The Court of Appeals and Ray C. Perez, respondents
GR. No. 118870
March 29, 1996

FACTS:

Ray Perez, private respondent, is a doctor of medicine practicing in Cebu while

Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, is a registered nurse. They married in Cebu on
December 6, 1986. After 6 miscarriages, two operations and a highly-risk pregnancy,
petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York. Petitioner was employed in the
United States in 1988 and became a resident alien in 1992. Private Respondent stayed with
her in the U.S. twice and took care of her while she became pregnant.

The couple and their baby arrived in Cebu on January 17, 1993. After a few weeks,
only the petitioner returned to U.S. When petitioner came home a few days before Ray II’s
first birthday, the couple was no longer in good terms. That their love for each other was
fading became apparent from their serious quarrels. Petitioner did not want to leave her
child with her husband and in-laws. She wished her son to grow up with his mother.

On July 26, 1993, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking private
respondent to surrender the custody of their son.

The trial court ruled in favor but was reversed by the respondent Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the custody of Ray II should be awarded to the mother pursuant to Article
213 of the Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother.

RULING:

Yes.
When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the
applicable. It provides that:

ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be

exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all
relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Italics supplied)

Since the Code does not qualify the word separation to mean legal separation
decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as the petitioner and private
respondent, are covered within its terms.
 Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also contains a similar provision.
The use of word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Section 6 of the
Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

The general rule that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from
his mother finds its raison detre(most important reason) in the basic need of a child for his
mother’s loving care. Only a compelling reasons shall justify the courts awarding the
custody of such child to someone other than his mother. In custody cases, the foremost
consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child. Courts invariably look
into all relevant factors presented by the contending parents, such as their material
resources, social and moral situations.

In the case at bench, financially capacity is not a determinative factor inasmuch as

both parties demonstrated that they have ample means. Respondent court stated that
petitioner has no permanent place of work in USA. The records, however, show that she is
employed in New York hospital and was, at the time the petition was filed, still abroad.

The respondent court also casts doubt on petitioners capability to take care of the
child since she works on 12 hour shift thrice weekly, at times even at night. The conclusion
of Court of Appeals is as unwarranted as it is unreasonable. First, her present work
schedule is not so unmanageable as to deprive her of quality time to her son. Second, many
mother in such position, has invited her own mother or relative to join her abroad, to look
after the child until he is able to take care of himself. Third, private respondent’s work
schedule was s not presented at the trial which should provide proof that he can always
find time for his son. Fourth, the fact that private respondent near his parents and sister is
not crucial in this case. Fifth, petitioners work schedule is not necessarily permanent.
Finally, it does not follow that petitioner values her career more than her family simply
because she want to work abroad

PREPARED BY: REINER P. CARDENAS

 CASE NO. 45
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and
ROSARIO C. SALIENTES
Vs.
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO SABUNDAYO, JR.,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY
G.R. No. 162734
August 29, 2006

FACTS:
Loran S.D. Abanilla and Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the
minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonettes parents,
petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private
respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the Salientes. Thereafter, he was
prevented from seeing his son.
Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a Petition
for Habeas Corpus and Custody,docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the Respondents
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are
hereby directed to produce and bring before the Trial Court the body of minor Lorenzo
Emmanuel Salientes Abanilla and to show cause why the said child should not be
discharged from restraint.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but was
dismissed. The CA stated that the order of the trial court did not award custody but was
simply a standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The trial court
was still about to conduct a full inquiry.

ISSUE:
 Whether the remedy of the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus is available to the
father.

RULING:
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a
person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and
petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently
joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has
yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case,
private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged
in his petition.Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a
person entitled thereto.Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and
petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently
joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has
yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case,
private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged
in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition
for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration. The Child and Youth
Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.Again, it bears
stressing that the order did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private respondent is
prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with the directive in Section 9 of A.M. 03-04-
04-SC that within fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the period
to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the respondent (herein petitioners)
to present the minor before the court. This was exactly what the court did.

Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of
custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners
can raise it as a counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But it is not
a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. Nothing in the said provision
disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.

