ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY TALKING ABOUT GOD

THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE AND

TALKING ABOUT CREATION
Texts and Studies
Avicenna-'s and Thomas Aquinas-' positions
EDITED BY

H. DAIBER and D. PINGREE BY

VOLUME LVIII RAHIMACAR

BRILL
LEIDEN . BOSTON
2005
 This book is printed on acid-free paper.

CONTENTS
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Acar, Rahim. Acknowledgements . IX

Talking about God and talking about creation: Avicenna's and Thomas Aquinas'
positions / by Rahim Acar.
p. cm. - (Islamic philosophy, theology, and science; v. 58) Introduction .
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 90-04-14477-3 (alk. paper)
1. Avicenna, 980-1037. 2. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274. 3. God-
PART ONE: TALKING ABOUT GOD
Comparative studies. 4. Creation-Comparative studies. 5. God-History of
doctrines. 6. Creation-History of doctrines. 1. Title. H. Series.
Chapter One Theological Language and Philosophical
B751.Z7A352005 25
Assessment .
213'.092'2-dc22
2005050724 Avicenna's Theory of Theological Language .. 26
We Cannot Know and Name God in Himself . 26
God Is Known through Creation .. 28
God Has Negative and Positive Relations to
Creation . 30
God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from
Creation . 34
Perfections Are Predicated of God and Creation
according to Tashkfk . 36
ISSN 0169-8729 41
Aquinas' Theory of Theological Language , .
ISBN 900414477 3
We Cannot Know God's Essence .. 42
© Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NI{ Leiden, The Netherlands God Is Known through Creation .. 44
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, God Has Negative and Positive Properties . 46
Martinus Niyhoff Publishers and VS?
God Has Perfections in a Different Mode from
All rights reserved. No part if this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in Creatures . 48
a retrieval system, or transmitted in aJryfirm or by any means, electronic, Perfections Are Predicated of God Analogically . 50
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written
permissionfrom the publisher. The Use of the Negative Element in Aquinas' Position . 54
Conclusion of Chapter One . 75
Authorization to photocopy itemsfir internal or personal
use is granted by Brill provided that
the appropriatefies are paid directly to The Copyright Chapter Two Conception of God and Theological
Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Language . 79
Danvers MA 01923, USA. Avicenna's Conception of Divine Formal Features
Fees are subject to change.
and Divine Knowledge . 81
God Is Simple .. 81
God Is Necessary and Immutable .. 86
PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
VI CONTENTS CONTENTS vu

God Is Eternal . 89 Causes Necessitate Their Effects . 176

God Knows Creatures as well as Himself . 93 Causes and Their Effects co-Exist . 177
Aquinas' Conception of Divine Formal Features The co-Existence of Causes and Their Effects Does
and Divine Knowledge . 101 not Require that They Be Equal . 181
God Is Simple . 101 The Efficient Cause Is the Cause only of the
God Is Necessary and Immutable .. 105 Existence of Its Effect . 182
God Is Eternal . 108 Arguments for the Sempiternity of the Universe .. 185
God Knows Creatures as well as Himself .. 113 The First Argument: Time and Temporal Beginning
Theological Language Revisited: Talking About Are not Applicable to All Things .. 186
God in the Light of Divine Formal Features . 119 The Second Argument: Temporal Posteriority
Conclusion of Chapter Two . 126 Requires a Change in God . 189
The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leads
to Impossible Conclusions .. 193
PART Two: TALKING ABOUT CREATION Aquinas' Position . 197
What Is Creation? .. 198
Chapter Three The Nature of Creative Action . 131 Creation Is not a Change . 200
Avicenna's Position: Creation is Voluntary and Creation as the Relation between God and the
Necessary . 132 Universe . 201
Interpretation of Avicenna's Position .. 133 Real Relations of God .. 201
God Creates by Will not by Nature . 136 How God Is Related to the World . 204
God Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe . 140 The Sempiternity of the Universe Is Possible but not
Objections Revisited . 146 Necessary . 210
Aquinas' Position: Creation is Voluntary and Countering Avicenna's Arguments for the Sempiternity
Hypothetically Necessary . 149 of the Universe .. 213
God Creates by Will not by Nature .. 150 Countering the First Argument . 213
God's Will Is Simple: God primarily and essentially Countering the Second Argument .. 216
Wills Himself . 155 Countering the Third Argument .. 222
God Freely Wills the Universe .. 156 Remarks on Arguments Concerning Sempiternity .. 225
God Has Free Choice . 159 Conclusion of Chapter Four .. 228
Is the Universe Necessary? . 162
Talking About Creation: Necessity or Hypothetical Conclusion .................................................................................. 231
Necessity . 164
Conclusion of Chapter Three . 167 Bibliography . 235
Primary Literature .. 235
Chapter Four The Beginning of the Universe . 169 Secondary Literature .. 236
Avicenna's Position . 170
What Is Creation? . 170 Index of Authors ........................................................................ 243
Creation Is not a Change . 172 Index of Topics .......................................................................... 245
Creation as the Relation between God and the
Universe . 173
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study has grown out of my doctoral dissertation comparing

Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions on creation. Throughout the process
I have received support and encouragement from many people.
During the dissertation stage, David Burrell's guidance led me to
identifY the roots of the apparent differences between Avicenna's and
Thomas Aquinas' understandings of creative action. I appreciated
his insights as well as his thoughtful and quick comments on my
drafts. Steven Brown's assistance in the subtle details of medieval
Christian philosophy helped clarify my arguments. He gave gener-
ously of his time and provided me with constant encouragement.
Sarah Coakley's attention to the finer points of my discussion as well
as to its scope and shape was very valuable and her deep interest
in the philosophy of religion inspired me, as did her encouragement
to contribute to this field. Wolfhart Heinrichs assisted me with the
more difficult Arabic translations. Robert Wisnovsky was a constant
conversation partner throughout, paying close attention to my argu-
ments and helping me to present a more balanced and hopefully
more persuasive discussion.
I am grateful to Hans Daiber for encouraging me to revise and
publish my dissertation. He read the manuscript and made helpful
comments and suggestions to improve it. I would like to also thank
to Caner Dagli for copy-editing the manuscript. Without his help
the text would be drier and more ambiguous.
Among many other professors whose support I greatly appreciate
are William A. Graham, Bekir Karliga and Necip Taylan. My friends
have provided me with thoughtful conversation and warm compan-
ionship. I am grateful to them for their support in different ways
and at different stages of this work.
Although I would not have finished this work without the contri-
butions of those mentioned here, I bear sole responsibility for its
shortcomings.
A part of chapter 3, concerning Avicenna's position regarding the
nature of creative action appeared in The Muslim World, 94/1 (2004),
x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

pp. 65-79. Thanks are due to the editors of The Muslim World for
permitting me to include it here with some revision. Finally, my
thanks go to Trudy Kamperveen for all the work she has done INTRODUCTION
toward the publication of this study in the IPTS series at Brill.

The purpose of this book is to study the positions of Avicenna and

Thomas Aquinas regarding theological language and creation. When
beginning to research this project, my sole intention was to compare
their positions concerning (1) the nature of the divine creative action
and (2) the eternity vs. temporal beginning of the universe. During
the process of research, it became clear that a statement of their
positions regarding theological language must precede the discussion
of their position regarding creation. Thus the study at hand is divided
into two parts. In the first part, which comprises the discussion con-
cerning their position regarding theological language, I tried first to
answer the question whether their positions can be philosophically
assessed and second to provide a statement of their conceptions of
divine attributes insofar as they are related to the discussion of cre-
ation. The first issue requires discussion, especially since scholars
interested in Thomas Aquinas' thought have expressed their worries
if Aquinas' theological views should be subject to philosophical assess-
ment. By having such a discussion, I intended to establish that
Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions are equally open to philosophical
scrutiny.
A concise statement of their conceptions of divine attributes is cru-
cial not only for understanding their positions regarding theological
language, but also for comparing their positions regarding the nature
of creative action and the beginning of the universe. It is crucial for
understanding their positions regarding theological language, since
their conceptions of divine formal features modify their conception
of theological language respectively. At the beginning, it seemed to
me that I needed to state their conceptions of divine perfection prop-
erties, or attributes, in order trace whether their positions regarding
the two question concerning creation can be assessed on the basis
of their conceptions of God. That is, if they had a common con-
ception of God, then either Avicenna's position or Aquinas' position
on these two questions would be more in conformity. Or if they had
important differences regarding their conceptions of God, then the
difference between their answers to these questions could be traced
to the difference between their conceptions of God. However, during
 2 INTRODUCTION
my work I found that discussion of their conceptions of divine attrib-
utes was crucial not simply as a criterion to check the compatibil-
ity of their answers to their positions regarding the nature of the
creative action and the beginning of the universe. But it also pro-
vided an important guideline to understand their statements on these
Issues.
Introducing OJlestions concemzng Creation
Historical Background
The questions concerning the nature of creative action and the begin-
ning of the universe had occupied the sharpest minds long before
Avicenna and Aquinas. In arguing for their positions regarding those
questions, Avicenna and Aquinas continue traditions that were shaped
long before them. They share some of the sources, which contributed
to the development of their own and opposing positions, although
each also has sources which were not available to the other. Among
these common sources are Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Proclus. I
Besides these common sources influencing their discussions of cre-
ation-though not necessarily determining their positions-they also
had predecessors whose interpretation of the classical sources influenced
them. For Avicenna, besides these figures from the ancient and
Hellenistic philosophy, al-Farabf seems to be a source of influence. 2
I 77ze Book qf Causes, which was translated from the Arabic, Xitab fi al-Khayr al-
Mabd, into Latin was attributed to Aristotle. However, it was mostly derived from
Proclus' Elements qf 77zeology. Vincent A. Guagliardo, "Introduction," in St. 77zomas
Aquinas: Commentary on the Book qf Causes, trans. Vincent A. Guagliardo et alii
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1996), pp. 9~32. Proclus,
77ze Elements qf 77zeology, trans. & comm. E. R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon, 1963).
See also Richard C. Taylor, "Aquinas, the Plotiniana Arabica, and the Metaphysics
of Being and Actuality," Journal qf the History qf Ideas 59 (1998), pp. 217~239. However,
the Book qf Causes may indicate indirect connection between Avicenna and Aquinas
with regard to their common Neoplatonic sources. The Plotiniana Arabica, which was
available to Avicenna, was not translated into Latin. However, the Book qf Causes,
which was available to and commented on by Aquinas, indicates the debt of its
author to the Plotiniana Arabica. The author of the Book qf Causes diverges from
Proclus, modifies the ideas taken from Proclus' Elements qf 77zeology in the light of
the material contained in the Plotiniana Arabica. Richard Taylor, op. cit., pp. 222~225.
2 See for al-Farabf's refutation of John Philoponus' criticism of Aristotle con-
cerning the eternity of the universe, Muhsin Mahdi, "Alfarabi against Philoponus,"
Journal qf Near Eastern Studies 26 (1967), pp. 233~260.
INTRODUCTION 3
John Philoponus and early Muslim theologians can also be consid-
ered among Avicenna's sources, not in the sense that he followed
them but in the sense that he was responding to them in constructing
his position. 3 For Aquinas, on the other hand, a host of Christian
authors, such Augustine, John of Damascus, Pseudo-Dionysius and
the Jewish theologian Maimonides must be mentioned among many
others. John Philoponus' arguments were also available to Aquinas,
even though his arguments may not have always been traced to his
name. 4
Avicenna may also be cited among Thomas Aquinas' sources via
Avicenna's own works and through the presentation of his ideas by
others. An important part of Avicenna's works were available in the
West within one hundred years of his death. 5 Goichon divides
Avicenna's influence in the medieval West into three periods on the
basis of the reaction it received. From the beginning of translations
of Avicenna's works into Latin until 1230, approximately one hun-
dred years, Avicenna's theories were received with unreserved admi-
ration. The second period begins at 1231 by the pontifical decree
authorizing the study of Aristotle's work and those of his commen-
tators. It lasted almost thirty years, and was characterized as an emo-
tional reaction to the first period. The third period began around
1260 through studies of Avicenna by Albert the Great, and contin-
ued in the Thomistic synthesis. Unlike the previous two periods, at
this stage Avicenna's theories were carefully studied and evaluated. 6
Beyond Avicenna's own works, al-Ghazalf's works, which were trans-
lated by the translator of Avicenna's works, Gundussalinus, also served
3 For a discussion of the Kalam theories in Avicenna's thought, whether Avicenna
might have been responding to Muslim theologians, see Michael E. Marmura,
"Avicenna and the Kalam," in Zeitschriftfiir Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wzssenschajien,
vol. 7, ed. Fuat Sezgin et alii (Frankfurt am Main: Institut fur Geschichte der
Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften, 1992), pp. 172~206. See also Robert Wisnonsky,
"Notes on Avicenna's Concept of Thingness (shay'iyya)," Arabic Sciences and Philosophy
10/2 (2000), pp. 181 ~221.
4 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, New York: Cornel!
University, 1983), p. 202; Herbert A. Davidson, Proqfs fir Eternity, Creation and the
Existence qf God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy (henceforth Proqfs) (Oxford &
New York: Oxford University, 1987), p. 120.
5 AmeIie-Marie Goichon, "L'influence d'Avicenne en occident," Revue de L'Institute
des Belles Lettres Arabes (Tunis) 14 (1951), pp. 374-375. Jacques Forget, "De I'influence
de la philosophie arabe sur la philosophie scholastique," Revue Neo-Scholastique (Louvain)
1 (1894), pp. 403-404.
6 Amelie-Marie Goichon, "L'influence d'Avicenne en occident," p. 376.
4 INTRODUCTION
as a source to understand Avicenna's theories.? Al-Ghazalf was thought
to be a proponent of Avicenna's philosophy, and his clear and more
accessible rendering of Avicenna's arguments made his work more
appealing to people interested in Avicenna's thought.
Avicenna may be considered to be one of the sources of Aquinas
in developing his theories regarding various aspects of creation. One
may immediately think that Avicenna may be a source for Aquinas
on this issue only in negative terms, by helping Aquinas to sharpen
his views, since Aquinas mostly criticized Avicenna's theories, such
as those concerning emanation and the necessity of the universe.
However, Avicenna also seems to be a positive source for Aquinas
regarding his understanding of creation. For example, one may assign
a part to Avicenna in Aquinas' affirmation that the relation between
the Creator and the universe is ultimately a relation of being, not
a temporal relation. These issues will be discussed in greater detail
later.
Conception if the Beginning if the Universe
The main question regarding the relation between God and the uni-
verse concerns what the universe owes to God. What does the uni-
verse owe to God? If one stretches the meaning of creation to denote
the relation between God and the universe, we may say creation is
conceived to be I) giving order, 2) giving movement, 3) giving exis-
tence after non-existence, which includes a prior non-existence, and
4) simply giving existence to the universe irrespective of temporal
considerations. Giving order and giving movement are the two alter-
natives that go back to ancient Greek thought, to Plato, 8 and to
Aristotle 9 respectively. The idea that the universe began to exist after
non-existence was not the way ancient philosophers preferred to
explain the existence of the universe. That the universe did not have
a beginning was supported by the majority of philosophers of the
ancient period, including Plato and Aristotle. lO God and the uni-
7 Etienne Gilson, Les Sources Greco-Arabes de l'Agustinisme Avicennisant (Paris: J. Vrin,
1930), pp. 74-76.
8 Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 1997), 28-29a.
9 Aristotle, Physics VIII. 1, in The Complete Works if Aristotle: The Revised O:gord
Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University, 1984).
10 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, ch. 15, pp. 232-252.
INTRODUCTION 5
verse, for them, seem to exist alongside each other. The doctrine of
the 'creation out of nothing,' as it is understood today may be seen
as having arisen later "as part of the controversy of early Christianity
with philosophy."ll
Plato offers what he self-consciously refers to as a likely story of
the creation of the physical universe. Plato asks whether the universe
has always existed, or whether it began to exist. He teaches that the
cosmos and all perceptible things must have begun, and they must
have been caused by the Demiurge. The Demiurge reproduces the form
and the character of what is changeless, when it creates the world.
Plato's discussion suggests that time and material things with chaotic
movements existed before the creation of the cosmos. The creative
role he assigns to God is to impose order on things already in exis-
tence. This is the first alternative in the quadruple division above,
and it turned out to be fruitful. Later efforts at assigning a begin-
ning to the universe either with regard to being and time, or sim-
ply with regard to being, may have been inspired by Plato's account.
His account was subject to various interpretations. For example, it
could mean that time began with the ordered universe, and there
was nothing before. It could also mean that orderly time began with
the ordered cosmos, which would still leave disorderly matter, motion
and time before God made it a cosmos. A third interpretation is
that Plato's talk of a beginning was simply a metaphor, and he talked
about it only for pedagogical purposes.l 2
That everything is created by God in the sense that everything
has a beginning seems to have been an idea that evolved over time.
That is, not all Jewish and Christian philosophers, who faced the
ancient Greek and Neoplatonic philosophical heritage, understood
creation in the third sense mentioned above. Except for a few peo-
ple in ancient times, philosophers denied that the universe had a
beginning. That the cosmos had a temporal beginning was approved
by many, who denied that matter itself had a temporal beginning.
Although the idea that the material universe had a beginning was
defended by many Jews and Christians, they were not unanimous
about it. Some of the verses in the Bible, such as Genesis I & 2,
11 Gerhard May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: the Doctrine if 'Creation out if Nothing' in EarlY
Christian Thought, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), p. xii.
12 For a discussion of the various interpretations of Plato's account, see Richard
Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 268-276.
6 INTRODUCTION
Job 28 and 38 were interpreted in a Platonic spirit to mean that
God created the cosmos out of already existing matter. Philo, for
example, who lived in the first century C.E., has contradictory state-
ments about the issue, denying a beginning once and approving it
at other times. Whether prime matter had also a beginning for Philo
is a disputed issue among scholars. 13 Some Christians seem to have
endorsed the idea that the universe is beginningless or endless, such
as Clement (d. 215 C.E.) and Synesius of Cyrene (370/5-413/414
C.E.), a view which can be traced to Platonic influence. 14
Instead of interpreting Plato's story in such a way that the cos-
mos has a temporal beginning and that God made it begin-as did
Speusippus and Crantor (d.e. 290 B.C)-Plotinus (e. 205-269/70
C.E.) argued that matter itself had a beginning but not a temporal
beginning. 15 This interpretation meant that God was the cause of its
existence. Thus, Plato's presentation of the relation between God
and the universe is considered in terms of being, not in terms of
time. Even Aristotle's God, at times, was considered to be the cre-
ator and sustainer of the world due in part to works, such as the
Theology if Aristotle incorrectly attributed to him. Proclus' (c. 411-485
C.E.) student Ammonius (c. 435/45-c. 517-26 C.E.) is considered
to have initiated the interpretation of Aristotle's position in this way,
and this interpretation was endorsed by later Greek commentators
such as Philoponus and Simplicius, thus paving the way for efforts
to harmonize Aristotelian philosophy with Christian faith. 16
In any case, Plotinus' conception of emanation seems to be the
first comprehensive account of the dependence of the universe on
its cause which does not claim that it began after non-existence.
Plotinus' position exemplifies the fourth division mentioned above.
Instead of employing Plato's Demiurge in the Timaeus, Plotinus offers
his theory of emanation to explain the existence of the universe. He
13 See for Philo's position, Philo, De prouidentia I and 2, ed. Mireille Hadas-Lebel
(Paris: 1973); Philo, De opijicio mundi, trans. & annot. R. Arnaldez (Paris: 1961) 2.7
& 5.21. For a discussion of Philo's position, see Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and
the Continuum, pp. 203-209.
14 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 193-196. See also Gerhard
May, Creatio Ex Nihilo: the Doctrine if 'Creation out if Nothing' in Earry Christian Thought,
ch. 1, pp. 1-38.
15 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 268-272.
16 Richard Sorabji, "Infinite Power Impressed: the Transformation of Aristotle's
Physics and Theology," in Aristotle Transfirmed: the Ancient Commentators and their bifluence,
ed. Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1990), pp. 181-195.
INTRODUCTION 7
replaces Plato's artisan model for the making of the cosmos-which
may not mean the whole universe in the sense of everything other
than God-with the nature model. In Plotinus' universe the Intellect
exists as an effect of the contemplation of the One, the Soul as an
effect of the contemplation of the Intellect, and so on down to the
production of the material world. 17
The arguments for the universe not having a beginning in the
temporal sense are linked to the explanation of the relationship
between the universe and its cause. Most of the arguments con-
tending that the universe cannot have begun after non-existence are
traced back to Aristotle, who must have had Plato in mind in his
arguments for the beginninglessness of the universe. In fact, Plato's
conception of creation does not conform to the idea of creation in
the sense of giving being to all other things, nor does the beginning
he talks about cover the whole universe. And since Plato and Aristotle
are considered by many Greek commentators and following gener-
ations up to modern times to have accepted God as the efficient
cause of the universe, as well as a final cause, the dispute over the
beginning of the universe turns around Plotinus' conception of the
relationship between God and the universe, and the question of
whether the universe must be related to God simply in terms of
being or must also be related to God in temporal terms.
Philoponus interprets Plato's story to imply that time began together
with the ordered cosmos, and argues clearly that there was nothing
before creation. He draws upon the authority of Aristotle for this
interpretation. Aristotle maintained that Plato meant that the heav-
ens and the cosmos began to exist, and that time began from there.
Philoponus has an important place among those who argue that the
universe had begun to exist. Unlike many others who were simply
responding to arguments that the universe cannot have begun,
Philoponus devised counter-arguments telling why the universe must
have begun after not having existed. He presents two sets of arguments:
one based on the impossibility of an infinite number, and the other
"on the principle that a finite body can contain only finite power."18
17 Plotinus, Enneads trans. S. MacKenna; third edition revised by B. S. Page
(London: 1962), 111.8. Dominic J. O'Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction to Enneads (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1993), pp. 70-78. See also John M. Rist, "The One of Plotinus and
the God of Aristotle," in Platonism and its Christian Heritage (London: Variorum
Reprints, 1985), ch. IX.
18 Herbert A. Davidson, Proqft, p. 86 ff. See also Richard Sorabji, Time Creation
8 INTRODUCTION
His arguments have played an important role for the philosophers
and theologians of Christian, Jewish as well as Muslim traditions.
Does the Universe Have a Temporal Beginning?
The arguments that the universe cannot have begun temporally after
non-existence may be divided into two groups: I) arguments based
on the nature of the world not the world as a whole but things mak-
ing up the world; and 2) the perfection properties of the Creator of
the world. Each group comprises sub-groups. One may include the
arguments from the nature of time within the family of the argu-
ments from the nature of the world. 19 However, this may not be
adequate, because time is not only associated with matter, but may
also be considered in regard to the action of the agent. Furthermore,
the arguments based upon the nature of time and motion, on the
one hand, and the arguments based on the nature of things which
make up the world and the perfections of God, on the other, may
not be of the same importance. The latter, as far as Avicenna pre-
sents them, are positive arguments designed to show that the uni-
verse is sempiternal. Sempiternity, as we shall see, may imply infinite
temporal duration, but it itself is not a temporal duration. The argu-
ments based on motion and time, on the contrary, are arguments
that aim to reduce the opposite claim to impossibility.
Most of Avicenna's arguments for the sempiternity of the universe,
based on the nature of things, are traceable to Aristotle. However,
Avicenna does not use all of the arguments that Aristotle offers in
this respect, such as the vacuum argument. The arguments from the
nature of the physical world include arguments based on the con-
cept of coming to exist, or the concept of generation. Firstly, Aristotle
argues that everything that comes to exist needs a substratum. The
prime matter of the universe cannot come to exist, since it is the
substratum for everything that comes to exist. If matter itself comes
to exist, it must come to exist from already existing matter. Hence
the assumption that the world began to exist is self-contradictory.2o
and the Continuum, p. 198. For Philoponus' arguments for the beginning of the uni-
verse and their repercussion in the Kalam, see Herbert A. Davidson, ProofS, ch. IV
and V.
19 Herbert A. Davidson, for example, presents the arguments for the eternity of
the world in this way. Herbert A. Davidson, ProofS, pp. 24-27.
20 Aristotle, Physics I.9; Physics IV.7; Herbert A. Davidson, ProofS, pp. 13-14.
INTRODUCTION 9
Secondly he argues in the same vein that celestial spheres are not
subject to generation and corruption, because the motions of the
celestial spheres do not have a contrary. Since they do not begin to
exist by generation, they always exist. Aristotle also provides a third
argument for the sempiternity of the universe from the concept of
possibility. For Aristotle, in order for something to come to exist, it
must potentially or possibly exist before it actually exists. This implies
that nothing can come to exist out of absolute nothingness. 21 Avicenna
closely follows Aristotle, when he argues that the possibility of some-
thing must be prior to its actuality and the possibility of the mate-
rial beings resides in matter. A fourth argument is based on the
conception of motion arguing that the universe has always been in
motion. His argument is that motion is beginningless, since any sup-
posed first motion requires that there be a motion before it. 22 Aristotle's
fifth argument is based on the concept of time. He argues that time
cannot have a beginning, because there can be no before and after
without time. Assuming a beginning for time does not eliminate
speaking of time before the beginning of time. Since a "before" can
only be in time, then assuming a beginning for time is impossible.
His sixth argument concerns the relationship between time and an
instant. An instant separates past from future. It is the end of past
and the beginning of the future. Assuming a first moment, then,
requires assuming a period of time before the assumed first instant. 23
The arguments regarding the nature of God can also be traced
back to ancient philosophy. One of the arguments questions why
God did not create sooner. If the universe began to exist, then God
could have created it before. But there is no reason why God should
have delayed it. This argument can be traced back to Aristotle. 24
Augustine responds to the "why not sooner" argument by saying
that there was no time before the universe. 25 Hence "why not sooner"
~r~ment does not apply to t~e beginning of the universe. Augus-
tIne s answer goes back to PhIlo. Many others, as well, discuss this
26
argument. The arguments based on God's immutability, on his
:~ Ar!stotle, De ~eneratione I.3; Herbert A. Davidson, ProofS, p. 16.
23 A~stotle, PhySICS VIII.l; H. Davidson, ProofS, pp. 18-20.
Ar!stotle, Physics VIII.l; H. Davidson, ProofS, pp. 24-25.
:: Aristo~e, Physics VIII. 1; Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Contznuum, p. 233.
. A~gustllle, Confimons, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford & New York: Oxford
Ulllvensty, 1991), XI.13.
26 Richard Sorabji, Time Creation and the Continuum, pp. 232-237.
10 INTRODUCTION
changeless will, on God's being a changeless and sufficient cause also
have antecedents in the teachings of Greek philosophers and com-
mentators, such as Proclus and Themistius. They are widely dis-
cussed by Augustine, Philoponus, as well as Muslim theologians and
philosophers. 27
The discussion of whether creation resembles a natural or a vol-
untary action must have arisen after the relation of the universe to
God was clarified-that is, after the view that God is the cause of
the existence of the universe became a standard account. Plotinus
seems to be the main figure who developed an account of the rela-
tion between the universe and God in these terms. He replaced
Plato's conception of the artisan model for the production of the
universe with the productive contemplation model. The latter turns
creative action into a kind of natural action. 28 It is countered by
arguments attempting to show that the divine creative action is a
voluntary action: God creates the world according to a plan by his
voluntary action. Arguments in this spirit go back to Augustine. 29
Comparative Studies between Avicenna and Aquinas with
Regard to the OJ/.estions conceming Creation
In the West, Avicenna is among the best known medieval Muslim
philosophers. Literature devoted to Avicenna's life and thought is
considerable, especially when compared to other intellectual figures
of the medieval Muslim world. Western interest in Avicenna can be
divided into the medieval and modern periods. In the Middle Ages
the works translated from the Muslim-Arab world contributed to the
flourishing of intellectual life in the West, particularly at the University
of Paris in 13th and 14th centuries. Avicenna's works were avidly
read and discussed and greatly influenced medieval Western philoso-
phers and theologians. In modern times, Western interest in the
thought of Avicenna is historical rather than philosophical, and focuses
27 For arguments based on the conception of God, see Richard Sorabji, Time
Creation and the Continuum, pp. 239-250. For a well articulated construction of argu-
ments based on the conception of God and responses to them, see Herbert A.
Davidson, Proqft, pp. 49-85.
28 Dominic J. O'Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction to Enneads, pp. 70-78.
29 Etienne Gilson, God and Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University, 1941), pp.
49-62.
INTRODUCTION 11
primarily on the impact of his philosophy on medieval Western
thinkers such as Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas. In this
respect it is worth mentioning Etienne Gilson's call to Western
medievalists and historians of philosophy to unearth Avicenna's thought
through attention to "Avicenna Latinus."3o Gilson's call received
responses from many scholars, so that we now have new editions of
the Latin translations of many of Avicenna's works, as well as a con-
siderable scholarship devoted either to comparative studies or explo-
rations of some of his theories. 31
Despite all this scholarship, relatively little effort has been made
in analyzing Avicenna's theory of creation and comparing it to
Aquinas' theory of creation. In many works, one may come across
statements of Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions on aspects of cre-
ation. At times the difference between their positions with regard to
creation is traced back to their conception of God. Nevertheless,
with the exception of one article by Beatrice Zedler,32 whose article
• 30 Etienne Gilson states that without studying the Muslim-Arab philosophical her-
Itage, one cannot obtain a correct understanding of medieval Western philosophers.
Thus he urges scholars to reedit the Latin translations of the works of Muslim-Arab
ph~osophers in general and those of Avicenna in particular. E. Gilson, "L'etude de
philosophes arabes et son role dans I'interpretation de la scolastique," Proceedings of
the Szxth Internatwnal Congress of Philosophy (1927), p. 596, mentioned in G. C. Anawati,
"St. Thom~s et la Metaphysique d'Avicenne," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974:
Commemorative Studzes, eds. A. Maurer et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies, 1974), pp. 450-451.
31 E.g., E. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns Scot " Archives d'Histoire
doctrinale et ~itteraire du Moyen Age II (1927), pp. 89-149; Stephen Brown, "Avicenna
and the Umty.o~the Concept. of Being," Franciscan Studies 25/3 (1965), pp. 117-150;
G. ~. Anawau, A Comparauve-Study of the Psychologies of Avicenna and Thomas
1
Aqumas;;' cta Antiqua Academi~ Scientiarum Hungaricae 29/1-4 (1981), pp. 13-32;
P. Lee, Samt. Thomas and AVlcenna on the Agent Intellect," Thomist 45/1 (1981),
pp. 41-61; Mlchael Marmura, "Avicenna's Bying-Man in Context," Monist, 69/3
(1986).' pp. 3,~3-395; E. M. Macierowski, "Does God Have a Quiddity according
t? AVlcenna~ Tho~i~t 52/1 (.1988), pp. 79-87; A. M. Goichon, "Un Chapitre de
~ Influence d Ibn Sma en, O~Cldent: Le de Ente et Essentia de Saint Thomas d'Aquin,"
III Le Lwre du Mzllenazre d:;tmcenna v. 4 (conference proceedings) (Teheran: 1956), pp.
118-131; ~olland-Gossehn, Le 'De ente et essentia' de S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: 1948).
32 Beatnce Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei '" Traditio
6 (19.48), pp'. 105-159. Dav.id Burrell's wor~ has an important place am'ong com-
parau~e studle~ between AVlcenna and Aqumas. Burrell explores how philosophers
?e~onglllg to different Abrahamic religions contributed to the development of a the-
ISUc .conception of God and creation, that grew increasingly articulate and more
co~slsten~ with the ~heis,tic id~~ of a free ~reator . .He does not primarily focus on
AVicenna sand Aqumas s posluons on the Issues I mtend to discuss. What is more
Burrell's work does not analyze their arguments for their respective positions, bu~
takes them at face value. Beside his other works see especially David Burrell, Freedom
12 INTRODUCTION
is primarily concerned with the nature of the divine creative action,
there is almost no in-depth modern discussion comparing Avicenna's
position to that of Aquinas on creation.
and Creation in Three Traditions (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, .199~);
Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sfnii, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.: Umversl~
of Notre Dame, 1986). Georges Anawati is one of the most respected scholars. m
Avicenna studies. He has devoted a considerable amount of effort to co~panng
Avicenna and Aquinas, and to tracing historical conditi.ons of tr~nslation .of AVlcen~a's
works into Latin. He wrote an almost book-length mtro~uctlOn to hIS tr~~slatI~n
of the Iliihiyyiit (Metaphysics) of al-Shi/ii' (The Healzn~), La Met~Pl!J!sl?~e du Shi/a (Pa~~,
1978-1985). In the introduction, he discusses va~ous ArabIc edItIons o~ the Shi/a ,
the Medieval Latin translations, and compares hIS own French translatI~n t~ Max
Horten's tum-of-the-century German translation (Max Horten's translatIOn. IS: Die
Metapl!J!sik Avicennas: das Buch der Genesung der Seel~, Leipzig: 1907). He also d:,~usses
the reaction to Avicenna's thought among Mushm thmkers such as al-Ghazah and
the 17th century Iranian philosopher Mulla Sadra (1571-1640), and among Westem
philosophers such as William of Auvergne (c. 1180-1249 C.E.) and Roger Bacon
(c. 1214-after 1292). He speaks at some length a~o':t the rel~tionship of Avicenna's
thought to that of Aquinas. This part of Anawatl s mtroductIo~ presents .almost"t~e
same view as his article, "St. Thomas d'Aquin et la metaphyslque d'AVlce~ne, m
St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies,. pp. 449-465. ~nawatI exam-
ines the reception of Avicenna's work in the West m general, and m the thought
of Aquinas in particular. He discusses the translations of Avicen~a's works, as well
as earlier treatments of the issue of Avicenna's influence on Aqumas. He also talks
about how Thomas frequently cited Avicenna as an authority, c.onsidered .him to
be a philosophical master, and maintained that Avi<;enna's doctn~es. were m ~en­
eral agreement with the Christian faith (p. 454). Fmally An~watI gIVes two ~IStS.
The first is of Avicenna's theories that were endorsed by Aqumas; the second IS of
Avicenna's theories that were refuted by Aquinas. Only in this section Anawati
mentions that Aquinas rejected Avicenna's positions on v~riou~ a~pects of .the issue
of creation (pp. 461-462). But Anawati does not treat thIs tO~IC m a ~etaI1ed way,
let alone offer a philosophical analysis of Avicenna's and Aqumas' posItIons. A.-M.
Goichon's The Philosophy if Avicenna and Its lrifluence on Medl~val Europ~ (trans,. M. S.
Khan, Delhi, [1969]), gives a general picture of the transl~t~on of .AVlce~n~ s works
into Latin of the historical periods into which one could dIVIde AVlcenna s mfluence
on medie~al \V"estem philosophers, and of the major issues in which one can detect
Avicenna's influence. She talks about Avicennan theories that were accepted though
with certain modifications such as the fact that his distinction between essence and
existence was viewed not 'only as a conceptual but as a real distinction (pp. 80-81,
83, 96). However she does not talk about Avicenna's theory of creatIOn on the
ground that his position reg~rdi~g this is~ue was generally rejected, except for the
attempt of Dominicus Gundlssalmus, whIch was not followed by others, to relate
his cosmogony to Christian doctrine .(\?p. 79~80). Ge:ard Verb?ke wrote t.he do~­
trinal introduction to the critical edItIOn of the Latm translatIOns of AVlcenna s
Metapl!J!sics (liber de philosophia prima, sive, scientia di?in.a, ed. S. :-ran Riet, 3 vol~. Louvain:
Peeters & Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977-1983). In thIS mtro<!uctIon, Ver?eke gIv~s a gen-
eral outline of the Metaphysics of Avicenna. He traces dIfferent Medieval Latm trans-
lations, or editions of the Metapl!J!sics of the Shijii', and summarizes A,?cenna's major
theories such as the essence-existence distinction, substance and aCCIdents, and the
relation~hip between cause and effect. However, he does not t:Jk about specific
~~~H"""" .... n .... l-.. 'CH' r- .... ""''''t-~A.n 1p1- -.::ll"np. rn.rnn~rp thprn to tho~p
INTRODUCTION 13
In her long and well-constructed article comparing Avicenna's posi-
tion to that of Thomas Aquinas, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in
the 'De potentia Dei,"'33 Beatrice Zedler compares Avicenna's concep-
tion of the act of creation to that of Aquinas. Beside discussing some
other aspects of creation, especially cosmogony, she insists upon the
difference between Avicenna's position and that of Aquinas with
regard to the nature of the creative action of God. Whereas for
Avicenna the universe is necessary, for Aquinas God has the free
will to create and the freedom to choose what to create. As will be
discussed in chapter 3, at times she over-interprets Avicenna's pas-
sages to support her argument. But more importantly, in her com-
parison, Zedler takes the texts of both authors at face value. She
does not attempt to identify the background of Avicenna's and
Aquinas' positions.
Louis Gardet devotes a chapter to this issue in his book La pen-
see religieuse d'Avicenne. 34 He first tries to situate Avicenna in relation
to the Muslim theologians (mutakallimun) in order to trace Avicenna's
debt to them. Then he describes Avicenna's conception of creation
as a kind of eternal act in which God creates the world by the neces-
sity of His nature or His essence, and not by His will. Thus the
relationship between God and the universe is not, according to
Avicenna, one of temporal priority and posteriority but a relation-
ship of essential or logical priority and posteriority. Next, Gardet
explains how Avicenna's emanationist cosmology serves as the frame-
work for such a theory of creation. Finally, he tries to identify terms
that are crucial to Avicenna's theory of creation, i.e., iMiith (origi-
nation), ibdii( (innovation), khalq (creation), takw'in (generation), and
examines their relationship to Qur'anic usage. Gardet does make
reference to Aquinas' reaction to certain positions of Avicenna's, but
such references are brief and superficial, and by his own admission
Gardet does not deal with the details of arguments but offers an
overall survey.3'> Hence Gardet neither analyzes Avicenna's theory of
creation, nor does he compare it to that of Aquinas. What he does
is giving a general idea of Avicenna's position, situating it within its
historical context.36
Beatrice Zedler, op. cit.
33
Louis Gardet, La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn Sfnii) (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), Ch.
34
11: "L'explication du monde: l'etre necessaire et I'etre possible," pp. 33-68.
35 Louis Gardet, La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn Sfnii), p. 44.
36 In another article, "Saint Thomas et ses predecesseurs arabes," Gardet's main
of Anulnas. .....A.n .....prn 1" tn lrlpnt-l-h.l thp ,.lp-norpp tn. urh;,...h Arlll1n~C' Hr'H' ..., ........ " .... ;""..-.... .....1 •• ..:4-1-. ... l-._ T_l ~_
 14 INTRODUCTION
Methodological Concerns
The study at hand is partly historical and partly philosophical. I do
not attempt to situate Avicenna's views, or those of Aquinas, in their
historical context, nor trace how much they owe to their predeces-
sors. I will also not address whether Aquinas was influenced by
Avicenna on some issue through the translations of Avicenna's works
into Latin. Although at times I refer to the correspondence between
Avicenna's and Aquinas' terms, this is not meant to trace the his-
torical connections between them but rather the philosophical ones.
This study is a historical one in the sense that I attempt to state
and compare the position of two historical figures on creation. Such
a comparison is worthy in itself because of the lack of serious atten-
tion to it so far, despite the wealth of references. As mentioned
above, there are not many detailed studies comparing Avicenna's
position to that of Aquinas with regard to their conception of cre-
ation. Moreover, their positions on various other related issues need
to be carefully investigated, rather than being passed over superficially.
In this sense this study aims at contributing to the scholarship of
medieval intellectual history.
