FACTS RULING

PANGASINAN VS Subj property is a 572 sq meter located in Laguna. Registered in the name of Aquilina Martinez under a TCT. In 1945, after the
ALMAZORA liberation of Manila from the Japanese occupation, Aquilina found out that their property was ruined by the war. In order to rebuild
their house they borrowed money from Conrado Almazora. Aquilina gave the owner’s duplicate copy to Conrado, and Conrado\s
family remained in possession of the property. Upon Aquilina’s death, the TCT was cancelled and a new one was issued to Aurora,
Aquilina’s only heir. In 1949, an Adjudication and Absolute Sale of Parcel of Registered land was signed by Aurora and her husband
in favor of Conrado which Aurora said was fraudulent. By virtue of this document, Conrado transferred the title in his name on June
17, 1965. In 1994, Aurora learned that the title had been transferred to Conrado and the same had been sold to Fullway Devt Corp for
4M. she sent letter to the heirs of Conrado in 1995 demanding the delivery of the payment. Aurora contended that the owner’s
duplicate copy was only for safeleeping and demanded its return but Conrado refused hence, the filing of the suit in 1996 to Conrado’s
heirs.
The action is barred by laches and prescription. It took aurora more than 50 years to file an action. As early as 1945, the title was already in the possession of
Conrado. Aurora slept on her rights to more than 50 years impervious in assessing her ownership of the subject property, thereby losing the same by laches. Her
allegations that she had repeatedly demanded the return of the owner’s duplicate is self-serving and thus cannot be given weight. There was also no proof of fraud.
Even though Aurora could have challenged the validity of the Adjudication and Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Registered Land to check if the signatures were
forged, she did not so. The 4 elements of laches were present. Sec 47 of PD 529 covers acquisitive prescription. A registered land can never be acquired by
adverse possession. In the case at bench, it was extinctive prescription and not acquisitive prescription which barred the action of petitioners. As the CA correctly
held, the action must fail not because respondents adversely occupied the property but because petitioners failed to institute their suit within the prescriptive
period under Art 1144 of the CC. Since petitioners contended that fraud attendant the circumstances, they had 10 years to file the petition by virtue of constructive
trust created by operation of law. The ppty was registered in the name of Conrado on June 17, 1965 and this should be the starting point of the , 10-year period.
Thus, they had until June 17, 1975 to file the case but they filed it only on 1996.

CALTEX- Caltex chartered M/T Vector, a commercial tanker owned and operated by Vector Shipping Corporation, Inc., to transport its
PHILIPPINES VS petroleum products. On its voyage in December 20, 1987, it figured into a collision with M/V Doña Paz, an inter-island passenger
vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. The collision resulted with an estimate of about 4,000 casualties. Respondents, the
AGUIRRE
heirs of the victims of the tragedy, initially instituted a class action with the Louisiana Court in December 1988. However, the said
court dismissed the case on November 30, 2000 on the ground of forum non conveniens. It was only on March 6, 2001 that
respondents filed an action for damages for breach of contract of carriage and quasi-delict with the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar against
petitioners, Sulpicio, Vector Shipping, and Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association, Bermuda Limited. The RTC of Catbalogan,
motu proprio dismissed the complaint pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as the respondents’ cause of
action had already prescribed. However, the petitioners as defendants therein, who were not served with summons, filed a motion for
reconsideration, alleging that they are waiving their defense of prescription, among others. The RTC of Catbalogan, however, merely
noted the petitioners’ motion. The respondents again filed a case with the Louisiana Court which was again dismissed on the same
ground of forum non conveniens. Respondents thereafter filed a filed a motion for intervention and a complaint-in-intervention with
the pending consolidated cases before the RTC of Manila. Also, codefendants in the consolidated cases, Sulpicio and Steamship were
furnished with a copy of the respondents’ motion to intervene. The RTC of Manila denied the said motions the ground of bar by prior
judgment and thereby disregarded petitioners’ unconditional waiver of their defense of prescription
Yes. The petitioners cannot be permitted to assert their right to waive the defense of prescription when they had foregone the same through their own omission.