PREPARED BY: MALSI, SARAH JOY

 CASE NO. 46
Tenchavez vs. Escano
15 SCRA 355
Reyes, J

FACTS:
The case at bar is a direct appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu denying the claim of Pastor Tenchavez for legal separation and one million peso in
damages against his wife Vicenta Escano and parents-in-law namely Mamerto and Mena
Escano.

27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer,
and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. MoisesLavares. The marriage was a
culmination of the love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil
registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an
amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she
and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage
in a church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to
Vicenta’sdad , he disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents
in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.

On June 1950 Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when
it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against
Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of
Nevada. In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escano filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to
annul their daughter’s marriage to Pastor. On 1954 Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8,
1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have
dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano abroad is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it
would be a patent violation of the declared public policy of the state specially Article 17
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich
citizens who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano
with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by
Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano’s marriage remains
subsisting and undissolved. She is subject to Article 15 of the Civil Code at the the time the
divorce decree was issued because they are both Filipino citizen. A foreign divorce
between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is the marriage
of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by Vicenta entitled Pastor Tenchavezfor damages prayed for.
DECISION

 Adjudging Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant

Vicenta F. Escaño;

 Sentencing Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of

P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;

 Sentencing Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, MamertoEscaño and the estate of
his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

PREPARED BY: APOSTOL, CORINA

 CASE No. 47
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 139 SCRA 139 (1985)
L-68470
OCTOBER 8, 1985

FACTS:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. They established their residence in
the Philippines. They were divorced in Nevada, U.S.A in 1982 and the petitioner has re-
married also in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. On June 8, 1983, private respondent filed a
suit against petitioner in the RTC of Pasay stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila is a conjugal property of the parties and asking that petitioner be ordered to render
an accounting of that business and that private respondent be declared with the right to
manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
case of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that they had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Decree of Divorce has no bearing in the
case. The denial is now the subject of this Certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the Nevada Divorce Decree is valid and binding in the Philippines
RULING:
Yes. Owing to the Nationality Principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorce the same being
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to
their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage according to the standards of American Law. He would have no standing to sue in
the case as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
estopped by his own representation before the Nevada Court from asserting his right over
the alleged property. On the other hand, petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with observe respect and fidelity and render support to private respondent. She should not
be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice is to be served.
Note: The marriage and resolution of this case transpired before the Family Code.
Petitioner: Alice Reyes Van Dorn
Respondents: Hon. Manuel Romillo, Jr. , presiding RTC judge Richard Upton, private
respondent

PREPARED BY: DADHWAL, RAAMAH ELISHA

 CASE NO. 48
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somero
G.r. No. 80116
July 20, 1989

FACTS:
On September 7, 1979, petitioner, Imelda ManalaysayPilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erick Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married at
Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. As a result, a child was born named
Isabel PilapilGeiling. After about three and a half years of marriage, marital discord set in
followed by a de facto separation. On January 15, 1986, a decree of divorce was granted by
the Division 20 of the Schoenberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany on the ground
of failure of marriage of the spouses which divorce proceedings was initiated by the private
respondent in said court in Jan. 1983. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner. The petitioner, then, in Jan. 1983 filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before the RTC of Manila which civil case was still pending. The
records show that under the German Law said court was locally and internationally
competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally
founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. On June 27,
1986 or five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two
complaints of adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married the
to the respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia in 1982 (Criminal
Case No. 87-52435) and James Chua in 1983 (Criminal Case No. 52435) . The respondent
city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of the two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to defer her arraignment and to suspend
further proceedings. A motion to quash was also filed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
on Criminal Case No. 87-52435 which motion was denied by the respondent judge. The
petitioner then prays for a TRO seeking an annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondent can prosecute the petitioner on the ground
of adultery committed by the latter during their marriage and whose complaints of
adultery were filed after the issuance of the divorce decree.

HELD:
No. Under Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code specifically provides that in
prosecutions for adultery and concubinage , the only person who can legally file the
complaint should be the OFFENDED SPOUSE. The initiator must have the status, capacity,
or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal complaint. Since the
private respondent or the innocent spouse has validly obtained a divorce decree of their
marriage in Germany and the criminal complaint of adultery was only filed after such
decree, the private respondent, therefore, has no longer the right to institute such
proceeding against the petitioner. He no longer has the status of “offended spouse” at the
time of the filing of the complaint. The questioned order denying the motion to quash is
SET ASIDE and another one DISMISSING the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435
(People vs Pilapil and William Chia) for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued is made
PERMANENT.

