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Before the election of 2000, only three Presidents took office without winning the popular vote: John Quincy Adams
in 1824, Rutherford B. Hayes in 1976, and Benjamin Harrison in 1888. In 1824, Adams, Andrew Jackson, Speaker of
the House Henry Clay, and Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford sought the Presidency. This was the first
time in American history when a majority of the twenty-four states conducted direct popular elections. Prior to this time,
most states chose electors to the Electoral College by vote of the state legislature. Jackson was the clear popular vote
winner with 152,933 votes compared to 115,696 for Adams. Despite Jackson’s popular vote advantage, he failed to
obtain a majority of the electoral votes cast. In the election that followed in the House of Representatives, Clay threw
his support to Adams, who won on the first ballot.
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, the Governor of Ohio won the 1886 presidential election after intense and most
likely fraudulent dealing. New York Governor Samuel J. Tilden, the Democratic nominee, won the popular vote by
more than 250,000. The Republicans quickly realized that if Hayes could overturn Tilden’s apparent victories in South
Carolina, Florida, and Louisiana, he could defeat Tilden by a single electoral vote. Using a variety of corrupt tactics,
Republicans went to work on changing the outcome in these three states. These states submitted two sets of returns;
Congress set up a special commission to settle the dispute. The commission’s Republican majority sided with Hayes in
each dispute, and Congress ultimately certified the election.
The election of 1888 was the last time until 2000 that a popular vote loser gained the Presidency. Republicans
nominated Benjamin Harrison of Indiana to challenge the Democrat incumbent, President Grover Cleveland. Cleveland
won the popular vote by 110,476 out of 11,381,032 votes cast. But Harrison defeated Cleveland in New York by a
mere 13,373 votes and gained the states’ all-important thirty-six electoral votes, which were enough to deny Cleveland
a second term.
Many historians claim that only the 2000 election can be seen as a clear example of a President being elected
without receiving more votes than his opponent. In the election of 1824, six of the twenty-four states still chose their
electors in the state legislature — there was thus no popular vote in these states. Some of these states, such as
sizeable New York, would likely have given very large majorities to Adams had they conducted a popular election. In
1876, Samuel J. Tilden won both the popular vote and the electoral vote. But the Confederate states were still under
military occupation, and the electoral boards in Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina disqualified enough Democratic
ballots to give Hayes, the Republican candidate, the electoral majority. The ability to engage in such behavior was
outlawed in 1887 when Congress enacted legislation that delegated to each state the final authority to determine the
legality of its electors. That legislation remains in effect today so that the events of 1876 will not repeat themselves.
The election of 1888 was a clouded election. Although the Electoral College did deprive the popular vote winner,
Grover Cleveland, of victory, neither candidate received a majority and Cleveland’s margin was only 110,000 votes.
Moreover, the claim was made, and was widely accepted at the time and by scholars since, that white election officials
in the South banned perhaps 300,000 black Republicans from the polls. Defenders of George Bush dismiss the
significance of the difference in 2000, pointing out that Gore’s popular vote surpluses were mainly among the West
Coast and North East Coast states. They claim it is clear that Gore won a plurality of the popular vote only because
these two regions are the most populated. Bush won more states in the largest regions of the country. He won two-
thirds of the smaller states, almost half of the larger states and a total of thirty of fifty of the states while accumulating
less than 0.5% fewer votes than Gore.
even though he received only forty-one percent of the statewide vote. George H.W. Bush received thirty-six percent
and Reform Party candidate Ross Perot received twenty-three percent.
After each state holds its popular election and appoints a corresponding slate of electors, the electors meet in their
respective states to cast their ballots for the President and Vice President.
The United States Constitution does not require electors to follow the state’s popular vote. Electors, in theory, have
discretion to vote for the candidate of their choice. States, however, do have the power to require their electors, either
by legislation or a pledge to follow the state’s popular vote. Only twenty-four states and the District of Columbia have
chosen to require their electors to follow the popular vote.
In theory, the electors for the remaining twenty-six states are free to cast their votes for whomever they choose. In
reality, the political parties who select the electors for their candidates expect electors to cast their votes in accordance
with the popular vote of the state. Electors are call “faithless electors” when they cast their ballots in ways other than
that directed by the popular vote of the state. In past presidential elections, votes cast by faithless electors have never
had an impact on which candidate won the election. In an election as close as the 2000 election, faithless electors
could have changed the outcome of the election.
After the popular vote has been decided in the election of each state, the electors meet in the capital of each state
to cast their electoral votes, one each for President and one each for Vice President. The electoral votes are sealed
and sent from each state to the President of the United States Senate who opens and reads them before both houses
of Congress. The presidential and vice presidential winners are the candidates with a majority of the electoral votes.
Currently, 270 electoral votes are needed for a majority.
The Constitution provides that if no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes, the election will “default” to
the House of Representatives, who shall select the President. Representatives from each state collectively have one
vote (only one vote per state). The candidate who receives a majority of the states’ votes becomes President. If
necessary, the Senate chooses the Vice President in a like manner. In any candidate fails to obtain a majority in the
House of Representatives by the fourth day of the March of the following year, the Vice President, as selected by the
Senate shall act as President.
