EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS:

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915 Decided on: April 24, 1985
Ponente: ESCOLIN, J.

FACTS: Petitioners Lorenzo Tanada and others, seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and
administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this
case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality
or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: Said laws needs publication requirement.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: They argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when decrees themselves
provides for their own effectivity dates. (Effective immediately upon approval)

ISSUE: Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special

provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity?

RULING: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where

the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the
date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which
is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides
for the date when it goes into effect.
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide
for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose
burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concern.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,
which have not been published, shall have no force and effect.
PUBLICATION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
DE ROY VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 80718 Decided on: January 29, 1988
Ponente: CORTES, J.:

FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents
resulting in injuries to private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On
the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court
of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioner‘s
motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in
HabulayasvsJapzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not
be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: The rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should
not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision
of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme
Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective.

ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding.

RULING: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision
in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice
to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of
Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
CASE NAME Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Angeles

GR Number/ Case Date: GR 108461 / Oct 21, 1996

Ponente: Torres, Jr., J:
Petitioners: Philippine International Trading Corp (PITC)
Respondents: Hon Presiding Judge Zosimo Z. Angeles
Subject: Consti 1
Topic: Powers and Functions of The President- Executive Power
Rule of Law:
ARTICLE VII – THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
Doctrine: The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine
society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral
domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains.
The ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
which traces its origin to native title.
Facts:

- PITC is a GOCC created under PD 252, which was later revised by PD 1071.
LOI 444 was issued by Pres Marcos, directing that trade between Philippines
and any of the Socialist and other Centrally Planned Economy Countries
(SOCPEC) incl. PROC, shall be undertaken or coursed through PITC.
- PITC issued AO No. 89-08-01 : applications to the PITC for importation from
the People’s Republic of China (PROC) must be accompanied by a viable and
confirmed Export Program of Philippine Products to PROC carried out by the
importer himself or through a tie-up with a legitimate importer in an amount
equivalent to the value of the importation from PROC being applied for, or,
simply, at one is to one ratio. (trade balancing)
- (This order was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation)
- Private respondents Remington and Firestone (domestic corporations)
individually applied for authority to import from PROC with petitioner.
Granted
- Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export
credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import
applications were withheld by the petitioner PITC from private respondents,
such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from PROC.
- Pres Ramos directed DTI and PITC to cease implementing Administrative Order
after his visit to PROC Philippines and PROC entered into a new trade
agreement
- PITC granted private respondents to import anew from the PROC, without
being required to comply anymore with the trade balancing.
- President Aquino issued EO 133, establishing DTI as the primary
coordinative, promotive, facilitative and regulatory arm of government for
the country’s trade, industry and investment activities, which shall act
as a catalyst for intensified private sector activity in order to accelerate
and sustain economic growth. DTI empowered to plan, implement, coordinate
activities of the government related to trade industry and investments; …
 to formulate country and product export strategies which will guide the
export promotion and development thrusts of the government.
- Lower Court ruled that the PITC’s authority to process and approve
applications for imports and to issue rules and regulations has already
been repealed by EO 133. That the PITC was not empowered to formulate or
promulgate the assailed AO. Lastly, the court declared the AO null and
void, since the same was not published.

Issue and Holding Is the obligation of the respondents for the charges in favor
of PITC, for the period when the questioned AO remained in effect, still
subsisting, or are the respondents freed from it?
Respondents are freed from their obligations.
EO 133 does not repeal the authority of PITC to process and approve
applications for imports and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI 444
and PD 1071. The President, in promulgating EO 133, had not intended to overhaul
the functions of the PITC. The DTI was established, and given powers and duties
including those previously held by the PITC as an independent government entity.
PITC was therefore attached to the DTI as an implementing arm of the said
Department. The President could not have intended to deprive herself of the power
to regulate the flow of trade between the Philippines and PROC, a power which
necessarily flows from her office as Chief Executive. She merely intended to
reorganize the Department of Trade and Industry.
PITC was legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid
exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. However, the subject AO was not a
valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The AO was not duly published,
it did not take effect, and therefore, private respondents cannot be made subject
to them.
Ruling Decision of lower Court AFFIRMED, to the effect that judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the private respondents, subject to MODIFICATIONS.
Mun. Gov’t of Coron vs. Carino
GR no. L-65894 (Sept 24, 1987)