On the philosophical side, I attempt to give an analytically clear
and reasonable statement of Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions, though
I do not attempt to give a full philosophical assessment of the valid-
ity of their arguments on every topic that I explore. My main objec-
tive is to compare their positions with regard to the questions
mentioned above, and to identifY to what extent they agree or diverge.
I attempt to assess the philosophical value of their positions only
when they have divergent views. For example, I do not attempt to
provide a justification of divine simplicity, or divine eternity, since
they do not have substantially different positions on these questions,
but I do discuss, for example, whether the model of voluntary agent
intellectual heritage and in particular whether he clearly knew different theological
schools and philosophical trends. He does not relate Aquinas to Avicenna exclu-
sively, nor does he pay special attention to the problem of creation. Gardet agrees
with Gilson that Aquinas used Avicenna's thoughts in metaphysics and Averroes's
thoughts in physics (pp. 421-422). But Gardet's is a general account intended to
give an overall idea of Aquinas' acquaintance with the Muslim philosophers and
theologians, and it does not deal with the issue of creation at all. Louis Gardet,
"Saint Thomas et ses predecesseurs arabes," in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974:
Commemorative Studies, pp. 419-448.
INTRODUCTION 15
can be applied to God without problems, because this is an issue
on which Avicenna and Aquinas disagree. Furthermore, the fact that
Avicenna appears to deny intention to God while Aquinas asserts it
of God is not of primary importance. But what is of primary impor-
tance in this context is whether there is a substantial difference
between Avicenna and Aquinas resulting from the fact that one
denies intention to God whereas the other attributes it to God.
By no means am I suggesting that discussion of differences between
Avicenna and Aquinas, with regard to specific features of their the-
ories-such as terminology, context, or organization, all of which
reveals the way they individually look at theological problems-is
unimportant. These differences should be traced as well. For exam-
ple, one will find Aquinas' articulation of his positions, his organi-
zation of the topics discussed to be more detailed, better organized,
and less obscure than those of Avicenna. However, I am only inter-
ested in their articulation of their theories inasmuch as it concerns
a substantial similarity or dissimilarity between their positions.
This study remains general with regard to the issues it explores
because it covers a wider area of discussion, and is intended to cover
the positions of Avicenna and Aquinas regarding theological lan-
guage on the one hand, and their positions regarding the nature of
divine creative action and the beginning of the universe on the other.
In the same vein, while discussing these matters, I did not attempt
to construct possible diverging interpretations of the texts I use. Nor
do I look, through the texts of these two philosophers, for passages
that might not be as supportive of my interpretation of them as the
passages that I use. In any case, entering into more detailed analy-
sis and interpretation would require having a firm ground on the
?asis of which detailed analyses make sense. If I aimed at provid-
rng detailed analysis and interpretation of peripheral topics, then it
would be more difficult to make my rather general remarks, which
are at times contrary to widely accepted views relating Avicenna's
theories to that of Aquinas. Besides being general, the discussion of
s~condary literature is limited to essential works, either those I clearly
disa~ee with or those from which I get fundamental support.
GIven these aspects of this study, I do not claim to provide a con-
clu~ive assessment of theories of Avicenna and Aquinas, though I
beheve that I have covered the representative texts of these authors.
It is hoped that this general discussion will provide a springboard
for further studies. I believe I have presented a clear statement of
16 INTRODUCTION
their positions and enough discussion to prove my claims, and have
shown that they have similar positions on a numbers of issues. I
would be more than happy if my study encourages others to gen-
erate challenging interpretations.
Another point that needs to be explained concerns the conceptual
tools I use to state the positions of these two philosophers, or crite-
ria on which I compare their positions. When comparing Avicenna's
position and Aquinas' position on a certain issue, I could take
Avicenna's position as the paradigm and evaluate Aquinas' views on
this paradigm. However, instead of attempting to suppress what
Aquinas offers-since he knew Avicenna and the problems his views
generated, he is definitely more attentive to issues that to which
Avicenna might have been inattentive-I usually tend to take into
account Aquinas' position, and examine whether or not Avicenna's
position fits to what Aquinas maintains. Nevertheless, I am careful
not to attribute to Avicenna something more than his texts allow.
For example, even though I argue that Avicenna's conception of
tashkik is similar to Aquinas' conception of analogical predication, I
clearly state that, in Avicenna's thought, tashkik does not play the
part that analogical predication plays in Aquinas' thought.
I do not attempt to reference all of their works in order to iden-
tify the development of their position on a certain issue. Since I am
interested in stating and comparing their mature views, rather than
in the evolution of their views over time, I consult the works that
are representative of their later positions. In formulating Avicenna's
position my primary source is the Metaphysics section of The Healing
(al-Shijin. However, at times Avicenna's other works provide some
valuable details guiding how to interpret the texts in the Metaphysics
of The Healing. Despite my preference for this particular work, I use
his other works either to support my interpretation of a passage in
the Metaphysics, or to supply a direct and clear statement of his argu-
ment on a certain issue. For similar reasons, I do not consult all of
Aquinas' works. I mostly use his later works, i.e., Summa contra Gentiles,
Summa Theologiae, and the de potentia Dei. Although I may indicate a
certain variation in his positions here and there, this is not an essen-
tial part of this study.
In regard to the way I read and translate Avicenna's texts, I must
state that I do not attempt to render Avicenna's Arabic terms in
English in a one-to-one correspondence with English philosophical
terms. Besides the difficulties of trying to be this consistent, I do not
INTRODUCTION 17
think that Avicenna was always so consistent in his choice of terms.
Furthermore, I do not think that all technical philosophical terms
have one definite meaning valid in all contexts. I have tried to pro-
vide the Arabic transliteration as much as possible.
Briif Outline
In the first chapter, I discuss Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions con-
cerning theological language. I first state their conception of human
knowledge about God. I argue that Avicenna and Aquinas have sim-
ilar positions as far as the divine perfections and human knowledge
of the divine perfections are concerned. However, Avicenna's posi-
tion is not as clearly articulated as Aquinas' position, whose theory
of analogical predication sets him apart from many of his medieval
contemporaries. I also examine 'the negative element' in Aquinas'
conception of theological language and attempt to show that the
negative element in Aquinas' conception of theological language is
not meant to free his teachings from philosophical assessment.
After arguing in chapter one that Avicenna's and Aquinas' state-
ments concerning God are equally liable to philosophical examina-
tion, in chapter two I investigate their conceptions of the divine
perfections insofar as they relate to comparing their conceptions of
the nature of the divine creative action and the beginning of the
universe. Since Avicenna and Aquinas are usually considered to have
different positions concerning the nature of the divine creative action,
and since they do in fact have different positions concerning the
beginning of the world, stating the similarities or differences between
their conceptions of divine perfections serves as a benchmark. That
is, it helps us to examine whether or not the difference between their
positions on these two questions is something traceable to their con-
ceptions of God. I argue that they agree on fundamental points con-
cerning the divine formal features, such as simplicity and necessity.
They also agree on the character of the divine knowledge and its
relation to the existence of things in re.
After showing the similarity in their conception of God through
examining divine formal features and divine knowledge, I revisit the
issue of theological language in the light of the divine formal fea-
tures, and examine how these features affect their understanding of
theological language. Considering their conceptions of divine formal
 18 INTRODUCTION
features, or formal properties, in relation to theological language
shows us that Avicenna adopts what I call a reductive strategy and
Aquinas an appreciative one in regard to theological languageY This
is another point that underlines the importance of analogical pred-
ication in Aquinas' thought.
In chapter three, I compare Avicenna's conception of the divine
creative action to that of Aquinas. Contrary to the usual interpre-
tation of Avicenna's position, I argue that Avicenna and Aquinas
have similar positions on this issue. I argue that for Avicenna God
has no natural action at all. He conceives creation as a voluntary
action, just as Aquinas does. For Aquinas God has both natural and
voluntary action. Still, I argue that the difference between Avicenna's
and Aquinas' positions is not fundamental. Aquinas' conception of
theological language amplifies the difference between their positions.
While Aquinas comes up with answers to both philosophical expec-
tations and religious concerns, Avicenna's theory may satisfy us only
philosophically.
In chapter four, I discuss the issue of whether the universe has a
temporal beginning. While Avicenna argues that the universe can
be related to its cause only in terms of being, not in terms of time,
Aquinas takes an agnostic philosophical position in regard to cre-
ation in time. I examine whether Aquinas' responses to the argu-
ments that the universe does not or cannot have a temporal beginning
are satisfactory, and conclude that Aquinas' answers do not satis-
factorily refute Avicenna's arguments. Even though they argue for
different positions concerning the beginning of the universe, their
positions are consistent with their common conception of God, i.e.,
as simple, eternal, necessary and immutable. I find Avicenna's posi-
tion more consistent not with their common conception of God but
with their common Aristotelian and Neoplatonic heritage.
37 By 'reductive strategy,' I want to express the fact that for Avicenna divine per-
fection properties are taken into account only insofar as they are modified by divine
formal features, such as eternity and necessity. In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinas
holds that they can be considered without being modified by divine formal features
and as modified by them.
INTRODUCTION 19
Contribution rif this Stu4J
This study generally supports David B. Burrell's contention that there
has been a collaboration among the followers of three Abrahamic
religions to found a philosophical basis for theistic beliefs,38 despite
the fact that I have criticized him in a few instances by arguing that
the distance between Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions on certain
issues is smaller than what he maintains. This study also confirms
Albert Judy's thesis that Aquinas did not substantially change his
interpretation of and position towards Avicenna. 39 Some scholars hold
that while Aquinas had closer ties to Avicenna's thought in his ear-
lier works, he later distanced himself from Avicenna's thought to a
significant extent. While Avicenna's name appears more frequently
in Aquinas' earlier works, in his later works Avicenna's name appears
less, and usually in a context where Aquinas is about to criticize a
certain theory of Avicenna. 40 Through examining their positions con-
cerning the divine attributes and the nature of the divine creative
act, I hope to show that Aquinas agrees with Avicenna with regard
to important issues, even when he wrote the de potentia.
I attempt to show that for Avicenna God has attributes, even
though he wavers as far as the theological language concerning these
attributes is concerned. I argue, contrary to the interpretation of
some scholars, that for Avicenna God's knowledge is related to the
universe in the manner of the knowledge of an artisan to his art-
work. This shows that Avicenna and Aquinas have similar positions
in this regard. In chapter three, I have attempted to show that cre-
ation, for Avicenna, is like a voluntary action. This again runs con-
trary to the widespread interpretation of his position.
38 David B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable Cod: Ibn-Sinii, Maimonides, Aquinas,
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1986), pp. 1-4.
39 Albert Judy, "Avicenna's Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles," Angelicum 52
(1975), f.lp. 340-384, 541-586; 53 (1976), pp. 184-226. Judy compares passages
~rom AVlcenna's Metaphysics VIII.4 to Aquinas' ScC I 22, 26 and 25. He argues that
l~ these chapters of the ScC I Aquinas produces a Thomistic version of Avicenna's
~cu~s~on concerning the divine simplicity and negative corollaries of the divine
S~pliClty. Thus Albert Judy's work and the study at hand support a common the-
S18 through examining different topics.
4<l For a discussion of Aquinas' attitude toward Avicenna's theories, see Albert
jUdy, "Avicenna's Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles," Angeluum 52 (1975) pp.
376-380. '
 20 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 21

Another important point, in a sense deriving from the preceding
considerations, is that evaluating Avicenna's positions based on the
Latin material, more specifically based on how Aquinas seems to
think, may not always lead to sound conclusions. For example, if we
take Aquinas' contention that creation is not a natural action but a
voluntary one as a criticism directed at Avicenna, we may not get
an adequate interpretation of Avicenna's position. Even if Aquinas
intended to criticize Avicenna, his criticism applies only to the image
of Avicenna as represented in the Latin. The image of Avicenna in
the Latin may not always give an adequate presentation of Avicenna's
views, howeverY
The importance of Aquinas' theory of analogical predication is
given new valence through comparing Aquinas' conception of the
divine attributes to that of Avicenna. Aquinas distinguishes between
the divine perfections and the mode of signifying them. While per-
fection properties are found in God and creatures, human language
cannot signify divine perfections in the manner they are found in
God. Based on this distinction Aquinas was able to underline the
contingency of creation as well as to hold that it is necessary in a
different sense, which is discussed in chapter three. Thus pressing
exclusively on the negative aspect of analogical predication is not
warranted.
One indirect result of this study concerns how to interpret the
theistic conception of God, or more properly the conception of God
more or less common to Abrahamic religions. To distinguish the
theistic conception of God from the Neoplatonic or pagan concep-
tion of God, some pairs of opposites are employed, such as neces-
sary emanation versus creation, eternal versus created universe, or
God as natural agent versus God as free creator. 42 Arguing that
Avicenna's position and Aquinas' position have more similarities than
one might initially think calls into question such broad distinctions
between theistic and Neoplatonic conceptions of God and creation. 43
A Note on Riferences
I refer to the Metapfrysics part of Avicenna's The Healing simply as
'Avicenna Metaphysics.' For example, 'Avicenna Metaphysics IV.2,
p. 165.2-4' stands for 'Avicenna, The Healing, Metapfrysics book 4,
chapter 2, page 165, lines 2-4.' I refer to Aquinas' Summa Theologiae
simply as ST Unless further specified, the reference is to the body
of the article in question. For example, 'STIa. 13, 3' refers to 'Summa
Theologiae, prima pars, question 13 and body of article 3.' Similarly,
I refer to the De potentia without writing Aquinas' name. For exam-
ple, 'De potentia Ill, 15, ad 7' indicates De potentia, book 3, article 15,
reply to objection 7.' Unless further specified, my references to Summa
Theologiae and De potentia go to the body of the respective article. I
refer to Aquinas' Summa contra Gentiles as ScG, and indicate the para-
graph numbers in accord with the translation published by the
University of Notre Dame Press. For example, 'ScG I, 14 [4], refers
to 'Summa contra Gentiles, book I, chapter 14, paragraph 4.'

41 Avicenna was known in the medieval Western world not only through the

translations of his own works but also through the translations of Averroes' works
and as well as the translation of al-Ghazall's (Algazel) Maqii!id al-Faliisifa (Intentiones
philosophorum). For a modern edition of the medieval translation of al-Ghazall's
Maqii~d, see C. S. B. Muckle (ed.), Algazel's Metaphysics, a Medieval Translation (Toronto:
The Institute of Medieval Studies, 1933). Al-Ghazall was out to criticize Avicenna,
and Averroes may not have had an adequate knowledge of Avicenna's theories.
For a discussion of Averroes' criticism of Avicenna and its problems, see Herbert
A. Davidson, Proqft, pp. 311-335.
42 For these assumptions see, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation: 43 Andrew Louth develops a similar position in his study on the development of
Writings on the "Sentences" rif Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, O!!estion 1, trans. Steven the Christian mystical theology. He underlines the affinity of Greek Fathers to
E. Baldner & William E. Carroll (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Neoplatonic thought. Andrew Louth, TIe Origins rif the Christian A{ystical Tradition .from
1997), "Introduction" by translators; Herbert A. Davidson, Proqft, p. In. Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981).
 PART ONE

TALKING ABOUT GOD

 CHAPTER ONE

THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND

PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT

The negative element in Aquinas' theology poses a disturbing chal-

lenge to scholars: should one demand that Aquinas conform to philo-
sophical expectations or should leave his definitions and the implications
of his theories unscrutinized, given that as a theologian he maintains
that God is ultimately unknowable, and given that his theory of ana-
logical predication leaves the divine perfections seemingly indeter-
minate? If one grants exemption to Aquinas' theories, should one
also grant such an exemption to Avicenna's theories on the basis of
his position regarding human knowledge and discourse about God?
In order to come up with an answer to these questions, I am going
to discus Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions regarding the basis, extent
and nature of human knowledge and discourse about God. Whether
their theological views are suitable to philosophical examination will
be judged on the basis of their conception of theological language.
Avicenna's and Aquinas' theories about God are philosophically
valuable, and both can be philosophically assessed. Their positions
regarding human knowledge of God and theological language are to
a considerable extent similar, in that both argue, (1) we cannot know
God in himself, (2) God is known through creation, (3) God has pos-
itive and negative properties, (4) God has all perfections in a different
manner from creation, and (5) perfections are predicated of God and
creation on the basis of a causal order.
Secondly, I argue that the negative element in Aquinas' theory is
not designed to exempt his theories from philosophical assessment.
With the negative element in his theory of theological language
Aquinas intends that two things be granted in our discussion of God:
(1) Things that imply a creaturely mode of existence cannot be pred-
icated of God univocally, but can be predicated only analogically;
and (2) one should not expect human discourse about God to express
God in himself or his eminent perfections. Aquinas does not argue
that one should not talk about God. He does "not maintain that his,
or anyone's theories about God, should not be required to have
26 CHAPTER ONE
philosophical rigor. For him theological statements contain or ~im
to contain knowledge. What Aquinas intends is not that theologIcal
statements should be left out of philosophical scrutiny, but that they
must be considered in the light of these two guiding rules. This does
not contradict Aquinas' purposes in emphasizing the unknowability
of God's essence.
Avicenna's Theory if Theological Language
There is no doubt that Avicenna does not have as elaborate a the-
ory of theological language as Aquinas does, and there are several
questions to which one might find answers in Aquinas' texts but 0t n.
in those of Avicenna. However, Avicenna provides enough matenal
that helps us find answers to essential questions with regard to the-
ological language. Avicenna acknowledges that w: cannot kn~w
God in himself, though he is known through creatIOn. The attnb-
utes that are predicated of God are based on God's negative and
positive relations to creatures. God has perfections in a manner
different from creatures. These perfections are predicated of God
and creatures according to tashkrk, i.e., according to priority and pos-
teriority. Avicenna's position on human knowledge and speech about
God conforms to Aquinas' position in general. The major difference
between Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions arises between Avicenna's
theory of predication according to tashkrk and Aquinas' theory of
analogical predication.
We Cannot Know and Name God in Himself
Avicenna's position regarding the subject-matter of metaphysics implies
that God in himself falls beyond the scope of human knowledge. In
the first chapter of his Metaphysics of the Healing (al-Shijii)!, Avicen~a
discusses whether God is the subject-matter of metaphYSICS. He dis-
tinguishes between the subject-matter and the objective of sciences
(ulilm). Each science takes the existence of its s~b~ect-m~tter to be
proven from another science. It investi~at~s wha~ It IS b~t I~ does n~t
try to establish that it is. On these prmClples, If estabhs~l~g Go~ s
existence is the goal of metaphysical investigation, then It IS not ItS
subject-matter, and therefore God is not the subject-matter of meta-
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 27
physics. l However, because metaphysics occupies the highest and ulti-
mate place among sciences which are available to human mind,
Avicenna is indicating that God, in himself, falls beyond human
knowledge.
In his commentary on the Qur'anic chapter al-Ikhlii!,2 Avicenna
clearly states that we cannot know and name God as he is in him-
self. He constantly reminds us of God's majesty and the inexpress-
ibility of what God is. He argues that "God's essence (dhiit) is that
he exists."3 Besides sheer existence, there is nothing to be added to
God. God's mode of existence-specific to himself and excluding all
the modes of existence assumed by other beings-is such that it has
no name. It cannot be expressed or explained (sharb) except through
concomitants that necessarily follow from his being (lawiizim).4 Although
Avicenna does not elaborate here, it seems that he assumes that a
true name could give us the essence, or definition of the thing that
is named. For example, when we call a certain existing thing 'a
man', through this name we understand certain things about him,
such as his being intelligent, having a soul, eating and drinking-
no matter whether we observe this person displaying any of these
actions. However, with respect to God, we cannot come up with a
name expressing what he is, such that it would enable us to look
directly at God and expect him to be in such and such a way.
But why cannot 'what God is' be put into words (yu(bar (anhu)? Is
it because of a defect in our language, or simply because of the low
degree of our comprehension? This is because God's majesty and
sublimity cannot be captured by us. Consequently, we cannot talk
about God as he is. The imperfection in human thought and lan-
guage cannot bridge the insurmountable distance between human
~nd divine being. What we can say properly about God ultimately
IS that 'he is he' (huwa huwa).5 This Arabic phrase, 'huwa huwa,' can
s :- Avicenna, al-Shifii', al-Iliihiyyiit (henceforth Metaphysics), eds. aI-Ab Qanawati and
Sa Id Zayid (Cairo, 1960-[1963]), I.l, p. 5.5-6 and 16-19; p. 6.1-2 and 14-16.
e~ alS?, op. cit., 1.2, p. 14.14-17.
Tt ~Vlcenna, Al-TqftZT al-OJtr'iinz wa Lughat al-Sufiyya fi Falsafat Ibn Sznii (henceforth
!!(SZT), .ed. I:Iasan 'A~f (Beirut: 1983).
AVlcenna, Tafs'iT, p. 106.12-13.
4 A'
~cenna, Tafs'iT, p. 107.16-18.
5
her' .
I A,YIce~na, . Tafs'iT, p. 107:3-7. This rt;minds the bibl!cal expression 'I am who
whI~h IS also underlmed by Aqumas. 1 shall bnng in Aquinas' discussion
ow III thIS chapter.
 CHAPTER ONE
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 29
28
basis on which we are allowed to predicate properties of God is cre-
also be translated in this context, as 'he is whatever he is,' or 'he is
ation, because (1) creation is a concomitant (lazim) of God, and (2)
identical to himself.' God has both negative and positive relations (irjaft) to creatures.
If we cannot know God in himself, then does God really have
The fact that creatures are concomitants of God serves to explain
those properties that we predicate of him or not? Taking Avic:nna's
how we come to know God. Although because of the simplicity of
emphasis to the extreme, some authors ev~n arwued that for ~Vlcenn,a
God in every respect only one thing emanates from God immedi-
God's attributes may be reduced to negatIOns. However, AVlcenna s
ately, all creatures to the very bottom of things are necessary con-
emphasis on God's transcendence and majesty should not lead us to
comitants of (lawazim) God. Avicenna states that these concomitants
think that for Avicenna God is devoid of perfections, or that the
of God make God known (taCrif) , showing something of their cause.
properties we attribute to God are mere words saying nothing. about
However, there is a gradation among these concomitants in show-
God. Such an interpretation cannot be justified, given that AVlcenna
ing God. The closer to the origin a concomitant is in the hierarchy
talks at length about God, and frequently affirms that God has per-
of being the better it makes the origin known or reflected. 9 There
fections. He unequivocally states that God has complete being, because
is a correlation between divine perfections and creaturely ones.
he does not lack any perfection, but he does not have the perfec-
Perfections that are found in the world are the effects of God's prop-
tions (kamalat) by way of participating. Moreover, God is pure good.
Good is either the being towards which everything strives, or is the erties. Since God is the origin, which gives being to all things that
come to exist, things that come to exist do so in accordance with
perfection of being. God as pure being is pure good and pure per-
the goodness and the perfection of their source. Avicenna clearly
fection (kamal).7 For him, the perfections found in creation belong
states that not only do things that come to exist follow the divine
first and foremost to the First, and secondarily to creation, because
s being and perfections, but that the manner of their existence also
whatever found in creation is acquired from God.
follows the divine goodness and perfection. Thus the perfections
that creatures display are the reflection of the divine goodness and
God Is Known through Creation perfection. 10
Based on the idea that creatures reflect God's perfections, and
Although Avicenna argues that God, as he is in himself, can nei-
hence bear a certain similarity to God, Avicenna establishes some
ther be named nor talked about other than to acknowledge that he
of. God's perfections by examining the order and perfections of cre-
is whatever he is, he still attributes many properties to God. The
a~on. Creation shows that the creator has perfections, because cre-
anon has a perfect, strong and enduring order. When Avicenna talks
6 I agree with John Rosheger in his critical stance against ~an R. Netton and about the ~ll of God, for ~xample, he emphasizes the order, har-
J. G. Flynn ascribing to Avicenna a position si~ar t? that of.Plotmus. Ian R. Netton mony and nchness of creatIOn. What he concludes is that such a
argues that for Avicenna God should be descn?ed I~ negatIve terms, and the pos-
itive tenns attributed to God simply reflect an Idea m the thought of the one who perfect, regular and lasting order can only be brought about by a
attributes it, but not something in the divine essence. Ian R. Netton, Allah Transcendent: cause that has perfect being and the perfections necessary for this
Studies in the Structure and Semiotics qf Islamic Philosophy, 7heology and Cosmology (New perfect order to happen in the world. Thus creation indicates that
York, NY.: Routledge, 1989), p. 155. J. G. Flynn argues that ?n ~vicenn~'s ren-
dering God might be the cause of perfections, but may not be IdentIfi~d WIth per- the cause of such and such things must have will. 11
fections. J. G. Flynn, "St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of God, Abr-Nahrazn
14 (1973-74), pp. 60-62. As Rosheger points ~l\~t this i~ only ~alf of the story. John
P. Rosheger, "A Note on Avicenna and the Dlvme Attnbutes, the Modem Schoolman
87 (2000), pp. 169-177. . - -
7 Avicenna, Metaphysics VII1.6, p. 355.6-14. See also, A,?cenna, al-Isharat wa al-
Tanblhat (henceforth Ishiirat), ed. J. Forget (Leyde: E. J. Bnll, 1892) VI, p. 158. 9A·
~cenna, Taftfr, p. 107.17-21.
S Avicenna, Al-Risala al-'Arshryya (henceforth Risala 'Ars~ryya) (Haydarabad: 1.353
IQ
AVlcenna, Kitab al-Nqjahfi al-Ijikmah al-Man(iqryyah wa-al- Tabf'ryyah wa-al-Ilahryyah
A.H.), p. 13.15-16. "Thus all perfection, beauty and bemg that belong to th~ngs (h~~cefo.rth Nqjat), ed. Majid Fakhry (Beirut: 1985), p. 286. .
other than the Truth (Ijaqq) belong at first to the First Turth. They are acqUIred AVlcenna, Risala 'Arshryya, p. 10.12-22.
from him (mustafiid), they do not [indeed] belong to anything other than him ('adahu)."
30 CHAPTER ONE
God Has Negative and Positive Relations to Creation
For Avicenna, the fact that God is unlike creatures does not mean
that God is utterly different from creatures, for indeed there are
signs of God in creatures. God has positive as well as negative rela-
tions (ir/iijiit) to creation. He reminds us of God's being unique
(waMiiniyy) , i.e., unlike anything existing, his being unmixed (Jiif) and
pure (maM) real (~aqq). Such properties may be thought, on the one
hand, to make God inclusive of, or identical to, all other beings, in
a sense making him like a substratum to specific existents. On the
other hand, they may also be thought as separating God from all
other things, making him absolutely different from them. Avicenna
denies the inclusion of all kinds of being (wujudiit) in God. He denies
that God can be the substratum on which all other beings (wujudiit)
subsist, or that he can be the being common to and inclusive of all
creatures. 12
However, Avicenna also rejects the idea that God does not have
any relation (ir/iija)13 to other kinds of being (wujudiit). In this regard,
Avicenna's rule of thumb is this: while some aspects (anhii') of exis-
tence are negated of every being, every being has a certain relation
(ir/iija) and connection (nisba) to other beings. This holds for God
more appropriately, as God is the origin of everything. Since God
is the origin-the creator of things-creaturely aspects of being must
be negated of God, as God is not included among the things in the
world. But again, since God is the creator of things, God has some
relation (ir/iija) to his creatures.
Know that when we say that or explain how 'the necessary being does
not become multiple in any way, and he (dhiituhu) is unique (wa~diiniyy)
12Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 344.1-5.
13The term 'ir/afa' is one of the crucial terms in Avicenna's theory concerning
God's properties and human talk about God. Harry Austryn Wolfson constantly
translates 'ir/afa' as 'relation.' See H. A. Wolfson, "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes
on Divine Attributes," in Studies in the History qf Philosophy and Religion, I, eds. Isadore
Twersky and George H. Williams (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University,
1973), pp. 143-169 (originally published in HomenaJe a Millas-Vallicrosa 22 (Barcelona,
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 1956), pp. 545-571). In his trans-
lation of Risala 'Arshryya, Arthur Arberry translates 'irf.iifa' as 'positive.' See Risala
'Arshryya, p. 7.16-17. Arthur J. Arberry, Avicenna on Theology (Westport, Conn.:
Hyperion Press, 1979), p. 32. Wolfson translates a similar occurrence in NaJat
(p. 287.10-12) as 'relation.' Wolfson, "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on Divine
Attributes," p. 151.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 31
in~act (!iif) pure real one (maMun ~aqqun), we do not mean by doing
thIS that no aspect (an~ii') of existence (wujudiit) is negated of him, nor
do w: mean tha~ ~e doe~ ~o~ have any relation (ir/iiJa) to other aspects
of eXIstence (wUJudat). ThIS IS Impossible. This is because many different
aspects (~n~ii') of :xistence are negated of every (kullu) being. Moreover,
every bemg .(maU(Jud). h~s a relation (ir/iiJa) and certain connection (nisba)
to other bemgs. ThIS IS especially true in the case of the one from
w~om ~ll b~ing (wujud) emanates. However, when we say that he is
~mque m ~Imself (dhat), and he does not multiply, we mean that he
IS as such [I.e., uniqueJ in himself (fi dhiitihi). In addition, if this [i.e.,
statement ~bout th~ umty of. God] is followed by many positive (fjiibiyya)
and. negatIve (salbwa) relatIOns (ir/iiJiit) these are the necessary con-
comItants of (la~iiZlm) of the being (dhiit) [i.e., God's being] and the
e~ects of ;he ~emg (dhiit). They.follow the existence of the being (dhiit)
[I.~., God_s b~mg]. T~ey a~e neIther constituents (muqawwimatun) of the
bemg (dhat) [I.e., Gods bemg], nor parts ofit. 14
Thus the statement that 'God is unique,' and 'does not become mul-
tiple'. et~ .... r~fers to God in himself (dhiit) , but does not prevent
predicatmg vanous attributes of God. Besides the reference to God
i~ hi~self (dhiit), many positive (ijiibiyya) and negative (salbiyya) rela-
tIons (u/iijiit) are predicated of God. However, things that we attribute
to or negate of God are not to be thought of as either constituents
(muqawwima), or parts (qjza') of God. They are necessary concomi-
ta~ts (lar:iizim) an.d effec~s (maCluliit) of the being (dhiit), they follow
(tuJad ba d) the bemg (wtgud) of God. 15
God's pos~ti:e .an~ negative relations to creatures imply similarity
a~ well as ~IssImIlanty. between God and creation. They also pro-
VIde the baSIS upon whIch some properties are affirmed of God and
some others are denied of him. Although Avicenna argues that God
:~ both negative and positive relations (ir/iija) to creatures, which
o ow the essence (dhiit) of God and are its effects he does not go
~~nd t.his. If God has positive and negative relations to creatures,
s. ImplIes at least that some properties are negated of God in com-
~anson to creation, while some other properties are affirmed of God
m comparison to creation. For example, 'being omnipotent' is affirmed
of God l6 W1'th regar d to creatures. That IS, . one assumes that crea-
tures are made by God. Furthermore, one may consider the fact
14 A~cenna,
.
15 Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 343.16 - p. 344.1-5.
16 A~cenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 344.1-5.
AVlcenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 368.2-3.
32 CHAPTER ONE
that any effect is the result of the power of an agent. If the agent
does not have power, in a broad sense, to cause the effect, the effect
would not exist. Since the existence of creatures is traced to God,
then one affirms that God must have the power to create. Thus one
may say that God is omnipotent in the sense that God has the power
to make all things. However, even though attributing power to God
says something about God, it still does not indicate much about what
God's power is. These properties (Jifat) are attributed to God on the
basis of creation. Whereas negative properties are attributed to God
with reference to (ir/aJa) his other-ness from creatures, positive prop-
erties are attributed to God with reference to (ir/aJa) the reflection
of God in creation, as creatures are God's effects. As such they indi-
cate something of what God is-as well as what God is not-but
they do not give comprehensive knowledge of God. The prop~rti~s
attributed to God in positive or negative relation to creatures mdI-
cate God only partially and indirectly.
Based on God's exclusion of other modes of being and God's rela-
tion (ir/aJa) to creatures, Avicenna accepts that God has both nega-
tive and positive properties. Avicenna has a triple division in this
regard. Besides purely negative and purely positive properties, there
are also properties combining both negative and positive aspects.
That is , we have three different sorts of names expressing the pos-
itive and negative relations between God and creation: (1) those that
only express God's otherness, (2) those that only express creature's
similarity to its cause, and (3) those that include different senses to
express both God's otherness from creation and creation's similarity
to God.
Know that since it has been established that he is the necessary being,
and that he is one in all respects, and that he is free from having
causes and that he does not have any cause at all, and that his prop-
erties ~re not additional to his essence (dhiit), and that he has glorification
and perfection properties (sifiit al-mad~ wa al-kamiil) , it is apt to talk
about his being a knower, being alive, having will, power, speech,
sight, hearing and other beautiful properties..It must be kr.t0wn. ~hat
his properties are reduced to (twja C ) eith.er negatIO~ (salb), relatIOn (it/iift),
or combination of both of these. If hIS propertIes have such a char-
acter [either negation, or relation, or their co~bination], then even if
they are multiple they do not destroy the umty [of God], and t.hey
do not contradict the necessity of [God's] being. As for the negatIOn,
C
take for example, eternality (qidam). First, (1) it is reduced (turja ) to
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 33
the negation of non-being of him, secondly (2) to the negation of being-
caused and having something prior (awwal).I7
Avicenna emphasizes the negative properties of God. For him a neg-
ative property does not have to be expressed negatively. The nega-
tivity depends on God's otherness from creatures, no matter whether
its expression has a negative or a positive wording. Some of the
divine properties have both negative and positive connotations,
although they have simply positive meaning in other contexts. For
example, God as the 'necessary being' (wajib al-wujUd) indicates, for
Avicenna, (1) that God does not have a cause, and (2) that God is
the cause of other things. But such statements may be interpreted
to show that God is not similar to creatures in terms of the mode
of being. Whereas creatures have their being from God, God does
not owe his being to anything else, that is, his being is not some-
thing received. In this sense it shows how God is not like creatures.
Hence the attribution of 'necessity of being' to God partly indicates
the negative relation (i(jaJa) between God and creation. But in itself,
the property 'necessary being' does not have to be a negative prop-
erty. Thus, God's otherness from creatures does not have to be
expressed negatively; it simply concerns the negative 'ir/afa' of God
to the world, i.e., his difference from creatures. IS
The terms 'God' and '$amad' are among the properties that com-
bine positive and negative aspects. Avicenna expands upon these
examples in his commentary on the chapter al-IkhlaJ. The 'divinity'
comprises in it two properties, which are the strongest properties in
making God known to us. These are (1) that he has the necessity
of being first and foremost (aqdam) in himself, and (2) that he is the
origin of all other beings. 19 Beside this double connotation of the
17 Avicenna, Risiila 'Arshfyya, p. 7.13-19.
IS Avicenna, Risiila 'Arshfyya, p. 7.20-21. H. Wolfson, in his article "St Thomas
on Divine Attributes," states that some philosophers, including Avicenna, interpreted
~ve.n positive terms negatively, and he argues that St. Thomas follows St. Augustine
1ll mterpreting positive tenns positively. In a sense what Wolfson says is true, but
positive tenns are interpreted, by Avicenna at least, negatively on the basis of God's
~therness-his difference from creation. For example, 'good' expresses both nega-
tlve and positive properties, when it is applied to God. See Nqjiit, p. 287.25-26.
The negation expresses only God's otherness from creation, but not God's being
devoid of goodness. Avicenna's negative interpretation does not amount to an
absolute negation but to emphasizing God's difference from creatures.
19 Avicenna, Tqfifr, p. 108.4-11.
34 CHAPTER ONE
properties ())f God, elsewhere Avicenna states that 'divinity' consists
of God's lalCk of need for anything whatsoever and the needfulness
of everything else for God. 20 This conception of divinity, or the prop-
erty 'God,' has a negative meaning, since it denotes God's need-
lessness in lfegard to anything else. It has also a positive meaning,
since all thimgs are needful of him.
In denoting God, Avicenna seems to accept a gradation among
God's properties. For example, the property, or the name, 'God,'
for Avicenma, is the most powerful of the divine properties, because
it describes God better than all other properties. That is why God
chose this term when he let himself become known to us in the
chapter al-lkhlii~. If we remember the dual meaning of the property
'God,' i.e., ((1) that he has necessity of being first and foremost (aqdam)
in himself, and (2) that he is the origin of all other beings,21 it will
remind us of two things. This property 'God' (1) denotes both the
negative amd the positive relationship between God and creation at
the same time, and (2) it refers to God's creative act, giving exis-
tence to creatures, the foremost perfection with regard to creation.
Thus the property 'God' is the strongest property making God known
in relation to creation.
God Has Pe1ftctions in a Different Mode .from Creation
God has perfections in a different mode from creation. God's mode
of having perfections, as opposed to the creaturely mode of having
perfections, is characterized by simplicity, necessity, fullness and purity.
These are called formal properties, in contradistinction to divine per-
fection properties, such as knowledge and will. In chapter 2, I will
have more to say regarding the distinction between divine formal
features and non-formal features. God has his attributes simply and
necessarily; whereas creatures have them in a composite, accidental,
and limited manner. In presenting Avicenna's position on this issue,
I am going to consider simplicity, necessity and eminence to under-
line the difference between the way creatures have properties and
the way God has them. As we shall see, Avicenna and Aquinas have
similar positions regarding the difference between God's manner of
having perfections and creation's manner of having their perfections.
20 Avicenna, Tqfsfr, p. 113.5-6.
21 Avicenna, Tqfsfr, p. 108.4-11.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 35
God has his properties in a simple manner. For Avicenna God's
unity is not merely numerical, but concerns separation of God from
everything else. In this context, he considers unity and simplicity to
mean the same thing. He explains God's unity in terms of simplic-
ity. God is one in three respects: (1) He cannot have constitutive
elements from which he is composed (tajtamn, (2) he cannot have
countable parts, (3) he cannot have parts like that of definition (ajzii)
al-&add) nor a statement (qawl), neither as the parts in a matter-form
combination or in any other way, such as the parts of an utterance
(qawl) which explain the meaning of his name. Each of these denotes
something which exists separately from other parts. Simply put, the
expressions we use for God cannot be understood as referring to
parts or aspects of God which exist in a distinct manner from each
other, such as the parts of the human body being distinct from other
parts and occupying a different part of space. Although all attrib-
utes we predicate of God have different meanings, it does not mean
that the attributes we express with different names exist in God in
a distinct manner, separate from each other. 22 The properties are
not constituents or parts of the essence of God. God simply has all
the properties he has by being what he is. They are not additional
to the divine being. 23
God has his perfections necessarily since he is necessary in all
respects. If he were not necessary in all respects, he would depend
on other causes and would not be absolutely necessary in himself.
There is nothing which can happen in or to the necessary being;
he necessarily has everything possible for him to have. Thus he has
no new will which can come to be, no new nature to gain, no knowl-
ed~e to be attained, and no new property to have. 24 Although for
AVlcenna what actually exists is necessary, the necessity God has and
~e necessity creatures have are different. Since God is necessary by
hImself, he does not owe his being and perfections to anything else.
All. creatures, however, owe their being and perfection to their cause,
~hmately to God. Furthermore, things that are subject to genera-
hon and corruption are in a process of gaining and loosing their
22 A . .
Vlcenna, Nq:jat, p. 264.8-12; see also, Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1.4-11; Tqftfr,
p. 108.20 - p. 109.1-5.
23 A . .
R' _ ~cenna, MetaphYSICS VIII.4, p. 344.2-5; see also ibid., p. 345.6-11; Avicenna,
zsala Arshryya, p. 5.22-24.