In a hypothetical election, the House must choose the President. Each state is given only one vote. The states with
a majority of Republican Representatives will likely choose the Republican candidate, and the states with a majority of
Democratic Representatives vote for the Democratic candidate. In other words, the Representatives will likely vote
along party lines, and not necessarily in accordance with the popular vote of their home state.
PRO STRATEGIES
There are a number of excellent strategies available to PRO debaters on this topic. The first strategy is to define
the Electoral College as a voting system that is fundamentally undemocratic because it violates the foremost
democratic principle that the votes of all citizens must be counted as equal. This is a fundamental principle of American
democracy found in the Declaration of Independence and in the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. No citizen should have his/her vote count more than the vote of any other citizen.
Senator Richard Durbin of Illinois explained it well when he said, “Imagine for a moment if you were told as follows: We
want you to vote for President; we are going to give you one vote in selection of the President, but a neighbor of yours
is going to have three votes in selecting the President. You would say that is not American; that it is fundamentally
unfair. We live in a nation that is one-person-one citizen, one vote. But that is exactly what the Electoral College does.”
The Electoral College violates the principle of equality in voting in at least three ways. First, the distribution of votes
in the Electoral College tends to over-represent people in rural areas. This is because the number of electors for each
state is determined by the number of members it has in the House plus the number of members it has in the House
plus number of members it has in the Senate (which is always two regardless of the state’s population). The result is
that in 1988, for example, the combined voting age population (3,119,000) of the seven least populous jurisdictions of
Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming carried the same
voting strength in the Electoral College (21 electoral votes) as the 9,614,000 people of voting age in the state of
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Florida. In providing these statistics, the League of Women Voters concludes that each citizen of Florida’s potential
vote counted about one-third the weight of a potential vote in the other states listed. Secondly, not only does the
Electoral College give the vote of different citizens different weight, the winner-take-all principle employed by 48 states,
completely takes away the votes many citizens cast for the President. Michael McGrath, founder of
ElectionReform.org, points out that in the 2000 election, 4,567,429 (42 percent) Californians voted for George W. Bush
and 5,861,203 (52 percent) voted for Al Gore. Yet all of California’s 54 electoral votes were awarded to Al Gore,
effectively eliminating the votes of more than 4.5 million California voters. Overall, with the current winner-take-all
principle, in the 2000 election the votes of 40 million Americans were not counted! Allowing the popular vote to replace
the Electoral College vote quite obviously overcomes the problem of inequality in voting perpetrated by the Electoral
College.
The third way that the Electoral College violates equality in voting is that it results in discrimination against racial
minorities. Today race remains a polarizing force in presidential politics. Rather than relying on overt racist imagery, as
Strom Thurmond did in 1948 and George Wallace did in 1968, modern politicians generally play the “race card”
through the subtle use of code words and careful manipulation of racial imagery. For example, George H.W. Bush’s
victory over Michael Dukakis in 1988 is frequently attributed to his campaign’s skillful handling of racial imagery —
most notably the infamous “Willie Horton” episode. Indeed, as Mathew Hoffman emphasizes, many of the rhetorical
devices and subtle images employed by modern-day Republicans are essentially variations on themes developed by
George Wallace in his 1968 campaign. Issues of race are frequently tied to a number of “social issues” ranging from
crime to welfare to affirmative action.
The winner-take-all principle has diluted the impact of African-American citizens, making sure that racial minorities
have no voice in determining the composition of the Electoral College. Republican strategists today often refer to their
party as having a an advantage in the Electoral College system by virtue of its dominance in the South. Mathew
Hoffman effectively summarizes the effect of the Electoral College: “The winner-take-all method now used to select
electors in forty-eight states and the District of Columbia severely dilutes African-American voting power. In the
Southern states where racially polarized voting patterns are particularly intense, this system denies minority voters an
opportunity to choose even a single presidential elector. In effect, these voters have no voice in the selection of the
President. Nor is the problem necessarily limited to the South — or to African-American voters. The winner-take-all
system denies minority voters in ways that undermine the will of the people. This is at variance with the fundamental
maxim of republican government observed by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers 22 that the sense of the
majority should prevail. The moral criterion of a democracy is that it should elect the people’s choice. In our
democracy, if you run for dogcatcher, it is decided by the popular vote. The only exception to this rule is the election of
the highest elected official in the country.
The 2000 presidential election exemplifies the deficiencies in the Electoral College. For the fourth time in the
nation’s history, the winner of the popular vote did not win a majority of electoral votes. Even when the Electoral
College chooses the candidate with the most votes, the results are less than a clear expression of the popular will. For
example, in the 1992 election Bill Clinton received only 43 percent of the popular vote.
Perhaps most significantly there is the very real possibility that the Electoral College could fail to provide a winner
at all, throwing the election of the President into the House of Representatives where each state delegation has only
one vote. This has happened only once and the result was very undemocratic as political “wheeling and dealing” took
the place of genuine concern for the popular will. The very fact that such a possibility exists in the world’s greatest
democracy is nothing less than a scandal.