Facts:
Then Pres Marcos directed the mayor of Coron to clear a certain space the
government then needed. The clearing of that space would require the demolishment
of respondents’ structures. The case was brought to court. After a series of
postponements, a date for the final hearing was set, during which respondents
and their counsel failed to appear. Upon petitioner’s motion that respondents’
failure to appear be construed as a waiver of their right to cross-examine
petitioners’ witnesses and to present evidence, the case was submitted for
decision.
Respondents appealed but failed to submit the required printed copies of
their record on appeal. Respondents also failed to act on the appellate court’s
directive to show cause why their appeal should not be dismissed.
The resolution dismissing respondents’ appeal became final and executory
on September 27, 1982, and a writ of execution issued on February 1, 1983.
BP 129 (Sec. 39): “No record on appeal shall be required to take an
appeal...”
Interim of Rules of Court promulgated on Jan 11, 1983 (Secs. 18): “...the
filing of a record on appeal shall be dispensed with...”
(Sec. 19b): “...In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule
109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed,
the period of appeal shall be 30 days, a record of appeal being required.”
In a supplemental motion dated April 12, 1983, respondents maintained that
since, under the present law, printed records on appeal are no longer required,
the rule on technicalities should be relaxed and their right to appeal upheld.
On July 29, 1983, the appellate court issued a resolution seeking to revive
the case.

Held:
The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege that may be exercised
only in the manner provided for by law.
Quoting Alday vs. Camilon, “Statues regulating the procedure of the court
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage. Procedural rules are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.”
EMETERIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-15127 Decided on: May 30, 1961
Ponente: CONCEPCION,J .:

FACTS: Emeterio Cui enrolled in the defendant university where plaintiff finished his law studies in the up to and
including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in
defendant Law College, he was awarded scholarship grants and his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after
ends of the semester. Plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law
in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. He
applied to take the bar examination in which he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University.
The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87, noting the contract that he signed which stated that
in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his right to transfer to another school
without having refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash and followed by Memorandum No. 38
that the Director of Private Schools issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Cui and the respondent university, whereby the former waives his right
to transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash valid or
not?

RULING: The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September 10, 1951, is a direct violation of
Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and void. The contract wascontrary to sound policy and civic honesty. The policy
enunciated in Memorandum No.38, s. 1949 is sound policy. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it
isunderstood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition andother fees corresponding to
these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to therecipient students when they decide to quit school or to
transfer to another institution.Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.
NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE – DIVORCE
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO JR. G.R. No. L-68470 Decided on: October 8, 1985
Ponente: MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private

respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong.
Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and begot two
children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that
petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Private
respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner‘s business in
Manila is their conjugal property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting
of the business and that private respondent be declared to manage the conjugal
property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause of
action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court. The denial now is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER: Respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce
proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property.
CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: The Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court
cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared
national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot,
especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the
alien spouse.

RULING: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article

15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner‘s
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
decision of his own country‘s court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own
representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO vs. REDERICK A. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
366 SCRA 437
PANGANIBAN, J.

Facts: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian

citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the
marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage with
petitioner a Filipina on January 12, 1994.
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without
prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed
a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy.
Respondent contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a
decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto
capacitated him to remarry.

HELD: The SC remanded the case to the trial court to receive evidence. Based on
the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized
Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the
court grant petitioner‘s prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the
ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law, he was
really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree.
Wild Valley v CA
Facts:
Philippine Roxas (owned by Phil. Pres. Lines), vessel, arrived in Venezuela to
load iron ore. When vessel was ready to leave the port, Mr. Vasquez (official
pilot of Venezuela) was designated to navigate the vessel through the Orinoco
River.

The master of the vessel, Captain Colon, was at the bridge with the pilot when
the vessel left the port. Captain Colon left the bridge when the vessel was
underway.

The vessel experienced some vibrations but the pilot assured that they were just
a result of the shallowness of the vessel. The vessel again experienced vibrations
which led to the vessel being run aground in the Orinoco River, obstructing the
ingress and egress of vessels.

As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon (vessel owned by Wildvalley Shipping)

was unable to sail out that day. For this reason, Wild Valley commenced an action
for damages.

Issue:
1. Whether or not fault can be attributed to the master(captain) of Philippine
Roxas for the grounding of said vessel.

2. Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies.

Held:
1. No. It's the pilot's fault!