Ratio: Article 344, RPC and Art. 15, Civil Code (Nationality Principle)

PREPARED BY: DUMOCLOY, JESA

 Case No. 49
Case Title: Republic of the Philippines v. CiprianoOrbecido III
G.R. No. 154380

FACTS:
On May 24, 1981, CiprianoOrbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was
blessed with a son and a daughter, KristofferSimbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer.
A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by
him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding
merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable
to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.[6]
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case
but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which
capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

ISSUES:
1. WON the remedy of CiprianoOrbecido III is to file either the petition for annulment
or petition for legal separation.
2. WON CiprianoOrbecido III can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

HELD:
1. No. The Court is unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even
feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of
validity. On the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would
not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain
married to the naturalized alien spouse.
2. Yes. If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed
as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph
2 of Article 26 as follows:
a. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
b. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
 In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was
still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would
have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus,Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to
remarry.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce
as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law
must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other
fact, such laws must be alleged and proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article
26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to
enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a
Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship
and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is
no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on
respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had
obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The

assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboangadel Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

PREPARED BY: AGUEDAN, JASMIN ZYRA M.

 CASE NO: 50
FE D. QUITA VS. CA and BLANDINA DANDAN
GR NO. 124862
December 22, 1998
FACTS:
On May 1941 Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the
Philippines. They were not blessed with children. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in
USA. She obtained a final judgment of divorce on July 1954. Three weeks thereafter she
married Felix in the same locality but they also ended in divorce. She married for the third
time, a certain Felix Tupaz. Arturo died on April 1972 without leaving a will. On August
1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed before the RTC of Quezon City a petition for issuance of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favour of the Philippine Trust Company.
Respondent DAndan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of the deceased, and her 6
children opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
Cabasal. It was resolved in her favour. Upon motion of the oppositors, Cabasal was replaced
by Higino Castillon. Later Ruperto Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of
Arturo, intervened. The RTC held that a foreign divorce between a Filipino citizens sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code is not recognized. Neither did it
consider the extrajudicial settlement of conjugal property due to lack of judicial approval. It
opined that no marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo and no evidence
were shown that the 6 children were acknowledge by the deceased. Only petitioner and
Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Equal adjudication of the net
hereditary estate was ordered in favour of the two intestate heirs. Blandina and her
children appealed and alleged that the case was decided without a hearing.
ISSUES:
WON Blandina is the rightful heir of the deceased.
WON Fe Quita has the right to to inherit from the deceased as his surviving spouse.
RULING:
No. Private respondent’s claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court.
She and Arturo were married in April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the
beginning under Art. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving
spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.
Regarding the second issue, the case must be remanded to the trial court because
the trial court did not ascertain the citizenship of petitioner when the divorce decree was
obtained.

PREPARED BY: KARL JEREMY F. LLANTO

 Case no. 51
Llorente vs. Ca
G.R.No. 124371
November 23, 2000
FACTS:
Lorenzo Llorente was listed as serviceman of the United States navy from March 10,
1927 to September 30, 1957. In 1937, Lorenzo and Paula were married in Nabua,
Camarines Sur. In 1943, Lorenzo got his American citizenship issued in his favor by District
Court in New York. In 1945, Lorenzo was permitted to leave the navy for a visit in the
Philippines. Upon his return, he discovered that his wife was pregnant and living in and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. On February 2, 1946,
they executed a written agreement wherein Lorenzo refused to give her monetary support,
they will dissolved their marital union that includes their properties. The agreement was
signed by both of them and was notarized. Later, Lorenzo return to the United States and
filed a divorce in California for which it was granted and a decree of divorce became final.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia and produced three children. In 1981,
Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left all his estate to Alicia and their
children. Lorenzo also filed for probate where Alicia be appointed as a Special
Administratrix of his estate. The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision declaring that
the divorce decree grabted to them abroad was void and inapplicable here in the
Philippines. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court with some
modifications.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower courts erred in declaring that the divorce granted to them
abroad was void and inapplicable in the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes. The fact that the late Lorenzo Llorente became an American citizen, the divorce
decree he obtained abroad was without question. The rule is, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law. Hence, when he obtained
the divorce decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen Lorenzo was no longer a
Filipino, Philippine laws relating to family rights, duties, or status are no longer applicable
to him. This is pursuant to Article 15 of the Civil Code. With respect to the successional
rights and the validity of the will, the Court remands the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinaic validity of Lorenzo's will and it is to determine the effects of
the divorce as to the successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs. He was a foreigner, not
covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity and is
not covered by our laws on succession. This ia pursuant to Article 17 of the Civil Code. The
case was remanded to the lower court where the foreign law must be alleged in order to
prove the validity of the will. Prepared by: Pamittan, Lawrence Mark