24 Avicenna, Najat, p. 265.3-11.
36 CHAPTER ONE
perfections. Contrary to creaturely manner of having properties, God
has all his properties necessarily.
God has his properties eminently. Although Avicenna does not
argue that God has properties eminently, his argument for God's
being pure being and pure perfection supports such an interpreta-
tion. Avicenna argues that God, as the necessary being, is pure good
and pure perfection (kamiil). God, as the pure being, lacks no per-
fection, is always in act (bi'l-ji'l) , and is pure good. 25 Contingent
beings, however, are not pure good, are vulnerable to non-existence,
hence also to evil. Since contingent beings do not have being on
their own, they are lacking in their being and hence in the perfec-
tion of their properties. 26 At first sight it may be difficult to see the
connection Avicenna makes between having being on its own and
being abundantly perfect or pure act. Although he does not develop
this topic very much, the quiddity (miihiyya) and existence (wu:fud) dis-
tinction may be helpful to make the contrast. Avicenna constantly
rejects that God has a quiddity (miihiyya) , and argues that God is
necessary being. Quiddity (miihiyya), in Avicenna's philosophy, applies
to many members of a genus or species. It also functions as a lim-
itation of the individual members under certain forms, excluding
other kinds or ways of existing. However, God has no quiddity lim-
iting his existenceY Hence God has his perfection properties emi-
nently in the sense that his perfections are unlimited.
Peifections Are Predicated qf God and Creation according to Tashkik
Although Avicenna argues that God has a positive relation to the
world as he is the cause of its being, hence laying the ground to
describe God with perfections that are found in creation, he does
not systematically treat the issue of predicating perfections of God
and creation. However, in a scattered manner, he talks about some
perfection properties, and states that these are not found in God
and creation in the same degree. Hence they are not said of God
and creation univocally.
25 Avicenna, Najat, p. 265.13-17; Avicenna, Risala 'Arshryya, p. 5.16-17.
26 Avicenna, Najat, p. 265.17-21.
27 See for example, Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, pp. 344-345.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 37
Avicenna's discussion of priority and posteriority explains the
difference between the way things have their properties and God
has them as well as how this difference is observed in language. In
the Metaphysics of the Healing, Avicenna talks about 'priority' (taqad-
dum) and 'posteriority' (ta'akhkhur). He states that things are said to
be prior or posterior to other things in many ways. However, all
the different respects that priority and posteriority have in their appli-
cations amount to one modality of predication: predicating bi'l-tashkik. 28
Something is prior in having a certain property over those which
are posterior, inasmuch as it has the property at such a degree, that
the posterior thing does not have it in that way. Moreover, there is
nothing of this property that is had by the posterior thing that is
not had by the prior thing. 29
Predications according to tashkik may be different depending on
the peculiarities of each case in which something is prior to another.
But what is required is that there be a certain measure, or a definite
28 The term 'tashkik,' or 'bi'l-tashkik,' is rendered sometimes as 'analogy' and 'ana-
logical,' and sometimes as 'ambiguous.' Wolfson translates it as 'ambiguous.' Harry
~ustrynWolfson, "Avicenna, Algazali, and Averroes on Divine Attributes," in Studies
In the !!,zstory if Philosophy and 1!-eligion v.l, ed. edited by Isadore Twersky and George
.H. Williams (~arvard, Cambndge, Massachusetts, 1973), pp. 154-156 passim. Wolfson,
m another an:lcle, renders mushakkak as 'ambiguous' and 'amphibolous.' He argues
that the ArabIC and Hebrew terms for ambiguous were rendered in Latin as ana-
logical. And Aquinas' use of analogy "has absorbed what in Arabic philosophy is
c~ed 'ambiguous'." H. A. Wolfson, "The Amphibolous Terms in Aristotle, Arabic
Philosophy and ~aimonides" in Studies in the History if Philosophy and Religion vo!. I,
p. ,477. A. M; GOlchon re~ders it as 'analogy.' A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la Langue
Phllosophlque d'Ibn Szna (Pans, 1938), p. 162. John Rosheger explains Avicenna's use
of the tel;'ID 'tas,hkik' and its relatives referring both to Avicenna's own texts and the
scholarship on It. John P. Rosheger, "A Note on Avicenna and the Divine Attributes"
!he Jo;1odem Schoolman 87 (2000), p. 174. I prefer to render Avicenna's term tashJdk,
m thIS context, as analogy rather than as ambiguous or ambiguity despite the fact
t?at the. predication according to tashkik is not on a par with an'alogical predica-
tIon as It shall be clear. As will be explained, for Avicenna predication according
to tashk-k' IS b ase d on an order. ThIS . order, as AVlcenna
. presents it is such that
I
~e ?ne that ?ri~a~ly has .the prol?erty, has all that the one that s~condarily has
, WIthout .bemg hmlted to It. In thIS way, we may consider the perfections as they
:~ found m creatur~s and God. God, as having existence primarily, does not lack
mg, or any perfectIOn as they are found in creatures, but he has more than what
c:eatures h~ve ~f them. Analogi~al predication may not be limited to 'having a
b Operty pnma~ly and secon~ar:ly because of the cause and effect relationship
fi etween two thmgs. However, It IS one sort of analogical predication. Thus I pre-
.er to render the expression, 'bi'l-tashkik' as analogical predication, in this context
mS2~ead ?f rendering it as, for example, 'priority-based ambiguous predication.' '
AVlcenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 163.7-9.
38 CHAPTER ONE
principle to start with. One can then predicate the same property
of different things according to priority and posteriority depending
on the distance between the thing in question and the measure or
principle. For example, in the case of a certain perfection, some-
thing which has the perfection more than other things and which
lacks nothing of this perfection is prior to other things with respect
to this perfection. The prior thing has this perfection primarily and
others have it secondarily.30
The term "being" is a good example to illustrate how perfections
are found and predicated according to tashk'ik. Being is predicated
both of a cause and its effect. However, the cause and the effect are
not of equal degrees with respect to having existence. The being of
the cause is independent of its effect. However, the being of the
effect depends on the cause. For Avicenna, this relationship of pri-
ority and posteriority between cause and effect with regard to hav-
ing being is so important that it can never be eliminated. The cause
and its effect may exist together in time or in sempiternity or in
some other respect, but they can never be of the same degree with
respect to having being. Thus being is said of the cause and of its
effect analogically (bi'!-tashk'ik) , and the cause is prior to its effect with
respect to being. 3!
Although Avicenna does not elaborate on this issue and does not
state clearly that being is applied to God and creation bi'!-tashklk,
his conception of the relationship between God and the world justifies
our saying that being is said between God and the world bi'!-tashk'ik.
In the passages where he discusses predication based on priority and
posteriority Avicenna does not mention God, but the entire discus-
sion regarding priority with respect to being hinges on the cause
that is the giver of being, not any random cause. Sharpening his
position, he mentions that there may not be a temporal priority
between the cause and its effect, but there is an existential priority
of the cause to its effect. Since God is prior to everything as the
cause which gives them being, Avicenna's discussion regarding how
things are predicated on the basis of priority and posteriority applies
primarily to the relationship between God and the world. Thus,
30 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 164.1-11 passim.
31 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 167.1-5. Also see pp. 164-166 passim.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 39
based upon Avicenna's larger discussion, 'being' is predicated of God
and creatures bi'!-tashklk, according to priority and posteriority.32
Avicenna's discussion of the predication of the term "one" may
be pointed to as another example relevant to the predication of prop-
erties of God and creatures. In his commentary on the chapter a!-
Ikh!ii~, Avicenna states that the term "one" is predicated of things
analogically (bi'!-tashklk). Things have different degrees of unity, depend-
ing on whether they are divisible only in the mind or according to
genus, or are divisible actually or potentially.33 God however cannot
be divided in any way. That is why, in the chapter Ik!ii~ of the
Qur'an, 'a~ad' is predicated of God. 'A~ad', as Avicenna explains,
denotes the utmost degree of unity or being one, that is, of sim-
plicity.34 Although as a generic term 'unity' (waMa) is predicated of
everything analogically, as the specific form of unity 'a~ad' is pred-
icated of God exclusively.
Avicenna's conception of predication according to tashk'ik is to some
extent similar to Aquinas' theory of analogical predication, which I
am going to discuss in the next section of this chapter. The discus-
sion of how one predicate is said of several things-not simply
homonymously-goes back to Aristode,35 whose works are among
the common sources between Avicenna and Aquinas. Aristode uses
the example how the term 'healthy' is predicated of many things,
some of which denote causing health, like food, while others denote
being signs of it, like a good complexion. He also explains that
substance is the primary reference as far as the predication of 'be-
ing' is concerned, whereas accidents have being as accidents of sub-
stance. In his example of health, substance is one reference point in
all its various predications. (This health example is also picked up
32 ~~zlur Rahman stat?,s that. Ib~ Sina "firmly held to the univocality of exis-
tence. Fazlur Rahman, Ibn Sma s Theory of the God-World Relationship" in
God and Creation, eds. David Burrell and Bernard McGinn (Notre Dame Indiana:
No.tre Dame, 1990), p. 3~. Throughout th.e article, Fazlur Rahman explains how
AVlcenna held that God IS a necessary bemg and creation is a contingent being.
H~weve:, he does not make any further explanation how the statement about 'the
Ull1VOCallty of existence' is consistent with the distinction between necessary being
and contingent being, the former belonging solely to God and the latter belonging
solely to creatures. '
33 Avicenna, Tajsfr, p. 109.13-17. See also, Avicenna, Metaphysics III.2 p 97 1-5
p. 103.1-9. ' . . ,
34 Avicenna, T qfsfr, p. 110.1-6.
35 Aristode, Metaphysics, trans. Christopher Kirwan (Oxford, 1971) IV.2 1003a33-
1003bll. ' ,
 CHAPTER ONE
40
by Aquinas). Avicenna's use of 'tashkfk' con~orms to A~isto~le's .expl~­
nation. That is, there is one referent of whIch somethmg IS saId pn-
marily; others have it secondarily. Rendering the term tashkfk as
'analogy' may be justified in relation to Aqu~nas' use of. the ter~.
As we shall see in the next section, for Aqumas, analogical predI-
cation is justified because of the causal order that holds b~tw~en
God and the universe. In Avicenna's writings, we find predlcatlOn
according to priority and posteriority. We also find that there is a
causal order between God and the universe. God, as the cause and
source of all being, is the giver of the being and the perfections of
other things. The example of 'being' as a predication of God ~nd
of creatures according to priority and posteriority shows that p~ed:ca­
tion bi'l-tashkfk and analogical predication are to some extent Slml1ar.
Despite these parallels, Avicenna's conception of tashkfk ~hould n~t
be taken as equivalent to Aquinas' conception of analogical pred~­
cation. One must not underestimate the differences between predi-
cation according to tashkfk and analogical predication. Although
Avicenna has this conception of analogy, he does not have an explicit
account of how analogical predication holds between God and cre-
ation with regard to perfections. Predication by way of tashkfk and
analogy are similar in the sense that they are based on a causal
order and gradation among the different subjects of which th.ey are
applicable, and which can be applied to God a~d cre~tures ms~far
as they are considered analogues. However, AVlcenna s conceptlOn
of tashkfk seems to be employed to distinguish between God and cre-
ation so as to remind us that they are not equivalent, although we
are obliged to use some common terms. He does not identify .the
extent and conditions of similarity and difference between predlca-
tions of perfection properties when they are predicated of God and
of creatures. Thus Avicenna's conception of predication bi'l-tashkfk
and Aquinas' theory of analogical predication are not equivale~t.
Consequently, Avicenna's theory of predication bi'l-tash~fk-as Wl~l
be shown-does not have an important part in shaping hIS own pOSI-
tion regarding theological language, while Aquinas' theory of ana-
logical predication plays a crucial role in this regard.
To sum up, according to Avicenna we cannot ~ow God'~ essence
and cannot name him in himself, because God IS too subhme and
too majestic to be comprehended by us. We know G?d t~roug~ cre-
ation because he is the origin of everything; creatlOn Itself IS the
concomitant of God's being. As an effect it reflects its cause. Hence,
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 41
the perfections therein, starting with 'being,' are given by God, and
are indicative of God's perfections. However, God is different from
creation as well, inasmuch as God is the cause and origin of it. Thus
for Avicenna, there is not only a relationship of similarity between
God and creation, but one of dissimilarity as well. Creation is sim-
ilar to God inasmuch as it is God's effect and reveals God's per-
fections. God is known to us through positive and negative attributes
on the basis of the dual relationship between God and creation. But
perfections are not found in God and in creation in the same man-
ner and to the same degree. Since God is the origin and true owner
of perfections, he has them primarily while creatures have them sec-
ondarily. In other words perfections are predicated of God and crea-
tures bi'l-tashkfk, according to the order of priority and posteriority.
Aquinas' Theory rf Theological Language
Aquinas presents his position regarding human knowledge of God
and his doctrine of predicating properties of God in a more elabo-
rate fashion than Avicenna. My presentation of Aquinas' conception
of God's properties will follow a similar pattern to my presentation
of Avicenna's conception, and will enable us to see the similarities
between Avicenna and Aquinas. Since Aquinas' theory of analogi-
cal predication plays a crucial role in determining how to consider
theological statements with respect to philosophical assessment, I put
more emphasis on his theory of analogical predication. Mter a brief
s~atement of his position, I will discuss reactions to and interpreta-
hons of Aquinas' position in present-day scholarship. One line of
t?0u~ht emphasizes the negative aspect with approval; another empha-
SIzes It but considers his position less satisfactory in explaining human
speech about God. I will argue that Aquinas' position secures human
sp.eech about God more reliably than some scholars think. The neg-
~hve element in Aquinas' theology in general and his position regard-
lUg theological language in particular function as a guideline in
speaking about God. Instead of diminishing the force of human
Speech about God, the negative element indicates the limits and rules
for, Our speaking about God. Consequently, Aquinas' theory of ana-
lo~c~ predication does not devalue theological statements, but defines
theIr limits. As long as one takes these specific conditions into account
one is justified in assessing theological statements-statements tha~
42 CHAPTER ONE
are made by fellow human beings-philosophically. If one does not
take the specific conditions of theological statements into account,
then one will be unjust in one's criticism of theological language by
expecting more than the nature of theological statements allows.
We Cannot Know God's Essence
Aquinas contends throughout his works that we cannot know God's
essence in purely positive terms: we cannot know what he is in him-
self, but we can know what he is not. Aquinas' frequent reminders
of God's unknowability in himself taken together with his teaching
that some of our terms apply to God not metaphorically but liter-
ally have received different interpretations from scholars. Even though
the assessment of the scope of the negative aspect of Aquinas' the-
ology varies from one scholar to another, it is certain that Aquinas
36
does not categorically deny the human mind all knowledge of God.
In ST question 12, Aquinas exclusively discusses the problem of
our knowledge of God's essence. There he makes a distinction between
seeing God and comprehending God. Whereas he denies the com-
prehension of God to any creature forever,37 he argues that the
human mind can know something about God's essence. In article
1, he argues that the created mind can see God's essence, not only
on the grounds of faith but also on philosophical grounds. Nevertheless,
he clarifies that this kind of knowledge of God, namely seeing God's
essence, is not possible for human beings in this life, because human
knowledge depends on the manner in which human beings have
existence. In this life the human soul has its being in union with
corporeal matter. It knows material forms and other things insofar
as they can be known through them. Since God's essence is not a
material form and the knowledge of God attained through the cre-
ated likeness is not of the divine essence in itself, the human mind
cannot know God's essence in itself in this life. 38 This is a subtle but
crucial aspect of Thomistic philosophy which I will take up in more
detail below.
Having a quidditative knowledge of God, or knowing God's essence
in itself, is different from knowing God through a created likeness.
36 Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), p. 41.
37 ST la. 12, 7.
38 ST la. 12, 11. See also ST la. 12, 2 and 4.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 43
When Aquinas argues that in this life we cannot see God's essence,
what he is denying to the human intellect is a quidditative knowl-
edge of God equivalent to human knowledge of other things accord-
ing to their definitions or their causes. Yet he does not deny that
the human mind can have some positive knowledge of God. In his
commentary on Boethius' De trinitate, Aquinas states that something
is known either through the form that is proper to a thing, or through
the form of something similar. In the case of God we do not know
God through the form that is proper to himself, but we know him
through the likeness that created things have to him. 39 In the De
veritate, we find a more decisive statement of Aquinas' position. He
argues that we know what something is when we can define it. As
John F. Wippel puts it, the intellect is said to know something "when
it conceives a form which corresponds in every way to that thing
itself. Whatever our intellect may conceive about God, this cannot
perfectly represent him. "40 It does, however, as we will see, some-
what represent him.
39 De trinitate, q.l, a.2. English translation of Aquinas' commentary on Boethius'
De trinitate: Thomas Aquinas, Faith, Reason, and 7heology: Qyestions I-IV of his Commentary
on the De trinitate of Boethius, trans. & ed. Armand Maurer (Toronto & Ontario:
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1987), pp. 21-22. It is interesting that in
~he De trinitate, Aquinas argues that through creation we can only know that God
IS an~ when it comes to what God is we know by transcendence, negation and
causahty. In ST la 12, 12, he states that through creation we know that God exists
and alS? "that he has whate~er must belong to the first cause of all things." This
s~ows, m a sense, that Aqumas clarifies or develops his position in his ST, and
~ves m?re value to the knowledge of God that we attain through creatures. This
IS also m agreement with Wippel's argument that Aquinas adds precision in his
later works in his theory of analogical predication against agnostic positions such
as tha.t of Maimonides. John F. Wippel, Metaphysical Themes in 7homas Aquinas
(Washmgton, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1984), p. 286. Lawrence
Moonan has similar interpretation of Aquinas' position. He argues that with regard
to our knowledge of God Aquinas' position evolves from a more reserved to a less
reserved one. Lawrence Moonan, Divine Power (Oxford: Clarendon 1994) pp.
231-235. ' ,
J.
40 F. Wippel, "Thomas Aquinas on What Philosophers Can Know about God"
A~encan Catholic Philosophical Qyarter[y 66/3 (1992), p. 283. On p. 286, Wippel mai~­
tains~ "In my view, in here defending our ability to apply some names to God sub-
stantIally, Thomas has now developed his position somewhat. He continues to insist
however, that this does not mean that we can comprehend or define the divin~
esse?ce, or know what it is. It also means that, against the position of the medieval
JeWIsh philosopher, Moses Maimonides, he clearly defends some kind of positive or
aflinnative knowledge of G~d." What Wippel says here for the de potentia is applic-
a~le to ST as well. Hence, It would not be wrong to say that Aquinas' position in
this regard gradually evolves to one in which he acknowledges a broader scope or
a more rationally grounded admission in regard to human knowledge of God.'
44 CHAPTER ONE
In SeC I, 14, where Aquinas argues that we cannot know what
God is positively but can through negation, he states the parallel
between giving definitions of created things and negating things of
God. 4! The activity of negating more and more things of God is
similar to defining things by first giving the genus of a certain thing
and adding its differentiae from other things. Of course, giving the
definition of created things aims at a positive knowledge of them,
while negating things of God does not presume to provide a posi-
tive knowledge of God.
For Aquinas, since we cannot know God in himself, the most
appropriate name for God is the least determinate name. In an inter-
esting passage in the Summa theologiae la. 13, 11, Aquinas treats the
question of whether "HE WHO IS is the Most Appropriate Name
for God."42 He argues that 'he who is' is the most appropriate name
for God for three reasons. The first reason is the meaning of the
name in itself. This name expresses only existence. Since God's
essence is being, and only God's essence is being, this name is the
most appropriate name. The second reason is the universality or
broadness of the scope of this name. In this life we cannot grasp
what God's essence is, and however we think of him we fail to have
full understanding of him. Thus, since this name is unrestricted,
indeed since it is less determinate and simpler, it is the most appro-
priate name for God. The third reason is that the wording of 'He
who is' is in the present tense. For God, to whom past and future
are not applicable at all, this name is the most appropriate name,
even though the present is also not applicable to God inasmuch as
it implies being in time. 43
Cod Is Known through Creation
We do not have a quidditative knowledge of God in this world,
because the manner in which we have being in this world limits the
SeC l, 14 [2] and [3].
41
ST la. 13, 11, and ad I. A similar discussion also occurs in Thomas Aquinas,
42
Qyestiones Disputatae de Potentia Dei in Qy~estiones disf!.utatae, volumen 11. editio X. Taurini.
Ed. P. Bazzi, [et al.] (Rome: 1965). EnglIsh translatIOn, On the Power qfGod (Qyaestzones
de potentia Dei), trans. English Dominican Fathers (London: Bums. Gates ~ Wash~oume,
1932-1934) (Henceforth De potentia) VII, 5. The answer to thIS questIon remmds us
of Avicenna's contention that the most appropriate thing we can say about God is
that 'he is' or 'he is whatever he is,' since God cannot be expressed, cannot be
talked about, as he is in himself.
.t~ 1''7""' T _ 1 () 1 ~.-l '2
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 45
reach of our knowledge. But we can attain a certain kind of knowl-
edge of God through the creatures that are in fact within the lim-
its of our reach. The human knowledge of God in this life is through
creatures, because creatures, as the effects of God, reflect God, and
are similar to him.
Although human knowledge concerning God is limited, human
beings can know that God has perfection properties in addition to
knowing God's existence. As part of his discussions regarding the
unknowability of God's essence by human beings in this life, Aquinas
underscores the limited character of human knowledge. In this life,
the knowledge that corresponds to the capabilities of the human soul
originates from the senses. Starting with sense-perceptual knowledge,
the human soul reaches the forms of realities. This knowledge is not
trivial, even if it does not include the quidditative knowledge of God.
It leads us to know not only that God exists but also that he must
have certain perfections:
The knowledge that is natural to us has its source in the senses and
extends just so far as it can be led by sensible things; from these, how-
ever, our understanding cannot reach to the divine essence. Sensible
creatures are effects of God which are less than typical of the power
of their cause, so knowing them does not lead us to understand the
whole power of God and thus we do not see his essence. They are
nevertheless effects depending from a cause, and so we can at least
be led from them to know of God that he exists and that he has what-
ever must belong to the first cause of all things which is beyond all
that is caused. 44
In ST la. 13, 1, Aquinas refers back to ST la. 12, 12 confirming
that in this world our knowledge of God is through our knowledge
of creatures. Based on our knowledge of creatures, we know that
God is the cause of them; he surpasses them, and he lacks anything
creaturely. We are, despite the last two points, also able to make
predications of God because of our knowledge of creatures as his
effects.45
The similarity of creatures to their cause can be traced through
the principle that every agent does something similar to itself. 46 In
SeC I, 29, Aquinas sets the stage to discuss how we ascend to the
44 ST la. 12, 12.
45 ST la. 13, 1.
46 SeC l, 29 [2]; De potentia VII, 5. John F. Wippel, the Metaphysical 7hought
of 7homas Aquinas (Washington, D.C., The Catholic University of America, 2000),
PP·517-."J1R.
46 CHAPTER ONE
knowledge of God through the knowledge that we attain from crea-
tures. Since what we know directly comes from creatures, there must
be a ground to justify our talking about God based on our knowl-
edge gained from creatures. The justification of how we can know
something of God in positive terms on the basis of our knowledge
of creatures is the similarity between God as cause and creatures as
his effects. Aquinas argues that since God has given all the perfec-
tions that creatures possess, these perfections must somehow be found
in God.
Cod Has Negative and Positive Properties
The similarity and the dissimilarity between God and creatures deter-
mine whether properties are negated or affirmed of God. It is the
similarity of God's effects to their cause that guarantees for us at
least some knowledge of God. This similarity of creatures to God is
again the basis upon which some properties are either negated or
affirmed of God. Affirming similarity of two things implies their dis-
similarity, because it amounts to not only denying absolute dissimi-
larity, but also denying identity of the two things in question. To
the extent that creatures are not similar to God, the properties we
find in creatures should be negated of God. In turn, to the extent
that creatures are similar to God, the properties we find in crea-
tures should be affirmed of God, although not absolutely, that is,
not in precisely the same way.
Since God is different from his creatures, God has negative attrib-
utes. Pursuing God's otherness from creatures increases our knowl-
edge of God, even if it is expressed in negative terms. In ST,
immediately after arguing for the existence of God, Aquinas under-
takes the task of clarifying "the ways in which God does not exist."47
From question 3 through question 11, Aquinas explains how God
is not, such as being composite, changeable, material. In SeC I, 14,
Aquinas explains why we need to use negation in order to know
God. He states that we cannot know God in himself, because he
surpasses our understanding. We cannot know God in a purely pos-
itive way, but we can come closer in our knowledge of God by nega-
47 ST la. prologue (prooemium) to question 3. Here Aquinas, at the end of ques-
tion 2 gives his plan for the rest of his investigation into questions concerning God
in himself.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 47
48 Th'
•
tlOnS. mgs are known not only directly but also through their
distinction from other things. Since we do not know what God is
in himself, we must frame the distinction between God and creation
in negative terms. Although these negative distinctions do not show
what God is, they show at least what God is not. Mter setting the
stage for using negations in order to know something of God, Aquinas
devotes 14 chapters to explaining what are the things that need to
be negated of God. The basic idea behind all these negations is the
polarity between God and creation. All these negations emphasize
God's otherness from creatures. 49
Since creatures are similar to God, God has positive attributes.
Perhaps it is Aquinas' bold assertion regarding the positive proper-
ties of God that puts him in a distinctive place among medieval
philosophers. For Aquinas, pure perfections, such as being, goodness
and wisdom, are properly predicated of God: they say something
about what God is, even if they do so inadequately. 50 Aquinas argues
that the perfections that we see in creatures are found in God with-
out reducing them solely to God's actions. That is, saying that God
has pure perfections does not mean that God causes them but does
not himself possess them in any manner. Aquinas consistently argues
that not all the perfections we find in creatures are limited to crea-
tures. They are found in God, though not in the way they are found
in creatures. If God did not have these perfections in some way,
then all that we could say about God would be limited to pure nega-
tions or declarations that he caused something but is in no way like
what he caused. In fact, the divine perfections are interpreted in
both ways by Aquinas' predecessors. Mter a brief survey of other
philosophers such as Maimonides, and Muslim thinkers, most likely
48 Aquinas, ScG I, 14 [2].
49 Norman Kretzmann gives a detailed list of properties that Aquinas, in ScG I,
15-28, negates from God: "(A) anything that begins or ceases to exist, (B) tempo-
~, (C) depe~dent for i.ts .e;astence on anything other than itself, (D) anything that
m3S a?y passIve p.otentlahtles, (E) matter, .or .anything material, (F) the universal
unatenal ca~se (pnme mat~er), (G) composIte III any way, (H) subject to anything
( natural, vlOl~nt, or coerClv~, (I) corporeal, whet~er a body or. a power in a body,
J) other than ItS own essenhal nature, (K) anythlllg whose belllg is other than its
nature, (L) anything that has any accidental characteristics, (M) specified by differentiae
(N) ~lassified within any genus or category, (0) defined, (P) the subject of an ~
P~on de~onstration, (Q) a universal formal cause, (R) the form of any particular
thing, (8) Imperfect." Norman Kertzmann, the Metaphysics qf 7heism: Aquinas's Natural
n::logy in Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), p. 118.
ST la. 13, 2.
48 CHAPTER ONE
including Avicenna,JI Aquinas argues for a stronger pOSItIOn. For
him, some of these names say something of what God is. Even
though we first know the perfections in creatures, these perfections
are also predicated of God in a substantial or formal way. The basis
of such predications is the fact that the perfections found in crea-
tures represent God's perfections.52
God Has Perftctions in a Different Mode ]ram Creatures
Aquinas has concerns similar to those of Avicenna regarding the
manner in which God has perfection properties. Like Avicenna,
Aquinas maintains that God has perfections in a manner different
from creation. The manner in which God has perfections is char-
acterized by the manner in which God is. Since God is simple,
immutable, infinite, necessary, eternal etc., perfections are found in
God simply, necessarily, immutably. In contrast to those who reduce
God's properties either to pure negations of properties in creatures
or to declaring that God caused them but in no way is like them,
Aquinas argues that some properties are predicated of God in a sub-
stantial or formal way. They say something about what God is. If,
then, they are found in such a way in God, then one must explain
how the attribution of these perfections to God does not violate the
believer's conception of God as a transcendent being. Arguing that
the manner in which God has perfection properties is determined
by divine formal features, such as simplicity and infinity, Aquinas
51 In ST la. 13, 2, after stating that Maimonides interprets affirmative statements
about God as negations, Aquinas-referring to the interpretation of the perfections
attributed to God as merely caused by him-says that "Others said that such sen-
tences were used to signify the relation of God to creatures, so that when we say
'God is good' we mean that God is the cause of goodness in things, and likewise
in other such propositions." The reference of the expression "others" may be Muslim
philosophers, including Avicenna. See H. A. Wolfson, "St. Thomas on Divine
Attributes," in Studies in Maimonides and St. 7homas Aquinas, ed. Jacob I. Dienstag,
(Ktav Publishing, 1975), pp. 8-9/680-68l.
52 ST la. 13, 2, De potentia VII, 5. Through his emphasis that perfections are
found in God, and predicated of God in the category of substance, Aquinas argues
for a stronger position. He diverges not only from Maimonides and Avicenna, but
also from Pseudo-Dionysius, whom he considers as an authority. Rudi A. Te Velde,
Participation and Substantiality in 7homas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995),
pp. 261-265. For a detailed discussion of Aquinas' inheritance and modification of
the Pseudo-Dionysian theology, see Fran O'rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics
of Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1992).
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 49
clearly sets the manner in which God has perfections apart from the
way creation has them.
Unlike creatures, God has perfections in accord with his simplic-
ity. In creatures perfection properties denote (1) something different
from other perfection properties, (2) something different from the
creature's essence. Aquinas gives the example of wisdom. If it is
predicated, for example, of a man, then it signifies something different
from his power, his will, as well as something distinct from his essence.
In this sense each perfection property indicates something distinct
from other perfection properties, and it is limited to a certain aspect
of the person who is wise. However, in the case of God, perfections
are not something extraneous to his essence. They do not have a
distinct existence from each other, indicating a certain limited aspect
of God. What a perfection property signifies when it is predicated
of God "is not confined by the meaning of our word but goes beyond
it."53 In brief, God is not wise accidentally. He is wise essentially.
His being is to be wise.
Although all the divine names, or perfection properties, signify one
and the same thing because of God's simplicity, they are not syn-
onymous. Despite the belief that God is simple, we attribute to him
many perfection properties. Consequently, in our way of speaking
he is considered in the way composite things are. Aquinas argues
that since we know these perfections as they are found in creatures,
we understand God's perfections through the concepts that are appro-
priate to the perfections as they are found in creatures. But, in fact,
perfections are found in God in a simple and unified manner. Hence
it is because of the perfection of God's unity or simplicity that the
perfections found in creatures in a divided way are found in him in
a simple and unified way.54 Although the perfections we attribute to
God are not distinct from each other in God, the names we use to
denote these perfections have different meanings, that is, they are
not synonyms.
God's being infinite and unlimited may be given as another exam-
ple to indicate that God has perfections in a different manner from
creation. God has perfections eminently, whereas creatures have their
53 ST la. 13, 5. See also SeC I, 32 [2], [4], [7], De potentia VII, 7. In SeC I, 32
[4] Aq~inas states that perfections are not predicated of God as properties, since
he conSIders them to be in the category of accident.
54 ST la. 13, 4, and ad 3 and 5; SeC I, 31, [4].
50 CHAPTER ONE
perfections in a limited manner. The perfections creatures have pri-
marily belong to God. Creatures have these perfections because, as
God's effects, they reflect God's perfections. However, since they do
not reflect God fully, they fall short of representing God's full power.
These perfections are not found in created things in a manner sim-
ilar to the manner that they are found in GOd. 55 Given that we
know those perfections as they are found in creatures, and that they
fall short of representing the way they are found in God, from a
human point of view they are said to be found in God eminently. 56
In ScC I, 30, Aquinas presents a further clarification of what the
eminence, or supereminence, of perfections means. He suggests a
hierarchy in speaking of perfections. Perfections as they are known
from creatures are given the names they have as they are in crea-
tures. But since such perfections are not restricted to creatures-to
the contrary, God has them primarily and since God surpasses crea-
turely limits-they are considered to be found in God eminently.
More precisely, then, God is eminently good, or the highest good.
Aquinas then talks about the mode of eminence, or 'supereminence'
of these perfections. How then do we express it? He states that their
mode of supereminence can be signified either through negations,
such as eternal, i.e., not temporal, infinite, or through positive pro-
portions such as the highest good, the first cause. 57
I do not intend to discuss all divine formal features in this con-
text. However, one can safely assume that a similar paradigm is
applicable with regard to other divine formal features such as neces-
sity, eternity, and immutability. That is, in the same manner as the
divine simplicity, they modify the divine perfections. That is, God's
knowledge and will, for example, are necessary and immutable as
much as they are simple.
Perfections Are Predicated rif Cod Analogically
For Aquinas perfections are predicated of God and creatures nei-
ther univocally nor equivocally. They cannot be predicated of God
univocally, because God is utterly different from creatures, being sim-
ple, eternal and infinite. Perfection properties cannot be predicated
55 SeC I, 29; ST la. 13, 2 and 3, De potentia VII, 5.
56 ScC I, 30 [2]; ST la. 13, 2 ad 2; ST la. 13, 3; ST la. 13, 7.
57 SeC I, 30 [2] and [4].
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 51
of God and creatures equivocally. Otherwise we would not know
anything about what they mean when they are predicated of God.
Aquinas proposes a way in between: analogical predication of pure
perfection terms. Analogical predication would allow affirmations of
what God is, and would eliminate the fallacy of equivocation in our
language about God. 58
Aquinas argues that perfections are predicated of God and crea-
tures according to the analogy of one to another in almost all his
works, though he is hesitant in the De veritate. 59 In ST, Aquinas states,
"words are used of God and creatures in an analogical way, that is,
in accordance with a certain order between them." He mentions two
modes of analogical predication, and gives the health example. In
one mode, a term is predicated analogically of two things, because
these two things have a certain relationship to a third thing. Health
is said of 'a diet' and a 'complexion,' because of the relation of the
latter two to the health in man-diet being the cause and com-
plexion being the sign of health. In the second mode, a term is pred-
icated of two things because of a relation between these two things.
Health is predicated of 'diet' and 'man' because the diet is the cause
of health in man. 60
58 Aquinas argues that if these perfections are predicated of God and creatures
equivocally, then all speech about God would be meaningless, and philosophers
who try to prove that God exists, or who speak about God's being such and such
would be committing the fallacy of equivocation. ST la. 13, 5. See also SeC I, 33
[6] and De potentia VII, 7. There is a parallel between the structure of being and
the use of language in Aquinas. That is, since (I) there is a similarity between God
and creatures, perfection terms are not predicated of God and creatures equivo-
cally, (2). God and creatures have different modes of being, perfection terms are
not pred.icated of them univocally, (3) perfections are found in God and creatures
but III different modes, they are predicated of God and creatures analogically. To
see such .a parallel between the structure of being and the use of language implies
that Aqumas' theory of analogical predication is not simply a theory about the use
of lanf?Uage. For discussions concerning whether Aquinas simply offers a theory
~g~di~g the use .of terms, or w?ether his theory of analogical predications has
unplicatlO~s reg~rding the conceptIOn of God see: Neil A. Stubbens, "Naming God:
Moses Malmomdes and Thomas Aquinas," Thomist 54 (April 1990) p. 267.
59JFW'
. . Ippe I"Th
, .
omas Aqumas on What Philosophers Can Know , about God"
pp. 293-.295: Wippel provides a survey of Aquinas' position regarding the analo~­
ical predicatlOn throughout Aquinas' works.
• 60 S! la. 13, 5. In ~he De potentia he c.ites tw? kinds of analogy, (I) a property
or
~ pr~dicated two thmgs because of their relation to a third thing, such as being
: sald of q~allty ~nd quantity on ~he basis of their relation to substance, and (2)
property IS predicated of two thmgs because of the relation of the one to the
other, as being is said of substance and quantity. In the first kind of analogy, there
mUst be something prior to the things of which something is predicated analogically.
52 CHAPTER ONE
Aquinas distinguishes between the signified perfections (res significata)
and the manner of signifying (modus significandi), and argues that the
res significata are predicated of God and creatures because of the
"order that creatures have to God as to their source and cause in
which all the perfections of things pre-exist transcendendy."51 Whereas
in univocal predication perfections are predicated of different sub-
jects with one meaning or conception (una ratio), in analogical pred-
ication perfections indicate different connotations of the subjects to
this one thing. Aquinas gives the health example again: the predi-
cations of health in regard to diet ("this is health food") and to com-
plexion ("you look healthy") indicates different relations to health,
one as a cause of health and the other as a sign of it. 52
Even though in analogical predication res significatae have different
foundations (rationes) in their different instances of predication, the
situation between God and his creatures is not exacdy the same as
that provided by the health example. In order to see the difference,
we must keep in mind that (1) perfection properties are predicated
of God and creatures because of the order of things to God as their
cause, and 2) perfection properties that we know from creatures and
which are predicated of God do not simply show God's causal activ-
ity but something found in God eminendy.53 In the health example,
the form 'health' is found only in the healthy man. But the diet is
not the form of health, or does not have health formally. It is the
cause of health in a healthy man. Likewise, complexion is not for-
mally health; it is simply a sign showing that a man is formally
healthy. However, as opposed to predication of health both of diet
and complexion, some forms of perfections are found both in God
and in creatures.
Since perfections are predicated of God and creatures analogi-
cally, i.e., with different rationes of the same res significata, the ques-
tion that arises is this: what is the thing that makes their rationes
different in their predication of God and creatures? The answer to
this question is found in the mode of existence of perfections. The
Since, Aquinas argues, there can be nothing prior to God, the analogy of many to
one is not the analogy that applies between God and creatures in predicating per-
fections. Only the second kind of analogy applies between God and creatures. De
potentia VII, 7.
61 ST la. 13, 5.
62 ST la. 13, 5.
63 ST la. 13, 2.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 53
rationes of perfections are different when they are predicated of God
and creatures on account of the modes of existence that belong to
God and to creatures respectively.54 As I have mentioned in the pre-
vious section, whereas God has these perfections simply, eternally,
infinitely, eminendy, creatures have them in their composite mode
of being-in a compounded manner, temporally and finitely. A fur-
ther question: What is the thing that the mode of existence corre-
sponds to in human knowledge and in the expression of these
perfections?
In order to answer this question I should mention Aquinas' dis-
tinction between the res significata and the modus significandi of perfec-
tion terms. In 5T la 13, 3, Aquinas argues that these names are
affirmed of God on the basis of their res significata, but they are denied
of God on the basis of their modus significandi. The modus significandi
is the way we signify things in a precise way when we affirm these
perfections. Aquinas states that as far as the res significata of these
perfections is concerned, they are literally predicated of God, and
their attribution to God is more appropriate than to creatures. But
as far as their mode of signifying is concerned, their predication of
God is inappropriate, because their mode of signification is crea-
turely.55 Hence it is the modus significandi in human language that cor-
responds to, but which cannot properly express, the mode of existence
of perfections.
Aquinas explains how our mode of signifying is appropriate for
creatures but not appropriate for God through highlighting the fail-
ure of human language to express simplicity and concreteness together.
He states that we use concrete nouns to indicate completeness and
subsistence, but concrete nouns always indicate composite things.