The fact is that the threat of a presidential election being decided in the House of Representatives is very real. In
fact, several recent elections have been very close calls in which the election could have quite easily been forced into
the House of Representatives. In both the elections of 1960 and 1968 very minor vote shifts could have sent both the
elections to the House of Representatives. Both elections involved the third party candidacies of two strong regional
candidates, Senator Byrd of Virginia in 1960 and Governor George Wallace of Alabama in 1968. Ky Fullerton, writing
in the Summer 2001 Oregon Law Review, points out that shifts of 4,480 votes in Illinois and 4,491 in Missouri would
have deprived John Kennedy of an electoral vote majority and thrown the election into the House of Representatives.
The election of 1960 showed that a third party candidate with little national support, can deprive a candidate of an
Electoral College majority.
In 1968 Richard Nixon was the Republican nominee for President. His Democratic opponent was Vice President
Hubert Humphrey, who became the Democratic frontrunner after the assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy. For
the first time since 1948, a formidable third-party candidate challenged the nominees of the two major parties. George
C. Wallace ran as the nominee of his own creation, the American Independent Party. Wallace knew he could not win,
but his stated goal was to obtain enough electoral votes to prevent either of the other candidates from obtaining an
Electoral College majority. His plan was, then, to offer to “release” his electors to support one of the other candidates
— likely Nixon — in exchange for concessions that would undermine many of the civil rights advances of the early
1960s. Wallace came very close to achieving his goal. He received 46 electoral votes. More importantly, Ky Fullerton
points out that a total shift of 53,024 votes from Nixon to Humphrey in Missouri, New Hampshire, and New Jersey,
would have reduced Nixon’s electoral vote total to 269, one less than the 270 required for election.
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Another way in which the Electoral College undermines the popular will is that it causes campaigns to focus on so-
called “battleground states,” ignoring much of the country. Why does this matter? Because campaigns do educate
voters. Many studies have shown that even though we may not like them, television advertisements do discuss issues
and voters do learn about the candidate’s issue positions from these ads. William Benoit, professor of communication
at the University of Missouri, writing in Newsday of April 20, 2004, points out that research using data from the National
Election Studies Project found that voters who lived in the battleground states — where candidates actively
campaigned — had more knowledge of Bush’s and Gore’s positions on issues than voters who lived in non-
battleground states where they did not campaign. So voters who happen to live in non-battleground states have less
issue knowledge because the Electoral College discourages candidates from campaigning in those states. Robert A.
Dahl, the Sterling Professor of Political Science at Yale University is probably America’s foremost scholar of
democracy and democratic institutions. In his 1998 book, On Democracy, he identifies five standards which must be
met if a society is to achieve truly democratic government. Among these standards, Dahl includes something he calls
enlightened understanding. He says, “within reasonable limits as to time, each member [of a democratic society] must
have equal and effective opportunities for learning about relevant alternative policies and their likely consequences.”
Obviously, the Electoral College fails to meet this requirement of a democratic society.
As another consequence of campaigns that ignore large portions of the country, vote turnout suffers. People in
“safe” states see little reason to vote because they know their vote will not have any effect. Their vote will not matter.
Only an election decided by the total popular vote of the entire nation will encourage people to vote.
The third PRO strategy is to define the Electoral College as an institution that is based on unwarranted and
outmoded assumptions. A major strength of a democratic society is the ability both to change institutions that no longer
serve the purpose for which they were established and to eliminate mistakes of the past. The United States democracy
has been an evolving institution characterized by a willingness to change institutions to correct both unwarranted and
outmoded institutions. Just as the Founding Fathers did not want people to choose the President, they didn’t want the
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people to choose Senators, instead giving the power to state legislatures. That lasted until 1913, when the 17
Amendment took effect. The assumptions underlying the requirement that state legislatures choose Senators were
similar to those which established the Electoral College. Both were created out of a mistrust of the voters. To some
extent these assumptions had some validity. One was that the people would lack the requisite information to make an
informed decision. Just as state legislators would be more likely to be familiar with candidates for the Senate, so too
would a small number of electors prominent in government be much more likely to be familiar with various presidential
candidates than the average citizen. In 1913 our nation was willing to recognize that the citizens of each state are fully
competent to choose their United States Senator by popular vote. Likewise American citizens are fully competent to
choose a President without requiring the intervention of an elector. National communication networks and the print
media provide extensive coverage of presidential campaigns from start to finish. Nor do those who currently serve as
electors know more than the average citizen.
A major reason why the Founding Fathers rejected the popular vote for choosing the President was that the
Southern States felt they would be at a disadvantage because a large segment of their population — slaves — could
not vote. While slaves could be counted as three-fifths for the purpose of representation in the House of
Representatives, they, of course, could not vote. The Southern states feared direct election would diminish their
influence in choosing the President. Thus, James Madison — perhaps the most influential delegate to the
Constitutional Convention — argued that while “the people at large” were “the fittest to choose the President, that “one
difficulty of a serious nature” made the election by the people impossible. Madison noted that the “right of suffrage was
much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern states and that the South could have no influence in the
election because of the large percentage of its population who were Negro slaves who could not vote.