PREPARED BY: PAMITTAN, LAWRENCE

 CASE NO.: 52
Garcia v Recio
GR 138322
October 2, 2001

FACTS:

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian, on March

1987.They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of
divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Petitioner, Grace Garcia, a

Filipina, and respondent were married on January 1994. In their application for a marriage
license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Starting October 1995, petitioner
and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.On
March 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriagein the court a
quo, on the ground of bigamy - respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her. She claimed that she learned of respondent’s marriage toEditha
Samson only in November 1997.

In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to
petitioner his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution. He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in
Australia in 1989; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. On July
1998 - while the suit for the declaration of nullity was pending - respondent was able to
secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because the marriage had
irretrievably broken down.The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground
that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines.

ISSUE: WON the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia legally capacitated him to marry
petitioner

RULING:

The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving
evidence which would conclusively show respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner.

Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January
1994. The court also agree with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in finding
that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry
without requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second
marriage.

Neither can the court grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent
null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence,
the court believes that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to
receive evidence, if any, which show petitioner’s legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing
in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties’ marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Metro Manila dated March 1987 and the other, in
Cabanatuan City dated January 1994.

PREPARED BY: EBOY, APOLINARIO JR. B.

 CASE NO. 53
CORPUZ V STO. TOMAS

FACTS:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor,
Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce
decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to
love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.1[6]

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce

and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although
summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and,
in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest
with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,2[7] the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC
concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled
that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code,in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the
Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief,
similar to that filed in Orbecido;he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that
the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil
Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,both support Gerbert’s position.

Gerbert made a direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 f the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that the alien spouse (Gerbert) can claim no right under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is
in favor of the Filipino spouse.
 The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void3[15] and
voidable4[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute
nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on
the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino

and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under
the Freedom Constitution,enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in

accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is

validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for
the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts
created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces
cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule
and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino
spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that
the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability
of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse
can claim no right under this provision.

However, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of
foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a

judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,

the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person,

the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by

evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.
Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.This means that the
foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for
the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having
legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree,
as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,but failed to include a copy of
the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we deem it more appropriate to remand
the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the
Canadian divorce law.

A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself,
as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108
of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceedingby which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with
our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No
costs.

--------------------------------------------------------the end ---------------------------------------------------

Dear guys,

You might want to consider the additional observations of the SC in this case as well as
corrections made by the Supreme Court on the proper procedures to follow in filing
petition for recognition of a divorce decree as well as change or correction of Civil Status of
persons the civil registry.

As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has
already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the recording to be legally
improper because there was no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without
authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that acts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry
in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations,
more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his
being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a

person’s legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
registry:
 Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the
civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in
their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the

marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved
marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and

naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context
of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree.
Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of
law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
 Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 19825 both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary
to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellationof the
entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of
the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries
in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC
of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;6[38] that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;7[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.8[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not
been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as
one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the
civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceedingby which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11 order. We
order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with
our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No
costs.