Our human expressions, if they are meant to signifY simple forms,
however, are abstract and do not signify subsistence and complete-
~ess along with simplicity. For example God is not simply wise, but
IS. also wisdom itself. The abstract noun wisdom , however, does not
SIgnifY something subsistent. Because God is both subsistent and sim-
ple, the perfection terms signify God inadequately.55
• 64 Since God is the equivocal cause-this is why univocal predication is not pos-
~ble between him and creatures-God's being the cause or source of the perfec-
tions does not seem to constitute a difficulty. For God's being the equivocal cause,
see SeC I, 29 [2].
65 ST la. 13, 3.
66 In ST la. 13, I, ad 2 and ad 3.
54 CHAPTER ONE
Still, Aquinas does not see this imperfection as something that
should prevent us from predicating pure perfections of God. Even
though they are not suitable for God in their creaturely signification,
this does not mean that we cannot form true or valid propositions
about God. In his discussion concerning the validity of our state-
ments about God Aquinas emphasizes the difference between the
structure of our statements about things and things as they exist in
reality. Aquinas argues that the structure of our statements does not
match things as they exist, whether they be material objects or sim-
ple beings such as God. Thus, the fact that God is simple and we
human beings use propositions that are not simple-since they con-
tain at least a subject and predicate-do not make our propositions
about God less valuable than our propositions about material things.57
Our propositions about created things and about God are valid
because "the intellect does not attribute its mode of understanding
to the things that it understands; for example it does not attribute
immateriality to a stone even though it knows the stone immateri-
ally."58 Hence, if for Aquinas the inadequacy of the signification of
statements we make about God does not make them invalid or devoid
of knowledge, why cannot we assume the same thing for the mode
of signification of our perfection terms when we speak of God?
'The Use qf the Negative Element in Aquinas' Position
There is an apparent difficulty in understanding Aquinas' position
regarding our knowledge of God and the expression of this knowl-
edge. Aquinas maintains that we do not know how God is in him-
self in purely positive terms. We can know God more adequately
59
only through negations of perfections as they are found in creatures.
Throughout his writings Aquinas also reminds us that human mind
cannot comprehend God (S7 la. 12, 7). However, he also maintains
that perfection terms are predicated of God analogically, i.e., liter-
ally not metaphorically, and that those perfections belong primarily
to God and secondarily to creatures. There is a tendency among
Aquinas scholars to interpret Aquinas' position in such a way that
67 57 la. 13, 12, and ad 3.
68 ScC I, 36 [2].
69 ScC I, 14.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 55
strips the force from Aquinas' theory of analogical predication.
Through the theory of analogical predication Aquinas allows that
we know God in some sense and our positive predications of God
are not metaphorical inasmuch as they concern perfection terms. As
a result of the emphasis on Aquinas' frequent reminders about the
unknowability of God, one can become confused about how to under-
stand analogical predication and how to assess Aquinas' statements
about God's perfections. If we do not know how God is in any way,
then can we talk about God, or how can we understand the state-
ments about God? Can one argue that since Aquinas is a theolo-
gian, one should not expect him to meet philosophical standards,
such as coherence and implication?
In fact the ambiguity in Aquinas' position has received different
interpretations from scholars of different backgrounds. For some of
them, the fact that Aquinas has a negative element in his theology
is something praiseworthy. It is something that justifies why one
should not attempt to push Aquinas' accounts of God and God's
perfections to their logical conclusions, or why one should not draw
unpleasant implications. For others, Aquinas' qualifications regard-
ing our knowledge of God's perfections amount to an ambiguity that
makes his theology less informative and not as explanatory as one
might initially expect. 70
I would like to consider the interpretations of J osef Pieper and
Harm Goris, who hold the negative dimension in Aquinas' philoso-
phy in high esteem, and William P. Alston, who presents the posi-
tion held by philosophers critical towards Aquinas' negative element.
Both sides agree that in Aquinas' view we do not have determinate
knowledge of God in himself. Pieper emphasizes that we do not have
7.0 Amon~ many different interpretations of Aquinas' theory of analogical predi-
canon, DaVld Burrell developed an interesting approach. He argued in his earlier
wO:ks, such. as Aquinas: Cod and Action, that through his theory of analogical predi-
cano.n , Aqumas offers not a t~e.ory explaining how perfections denoting God are
pre~cated, but rather emphasIzmg the transcendence of God. For Aquinas anal-
ogy IS not a method to describe God but an "intellectual therapy," which relieves
us from our nee~. for theo~es ~bout God. S?e Da~d Burrell, Aquinas: God and Action,
~. 118: For a C~tIcal exammatlOn of Burrell s earher position, see Philip A. Rolnick,
nalogzcal Posslbllztzes (Atlanta: Scholars, 1993). In his later work, Burrell acknowl-
edges more credibility to analogical predication in attributing perfections to God
an? c;,e~tures. David B. Burrell,. "From Analogy of "Being" to the Analogy of
Bemg, m Recoverzng Nature: Essays In Natural Phzlosophy, EthiCS, and Metaphysics in Honor
rif Ralph McInerny, ed. Thomas Hibbs and John O'Callaghan (Indiana, Notre Dame:
Notre Dame University, 1999), pp. 253-266.
 r\
'~'.
56 CHAPTER ONE
quidditative knowledge of God, but only have the hope of know
God. Goris argues that we should not assess Aquinas' teaching in
purely philosophical terms. Alston contends that Aquinas' theory of
analogy leaves the meaning of perfection terms indeterminate, and
that perfection terms according to Aquinas' theory of analogical pred-
ication are not adequate for philosophical discussion. Against Aquinas'
theory regarding theological language, he argues that perfections can
be predicated of God and of creatures univocally. Since his presen-
tation of the problem is more direct and articulate, I mainly rely on
Alston's discussion to state my position. I will argue that contrary
to Alston's interpretation, Aquinas' theory of analogy does not leave
us with indeterminate conceptions of the divine perfections. The
unfavorable interpretations of Aquinas' position result from the error
of expecting that analogical predication should teach us the ratio pro-
pria of the divine perfections. The fact that we do not know the ratio
propria of the divine perfections shows only that our knowledge of
God is limited, not that our knowledge of God is indeterminate such
that we cannot make philosophical assertions about divine perfec-
tions or criticize those assertions. There is no compelling reason,
based on Aquinas' theory of analogy, to consider statements con-
cerning God as indeterminate, and hence not suitable for philo-
sophical assessment.
Josif Pieper
In 'The Silence if St. 'Thomas,71 ]osef Pieper emphasizes the unknowa-
bility of things and of God in Aquinas' thought and the apophathic
character of his theology. He does not conclude that what we say
about God has no philosophical rigor, but his emphasis on the ulti-
mate unknowability of God weakens the hope of evaluating Aquinas'
teachings in philosophical terms. Pieper argues that since we do not
know the relationship between God-who gives things their truth-
and things, we cannot know things. Since we cannot know the 'truth'
of things, we cannot know God-except imperfectly-because he is
only imperfectly reflected through creatures, i.e., in as much as they
imitate their source. Hence Pieper maintains that, for Aquinas, God's
71 Josef Pieper, The Silence if St. Thomas, trans. s. J. Murray and Daniel O'Connor
(New York: 1957).
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 57
knowledge is beyond our reach. We may only hope to attain this
knowledge.
Pieper discusses the concepts of the truth of things and truth of
kno,:ledge in order to clarifY what the truth of human knowledge
conSIsts o~ He states that, according to Aquinas, 'being true is being
thought eIther by God, hence being created, or by other subjects. '72
G~d's .thought, or knowledge, is the creative knowledge giving every-
thmg ItS truth, measuring everything but itself is not measured. It is
God's creative knowledge that makes things understandable to human
beings. Created things in turn are measured by God's knowledge on
the one hand, and measure human knowledge on the other. The
human mind, however, is measured but does not measure as far as
natural beings are concerned. The truth of human knowledge depends
on its conformity to the truth of creation. 73 Thus things are related
(1) to God, and (2) to the human mind. Although we know things
as they are related to the human mind, we cannot know things as
they are related to God. As Pieper states, we cannot know "the rela-
tion between natural reality and the archetypal creative thought of
God."74
Pieper points to a vicious circle in Aquinas' thought regarding
human knowledge of God. Because we cannot properly grasp "the
correspondence between the original pattern in God and the cre-
ated copy, in which formally and primarily the truth of things con-
sists,"75 we cannot know the 'truth of things' perfectly. This is because
ultimately it is the divine knowledge of things that constitutes the
truth of things, and we cannot properly know what God is. We do
n~t ~o,: what God is, because our knowledge of God through cre-
at~on I~ Imperfect or defective. Our knowledge of God through cre-
~tIOn IS defective because (1) creation can represent God only
Imperfectly, and (2) even this imperfect representation or reflection
of God is too much for the human mind to fully understand. 76
If we cannot know God without knowing creatures, and if we can-
not. kn~w the truth of creatures without knowing God, then what
OptIOn IS left for us as far as the knowledge of God is concerned?
72 Pieper, op. cit., p. 50.
73 Pieper, op. cit., pp. 51-57.
74 Pieper, op. cit., pp. 58-59.
75 Pieper, op. cit., p. 62.
76 p. .
. leper, op. Clt., pp. 66-67. See also Pieper's reference to Aquinas Q,uaestiones
Disputatae de Veritate V, 2 ad 1 1. '
58 CHAPTER ONE
In Pieper's own words, "St. Thomas's doctrine means that hope is
the condition of man's existence as a knowing subject, a condition
that by its very nature cannot be fixed: it is neither comprehension
and possession nor simply non-possession, but 'not-yet-possession'."77
Pieper's discussion does not directly concern the problem of ana-
logical predication, which is the topic of my discussion here. Never-
theless it is related to this discussion. Since we name God through
creation, and we do not know things perfectly, but only hope that
we will know them perfectly, then we cannot properly name God
through creation, but only hope that we can later properly name
God through creation.
What can we make out of this riddle? Do Thomas' teachings as
presented by Pieper mean that what Thomas or anyone says about
God should not be taken seriously? What would 'hoping to have
knowledge' mean, if it means to exclude the claim of knowledge? I
do not think Aquinas' writings are meant to contain no knowledge
of God, being mere instrumental statements put forward with the
hope of reaching knowledge of God eventually-a hope that won't
be fulfilled in the present life. As Pieper himself notes, despite his
reminders of the unknowability of God and things, Aquinas does not
adhere to agnosticism. 78 One may take Pieper's conclusion in a
broader sense to mean that Aquinas' constant reminder of the
unknowability of God shows that he considers human knowledge
qualified and limited. Human knowledge is conditioned by our human-
ity whether it concerns God or things. This would be acceptable,
but the fact that human knowledge is not absolute-that is, not the
knowledge the Creator has of his creation-does not mean that
human knowledge is not reliable or offers only hope but not any
kind of knowledge whatsoever. This would be a self-contradiction.
There is no reason to take Aquinas' reminders regarding the unknowa-
bility of things and God to mean that he is arguing that we cannot
and do not know things and God at all. To do so would render
Aquinas' life-long occupation as a grand effort to create an illusion.
Pieper must mean something more-but he does not express it.
77 Pieper, op. cit., p. 69.
78 Pieper, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 59
Harm Cons
!Iar~ Goris discusses Aquinas' approach to theological statements
III hIS. Free Creatures if an Eternal Cod.
79
Goris argues that although the
negatIve element in Aquinas' theology does not exclude all affirmative
theo.logy, it "qualifies ~ll at,Jirm~~ve God-talk in a very radical way."80
Gons first ~t~tes Aqumas pOSItIOn regarding predicating names of
God, explammg how perfection terms are predicated of God not
met.aphorically but pr~perly or literally. Analogically predicated per-
fectIOn terms are predicated of God primarily and of creatures sec-
ond~rily: Goris states that although Aquinas' theory of analogical
predicatIOn expresses "confidence in the appropriateness and truth-
fulnes~ of human language to talk about God" there is a "negative
stroke' "interwoven with all positive affirmations. "81 Based on th
imperfection .of.human l~nguage about God, Goris distinguishes tw:
aspects. of"thIs ImperfectIOn: (1) imperfection on "the grammatical-
syntactIcal level, and (2) imperfection on "the logical-semantic" level.
The i~perfection in human speech about God resulting from the
grammatIcal structure of human language consists of the fact that
when a~ attribute is predicated of something it does not show that
the subject and the predicate are identical, i.e., are one and the
same thing. For example, when we say 'A is wise' it signifies that
the ~roperty 'wise' inheres in the subject A, or is possessed by A,
but It d~es not mean that the subject and the predicate are identi-
cal. G~ns states that Aquinas considers this deficiency of human lan-
~age ~n expressing d~vine pe.rf~ctions to be due to God's simplicity.
Sm~e m God there IS no dIstmction between his essence and his
;ttnbutes, the statem~nt, "God is wise," though true and proper,
alls .short of expressmg how God is wise. To complement this
de~C1ency one should also say that 'God is wisdom itself.' However,
.~emg an abstract name, 'wisdom' does not signify a subsistent being
~k~ ?od. Thus, the way we signify God is again deficient. Thi~
~ ~Iency re~ulting from the structure of human language applies to
. ~man discourse about God using concrete or abstract nouns
adJectIves, pronouns and tensed verbs. 82 '
Fi 79 Harm J. M. J. Goris, Free Creatures if an Eternal God: Thomas A ui G d'
~~knowl~dge and .Irresistible Will (Leuven: Peeters, [1996?]). q nas on 0 s
Gons, op. Clt., p. 14.
81 Goris, op. cit., p. 15.
82 Goris, op. cit., p. 16.
60 CHAPTER ONE
The second type of imperfection, resulting the mode of signifying
God, is the imperfection at the logical-semantic level. Simply put,
the imperfection results from the difference between the way these
perfections are found in God and the way they are found in crea-
tures. Whereas in creatures these perfections are found in a limited
and accidental manner and are also distinct from each other, they
are found in God to a 'maximum degree.' They are identical to
God's essence, and finally they are identical to each other as well,
e.g., God's wisdom is not something different from God's justice.
Since "the mode of signifying that belongs to perfection-terms fits
and depends on the way in which the signified perfections exist in
creatures,"83 they cannot express the divine perfections. Hence we
cannot predicate perfection terms of God and of creatures in the
same sense (ratio).84
Does this mean (1) that we simply do not know what perfection
terms mean when they are predicated of God? Or (2) that we only
partially know what they could mean when predicated of God? We
cannot take (1) as Goris' position, because Aquinas has clear state-
ments to the effect that we know God, even if this knowledge is
imperfect. If we take (2) to be Goris' position, then we must ask
what this partial knowledge may consist of, and how we can treat
this partial knowledge with regard to other kinds of supposedly com-
prehensive human knowledge.
Goris does not state exactly how this negative aspect of Aquinas'
theory would affect our assessment of Aquinas' statements concern-
ing God. However, his statement of the methodology which he wants
to follow in his work might be taken as the reflection of his con-
clusion regarding the negative aspect of Aquinas' position concern-
ing theological language. He suggests that Aquinas' texts should be
read as theological texts. This means that when reading Aquinas one
should keep in mind that Aquinas is talking about God as related
in the Scriptures-a God who foreknows, predestines, etc. .. , In
accordance with this idea, Goris' goal
Goris, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
83
Goris, op. cit., p. 17. "As a consequence of this, we cannot ~ay that the per-
84
fection-terms when predicated of God have exactly the same ratIO as when they
are predicated of creatures. They are not .said univocally ?f ?ot~ cr~atu,~es and
God, but analogically, leaving the One signified beyond their significatIOn.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 61
is not ~o .talk abo~t the abstract concept itself of e.g. foreknowledge
?r ommSCIence ~s Isolated from talking about God, and then to analyse
It and to show Its conceptual coherence with other concepts like the
ones of im~utability.or c~ntingency. Although conceptual analysis will
play a cr~CIal rol~ III thIS stu~y, we do not aim at constructing a
closed, fimshed lOgIcal structure III which well-defined concepts of fore-
knowledge, immutability, contingency etc. are the building blocks and
their logical relations of implication the cement which links them. We
shall be talking about God who transcends all that is, all that we know,
and all that we say and who, therefore, does not fit into any con-
ceptual framework. 85
Similar to this first strategy of suspending the demands of concep-
tual coherence and logical structure between concepts and theories
. .
Gons mtroduces a second strategy: to avoid defining God's attrib-
'
utes, owing to our lack of knowledge or our incapability of com-
prehending those attributes as they are found in God. 86 His third
methodological guideline is "to take a close look at the language
used for God: we have to start with a logical-semantic (...) and
grammatical-syntactic (...) analysis of statements like 'God foreknew',
'God provides' etc."87 Considering Goris' methodological guidelines
to structure his study as arguments meant to suggest the correct way
of dealing with Aquinas, I would like to make some qualifYing remarks.
Suspending the demands of conceptual coherence and logical struc-
ture between concepts and theories may be granted to religious texts,
as they are not philosophical, or theological, texts. They may not
be e~pected t~ give the reader full-fledged well-constructed philo-
sophIcal theones about how God is. However, when it comes to
philosophical and theological texts produced by a scholar, then stan-
da~d philosophical and theological criteria, such as consistency, impli-
catIon, etc.... can be justifiably expected. Based on the unknowability
of. God, if one does not expect philosophical arguments to meet
phIlosophical expectations, it would hardly be possible to criticize
any theological statement. Since no ordinary man is able to have
85 Goris, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
86 Goris,. op. cit., p. 19. "Stated bluntly, we do not know what God's foreknowl-
~dge, prOVIdence etc. really is. They are divine acts and as such in reality'd _
. h the di"
ucal WIt VIne essence ItSel£ Therefore, in contrast "with common procedure
I en
We .cannot start our reflections by giving a definition of e.g. foreknowledge Fo;
talking about real foreknowledge is talking about God of whom we do not know
what He is or how He is."
87 Goris, op. cit., p. 19.
 CHAPTER ONE
62
the knowledge of God in himself, what philosophers or theologi~ns
discuss is not whether what a proposition that asserts somethmg
about God conveys exactly how God is in himself with respect to
the point in question. To the contrary, what philosoph~rs or the-
ologians discuss is rather concerned with-granted the avaIlable data,
such as natural reason, or a certain religious text-how the concep-
tion of God in this and that way would be philosophically tenable.
The second reason Goris puts forward is acceptable, but mu~t. be
qualified in keeping with Aquinas' ge~eral strategy of not. gIVm~
definitions of 'divine versions' of perfectIOns. To be clear, thIS POSI-
tion does not mean that one may neglect whether one's conception
of a divine perfection like foreknowledge is consiste~t with ~ne's
other convictions about God. When talking about God s perfectIOns,
what a theologian or philosopher seeks after is not to have total
grasp of the perfections as they are found in God, but to ma~e a
reasonable, coherent expression of what one knows of God, or. thm~s
one knows about God. Defining 'divine versions' of perfectIOns IS
one thing; expressing divine perfections in a philos~phically tenable
manner is another. The latter is the very thing that IS expected from
a philosopher or theologian. . ', . whether divine perfections are determinate enough to be assessed
Now let me turn to the third factor shapmg Gons work. It IS
proper and even necessary to take into acc.ount the logical-semantic
and grammatical-syntactic differences reqmred by the man~er p:r-
fections are found in God and in creatures, and the manner m whIch
we talk about these perfections. Without doubt human discourse
about the Creator and about creatures differ, since these two are
not equivalent. However, this does not require that human knowl-
edge and expression of this knowledge be reasonably exclude~ from
philosophical assessment. Worst yet would ~e to grant such l~mu­
nity to theories of some people, l.e., theologians, to the exclUSIOn of
some others, i.e., philosophers. Such a distinction would be totally
arbitrary.
William P. Alston
William P. Alston puts the complaints of philosophers. about Aquinas'
conception of theological language into two categones:
They [theological statements] (1) lack the truth conditions. and (2) ~a~­
not figure in reasoning in the ways. they ar~ supposed to m Thomls~lc,
and other, theology ... If (I) is valid, that IS gomg to play havoc WIth
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 63
any attempt to perform inferences to or from theological statements.
If it is indeterminate just what it takes to make a given (putative) state-
ment true, then what follows from the statement, or what it follows
from, will certainly be indeterminate, because what the statement "says"
is indeterminate. But, of course, (2) can make trouble even if theo-
logical statements are as determinate as you please. For the determi-
nate theological meaning might not be such as to underwrite the
inferences that Aquinas and other theologians purport to perform. ss
These two issues are related to the res signfficata and the modus signfficandi
in Aquinas' theory of theological language, respectively. However,
these complaints regarding Thomas' position on theological language
depend on a particular interpretation of Aquinas' position, namely
that (I) knowledge of perfections as they are found in creatures is
not of much help in knowing the divine perfections, for different
reasons; and (2) the limitation in the grammatical structure of human
language to express the identity of God and his attributes, and the
identity of different attributes with each other, makes theological
statements unsuitable for reasoning; hence they cannot be under-
stood in rational terms. In the following I will examine only the first
problem, which is the major problem with respect to the question
philosophically. As for the second problem, I agree with Alston in
that it does not constitute a serious impediment regarding the definite
meaning of perfections, even though it constantly reminds us of the
imperfection of our thought and expression of God's perfections. 89
Mter stating Alston's presentation of Aquinas' position, I will discuss
whether in Aquinas' theory there is no common meaning in the two
predications of perfections of God and of creation. Then I will eval-
uate, if there is indeed some common element, whether it is a firm
enough ground to supply some truth conditions for theological state-
ments and make them suitable for philosophical assessment.
The question whether there is a similarity between the divine per-
fections and the creaturely ones may be the fundamental question
which determines whether our knowledge of God's perfections is
determinate enough to fit into philosophical discussions. Even though
88 William P. Alston, "Aquinas on Theological Predication: A Look Backward
and a Look Forward," in Reasoned Faith: Essays in Philosophical Theology in Honor if
Norman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca & London: Cornell Universily, 1993),
pp. 167-168.
89 Alston, op. cit., pp. 168-171.
64 CHAPTER ONE
Alston accepts that according to Aquinas 'forms of perfections' are
intrinsic in God and creation,90 he hesitates to see a similarity between
the divine and creaturely perfection properties according to Aquinas.
Alston rejects Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas' theory of analogy
as the analogy of proportionality, an analogy based on the similar-
ity of the relationships of two things to a third thing. For example
take the term 'wise.' 'Wise' is predicated of God and of creation
9l
analogically, because they bear similar relationships to wisdom.
Against this Alston argues that the kind of analogy Aquinas sees
between God and creation is the analogy of attribution and it is not
based on a similarity between God and creation.
We must be careful not to read Thomas on analogy in terms of the
dominant current meaning of the term in which it has to do with
some likeness or similarity between things. Analogically related uses of
terms, or the things to which they are applied in these uses, need not
be markedly similar to each other. Similarity is only one of the rela-
92
tions that can tie together analogically related senses.
For Alston, the fact that Aquinas does not attempt to delimit the
divine version of these perfections indicates that for Aquinas our
knowledge of divine perfections is not sufficiently determinate to use
in philosophical discussions. After stating that Aquinas applies vari-
ous general principles concerning God's perfections, Alston concludes:
"Thus someone who is looking for as full-blooded a conception of
God's knowledge, volition, love, or power as we have of human
knowledge, and so on, will be disappointed with what he gets from
Aquinas."93 Alston gives the example of 'will,' to illustrate what it
could mean to say that 'God wills P.' If we say 'God wills P,' it
means that God "does something of the same sort as what we call
willing by creatures, except that it is in a higher mode." "Understand-
ing the divine sense does not give us as much as we might like to
90Alston, op. cit., pp. 157-158. . .
9\See Alston, op. cit., p. 153; Ralph McInerny, Aqumas and Analogy (Washmgton,
D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), pp. 16-17,22-23. Both authors
notice how Cajetan's interpretation of Aquinas theory of analogy as the analogy of
proportionality misrepresents Aquinas' true .intt;ntion, and makes his theor~ of ana-
logical predication closer to umvocal predIcatIOn. McInerny also emphaSIzes that
Cajetan's interpretation denies Thomas' caution in ST la, 16, 6 saying that the ratio
propria is found in only one of the analogates, which is the reason why two instances
of the predication of a perfection term are analogical, not univocal.
92 Alston, op. cit., p. 152.
93 Alston, op. cit., p. 159.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 65
have by way of a detailed conception of what it is for God to will
that P."94
Referring to ST la. 13, 3, where Aquinas states that perfections
are predicated of God literally, and SeC I, 30, where Aquinas states
that perfections can be affirmed because of their meaning, Alston
claims that 'as far as the res signijieata is concerned, Aquinas gives
the impression that he endorses univocal predication without using
the language of 'univocity-equivocity-analogicality'. '95 Based on this
claim, Alston states that "if the lack of univocity" is attached "only
to the modus signijieandi," then there would not be any "room for ana-
logically related senses."96 Later, Alston considers more passages from
Aquinas, such as, ST la. 13, 2, where Aquinas states that creatures
fail to have the forms of their cause as those forms are in God , and
SeC I, 32, 2 and 3, where Aquinas states that perfection terms are
not predicated of God and of creatures univocally because they do
not share the same form according to the same mode of being. Based
on these passages, Alston concludes that, in Aquinas' position, crea-
turely terms are not fully applicable to God with respect to either
"lexial" or "grammatical" aspects of their meaning. "There can be
no exact reproduction of form just because creatures have in a divided
way what is found in God in an absolutely simple way without any
real distinction among the divine perfections."97 Again, since we can
attribute to God only a more eminent analogue of creaturely per-
fections without satisfactorily knowing what they are,98 according to
Aquinas' position we would not sufficiently know what the divine
perfections are so that we can consider them philosophically.
Not being satisfied with Aquinas' position, Alston offers his own
suggestion, which would make theological statements more determi-
~ate, providing them with truth conditions. He argues that it is pos-
SIble to form concepts that are univocally predicated of God and
creation. In elaborating his position, Alston first examines passages
94 Alston, op. cit., pp. 160-161.
95 Alston, op. cit., p. 164.
9.6 Alston, .op. cit:, p. 165. Although Alston acknowledges that a term cannot have
leXIcal me~mng W1th~)Ut also having a mode of signification, here he takes Aquinas
t? ~e aq~umg for umvocal predication. But Aquinas only says that as far as the res
S7gTlifi.cata. IS concernt;d they are 'predi~ated of God literally not metaphorically. Literal
predicatIOn, accordmg to Aqumas, mcludes not only univocal predication but also
analogical and equivocal predication, and is the opposite of metaphorical p:edication
97 Alston, op. cit., pp. 166-167. .
98 Ibid.
66 CHAPTER ONE
from De veritate Il, 11, ScC 1,32,2 and STla. 13,5, and he con-
cludes that in all these passages Aquinas concludes from, "God and
creature do not share exactly the same forms" that "No terms can
be predicated univocally of God and creatures." The reason why
Aquinas makes this argument, as Alston states, is that for Aquinas
"terms signifY immediately our concepts, and through them the things
of which these are concepts, this claim is based on the assumption
that our concepts reflect precisely the ontological character of their
objects."99 Later, Alston also underscores that the close connection
between concepts and the ontological character of the objects, through
whose knowledge these concepts are formed, may not be in con-
formity with Aquinas' theory of how we come to name God. Since
we first know perfections through creatures and then realize that
these perfections primarily belong to God, if our concepts were closely
tied to their objects, then it would be impossible for us to attribute
these perfections to God, as it would call for separating them from
their creaturely features. 100
Contrary to Alston's reluctance, I think that on Aquinas' part there
is some similarity between the divine and creaturely perfections, no
matter whether we call it analogy of attribution or not. This asser-
tion can be supported by three arguments. First, if there were no
similarity at all between divine and creaturely perfections, then (i)
we would be l~ft only with saying that God is the cause of this or
that perfection, and (ii) we could no longer talk about God and his
perfections. We could not know what they mean. However, Aquinas
rejects that predicating perfections of God simply means that God
is their cause and he talks about divine perfections and their impli-
cations throughout his works. For example, he argues from the fact
that 'God has knowledge' to that 'God has will.' The second argu-
ment is based on the idea that perfection properties are intrinsic to
both God and creation. As Alston himself notices, "1he causaliry here
is if such a sort as to involve transmission if firm (perfection) from cause to
ifftct."lOI Although the mode of their realization in God and crea-
tures is different, they are the same perfections. Leaving aside for
now the discussion concerning the nature of this difference, let me
state my third argument, which is based on Aquinas' contention that
99 Alston, op. cit., pp. 174-175.
100 Alston, op. cit., pp. 177-178.
IO! Alston, op. cit., p. 157.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 67
we predicate perfections of God, these perfections being known
through creatures. Although, according to Aquinas, 'ontologically' or
'causally' these perfections belong to God primarily, 'semantically,'
they are said primarily of creatures. We know these perfections first
in creatures, and then apply them to God, but we acknowledge that
they belong ontologically to God primarily and 'in a higher mode.'
If there were not a similarity between the divine perfections and the
creaturely ones, then we could not attribute them to God except by
blind faith. We would not be able to conceive of even a nominal
similarity between them, because we do not know the divine per-
fections in themselves and we cannot judge exactly how the names
of creaturely perfections are suitable to name God's perfections. Even
though these names are names of perfections, we would not know
if they denote simply creaturely perfections or not. Thus Aquinas'
theory of analogy requires a similarity between the divine and crea-
turely perfections from the start.
Now I would like to turn to the question whether the similarity
between divine perfections and creaturely perfections is firm enough
as to provide us with a determinate conception of divine perfections
so that they are suitable for philosophical discussions, permitting
inferences from and implications of them. The fact that Aquinas
does not attempt to explain what the 'divine versions' of perfections
look like is a direct result of his position on how, or why, divine
perfections are different from creaturely perfections. Whether we
reduce it to simplicity or explicitly refer to other "formal features,"
such as necessity, infinity and eternity, it is the divine mode of being
that prevents human beings from knowing what the 'divine versions'
of perfections are like. Since this kind of knowledge of God is in no
way open to the mind of a philosopher, any attempt from Aquinas'
side would show an inconsistency. However, the fact that he does
not present "full-blooded" conceptions of the divine perfections does
not mean that the divine perfections as we know and talk about
them are indeterminate. It only shows that our knowledge of the
divine perfections is imperfect in the sense that it lacks the full grasp
of God-comprehending God in himself. But from this one cannot
conclude that the knowledge we claim to have of God is or must
be indeterminate in such a way that makes it unsuitable for philo-
sophical assessment.
Alston's claim-based on ST la. 13, 3, where Aquinas states that
perfections are predicated of God literally-that "as far as the res
 68 CHAPTER ONE
significata is concerned, Aquinas gives the impression that he endorses
univocal predication without using the language of 'univocity-equiv-
ocity-analogicality"102 is an important statement that needs to be dis-
cussed. It is true that Thomas uses perfection terms for God and
creation with the same res significata literally. But I would not agree
with Alston that Aquinas is not aware of the implications of his argu-
ment. Aquinas would not accept the position that perfection terms
are predicated of God and creation univocally, even though they,
on Aquinas' understanding, have literal and similar meanings in their
predication of God and of creation such that divine perfections are
as determinate as creaturely perfections are for us. From the way
Alston presents univocity, it follows that univocity is determined only
on the basis of the res significata. Of course one can take such a posi-
tion, but according to Aquinas both the res significata and the modus
significandi are required in determining whether a perfection term is
predicated analogically or univocally.103
From Alston's presentation of Aquinas' position, we receive the
impression that there is an incoherence between Aquinas' statements
in ST la. 13, 3, SCC I, 30, and his statements in ST la. 13, 2, ScC
I, 32, 2 and 3. As Alston presents them, while in the first group of
passages Aquinas seems to be accepting the univocal predication of
perfection terms of God and creatures as far as res significata is con-
cerned (as explained in the previous paragraph), in the second group
of passages Aquinas seems to argue that there can be univocal pred-
ication of terms between God and creation neither with respect to
the modus significandi nor with respect to the res significata.
In order to confirm that there is in fact no discrepancy in what
Aquinas argues in different parts of his work, we need to highlight
Aquinas' conception of analogical predication and its difference from
univocal predication. Aquinas distinguishes between analogical and
univocal predications on the basis of the ratio propria. If the ratio pro-
pria of a term is found in both subjects when a term is predicated
of two different things, then it is a univocal predication. If, however,
the ratio propria is found only in one of the analogates and not all,
then it is a case of analogical predication. 104 As opposed to a uni-
102 Alston, op. cit., p. 164.
103 See Ralph McInerny, Being and Predication (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America, 1986), p. 282.
104 Thomas Aquinas, ST la. 16, 6. See also Ralph McInerny, Being and Predit;ation,
p. 281.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 69
vocally predicated term, which has one and the same meaning (ratio)
t~roughout all its predications, an analogically predicated term has
dIfferent me~nings (ratio) in its different predications, one being the
proper meanmg and others having somehow divergent meanings. 105
BesIdes the concept of a ratio propria Aquinas also introduces the con-
cept of the ratio communis. A ratio communis includes all the different
but related rationes (conceptions or meanings) of the term in its var-
ious predications. Ralph McInerny illustrates this by using Aquinas'
recurre~~ example of health. The ratio propria is found only in one
compOSItIOn of the res significata and the modus significandi. The ratio
propria of health is found only in the 'subject of health.' "'Subject
o~' is a modus .significandi which if joined with the res significata con-
~t~t~tes t~e ratto propria. The other notions are fashioned by con-
JOllllng dIfferent modes to the same res significata. What then would
the ratio communis of the analogous name 'healthy' be? Perhaps some-
thing like: '_ _health'."106 Other modes of signifYing 'health' that
could fill in the blank include 'cause of' and 'sign of'
Now let us examine what it means to predicate perfection terms
of God and creatures analogically, so that we can decide whether
Aquinas' theory of analogy leaves us with indeterminate conceptions
of the divine perfections. Based on the above discussions, if a per-
fection term is analogically predicated of God and of creatures, then
the res significata is common to God and creation. When, for exam-
ple, we say 'Socrates is wise' and 'God is wise,' the term 'wise' in
the two predications is not simply identically written and pronounced
but has a meaning found in both of analogates. Otherwise the two
ins:ances of predication would be equivocal predication, and not ana-
lOgical. However, the ratio propria of the perfection 'wise' is found
only in one of the analogates, i.e., in God but not in Socrates. If
the ratio propria were found in both of the analogates, then the two
predications would be univocal not analogical. The common element
105 Ralph McInerny, Aquinas and Analogy, p. 128.
106 •~:Inerny: op. cit., p. 128. McInerny's explanation is obscure when he says
that It,,, enters mto the other. acco~mts," and ':rt]he ratio propria is 'the subject of
h?alth. !Iowever, the quotatIOn gIVen above m the text is clearer and coherent
WIth Aqumas' theory in that in. all predications what is analogically predicated is
the. res slgnificata, and the res ;Ignificata h~s the mtio propria only in one of the precli-
~atlOns. So the. res slgnificata IS. found WIth ratIO propna only in one of the predica-
hom that combmes the res slgnificata and "one of" modi significandi. See also McInern
Bezng and PredicatIOn, p. 283. y,
70 CHAPTER ONE
in both predications is 'wise.' 'Wise', taken as the res significata, is one
and the same in both of them. However, this same res significata, wise,
does not have the same ratio (conception/meaning) in the two appli-
cations. Following the analysis above regarding the constitution of
the ratio propria, we may infer that 'wise' as the res significata with the
combination of the divine mode of being makes the ratio propria of
the perfection 'wise.' Aquinas' theory that 'perfections primarily belong
to God' confirms this result.
In order to see the extent to which creaturely perfections help us
to understand divine perfections, and to decide whether creaturely
perfections help us to reach a determinate knowledge of the divine
perfections, the relationship between the proper conception (ratio pro-
pria) and improper conceptions (rationes) of perfections must be clearly
identified, as does the conception (ratio) of perfections occurring in
theological statements.
It should be recalled that although perfections with their proper
conception are found only in God, perfections are found in God as
well as in creatures. In this regard, there is an important difference
between Aquinas' favorite example of analogical predication, i.e.,
health, and the analogical predication of perfections between God
and creatures. In the health example 'health' with the ratio propria is
found only in the predication 'x is the subject of health,' and the
form health is intrinsic only to 'the subject of health.' We may pred-
icate 'health' with the ratio propria of a man and of a horse univo-
cally, because the form health is intrinsic to both of them. Thus, in
the health example what causes the analogical predication is the fact
that in the subject of health the form is intrinsic, but in the cause
of health, health is not intrinsic. Thus, the conception of health found
as a form in the subject does not help us much in understanding
the conception of health as an effect in the cause, or vice versa.
However, in the case of analogical predication where God and crea-
tures are two analogates, the cause that makes predications of per-
fection terms analogical is not that the form is found in one and is
not found in the other. Although God is the cause of perfections in
creation, Aquinas denies that when we predicate perfections of God
we simply mean that God is the cause of this or that perfection in
creatures. God also has perfections. I want to emphasize that per-
fections are found in both God and creation, as opposed to the
health case where the form of health is found only in the subject of
health.
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 71
In theological statements, perfections are predicated of God with
their improper conception (ratio), not with their proper conception
(ratio propria) as they are found in God. Let us remember that we
first know perfections as they are found in creatures. Then, we name
God with the perfection terms the ratio of which is not the ratio
propria, because perfections are found with the ratio propria only in
God. Since we do not know God directly, we cannot know and thus
name God with the perfections according to the ratio propria. Since
we predicate perfections of God, as Aquinas does in practice-such
perfections being known with divergent or improper conception-it
must be granted that the conception of perfections as found in crea-
tures is applied to God in theological statements. Otherwise, we could
not predicate perfection terms of God, since such terms are based
on creaturely perfections. In fact, this is what analogical predication
is all about: perfection terms with their improper conceptions are
predicated of God, but not based on proper conceptions of divine
perfections.
Theological statements must have the same truth conditions and
philosophical value as other philosophical statements, because the
conception of perfection terms we predicate of God is the same as
when we predicate them of creatures. Aquinas' conception of divine
simplicity, as we have seen, is the major reason why Alston objects
to this claim. Since perfections are found in God in accordance with
divine simplicity, being identical to the divine essence and to each
other, perfection terms as known through creatures would not be
applicable to God. Can it really be the case that divine simplicity
makes predication of perfections of God indeterminate and thus ill-
suited to philosophical assessment? How does the fact that perfec-
tion properties are found in God in a simple, undivided, manner
affect our predication of perfections terms of God, and how does it
affect the philosophical value of theological statements? In other
words, what does divine simplicity impose on us when we predicate
perfections of God? Answering this question will establish the extent
of conformity and difference between the proper and improper con-
ceptions of perfections when they are analogically predicated of God
and creatures. The question needs to be divided into two parts. (1)
Does considering perfections in the light of divine simplicity add
something positive to the account of the divine perfection? If it adds
something positive, then would this new ratio of the res significata turn
out to be indeterminate? (2) Does considering perfections in the light
72 CHAPTER ONE
of divine simplicity subtract anything from the creaturely account of
the res significata, or does it limit or specify the extent to which the
rationes of the res significata are applicable to God? If it subtracts or
limits the extent to which the rationes of the res significata are true of
God , then does this make the new accounts of the res signigicata inde-
terminate, and thus not suitable for philosophical discussion?
For Aquinas, divine simplicity does not add anything positive to
the meanings or rationes of the perfections as far as human knowl-
edge of and discourse about God are concerned. Accordingly, Aquinas
does not give any positive explanation of what the rationes of the
divine perfections would be. Alston also attests this, even though he
seems somehow surprised. If taking divine simplicity into account in
determining the rationes of the divine perfections can yield some fur-
ther positive knowledge, then it must be possible for us humans to
be able to know what is simple. This is an attainment, according to
Aquinas, of which human minds are not normally capable. Since
taking divine simplicity into consideration does not add something
positive to our knowledge of the divine perfections, we do not have
new rationes, with increased positive information of the divine per-
fections. We do not have new rationes of perfections that would be
indeterminate, and hence ill-suited to philosophical considerations.