Paul Finkelman, professor of law at the University of Tulsa, writing in the Cardozo Law Review of March 2002,
makes clear that in order to guarantee that the non-voting slaves could nevertheless influence the presidential election,
Madison favored the creation of the Electoral College. Hugh Williamson of North Carolina was more open about the
reasons for southern opposition to popular election of the President. He said that under a direct election of President,
Virginia would not be able to elect her leaders President because “her slaves will have no suffrage.” The same, of
course, would be true of the rest of the South.
The assumptions about the necessity to protect slave states are no longer relevant. It is interesting to note,
however, that the Electoral College still rewards states that limit access to voting. In 2000 there were many claims that
African-Americans were discouraged and intimidated from voting.
Just as most of the assumptions made in establishing the Electoral College are no longer valid, many of those
assumptions were never valid nor warranted. One reason often given for establishing the Electoral College is that it
benefits small states. Yet studies of past elections have shown that the effect of the Electoral College is unpredictable
and unclear. Sometimes it benefits small states and sometimes benefits large states, depending on seemingly minor
shifts in distribution of votes across states. The Harvard Law Review of June 2001 makes the point well: “A central
problem with the Electoral College’s failure to conform to the one-person-one-vote principle is that it operates in a
nontransparent way. The inconclusive empirical data regarding whom the Electoral College benefits and the diverse
and often conflicting rationales offered for its existence are so complex that it is unlikely that the public will ever be able
to reach a secure understanding of the justifications behind it.”
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CON STRATEGIES
There are also a large number of excellent strategies available to CON teams on this topic. The first CON strategy
is to define the Electoral College as a voting system which best guarantees to produce Presidents who have both
adequate popular support to allow them to govern and a popular vote that is sufficiently distributed across the nation to
enable them to govern. Calls for replacing the Electoral College with the popular vote are very much flawed in their
understanding of American democracy. Ours is a federal system in which the vote of the several sovereign states has
always been more important than a purely majoritarian type of democracy. Neither the United States Senate, nor the
Supreme Court, nor the President is elected on the basis of one-person-one-vote. That is why a state like Montana,
with under a million residents gets the same number of Senators as California, with over 33 million people. The
Electoral College, like the Senate recognizes the central importance of strong regional interests and loyalties. These
factors have played a great role in the history of the country and continue to do so today. The Electoral College system
contributes to the cohesiveness of our highly diverse country by requiring a wide distribution of popular support to be
elected President. Without such a mechanism, presidents would be elected either through the domination of one
populous region over the others or through the domination of large metropolitan regions over the rural ones. As things
stand now, no one region contains an absolute majority of electoral votes to elect a president. Thus, the Electoral
College provides a strong incentive for candidates to pull together coalitions of states and regions rather than
exacerbate regional differences. The Electoral College forces presidential candidates to campaign on a national basis
and to make their appeal to a broad cross-section of the American electorate in every state. Candidates seeking to win
only the popular vote surely would focus on the great urban centers at the expense of smaller states and sparsely
populated areas. John McGinnis, professor of law at Cardozo Law School, writing in the 2001 Florida State University
Law Review, makes the point clearly, “because an Electoral College system forces candidates to speak more widely in
the country than would a direct election, the concern of a more diffuse population will be addressed. For instance, the
concerns of rural voters, who dominate some states but are more expensive to reach than urban voters, are more
likely to be discussed. Addressing the hopes and fears of the entire electorate is the therapeutic side of an election.
Citizens whose concerns are addressed (even if not satisfied) are less likely to cause social unrest. The ironic
catharsis engendered by an electoral system that focuses on disparate issues thus promotes the stability.
This unifying mechanism comes with only a small price. That price is that in very close elections there is a slight
chance that the candidate who wins a slight majority of popular votes may not be the one who is elected president —
depending (as was the case in 1888) on whether the candidate’s popularity is concentrated in a few states or whether
it is more evenly distributed across the states. Yet this problem is not significant because the difference in the popular
vote between the two candidates is likely to be so small that either candidate could govern effectively. Thus, if a
candidate receives a substantial majority of the popular vote, then that candidate is virtually certain to win enough
electoral votes to be elected president; in the event that the popular vote is extremely close, then the election defaults
to that candidate with the best distribution of the popular votes. One way or the other, the winning candidate must
demonstrate a sufficient popular support to govern as well as a sufficient distribution of that support to govern.
The only two elections in United States history where the winners did not receive the most popular votes are quite
instructive. It is important to recognize that in both the election of Benjamin Harrison in 1888 and George W. Bush in
2000, their opponents did not receive a majority of the votes cast. However, both Harrison and Bush are legitimate
presidents based upon the important premise of “federal plurality” George W. Bush captured the votes of thirty states.
Bush won the largest distribution of votes throughout the largest regions of the country, thus satisfying a federal
plurality as opposed to a national plurality. Bush received substantial popular support; his 47.8 percent total was only
slightly less than Gore’s 48.4 percent. Bush clearly won the federal plurality. Joy McAffee, writing in the Cumberland
Law Review of 2001/2002, divided the states into small and large states based on the average number of electoral
votes. There were thirty-one smaller states and nineteen larger states. Bush won 67.7 percent of the thirty-one smaller
states and nineteen larger states. Bush won 67.7 percent of the thirty-one smaller state electoral votes to Gore’s 32.2
percent. Furthermore, Bush received a close 47.4 percent of the nineteen larger states to 52.6 percent of Gore.