Article 1106 of the Civil Code provides that “[b]y prescription, one acquires ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the
conditions laid down by law. In the same way, rights and conditions are lost by prescription.” The first sentence refers to acquisitive prescription, which is a mode
of “acquisition of ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under the conditions provided by law.” The second sentence
pertains to extinctive prescription “whereby rights and actions are lost by the lapse of time.” It is also called limitation of action. This case involves the latter type
of prescription, the purpose of which is to protect the diligent and vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his rights, forgetting them and taking no trouble of
exercising them one way or another to show that he truly has such rights. Respondents’ cause of action against the petitioners has prescribed under the Civil Code.
The respondents brought their claim before a Philippine court more than 13 years after the collision occurred. Article 1139 of the Civil Code states that actions
prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. The RTC of Catbalogan cannot be faulted for the motu proprio dismissal of the complaint filed before it. It is
settled that prescription may be considered by the courts motu proprio if the facts supporting the ground are apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on
record. The Court cannot consider petitioner’s unconditional waiver as basis in order to reverse the rulings of the courts below as the dismissal of the complaint
had become final and binding on both the petitioners and the respondents. It is not contested that the petitioners were not served wit h summons by the RTC of
Catbalogan prior to the motu proprio dismissal of the respondents’

REPUBLIC VS
ESPINOSA
(WON Espinosa prove
sufficiently that he had
ownership of the public
alienable land by acquisitive
prescription?)
HEIRS OF DELFIN
VS NHA
(WON petitioners are entitled to
just compensation for the Iligan
City ppty occupied by NHA)
On March 3, 1999, Domingo Espinosa filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land in Cebu. Espinosa alleged that
the property is (a) disposable, (b)purchased from his mother on 1970 and the other heirs waived rights there to and (c) he & his
predecessor in interest has been in possession of the ppty for more than 30 yrs. 1. Presented advances survey plan 2. Two tax decl.
under Isabel’s name 3. Three tax dec under his name. Rep opposed claiming that (a) CA 141 or PLA has not been complied and
Espinosa’s predecessor-in-interest only possessed the ppty from 6/12/1945. (b) the tax decl. do not prove his possession and that of his
predecessor-in-interest are in character for the length of time required by law. The MTC granted basing the judgment to compliance
under PD 1529. Espinosa was able to establish ownership and possession over the subject lot which was considered by DENR as
alienable and disposable land of public domain. CA dismissed petition and affirmed MTC decision. The CA ruled that jurisprudence
has consistently pronounced that “open, continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 yrs of alienable public ppty ipso jure
converts the same in to private ppty.”
In a complaint for “Payment of Parcel(s) of Land and Improvements and Damages”the Delfin Spouses claimed that they were the
owners of 28,800 sq meter parcel of land in Iligan Cty. They allegedly bought the ppty in 1951 from Felix Natingo ang Carlos
Carbonay who allegedly had been in actual possession of the pprt since time immemorial. The Delfin Spouses had been declaring the
Iligan ppty in their names for tax purposes since 1952 and had been planting it with mangoes, coconuts, corn, seasonal crops and
vegetables. They further alleged that, sometime in 1982 respondent NGA forcibly took 10,798 sq m portion of the ppty. RTC ruled in
favour of the Delfin Spouses. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the characterization of the ppty is no longer an
issue because the NHA already conceded that the ppty is disposable public land citing Procl No. 2151 which characterized the ppty as
a certain disposable parcel of public land. However, the Delfin Spouses supposedly failed to establish their possession of the ppty since
June 12, 1945 as required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
for one to invoke Sec 48(b) and claim an imperfect title over an alienable and disposable land of the public domain based on a 30-year possession & occupation,
it must be demonstrated that such possession and occupation commenced on Jan 24, 1947 and the 30-yr period was completed prior to the effectivity of PD 1073.