My answer to the second question is positive, and not at all a
controversial answer. Taking divine simplicity into account limits and
modifies the extent to which the rationes of perfection terms are
applied to God. In this sense divine simplicity subtracts some ele-
ments that constitute the rationes of the perfections that are first known
through creation. This is the case as far as our knowledge of God
is concerned, not as far as God in himself is concerned. However,
subtraction may not be a good term to express the manner in which
divine simplicity affects the conception of perfections as predicated
of God. For example, unlike human knowledge, God's knowledge is
not subject to change. While 'being subject to change' is subtracted
from the conception of God's knowledge 'being not subject to change'
is added. Hence instead of 'subtraction,' 'modification' seems to be
a more suitable term to express the effect of divine simplicity.
Consequently, since divine simplicity modifies the conception of the
perfections, one should discuss whether this modification would make
the divine perfections indeterminate.
I do not think that the modification of the conception of the divine
perfections makes the divine perfections less determinate or deprives
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 73
theological statements of the truth conditions that they otherwise
would have. This modification only removes what the divergent
rationes of perfection terms imply when they are predicated of God.
For example, it removes the changeability, temporality and finitude.
One could argue that the void after removal of the creaturely fea-
tures is filled with new features, such as immutability, eternity and
fullness. However, this does not make the conceptions of divine per-
fections indeterminate, because these new features are either of the
same kind as those that are removed-hence they have similar truth
conditions-or they do not add something positive the truth condi-
tions of which we do not know.
From the discussion above, it follows that the simplicity of God
does not make divine perfections indeterminate or less determinate
than creaturely perfections. Rather it provides guidelines to distin-
guish the predication of perfection terms of God and of creatures.
There seems to be an unfulfilled expectation driving the arguments
for indeterminacy of our knowledge of the divine perfections, This
unfulfilled expectation is that Aquinas does not give a positive account
of ratio propria of the divine perfections as they are different from
creaturely perfections, but simply qualifies them as 'in a higher mode,'
or 'eminently.' As I tried to show above, this attitude of Aquinas is
in total conformity with his teaching that we do not know what God
is in himself. Otherwise he would have made the mistake of assum-
ing a privilege for himself of knowing what he deems to be unknow-
able for ordinary human minds.
Both groups of scholars, i.e., scholars who view the negative ele-
ment in St. Thomas' theology with favor and those who assume a
more critical position towards it, mistake Aquinas' silence about the
ratio propria of the divine perfections to mean that since divine sim-
plicity does not provide us with a determinate knowledge of what
the ratio propria of the divine perfections is, our knowledge of the
divine perfections, hence our expression of this knowledge is inde-
terminate and hence ill-suited for philosophical examination. However,
it is spurious to conclude from 'divine simplicity does not teach us
the ratio propria of the divine perfections' that 'if we do not know the
ratio propria of the divine perfections, then theological statements fea-
turing these perfections are indeterminate and elusive of philosophical
assessment.' Based on the different modes of being, divine simplic-
ity simply limits human knowledge of divine perfections by indicat-
ing to us where the conception of the res significata is not applicable
74 CHAPTER ONE
to God any more. Consequently, it provides us with a general frame-
work to observe the difference between the creaturely perfections
and the divine perfections. Let me emphasize that divine simplicity
limits our knowledge of the perfections of God but does not make
our knowledge indeterminate. Limited human knowledge concern-
ing divine perfections may be expressed with as much philosophical
rigor as human knowledge concerning creaturely perfections. The
philosophical rigor of theological statements, as well as its confor-
mity to religious teachings, is insured by observation of the require-
ments of divine simplicity.
Contrary to negative and indeterminate interpretations of Aquinas'
position on theological language, Aquinas in fact attempts to pro-
vide a firm basis for theological language so that it may be of philo-
sophical value while doing justice to God's transcendence. Aquinas
wants two things to be granted in our speech about God: (1) A dis-
tinction between the two kinds of terms with respect to predication
of God and creatures. The first category concerns the terms denot-
ing perfections that cannot be separated from the mode of existence
of the creatures in which they are found. The second category includes
terms denoting perfections that are independent of or separable from
the mode of their existence. (2) Since what we know primarily are
creatures, those terms that signify properties that cannot be separate
from their creaturely mode of existence can be predicated of God
only metaphorically. Terms that signify perfections that are inde-
pendent of or separable from their mode of existence can be said
of God and creatures literally, i.e., their meaning is common to all
modes of being in which they are to some extent realized. Thus,
they are predicated of God and creatures not univocally but ana-
logically. They are predicated of God and creatures, because their
ratio is common to God and creatures, even though their ratio does
not fully express God and is not identical to the ratio of perfections
as they are found in God. Since semantically we know and express
perfections in the creaturely mode, when we predicate them of crea-
tures we do not need to do anything extra. But since they are found
in God other than the way they are found in creation, when we
predicate them of God we must keep in mind that they are not lim-
ited, and are distinct neither from each other nor from God's essence.
The difference between the divine mode of being and the crea-
turely one must guide us so that we do not draw the same impli-
cations we draw from the creaturely mode of existence. We cannot
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 75
say, for example, 'God will know this and that tomorrow,' or 'God
forgot this and that,' because these implications do not apply to
divine knowledge. But the fact that we cannot draw the same impli-
cations from God's perfections and from creaturely perfections does
not mean that the res significata does not have a common meaning
that is true for God and creation. Based on the fact that we can
only predicate perfections known through creatures, one cannot argue
from that 'we cannot grasp the whole picture,' to 'we cannot or
should not expect from our knowledge of God, attained through cre-
ation, to meet philosophical expectations.' One can and should think
critically about any claim of knowledge about God attained through
creation in order to get a better 'human' understanding of God, not
in order to comprehend God's essence. In our discussions of God's
perfections what we discuss is not the perfections as they are found
in God, as infinite, ultimate and unknowable, but our understand-
ing of God as revealed through creation and modified through the
divine simplicity, immutability etc.
Contrary to Pieper's thesis, I argued that Aquinas' reminders of
the unknowability of God indicate that our knowledge is limited, not
that we do not know God at all or our knowledge of God is not
reliable. I tried to show that Goris' strategy to study Aquinas' phi-
losophy, taken as philosophical arguments, exaggerates Aquinas'
emphasis on the unknowability of God. I postponed discussing Goris'
argument for not assessing Aquinas' teaching on purely philosophi-
cal grounds on the basis of Aquinas' theory of analogy to my dis-
cussions of Alston's arguments. I have discussed Alston's position
defending that Aquinas' theory of analogy makes the divine perfec-
tions indeterminate, thus not suitable for philosophical discussion.
Against Alston's position, I tried to show that although Aquinas' the-
ory of analogy does not help us to know the 'divine versions of per-
fections,' predication of perfections of God is as determinate as
predication of creaturely perfections of creatures. Therefore, theo-
logical statements fit into philosophical assessment as much as other
philosophical statements.
Conclusion if Chapter One
Regarding our knowledge and discourse about God, there are points
on which Avicenna and Aquinas agree. They agree that (1) we do
76 CHAPTER ONE
not know God in himself, (2) we know God through creation, and
(3) we do not predicate perfections of God and of creatures either
univocally or equivocally. There is a similarity between Avicenna's
concept of tashk'ik and Thomas Aquinas' concept of analogical pred-
ication. Avicenna's use of the term 'tashk'ik' -expressing predication
of perfections of God and of creatures-conforms to Aquinas' use
of analogy, in the sense that it excludes univocal predication and
acknowledges an order between God and creatures with regard to
having perfections, God being the source of perfections of creatures.
In other respects, Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions regarding the-
ological language diverge from each other. This divergence is the
fact that Avicenna's theory of predication by tashk'ik is not a well-
defined explanation of theological language and does not play a cen-
tral role in Avicenna's conception of theological language, whereas
Aquinas' conception of analogy plays a central role providing clear
guidelines regarding how to talk about God. From the ambiguity
and scarceness of his discussion of this topic, one can conclude that
Avicenna does not seem to intend to develop a theory of theologi-
cal language, but simply wants to state that properties are not said
of God and of creatures in the same sense.
This ambiguity may be discerned in his going back and forth
between arguing that God's attributes are either negations or rela-
tions and affirming that God has all perfections. He tends to reduce
the positive properties to relations, even though his position in the
Metaplrysies of The Healing and other works may show some varia-
tions. Although he does not want to say that God is devoid of per-
fections, he underlines the relational character of divine attributes as
we know them. Out of caution, he wavers between affirming them
and reducing them to mere relations. This is why some authors
argued that for Avicenna God does not have properties.
Even though Avicenna argues, in many places but not all, that
the positive attributes of God should be reduced to relations, and
that they should not be taken as showing something of what God
is, in practice this cannot be the case, because such a position would
suffer from the fallacy of equivocation. We may think that Avicenna
was fully aware that the perfections attributed to God do not show
anything more than that God is the source of those creaturely per-
fections. If we follow this line, then Avicenna's position regarding
God and his attributes would amount to the fallacy of equivocation
and would be meaningless. Such an interpretation does not seem to
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASSESSMENT 77
explain Avicenna's theological discussions, since Avicenna only held
that one cannot predicate perfections of God and creatures univo-
eally. However, he was not able to provide a theory to explain how
they are predicated of God and creatures. His conception of tashk'ik
serves only to indicate that they are not predicated univoeally but not
how they are predicated. As will be explored in chapter 2, he modifies
perfection properties in the light of the divine formal features so that
they are predicated of God.
Unlike Avicenna, Aquinas argues that the perfections that are
affirmed of God show what God is, but are found in God super-
eminently. In SeC, he argues that their mode of supereminence
amounts to either a negation or a relation, which seems like a posi-
tion closer to that of Avicenna. However, Aquinas takes a bolder
position in his ST and De potentia, which are written later than SeC.
There Aquinas seems to emphasize that perfections are found in
God and creatures, and they cannot be reduced to relations. Conse-
quently one can argue, at least, that Aquinas has a more strongly-
held position in affirming that God has perfection properties.
Aquinas' distinction between res signifieata and modus signifieandi of
perfection terms plays a crucial role in his taking the discussion up
a step further than his predecessors with regard to the predication
of the divine perfections. Avicenna did not argue that God is devoid
of perfections, but the fact that we know these perfections in crea-
tures made him hesitate between affirming on the one hand that
these perfections are also found in God and reducing them to rela-
tions on the other. This is because the perfections as they are found
in creatures cannot be attributed to God, who is the simple, eter-
nal, immutable being. Since he did not want to deny these perfec-
tions to God-as he conceived God to be the source of all being
and perfection, just as Aquinas did-Avicenna tended to interpret
the perfections as relations, i.e., the perfection terms predicated of
God in relation to creation. However, Aquinas' clarification that the
way we express these perfections are creaturely, and 'it is not and
cannot be divine' made it easy for him to argue that these perfections
primarily belong to God. This impacts how they handle the rela-
tionship between God and creatures. For example, even though both
argue that God is simple, Avicenna argues that because of his sim-
plicity God creates only one simple intellect immediately. For Aquinas,
it is quite the contrary. Hence, it is an important achievement of
Aquinas that he was careful about the limits of human knowledge
78 CHAPTER ONE
and its conformity to reality. That is, he considered how limited
human knowledge is applicable to conceiving the divine reality and
expressing it. Likewise, his position allowed him to not expect that
human knowledge must conform to the divine reality in order to
talk about God with the claim of knowledge. Nevertheless even after
arguing for analogical predication, Aquinas prefers the negative way
and this shows that his affiliation with Pseudo-Dionysius continued.
Both Avicenna's and Aquinas' theological statements are well-suit-
able for philosophical assessment, although they argue that God is
ultimately unknowable. Furthermore the fact that Aquinas is a theo-
logian does not justify that his theological views be exempt from
philosophical examination. If at all, such an exemption would go to
Avicenna, because although Avicenna affirms that properties are
predicated of God and of creatures according to tashkik, he does not
have a full-fledged theory regarding theological language. Aquinas,
however, does have a well-articulated theory of theological language,
indicating not only that properties are predicated of God and of
creatures non-univocally, but also including the rules determining
how and to what extent perfections of two analogates conform. Since
both assume God's unknowability and since Aquinas has well-artic-
ulated position regarding theological language and the value of pred-
icating properties of God, whatever is applicable to Avicenna's
theological ideas is also applicable to those of Aquinas. That is, if
Avicenna's theories can rightfully be subject to philosophical assess-
ment and are philosophically valuable, then Aquinas' theories, in this
regard, are also suitable-even more eligible-to philosophical assess-
ment. I do not see any reason to exempt Avicenna's and Aquinas'
positions from being subject to philosophical assessment.
CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND
THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE
Attempting to state Avicenna's and Thomas Aquinas' conception of
God, I will discuss their conception of divine formal features and
divine knowledge. Accordingly, this chapter comprises three sections,
two of them are devoted to discussion of Avicenna's and Aquinas'
positions concerning divine formal features and knowledge, and one
section devoted to the way divine formal features modify their posi-
tions regarding theological language.
I include a discussion of divine knowledge in this chapter because
divine knowledge is closely connected to the discussions of the nature
of the creative action as well as the beginning of the universe. Since
the divine will as the cause of the universe will be discussed in chap-
ter 3, I will not discuss it here, even though it is in a sense on the
same level with the divine knowledge of the universe.
A discussion of Avicenna's and Aquinas' conceptions of God's sim-
plicity, immutability, eternality and necessity, i.e., divine formal fea-
tures, seems crucial not only for issues related to theological language
but also for issues related to creation. A statement of their concep-
tion of divine formal features is important for a better understand-
ing of Avicenna's and Aquinas' conception of theological language,
because their conceptions of divine formal features modify the way
they talk about God.
Discussion of divine formal features will also help us better under-
stand their arguments regarding the nature of the divine creative
action and the beginning of the universe. At first glance, for some-
one who argues for the sempiternity of the world, i.e., that the uni-
verse has always existed, those who defend the temporal beginning
of the universe should hold that God is not simple, that he is change-
able, and that his knowledge is changeable. One might expect, at
least, that Avicenna and Aquinas conceive of God's formal or non-
formal attributes differently, if their position on the question of the
beginning of the universe is consistent with their conceptions of God.
That is, since Avicenna defends the position that the universe has
80 CHAPTER '!WO
always existed, and Aquinas argues that the arguments for the sem-
piternity of the universe do not yield necessary conclusions, then
either each of them conceives of God in a different manner from
the other-so that their conception of God is consistent with their
respective positions concerning the beginning of the universe-or
they have similar conceptions of God, and regarding the beginning
of the universe one of them takes a position that is more coherent.
The distinction between formal and non-formal divine properties
is based on whether a property says something of what God is, or
of how God is. David B. Burrell calls 'formal features' the proper-
ties that modify the mode in which God has the perfection proper-
ties he has. While non-formal properties tell something about what
their subject is, formal properties do not directly tell us what their
subject is. For example, simplicity, as a formal property, does not
tell us about the subject that has this formal feature the way a perfec-
tion property, such as will, does. Formal features concern the onto-
logical constitution, or the mode of existence, of the subject. Burrell
states " 'Formal properties' are not so much said of a subject, as
they are reflected in a subject's very mode of existing, and govern
the way anything might be said of that subject."l Besides simplicity,
limitlessness, unchangeableness, necessity, unity and eternity are
included among the formal features. As opposed to perfection-terms,
like good and wise, formal features are treated as negations by
Aquinas and Avicenna. 2
Avicenna and Aquinas agree that (1) God is simple, (2) God is
necessary and immutable, (3) God is eternal, and (4) God has knowl-
edge of himself and creation. Simplicity seems to imply self-neces-
sity, immutability and eternity. That is, if you take one in, then you
must take in the others, too. As for (1), God does not have a quid-
dity in addition to his being; God is an intellect, or intelligent being;
the perfections that God has are identical to God's essence. Regarding
(2), Avicenna emphasizes the necessity of God, while Aquinas empha-
sizes the immutability of God. However, the ontological aspect of
Avicenna's conception of necessity collapses to immutability. Thus,
both argue that God is altogether immutable. Regarding (3), although
1 David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Slnii, Maimonides, Aquinas (Notre
Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame, 1986), p. 47.
2 For Burrell's discussion of divine formal features, see ibid., pp. 46-50.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 81
Avicenna does not have discussions devoted to it, both seem to have
a similar conception of the eternity of God. That is, God has being
in and of himself, God has all his being at once, and is not in need
of further perfection. Regarding (4), God's knowledge of other things,
both argue that God has one knowledge, God knows primarily him-
self, and God's self-knowledge is inclusive of his knowledge of other
things. His knowledge of other things is in accordance with his being,
which is simple, immutable, intellectual and eternal.
However, Avicenna and Aquinas have dramatically different posi-
tions with regard to taking divine formal features into account with
respect to theological language. Whereas Avicenna tries to modify
the application of perfection properties to God in the light of the
divine formal features, Aquinas does not concern himself with it,
because he acknowledges that we do not need to and we cannot
speak about God as he is in himself. That is, while Aquinas is con-
tent with simply removing the creaturely implications of perfections
in predicating them of God, Avicenna wants additionally to modify
them in accordance with the divine formal features. While Avicenna
adopts what I call a reductive strategy, Aquinas follows what I call
an appreciative strategy traceable to his well thought-out theory of
analogical predication. His ease in talking about God makes Aquinas
more comfortable when explaining God's knowledge of creatures,
God's being a voluntary agent, etc.
Avicenna's Conception if Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge
God Is Simple
God's simplicity is arguably the most troublesome attribute for
Avicenna. 3 Avicenna's first step in arguing for God's simplicity is to
deny that God has a quiddity other than being. He argues that there
3 One may want to append to the discussions regarding God's simplicity the dis-
cussions regarding God's unity. Regarding God's unity, Avicenna and Aquinas may
have different positions. Whereas for Avicenna God's unity means God's unique-
ness, Aquinas argues not only for God's unity but also for a Trinity of Persons in
God. Robert Burns rightly relates Aquinas' conception of the divine simplicity to
his rejection of a Trinitarian natural theology. Aquinas maintains that "it is impos-
sible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason' since 'we can
know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction
 82 CHAPTER TWO
is no composItIOn of existence and quiddity in God. 4 However,
whether he absolutely denies that God has a quiddity at all, or he
argues that God's quiddity is identical to his being is unclear. 5 Since
for Avicenna God is 'necessary of being' (wiijib al-wu:iud), he tries to
show that 'necessity of being' (wu:iub al-wu:fud) cannot be a quiddity
for God such that it is distinct from God's being. If 'necessity of
being' were taken as a quiddity, then the 'necessary being' would
not have existence, since quiddities do not, in themselves, have exis-
tence. But the necessary being is supposed to be existent and be the
origin of the existence of other things. 6 If the necessary being had
an existence different from its quiddity, i.e., 'necessity of being,' and
of the persons'" (ST, la. 32.1). See Robert Burns, "The Divine Simplicity in St
Thomas," Religious Studies 25 (1989), pp. 271-293, p. 271. Hence Aquinas' discus-
sion of the creation insofar as it is within the limits of natural reason pertains only
to God as one. His position regarding the Trinity does not affect his discussions
concerning his arguments on creation, as, for example, simplicity affects them. This
is because whether the universe has temporal beginning or not is affirmed or denied
of one God as a simple being inasmuch as God is known through natural reason.
Hence, I will not enter into their conception of God's unity. For Avicenna's dis-
cussion that God must be one, unique, without a similar, an associate, or an oppo-
site, see Metaphysics VIII. 5, pp. 349-351.
4 I want to use the term quiddity instead of 'essence' to denote 'that which is'
(miihiyya). The main reason for this choice is that the Arabic term 'dhiif is usually
translated as essence. Whereas 'dhiit' denotes an individual being and includes a ref-
erence to its existence, 'miihiyya' is indifferent to existence and applicable to many
individual members. This is why 'the dhiit of x' can be rendered as 'being of x' as
well as 'the essence of x,' singled out as an object of thought.
5 Avicenna, Metaphysics VllI.4, p. 344.10 "The first does not have a quidditiy
(miihiyya) other than being (inniyya). You know the meaning of quiddity (miihiyya),
and how it differs (tufiiriq) from inniyya (being) in [respects] that it differs, from the
beginning of our explanation. Now we say: It is not appropriate for the necessary
being to have a quiddity (miihiyya), which must have (yalzamuhii) the necessity of
being. Quite contrary, we say at the outset: [to be] necessary of being (wiijib al-
wujild) can be thought of as (yu'qal) to be identical to the necessary being (wiijib
al-wujild), just as the [number] one can be thought of to be identical to one [thing)."
In this paragraph Avicenna makes 'necessity of being' similar to 'one.' Just as 'being
one' is not the quiddity of anything, being a 'necessary being' is not the quiddity
of God. Hence God is 'necessary being' but does not have a quiddity. For discus-
sions of whether for Avicenna God has a quiddity, see Albert Judy, "Avicenna's
Metaphysics in the Summa contra gentiles," Angelicum 52 (1975), pp. 340-384, 541-586;
53 (1976), pp. 184-226; Edward Michael Macierowski, the 7homistic Critique if
Avicennian Emanationism from the Viewpoint if the Divine Simplicity with Special Riference to
the Summa Contra Gentiles (University of Toronto, 1979, Ph. D. dissertation). In ST
la. 11, 1, ad 1, Aquinas argues that for Avicenna 'one' adds something to 'being.'
I do not know where exactly Aquinas' reference goes, but in the paragraph that is
translated above, Avicenna assumes that 'one' does not add anything to 'being.'
6 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 345.6-11.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 83
if 'the necessary being' were the necessarily existing being because
of this quiddity, then 'the in and of itself necessary being' would be
necessary by something else, i.e., by its quiddity. This contradicts
the conception of a necessary being. 7 Hence the necessary being does
not have a quiddity which is additional to its being.
For Avicenna, God cannot have a quiddity because self-necessity
and having a quiddity cannot go together. Being in a general sense,
which is applied to everything that exists, can be an effect, i.e., some
beings are caused. But the being that is in and of itself necessary
cannot be something caused. Otherwise this being would not be nec-
essary in and of itself Since, there cannot be a quiddity due to
which the necessary being exists,S the necessary being does not have
a quiddity.
That God does not have a quiddity extraneous to his being paves
the way to the conception of God as pure being. At the end of his
discussion of whether God has a quiddity other than his being,
Avicenna concludes, "there is no quiddity belonging to the neces-
sary being other than that he is necessary of being. And this is being
(al-inniyya)."9 Avicenna confirms that necessity of being is not some-
thing other than being (al-inniyya), and his confirmation should be
taken into account. First, he states that the necessity of being is not
a quiddity of the necessary being and then he explains the expres-
sion 'the necessary being,' saying that 'this is being.' One may want
to see a difference between the implication of the terms 'necessary
being' and simply 'being,' such that necessary being has something
additional to being. But here Avicenna clearly indicates that neces-
sity of being is not something additional to being, since for him, as
a general rule, actual existence is identical to being a necessary
being. 10
7 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 345.12-16.
8 Ibid., p. 346.5-8.
9 Ibid., p. 346.11-12. Avicenna reserves the term 'inniyya' for God's being which
is identical to his miihiyya. But it is not like the miihiyya in the sense that miihiyya is
applied to other things. Inniyya is used in the sense of existence, reality, that-ness.
For a discussion of the meaning and the origin of the term 'inniyya,' see Richard
Frank, "The Origin of the Arabic Philosophical Term inniyya," Cahiers de Byrsa (Paris:
1956), pp. 181-201.
IQ One may want to distinguish between 'being' and 'being a necessary being,'
and argue that necessity may be considered as a quiddity for God as distinct from
his being. But one needs to keep in mind that for Avicenna actual existence is iden-
tical to being 'necessary.' In other words, whatever exists is necessary, whatever is
84 CHAPTER TWO
After arguing that the necessary being is not composed of 'being'
and a quiddity that is distinct from his being, Avicenna maintains
that God is pure being, 'is an immaterial (mujarratd) being with the
condition that non-existence and distinguishing rmarks (aw~iif) are
negated of him.' By this, Avicenna does not wa.nt to make God
devoid of divine perfections, but he wants to distinguish God (l)
from limited beings, and (2) from the being comrrlOn to and predi-
cated of all existent things, ens commune. II To illustrate the idea that
God is not one of those limited beings, let's consid!er human beings.
In a man, there is being, and in addition to it the:re is the quiddity
of humanity. Consequendy, a human being is a limited being, since
it is being 'with the condition of affirmation ('[jabl ) of humanity of
this being.' To illustrate the second, Avicenna uses the example of
universals. He contrasts this 'immaterial being' to uniiversals. Universals
are predicated of many things with some additi(on. In this sense
'being,' as a common ground of all things which is predicated of
them all, is 'being without the condition of affirrmation of proper-
ties' but not 'with the condition of negation.' Hence 'being with the
condition of negation of non-existence and properties,' denotes and
belongs to God in contrast to (1) 'being with the condition of
not necessary does not exist. For such a distinction concerning Avicenna's concep-
tion of God as necessary being, see Edward Michael Macierowski, The Thomistic
Critique of Avicennian Emanationism fiom the Viewpoint of the Divine, Simpliciry with Special
Riference to the Summa Contra Gentiles, pp. 92-118. Macierowskii compares Avicenna
conception of God to that of Aquinas. He argues that where;as for Avicenna nec-
essary existence is more fundamental in conceiving God, for Aquinas it is simply
'being' without qualification. However, Macierowski misses Awicenna's point, since
Avicenna makes painstaking efforts to argue that God does mot have a quiddity,
and necessity of being cannot be God's quiddity after the mlanner of quiddity in
other things. Indeed for Avicenna, God is not the only necessary being, but every
existent thing is a necessary being. The only difference ben.ween God and other
things with regard to necessity is that whereas God is self-necessary-which amounts
to uncaused necessity-other things are necessary on account olf something else. For
Avicenna's additional arguments, see Metaphysics VIIl.4, p. 346.13 - p. 347.2.
Avicenna argues that if the necessary being had a quiddity and existed by that
quiddity, then that quiddity would have being before being; lbut this is not possi-
ble. Being then would be in need of a quiddity in its own being, which is contra-
dictory. In Book VIII, p. 346.8-12, he argues that the necressary being may be
indicated (mushiirun ilayhi) by the intellect. If he had a quidditty, then this quiddity
would be something different from the thing that is indicated b~ the intellect. Hence
this quiddity would be the quiddity of something else. The laLst argument assumes
that the species of immaterial things are confined to one m,ember, and that the
self-necessary being is not caused.
11 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 347.9-16. Aquinas exprresses the same con-
tention quite clearly in the ST la. 3, 4, obj. I & ad I.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 85
affirmation,' as well as (2) 'being without the condition of affirmation'
of properties.
As a corollary to God's being simple or without composition, but
pure being, God does not have a genus, or a differentia. Avicenna
argues from that God does not have a quiddity to that God does
not have a genus. For him, whatever does not have a quiddity also
does not have a genus. Genus, he argues, is in a sense a part of
things that have it. But since God does not have composition, God
does not have a genus. 12 If God were to have a quiddity, it would
either be 'the necessity of being,' or a 'constituent of the necessary
being.' However, in both cases the necessary being would be sub-
sisting by something 'not necessary of being.' This, for Avicenna, is
a contradiction. 13
The same reasoning, i.e., the necessary being cannot be subsis-
tent by something else, is repeated to show that God does not have
a differentia. Being without a quiddity, a genus and a differentia,
Avicenna concludes that God does not have a definition, nor can
there be a demonstrative proof for God. God's action also cannot
be assigned a reason (limmiyya).14
Accordingly Avicenna asserts that God is not matter and is devoid
of the attachments (lawii~iq) of matter. 15 He usually uses this formula
in order to support other philosophical arguments. 16 God is separate
from matter and he does not have a material cause, since (1) mate-
rial things are possible of existence, (2) matter itself is something
potential and (3) does not exist without a form, i.e., only as a com-
posite. To the contrary God is (la) the necessary being, (2a) pure
act, and (3a) devoid of any composition whatsoever. 17
12 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIlI.4, p. 347.17-19.
13 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIlI.4, p. 348.1-4.
14 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 348.5-6. Cf. Aquinas, ST la. 3, 5. Avicenna's
argument from the fact that God is simple to the fact that God does not have a
genus is circular. But the point seems to be not to establish that God does not
have a genus, or differentia-and as a result, a definition-on 'independent' grounds
but to explain the implications of God's being simple.
15 See, e.g., Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.5 p. 354.6-8; VIII.6 pp. 356-358; God is
intellect because he is free from matter.
16 Avicenna's explanation of what God's being an intellection, intelligent and
intelligible (knowing, knower, and known) means is a good example. Avicenna states
that God's being an intellection, intelligent and intelligible simply means "that from
this immaterial being (mujarrad) the allowability (jawiiz) of mixing with matter and
its attachments ('alii'iq) is negated, and this being is taken with a consideration of
a certain relation." See, e.g., Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 368.1-2.
17 Avicenna, Risiila 'Arshryya, p. 5.15-19.
 86 CHAPTER 1WO
God Is Necessary and Immutable
Whereas Avicenna argues for God's self-necessity and does not offer
a detailed discussion of God's immutability, Aquinas does not empha-
size God's necessity as much as Avicenna does, but he discusses
God's immutability in detail. However, I am going to highlight the
similarity of functions related to their points of emphasis, rather than
directly compare their conceptions of the necessity or immutability
of God. That is, I am going to argue that the necessity of God in
Avicenna's thinking has a similar function to the immutability of God
in Aquinas' thought. I will take Aquinas' conception as the basis and
argue that Avicenna's theories conform to Aquinas' expectations.
Avicenna's conception of divine necessity functions in a manner
similar to Aquinas' conception of divine immutability in setting God
apart from creation. For Avicenna, God is the necessary being, the
only self-necessary being. Avicenna's conception of God's necessity
may be reduced to God's self-subsisting existence and immutability
in Aquinas' approach. That for Avicenna God's immutability follows
from God's necessity-even his conception of God as necessary being
equals Aquinas' conception of God as immutable 18-can be shown
through an analysis of his frequent references to God as 'necessary
in all respects.' For Avicenna God's being necessary in all respects
means that God is fully in act and is free from potency. Similarly,
for Aquinas, God's immutability amounts to God's freedom from
potency. All other things are in some sense potential and liable to
change, but God changes not in any respect whatsoever. Hence,
God's being necessary in all respects in Avicenna's conception of
God has the same function as God's immutability in Aquinas' system.
To appreciate the full-force of Avicenna's conception of necessity
requires a precise statement of Avicenna's conception of necessity.
However, since by doing this I intend to introduce his conception
of divine necessity, my discussion of necessity is limited to the modal-
ity of being and I will not enter into discussion of the modality of
propositions.1 9 First, I will introduce Avicenna's conception of neces-
18 The Aristotelian background of Avicenna's conception of necessity also sup-
ports such an argument. For Aristode's idea of necessity, see, Richard Sorabji,
Necessiry, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory. (London: D~c.kworth, 1980).
19 For Avicenna's position concerning the modahty of proposItIOns see Alien
Back's "Avicenna's Conception of Modalities," Vivarium 30/2 (1992), pp. 217-255;
Gerard Verbeke, 'La dialectique du possible et du necessaire', in Avicenna Latinus,
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 87
sity in general terms, and then state his conception of God's neces-
sity, which distinguishes God from everything else.
Necessity for Avicenna is one of the primary concepts that are
conceived before everything else. At the beginning of the MetapkJsics,
Avicenna talks about the primary concepts. These primary concepts
cannot be defined in the strict sense, since they cannot be subsumed
under anything more known. Avicenna's examples of these primary
concepts are 'existent' (mal£!iud), 'thing' (shql) , 'necessary' (rjarufi and
wiijib), possible (mumkin) and impossible (musta~Zl).20 He considers strict
definitions of these terms, which can be traced back to Aristotle,21
to fall into a vicious circle. 22 Although these concepts are inscribed
in the mind a priori, and the conception (t~awwur) of every thing
rests on their being conceived before all else, if one wants to indi-
cate (yadull) what they are, this will not be a definition of some-
thing unknown, but rather a waking call (ikhtiir) for or directing the
attention (tanblh) of the mind by means of a name, or a sign (Caliima).
Although they are conceived before everything else, still one may
need his attention to be directed to them. However, the name or
the sign-which serves to direct one's attention to them, for some
reason or condition-may clarity and be helpful in grasping them,
even though they are more obscure in the mind than the primary
conceptsY Hence, for Avicenna, to consider something to be nec-
essary is one of the primary notions which cannot be defined.
For Avicenna Necessity and actual existence, imply each other.
From among this triplex of necessary, possible, and impossible, accord-
ing to Avicenna, 'necessary' is conceived before (awlii) the other n:o,
because "it signifies certainty of existence." To say that 'somethmg
is necessary,' means 'confirmation of its existence.'24 Moreover, 'being
Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina, vol. I, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain, 1977),
pp. 42*-62*. . ..
20 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5, p. 29.5-6 and 1.5, p. 35.3-4. AVIcenna uses, m thIS
context, 'r!arun' and 'wiijib' interchangeably, although 'wiijib' is the standard term
to express necessity. See Metaphysics 1.4, p. 25.4-6 and 1.5, p. 35 paSSIm. See also
Herbert Davidson, Proqft, pp. 289-290.
21 Aristode's Prior Analytics 1.13, 32a 19-20, Metaphysics V.5, 1015a34, discussed
in Herbert Davidson Proqft, p. 290.
22 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5, p. 35.17-18 - p. 36.1-2.
23 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5, p. 29.14-16. . , .
24 Avicenna Metaphysics 1.5, p. 36.4-5. (I quoted Herbert DaVIdson s translatIOn
(Proqft, p. 290))..Avic;nna:s enigmatic ~tate~ent a~:JOut G?d's simpliei~ :?akes more
sense with the IdentIficatIon of necessIty With bemg. AVIcenna states. Thus there
is no quiddity belonging to the necessary being other than that he is necessary of
88 CHAPTER TWO
is known by itself' while 'non-being is known with reference to being.'
This close connection of necessity to being is very helpful in mak-
ing sense of Avicenna's contention that every thing that exists in re
is necessary. That is, necessity is assigned to 'what exists.'25 If neces-
sity indicates existence, then everything that exists is necessary. Or
nothing that is not necessary exists.
Avicenna takes 'that which is necessary, i.e., what actually exists,
as the starting point from which further implications of the modal-
ity of being branch. Avicenna takes 'that which exists' into consid-
eration and argues that it can be divided into two kinds in the mind:
(1) necessarily existent in itself, and (2) not necessarily existent in
itself. The latter cannot be impossible to exist, if considered in itself,
otherwise it would not exist at all. 26 If everything existing is neces-
sary, and if "possibly existent" things exist in re, then "possibly exis-
tent" things are necessary insofar as they exist in re. 27 While the
self-necessary being does not have a cause 28 -otherwise it would
not be necessary in and of itself-things that are necessary by some-
thing else need a cause necessitating them, i.e., making them exist.
Even the non-existence of things that we think to be possible to
exist, but do not exist actually, is due to a cause, i.e., the absence
of their cause. 29 Avicenna's division of being on the basis of neces-
sity and possibility amounts to three categories, (1) necessary in and
of itself, (2) necessary by something else, and (3) possible in itself
and not necessitated by something else. However, only things in the
first two categories actually exist.30
For Avicenna, it is self-necessity that opposes to possibility. Avi-
cenna's conception of necessity and possibility diverges from the con-
being. And this is being (al-inniyya)." Metaphysics VII1.4, p. 346.11-12. If necessity
signifies certainty of being, then describing God as 'necessary being,' amounts to
the self-subsisting existence of God.
25 Avicenna identifies investigation into necessity-possibility with the investigation
into actuality-potentiality. This also conforms his reduction of necessity to existence.
Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.4, p. 25.4-6.
26 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.6-10.
27 Herbert A. Davidson traces the distinction between self-necessary being and
the things that are possible to exist in themselves but are necessary insofar as they
exist back to Aristotle's conception of necessary beings. For Aristotle whereas some
necessary things do not owe their necessity to anything else, some necessary beings
have a cause of their necessity, Aristotle, Metaphysics V.5, discussed in H. A. Davidson,
Proqfs, p. 291.
28 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 38.1-10.
29 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 38.11-16, p. 39 passim.
30 Herbert Davidson, Proqfs, p. 291.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 89
ception of Aristotle and al-FarabL 31 According to Avicenna neces-
sity, simply taken, does not oppose possibility. Only self-necessity
excludes possibility. Consequently, for Avicenna, there is no difference
between material things and heavenly bodies or even intellects with
regard to modality of being. Although things subject to generation
and corruption in the sublunar world are temporal and subject to
change, and heavenly beings are not temporal and are not subject
to change this does not make any difference between them with
regard to their status of being. They are forever possible, if consid-
ered in themselves, and necessary on account of their cause as long
as they exist. That the duration of something's existence is longer,
or shorter, or that it is sempiternal does not make any difference. 32
Self-necessity sets God apart form creation. God is the only self-
necessary being, and all other things are necessary through some-
thing else, ultimately through God. Since necessity implies existence,
for Avicenna, then self-necessity implies self-subsistence, i.e., having
no cause. This self-subsistence, i.e., having no cause, is the neces-
sary condition of simplicity, unity and immutability.33 In addition to
God's self-necessity, Avicenna frequently states that the self-necessary
being is necessary in all respects. 34 Given this, then for Avicenna the
necessary being is also pure act, without any potency. In opposition
to the self-necessary being, things that are necessary by something
else depend on their cause, and they are composite and potential.35
Independence of and dependence on a cause is what ultimately dis-
tinguishes God from all other things. This is in fact what Aquinas'
analysis of immutability amounts to, as we shall see when discussing
his account.
God Is Etemal
As with the discussions of the necessity and immutability of God,
Avicenna does not discuss God's eternity as much as Aquinas does.
Despite the difference between Avicenna's and Aquinas' discussions
of God's eternity, what Avicenna attributes to God can be matched
31 See Davidson, Proqfs, p. 292.
32 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.7, p. 47.10-15; Davidson, Proqfs, p. 292.
33 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.11-18.
34 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.11-18.
35 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.7, p. 47 especially lines: 16-19.
 CHAPTER TWO
90
to Aquinas' conception of God's eternity. Avicenna:s c~nception. of
qidam functions in a similar manner to that of Aqumas conceptIOn
of aetemitas. For both asserting God's priority or eternality amounts
to saying that (l) God is a self-subsisting existent, (2) fully actual,
without succession, (3) is not subject to change and so not bound to
time, but not exclusive of time and temporal beings, because they
depend on the eternal God. In the latter sense, God's eternality is
not being atemporal, or timeless, like numbers, but being free from
and above time.