Capturing over two-thirds of the smaller states and almost half of the larger states, the electoral votes of Bush were
distributed more evenly throughout the states, the electoral votes of Bush were distributed more evenly throughout the
states than that of Gore, thus capturing the federal plurality.
In both the election of 1888 and 2000, there was no loss of legitimacy by either Harrison or Bush. Bill Lambrecht,
writing in the St. Louis Post Dispatch of November 9, 2000, points to research concerning public reaction to the 1888
election. The findings show that there was no vigorous objection about the outcome. The same was true of the 2000
election. The American people recognize the Electoral College as the legitimate system for choosing a president, and
they support the results of those elections.
The second CON strategy is to define the conflict between deciding the United States presidential election by the
Electoral College or the popular vote as a conflict between a tested and proven method and an unknown method which
involves substantial risks. This strategy rests on the reality that there should be a strong presumption in favor of the
Electoral College. The Electoral College has achieved peaceful and orderly transfers of power for more than 200 years
and is a known quantity. Moving to a popular vote or to any other system might introduce harmful, unintended
consequences. The results of the Electoral College are likely to be accepted without question. One of the most striking
facts of the 2000 election was that the United States citizenry, in general, readily accepted that the winner of the
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Electoral College would become president rather than the winner of the popular vote. That is undoubtedly because of
the longevity and the Electoral College and its success in providing the country with excellent results.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., historian and former special assistant to President John F. Kennedy, writing in the
American Prospect of March 25, 2002, points out that allowing the national popular vote to replace the state-by-state,
winner-take-all electoral votes would hasten the disintegration of the party system. Minor parties have a dim future in
the Electoral College. Unless third parties have a solid regional base like the Populists of 1892 or the Dixiecrats of
1948, they cannot hope to win electoral votes. Millard Fillmore, the Know-Nothing candidate in 1856, won 21.6 percent
of the popular vote and only two percent of the electoral vote. In 1912, when Theodore Roosevelt’s candidacy turned
the Republicans into a third party, William Howard Taft carried 23 percent of the popular vote and only 1.5 percent of
the electoral votes.
The two party system has been a source of great stability; Franklin Delano Roosevelt called it “one of the greatest
methods of unification and of teaching people to think in common terms.” The alternative offers great incentives for
radical zealots like Ralph Nader, freelance media adventurers like Pat Buchanan, eccentric billionaires like Ross Perot,
and flamboyant characters like Jesse Ventura to jump into presidential contests. These same incentives will encourage
splinter parties like green parties, senior citizen parties, nativist parties, pro-choice parties, homosexual parties, and so
on down the single issue line. These splinter parties would multiply not because they expected to win elections, but
because their accumulated vote would increase their bargaining power in a runoff. Runoffs might well become the rule
rather than the exception. Edward C. Banfield, professor of government at Harvard University, emphasizes the
importance of the two party system in his 1980 book, Political Parties in the Eighties:
If they were to evaluate the party system on the basis of results, they would have to conclude that on the whole it is
a good one. It has played an important part (no one can say how important, of course, the innumerable causal forces
have been at work along with it) in the production of a society which, despite all its faults, is as near to being a good
one as any and nearer by far than most; it has provided government which, by the standards appropriate to
governments, have been humane and, in some cases, bold and enterprising; it has done relatively little to impede
economic growth and in some ways has facilitated it; except for the Civil War, when it was, as Henry Jones Ford said,
“the last bond of union to give way,” it has tended to check violence, moderate conflict, and narrow the cleavages
within the society; it has never produced, or very seriously threatened to produce, either mob rule or tyranny, and it has
shown a marvelous ability to adapt to changing circumstances.
The third CON strategy is to answer clearly misguided or wrong criticisms of the Electoral College. The first such
charge is that the Electoral College discriminates against racial minorities. The Electoral College enhances the status
of minority groups. This is so because the votes of even small minorities in a state may make the difference between
winning all of that state’s electoral votes or none of that state’s electoral votes. Since ethnic minority groups in the
United States happen to concentrate in those states with the most electoral votes, they have an importance to
presidential candidates well out of proportion to their number. The same applies to special interest groups such as
labor unions, farmers, and environmentalists. Electing the president by popular vote would therefore actually damage
minority interests since their votes would be overwhelmed by a national popular majority.
Likewise, the claim that the Electoral College depresses voter turnout is completely and absolutely flawed.
Presidential elections do not occur in a vacuum. States and localities also conduct other elections at the same time.
Elections for U.S. Senators, U.S. Representatives, state governors, state legislators, and a large number of elected
officials are as much an influence on voter turnout in presidential elections as the presidential contest.
There is also only a remote possibility that a presidential election will be decided in the House of Representatives.