The earliest tax decl in Isabel’s nae was for the year 1965 that as of Jan 25, 1977 only 12 yrs had lapsed from the time she first came supposedly into possession,
it was incumbent to Espinosa to prove that Isabel’s possession of the property dated back at least to June 12, 1945. Anent to the object of prescription, Court held
that there must be an official declaration to thateffect before the property may be rendered susceptible to prescription. Accordingly, there must be an express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. In the case: Thus,
granting that Isabel and, later, Espinosa possessed and occupied the property for an aggregate period of thirty (30) years, this does not operate to divest the State
of
its ownership. The property, albeit allegedly alienable and disposable, is not patrimonial. To overcome this presumption, there must be incontrovertible evidence
for such. At any rate, as petitioner correctly pointed out, the notation on the survey plan does not constitute incontrovertible evidence that would overcome the
presumption that the property belongs to the inalienable public domain. A mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify the lands of the public domain.
Requirements for the Blueprint Survey The blueprint copy of the advanced survey plan may be admitted as evidence of the identity and location of the subject
property if: (a) it was duly executed by a licensed geodetic engineer; (b) it proceeded officially from the Land Management Services (LMS) of the DENR; and
(c) it is accompanied by a technical description of the property which is certified as correct by the geodetic surveyor who conducted the survey and the LMS of
the DENR. Decision: Espinosa failed to prove that the property is patrimonial. As to whether Espinosa was able to prove that his possession and occupation and
that of Isabel were of the character prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the foregoing considerations. Application for
registration denied. CA decision reversed and MTC decision reversed and set aside.
Prescription: Only publicly owned lands which are patrimonial in character are susceptible to prescription under Sec 14(2) of PD 1529. Consistent with this is
Article 1113 demarcates ppties of the state, which are not patrimonial in character, as being not susceptible to prescription. Contrary to petitioner’s theory then,
the publicly-owned land must be patrimonial or private in character at the onset. Possession for 30 yrs does not convert it into patrimonial ppty. For the land to be
converted into patrimonial ppty, there must be an express declaration in the form of a law duly enacted by |Congress or a Presidential Proclamation. Attached in
the present petition was a copy of a supplemtal letter to the Director of Land Mgt Bureau which stated that the petitiner’s ppty was no longer needed for any
public or quasi-public purposes. However, a mere indorsement of the Exec Secretary is not the law or pres proc required for converting land of the public domain
into patrimonial ppty. Accordingly, regardless of the length of petitioner’s possession, no title could vest on them by way o f prescription. PLA: while petitioners
may not claim title by prescription, they may claim title pursuant to Sec 48(b) of PLA by satisfying 2 requisites. 1) the land subj is an agricultural land 2) open,
continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Clearly, petitioners acquired title over the Iligan ppty pursuance to section 48(b)
of PLA. First, there is no issue that Iligan ppty had already been declared to be alienable and disposable land. Respondent has admitted this and Deputy Public
Land Inspector Pio Lucero, Jr’s letters to the Dir of Land to attest this. Second, although Delfin Sposes testimonial evidence and tax declarations showed that their
possession went only as far back as 1952, it was attested that the ppty had already been occupied as early as June 1945. It also follows that they must be
compensated.
 FACTS
HEIRS OF The subject of this case is a parcel of land located in Zambales, originally possessed by Macaria de Ocampo. Maracaria’s nephew,
FELICIANO Hermogenes Yambao, had 8 children. After Hermogenes died, it was claimed that all of his heirs were free to pick and harvest from
the fruit bearing plants. Eleanor Yambao, Hermogenes’ granddaughter even constructed a house in the subj ppty. However, the
YAMBAO VS HEIRS
communal and mutual use of the ppty ceased when the heirs of Feliciano prohibited them from entering and ejected them. This
OF HOMOGENES prompted the heirs of Hermogenes to file to RTC a complaint for partition, declaration of nullity of documents and damages against
YAMBAO Feliciano. The heirs of Hermogenes alleged that they and the hairs of Feliciano are co-owners of the subj ppty having inherited the
(WON the CA erred in right thereto Hermogenes. The heirs of Feliciano denied the allegations of the heirs of Hermogenes and claimed that their father was in
recognizing co- ownership &
ordering the partition of the possession of the subj ppty in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. Accordingly, Feliciano was awarded a free patent
property) thereon. RTC dismissed the complaint filed by Hermogenes for they failed to show that the subj pppty is owned by Macaria and the tax
decl and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and failed to show that Hermogenes succeeded from Macaria. The CA in
the review of the records, showed that Feliciano acknowledged the source of claim was Hermogenes and Feliciano’s claim of sole
possession in his application for free patent did not extinguish the fact of co-ownership.