PREPARED BY: SORIANO, LERMA

 Case No.: 54
Fujiki v. Marinay
196049
June 26, 2013

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Order dated January 31, 2011 of the RTC and its Resolution dated March 2,
2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and dismissing the petition for
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”
based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner to file the petition.
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married respondent Maria Paz
GalelaMarinay in the Philippines on January 23, 2004, but said marriage did not sit well
with the petitioner’s parents, thus, Fujiki could not bring her to Japan where he resides.
Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara, and without the first marriage being dissolved, they got married in May
15, 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan, however, she
allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and were able to reestablish their relationship,
wherein, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On
January 14, 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” The RTC immediately dismissed the
petition and withdrew the case from its active civil docket citing A.M. 02-11-10-
SCprovisions. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
RULING:
No. A.M. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an
action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. A foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however,
recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the FC, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
decree abroad. The principle in Article 26 of the FC applies in a marriage between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen who obtains foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage is
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated. The Supreme Court
held that there is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
Japanese family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. Again, while the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void ab initio under Art. 35 (4) of the Family Code.
Also, Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, even though living abroad. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
Petition granted. The Order and Resolution of the RTC are reversed and set aside.
The RTC is ordered to reinstate the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
decision.

PREPARED BY: PALATAN, ROSELYNE

 Case No:55
Medina vs Koike
Gr No: 215723
July 27,2016

FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla Medina (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent
Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, and Fuka Koike.

On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced
on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate7 and the same was duly recorded in the
Official Family Register of Michiyuki Koike.

Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage9 on
file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a
petition10 for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code11 before the RTC.
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents to support her petition.

In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition. Doreen's motion
for reconsideration was subsequentlydenied in a Resolution dated November 28, 2014.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce.

RULING:

NO.
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which
addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner -
allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision
reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.The law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the
effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.

Nevertheless, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, the Court ruled tha the starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained
that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself.

Thus, in Garcia v. Recio, it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown
that the divorce decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign
laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and
the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other.

Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of
factual issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions. 32 In
this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered
by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in
accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

Paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which states that an appeal
by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting
issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate
action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are
involved shall final.Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to
either dismiss the appeal or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in
the instant appeal and substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred
to the CA for further appropriate proceedings.

In the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is hereby
REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of
evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance with
this Decision.

PREPARED BY: BALUBAL, JOY

 CASE NO. 56
YASIN V SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT SCRA

FACTS:
May 5, 1990 Hatima C. Yasin Muslim Filipino filed in the Sharia District Court in
Zamboanga City duly represented by her elder brother and atty-in-fact Hadji Hasan
S. Centi a Petition to resume the use of her maiden name after the dissolution of her
marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Law of the Philippines to Hadji Idris
Yasin also a Muslim Filipino.
Therafter Yasin contracted another marriage to another woman, wherefore invoking
the provisions of Article 143 par 1 (c) of PD 1803 in relation to Article 371 (2) of the
NCC, Petitioner be allowed to resume her maiden name Hatima Centi Y Saul.
On July 4, 1990 The respondent court denied the petition on the ground that the
petition is substantially for change of name and that compliance with the provisions
of Rule 103 Rules of Court on change of name is necessary if the position is to be
granted.
Hatima filed for Motion for reconsiderration alleging that the Petition is not covered
by Rule 103 Rules of Court but merely a Petition to resume the use of her maiden
name and surname after the after the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under
the Code of Muslim Law of the Philippines and after the marriage of her former
husband to another woman.
Aug 10 1990 the Motion was denied.
ISSUE:
1. Does Petitioner seek to change her registered name?
2. In case the marriage ties no longer exist (as in the case of death, divorce,
annulment), Does women need to seek judicial confirmation of the change in their
civil status in order to revert to their maiden name?

RULING:
The Court rules in negative.
The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the civil
register. While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no person can
change his name or surname without judicial authority, nonetheless, the only name
that may be changed is the true and official name recorded in the Civil Register. A
name given to a person in the church record or elsewhere or by which he is known
in the community - when at variance with that entered in the Civil Register - is
Unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name.
Petioner's registered name is Hatima Centi Y Saul, In the instant petition, petitioner
does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she be
allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her
marriage, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
(Art. 45 PD 1803) and under Art 54 of the same code a) the marriage bond shall be
severed and the spouses may contract another marriage in accordance with this
code:
Article 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such
as "Mrs."
Article 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she
shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may
resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue
employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek judicial authority to
use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs." before her husband's full name
or by adding her husband's surname to her maiden first name. The law grants her
such right (Art. 370, Civil Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no
longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the
Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the
change in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her
former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her.
When petitioner married her husband, she did not change her name but only her
civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname
of her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the husband's
surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage and after the death of
the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal separation.
Rule 103 of Rules of Court on change of name is not applicable to judicial
confirmation of the right of the divorced woman to resume the use of her maiden
name and surname.
Petition for confirmation of change of Civil Status and/or resume of the use of
maiden name must be given due course and granted as in fact it is right conferred by
the law.
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by petitioner
before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary proceeding since the law
requires her to do so as her former husband is already married to another woman
after obtaining a decree of divorce from her in accordance with Muslim laws.
The Petition is Granted the orders of Respondent Court dated July 4, 1990 and
August 10, 1990 are herby SET ASIDE.