Only twice, in 1800 and 1824 has this happened. Both of these elections occurred before the various political factions
in the country were firmly consolidated into the two dominant political parties. The contests among various candidates
is today played out as various candidates seek the nomination of their parties. Despite the recent independent
candidacies of Ralph Nader, Ross Perot, and Pat Buchanan, the two major political parties have a virtual lock on the
presidential election process. One substantial factor in this domination is the federal matching campaign funds
program, enacted by Congress in 1974. To qualify for matching funds during the presidential primary, a candidate must
overcome several obstacles to obtain federal funds. In the general election the advantage of the two major parties is
even greater, where a party that obtains twenty-five percent or greater of the popular vote in the previous presidential
election is considered a “major party” qualifies for substantial federal matching funds. Minor parties qualify for a much
smaller amount if they garner more than five percent of the popular vote. Ky Fullerton, writing in the Oregon Law
Review of Summer 2001, makes this point clearly: “In light of the two major parties’ enormous edge in fundraising, the
current system strongly favors Republicans and Democrats. Matching funds provided by the government only enhance
the financial gulf between the major parties and smaller parties. In addition to enormous amounts of money, parties
seeking matching funds must also have a widespread, national organization. The requirements needed to obtain
matching funds are a likely reason why no third-party candidate after the advent of federal matching funds has come
even remotely close to depriving a candidate of an electoral vote majority.”
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William Benoit, (Prof., Communication, U. of Missouri), NEWSDAY, Apr. 20, 2004, A40.
A second reason to abolish the Electoral College is the pernicious effect it has on campaigning.
Candidates know the rules. They know that winning a state by a million votes is no better than winning by
10,000 or 100 votes or even a single vote. In order to get the most "bang for the buck," candidates have
increasingly targeted the so-called battleground states. In 2000, some states were considered sure to go
for Bush; other states were certain to go for Gore. It would have been a waste of time and money for either
candidate to campaign in those states. For example, Bush did not need to campaign in states he was
expected to win (because Electoral College rules mean winning by a larger margin is no better than barely
winning). Similarly, Bush would have wasted resources to campaign in states he was expected to lose. As
a result, both candidates focused their campaigning in 2000 to about 24 key battleground states. President
Bush kicked off his re-election campaign with three ads that began airing on March 4. These ads were only
broadcast in 18 states (and on some cable networks). Sen. John Kerry is running ads in the same states.
Voters who live in the other 32 states might breathe a sigh of relief to discover what they are missing, but
this is unfortunate. Why does this matter? Because campaigns do educate voters. For example, many
studies have shown that, even though we may not like them, television spots do discuss issues and voters
do learn about the candidates' issue positions from these ads. Research using data from the National
Election Studies project found that voters who lived in battleground states — where the candidates actively
campaigned — had more knowledge of Bush's and Gore's positions on issues than voters who lived in
non-battleground states — where they did not campaign. So voters who happen to live in non-battleground
states had less issue knowledge because Electoral College rules discourage candidates from campaigning
in those states. This is anti-democratic. Abolishing the Electoral College would eliminate the disincentive to
limit campaigns to battleground states.
D. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE REDUCES VOTER PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS.
William Benoit, (Prof., Communication, U. of Missouri), NEWSDAY, Apr. 20, 2004, A40.
First, the Electoral College may be reducing voter turnout. Everyone knows that Vice President Al
Gore received a half-million more votes than Gov. George W. Bush, but Bush became president. What
most people do not realize is the effect this could have on voters. Political observers have lamented a
steady decline in the percentage of voters who turn out for presidential elections. One potential reason for
declining turnout is a feeling of powerlessness among voters. In a country with more than 210 million
voting-age citizens, some people may feel that their votes do not count. Optimists can point to the fact that,
when the Florida recount was stopped, only 300 votes separated Bush and Gore. But others may think
instead that their votes did not count when a candidate who received a 500,000 majority was declared the
loser. Notice that, although Democrats might be more likely to feel disempowered at this moment in
history, Republicans may realize that this could happen to their candidate next time. Under the rules of the
Electoral College, many votes in fact do not count. The candidate who receives the most votes in a state
wins all of that state's electoral votes. It does not matter whether a candidate wins a state by one vote or
by a million: The extra votes do not help the winning candidate. Similarly, when candidates lose a state,
they get no electoral votes, regardless of how many votes they received. The votes of the million who
voted for the first candidate might just as well never have been cast. Although the people who supported
the loser will probably be most upset, all of the "extra" votes for the winner — over a majority-plus-one —
and all of the votes for the loser do not count. If we abolished the Electoral College via a constitutional
amendment, every vote cast would count, every vote cast would make a candidate closer to winning the
election.
II. REPLACING THE ELECTORAL VOTE WITH THE DIRECT POPULAR ELECTION ENHANCES DEMOCRATIC
LEGITIMACY IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
Brandon Robb, (J.D. Candidate), LOYOLA LAW REVIEW, Summer 2008, 459-460.
Switching to a national popular election, if anything, would create a disincentive for voter fraud, given
the extraordinary lengths a party would have to go to in order to succeed with it, and the greater likelihood
that any such Herculean vote-rigging plot would be discovered and its perpetrators punished. In addition, a
losing presidential candidate would be far less likely to contest an election if it involved having to "overturn"
an election in which their opponent won by hundreds of thousands or millions of votes nationwide instead
of by just several thousand votes in a few states, like in 1960, or a few hundred votes in one state, like in
2000.