ABALOS VS The heirs of Torio filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages with the MTC against Abalos and the spouses Felix &
Consuelo Salazar. Resp contended that they are the heirs of Torio who died intestate and left a parcel of land which through his
HEIRS OF TORIO tolerance allowed Jaime and spouses Salazar to stay and build their respective houses. Subs, respondents asked them to vacate the
(WON they and their
predecessors-in-interest
disputed lot. Jaime and Spouses Salazar contended that among others, the respondents cause of action is barred by prescription and
possessed the land in the that they are in actual, continuous, and peaceful possession subj as owners since time immemorial and they paid RPT. RTC ruled that
concept of an owner or it is by Jaime and Javier Spouses have acquired tbe ppty by prescription. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC
mere tolerance)
REPUBLIC VS This case involves Laureana and Iden’s application for registration of land title over a parcel situated in Batangas filed in 2009. On
Sept 2009, the Republic filed an opposition to the application on the ff grounds: 1) neither the applicants nor the predecessor-in-int.
MALIJAN-JAVIER have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question in the concept of an owner
since 6/12/1945 or earlier. 2) the tax declarations relied upon by appellees do not constitute and sufficient evidence of bona fide acq.
Of the land by the appellee 3) the parcel of land applied for is a land of public domain and not subj to private appropriation. Laureana
alleged that she was married to Cecilio and they purchased the ppty from Spouses Lumbres on oct 10, 1985. A deed of absolute sale
was executed. Banawa testified that since her birth, Cito & Juan owned the ppty in 1937. The half owned by Cito was transferred to his
daughter Luisa. Both Luisa and Juan then transferred to Spouses Lumbres until half was sold to Spuses Javier and other half to their
son. Hernandez and Maglinao testified that the land was within alienable zone and it was outside a reservation or forest zone. RTC
granted the application. The republic contended that there should be 1) Cenro/penro cert 2) a copy of orig classification approved by
DENR sec & cert as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records attached to the application of registration which was
not complied. The CA ruled that there was substantial compliance and honored the testimony of Hernandez and Maglinao.
SUPAPO VS DE Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Spouses De Jesus to compel respondents to vacate a piece of land in
Quezon. The subject lot was registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo. The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot.
JESUS They also did not employ an overseer but they sure to visit at least twice a year. During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two houses
(Did the action already
prescribe and is it barred by res
built on the subject lot, those were built without their knowledge and permission. They learned that the Spouses De Jesus and Macario
judicata?) occupied such. The Spouses Supapo demanded from respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by bringing dispute to
the Lupon Tagapamayapa and failed to settle amicably. They filed criminal case under the Anti-Squatting Law under PD 772. But
Congress enacted RA 8368 repealing PD 772 dismissing the criminal action. On April 30, 1999 the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case
became final.
Accion Publiciana - It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of title. It refers
to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year of unlawful withholding of possession of realty.
It involves Lot No. 557 in Cebu. The petitioners and the respondents are relatives residing in the same lot. Respondent Lopez acquired a portion of Lot No. 557
LAUSA VS due to Rodrigo’s default on his loan. Lot No. 557 was part of the Banilad Friar Estate Lands, which had been bought by the government through Act No. 1120 for
QUILATON distribution of its occupants. Martin Antonio was the initial beneficiary and assigned it to Alejandro Tugot which was the grandfather of most of the respondents
and petitioners. Alejandro possessed the lot until his death, thus his children and grandchildren continued to reside in the lot. The present controversy arose when
the respondents claiming to be its registered owners, attempted to eject the petitioners. In 1994, Mauricia donated Lot No. 557 to her four children thus the TCT
No. 571 was cancelled and was reissued as four TCT’s for the children. The children of Mauricia then performed several acts of ownership on the property.
Rodrigo: Mortgaged his TCT to Lopez as security loan but defaulted leading to foreclosure and was sold to public auction to Lopez issuing a new TCT.