PREPARED BY: SANTOS, LAUREAN

 CASE NO. 57
GARCIA vs. SANTIAGO
G.R. NO. L-28904
December 29, 1928

FACTS:

Plaintiff Cipriana Garcia alleges in her complaint that she was married to defendant
Isabelo Santiago since 1910. They lived together as husband and wife when plaintiff was
compelled to leave the conjugal dwelling because of continued family dissentions. She
alleged that the son of Isabelo by his first wife, Alejo Santiago, and her daughter by her first
husband, Prisca Aurelio had an illicit relation. Defendant seemed to have countenanced the
illicit relations between Alejo and Prisca instead of vindicating the honor of plaintiff’s
daughter by requiring their marriage. Palintiff also asserted that defendant had been
conveying their conjugal properties including the lands acquired during their marriage to
Alejo in order to foster the latter’s whims and caprices, to the prejudice of plaintiff’s rights.
Moreover, defendant publicly maintained an illicit relationship with a certain Geronima
Yap.

The plaintiff and defendant’s quarrel on these matters culminated in their

separation in February 1925 which became necessary to avoid personal violence. Plaintiff
repeatedly demanded for support from defendant, however, defendant continuously
refused to do so. Thus, she demanded that she is entitled to a monthly allowance of
P500.00 in consideration of their conjugal partnership and that the Court should restrain
defendant form conveying or attempting to convey any property of their conjugal
partnership. Furthermore, because defendant is unfit to administer the same on the
grounds of his immoral acts, the administration of their conjugal partnership should be
transferred to her.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not plaintiff and defendant’s separation is unjustified.

II. Whether the Court erred in dissolving the preliminary injunction and refusing to set
aside the transfer of property made by defendant in favor of Alejo.

III. Whether the Court erred in not granting the right to administer the conjugal
property to the plaintiff.

IV. Whether the Court erred in not granting the other remedies prayed for in the
complaint.

RULING:

I. NO. It clearly appears that the spouses lead a stormy life following the dishonor of
plaintiff’s daughter, Prisca, because of her illicit relation with Alejo. Thus, causing
 plaintiff to leave the conjugal home due to defendant’s order and threats to ill-treat
her if she returns home. Notwithstanding that the alleged pregnacy of Prisca caused
by Alejo is probably unfounded, it is unimaginable for the plaintiff to let them
continue their illicit relations for it would subsequently create a very embarrassing
situation to her.

In consideration of these facts, the Court held that the plaintiff’s separation from her
husband is not unjustified. Moreover, compelling them to continue cohabiting as
husband and wife could lead to further quarrels. Thus, separation seems necessary.

II. NO. The plaintiff has failed to prove that the property conveyed to Alejo belongs to
the conjugal property; instead, documentary evidence proved that said property
was acquired by Isabelo before his marriage to the plaintiff.

III. NO. The Court found no sufficient reason for depriving the husband from his right to
administer such conjugal property.

IV. NO. The Court finds no error in not granting the plaintiff the allowance for
attorney’s fees. Moreover, the monthly allowance of P500 prayed for in the
complaint is too much, thus, subject to modification. The Court held that an
allowance of P50 monthly to be paid within the first 10 days of the month is all that
ought to be granted to the plaintiff.