Although the Arabic term qidam36 does not have the same range
of meaning as the Latin term aetemitas, it should be employed as the
technical term for eternity, because this term may have the sense of
the measure of being just as eternity does. Qjdam is not the standard
term corresponding to the term eternity in the Latin translations of
the Metaphysics of the Healing. Although 'abad' and similar terms are
rendered in Latin by eternity, they are not the proper terms express-
ing eternity in the strict sense. 37
For Avicenna the term qidam is not exclusively predicated of God,
but is a term which is used to rank things with respect to a certain
criterion. For Avicenna it is God's qidam that singles out God from
everything else, although there are infinitely many respects in which
qidam may be attributed to things. Aquinas' expressions attributing
36 The standard terms to express priority and posteriority among things on the
basis of a certain criterion are 'taqaddum' and 'ta'akhkhur.' 'Taqaddum' derives of the
same radix as 'qidam,' which has more or less the same me~ning. 'Qgdf",:' deriving
of the same radix is a verbal adjective of the first form, WIth the functIOn of the
'active participle' meaning 'that which is prior.' Besides the term 'qidam,' term~ such
as 'dii'im,' (rendered usually as semper) 'sarmad,' 'azal' and 'abad' are rendered m the
Latin translation as 'aetemus' or 'semper.' Dii'im is usually rendered as semper except
for it occasional rendering of eternal: 1.8, p. 55, line: 69 an~ IX.I p. 435 line: 5 ;.2
dii'iman rendered semper. IV2, p. 211, line: 22; IV.3, p. 217 Ime: 43; 1.5, p. 36 I~ne:
81; ibid., line: 92; 1.7, p. 55 line: 50; dahr rendere.d aetemztate: IV~I, p. 189 vanant
reading; mu'abbada rendered aetemae, IV.2 p. 211, Ime: 14; ab~d!yyat rendered aetema
IV.2, p. 211 line: 22; azal rendered aetemus: IV2, p. 210, Ime: 4; az~tz rendered
aetema, VII.2 p. 366 line: 55; sarmad rendered aetemztate: VIII.3 p. 396 Ime: 38; am .t
yazal rendered semper. IV.2, p. 210 line: 7; dii'zm rendered semper. VLI, p. 300 Ime:
90; qadfm rendered aetemus: I-?C.I, p. 443, line: 81; abadf rendere? aetemus: IX.7,
p. 511, line: 89. Avicenna, Lzber de phzlosophza pn",:a, szve, sczentza dzvzna, ed. S. van
Riet 3 vols. (Louvain: Peeters & Leiden: E. J. Bnll, 1977-1983).
3,' 'Dii'iman' can be rendered in English as 'always.' It was interpreted in different
ways. Whereas Plato's texts allow a temporal se~se, PI~tinus gives ~. non-temporal
meaning to always. For Plotinus it denotes true be~ng . .Richard SorabJI, Time Creatzon
and the Continuum (Ithaca, New York: Cornell UmversIty, 1983), p. 112.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 91
eternity to immaterial substances38 may be similar to the usage of
qidam. Aquinas sometimes employs the term eternity to express the
mode of being of creatures. Nevertheless Aquinas' texts are unequiv-
ocal that it is God's eternity that singles out God from everything
else. Both 'God's qidam' and 'God's aetemitas' amount to saying that
God is the self-subsistent and fully actual being, and everything else
owes its existence to God. In this sense, only God is eternal. All
other things have a beginning either with respect to their being or
with respect to time.
The term 'qidam' may concern ranking things according to a cri-
terion as well as the criterion itsel[ The fifth form of the root q-d-m,
i.e., taqaddama, of which the term qidam is derived, is used to rank
things on the basis of a criterion. "The thing that is prior (mutaqad-
dim) inasmuch as it is prior has something which the posterior thing
lacks, and the posterior thing does not have anything unless the prior
thing also has it. What is generally noticed among ordinary people
(alj·umhur) is that which is prior (mutaqaddim) with respect to place
and time. [However,] priority (taqaddum) and being before (al-qabl)
are applicable to [vertically] ordered (tart'ib) things."39 In addition to
ranking things on the basis of a criterion, 'that which is prior' (mutaqad-
dim) may also mean the criterion itself. For example, if something is
prior to everything else in some respect, then this thing is the cri-
terion on the basis of which other things are ranked. 40
Priority and posteriority apply to things with respect to being as
well. Avicenna considers two ways in which this is applied with
regard to being. In one of them, something is the condition of the
being of the second thing, although it is not the cause of the sec-
ond thing, such as one and many. In order to have many there
must be one, but the existence of one does not require the existence
of many.4! The second way priority and posteriority apply to things
with regard to being concerns the causal relationship between two
things. The cause is prior to the effect with regard to having exis-
tence, since the effect depends on the cause in order to exist, while
the cause does not depend on the effect. 42 Avicenna denies that
38 ST la. 10, 2, ad 2.
39 Avicenna, Metaphysics lVI, p. 163.8-11.
40 Avicenna, Metaphysics lVI, p. 164.7-8.
41 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.l, p. 164.12-17.
42 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.l, p. 164.18-19 - p. 165.1-4.
92 CHAPTER TWO
among the vertically ordered causes and effects there can be a rank-
ing with regard to time, i.e., temporal priority. The ranking in such
a chain of existents is in regard to having being. The thing that
bestows being is prior to the thing that has existence because of it,
and the effect is posterior to its cause since it owes its existence to
its cause. 43
The priority of God to everything else is not a temporal priority
but an existential priority. Since for Avicenna (1) not everything is
temporal,44 (2) God is not a temporal being,45 and (3) the cause of
being is unlike the cause of movement,46 God's priority to every-
thing else cannot be a temporal priority. Avicenna argues that if a
cause is essentially the cause of the being of something else, then it
is always (da)iman) the cause of its effect as long as the cause itself
exists. Such a cause is prior to its effects because it does not owe
its existence to its effects, whereas its effects are nothing in them-
selves, but exist on account of their causeY Since God gives being
to everything else no matter whether it has a temporal beginning or
not,48 the relationship of priority and posteriority that holds between
God and the universe concerns being. The cause and the effect are
simultaneous either during a period of time, or sempiternally, but
the cause is prior to its effect with regard to being. 49
When qidam is predicated of God, it means 'to be without begin-
ning,' or 'to be without origin,' or 'to be prior to everything else.'
If God is prior to everything else, there cannot be anything prior
43 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV. I , p. 165.10-14. For the denial of temporal priority
of essential and immediate causes to their effects, see also Avicenna, Metaphysics
VI.2, p. 266.
44 See for example Avicenna, Isharat, p. 153.
45 Avicenna Metaphysics VIII.5, p. 354.10; VIII.6, p. 362.1-2; IX.I, p. 373.5. In
VIII.6, p. 362.1-2, he writes: "However, the First who is not subject to time and
what is true of it (&ukmuhu) ..."
46 Avicenna, Metaphysics VU, p. 257.12-17.
47 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 266.
48 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.3, p. 342.15-19.
49 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 167.1-5 "Thus the existence of every effect is
necessary through the existence of the cause.... They are together (ma'an) in time
or sempiternity (dahr) or something else. But they are not together (ma'an) with
respect to having existence (&~iil al-wujiid). That is because the existence of that
[cause] is not derived (lam ya&~ul) from the existence of this [effect]. That [cause]
has existence, but it [i.e., that it has existence] is not derived from the fact that
this one has existence. This [effect] has existence; it [i.e., that it has existence] is
derived from the fact that that [cause] has existence. Hence that [cause] is prior
[to this effect] with respect to having existence."
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 93
to God' with respect to being. In this sense qidam is a restatement
that God is the cause of being of others, and that he is the self-sub-
sistent being. Avicenna takes qidam to be negation. If God is said to
be qadim (eternal), it is a negation. "It is first reduced to (tury'a') the
negation of non-existence of him [God], and secondly it is reduced
to the negation of causality (sababi;yya) [negation of that God has a
cause] and negation of a beginning (al-awwal)."50
In his Ta'liqat, Avicenna gives some explanation of how being is
divided on the basis of immutability. The first concerns those things
that are in time. These are changeable things, which have a begin-
ning and an end in infinitely flowing time. The second realm of
being is together with (ma'a) time, but not in time. This is called
sempiternity (dahr). Sempiternity encompasses time, because time
springs forth (yansha») from the movement of the sphere (alfalak) ,
which is a sempiternal being. The relationship of sempiternity to
time is the relationship of what is permanent to what is changeable.
Although there is no past, present or future in the temporal sense,
the human mind cannot conceive it. It conceives of every thing in
time. The third category "is the being (kawn) of what is permanent
(thabit) together with what is permanent. It is called eternal (sarmadt).
It encompasses sempiternity." This triple division gives the structure
of the hierarchy of beings. 51
In sum, for Avicenna only God is eternal in the true sense. He
interprets this eternity negatively. The eternal being (1) does not lack
being, (2) does not have a cause, and (3) does not have a beginning
in any way. Hence God, being the only eternal existent, does not
lack any aspect of his being, i.e., there is no succession in God, he
does not have a cause, and he does not have a beginning.
God Knows Creatures as well as Himself
Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of God's knowledge.
The similarity between their conceptions of God's knowledge may
50 Avicenna, Risala 'Arshiyya, p. 7. Avicenna also uses the term 'azal'i' (having no
end in the past) to express God's eternity in much the same sense as qidam: "There
is also mention of 'being eternal' (azalZ), which in reality (&aq'iqat) means that its
being (hasti) has no beginning." Parviz Morewedge (trans. & commentary), 7he
Metaphysica qf Avicenna (New York: Columbia University, 1973), chapter 26, p. 58.
51 Avicenna, Ta'lZqat, ed. A. Badawi (Cairo: 1973), pp. 141-142.
94 CHAPTER TWO
be reduced to two overarching ideas. (1) God has one act of knowl-
edge, in which God's self-knowledge and knowledge of other things
are included; and (2) since God knows other things in himself, God's
knowledge of other things is in accordance with his being: (a) intel-
ligible (b) simple, (c) immutable, (d) eternal, but not temporal.
Avicenna argues that God knows himself and that he is the prin-
ciple of other things. That God knows 'that he is the principle of
other things'52 is prone to misunderstanding. For example, if John
knows that he is the father of Adam, his knowledge 'that he is the
father of Adam' does not require that John knows who Adam is,
what he looks like, what his thoughts and his actions are, etc. Often
God's knowledge 'that he is the principle of other things' is equated
with this limited kind of knowledge John might have of his son.
However, the relationship between God and other things is not the
same as the relationship between a father and his son, or any kind
of relationship between two creatures. The closest relationship may
be in this respect the relationship between the cause and its effects,
even though not every cause and effect relationship conforms to the
relationship between God and the universe. Since God has one act
of knowledge, God primarily and essentially knows himself. His knowl-
edge of himself is not to be understood in a narrower sense, reduc-
ing it, for example, to self-awareness. God's self-knowledge must also
include the knowledge concerning things that are concomitants of
God's being (dhiit). Since God is the only self-necessary being, and
everything that exists other than him owes its existence to God's
being, the knowledge pertaining to them must be included in God's
self-knowledge. On Avicenna's account, otherwise they would not
exist.
Contrary to conventional interpretations, Avicenna clearly states
that God's knowledge 'that he is the principle of other things' includes
his knowledge of other things, not simply the relationship of being
their principle. In book VIII, chapter 6 of the Metaphysics of The
Healing, Avicenna states that God's knowledge of other things does
not derive from those things, but is the result of his knowledge of
himself: "Since he is the principle (mabda') of all being, he knows
from himself (min dhiitihi) [i.e., through the knowledge of his self]
everything (mii) that he is the principle of, and he is the principle
52 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 363.3-4.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 95
of the existent things (mawjudiit) that are complete (tiimm) in their
individual existence (hi ayiinihii) [immediately], and of the existent
things that are subject to generation and corruption first in their
species (anwii'ihii) and through them in their individuals (hi ashkJzii~ii)."53
Thus God knows things that are not subject to generation directly,
as one by one, since their species are identical to their single mem-
bers. And similarly, he knows first the species of things subject to
generation, and via their special form particulars that are subject to
generation and corruption. In any case, God's knowledge that he is
the principle of other things does not simply mean that God is a
principle, but includes God's knowledge of other things, because of
the special relationship between God and other things.
In order to maintain this idea that God has one act of knowl-
edge, Avicenna argues that God knows things in a universal way.54
53 Avicenna, Metaphysics, VIII.6, p. 359.1-4. See also Ishiiriit, VII, p. 181. For a
further confirmation that for Avicenna God does not only know 'universals,' in the
sense of genera and species of things, but also particular things see Metaphysics VIII. 7,
p. 364.7-15. For a detailed discussion of God's knowledge of individuals according
to Avicenna and Aquinas, and the conformity between Avicenna's position and that
of Aquinas see Nicolas Louis Rofougaran, Avicenna and Aquinas on Individuation (Harvard
University, 2000, Ph.D. dissertation), pp. 241-261. Rofougaran argues that Avicenna's
conception of 'dhiif (individual essence) includes matter and the accidents of things.
Since God knows individual essences, God's knowledge of individuals includes both
their matter and accidents, as Aquinas also maintains. Rofougaran holds that Aquinas'
and Avicenna's conception of God's knowledge of particulars is similar, partly due
to their affiliation with Aristotle's philosophy.
54 Here Avicenna contrasts 'universal' not to 'particular' but rather to 'material.'
One can distinguish here two things. In the literature, Avicenna's expression 'God
knows things in a universal manner' is usually equated with 'God knows univer-
sals' with the implication that God does not know particulars. In fact, as the con-
text indicates, Avicenna contrasts universality to materiality not to particularity. See
Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 359.7-14. Avicenna does not mean that God does not know
particulars. Avicenna simply means that God's knowledge of particular material
things is not a temporal changeable knowledge, or sensible knowledge. In this sense,
Aquinas would not also deny that God's knowledge is not temporal, nor is it sub-
ject to change, although he criticizes Avicenna's account for failing to explain God's
knowledge of particulars. For Aquinas' criticism of Avicenna, see ST la. 14, 11.
Michael Marmura has written a superb article on Avicenna's theory of God's knowl-
edge of particulars. His semantic clarifications concerning the usage of the terms
"universal" and "particular" are invaluable. However, Marmura's interpretation of
Avicenna's position comes closer to the traditional interpretation of Muslim the-
ologians that for Avicenna God does not know particulars in the realm of genera-
tion and corruption. (Michael E. Marmura, "Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory
of God's Knowledge of Particulars," Journal qftheAmerican Oriental Sociery 82/3 (1962),
pp. 299-312). Contrary to the traditional interpretation of Avicenna's position sup-
ported by Marmura, from Avicenna's texts the most one can argue is that Avicenna
does not provide a successful explanation of how God knows particulars that are
96 CHAPTER TWO
The universal way of knowing things is contrasted to the way of
knowing things which are subject to generation and corruption, inas-
much as they are subject to generation and corruption. The knowl-
edge of material, changeable things in accordance with the conditions
in which they exist must include the material and temporal proper-
ties of things. In this sense, Avicenna denies that God would have
such knowledge of individuals because, he argues, this kind of knowl-
edge is either sensory, or imaginal (mutakhayyal) knowledge. As being
sensory or imaginal knowledge, it is conditioned by the particular
organs which provide this kind of knowledge. Furthermore, since
things occur in time, and the knowledge pertaining to them in their
material temporal conditions must be renewed, it also requires mul-
tiplicity of the acts of knowing. Avicenna concludes, as the affirmation
of many actions (rifii'fl) of God implies an imperfection in God, so
does the affirmation of many acts of knowing in God. 55 Hence, hav-
ing a sensory knowledge of things would imply a multiplicity in God,
which would not conform to his simplicity.
God knows himself and other things in a simple manner without
having any multiplicity. Avicenna contrasts 'to be intellect' and 'to
know in a simple sense' to the knowledge that souls have. Whereas
in the soul the forms of different objects of knowledge are distin-
guished, and arranged in a way distinct from each other, in the
knowledge of an intellect there is no distinction among the forms of
various objects of knowledge. 56 What does this knowing 'in a simple
subject to generation and corruption. But the claim that for Avicenna God does
not know particulars is very difficult to justify, given Avicenna's contention that
God's knowledge is the cause of things. For a detailed examination of al-GhazalI's
and Michael Marmura's interpretations of Avicenna's position see, Rahim Acar,
"Reconsidering Avicenna's Position on God's Knowledge of Particulars," in Jon
McGinnis and David C. Reisman eds., Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosoplry in
Medieval Islam, (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2004), pp. 142-156.
55 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VIII.6, p. 359.11-12.
56 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VIII.7, p. 362.17 - p. 363.4 "Then (thumma), it must be
known that the First [i.e., God] is said to be intellect, or intellection, (Caql), it is
said in a simple (al-basff) sense, which you have known in the book of the soul;
and that in him there is no distinction (ildztiliif) among forms (~uwar) arranged
(mutarattiba) differently, as is the case in the soul in the sense [po 363] that was
stated in the book of the soul (Kitiib al-Nafi). This is why he knows (yaCqil) things
all at once without being multiplied by them in his substance, or without that they
are formed (ta~awwar) in the reality of his essence (dhiitihi) with their [own] forms.
To the contrary, their forms emanate from him as things known (maCqulatan). He is
more worthy to be an intellect more than the forms emanating (al-jii'irja) from his
intellect-ness (Caqliyyatihi). Since he knows himself (dhiit), and he is the principle of
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 97
sense' mean? Does it mean that God has the knowledge of one sin-
gle thing concerning other things? And can it be God's knowledge
that 'he is the principle of other things' without the implication of
God having the knowledge of other things? One may be tempted
to think so. This would make it easy to explain God's one act of
knowledge, since for Avicenna God has only one knowledge, and
since God's knowledge of being 'the principle of other things' can
be identified with God's knowledge of himself without the implica-
tion of God's knowledge of other things.
Avicenna attempts to explain how God knows many intelligible
things without his simplicity being damaged, and without those intel-
ligible forms being independently existing things, as Platonic ideas,
or without them being placed in an intellect containing them like a
substratum. He argues that God's knowledge of many other things
does not constitute a multiplicity in God, because these forms are
subsequent to God's essence. 57 Avicenna explains the relationship
between God's self-knowledge and his knowledge of other things on
the basis of the relationship between a causal principle and its effect. 58
Avicenna's premises are: (1) God's knowledge of himself is identical
to himself, (2) God knows things after (ba'da) himself through his
knowledge of himself. The conclusion he draws from these is: God's
knowledge of himself is the cause of his knowledge of things that
are posterior to himself. Even if the relationship between God's self-
knowledge and his knowledge of things which are posterior to him
is construed in causal terms, Avicenna does remind us again that
the relationship between God and his knowledge of other things is
everything, he knows everything from his own essence." For Avicenna's discussion
of the simple knowledge in opposition to complex or discursive knowledge, see
Avicenna, De Anima, ed. F. Rahman (London, New York & Toronto: Oxford
University, 1959) V, 6, p. 242.6 - p. 244 n. 9. On the issue of whether God's
knowledge is discursive, c£ Aquinas, ST la. 14, 7.
57 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VIII.7, p. 364.1-6. See also Ishiiriit VII, p. 182. The
expression that 'these forms are posterior to God's essence' may need some elabo-
ration. What does Avicenna mean by this being posterior to God's essence? Clearly
this is not a temporal posteriority. Can one interpret Avicenna along Aquinas' lines:
'other things being ordered to God as their cause'? In any case Avicenna himself
states that there is a causal relationship between God and his knowledge of forms
of other things. Can this be a strictly causal relationship, or is it just a manner of
speaking?
58 This explanation of the link between a principle and its effect is used by
Aquinas frequently. Things are included in their principles. Even though Avicenna
may not be as articulate as Aquinas is, as we shall see later they have similar
approaches.
98 CHAPTER TWO
the relationship between an intellect and the intelligible forms belong-
ing to it or known by it, as opposed to the relationship between the
soul and its objects of knowledge. Avicenna wants to confirm that
even if between God's self-knowledge and knowledge of other things
there is the relationship of a causal principle and its effect, there is
no distinction among the intelligible forms in God's knowledge. He
knows them all at once. Avicenna also asserts that the intelligible
forms are simply relations. 59 By saying this, Avicenna seems to deny
the existence of these intelligible forms independently of the divine
essence and divine self-knowledge, even if he has to talk about them
as if the divine self-knowledge and divine knowledge of other things
are two distinct things. Hence, the causal relationship between God's
self-knowledge and knowledge of other things conveys here more of
the sense of dependency and inclusiveness than the sense of a causal
relationship, in which a cause brings about a distinct effect.
Showing the compatibility between God's simplicity, God's self-
knowledge, and God's knowledge of other things is a frequent con-
cern of Avicenna's. To this effect, he also proposes that intelligible
forms of other things are 'from him' but 'not in him.' This formula
favors an efficient-causal relationship between God's self-knowledge
and the knowledge of other things over a material-causal relation-
ship. God's knowledge of other things is thus not a constitutive ele-
ment of God's self-knowledge but comes out of it. This formula
apparently relieves Avicenna in his quest to save God's simplicity.
But it also gives rise to new problems: what does 'from him but not
in him' mean? Would it force him to postulate those intelligible
forms as Platonic forms subsistently existing, or an intelligence con-
taining them and functioning as their substratum? He rejects the
position that they can exist subsistently as Platonic ideas or that they
reside in an intellect or a soul which functions as their substratum. 50
In order to explain how multiple intelligible forms do not cause mul-
S9 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.1-6.
60 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 365.8-17. In Ta'tiqat (pp. 119-120), Avi~enna
also uses 'in him.' Usually Avicenna emphasizes that God's necessary concomitants
are 'from him' but not 'in him.' Here he says 'in him.' He is aware that this is
unusual on his part, so he explains what he means by saying 'in him': "These exis-
tent things are from among the necessary concomitants of his essence. And his nec-
essary concomitants are in him, in the sense that they emanate from him, not that
they emanate from something else into him such that he is receptive and has an
affection (irifi'iil) ..." See also Ta'liqat, pp. 152, 180.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 99
tiplicity in God, Avicenna distinguishes between the emanation of
'intelligible forms insofar as they are understood by God without any
extra condition (bi-la ziyada) and insofar as intelligible forms exist
in re. He states that one should not be concerned with the existence ,
or more accurately the realization, of intelligible forms in re, because
God's existence does not depend on the existence of other things.
Even though God's essence may be considered in relation to things
in re-since God is their principle-God is necessary by himself, but
he is not necessary 'because he is the cause of their existence.'
Avicenna seems to argue that if one considers intelligible forms with-
out being concerned with their realization in re these do not harm
divine simplicity. For Avicenna, 'intelligible forms insofar as they are
understood' are not entities distinct from God's self-knowledge, despite
the fact that his efficient causal model suggests two distinct entities. 51
God's knowledge of other things is in accord with God's being.
To spell out what I mean by this phrase, three points come to mind:
(1) Since God is independent of other things and they depend on
God for their existence, God's knowledge of other things is inde-
pendent of other things. Other things depend on God's knowledge
for their existence. (2) God's knowledge is eternal and immutable.
(3) God's knowledge is simple and intelligible. I have already spo-
ken about the simplicity of God's knowledge, and that God's knowl-
edge of other things is included in God's self-knowledge, which is
also intelligible. All three points are interconnected. It seems that
one either has to take the whole package, or leave it all.
Avicenna construes the relationship between God's knowledge and
the existence of other things to be such that God's knowledge of
other things is not attained from things themselves, but things exist
because God knows them. In explaining his conception of the rela-
tion between God's knowledge of creatures and the existence of crea-
tures, Avicenna distinguishes two different relationships between the
object of knowledge and the one who knows: either the knowledge
is attained from the object of knowledge which already exists, or the
61 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 366.1-7. One may question whether Avicenna's
explanation is convincing or not. But it is certain that he knows other things inas-
much as they are intelligible, and this knowledge is, in a sense, the result of God's
self-knowledge. As I will try to show, in Aquinas' works we come across the same
formula: God's knowledge of himself and other things are not different acts of
knowledge. Still God primarily and essentially knows himself.
 100 CHAPTER TWO
knowing subject has the knowledge first and then realizes his knowl-
edge in concrete in the external world. He gives the example of the
architect and the building. First the architect has the plan of a build-
ing in his mind. Then he builds the building in accordance with the
plan in his mind. For Avicenna, "This is the relation (nisba) of every-
thing to the First Intellect, the necessary of being. This is because
(fa innahu) he knows (ya'qil) himself (dhiitahu) and what his self neces-
sitates. And [because] he knows from his self (dhiitihi) how there is
(kawn) good in everything. Consequently (fa) the forms of existent
things (al-mawjudiit) follow his intelligibly known form (~uratahu al-
ma'qula) [i.e., God's knowledge of himself] in accordance with the
order (al-niZiim) known (ma'qul) by him ('indahu)."62
By arguing that God knows things from himself and not from the
things themselves, Avicenna is able to assert God's independence of
other things, as well to maintain the eternity and immutability of
his knowledge. Avicenna argues that if God were to know things
from things themselves, this would imply that God is not self-sub-
sistent but is subsistent because of creatures. Since God has knowl-
62 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 363.9-11. See also Ishiiriit VII, p. 181. The
kind of knowledge God has of creatures insofar as they exist in re needs clarification.
If one thinks that God knows only universals, interpreting Avicenna's expression
'God knows things in a universal manner,' then God does not know particular
things, but simply universals, i.e., concepts that are predicated of many particular
things. But since universals qua universal, such as humanity, do not exist outside
the mind, God's knowledge of other things, conceived to consist of universals, does
not imply anything regarding the existence or the organization of things existing in
re. In this context, Avicenna's position regarding God's knowledge of creatures-
with his emanation theory at the background-as consisting of universals, hence
being theoretical knowledge, is contrasted with Aquinas' position on the artisan-
artifact model in the manner of practical knowledge. For this contrast see David
B. Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sinii, Maimonides, Aquinas, pp. 72-75 and
pp. 86-90. Burrell argues that for Avicenna God's causation is not quite intentional
(p. 73). God's relation to the world is conceived of on the basis of speculative knowl-
edge (p. 74). N. Rofougaran adopts this same position with reference to David
Burrell's article "Creation, Will and Knowledge in Aquinas and Duns Scotus," in
Pragmatik, Handbuch pragmatischen Denkens, Herausgegeben von Herbert Stachowiak,
Band I (Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986), p. 248. See Nicolas Louis Rofougaran,
Avicenna and Aquinas on Individuation, pp. 119-220. See also Rudi A. Te Velde,
Participation and Substantiality in 7homas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J. Brill, 1995),
pp. 102-108. It is true, Avicenna maintains that God does not know things that
are material and temporal with their material and temporal properties. In this sense
God's knowledge of them is 'universal.' It is also true that Avicenna explains the
existence of the universe with his version of the emanation model. Nevertheless, it
does not seem to be true that for Avicenna God's knowledge of other things falls
within theoretical knowledge rather than practical knowledge.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 101
edge of himself and other things, if he did not know other things
from his self (dhiit) then God would depend on other things for his
knowledge of them. This would amount to God's dependence on
other things. 63
However, such dependence may not be suitable for God, because
it makes God's knowledge of other things similar to creaturely knowl-
edge. It strips divine knowledge of simplicity, necessity, etc. If God's
knowledge of other things were derived from those things themselves,
Avicenna argues, this would make God's knowledge subject to change,
as well as making it temporal, in the sense that its truth or falsity
is bound up with the flow of time. For example, at time T God
would not know that John was born, since he was not born. Then
at time T] God would know that John was born because he was
born. God's dependence on other things for his knowledge of them
would also imply uprooting God's simplicity; as creatures are sub-
ject to change, generation and corruption, God's knowledge of them
would also follow the same course. Consequently, God's knowledge
of other things would be like accidents occurring to him and van-
ishing away from him. This, Avicenna argues, contradicts God's
being "necessary in all respects." Hence God's knowledge of other
things cannot be drawn from those things, because it contradicts
God's simplicity, necessity and immutability. 64
Aquinas' Conception if Divine Formal Features and Divine Knowledge
God Is Simple
Aquinas' position regarding God's simplicity conforms to Avicenna's
to a large extent. For Aquinas, like Avicenna, God is free of mat-
ter and mixing with matter, does not have a quiddity distinct from
his being, and does not have a genus, differentia or definition.
Aquinas starts his discussion of God's simplicity with the exami-
nation of whether God is a body or something material. 65 Aquinas
63 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14-17.
64 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14-17.
• 65 ST la. 3, 1 & 2. As m~nitioned in t~e section on Avicenna's position, Avicenna
SImply assumes that God IS not to be Identified with matter and does not have
anything material. '
102 CHAPTER TWO
brings in various arguments to reject the position that God is a body,
such as God's being the unchanging first cause of all things, God's
being pure actuality without any potentiality, and his being the most
excellent being, unlike any body.66 In addition to God's not being
a body, God also is not something composed of form and matter.
One of Aquinas' arguments to this effect is that God does not have
potentiality at all. Since matter is potential, and God is pure actu-
ality, God cannot have matter, so he cannot be composed of mat-
ter and form. His second argument to this effect is based on
participation. In composite things, form is the component giving that
thing its goodness and perfection, while matter participates in good-
ness and perfection. However, God is good in and of himself, and
cannot therefore participate in goodness and perfection. Consequently,
he is not composed of matter and form. Aquinas' third argument is
based on the idea that every agent acts by virtue of its form. As
God is primarily and by himself an agent (per se agens), he must be,
primarily and in himself, a form. Hence God is essentially a form,
not a composite of form and matter.67 God is a form that is not
receivable by matter; he is a self-subsisting form. 68
After confirming the position that God is not something material,
or mixed with matter, Aquinas argues the identity of God with his
essence and existence. His treatment of the question takes on a
different form than that of Avicenna. Aquinas not only talks about
the identity of existence and quiddity in God, but he also talks about
first the identity between God and his quiddity (ST la. 3, 3), and
then about the identity between God and his existence (ST la. 3,
4). When dealing with the question of whether in God there is a
composition of quiddity, essence, or nature, and the subject, i.e.,
God, Aquinas states that God, (i.e., the subject to which the form
deity refers) and his quiddity, or his nature, are identical. He con-
trasts their identity in God to their non-identity in material beings.
Material beings are not identical to their quiddities because an indi-
vidual human being, for example, has more than what its essence
is, which defines the human species. An individual human being, in
addition to its form, has its individuating matter (materia individualis),
66 ST la. 3, 1.
67 ST la. 3, 2.
68 ST la. 3, 2 ad 3.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 103
by which it becomes individuated. However, the individuality of
things that are not composed of matter and form, but pure form,
cannot derive from an individuating matter. These forms are intrin-
sically individual and by themselves subsistent. Hence, God as a non-
material form is identical with his quiddity, i.e. deity. 69
In ST la. 3, 4, Aquinas discusses whether there is a composition
of essence (essentia) and existence (esse) in God. He brings in argu-
ments similar to those of Avicenna. One of Aquinas' arguments to
show that God is identical to his existence is that if God were not
identical to his existence, then he must have obtained his existence
from his essential principles (principiis essentiae), or from some exter-
nal cause. But it is impossible that existence be caused by essential
principles as such, because nothing can bring itself into being. Since
God is the first cause, there cannot be anything that brings him into
existence. Hence, in God existence cannot be other than his essence. 70
The second argument is based on the similarity of opposition be-
tween self-existence (ipsum esse) and essence and between actuality
and potentiality. If God, the self-existing being, had an essence other
than his being, then God would have potentiality. Since God does
not have any potentiality, then God's essence and being must be
identical. 71 Aquinas' third argument is based on participation. Every
thing that exists exists either by itself or by participation. But God
cannot exist by participation. Hence, his essence and his being must
be identical. 72
Aquinas also shares Avicenna's contention that God is the being
with the condition of negation. He registers an interesting objection
concerning God's being unspecified existence. If God's essence were
identical to existence, then there would be nothing to specify God's
being, and everything existing would be identified with God. Answering
this objection Aquinas makes a distinction between two senses of
'unspecified (nonfit additio) existence.' It may mean either that 'further
specification is excluded by definition,' or 'further specification is not
included in the definition.' For example, reason is excluded from
irrational animals by definition, and it is not included in the definition
of animal in general. In the first sense, being with the condition of
69 ST la. 3, 3.
70 ST la. 3, 4.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
104 CHAPTER 'TWO
exclusion of any addition (esse sine additione) is the divine being; in
the second sense it is existence in general (esse commune).73
As part of his discussion of divine simplicity, Aquinas also addresses
the question whether God is composed of a genus and a differentia.
Similar to Avicenna's position he rejects that God can be composed
of genus and differentia. Aquinas distinguishes two ways of belong-
ing to a genus: (l) immediately and strictly as species and members
of a species belong to a genus, and (2) mediately, just as a unity
and a point both belong to the genus of quantity because they gen-
erate number and extension, that is, just as measure is considered
to belong to the genus of what is measured. He offers three argu-
ments to refute the position that God can be in a genus. The first
argument is based on God's lack of potency. Species, within a genus,
differ from each other by some differentia, and the differentia is
somehow an actualization of the genus. Since God does not have
potentiality or since God is not the actualization of a potentiality,
God does not belong to a genus as a species. 74 The second argu-
ment is based on the identity of God's essence and existence. If God
had a genus, it would be the genus of 'existent' (ens). However,
Aquinas states with reference to Aristotle, 'existent' cannot be a
genus, because every genus has a differentia that does not partici-
pate in the essence of the genus. But there cannot be any differentia
that is not an 'existent' (ens). Hence God does not have a genus.
The third argument again is based on the identity of God's exis-
tence and essence. Things that belong to a genus share a quiddity,
or a generic essence (quidditate vel essentia generis). But as existent things,
they differ from each other. For example both horse and man belong
to the genus 'animal' but neither of them is identical to 'being ani-
mal.' Hence things that belong to a genus must differ from their
genus. Since God's being and essence are identical, God does not
belong to a genus. 75
73 ST la. 3. 4 obj. I & ad I. Avicenna has the same contention that God's being
is the being with the condition of exclusion of any addition.
74 ST la. 3, 5. . .
75 ST la. 3 5. "Tertio quia omnia quae sunt In genere uno commumcant In
quidditate vel' essentia generis quod. p~aedic~tur de eis in, e~ quod qu!d." ~otice
here, how Aquinas uses terms 'qulddltas an~ essentza genens. SInce the discusslOn of
belonging to a genus requires a genu~ whic~ ca~ ~ave. more than on~ m?m~er,
Aquinas uses these terms instead of simply. es.sent,,!, ThIS may be an ~m'ph.catlO~
that 'essentia' is the individual essence when It IS Said of God, and that It IS Idenh-
cal to God; and if we talk about God's essence, we talk about an individual essence,
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 105
Aquinas states two objections, arguing that God must belong to
the genus of substance: (l) Since the definition of substance, a self-
subsisting thing (ens per se subsistens) is most suitable to God, God
must be a substance;76 and (2) since measures belong to the same
genus as what they measure, and God is the measure of all sub-
stance, God must belong to the genus of substance. 77 Aquinas' reply
to the first objection is similar to that of Avicenna, who also states
this objection and answers it. The substance signifies 'an essence that
exists by itself, not in a subject, if it exists.' But it does not mean
this essence is identical to its existence. In other words, substance
does not imply its existence. Hence, God does not belong to the
genus of substance. 78 God's being the measure of substances does
not require that God be in the genus of substance, since nothing is
commensurate with God. As the self-subsisting being God is called
the measure of things to indicate that the nearer they come to God,
the more fully they exist. But it does not require that God be a sub-
stance as things coming closer to him are substances. 79
Cod Is Necessary and Immutable
For Aquinas God is necessary and immutable. Unlike Avicenna, who
emphasizes God's necessity, Aquinas puts greater emphasis on God's
immutability but their positions are similar inasmuch as necessity is
connected to immutability and eternity. That God is a necessary
being is either clearly mentioned or assumed frequently throughout
Aquinas' writings. Perhaps his discussion of God's eternity in ScC I,
15 and in his tertia via (ST la. 2, 3)80 displays Aquinas' subscription
which is identical to God's being. In this context Avicenna's statement that 'God
does not have a quiddity (mahiyya) other than being,' may be more understandable.
The essence God has cannot be a quiddity applicable to anything other than God.
76 ST la. 3, 5, obj. I.
n ST la. 3, 5, obj. 2.
78 Ibid., ad I. For Avicenna's position see Metaphysics VlII.4, p. 348.5-16.
79 Ibid., ad 2.
. 80 Aquinas' third way is one of the much-discussed pieces of Aquinas' writings.
Two issues of debate regarding the third way are: whether Aquinas' move from 'if
everything is possible to exist and not to exist' to 'then nothing would exist at some
time' is justified, and whether Aquinas means logical necessity when he argues that
there must be a necessary being.' Patterson Brown criticized scholars who inter-
preted Aquinas's tertia via in this manner, such as]. J. C. Smart, "The Existence
of God," Church Qyarterfy Review (1955); P. Edwards "The Existence of God," in A
Modem Introduction to Philosophy, ed. A. Pap and P. Edwards (Glencoe, 1957), p. 455;
106 CHAPTER TWO CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 107

to God's necessity best. God is not the only necessary being, nor is based on the negation of potentiality in God may be considered a
God's necessity a logical necessity.8l But God is the only self-necessary modification of his first way. Since God is the first and the source
being and it is this self-necessity that sets God apart from everything of the being of other things, and actuality precedes potency, and
else. 82 Aquinas also argues that self-necessity implies eternity.83 This since anything changing is potential, God must be unchangeable.
84 On his argument based on the simplicity of God, in a changing
self-necessary being must be immutable and the origin of all change.
In Summa Theologiae, Aquinas offers three reasons why God is thing there is a part that changes and there is a part that persists
immutable. God is immutable, because otherwise God would be (1) through the process of change. So there must be at least two parts
potential, (2) composite, and (3) imperfect. Aquinas has already argued in a changing thing. This undoubtedly requires that anything change-
that these predicates must be negated of God. 85 Aquinas' argument able must be composite. This is contrary to God's being simple.
Hence God's simplicity requires that God be immutable. Another
implication of change which is unacceptable to Aquinas is that the
and C. B. Martin, Religious Belief(Ithaca, N.Y., 1959), pp. 151-152. Patterson Brown,
changing subject acquires something new that it did not have before
"St. Thomas' Doctrine of Necessary Being," The Philosophical Review 73/1 (1964),
pp. 77-78. See also Anthony Kenny, Five Wqys (Notre Dame, Indiana: University the change. This obviously runs against God's being the most per-
of Notre Dame, 1980). Brown argues that "A large number of commentators have, fect being, having all perfection and needing nothing else. 86
like Smart, interpreted the first part of Aquinas' Third Way according to the fol-
Moreover, for Aquinas, onlY is God unchangeable. Not only mate-
lowing schema:
(1) If anything exists, then there must exist a logically necessary being. rial things, which are subject to generation and corruption, but all
(2) Something exists. things including angels and pure forms are subject to change in some
(3) Therefore: there must exist a logically necessary being.
St. Thomas would have to have been rather artless to defend such an argument. sense. 87 Aquinas distinguishes two respects that something may be
For the most obvious point about it is that the two premises are entirely superfluous. changeable: (1) Something is changeable either because of something
That is to say, if God's existence is supposed to be logically necessary, then surely else's power over it, or (2) because of its own potency. All things
the conclusion will stand on its own. Step (3), in short, itself constitutes the ratio-
nalistic version of the ontological argument. So, if this interpretation of Aquinas' depend on God's power and will for both their coming to exist and
demonstration were correct, the Third Way would really be an a priori proof merely their remaining in existence. In this respect all such things are change-
masquerading as a posteriori." (p. 78). Moreover, Brown argues, even in the third
way Aquinas argues that there is more than one necessary being. This argument
able. But God does not depend on anything else. In terms of their
clearly indicates that 'necessary being' does not mean, for Aquinas 'logically nec- own potentiality, Aquinas distinguishes two kinds passive and active.
essary being' (p. 79). This is why Immanuel Kant's criticism of the cosmological Material things are changeable with respect to their having passive
argument, i.e., it is a form of ontological argument, does not apply to Aquinas'
third way (p. 80). Immanuel Kant Critique qf Pure Reason, trans. & eds. Paul Guyer potentiality, i.e., their matter is not fully actualized. Heavenly bod-
and Alien W. Wood (Cambridge, New York, 1998), A606-607, B634-635. ies, however, do not undergo substantial change, since their matter
81 Patterson Brown, "St. Thomas' Doctrine of Necessary Being," pp. 78-80.
is fully actualized. But they change with respect to their place.