RTC 1. TCT No. 571 was a forgery and declared it and all titles originating from it as void ab initio. 2. Mauricia’s previous acts show that she acknowledged
Alejandro’s ownership over Lot No. 557. 3. She exercised dull acts of ownership over Lot No. 557 only in 1994, after she had filed a petition for issuance of new
owner’s duplicate in 1946. 4. Failed to present evidence showing how she acquired the title of Lot No. 557. And as Alejandro’s heirs both the petitioners and
respondents are entitled to share. 5. Lopez’ TCT is null and void and could not claim the defense of a purchaser in good faith.
CA’s Reversal of RTC Ruling TCT No 571 is valid as the existence of the copy in the Register of Deeds and was issued in a regular manner. Failed to disprove
the presumption of regularity. There is no showing that indeed the title was fraudulently issued. 1. The deed of assignment on the other hand was canceled as
shown in the DENR File thus the property remained with Antonio not Alejandro. CA noted that the lot Alejandro appears to own was Lot No. 357 not 557 as
shown by evidence. (1) Mauricia has in possession the property since 1946 and (2) it is a registered lot under the Torrens system.
the CA should have immediately dismissed the complaint as the cause of action had been barred by prescription. The petitioners filed only on sept 20, 1995
almost 50 yrs after Mauricia had been issued TCT on July 16, 1946. Hence they are now barred by laches from seeking redress before the courts.
REPUBLIC VS St. Jude’s enterprises is the registered owner of Lot 865- B-1 as part of Lot 865-B in Caloocan with an area of 40,623 square meters. In
1966, it subdivided the lot and cancelled TCT No. 22660 for TCT no 23967-24068 all in the name of St. Judes Enterprises. The
CA*** subdivision of the lot was later found to have expended from 40,623 to 42,044 square meters with an increase of 1,421 square meters.
This expanse or increase in area was confirmed by the Land Registration Commission. Some of the titles were cancelled for they were
sold to the different buyers. But the Solicitor general filed an action seeking the annulment and cancellation of Transfer Certificates
principally on the ground that the TCT were issued on the strength of a null and void subdivision plan which expanded the original
area from 40,623 to 42,044 square meters. • Contended that they are acquired in good faith. • Enterprise argues that the government
is now in estoppel to question the approved subdivision plan and the allegation of increase was without any basis in fact and in law.
RTC denied for there was no one to blame for the increase but the plaintiff and allowed and approved subdivision plan. There was
absence of complaints from
RULING
Feliciano’s fee patent appl. indicated that he merely tacked his possession of the ppty from his father Hermogenes who held the ppty since 1944. This is an
implicit recognition of the fact that Feliciano merely co-owns the subj ppty with the other heirs of Hermogenes and the heirs of Felic. Did not present any
evidence that would show that Hermo. Bequeathed the subj ppty solely to Felici. . Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a coheir or co-owner as
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation
of the co-ownership. An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co- owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property. Adverse possession og co-owner requisites:1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust or other co-owners. 2) hat such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners. 3) That the evidence thereon
must be clear and
convincing. Although OCT No. P-10737 was registered in the name of Feliciano on November 29, 1989, the prescriptive period within which to demand partition
of the subject property, contrary to the claim of the heirs of Feliciano, did not begin to run. At that time, the heirs of Hermogenes were still in possession of the
property. It was only in 2005 that the heirs of Feliciano expressly prohibited the heirs of Hermogenes from entering the property. Thus, as aptly ruled by the CA,
the right of the heirs of Hermogenes to demand the partition of the property had not yet prescribed.
In the instant case, it is clear that during the possession of the ppty in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof by immediate predecessor-in-interest
of respondents which is shown in the tax declaration where it contains a statement admitting that Jaime’s house was built on the land of Vicente Torio. Petitioners
vener disputed such acknowledgment. Thus, petitioners couldnot have deemed as possession in good faith as to enable them to acquire subj land by prescription.
The court agrees that petitioners possession was by mere tolerance. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or mere tolerance of the owner are
inadequate for purposes of prescription. Moreover, even if the character of the petitioners’ possession had become adverse, their possession still falls short of the
required period of 30 yrs in cases of extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records show that the earliest tax decl was in 1974 and the 30 yr would be completed
in 2004. However, since a complaint was filed in 1996 it is deemed interrupted hence, it did not ripen into ownership.