18
CONTENTIONS
I. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE UPHOLDS DEMOCRATIC FEDERALISM.
A. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE REQUIRES CANDIDATES TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF PEOPLE
THROUGHOUT THE NATION.
HARVARD LAW REVIEW, June 2001, 2544.
A final rationale for the Electoral College is that it encourages "truly national campaigns." The
winner-take-all aspect makes individual small states worth the trip, and the Senate add-on provision
magnifies the impact of small states that candidates would otherwise ignore.
Daniel Lowenstein, (Prof., Law, UCLA Law School), UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PENNUMBRA,
2007, 22.
Against all the pressures of nationalization, it is important to maintain the states as strong and vital
elements of our system, both in practice and in public understanding. Unlike some conservative
jurisprudes, I do not believe constitutional limits on the powers of the federal government are a promising
way to accomplish this. In practice, the Electoral College is by no means the most important institution we
have for strengthening the states, but neither is it by any means the least important.
B. THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE REQUIRES THAT THE WINNER HAVE BOTH SUFFICIENT AND
WIDESPREAD SUPPORT.
William Kimberling, (Deputy Dir., FEC Office of Election Administration), THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE,
2003, 1.
The Electoral College has performed its function for over 200 years (and in over 50 presidential
elections) by ensuring that the President of the United States has both sufficient popular support to govern
and that his popular support is sufficiently distributed throughout the country to enable him to govern
effectively.
Daniel Lowenstein, (Prof., Law, UCLA Law School), UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PENNUMBRA,
2007, 22.
The Electoral College turns the many winners who fail to win a majority of the popular vote into
majority winners. It also magnifies small majorities in the popular vote into large majorities. These effects
of the Electoral College enhance Americans' confidence in the outcome of the election and thereby
enhance the new president's ability to lead.
II. REPLACING THE ELECTORAL VOTE WITH THE DIRECT POPULAR VOTE UNDERMINES DEMOCRATIC
FEDERALISM.
Joy McAfee, (Staff), CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW, 2001/2002, 661-662.
A national plurality is simply the calculation of the popular vote percentages in the country, with Bush
receiving 47.8% and Gore capturing his national plurality of 48.4%. This national plurality percentage will
not elect a President. Instead, a candidate must win a federal plurality by winning more populous votes
state-by-state. Bush won the federal plurality. By dividing the states into small and large states based upon
an average number of Electoral College votes, the country can be divided into thirty-one smaller states
and nineteen larger states. Bush received 67.7% of the thirty-one smaller state electoral votes to Gore's
32.2%. Furthermore, Bush received a close 47.4% of the nineteen larger states to 52.6% of Gore.
Capturing almost two-thirds of the smaller states and almost half of the larger states, the electoral votes of
Bush were distributed more evenly throughout the states than that of Gore, thus capturing the federal
plurality.
James McClellan, (Staff), INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Dec. 18, 2000, 41.
And what results might we expect if the direct-election advocates have their way? The present system
forces presidential candidates to campaign on a national basis and to make their appeal to a broad cross-
section of the American electorate in every state. Candidates seeking support under a direct-election
arrangement on the other hand, surely would focus on the great urban centers, at the expense of the
smaller states and sparsely populated areas, if they expect to win.
21
William Kimberling, (Deputy Dir., FEC Office of Election Administration), THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE,
2003, 1.
Proponents further argue that the Electoral College contributes to the olitical stability of the nation by
encouraging a two-party system. There can be no doubt that the Electoral College has encouraged and
helps to maintain a two- party system in the United States. This is true simply because it is extremely
difficult for a new or minor party to win enough popular votes in enough States to have a chance of winning
the presidency. Even if they won enough electoral votes to force the decision into the U.S. House of
Representatives, they would still have to have a majority of over half the State delegations in order to elect
their candidate -- and in that case, they would hardly be considered a minor party. In addition to protecting
the presidency from impassioned but transitory third party movements, the practical effect of the Electoral
College (along with the single-member district system of representation in the Congress) is to virtually
force third party movements into one of the two major political parties. Conversely, the major parties have
every incentive to absorb minor party movements in their continual attempt to win popular majorities in the
States. In this process of assimilation, third party movements are obliged to compromise their more radical
views if they hope to attain any of their more generally acceptable objectives. Thus we end up with two
large, pragmatic political parties which tend to the center of public opinion rather than dozens of smaller
political parties catering to divergent and sometimes extremist views. In other words, such a system forces
political coalitions to occur within the political parties rather than within the government.
B. THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL FEATURE OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PROMOTES THE DOMINANCE OF
TWO POLITICAL PARTIES.
League of Women Voters of Fairfax, Virginia, ELECTING THE PRESIDENT, Oct. 1992, 8.
Proponents further argue that the Electoral College contributes to the political stability of the nation by
encouraging a two-party system. This is true simply because it is extremely difficult for a new or minor
party to win enough popular votes in enough states to have a chance of winning the presidency. Even if
they won enough electoral votes to force the decision into the U.S. House of Representatives, they would
still have to have a majority of over half the state delegations in order to elect their candidate — and in that
case, they would hardly be considered a minor party.