PREPARED BY: REALYN M. PALLAY

 CASE NO. 58
ELOISA GOITIA VS. JOSE CAMPOS RUEDA
GR NO. 11263
NOVEMBER 21, 1916
FACTS:
This is an action for support by Eloisa Goitia against Campos Rueda.
Eloisa and Campos were legally married and thereafter lived together for about a
month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home because of the reason that the
defendant demanded her to perform “unchaste and lascivious acts” on her genitals;
defendant made other lewd demands; and defendant maltreated petitioner by word and
deed on the ground that the latter refused to do any of the defendant’s demands other than
legal and valid cohabitation. Petitioner filed an action against her husband for support
outside their conjugal domicile. The trial court ruled in favour of respondent and stated
that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home
unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed a motion for review.
ISSUE: WON Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal abode.
HELD:
Yes. The husband was held liable to support his wife. Art. 143 of the Civil Code
provides that the husband who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfil the obligations
either by maintining her in his own home at his own option. However, this option given by
law is not absolute. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms
of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation,
the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not
permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in
the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as
damages or as a penalty; nor is a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but rather a
judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the
sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and
purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and
indulges in the habit of assaulting her. In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the
conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can
therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the
conjugal home. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not
an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and
inviolable in its nature; it is merely stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in
so far only as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public peace and
morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever impair the marriage
contract of for any purpose place the wife in the situation of feme sole.
 PREPARED BY: RUCHELLE ANN A. GALAMGAM

Case No. 59
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGAR JUMAWAN
G.R. No. 187495
April 21, 2014

FACTS:
Edgar Jumawan, the accused-appellant, was charged of two informations of Rape
before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro City by KKK, his wife. Contrary to and in violation of R.A.
8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, Jumawan pleaded not guilty.
During the trial, KKK averred that conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused. However, after quite some time, the latter started
to be brutal in bed. Consequently, they started quarrelling upon his complaint that she
failed to attend to him. Thus, on October 16 and 17, 1998, accused raped KKK even before
the presence of their children.
On the other hand, accused denied raping his wife. He asserted that KKK merely
fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control and
management of their businesses as well as the possession of some of their properties.
Moreover, KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs.
The RTC ruled in favor of the prosecution. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the
RTC ruling. It rejected the accused’s argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife
with mutual obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing
physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK.
Hence, a petition for review.

ISSUES:
1. WON consent to copulation is presumed between husband and wife?
2. WON the evidentiary rules on rape should be applied differently to accused, being
the husband of KKK?

RULINGS:
1. No. The Philippines recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as
the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality
between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to
modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to
achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar
as it eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband
has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every
act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.A man
who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will, commits sexual
violence upon her and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.It is true that
the Family Codeobligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions
affection and sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and
mutualand not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
2. No. The definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as
traditionally known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim
is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all three forms of the crime
shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and
those committed without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women
raped by their husband and those raped by any other man alike.Since the law does
not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for
different definition or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply
what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation and
unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct
or stricter evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its
victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify them differently from the victims
of non-marital rape.Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to
apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any differently if the aggressor is the
woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a
moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal
relationship between the accused and his accuser.

PREPARED BY: ARAGON, CELINE JOY

 CASE NO: 60
Garcia v. Drilon and Jaype-Garcia
G.R. No. 179267
2013

FACTS:

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002. They had 3 children, namely: Jo-Ann
J. Garcia (17 yo), who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent
adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia (6 yo), and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia (3 yo).

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life
revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese
descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and
children.
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent
physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private
respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and
hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that
caused some bleeding. Petitioner also sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann.
He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. Even the small boys are aware of
private respondent's sufferings.

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and
in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
Their Children”. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and
economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep
wells. He is the President of 3 corporations which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. Unfortunately, until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given
private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise
to millions of pesos.
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against
the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO on
March 24, 2006 effective for 30 days.

During the pendency of the case petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition, with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being in violation of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being
"an unwanted product of an invalid law."
 However, the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise
the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is
clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A.
9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by
the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

ISSUES:

1. WON the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that, the
petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
2. WON the Court of Appeals committed serious error in failing to conclude that R.A.
9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.
3. WON the Court of Appeals committed grave mistake in not finding that R.A. 9262
runs counter to the due process clause of the constitution.
4. WON the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the law does violence to the
policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution.

RULING:

1. NO. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute. Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 should have been raised at the earliest opportunity in
his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.

Notwithstanding the procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.
We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of
constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private respondent's
plea in her Comment to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

2. NO. We find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be
discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification
under the law.

3. NO. R.A. 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. A
protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against
women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm,
minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability
to regain control of their life.