There being no contractual obligation, the master was only required to give
ordinary diligence in accordance with Article 1173 of the New Civil Code. In the
case, the master exercised due diligence when the vessel sailed only after the
main engine, machine rise and other auxiliaries were checked and found to be in
good running condition and when the master left a competent officer - the pilot
who is experienced in navigating the Orinoco River.

Philippine rules on pilotage enunciate the duties and responsibilities of a

master of a vessel and its pilot. The law is explicit in saying that the master
remains the overall commander of the vessel even when there is a pilot on board.
He remains in control despite the presence of a pilot who is temporarily in
charge of the vessel. It is NOT required of him to be on bridge while the vessel
is being navigated by a pilot.
Furthermore, the Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated
the engaging of a pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal,
bank, deep and shallow ends of the river. Admitting his limited knowledge of the
River, Captain Colon deemed it best to rely on the knowledge and experience of
pilot Vasquez to guide the vessel safely.

The pilot should have been aware of the portions which are shallow and which are
not. His failure to determine the depth of the river and his decision to plod on
his set course, in all probability, caused damage to the vessel. Thus, he is
negligent and liable for the grounding.

2. NO. The elements of res ipsa loquitor are:

-accident was of such character as to warrant inference that it would not have
happened except for defendant's negligence
-accident must have been caused by an agency/instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of
-accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.

There was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master to the pilot
on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, requisites 1 and 2 (negligence and
control) are not present in the following situation.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
297 SCRA 469
1998

FACTS:
Herein private respondent Milagros P. Morada is a flight attendant for petitioner
SAUDIA airlines, where the former was tried to be raped by Thamer and Allah
AlGazzawi, both Sauidi nationals and fellow crew member, after a night of dancing
in their hotel while in Jakarta, Indonesia. She was rescued. After two weeks
of detention the accused were both deported to Saudi and they were reinstated by
Saudia. She was pressured by police officers to make a statement and to drop
the case against the accused; in return she will then be allowed to return to
Manila and retrieved her passport. For the second time, she was asked by her
superiors to again appear before the Saudi court. Without her knowledge, she
was already tried by Saudi court together with the accused and was sentenced to
five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes in connection with Jakarta rape
incident. The court found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a disco,
dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition.

ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT the QC Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear
and try the civil case based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code or the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia court though there is the existence of foreign element.

RULING:
The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact that
one party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a resident
foreign corporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are
many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties
to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other
cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the
foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner
SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of
travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.

The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact that
one party is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a resident
foreign corporation. The forms in which this foreign element may appear are
many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of the parties
to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between
nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other
cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form. In the instant case, the
foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner
SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of
travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.

Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign

element, the problem could present a “conflicts” case. Where the factual
antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree
with petitioner that the problem herein could present a “conflicts” case. A
factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the
diverse laws of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign element.” The
presence of a foreign element is inevitable since social and economic affairs of
individuals and associations are rarely confined to the geographic limits of
their birth or conception.
G.R. No. 124110 April 20, 2001
UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ANICETO FONTANILLA, in his personal capacity and in behalf
of his minor son MYCHAL ANDREW FONTANILLA, Respondents.

FACTS:
Aniceto Fontanilla bought from United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel
Bureau
in Manila, three “Visit the U.S.A.” tickets from himself, his wife and his minor
son, Mychal, to visit the cities of Washington DC, Chicago and Los Angeles.
All All flights had been confirmed previously by United Airlines. Having used
the first
coupon to DC and while at the Washington Dulles Airport, Aniceto changed
their itinerary, paid the penalty for rewriting their tickets and was issued
tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words: “Check-inrequired.”
They were then set to leave but were denied boarding because
the flight was overbooked.
The CA ruled that private respondents’ failure to comply with the check-in
requirement
will not defeat his claim as the denied boarding rules were not complied with
applying
the laws of the USA, relying on the Code of Federal Regulation Part on Oversales
of the
USA.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in applying the laws of USA.