John Bibby (Prof., Gov't., U. Wisconsin), POLITICS, PARTIES & ELECTIONS IN AMERICA, 1987, 220.
The Electoral College system works to the advantage of the two major parties and the detriment of
minor parties. The combination of a winner-take-all system to determine the allocation of the states'
electoral votes and the requirement of a majority in the Electoral College to be elected makes it almost
impossible for third parties to win a presidential election. To win any electoral votes and have any impact
on the electoral vote, a third party candidate must have voter support that is geographically concentrated
the way George Wallace's was in the southern states in 1968 or Strom Thurmond's was in 1948. When a
third party candidate's support is more evenly spread across the country, as in the case of John Anderson
in 1980, the candidate has virtually no hope of winning any electoral votes.
James Reichley (Fellow, Brookings Inst.), THE LIFE OF THE PARTIES, 1992, 417.
Elimination of the Electoral College system as it now operates would go a long way toward destroying
the two-party system in the United States. If third or fourth parties come to hold the balance of power in
close presidential elections—as has rarely happened under the Electoral College system—non-
mainstream candidates like Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson, and special-interest groups like NOW, will
be strongly motivated to form parties of their own that will play powerful roles in national politics.
II. THE DOMINANCE OF TWO UMBRELLA POLITICAL PARTIES BEST PROMOTES DEMOCRATIC
CONSENSUS.
A. THE DOMINANT PARTIES REPRESENT DIVERSE INTERESTS.
John Bibby (Prof., Gov't., U. WI), POLITICS, PARTIES & ELECTIONS IN AMERICA, 1987, 266.
In the United States, lines of partisan conflict tend to cross-cut social and economic cleavages in
society. The parties tend, therefore, to be broad coalitions embracing a wide variety of interests. Indeed,
both parties draw significant levels of electoral support from virtually every major socioeconomic group in
society.
25
John Bibby (Prof., Gov't., U. WI), POLITICS, PARTIES & ELECTIONS IN AMERICA, 1987, 37.
Throughout their history, American parties have been broadly based coalitions. Both majority and
minority parties have attracted to their banners significant support from virtually every element of society,
but the core of support for the major parties has consistently differed.
B. THE DOMINANCE OF THE TWO UMBRELLA PARTIES REQUIRES COMPROMISE AMONG DIVERSE
INTERESTS.
Joy McAfee, (Staff), CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW, 2001/2002, 655.
America is based upon a two party system that enables a central organization to carry out goals that
demand a wide range of interests and a broad spectrum of opinion due to the melting pot of ideals, morals,
and goals. The two major parties are national and are a union of the fifty states creating a coalition of
county and local party organizations. Without a two-party competition, it would almost be impossible to win
a true sizable plurality of at least forty percent. Compromises and concessions would vanish, and a
candidate could represent all fifty states by winning the vote with a minimal plurality. True representation
would cease to exist because it would not be needed to win. Instead, a minority party could represent a
select group with large numbers and disregard the many important compromises needed to gain these
votes under a two party system.
C. THE DOMINANT PARTIES MUST ADAPT TO THE POPULAR WILL.
John Bibby (Prof., Gov't., U. Wisconsin), POLITICS, PARTIES & ELECTIONS IN AMERICA, 1987, 11.
Additionally, parties can contribute to citizen control of government because they are forced to
advocate policies that will retain the support of their traditional constituencies, while at the same time
seeking additional votes among the unaffiliated or the disaffected members of the opposition party. The'
very uncertainty of electoral outcomes works against parties becoming excessively complacent because
retention of office requires a constant reassessment of public sentiments. As a result, parties and
candidates spend millions of dollars in both election and nonelection years on public opinion surveys of
voter sentiments.
III. MAINTAINING A TWO PARTY SYSTEM IS OPTIMAL.
A. THE TWO PARTY SYSTEM IS A DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM.
Spencer Christian (Journalist), ELECTING OUR GOVERNMENT, 1996, 68.
The two-party system is a rarity in global politics—only five other countries (Australia, Austria, Great
Britain, Canada, and New Zealand) also have two major political parties. But the two-party system is so
much a part of American government that it almost seems as if someone deliberately designed it.
B. AMERICANS ARE OVERWHELMINGLY COMMITTED TO THE CURRENT AMERICAN POLITICAL
SYSTEM.
William Flanigan (Prof., Gov't., U. MN), POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE, 1994,
8.
Overall, Americans are proud of their country and their democratic form of government. This translates
into high levels of political system support. Eighty-five percent of the respondents to a national survey
believe that whatever its faults, the United States still has the best system of government in the world.
Over half of the public would not change anything' in the American political system.
C. AMERICANS OVERWHELMINGLY ASSOCIATE THE TWO PARTY SYSTEM WITH AMERICAN
DEMOCRATIC IDEALS.
William Flanigan (Prof., Gov't., U. Minnesota), POL. BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE, 1994,
50-51.
For more than one hundred years the U.S. electorate has supported a two-party system in national
politics. This remarkable stability is unknown in other democracies.