It is well-settled that CENRO/PENRO certification is not enough to establish that a land is alienable or disposable. It should be accompanied by the official
publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. The applicant for land regis. Must present a a copy of orig
classification approved by DENR sec & cert as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records attached to the application of registration. Absent this,
the land remains a public domain. Thus, even if the respondents shown, through their testimonial evidence, they they and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945, they still cannot register the land for failing to
establish that the land is alienable or disposable.
The Action Has Not Yet Prescribed: The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana is dismissible for filing out of time. One their part, the
Spouses Supapo admit that they filed the complaint for accion publiciana more than ten years after the certificate to file an action has prescribed. The parcel of
land is registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo acquired the TCT of the lot in 1979. Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the
existence, authenticity and genuine of the TCT of the Spouses Supapo. Respondents rest their case on the fact they have been in actual, public, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner since 1992. The contend they built such in good faith and having possessed the lot for
more than 10 years. Lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Acquisitive prescription is baseless when the land involved
is a registered land because Article 1126 of the Civil Code provides such. The Spouses Supapo enjoy the benefits under the Torrens system for Section 47 of PD
1529 provides that registered land not subject to prescription. For such is imprescriptible. • Regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time if the possession was unauthorized or tolerated. On Laches: It cannot be a valid ground to deny the
petition. On the contrary, for the facts show that 1.) Brought the action the Lupon 2.)Initiated criminal complaint 3.)Filed for accion publiciana The following
negate the allegation of laches for the part of the Spouses Supapo in bringing their actions.
Issue 1: CA erred that Alejandro Owned Lot 357 not 557 CA based its conclusion on several tax documents in the name of Alejandro Tugot indicating such. It overlooked the evidences: 1.
Testimony of the Assessor’s Office that he issued a certification of correction from 357 to 557. 2. The Lot 357 is covered by another address in the city’s base map by a certain Antonio Yap. 3.
The Deed of Donation recognizes Alejandro as the owner of Lot 557. 4. Court approved subdivision plan. Issue 2: CA erred on Failure to Prove Fabricated TCT It overlooked the evidence
that the petitioners presented the fabricated title. The signatures where checked and all these pieces of evidence by preponderance of such prove that TCT No. 571 is a fabricated title. 1. There are
discrepancies and different area was covered by the ‘originated’ title 2. 571 had discrepancies with 570 and 572, it used an old form and was signed by a different Acting Register of Deeds.
Differences in the signature. The allegation that she brought from Antonio is negated by the content of the ‘originate’ title, TCT 16534 which covered a different property. Issue 3: CA erred rely
on fake title to deny prescription Ca concluded that it cannot prescribe for it was under the Torrens system. Still, the lot cannot be acquired through prescription but for a different reason. The
Deed of Assignment between Antonio to Alejandro was cancelled three months after execution, thus it could have not vested Antonio’s rights over Lot No. 557. Thus, it reverted to its original
status as a subject of conditional sale between Bureau of Lands and Antonio upon full payment.• Under Act No. 1120 for the administration, temporary lease and sale of friar lands until full
payment. Three possible scenarios: 1. Antonio completed payment and it would be registered under Antonio’s name. Land registered under the Torrens system cannot be acquired through
prescription. 2. If he failed, the title remains with the government. And as such, prescription will not run against the government (1107). 3. Another person could have bought the rights. All these
scenarios negate the possibility of prescription.
Effects of the Nullity of TCT No. 571 Neither Mauricia nor Alejandro has title over Lot No. 557. A person only transmits rights that he possesses. When innocent third persons, however purchase
or acquire rights over the property relying on correctness of the certificate of title, courts cannot disregard the rights they acquired and order the cancellation of the certificate Innocent purchasers
in good faith may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and neither the law nor the courts can oblige them to go behind the certificate and investigate again the
true condition of the property. • They are those who buy the property of another, without notice that some other person has a right or interest in such property and pays a full price for the same, at
the time of such purchase or before has notice of the claims or interest of some other person in the property. • It covers innocent lessee, mortgagee or encumbrancer for value but not donee. The
TCT’s issued to Mauricia must be cancelled for there is no ownership for such.