HELD:
No. According to the doctrine of “lex loci contractus”, the law of the place
where a
contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity,
obligation and interpretation shall govern. This has been said to be the rule
even though
the place where the contract was made is different from the place where it is to
be
performed. Hence, the court should apply the law of the place where the airline
ticket
was issued, where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and
the
ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Therefore, although,
the contract
of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased
through petitioner’s agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were "rewritten"
in D.C.,
however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage
entered
into by the parties in Manila.
Nationality Principle – Internal and Conflict Rule
Aznar vs Garcia
G.R. No. L-16749
Decided on: January 31, 1963
Ponente: LABRADOR, J.:
FACTS: Edward Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California, where
he resided (and consequently was considered a California citizen) for a period
of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary
until the time of his death . However, during the entire period of his residence
in this country he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In his
will executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter,
Maria Lucy Christensen as her only heir, but left a legacy of sum of money in
favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (who in a decision rendered by the Supreme
Court had been declared another acknowledged natural daughter of his). Counsel
for the acknowledged natural daughter Helen Claims that under Art. 16, par. 2 of
the Civil Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the
matter is referred back to the law of the domicile; that therefore Philippine
law is ultimately applicable; that finally, the share of Helen must be increased
in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine law.
Upon the other hand, consel for the child Maria Lucy contends that inasmuch as
it is clear that under Art. 16 par.2 of our Civil Code, the national law of the
deceased must apply, our courts must immediately apply the internal law of
California on the matter, that under California law there are no compulsory heirs
and consequently a testator could dispose of any property possessed by him in
absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being entitled to
anything under california law, the will of the deceased giving the bulk of the
property to Maria Lucy must remain undisturbed.

ISSUE: What law should govern? Philippine law or California law?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision apealed from is hereby reversed and the case
returned to the lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the
Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of
the meaning of the term ―national law‖ is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of
personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that
under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will
in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article
946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is
situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the
law of his domicile. University of the Cordilleras College of Law First Year C
S.Y. 2013 - 2014
81
It is argued on executor‘s behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen
of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary
provisions of Christensen‘s will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and
following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the
testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law of the
decedent‘s domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws
rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on
succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In
re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed
out as the national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained
the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one
for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees‘ (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause ―if there is
no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated‖ in Sec. 946
of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision
in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern. This
contention cannot be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned
in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California
Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testator‘s domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile cannot and should not
refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and
forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if
the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal
law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,
Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children
legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of
California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will
depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be governed
by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..
Nationality principle
Bellis vs. Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678
Decided on: June 6, 1967
Ponente: BENGZON, J.P., J.:
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the time of his
death. He executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his
distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the following order and
manner
a) $240,000.00 to his first wife MARY E. MALLEN
b) $120,000.00 to his three illegitimate childrenAMOS BELLIS, JR., MARIA CRISTINA
BELLIS, MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,or $40,000.00 each, and
c) After foregoing the two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to
his seven surviving children by his first and second wives EDWARD A. BELLIS,
HENRY A. BELLIS, ALEXANDER BELLIS, and ANNA BELLIS-ALLSMAN, EDWARD G. BELLIS, WA
LTER S. BELLIS, and DOROTHY E. BELLIS in equal shares.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the
deceased.
The LOWER COURT issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the
executor‘s final account, report and administration, and project of partition.
Relying upon Article 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is which did not provide for legitimes.

ISSUE: Which law must apply in executing the will of the deceased – Texas Law or
Philippine Law?

RULING: The said illegitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes under
the Texas Law(which is the national law of the deceased), here are no legitimes.
The renvoi doctrinecannot be applied. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where
the decedent is a national of one country ad a domiciliary of another. In the
said case, it is not disputed that the deceased was both a national of Texas and
a domicile thereof at the time of his death.
Article 16, Paragraph 2 of Civil code render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate and testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession, (b) the amount of successional rights, (c) the
intrinsic validity of provisions of will, and (d) the capacity to succeed.
They provide that:
ART.16 Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country to where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of successions and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the
country wherein said property may be found.
MERARDO L. ZAPANTA, petitioner, vs, THE HON.
AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

Prejudicial questions; Definition.—A prejudicial question is

one that arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal (People vs. Aragon, L5930,
February 17, 1954).

Same; Same; When action for annulment of second marriage

deemed a prejudicial question in a bigamy case.—The pre dicial
question must be determinative of the case before the court, and
jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court.
(People vs. Aragon, L5930, February 17, 1954).

Hence, where the defendant in a bigamy case in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan claims that the second marriage is void on the ground
that he entered into it under duress, force and intimidation , and,
as a matter of fact, a case is pe the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga for the annulment of said marriage , t he ci vil ac tio n
for ann ulme nt mu st decided before the action for bigamy can
proceed.