The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right
to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without
notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough
to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the same way, the
 victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of
her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were required before
such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting
vital public interests, among which is protection of women and children from
violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

4. NO. Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of

encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed
policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution."

But, under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case
or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-
explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and
Family Violence as follows:

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a

proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the
issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is
somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of
protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate
equally with the person against whom the protection order has been sought.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.

PREPARED BY: IGNACIO, GRACHEL S.

 CASE NUMBER: 61
GO - TAN vs. SPOUSES TAN
G.R. NO.: 168852
September 30, 2008
FACTS:

Petitioner Sharica Mari Go-Tan married Steven Tan in 1999 and two children were born
out of the marriage. Barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a petition with
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against Steven and her
parents-in-law, respondents Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan for causing her verbal,
psychological and economic abuses in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h)
(5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262 otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and Children Act of 2004.

Petitioner's prayer for the Temporary Restraining Order was granted. However,
respondents contended that the Regional Trial Court lack jurisdiction over their persons as
they are not among the persons liable as enumerated under R.A. 9262 by virtue of the
principle 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius".

Subsequently, the petitioned was dismissed. Petitioner moved for a motion for
consideration asserting the application of the Doctrine of Necessity in the broader interest
of substantial justice and due process. The motion was denied on the grounds that the
inclusion of the respondents under the coverage of RA 9262 would be a strained
interpretation of the provisions of said law.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondents may be included in the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order
in accordance with R.A. 9262.

RULING:

Yes. The Court held that the respondents may also be held liable for violation of RA
9262 through the application of the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised
Penal Code. A provision of RA 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code (Section 47), which allows legal principles of the Revised Penal Code to
be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A.
9262.

Settled is the rule that "once conspiracy or action in concert to accomplish a criminal
design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary since all the conspirators are
principals." Therefore, the principle "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" finds no
application in this case because it is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction” and
not of universal application nor is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of
discovering legislative intent when the provision of the law is not clear.
 However, proving conspiracy is a matter of evidence and can be best decided after
fullblown trial on the merits.

PREPARED BY: REALYN M. PALLAY

FOR YOUR REFERENCE:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with
the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial

support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;

(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,

business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely
controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;

(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,

that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

Section 47. Suppletory Application – For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code
and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application.

Article 8 (Revised Penal Code). Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. -

Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the
law specially provides a penalty therefor. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
 CASE NO: 62
PELAYO vs. LAURON

G.R. NO. : L-4089 (12 Phil 453)

January 12, 1909

FACTS:

On the 23rd of November, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaintagainst Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abellarender medical assistance to their
daughter-in-lawwho was about to give birth to a child, and after consultation with the
attendingphysician,Dr. Escaño, it was found necessary, on account of the difficult birth, to
remove the fetusby means of forceps which operation was performed by the plaintiff, who
also had to remove theafterbirth, he visited the patient several times; that the just and
equitable value of the servicesrendered by him was P500, which the defendants refuse to
pay without alleging any good reasontherefor; that for said reason he prayed that the
judgment be entered in his favor as against thedefendants, or any of them, for the sum of
P500 and costs, together with any other relief that mightbe deemed proper.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendants should be held liable for the fees demanded by the
plaintiff upon rendering medical assistance to the defendants’ daughter-in-law.

RULING:

No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are created by law, by
contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicitacts and omissions or by those in which any kind
of fault ornegligence occurs. Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those
expressly determined in the code or in special laws, etc.,are the only demandable ones.
Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties and
must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts.1090 and 1091.) The rendering
of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to
which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.)

If every obligation consists in giving, doing or not doing something (art. 1088), and
spouses aremutually bound to support each other, there can be no question but that, when
either of them byreason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other is
under the unavoidableobligation to furnish the necessary services of a physician in order
that health may be restored, andhe or she may be freed from the sickness by which life is
jeopardized; the party bound to furnishsuch support is therefore liable for all expenses,
including the fees of the medicalexpert for hisprofessional services.

In the face of the above legal precepts, it was unquestionable that the person bound
to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he rendered to the
daughter-in-law of the defendants during her childbirth, was the husband of the patient
and not her father and mother- in-law of the defendants herein.

PREPARED BY: MAMAUAG, MITZ ANNE D.