Aquinas' conception of necessity and necessary being(s), and his use of modal oper-
ators is a topic of debate among scholars. Aquinas employs necessity in various Immaterial heavenly substances, which are angels, or intellects, are
ways, and he grants that there are necessary beings other than God. If one does also subject to change with respect to their goal and their place.
not take into consideration which kind of necessity Aquinas is concerned about on
a given topic, one is likely to misunderstand him. For a brief survey of Aquinas'
They may change their goal and choose to do evil. They are also
understanding of necessity see J. J. MacIntosh, "Aquinas on Necessity," American subject to change with respect to place; since they are limited beings,
Catholic Philosophical Qyarterly 72/3 (1998), pp. 371-403. they cannot be in all places at once. Thus, they may change from
82 ST la. 2, 3 (Third way).
83 SeC I, 15, [5].
being in this place to being in that place. 88
84 ST la. 2, 3 (First way). Aquinas is more faithful to Aristotle's conception of
necessity than Avicenna. Aquinas places necessity in the nature of things. Necessity
and immutability go hand in hand. Unlike Aristotle and Aquinas, as stated in the
preceding section, Avicenna places necessity in the cause, not in the nature of things. and biblical objections and attempts to supply answers to them see Brian Davies,
Thus, something is immutable inasmuch as it is necessary. Patterson Brown, "St. The Thought qf Thomas Aquinas (Oxford & New York: Oxford University, 1992), pp.
Thomas' Doctrine of Necessary Being," pp. 81-85. 109-117.
85 Aquinas argues for a denial of potentiality and composition in God in ST la. 3, 86 ST la. 9, l.

SeC I, 16 & 18; he argues that God is perfect in ST la. 4. God's immutability is 87 ST la. 9, 2.
______ L~...l __ L_~ _ _ ~ ... ~ ... :~ l-u ~ ................ ......... 1-.. ......1......... ll'.......... ..,. r1~C' .... nC'<."~,......, ."f' hn.t-h ,....h;lncn.......h; .... -::r.l 88 <;:7 T~ Q ?
108 CHAPTER TWO
In all creatures then there exists potentiality of change, either sub-
stantially as with perishable bodies, or in place as with the heavenly
bodies, or in orderedness to a goal and application of power to different
things as with the angels. And in addition there is a changeableness
common to the whole universe of creatures, since whether they exist
or not is subject to the creator's power. So, because God cannot change
in any of these ways, he alone is altogether unchangeable.
89
God Is Eternal
Aquinas' conception of God's eternity conforms to that of Avicenna
in its basic tenets. For Aquinas, God is eternal, and only God is
eternal in the true sense, eternity should not be mixed with time
and identified as omnitemporality. This is, because whereas eternity
is the measure of being, time is the measure of movement. Conse-
quendy that which is eternal is immutable and that which is tempo-
ral is changeable. However, eternity does not mean being atemporal,
or timeless, like numbers, but being free from and above time. Hence,
asserting that God is eternal amounts to saying that God is immutable.
This ultimately amounts to saying that God is self-subsistent being.
On this point Aquinas and Avicenna agree.
Following Aquinas' procedure, let me first state how he contrasts
eternity with time before discussing how he understands God's eter-
nity. In treating God's eternity, Aquinas adopts Boethius' definition
of eternity.90 Having adopted Boethius' definition of eternity, Aquinas
tackles the objections raised against it. Boethius defines eternity:
"Etemiry is the instantaneously whole and peifect possession if unending life·"91
89 ST la. 9, 2.
90 Scholars agree that Aquinas' position regarding God's eternity should be I?cated
within a definite tradition in Western Christian theology. In some respects It may
be traced to ancient Greek and Hellenistic philosophers. Within the Christian tra-
dition, Aquinas followed Augustine (350-430 C.E.), Boethius (480-525 C.E.) and
Anselm (1033-1109 C.E.). See, for example, Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann,
"Eternity," the Joumal if Philosophy 78/8 (1981), pp. 429-434; Brian Davies, 7he
7hought if 7homas Aquinas, pp. 103-104.
91 "Aeternitas est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio." Boethius,
De Consolatione V, prosa 6. PL 63, 858, ed. E. K. Rand, in H. F. Stewart, E. K.
Rand, and S. J. Tester, Boethius: the 7heological Tractates and the Consolation if Philosophy
(London: Heinemann; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1973), p. 422.9-11, quoted in
Eleonore Stump, Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 431. Understanding God's
eternity and even whether eternity is coherent with the conception of God pre-
sented in the Scriptures is one of the areas of serious debate among theologians
and philosophers of religion. Stump and Kretzmann's article, which includes dis-
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 109
Aquinas interprets the parts of this definition of eternity negatively.92
Following Boethius, Aquinas argues that we come to know eternity
through time, as we move from the knowledge of composite things
to the knowledge of simple things. According to him, time and eter-
nity are opposed to each other in two respects: change and limit.
Whereas time is associated with change "as the numbering if bifOre and
qfter in change,"93 eternity is associated with immutability. Change
includes succession, because in changeable things one part, or state,
follows another. Numbering the antecedent and consequent parts of
change gives rise to the notion of time. Based on our knowledge of
time, Aquinas argues that we come to know eternity. Eternity, in
opposition to time, is what an immutable thing has. Since an immutable
thing does not change at all, its mode of existence does not vary at
all. There is no succession and no 'before and after' in such a thing.
As for the second point of opposition between time and eternity,
time is associated with things that have a beginning and an end,
whereas eternity belongs to something that does not have a beginning
or end. 94 Aquinas points out that time is attributed to changing
things, because changing things can be assigned a beginning and an
end. In contrast to time, eternity belongs to unchangeable things be-
cause one cannot assign a beginning and end to them. Hence some-
thing eternal does not have a limit (interminabile) either with respect
cussion of implications of Boethius' paradigmatic definition, and its historical roots
going back to Parmenides (see: pp. 429-434), pioneers the debate in the last quar-
ter of the 20th century. In order to explain the tenability of the conception of eter-
nity of God, they argue for the Eternal-Temporal simultaneity (ET-Simultaneity)
with support from the theory of relativity. Their article has received a wide rang-
ing reaction from philosophers of religion and theologians. David Burrell in his arti-
cle "Eternity" argues that Stump and Kretzmann's efforts to give a new explanation
of eternity hardly goes beyond the traditional conception of eternity. Moreover,
where it goes beyond the traditional conception, it has been subject to severe crit-
icism. Burrrell argues, despite all the merits of the article, that it does not make
any substanti~1 contribution to the conception or deeper understanding of eternity,
because etermty cannot be understood except by one who is eternal. David B.Burrell
"God's Eternity," Faith and Philosophy 1/4 (1984), pp. 394-402. '
92 That Aquinas negatively interprets the components of Boethius' definition is
m~ntained by Mark~s tI: W6rner~ "Der Sinn von .'Ewigkeit' und seine Deutung
be? Thomas von Aqulll, III On~ologze und 7heologze: Bettrage ;:.um Problem der Metaphysik
bet Amtoteles und 7homas von Aqum, ed. M. Lutz-Bachmann Europaische Hochschul-
schriften (Frankfurt: 1988), esp. pp. 93-94 and John C. Yates, the timelessness if God
(London: 1990), pp. 39-40, mentioned in Goris, Free Creatures if an Eternal God,
p.42.
93 Implicit reference to Aristode, Physics IV, 11.220a25.
94 Reference to Aristode, Physics IV, 12.22Ib28.
 110 CHAPTER 1WO
to a beginning or with respect to an end, and it does not have suc-
cession. Not having a limit, as Aquinas suggests, can be reduced to
immutability.95
Mter clarifying the meaning of eternity, Aquinas argues that God
is eternal. For him God is eternal because God is unchangeable.
God's immutability in turn may be reduced to God's self-subsistent
existence. Despite the implications of eternity being possessed by
many things-because eternity runs parallel to immutability-Aquinas
argues that only God is eternal in the proper sense. Moreover, eter-
nity is not some addition to God, because eternity is identical to his
being, or rather to his immutable being. 96 The contrast between time
and eternity amounts to the contrast between motion and being,
which may be traced to ancient Greek thought through Neoplatonic
sources,97 a contrast Aquinas makes explicit in ST.9B Whereas time
measures movement, eternity measures being. Consequently, insofar
as something is not permanent in its being, it is subject to time. Its
endurance is measured by time in accordance with its change. Hence
it is not eternal. This may also be interpreted in the following way:
since God's being is immutable, God's being cannot be measured
by time. God's immutability, in turn, ultimately resides in God's
being self-subsistent being. We should recall Aquinas' argument regard-
ing God's immutability. He argues that God is totally immutable
because, unlike all other things, he is not subject to the power of
anything else. Consequently, God's immutability amounts to his self-
subsistent being. Therefore, eternity exclusively belongs to God,
because only God is self-subsistent being. 99
It should be emphasized that for Aquinas God's being eternal
amounts to God's self-subsitent being, although one can find diverg-
ing elements in Aquinas' treatment of eternity. On the one hand the
95 Aquinas ST la. 10, 1. Aquinas also states that eternity does not simply imply
existence but life. So something that is eternal is living. Living includes activity and
simple existence does not. ST la. 10, 1, ad 2. Stump and Kretzmann argue that
for Boethius something eternal is alive (p. 434). William Lane Craig thinks that
they are wrong in their understanding of Boethius' position. William Lane Craig,
"The Eternal Present and Stump-Kretzmann Eternity," American Catholif; Philosophical
Qyarterry 73/4 (1999), p. 525. But it seems that Aquinas understands Boethius in
the way Stump and Kretzmann do.
96 ST la. 10, 2.
97 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity," p. 431.
98 ST la. 10, 4 ad 3.
99 This is ultimately traceable to God's simplicity, identity of existence and essence.
See David Burrell, Knowing the Unknowable God, pp. 49-50.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE III
definition of eternity (ST la. 10, 1), his explicit statements that eter-
nity properly belongs to God alone (ST la. 10, 3), and that God is
identical with eternity (ST la. 10, 2 ad 3) amounts to saying that
only God is eternal and nothing else is eternal. His statement that
eternity measures being while time measures movement (ST la. 10,
4 ad 3), and his statements that God shares his eternity as he shares
his immutability (ST la. 10, 2 c, and ad 1) imply that eternity accepts
gradation. That is, the more something is immutable, i.e., has things
that are proper to it, the more it is eternal. In this respect the only
thing that sets God apart from all else, and makes eternity properly
belong to God, is that he does not depend on something else in his
being. As mentioned in the previous section on Aquinas' conception
of God's immutability, God's self-subsistent being is what ultimately
distinguishes God from all else and makes him utterly immutable. 100
Thus what makes God properly eternal in exclusion to other things
is that his being is not subject to change because of something else's
power. That is, he does not derive his being from something else,
but is self-subsisting being.
Saying that 'God is eternal' does not in fact express 'what God
really is' in positive terms. The contrast between time and eternity
with regard to our knowledge of them is applicable between tem-
poral beings and God. By negating what time is, i.e., measure of
change, we get what eternity is. By negating the properties of tem-
poral things, change and limit, we get how an eternal being should
be. But what do the results achieved by negation amount to? Do
they amount to a claim about how eternity is, or how an eternal
being can act in time? Aquinas' discussion of eternity is part of the
negative dimension of his theology. 101 Saying that God is eternal does
not express anything positive about how God is, but rather expresses
how God is not.
God is neither sempiternal, nor timeless. Aquinas clearly sets eter-
nity apart from time. If the difference between time and eternity
100 ST la. 9, 2. See also Aquinas' conception of God's infinity, ST la. 7, 1.
101 Harm Goris considers Aquinas' discussion of God's eternity as part of "Aquinas'
project of mapping out 'how God is not'." Goris, Free Creatures, p. 42. David Burrell
argues that eternity is one of the formal features of God besides others, such as
simplicity and immutability. As such, it serves to assert the distinction between God
and all the rest. It does not say how God is directly, like other attributes such as
knowledge, but it indicates God's ontological constitution. David Burrell, Knowing
the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sfnii, Maimonides, Aquinas, pp. 46-50; "God's Eternity," Faith
and Philosoplry, pp. 390-392.
 112 CHAPTER TWO
were only that time has a beginning and an end while eternity lacks
these limits, then time could be part of eternity. Then eternity would
be transformed into sempiternity (aevum, or aeon), or omnitemporal-
ity.102 Eternity is also different from time insofar as "eternity is an
instantaneous whole whilst time is not."I03 Consequently, argues
Aquinas, even if time existed forever it would never be instanta-
neously whole-one could indicate beginnings and endings. 104 God's
eternity should also not be confused with the timelessness of neces-
sary truths. Necessary truths may be immutable, and indifferent to
time and change, but they are not eternal. 105 If we call the mode
of their existence timeless, then eternity does not consist of time-
lessness in this sense. 106 Thus, for Aquinas claiming that God is eter-
nal does not mean that God is timeless, since eternity includes all
times. 107 Relating the eternal Creator to his temporal and/or sem-
piternal creatures fuels debates over topics, such as God's knowledge
of creatures, the beginning of the universe, God's intervention in his-
tory, and so forth.
Aquinas' discussion of the difference between time, aevum, and eter-
nity, which is of Neoplatonic origin, runs parallel to the hierarchi-
cal triple division of being. It is probably the only text of Aquinas
in which we find a similarity to Avicennan texts concerning the issue
of eternity. According to this triple division, God is eternal, things
which are not subject to generation and corruption (i.e., heavenly
102 Richard Dales argues that early medieval commentators minimized the notion
of simultaneity in Boethius' definition with the consequence that eternity came to
mean omnitemporality. Only in the 13th century did the implications of eternity
become the object of philosophical and theological reflection. Richard C. Dales,
"Time and Eternity in the Thirteenth Century," Journal qf the History qf Ideas 49/1
(1988), pp. 27-28.
103 ST la. 10, 4.
104 ST la. 10, 4.
105 ST la. 10, 3 ad 3.
106 Burrell distinguishes between atemporality and eternity: while the former may
be irrelevant to time, it does not include having life, but eternity does: "Other
things, which for one reason or another, may be unaffected by time, or to which
time is irrelevant, may be said to be atemporal (or timeless), but not, properly speak-
ing, eternal. For what eternity adds to timelessness is the 'perfect possession all at
once of limidess life.' Aquinas makes Boethius' celebrated formula his own, and in
doing so explicates it: the 'perfect possession' in question is the identity of the divine
subject with its to-be, the absence of any composition whatsoever, and hence a per-
fect at-one-ness with itself. And such an unrestricted act of existing amounts to 'Iim-
idess life.'." David Burrell, "God's Eternity," p. 393.
107 ST la. 10, 2, ad 4; also see, ST la. 14, 13.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 113
bodies and angels) are in aevum, and things which are subject to gen-
eration and corruption are in time. Hence, aevum lies between eter-
nity and time, absolute immutability and absolute changeability.
Eternity is the measure of a being that is absolutely immutable and
is not accompanied by something changeable. It does not have a
before or an after, and it is not accompanied by before or after at
all. Aevum measures beings like angels which combine unchange-
ableness of substance with changeability of thought, will and place.
It does not have before and after in itself, but it is accompanied by
before and after. Unlike aevum, time measures things that are alto-
gether changeable. 108
God's eternity is almost a restatement of God's otherness from
creatures, based on his simplicity and immutability. Only the eter-
nal being in the proper sense is self-subsistent and absolutely immutable.
It exists all at once, and includes all times. Aquinas' position con-
forms to that of Avicenna in the sense that for both of them God
is the self-subsistent and fully actual being.
God Knows Creatures as well as Himself
Aquinas shares a similar conception of God's knowledge with Avicenna.
Even though there are divergences, they agree that (1) God knows
himself as well as other things by one act of knowledge; (2) God's
knowledge of himself and other things is in accordance with his
being, i.e., it is identical to God's being. It is simple, creative and
eternal.
For Aquinas, like Avicenna's contention, God knows himself and
his knowledge is identical to himself. To establish his claim, Aquinas
employs God's immateriality and actuality. First, he uses the imma-
teriality of God to argue that God is a knower. In a similar man-
ner to Avicenna, he founds knowing on 'being free from matter.'
Freedom from matter, according to Aquinas, is proportionate to hav-
ing knowledge. Since God is absolutely free from matter,109 God
knows to the highest degree. IIO Secondly, he introduces God's actu-
ality in order to explain that in God the knower and the object of
knowledge are identical, i.e., God knows himself through himself. In
108 ST la. 10, S.
109 See for Aquinas' argument for God's being free from matter, ST la. 7, I.
110 ST la. 14, l.
 114 CHAPTER TWO
explaining how God knows himself through himself, Aquinas distin-
guishes two kinds of operations: one in which the object of the oper-
ation is outside the agent, and one in which the object of the operation
is inside the agent. Recalling Aristotle, III Aquinas states that an actual
intelligible is identical with an actual intellect (intelligibile in actu est
intellectus in actu). The object of knowledge and the knowing subject
are not identical if there is potency in either of them, i.e., the know-
ing agent or the object of knowledge. Since there is no potency in
God, in God the knowing intellect and the object of knowledge are
identical. Like Avicenna, for Aquinas God is intellect and intelligi-
ble. 112 In God not only are the knower and the object of knowledge
identical, but also the act of knowing is identical to them. Since God
does not have a form separate from his being-his being is identi-
cal with his essence-and since God's essence (i.e., knower) is iden-
tical with his knowledge, God's being is identical to his act of knowing.
Hence in God, the knower (subject), the thing known (object) and
the act of knowing are identical. l13
Divine knowledge for Aquinas is not limited to God's self-knowl-
edge so as to exclude knowledge of other things. Like Avicenna,
Aquinas locates God's knowledge of other things within God's self-
knowledge. Since other things are the effects of God that fall within
God's creative power, in order for God's self-knowledge to be per-
fect, the knowledge of the effects of his power must be included
within God's self-knowledge. Since God knows other things in him-
self but not in themselves as they exist in re, the manner they are
found in God's knowledge is in accordance with the manner in which
God exists, i.e., immaterially and simply, etc. 114 Since God is sim-
ple, he must have one act of knowing, which includes both his self-
knowledge and knowledge of other things.
III Aristotle, De Anima Ill, 2.426aI6; De Anima Ill, 4. 430a3.
112 ST la. 14, 2.
113 ST la. 14, 4. One can see the similarity between Aquinas' position and that
of Avicenna, if Avicenna's triplet is recalled. God is intellect/intellection ('aql), intel-
ligent ('iiqil), and the object of intellection (ma'qill), or act of knowing, knower, and
the object of knowledge. Avicenna, Metaphysics VIlI.6, p. 357.3-9.
114 ST la. 14, 5. In ScC I, Aquinas' presentation of his position seems closer to
the way Avicenna expresses his position. Aquinas states that God primarily and
essentially knows himself, and through his self-knowledge also knows other things.
One does not see an important change in both Summas regarding this question,
except that his wording in ScC reveals more affinity to Avicenna's expression. SCC
I, 49. See also ST la. 14, 14; ScC I, 48 [7] and [8].
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 115
Another argument for the oneness of God's knowledge can be
found in Aquinas' discussion of whether God can have speculative
knowledge. God's knowledge of things, as a master plan of things
existing in re, is practical knowledge, but it is not only practical but
also speculative. This is a subtle point that one does not see explic-
itly in Avicenna. Aquinas argues that one and the same knowledge
can be both speculative and practical in different respects. Knowledge,
he contends, is speculative if its aim is consideration of truth, and
but not producing something based on this knowledge. However,
knowledge can be in one respect speculative and in another respect
practical. God's knowledge of himself is speculative knowledge, since
another God cannot be produced. God has, however, both specu-
lative and practical knowledge of created things, given that in addi-
tion to the things that he created there are things that God could
create but he has not created and will not create. 115 Ultimately God's
speculative and practical knowledge of things is subsumed within his
knowledge of himself. It is true that, because of his perfect knowl-
edge, God knows things as they are producible (operabilia). However,
given that God knows things other than himself in himself, and that
God's knowledge of himself is speculative knowledge, ultimately God's
knowledge of other things is also speculative. 116 Hence God has one
act of knowledge, i.e., his self-knowledge, which includes his knowl-
edge of other things.
Just as Avicenna felt the need to explain how God could know
many things at once without having many acts of knowledge, Aquinas
discusses whether God's knowledge is discursive. He argues that God
knows other things not from themselves, but in himself. Consequently,
his knowledge of other things is not discursive in the sense of hav-
ing pieces of knowledge succeeding one another. God knows every-
thing at once. ll7 One may compare God's being the cause of things
and having knowledge of things to human knowledge of things based
on a cause-effect relationship. Aquinas considers the objection that,
insofar as human experience goes, knowing effects through their
causes is discursive. Therefore if God knows other things through
himself because he is their cause, then God's knowledge of other
115 ST la. 14, 16.
116 ST la. 14, 16, ad sed contra.
117 ST la. 14, 7.
 116 CHAPTER TWO
things must be discursive. IIB He explains that God's act of knowing
does not depend on temporal succession, nor does it depend on
causal succession. Since God knows other things in himself, by know-
ing himself he does not consider one effect after another. In this
respect, human experience with respect to knowing something through
some other thing cannot be applied to God. We know effects from
causes but not in their causes but God knows them in their causes,
since he is the first cause of everything, and he knows his effects in
himself. llg
Aquinas' argument that God's knowledge is not discursive is largely
harmonious with Avicenna's argument that God's knowledge is sim-
ple, despite apparent differences. On the one hand, Aquinas empha-
sizes that God knows other things 'in himself' and implies that he
does not know them 'from himself.' Otherwise it would suggest a
similarity to the human knowledge of effects from their causes, and
would imply that God's knowledge of other things is discursive.
Avicenna, on the other hand, argues that God's knowledge of other
things is not 'in himself' as constitutive parts of God's knowledge
but 'from himself' as a necessary concomitant of God's self-knowl-
edge. Both aim at securing the simplicity of God's knowledge, even
though they address different concerns because of the difference in
their approach to expressing God's simplicity, an issue which will be
discussed in more detail below.
The discussion I have pursued so far, i.e., that for Aquinas God
has one knowledge of himself and other things, is also a discussion
of God's knowledge being simple and intelligible. 120 What still needs
liB ST la. 14, 7, obj. 2 & 3.
119 ST la. 14, 7.
120 Even though God knows other things .im~a~e:ially an~ simply, ~his. ~oes ?ot
mean that God's knowledge fails to contam mdlVlduals Wlt~ theIr m?IVlduallty,
because, by knowing his essence, God knows essences of all. t~mgs (essentzGS, omnzum).
ST la. 14, 14. Aquinas devotes article 6 in q 14 to emphaslz~ng t~at G?d.s ~?wl­
edge of other things is not universal, but that God knows thmgs m theIr mdlVldu-
ality. He argues that to know something with its fe~tures that a~e .common to many
things but not with its exclusive (speciali) featur.es I~ to know. It Imperfecdy. S.o, ~f
God knew things only in their universal propertIes (z~ unz~ersalz tantum), but. not mdl-
vidually, then God's knowledge-consequendy God s be~ng-would b~ Imp.erfec~.
Since God cannot be imperfect, God must know other thmgs not only m theIr ~nI­
versal features but in their proper, individual existence. Another argument Aqumas
devises to show that God knows things with their specific properties is based on
his theory of participation. First, he affirms that all perfections that are found in
creatures are found in God eminendy (secundum modum excellentem). He argues that
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 117
discussing is the eternity and immutability of God's knowledge of
other things. Even though these can be deduced from God's knowl-
edge being identical to his being as well, some aspects may need
highlighting.
the nature proper to each thing consists in its participation in the divine perfection
to some degree. But God would not know himself perfecdy, if he did not know
how other things participate in his perfection.
. ~~e intel!igibility of God's. knowledge vis-i-vis the extension of his knowledge to
mdlVlduals IS one of the topICS where Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions are con-
sidered to radically diverge. When treating God's knowledge of individuals in ST
la. 14, I I, Aquinas' first objection can be compared to what Avicenna states when
he argues that God's knowledge of material individuals cannot be of material indi-
viduals qua material individuals. In fact, Aquinas has also argued that God knows
things 'as they are in himself' in the sense that they are known in accord with his
~anner of knowing, (ST la. 14, 6 ad I), and hence his manner of being, i.e., God
IS free from matter (ST la. 14, I) and in accord with the way that the intelligible
na.tures (species) of t~ings are included in the divine essence (ST la. 14, 5 ad 3).
WIth reference to Aristotle, he reminds us that the mind grasps universals and the
senses grasp individuals (ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium). (Aristode, De Anima
11, 5.41 7b22). For Avicenna's position, see chapter 2, section I. Another objection
Aquin~s .stat~s is that matter is the principle of individuation. But matter is pure
potentIality, m total contrast to God's being, which is pure actuality. If matter is
the only indispensable condition for material individuals, then God cannot know
their individuality. Whereas Avicenna proposes knowing individuals in a universal
manner, Aquinas argues that unlike humans who need one faculty to know uni-
versals and immaterial things, and another faculty to know individual material things,
God knows both kinds of things by his simple intellect (per suum simplicem intellec-
tum) (ST la. 14, I I). Without mentioning Avicenna's name, Aquinas mentions
Avic.enna's :xa~ple of ho~ particular eclipses can be known through their causes.
Aqumas mamtams that AVlcenna's effort to show how God knows individuals fails.
;\q~i?as refutes .Avicenna's a.rgument on the ground that the forms and powers that
mdiVlduals receIve from theIr causes are not individuated except through individ-
ual matter (materiam individualem). Aquinas argues, in his turn, (a) since God's knowl-
edge of things is their cause and whatever exists is caused by God, only things that
Go.d knows to exis~ can exist. (b) And since God is not only the cause of form,
whIch bears the unIversal conception (ratio universalis), but also the cause of matter
by which things are individuated, God's knowledge must include individuals:
Con?nuin? ~is explan~tion, A<:juinas reiterates that (c) God's essence, as the pro-
d~ctIve pnnClpl: (pnn~zpzuTTl; actzvum) of things, must be a sufficient principle to know
things not only m theIr unIversal natures but also in their individuality. I think one
can find all three arguments (a, b, c) in Avicenna too, with regard to God's being
no.t only the. c~use of forms but also the cause of matter, God's self-knowledge
bemg the pnnClple of both the knowledge and the existence of individual things.
Furt~ermore, Avicenna's example of an astronomer knowing particular eclipses in
a unIversal manner seems to have been misunderstood. Avicenna's example seems
t? be intended t? be an example to illustrate what intellectual knowledge of par-
~culars ca~ be lIke. In. the Ishariit, VII, pp. 182-.183, Avicenna clarifies his posi-
tIon by notIn/? that parucula.r events ma~ be d.etermmed by supplying their particular
causes. In this case, a partIcular matenal thmg may be known with the inclusion
of its particula~ matte:. So ?ven. if we do not take it to. be a simple example, it
would be fine, smce AVlcenna s pomt seems to be that God IS not something temporal
 118 CHAPTER TWO
In accord with God's eternity, God's knowledge of other things is
also eternal, i.e., all that is known about creatures is known as one
simultaneous whole, embracing the whole of time. 121 Having argued
that time is something included within eternity, Aquinas continues,
God surveys all things as they are in their presence to him. 122 In
accordance with God's eternity, God's knowledge is necessary.123
Aquinas does not specifically discuss the necessity of God's knowl-
edge in this context, but the necessity of God's knowledge is as-
sumed, probably because it can be deduced from God's eternity and
immutability.
The fact that God's knowledge is identical to his substance, not
something additional, is also the basis for Aquinas' argument that
God's knowledge is not changeable. 124 If one argues for the immutabil-
ity of God's knowledge, the immediate objection to this position con-
cerns how to explain the changeable creatures of God in relation to
the unchangeable knowledge of God. This is again a concern com-
mon to Avicenna and Aquinas. They propose similar solutions as
well. One of Aquinas' objections is as follows: Knowledge implies a
and his knowledge of temporal material things cannot be like the knowledge that
temporal things have of temporal things. In any case, in Ishiiriit, p. 185, Avicenna
states that even if God's knowledge of particulars must be above time and sempi-
ternity, God knows particulars in a sacred (muqaddas) manner. The existence of par-
ticular temporal things is identical to the divine execution (qadar) of God's primal
(al-awwal) decree (qarfii'uhu). If they were not necessary, they would not be. This
may be compared to Aquinas' statement in ST la. 14, II ad I. Aquinas states that
the intelligible species, or likeness, of the divine intellect-which is identical to the
divine essence-is not immaterial by abstraction that takes place later on, but imma-
terial by itself Thus, it is the principle of essential elements entering into compo-
sition in composite things, whether it be principle of species, or be principle of
individuation. Hence, God knows particulars as well as universals through this intel-
ligible species, or likeness, which is his essence.
121 ST la 14 13
122 ST la: 14: 13.' Aquinas contends that the eternal presence of temporal things
to God does not simply mean that God has their intelligible natures present in
himself. The editor-translator of this volume, Thomas Gornall, notes that Aquinas'
contention refers to Avicenna's position. Aquinas' manner of explaining the atem-
poral nature of God's knowledge may be different from that of Avicenna. Avicenna
argues that time is a corollary of movement and things subject to movement. God's
knowledge cannot be subject to time, absolutely free from matter and its attach-
ments as he is. However, it does not mean that time and eternity are mutually
exclusive, such that an eternal being does not know anything regarding temporal
things or what happens in time.
123 ST la. 14, 13, ad I & 3.
124 ST la. 14, 15.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 119
relation to the object of knowledge. Since creatures, which are the
objects of God's knowledge, are in time, and creatures are subject
to change, then God's knowledge of them must change as well. l25
Aquinas' answer to this objection is that the reference of God's
knowledge of creatures is not to creatures as they exist in re but as
they are known by God in himself. Hence, God's relation to things
as his objects of knowledge does not imply a change in God. In a
sense, Aquinas' argument amounts to saying that God's knowledge
of things is independent of their actual existence in re. 126
Aquinas considers God's knowledge of other things to be the cause
of their existence. God's knowledge of other things, he maintains, is
to created things what the knowledge of an artisan is to his artifacts.
Just as the artisan makes the artifacts through the form he has in
mind, God's knowledge of other things functions as the principle of
his creative action (principium actionis). However, taken by itself, an
intellectual form does not indicate that it will be made to exist out-
side God's knowledge. Furthermore, an intellectual form-as some-
thing theoretical and speculative-is indifferent to determinate objects,
because it includes opposites at once. Aquinas concludes that God
is the cause of things by his intellect together with his will. 127
Theological Language Revisited: Talking About God
in the Light if Divine Formal Features
Talking about the simple God in non-simple human terms is one of
the places where Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas have quite divergent
125 ST la. 14, 15, obj. I.
126 I~ this context,. one must note a difference between Avicenna and Aquinas.
For AVlcenna all attnbutes of God are eternal, as God's being is. Avicenna defends
his position by simply stating that God's existence is independent of the existence
of thi~gs in re. Aquinas, however, defends his position by arguing that some names
are Said of God eternally, and some names are said in time. Whereas, for Aquinas,
God's knowledge and love exemplifY the former kind of divine names, God's being
Creator and Lord exemplifies the latter kind of the divine names. Whereas the for-
mer indicates God's relations resulting from God's act that is known to be in God
the latter arises from the existence of things in re, because of God's action which
takes its objects as existing in themselves, but not in God. Hence whereas the for-
mer do not accept change, the latter allow change of relation in accordance with
the change in things existing in re. See: ST la. 14, 15, ad I; ST la. 13, 7.
127 ST la. 14, 8.
120 CHAPTER TWO
positions. Simplicity, as I have discussed, is one of the divine formal
features acknowledged by both Avicenna and Aquinas. They share
a similar conception of the simplicity of God. However, they go in
the opposite directions regarding how to talk about God in confor-
mity with divine simplicity, necessity and other divine formal fea-
tures. Given divine simplicity, on which ground are we justified in
attributing to God properties, which we know as existing in com-
posite beings and through our human conditions? How can God
have many perfection properties? In the face of these questions,
divine formal features play a different role in the positions of Avicenna
and Aquinas regarding theological language.
In order to hold together divine simplicity despite the plurality
and creaturely aspects of properties predicated of God, Avicenna
attempts to show that (1) they are ultimately reducible to divine pure
being, and (2) they are properties attributed to God in relation to
creation, i.e., they do not have to be conceived in the manner they
are found in creatures. Aquinas, however, emphasizes the concep-
tual difference among divine perfection properties, despite the exis-
tential unity and identity. He argues that human ways of signifYing
do not, and need not, match divine properties. This is supported by
his theory of analogical predication.
In addition to divine simplicity, other divine formal features, such
as necessity and eternity, also affect theological language and argu-
mentation. Here the central issue seems to be limited to modifying
the meaning of perfection terms. Thus the meaning divine perfec-
tion properties and rational assessment of theological statements which
feature them seem to be major issues in this regard. For example,
we may have to think extraordinary ways to conceive of divine will,
vis a vis divine necessity. God does not simply have will, but God
has necessary will. As a result, we may not draw all the implications
of the property of will but make the adjustments required by divine
necessity.
Still, divine simplicity modifies the whole approach to theological
language, including the manner in which other formal features, such
as necessity and immutability, are taken into account. The role one
assigns to divine simplicity with regard to theological language deter-
mines how and to what extent divine perfection properties are modified
by divine formal features other than simplicity. Avicenna thinks that
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 121
divine perfection properties must be considered only insofar as they
are modified in the light of other divine formal features. For exam-
ple, divine will can be considered only insofar as it is necessary.
Aquinas however takes divine perfection properties, both in the light
of divine formal features and on their own.
Concerned with keeping divine simplicity intact, Avicenna takes a
reductive and relativizing strategy regarding divine perfection prop-
erties, attempting to show how they are reducible to divine being.
He argues that divine perfections are said of God in relation to crea-
tures despite his explicit discussions attributing various perfections to
God. In explaining how various properties are attributed to God
without falling into anthropomorphism Avicenna attempts to show
that all attributes reside in one single or simple thing. For him the
only property predicated of God in himself is 'being.'128 All other
properties predicated of God either indicate a relation to creation,
or consist of a negation denying something creaturely of God. As a
result, Avicenna tries to show that all that is attributed to God can
be reduced ultimately to a 'self-subsistent pure being.' His guiding
principle seems to be this: since God's perfections are all one and
simple in being, our conception of God's perfections should be in
accordance with God's simplicity. Thus differently conceived per-
fections may be reduced to a simple origin: 'being with the condi-
tion of negation.'129
Avicenna's attempt to show how all that is said of God is reducible
to being can easily be seen in his elaborations of various attributes
of God. For example, when he talks about God's being perfect, he
first states that God is the perfect, or complete being, even above
being perfect. And he explains 'being perfect,' in terms of having
being. God is perfect, or above perfection, because he has all the
being that belongs to him as well as to other beings. 13o The same
reasoning is applied in explaining that God is good, and that he is
true or real (baqq), which are reduced to being. 131 God is good not
128 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 367.12-15.
129 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIllA, p. 347.9-10.
130 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.6~ 1O. Aquinas shares Avicenna's position.
Aquinas, ST la. 4, 2.
131 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.11 ~ p. 356.15.
 122 CHAPTER TWO CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 123

only because he is necessary of existence by himself, but also because
he bestows the perfection and goodness of all other things. God is
true or real (baqq) since he is necessary of being, hence the belief in
his existence is true and is always true. He also mentions in pass-
ing the correlation between 'being' and 'being in act.' That is, in-
activity is the result of non-being. 132 Thus 'being in act' may also be
reduced to being.
Avicenna includes among divine attributes that God is a pure
intellect and pure intelligible. His explanation of God's being an
intellect has two implications, one a negation and the other an affir-
mation. He reduces it to immateriality. God is a pure intellect/intel-
lection (Caql) because he is a being separate from matter in all respects.
Since it is matter and its attachments (Calii/iq) that prevents some-
thing to know and be known,133 God is a pure intellect and a pure
intelligible. He argues that God's being an intellectlintellection (Caql),
an intelligizer (knower) (Ciiqil) and an object of intellection (maCqul) at
once l34-or knowledge/knowing, knower and object of knowledge-
does not imply any composition. For Avicenna, these three names
indicate one and the same thing. They are coined only because of
different points of view. One and the same thing considered "inso-
far as it is a separate entity (huwiy)'atan), it is an intellect;" "consid-
ered insofar as this separate entity (huwiyya) belongs to its essence (li
dhiitihi), it is an object of intellection belonging to its essence (dhiit);"
and "considered insofar as its essence belongs to itself (lahu) as a sep-
arate entity, it is an intelligizer (Ciiqil) of its essence (dhiit)."135 Avicenna
underlines that they, i.e., caql, Ciiqil and maCqul, mutually imply each
other. That is, an caql by definition is something that has knowledge,
or an act which involves knowledge, and is an object of knowledge,
etc. 136 As they are 'correlative' concepts one cannot exist without the
existence of the other.
As a divine attribute, God's being an intellect, deserves special
attention. This is because, on the one hand, God's being an intel-
lect is one of the properties that Avicenna reduces to being. On the
other hand, God is said to be an intellect in relation to creation,
since divine knowledge is the ultimate source of the existence of
other things. As I have discussed above, for Avicenna things exist
because God knows them to exist. Thus divine knowledge seems to
be at the junction of divine attributes which Avicenna reduces to
being and those which he considers to be said of God in relation
to creation. Conforming to his reductive strategy, Avicenna reduces
divine perfection properties that are attributed to God in relation to
creation to divine knowledge. Divine knowledge is in turn reduced
to divine being. In this way all divine attributes are reduced to divine
pure being.
In conformity with his strategy of reducing divine attributes to
pure being, Avicenna also argues that divine perfection properties
which are said of God in relation to creation are not conceptually
different from each other. From the 'existential identity of divine
attributes to the divine essence and to each other' Avicenna arrives
at the 'conceptual identity' of divine attributes. 137 He argues that
divine will is identical to divine knowledge not only in terms of exis-
tence but also in terms of conception. He attempts to show how
various divine perfection properties are reducible to divine knowl-
edge. For example, to say that God has power means that God
knows everything as an intellect and that he is the origin (mabda') of
everything by himself (bi dhiitihi). Avicenna also examines the difference
between 'life' as found in creatures and as found in God. Life as
found in God, he argues, depends on apprehension and action. In
the case of human beings, each of these two actions stems from a
different source. But insofar as God is concerned, they do not come
from different sources, since in God the perfections are identical to
his essence. If apprehension and action, which perfect life in us, are
identical, then God's knowledge, God's willing and God's act of cre-
ation are identical. I38
Avicenna's interpretation of divine attributes, when he explains the
existence of creatures, indicates his commitment to the conceptual
as well as existential identity of the divine attributes to each other.

132 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.15 - p. 356.5.

133 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 356.16 - p. 357.2. 137 For the assertion of a conceptual as well as existential identity of the divine
134 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 357.3-5. attributes, See Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 367.7-12; Nqjat, ed. Majid Fakhry
135 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 357.5-7. (Beirut: 1985), p. 287.3-12.
136 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 6, p. 357.13-20. 138 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.11-17.
124 CHAPTER TWO
Avicenna examines the relationship between knowing something and
having the power to make it. In case of human beings, knowing
something and making it are different. Man knows, but the fact that
he knows does not mean that what this man conceives of becomes
immediately realized. But as far as God is concerned, since his know-
ing is identical with his having power to make what he knows to
be realized, God's knowledge of something is identical to his making
it. Whereas human beings need to will in order to make the thing
that they know, God does not need an additional will to make it. 139
Thus we have the reduction of 'power' and 'will' of God to knowl-
edge of God.