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pedro M. Santos and Jorge C. Salonga for petitioner.
Solicitor General, Romulo L. Chua and Dewey G
Soriano for respondents.
DIZON, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition filed by Merardo L Zapanta against the Hon.
Agustin, P. Montesa, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Fernando
A. Cruz Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan, and Olimpia A. Yco, to enjoin
the former from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 3405 pending the
final determination of Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga.

Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco on May 20, 1958, an information
for Bigamy was filed by respondent Provincial Fiscal against petitioner in the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan (Criminal Case No.
3405), alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin,
and without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage
with said complainant.

On June 16, 1958, petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga
Civil Case No. 1446 against respondent Olimpia A. Yco for the annulment of their
marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation.
On the 30th of the same month respondent Yco, as defendant in said case, filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of
action, but the same was denied on July 7 of the same year.

On September 2, 1958, petitioner, in turn, filed a motion

in Criminal Case No. 3405 to suspend proceedings therein,
on the ground that the determination of the issue involved
in Civil Case No. 1446 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga was a prejudicial question. Respondent judge
denied the motion on September 20, 1958 as well as
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, and ordered his
arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner
filed the present action.
We have heretofore defined a prejudicial question as that which arises in a case,
the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein,
and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (People
vs. Aragon, G.R. No. L5930, February 17, 1954). The prejudicial question—we
further said—must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction
to try the same must be lodged in another court (People vs.
Aragon, supra). These requisites are present in the case at bar. Should the
question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga prosper on the ground that, according to the evidence,
petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress, force and
intimidation, it is obvious that his act
was involuntary and can not be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy with which he was charged in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Thus,
the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is
determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy.

On the other hand, there can be no question that the annulment of petitioner's
marriage with respondent Yco on the grounds relied upon in the complaint filed
in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is within the jurisdiction of said
court.
In the Aragon case already mentioned (supra) we held that if the defendant in a
case for bigamy claims that the first marriage is void and the right to decide
such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment must
first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason
not to apply the same rule when the contention of the accused is that the second
marriage is void on the ground that he entered into it because of duress, force
and intimidation.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in the petition is hereby granted. Without costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,

Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Note.—A similar definition of prejudicial, question is found in Fortich Celdran

v. Celdran, L22677, Feb. 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 502, 505506.

See also People v. Villamor,

L13530, Feb. 28. 1962, ante, which held that the question of existence of the
deed of sale in a civil case is not a prejudicial question in the criminal
prosecution for false testimony which imputes to the accused false testimony that
the complainant executed the alleged document knowing it to be false. See the
discussion on prejudicial question and illustrative cases in 19 SCRA 507.
Donato vs Luna
GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988
Petitioner: Leonilo C. Donato
Respondents: Hon. Artemon D. Luna, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch
XXXIII, Hon. Jose Flaminiano, City Fiscal of Manila, and Paz B. Abayan
FACTS:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January
23, 1979 with the
lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of private respondent Paz
Abayan. Before
the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and
Domestic Relations
Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
petitioner contracted on
September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented
to entering into the
marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous knowledge that
Donato was already
married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato’s answer
interposed the defense
that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage
license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent
to obtain
petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second
marriage, Paz and
Donato had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for
5 years proven by
a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the
requisite marriage
license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato
continued to live with
Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato
already previously
married.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the Information for Bigamy,
petitioner filed a motion
to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that the civil case filed by
Paz Abayan seeking
the annulment of his second marriage raises a prejudicial question which must
first be determined or
decided before the criminal case can proceed.

ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court
be suspended in
view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations
Court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

HELD:
Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply the rule on prejudicial question since a
case for annulment of
marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused if it
was shown that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was the one that was
obtained by means of
duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must
be involuntary and
cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
touching upon the
nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato’s guilt
or innocence in the
crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner’s second wife, the herein private
respondent Paz B.
Abayan, who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her
consent was obtained through deceit.
QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO
GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

FACTS:
Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner
raised in his affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that
an administrative case is pending before the Office of Land Authority between
the same parties and involving the same piece of land.

In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private Respondent
over the property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot. Petitioner
argue that the administrative case was determinative of private respondents right
toe eject petitioner from the from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial
question which bars a judicial action until after its termination.

The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the Petitioner’s
affirmative defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. Private
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no Prejudicial Question.