Estoppel Against the Government: As a rule, the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistake or error of tis officials or agents. • Public are little favored. They should not be
invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances. • They must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice
clearly require it. In the case: For nearly twenty years (starting from the issuance of St. Judes titles in 1966 up to the filing of the Complaint in 1985), petitioner failed to correct
and recover the alleged increase in the land area of St. Jude. Its prolonged inaction strongly militates against its cause, as it is tantamount to laches, which means the failure or
neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. • Surveyors erred for such. • None of
the neighboring owners ever complained. • There was no actual damage to third persons. Torrens Title and Good Faith Where innocent third persons, relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title, acquire rights over the property, courts cannot disregard such rights and order the cancellation of the certificate. Such cancellation would
impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance whether the
title has been regularly issued or not. This would be contrary to the very purpose of the law, which is to stabilize land titles. In the case: When private respondents-purchasers
bought their lots from St. Jude, they did not have to go behind the titles thereto to verify their contents or search for hidden defects or inchoate rights that could defeat their rights
to said lots. Although they were bound by liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles, private respondents-purchasers could not have had notice of defects that only an
inquiry beyond the face of the titles could have satisfied. • No proof of bad faith. • The area measurement was not eve precise and the new size is more precise and more
accurate. Time and again, we have said that a Torrens certificate is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of the person whose name appears thereon
 FACTS RULING

FUDALAN VS The subj of this action is a parcel of land in Panglao, Bohol in the name of Juana Fuderanan. Spouses Ocial filed an action of validity Baldomera claims that because they have been in adverse possession for the requisite period, their possession has now ripen into ownership through acquisitive
of partition and sale, recovery of ownership and possession and damages against Fudalans. Spouses Ocial alleged that in March 13, prescription which failed to convince the court for it was merely a bare allegation as no evidence, documentary or otherwise showing that the title was transferred
OCIAL 2001 the heirs of Juana executed Extrajudicial settlement among heirs with simultaneous deed of absolute sale inclusind fruit-bearing from Juana to her parents. In fact, she never denied that the tax declaration was still in the name of Juana Fuderanan. As such, for lack of just title, she could not
(WON the land was acquired by
Baldomera through acquisitive mangot trees that they caused the placement of a ‘no-tresspassing’ sign in one of the mango trees, they also caused the deed of extra. have acquired the lot through ordinary prescription. The alleged agreement which is compromise agreement cannot transmit ownership for no rights can arise
prescription?) Settlement among heirs with simultaneous sale for the cancellation of tax declaration and the issuance of a new tax declaration in their therefrom. Can Baldomera acquire the ppty through extraordinary prescription? No. it was only on 1994 that her husband, Flavio was named as administrator that
favour. That in june 2001, the fudalans without any lawful right or authorization surreptitiously planted ubi and they also claimed the it was also paying taxes and that it was also the time they started occupying the property. This is contrary to her assertion that they had been occupying and paying
landowner’s share of the mango produce and the Fudalans illegally placed two “no-tresspassing” signs inside the questioned ppty. The taxes before the said period. On this note, the 30-year period would only be completed on 2024. Also, the records would reveal as early as November 2001, her
Fudalans claimed that they were the rightful owners of the subj land having purchased the same from the Fuderanans which was possession was interrupted when Spouses Ocial filed a complaint in Panglao, Bohol.
evidenced by a private document. Baldomera filed an answer for intervention against the Fuderanans for specific performance quieting
of title and nullification of the deed of extra-judicial settlement with simultaneous sale in favor of Spouse Ocial. Although the title is
still in the name of Juana Fuderanan the ppty was absolutely owned by her parents who acquired the ppty in 1935 and thereafter took
possession of the land and that they bought it from the Fuderanans.
ANDRES VS STA
LUCIA REALTY

MAYBANK
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TARROSA

BENTIR V
LEANDA

REPUBLIC VS
BANEZ

AINZA VS
PADUA

MONTERO VS
TIMES
TRANSPORTATIN
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VIRTUCIO VS
ALAGARBES
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