The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the CFI
praying that the Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be
dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter
exclusively.

The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the ejectment
case to be one of prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for lack
of merit.

Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE PARTIES INVOLVING THE
LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE EJECTMENT CASE CONSTITUTES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH
WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR TO SAID EJECTMENT CASE.

DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL COURT
OF MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.
Technically, No prejudicial question.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case

the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said
case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. (Zapata v. Montessa
4 SCRA 510 (1962); Pp v. Aragon, 500 G. No. 10, 4863) The Doctrine of Prejudicial
Question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and criminal actions
are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely
related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before
the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question
in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the
latter pending final determination of the former.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5,

Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court are:
the Civil Action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in
the criminal action
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.

However because of intimate correlation of the two proceedings and the possibility
of the Land Authority in deciding in favor of Petitioner which will terminate or
suspend Private Respondents Right to Eject Petitioner, the SC gave the lower
court and advise. This advise became the which became the basis for deciding the
case.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial
court to have taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after
a determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not
jurisprudence dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner’s right of possession being upheld
in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require not only the parties
but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn out to
be a sheer exercise of futility. Thus, 1 AM Jur 2d tells us:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion,
upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance
to abide the outcome of another pending in another court, especially where the
parties and the issues are the same, for there is power inherent in every court
to control the disposition of cases on its dockets with economy of time and
effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties to
the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised in
the first action are settled the second action should be stayed. (at page 622)
While the rule is properly applicable for instances involving two [2] court
actions, the existence in the instant case of the same consideration of identity
of parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels
and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties right of possession
before the ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule’s
analogous application to the case at bar.

Fortich-Celdran, et al vs. Caldran, et al, 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous

situation. In sustaining the assailed order of the then CFI of Misamis Oriental
ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document
against several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until
the civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged
document shall have been decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own
action on administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court
against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in Abeyance, thus:
“As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by respondent
attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 (Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago
Catane, etc, et al.) is necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu
CFI, action on the herein complaint is withheld until that litigation has finally
been decided. Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such decision.”(SC
minute resolution April 27, 1962 in Adm Case No. 77, Richard Ignacio Celdran vs.
Santiago Catane, etc. et. al)
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial
question to an administrative case. We see no reason why the reverse may bot be
so considered in the proper case, such as in the petition at bar.

The SC even noted the Wisdom of Its advice.

Finally, events occurring during the pendency of the petition attest to the
wisdom of the conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel
for petitioner, it was stated that he intervenor Land Authority which later
became the Department of Agrarian REform had promulgated a decision in the
administrative case affirming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell issued in
favor of the private respondent. Wit this development, the folly of allowing the
ejectment case to proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.
Globe Mackay vs. CA
G.R. No. 81262
Decided on: August 25, 1989
Ponente: CORTES, J.:
Facts: 10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing
agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager,
discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused
Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported
it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice
President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told
Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When
Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a ―crook‖ and a
―swindler‖, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of
his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover,
petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still
incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila
police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner
are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal‘s Office of Manila a
total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were
dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in
January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic
Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that
Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a
civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX,
through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent,
ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual
damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain
significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the
right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the
latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else
the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail;
his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be
trusted.‖) as well as against Tobias (―crook‖, and ―swindler‖); the writing of a
letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to
dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private
respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS COURT OF APPEALS 219 SCRA 115
G.R. No. 97336
Decided on: February 19, 1993
Ponente: DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari. On October 27, 1987, without the
assistance of counsel, private respondent filed with the aforesaid trial court
a complaint for damages against petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that she is 20 years old,
single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her country; other petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange
student, before August 20, 1987 the latter courted and proposed to marry her,
she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they therefore
agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
apartments. She was a virgin at that time; after a week before the filing of
complaint, petitioner‘s attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated
and threatened to kill her; as a result of the complaint. Petitioner repudiated
the marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and that the
petitioner is already married to someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent then
prayed for judgment ordering petitioner to pay her damages. On the other hand,
petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent and denied all allegations against him. After trial
on the merits, the lower court ordered petitioner to pay the private respondent
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Article 2176
of the Civil Code, which defines quasi-delicts thus:
―Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.‖
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that
where a man‘s promise to marry in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise
was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but
because of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the willful injury to her honor
and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs,
or public policy.