Avicenna's commitment to the conceptual identity of the divine
attributes accords with his commitment to consider the divine perfec-
tions insofar as they are modified not only by divine simplicity but
also other divine formal features such as necessity. As a result of his
strategy to reduce all attributes of God to God's being, he maintains
the conceptual identity of divine perfection properties. Given his
argument for the conceptual identity of divine perfection properties,
Avicenna does not, and indeed could not, emphasize the difference
between divine perfection properties. For example, he could not
underline the difference between God's knowledge and will in the
manner Aquinas does. For Avicenna, God does not have will but
necessary will. Consequently, Avicenna does not distinguish between
what there is and what there could be, even though he believes that
God is omniscient, omnipotent, and has free will. This can be con-
trasted to Aquinas' use of the distinction between God's power con-
sidered absolutely and God's power as determined to something. 140
Aquinas' theory of analogical predication plays an important part
in securing divine simplicity despite the inadequacy of human lan-
139 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.18 - p. 367.2.
140 Aquinas distinguishes between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity in
examining the claims for the necessity of the world. His arguments are grounded
on his appreciative strategy which does not require that the divine perfections be
considered only insofar as they are modified according to the divine formal fea-
tures, such as necessity and eternity. Lawrence Moonan discusses Aquinas' distinc-
tion between the divine power 'considered absolutely,' and 'considered as determined
to something.' Lawrence Moonan, Divine Power (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994),
pp. 265-295. His discussion recalls Aquinas' distinction between the divine will con-
sidered absolutely, and considered together with the divine formal features.
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 125
guage to express it. While discussing divine simplicity, in ST la. 3, 6,
Aquinas discusses whether God is a composite of subject and acci-
dents. Aquinas rejects the position that in God there can be acci-
dents by arguing (1) that accidents realize a potentiality of their
subject, but God does not have a potency at all; (2) that God is
identical with existence and nothing can be added to existence; and
(3) that accidents are caused by the principles of the subject (acci-
dentia causantur ex principiis subjecti), and since God is the first cause,
there cannot be accidents in God. 141 One objection to this is that
something accidental cannot be a substance, such as heat is acci-
dental to hot things. Since the perfections, such as wisdom and
power, are accidental in man, they must be accidental in God toO. 142
In his reply to this objection, Aquinas states that perfections, such
as power and wisdom, are not predicated of God and of us 'uni-
vocally.' Since they are not predicated univocally, the fact that they
are accidents in us does not require that they be accidents when
they are predicated of God. 143
The theory analogical predication makes Aquinas able to main-
tain an appreciative strategy concerning the predication of pure per-
fections of God. With the theory of analogical predication Aquinas
was comfortable to maintain that God is simple, and that pure per-
fections are found in God and they are predicated of God properly.
Certainly, the mode of signification in human language does not
compete with the mode in which perfections are found in God,
because the mode of signification in human language is proper only
to the mode in which perfections are found in creatures. Predication
of perfections of God and of creatures are analogical exactly because
the mode of signification in human language does not conform to
the manner perfections are found in God. Consequently, although
God's perfections are identical to God's essence and each other exis-
tentially, we can talk about them without damaging divine simplicity
and without modifying them to the point of being reducible to divine
pure being. Indeed, Aquinas argues that these perfection properties
differ from each other conceptually, since each indicates God from
141 ST la. 3, 6; De Potentia VII, 4.
142 ST la. 3, 6, obj. 1.
143 ST la. 3, 6, ad 1; De Potentia VII, 4, ad 3.
126 CHAPTER TWO
CONCEPTION OF GOD AND THEOLOGICAL LANGUAGE 127

a specific respect. His theory of analogical predication allows Aquinas by divine formal features and on their own. Their positions with
to maintain that we talk about God without reducing divine per- regard to any particular theological-metaphysical question must be
fections to the divine being and without damaging God's simplicity. understood in the light of this underlying difference. The issue of
Aquinas acknowledges at the outset that neither our knowledge of the nature of divine creative action which is the topic of the fol-
God nor the way we express this knowledge can conform to God's lowing chapter is going to provide a good example in this regard.
mode of being. Hence, he does not feel the need to modify divine
perfections in accordance with the divine formal features so that they
can be predicated of God. Avicenna, however, has difficulties in
explaining how he can maintain that 'God is simple,' and also that
'God has perfections.' In order to keep divine simplicity intact,
Avicenna argues not only for the existential identity of God's attrib-
utes to God himself and each other, but also argues for the con-
ceptual identity of each to the others. As a result, he attempts to
modify the divine perfections in the light of the divine formal fea-
tures by reducing them to pure being.

Conclusion if Chapter Two

I have attempted to show that Avicenna and Aquinas share similar

insights concerning God's simplicity, necessity, immutability and eter-
nity. Furthermore, for both of them God's knows himself and crea-
tures, God's knowledge of things is the cause of their existence.
Moreover, God's knowledge of things is in accord with how God is,
i.e., simple, eternal and so on. Having argued that Avicenna and
Aquinas have similar conceptions of divine formal features and divine
knowledge will help us better understand and examine their argu-
ments regarding the nature of the creative act and the beginning of
the world.
Although Avicenna and Aquinas have similar conceptions of divine
formal features, they follow very different paths with regard to theo-
logical language in light of these features. As part of his reductive
strategy, in order to keep divine perfection properties separate from
creaturely perfection properties, i.e., to keep them unaffected by the
imperfection of human knowledge and talk of God, Avicenna con-
siders divine perfection properties only insofar as they are modified
in the light of the divine formal features. Contrary to such a reduc-
tive strategy based on divine formal features, Aquinas takes divine
perfection properties into account both insofar as they are modified
 PART TWO

TALKING ABOUT CREATION

 CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION

In the first and second chapters I attempted to establish that there

is a shared ground between Avicenna and Aquinas on the basis of
which one can compare their theories regarding creation. I have also
underlined the difference between their positions concerning theo-
logical language. In this chapter, I will discuss Avicenna's and Aquinas'
conception of the act of creation. To be more precise, I will try to
identify whether the act of creation is likened to acts stemming from
nature or acts stemming from will. According to the prevalent inter-
pretation, for Avicenna God's creative action is similar to the actions
of things acting through their natures. Aquinas, however, is credited
with the second alternative. I will argue that this sharp distinction
between Avicenna's position and that of Aquinas regarding the char-
acterization of the act of creation is unwarranted, since they agree
on the basic issues. For both of them, (1) God creates by will, (2)
God primarily and essentially wills himself, and his volition con-
cerning the universe is subsumed in his self-volition, (3) the universe
is not the end of God's will, and (4) God does not need to create
in order to be what he is, i.e., God's being and goodness do not
depend on the existence of other things.
However, Avicenna and Aquinas reached different conclusions
regarding the necessity of the actual universe, or regarding God's
freedom to create and to choose. For Avicenna there is a strong
relationship between God's being and the actual universe. He argues
that all existing things are necessary concomitants of the essence of
God. This argument has two plausible implications. The first is the
necessity of the universe. If God's essence necessitates other things,
then they are necessary. Thus God has to create. Second, God wills
only the actual universe. Or more precisely, God could not have
willed a different universe because this universe is necessitated by
God's essence. Aquinas argues, contrary to Avicenna, that since God
creates by will and the universe is not the end of God's will, the
universe is not necessary, i.e., God does not have to create. Moreover,
God knows himself to be imitable by creatures in infinitely many
132 CHAPTER THREE
ways. Although this universe is the actual one, God has free choice
regarding which things or universe to create. For Aquinas, the uni-
verse is hypothetically necessary, i.e., if it is considered together with
the eternity and immutability of God's will. I will argue that the
unspecified necessity of the universe in Avicenna's thought corre-
sponds to the hypothetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas' sys-
tem. This can be shown on the basis of their positions regarding
theological language, discussed in previous the chapters.
Avicenna's Position: Creation is Voluntary and Necessary
In Avicenna's account of creation, one does not find the detailed
and complex explanations found in Aquinas' account. This is partly
attributable to Avicenna's reductive strategy regarding our knowl-
edge of God. Since our knowledge of the perfections we attribute
to God is derived from our knowledge of creation, he limits himself
to what is given, i.e., there is the existing world, which is not self-
existing. He also considers divine will together with how it is, i.e.,
necessary and immutable. For him, creation is a voluntary act, but
the divine will is different from the human will, because it is sim-
ple, immutable and eternal. Moreover, the world is not the end of
God's will. God's being and goodness do not depend on the exis-
tence of the universe; the universe necessarily follows from the essence
of God, who is a knowing and willing being. Even though God's
will is independent of any factor motivating him to will creatures,
and even though God's being and perfection are independent of the
existence of other things, the universe is necessary. Since the uni-
verse, considered in itself, is contingent and since God's being and
goodness do not depend on the existence of other things, the neces-
sity of the universe in Avicenna's argument is the result of his posi-
tion regarding theological language. That is, since he considers divine
perfection properties only insofar as they are modified by the divine
formal features, God's will to create and to create this universe is
necessary and eternal. Consequently this universe is necessary.
Avicenna usually is considered to have held that God's creative
action is similar to the actions of natural things acting through their
natures. This interpretation of Avicenna's position is supported by
his denial of intention to God in creation and by his claim that the
universe is necessary. Despite this, for Avicenna creation is a vol-
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 133
untary action. When he argues that God cannot have an intention
in creation, he simply wants to state that other things do not con-
stitute a final cause for God. Furthermore, the necessity of the uni-
verse does not make the act of creation like the actions of natural
beings. Nor does it take God's freedom away, since for Avicenna
the necessity of the universe is neither imposed on God from out-
side, nor is it required by something internal to God. The existence
of the universe, as well as the form the universe takes, is necessary
because God is necessary in all respects.
In the following, I will first state an interpretation of Avicenna's
position concerning creation shared by many scholars. Then I will
introduce Avicenna's conception of the divine will, and his account
of why and how things other than God exist. I will also explore the
sense in which God is a free creator for Avicenna, and how he rec-
onciles the necessity of the universe with divine freedom. Without
attempting to question the validity of Avicenna's arguments for divine
freedom vis a vis his act of creation, I will rather show how creation
is a voluntary action for Avicenna, even though he argues that God
has no intention in creation and that the universe is necessary.
Interpretation if Avicenna's Position
To distinguish the theistic conception of God from the Neoplatonic,
pagan, conceptions of God, some contemporary scholars employ
strategic pairs of opposites: necessary emanation versus creation, eter-
nal versus created universe, God as natural agent versus God as free
creator.! In this context, one may easily contrast Avicenna's theory
of emanation to voluntary creation in reference to how the universe
comes to exist. Following this contrast, emanation denies intention
to the efficient cause and implies the necessity of the effect, whereas
creation as a voluntary action bespeaks the intention of the efficient
cause as well as the contingency of the effect.
I For these assumptions see for example, Thomas Aquinas, Aquinas on Creation:
Writings on the "Sentences" if Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Qyestion 1, "Introduction"
by translators, pp. 1-20; Herbert A. Davidson, Proqft, p. I footnote: I; Rudi A. Te
Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas (Leiden & New York: E. J.
Brill, 1995), pp. llO-1l1. Cf. Andrew Louth, The Origins if the Christian Mystical
Tradition )Tom Plato to Denys (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981). He underlines the affinity of
Greek Fathers to Neoplatonic thought.
134 CHAPTER THREE
Avicenna is regularly presented as insisting that God creates by
the necessity of nature. The term "nature" in the expression "neces-
sity of nature" may be understood as nature in inanimate things like
fire or stone. It may also be taken in the sense of the essence or
quiddity of anything that exists. In inanimate things nature is the
principle of action. They act on account of their natures because
they do not have the volition or desire with which animate beings
are endowed. Let us take fire as an example. The characteristic
action of fire is to burn. Obviously fire cannot refrain from burn-
ing. Within the natural order, ceteris paribus, fire acts by way of nat-
ural necessity in burning. Avicenna's position is usually associated
with nature in this sense.
In a detailed study discussing Avicenna's theory of creation, Beatrice
H. Zedler2 employs the term "nature" in this sense of acting through
nature as opposed to acting through will. In this article, Zedler sup-
ports the thesis that Aquinas wrote the De potentia as a Christian
reply to Avicenna's theory of emanation. 3 Zedler interprets Aquinas'
2 Beatrice H. Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De Potentia Dei',"
Traditio VI (1948), pp. 105-159. The idea that for Avicenna creation is like a nat-
ural action is the popular interpretation of Avicenna's position among scholars. In
a passing reference, Etienne Gilson, when discussing Duns Scotus' conception of
the function of the divine will and intellect with regard to creatures, writes:
"Exterminating Avicenna's necessitarianism at its very root Duns Scotus proves,
therefore, that far from flowing from the first being in virtue of any natural law,
creatures could not even have any distinct ideas in the first being without a free
intervention of His will." Etienne Gilson, TIe Spirit if Mediaeval Philosophy, trans.
A. H. C. Downes (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1991), p. 255. In
a similar fashion Oliver Leaman presents Avicenna's conception of creation, as
though, for Avicenna things were planned by something other than God and God
said yes and had to do so. Consequently, God plays hardly any part in the exis-
tence of things. "For the latter [i.e., Avicenna], God is the ultimate cause of every-
thing which exists, but it is not clear whether, once a thing has passed the test of
possibility, God can prevent it from coming into existence. God is rather in the
position of a constitutional monarch, who is required to sign the legislation passed
by parliament, which makes the legislation 'royal', so legal. But all that the crown
does in this sort of situation is rubber-stamp, as it were, a decision which has already
been taken elsewhere." Oliver Leaman, A Brig Introduction to Islamic Philosophy
(Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 44. Although Arthur Hyman does not clearly articu-
late why the necessity opposes the divine will, he assumes a sharp opposition. He
argues that by holding that God created through the divine will, Maimonides dis-
agrees with Aristotle, "as well as with the emanationists, who affirmed that the
world emanated from God by necessity." Arthur Hyman "Maimonides on Creation
and Emanation," in Studies in Medieval Philosphy, ed. John F. Wippel (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987), pp. 50-51.
3 Zedler, op. cit., pp. 108-109.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 135
many arguments as being directed against Avicenna's teachings, spe-
cifically that the world as eternal and necessary presumes that God
acts ex necessitate naturae.+ As Zedler argues, Aquinas traces Avicenna's
insistence on the principle: "from one only one can proceed," to
Avicenna's conception of God's creative action: God acts by neces-
sity of nature. s The fact that Avicenna assimilates God's creative
action to natural actions may also be observed from Aquinas' identi-
fication of natural action. Aquinas states throughout the De potentia
that "Nature is determined to one effect," and "explains this as mean-
ing that nature is determined to one thing, both as regards what is
produced by the power of nature and as regards producing or not
producing."6 Since for Avicenna emanation is necessary, God has to
create, and to create this actual universe. This confirms the con-
tention that God acts by the necessity of nature.
Zedler explains away the passages in which Avicenna states that
God's action is not like natural actions. On Zedler's interpretation,
Avicenna's denial is not directed to the nature of natural things, but
rather intends to deny that God's nature (intelligence) has any part
in his act of creation, since for Avicenna, things are concomitants
of God. This means, however, that "the production of the world is
accomplished almost in spite of Him." Hence Aquinas' understanding
of Avicenna's account of God's creative action, i.e., that God acts
by the necessity of nature, was correct. 7 Combined with necessity of
the universe, Avicenna's denial of intention to God in creation would,
according to this interpretation, confirm the thesis that for Avicenna
creation is not a voluntary action but a natural one. Avicenna's
adherence to the principle that "from one only one can proceed"
reflects this point. Since for Avicenna God does not intend what
emanates from him, the things that emanate from him can only be
in accordance with the divine simplicity, which suggests comparing
emanation to a natural agent producing an effect similar to it. Thus,
for example fire, being devoid of intention, cannot design its effect,
but simply produces something similar to itself. 8 Since intention is
4 Zedler, Ibid., p. 113.
5 Zedler, Ibid., pp. 114-115.
6 Zedler, Ibid., p. 115.
7 Zedler, Ibid., pp. 121-122.
8 Zedler, Ibid., pp. 114-115.
136 CHAPTER THREE
found only in voluntary agents, if an agent lacks intention, its action
cannot stem from volition. This, in turn, implies that the divine
knowledge does not have a part in creation. Since willing and inten-
tion are based on knowledge, if one denies that God is an inten-
tional or a voluntary creator, then divine knowledge can have no
part in creation. Hence Avicenna's contention that the universe is
necessary and that God does not intend anything in creating appar-
endy support interpreting his position that creation is a natural action,
and not a voluntary one based on knowledge. 9
God Creates by Will not by Nature
Before beginning to discuss how Avicenna explains creation of the
universe and the role divine will plays in the act of creation, it is
proper to state that for Avicenna God's will is in accordance with
his being, following the identity of God's attributes with his being.
That is (1) God's will is simple; God has one act of self-will which
includes God's willing of other things; (2) nothing else is the end of
God's will, so it does not depend on anything external; (3) God's
will is necessary, eternal and immutable. Avicenna takes the divine
will into account only insofar as it is understood together with these
divine formal features.
Since the divine will is simple, God has one act of will. God pri-
marily wills and loves himself, and God's willing of other things must
be subsumed under his self-willing. lO Besides being simple, God's will
is eternal and immutable, following from his eternity and his being
pure act without any potency. Avicenna touches on the eternity and
9 David B. Burrell, siding with L. Gardet, contrasts Avicenna's theory of nec-
essary emanation to intentional creation, and argues that Avicenna's and Al-Farabi's
insistence on the 'from one only one can proceed' is because of "an insufficiendy
intentional view of the divine nature." Louis Gardet, La pensee religieuse d'Avicenne (Ibn
Sinal (Paris: J. Vrin, 1951), pp. 157-158, as cited by David B. Burrell, "God's
Eternity," Faith and Philosophy 1/4 (1984), p. 395. Necessary emanation for Burrell
may not even be counted as divine action. See op. cit., p. 404. I agree with Burrell
and Gardet that Avicenna did not pursue the logical consequences of his concept
of God as pure intelligible being. But I would not say that for Avicenna God acts
by necessity of nature, devoid of willing and intention, because all Avicenna aims
at is to distinguish between creaturely volition and divine volition. As will be dis-
cussed below, neither for Avicenna nor for Aquinas are other things the end of the
divine will.
IQ Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 4, p. 363.14-16; VIII. 7, p. 366.12-13; Avicenna,
Ta'liqiit, p. 157 "God is self-lover"; Avicenna, Nqjiit, p. 286.8-19.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 137
immutability of the divine will in various contexts, albeit indirecdy,
but notably to support the contention that God creates eternally.
Since creation can be traced back to the divine will, if God's will
were not eternal and immutable, then God would be subject to
change, or, in other words, receptive and in need of something exter-
nal in order to be an efficient cause. Since God is eternal and since
there is no change in God, God's action must also be eternal. ll If
God did not will eternally to create, nothing would be created because
this implies a change both in God's will and in God's knowledge,
due to the identity of will and knowledge in God. 12
In fact, Avicenna explicidy argues that creation is a voluntary
action, following upon God's knowledge of things, which follows from
God's self-knowledge. 13 God's will is the cause of the existence and
the order of things. However, Avicenna is much concerned lest the
divine will should be put on a par with human will.
The First knows (ya<qilu) his essence, and the order (nil-iim) of good
existing (al-mau!Jud) in everything (fi al-kull), i.e., how it [i.e.,every-
thing] is according to this order, since he knows (ya<qiluhu) it [i.e.,
everything] as something emanating (mustqfir/), becoming (kii'in) and
existing (mau!Jud). And everything that is known to be (ma<lum al-kawn),
and the direction of [its] coming to be (jiha al-kawn) on account of
Can) its place of origin is known by «inda) its principle. And it [i.e.,
everything that is known to be] is good, and is not contradictory (ghG;)!r
muniij) [to good], since it [i.e., everything that is known to be] follows
(tiibn the goodness of the essence of the principle and its perfection,
which are loved in themselves (li dhiitG;)!hima). And this thing [i.e., what
emanates from the principle] is that which is willed (muriid). However,
the object of volition (muriid) of the First is not in the manner of our
object of volition (muriidinii) , such that he would have an aim (gharar/)
in what comes to be (yakun) because of him «anhu). It appears that
you know its impossibility, and you will know [more]. On the con-
trary, he is the wilIer (murfd) of his essence (li dhiitihi). This kind of
pure intellectual «aqliyya) volition (iriida) and this life of his, similarly,
are identical to him (bi <G;)!nihi).14
This passage can be divided into two parts. In the first part Avi-
cenna asserts God's knowledge of things, and in the second part how
II Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, pp. 373, 376-377; see also Avicenna, Metaphysics
VLl, p. 263; VI.2, p. 266.
12 See, Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 358.14 - p. 359.2; Avicenna, Ta'liqiit,
p. 158.
13 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.16.
14 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 7, p. 366.8-13.
138 CHAPTER THREE
God's will IS related to things. In the first part Avicenna states that
(1) God knows himself, (2) God knows the order by which all things
exist, and (3) God knows everything that exists as well as how they
exist. In the second part Avicenna attempts to explain how the divine
will is related to things. God's will is not directed at the emanation
of things primarily, but as God's self-knowledge includes his being
the principle, the creator of things, it also includes the knowledge
of things to be created. God's essence and perfection are loved in
themselves so God's essence is what is willed. Other things come to
exist through God's self-volition. They are known and willed, but
they are not a final cause for God's will. By willing himself, God
also wills the existence of other things. Avicenna does not explain
further how God's will with respect to himself and his will with
respect to other things differ from each other. For example, we do
not find the distinction Aquinas makes, whereby God wills himself
necessarily, but he does not will other things necessarily.
For Avicenna, nothing else constitutes an end for God, and God
does not pursue an end distinct from himself in creating the uni-
verse. He gives two basic reasons for arguing this: (1) that only God
exists by himself and everything else depends on him, and (2) that
God is simple. Avicenna explains the first by arguing that there is
nothing to be intended. Only God exists without a cause, and there
can be no reason (sabab) unless it be because of God, in God or by
God, or belongs to God. If we assume that God has an end dis-
tinct from himself, we propose a voluntary action similar to human
voluntary actions, with possibilities independent of the agent. A vol-
untary agent may seek to realize one of these possibilities. However,
with regard to God, since there can be nothing outside and inde-
pendent of God to be intended, God does not act for the sake of
something else. Hence, God creates other things even though other
things do not constitute an end for God. 15
Avicenna's second reason concerns God's simplicity and perfec-
tion. If God is supposed to have an intention for the existence of
other things, three things follow from this supposition: (1) In God
there is something distinct from God's self-knowledge which is the
ground for whatever God intends. This thing is God's knowledge of
the necessity or lovability or goodness necessitating this act of inten-
15 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.6-10.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 139
tion; (2) God intends, and (3) there is a benefit to which the inten-
tion is directed. This is impossible for Avicenna, given that God is
simple. 16 God's simplicity for Avicenna requires that God have one
knowledge and one will, which are in turn identical to each other.
Since God primarily knows, wills and loves himself, God's will can-
not be directed to an end other than God.
Avicenna argues not only that creation is a voluntary act, but also
underscores that creation cannot be similar to actions stemming from
nature, where 'nature' is taken to mean the principle of action in
inanimate thingsY For Avicenna, a natural action excludes (1) knowl-
edge and (2) approbation (rir/a) of the result of action by the agent. 18
After stating that the act of creation is different from human vol-
untary acts, he continues:
The existence (kawn) of everything from him is not in the way of nature
[either], such that the existence (kawn) of everything from him is with-
out a cognition (ma'rifa) and without his permission (rir/an). How could
16 Avicenna, Metapfrysics IX.4, p. 402.10-13. However, the kind of intention
Avicenna denies to God regarding the creation is an intention of 'something extra-
neous to the act of creation of things, and something extraneous to God's knowl-
edge and will of himself,' as Avicenna indicates just before his statement that God's
action is the action of a knowing agent. This extraneous intention consists of 'intend-
ing creation for the sake of creation, or creatures.'
17 See for Avicenna's conception of nature, A.-M. Goichon (ed. trans. & annot.),
Introduction cl Avicenne: Son Epitre de Dijinitions (Paris: Desclee, 1933), pp. 92-97.
18 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.13 - p. 403.1. See also, Metapfrysics VIII.7
p. 363.10-13. G. Anawati translates lines 13-15 in the passage quoted above: "wa
kayJa . . .ya'qilu dhiitahu . . .": "De plus, que le tout provienne de lui par mode de
nature ne signifie pas que l'existence du tout proviendrait de lui sans connaissance
ni agrement de sa part. Comment cela serait-il possible, alors qu'il est intelligence
pure, s'intelligeant lui-meme?" G. Anawati (trans. & ed.), La Metaphysique du Shifd'
(Paris: J. Vrin, 1978-1985), vol. 2, p. 137. I think Anawati's translation misses the
very point Avicenna is trying to make. While Avicenna is trying to separate actions
stemming from nature from actions stemming from knowledge and approval, Anawati
conflates them. Hence the translation gives the impression that for Avicenna the
idea 'that God's action is like a natural action' is not opposed to the idea that God
is pure intellect. On the basis of such a translation, one may argue that although
for Avicenna God is a pure intellect, his act of creation is like the action of nat-
ural things, i.e., devoid of knowledge and volition. After stating that God's action
should not be identified with the action of natural agents, Avicenna quite under-
standably asks how the action of an intelligent agent could be identified with the
action of natural agents, which are devoid of knowledge. The reason Anawati pro-
vides for his translation is this: "Parce que le necessairement existant n'a d'aucune
maniere un principe; sa creation du tout ne peut pas avoir lieu par mode d'inten-
tion par essence, car Cela impliquerait une recherche de perfection; il serait, de ce
point de vue, cause." G. Anawati, op. cit., p. 227. Anawati's reason is not justified,
since Avicenna does not identify will and intention, as will be discussed below.
 140 CHAPTER THREE
it be so, while he is a pure intellect who knows his essence? Thus he
must know that the existence of everything necessarily follows (yalza-
muhu) from him, because he does not know his essence, except as he
is the pure (maM) intellect and the first principle. And he only knows
everything from himself in accordance with being their principle, and
with there being nothing in his essence preventing (miini'), or repug-
nant to (kanh) the emanation of everything from him. And he (dhii-
tuhu) knows that his perfection (kamalahu) and his transcendence ('uluwwahu)
is such that good emanates from him, and that this [i.e., emanation
of things] is of the necessary concomitants (min lawiizim) of his majesty
(jaliilatihi) , which is loved in itself (al-ma'shuqa lahu li dhiitiha).19
In this passage Avicenna contrasts voluntary action and natural action
on the basis of the agent's knowledge. He identifies the former with
having knowledge and approbation and the latter with the lack
thereof. Approbation for the existence of other things may be an
expression suitable for the divine will concerning other things because,
for Avicenna, the universe is not the end of God's will. 20 What
Avicenna's text suggests is that whatever God has not known to exist
and whatever God has not allowed to exist does not come to exist. 21
God Freely and Necessarily Creates the Universe
Based on Avicenna's statements that God is a voluntary creator, can
we say that for him God is a free creator? If God primarily wills
only himself, and if creation is not an end for God, does the fact
19 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 402.13 - p. 403.1. Beatrice Zedler misses the very
point Avicenna is trying to make in this passage. Despite the textual counter-evi-
dence, she equates Avicenna's conception of concomitance with acting by way of
nature. Beatrice H. Zedler, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'De potentia Dei',"
121-122. One can mistakenly equate Avicenna's position with the position of Plotinus.
Whereas for Plotinus the One is beyond being and knowledge, and beyond activ-
ity, Avicenna clearly argues that things follow from the divine knowledge and will.
To the best of my knowledge Avicenna never attributes 'nature' to God. It would
be unusual of him if he were to do this, unless he used it in a broader sense, given
his subscription to the Neo-Platonic hierarchy of being. In this hierarchy 'nature'
is placed below soul. In this respect, even human actions, in the proper sense, do
not fall under the category of natural actions. For Plotinus' conception of the hier-
archy see Dominic J. O'Meara, Plotinus: an Introduction (Oxford: 1993), pp. 60-78.
20 Aquinas expresses more or less the same thing as what Avicenna calls 'rii/ii'
in ST la. 14, 8. Although God's will is the cause of things in the proper sense,
God's knowledge may be considered the cause of them because of the identity of
knowledge and will in God. In this respect, Aquinas states: "God's knowledge as
the cause of things has come to be called the 'knowledge of approbation' (scientia
approbationis)."
21 See Avicenna, Ishiiriit, p. 185.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 141
that other things come to exist imply that God is compelled or
required to create? God's freedom to create may be taken away
either by something external, or by something internal that is required
by God's nature. Avicenna rejects both of these constraints on the
divine will.
Avicenna argues that no cause external to the agent can be assigned
to God's volition concerning the universe. He emphasizes that God's
will is different from human will because the divine will does not
depend on anything external to the agent. While for human voli-
tion there is an end distinct from the willing agent, for God's will
there cannot be anything causing God to will something. To express
this idea Avicenna sometimes uses the term 'da'in,' i.e., a motive, or
a reason, pushing God to do something. 22 Most of the time, he uses
the terms "intention" (qaFj) and "purpose" (ghararj).23 As I have
already stated, for Avicenna there is nothing outside God that might
compel God to will something. Hence God is not to be conceived
as seeking after something that exists independently of God. Nor
does God create for the sake of compensation ('iwarj).24
For Avicenna there is nothing internal requiring that God should
create, though this seems difficult for Avicenna to defend since he
argues that God knows himself in such a way that the existence of
things is the necessary concomitant of God's majesty, which is loved
in itself. Avicenna's statements lead one to think that God's volition
concerning other things must be included in God's essence, so that
God would be the natural agent of the universe in the sense that God
creates because of his nature. Hence one is led to think that creat-
ing other things must be a constitutive element of God's essence:
God would not be what he is if he did not create. To elucidate how
Avicenna defends his case, I will first present his more negative way
of explaining why other things exist, followed by his more positive
explanation. Avicenna explains the existence of the universe through
generosity and concomitance. While generosity concerns the nega-
tive aspect of this account, concomitance offers a positive dimension.
For Avicenna, God creates out of his generosity, since he neither
expects nor attains anything in return. Generosity requires that the
L2 Avicenna, Ta'liqiit, pp. 103, 117.
23 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7 p. 366.11-17; IX.3; Ishiiriit VI, p. 159; VII, p. 185;
Ta'liqiit, p. 149.
24 Avicenna, Ishiiriit VI, p. 159.
 142 CHAPTER THREE
generous agent be free from internal as well as external constraints.
Avicenna argues that anything-in this case, the existence of the
universe--may be considered with respect to the agent or with respect
to the patient. Thus something may be deemed generous with respect
to the agent, while it may be called good with respect to the thing
that receives and becomes perfect by it. In this case, the act of cre-
ation will be generous with regard to God and good with regard to
the universe. He defines generosity (jud) to be the case where the
agent is not in any way affected (murifG'il) by what it does, or by
something following upon what it does. Generosity is giving out what
is proper to be given not because of a debt, or compensation ('iwar;l),
without pursuing a desire or expecting revenue. 25 By excluding pay-
ment of a debt and compensation from generous actions, Avicenna
indicates that in order for an action to be an act of generosity, it
must be free from external factors compelling the agent, as well as
free from anything internal to the agent, like expecting to attain
something through the object of volition (muriid) or intention (maqsud).
If God were to pursue after something willed or intended, God would
be imperfect. An agent might be pursuing a purpose (gharar;l) "with
regard to himself in his being (bi ~asabi nafiihi fi dhiitihi), or with
regard to the exigency (m~iili~) of his being (dhiit), or with regard to
something else in his being, or with regard to his benefit (m~iiliM."
All these imply that the agent obtains something in return. Yet any
agent obtaining something in return for its action is imperfect either
with respect to its being or with respect to one of its perfections
(kamiiliit).26 God is truly generous, since God's giving being to things
can neither be compelled by something external nor required by
something internal to God.
Clearly, Avicenna employs 'denial of intention to God' in order
to support his argument that there is nothing external compelling
God to create, as well as his argument that there is nothing in God's
essence requiring God to create. He seems to consider the intention
both with regard to 'what is intended' and with regard to the 'intend-
25 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.5 p. 296 lines: 6-11. Ishiiriit VI, p. 159. See also
Ta'liqiit, p. 106, Metaphysics VIII.7 p. 367 lines: 7-12.
26 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.5 p. 297 lines: 7-11. Aquinas has a similar contention
in ST la. 19, 3, ad. 2. "2. That God necessarily wills his own goodness does not
demand that he will other things as well on that account for his goodness can well
be without them." ' 28
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 143
ing agent.' Yet intention cannot be attributed to God insofar as it
is considered with respect to the 'intended object,' as in compensa-
tion and debt, since there can be nothing external compelling God
to create. Similarly, intention cannot be attributed to God, since it
implies imperfection of the agent. Thus for Avicenna God is a free
creator since God creates out of his generosity, without any exter-
nal motive and without internal requirements.
Before beginning to discuss whether the necessity of the universe
poses a threat to the divine free will, it must be noted that for
Avicenna God's having free will does not mean that God has free
choice. For Avicenna, the idea that God does not have free choice
follows from the assertion that other things are not God's end. If
other things could be ends for God, then God would have free choice
because one end could be distinguished from alternatives (naq'ir;l) in
a free choice (ikhtiyiir). Since the one with free choice (ikhtiyiir) chooses
one end as better than its alternative, then in order for God to have
free choice there must be alternatives placed in front of God. Then
God would be required to choose the better alternativeY However,
there can be no set of independent "possible universes" facing God
so that he may choose one. Since there is nothing for God to intend,
there is nothing for God to choose over others.
The necessity of the universe, which Avicenna unwaveringly upholds
may not necessarily contradict maintaining that God is a free cre-
ator. Avicenna argues for the necessity of the universe through his
theory of concomitance, which I have called the more positive aspect
of his account of why the universe exists: it is a necessary con-
comitant of God's essence (dhiit). Even though God does not will the
universe for something external, so that he would depend on it, the
existence of the universe is a necessary concomitant (liizim) of God's
essence (dhiit).28 Here one may question whether there is a tension
between Avicenna's conception of generosity and concomitance. If
other things necessarily follow from God's essence, does that show
God to be in need of creating? Or does it make God dependent
upon his creatures, such that God would not be what he is if crea-
tures did not come to exist?
27 Avicenna, Ishiiriit VI, pp. 159-160.
Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.4, p. 403.1; Ta'liqiit, p. 103.
144 CHAPTER THREE
We may find an answer to these questions by identifying the rela-
tion between a concomitant and the thing of which it is a con-
comitant. "A concomitant," states Avicenna, "is the thing that
necessarily follows (yal::.am) something because of what it is that [the
thing] is (li annahu huwa), [however] it does not make subsist (la
yuqawwim) the thing [it follows]."29 Although the concomitant neces-
sarily follows the thing of which it is a concomitant, the thing that
has this concomitant does not subsist through its concomitant. That
is, the thing that has a concomitant does not depend on its con-
comitant in order to be the thing it is. Friendship in a narrower
sense may serve as an example. The constitutive element of friend-
ship between two people consists in the fact that they love each
other. But they do not make one another friends simply by expect-
ing to get help from each other. A relationship based on mutual
interests would be a business transaction rather than a relationship
of loving and caring. But helping each other, when the need arises,
necessarily follows from a relationship based on love. It is almost
inconceivable that two friends who love each other would not help
each other. In this sense, benefit is a necessary concomitant of friend-
ship but is not constitutive of what friendship is.
Avicenna distinguishes two kinds of concomitants in the TaCZ'iqat: 30
Concomitance is of two kinds (wajhayn): [1] One of them is that some-
thing is a concomitant (liiziman) [stemming] from ('an) some other thing
because of (li) its nature and substance, such as light [stemming] from
the source of light (al-mur/i') and burning [following] something hot.
[2] The other is that it [i.e., something] is the concomitant (liiziman)
[stemming] from it [i.e., the thing, of which it is a concomitant]' And
it [the concomitant] follows (tiibi'an) its [the thing that has the con-
comitant] self-knowledge, and it knows that this concomitant emanates
from itself. This is the concomitance (al-luzum) that necessarily follows
(yalzamu) from the Creator (ai-ban). This is because he is in himself
(fi dhatihi) perfect (kiimil), complete (tiimm), loved (ma'shuq), and he knows
('atzm) himself. Indeed magnificence (majd) and nobility ('uluww) belong
to him. And these things, which are existent on account of him ('anhu),
are concomitants (liizima) of his self-knowledge, magnificence, nobility
and of his goodness (khayriyyatihi). Goodness is not something different
from his essence (dhiitihi).
29Avicenna, Ta'liqiit, p. 180.
30Avicenna, Ta'liqiit, p. 103. e£ G. Verbeke's statement of Avicenna's position.
Verbeke argues, " ... der Schiipfer wiirde nicht sein, was er ist, wenn er die Welt
hervorzubringen aufhielte." G. Verbeke, "Avicenna im Westen: Eine historische
Begegnung," in Acta Antiqua Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 29 (1981), p. 9.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 145
Here Avicenna attempts to distinguish between the concomitants of
God and the concomitants of natural beings. While concomitants of
other things stem from their nature, God's concomitants stem from
his knowledge. It is, of course, open to discussion whether such an
explanation can work without difficulty, but he makes a clear dis-
tinction between God and other things with regard to their con-
comitants. While for other things their nature necessitates their
concomitants, in the case of God, it is his self-knowledge that deter-
mines the emanation of concomitants. The concomitants of natural
things, such as fire or water, follow the course of nature because
they are concomitants of natural things without knowledge and will.
Similarly, God's concomitants follow what God is, i.e., the divine
nature. In contrast to natural things, however, God's concomitants
follow from the divine knowledge and will, which are identical to
God's essence (dhat).
Through his theory of generosity and concomitance, Avicenna
wants to assert both God's independence from the universe and the
necessary existence of the universe owing to the divine will. While
God's being and goodness do not depend on the existence of the
universe, the universe necessarily follows from God's being. 31 Yet if
God's being and goodness do not depend on the existence of the
universe, God does not need to create in order to be what he is.
We may further ask: if creation is not constitutive of God, why
must the universe be a necessary concomitant? The answer to this
question concerns not what God is, but rather how God is. That is,
it does not concern the divine perfections, specifically the divine will,
per se, but divine formal features like simplicity and necessity. Avicenna
does not consider this question separately, hence he does not state
in detail that the necessary concomitance of the universe is due to
God's being necessary, immutable, or fully actual. Nevertheless, as
discussed in chapter 2, Avicenna takes divine perfection properties
only insofar as they are modified by divine formal features. For him,
when talking about God divine perfection properties must be con-
sidered in the manner they are found in God. For example, at the
beginning of the first chapter of Book IX of the Metaphysics of 77ze
Healing, when he is about to begin his explanation why the universe
31 For the independence of God's being and perfection from the existence of
other things see also: Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.1-7, p. 367.7-12.
146 CHAPTER THREE
must be sempiternal, Avicenna reminds the reader that God is a
necessary being. He is necessary in all respects; nothing new or addi-
tional can happen to him. 32 On the basis of the necessity of God,
the universe necessarily follows the divine knowledge and will. Yet
divine knowledge and the divine will concerning the universe are
also necessary. Why? Because God is necessary in all respects. So
God's will concerning the universe is included in the divine self-voli-
tion, not because God's being what he is includes or depends on
the existence of creatures, but because of the formal features of sim-
plicity and necessity.
Objections Revisited
Arguments designed to show that for Avicenna creation is a natural
action rather than a voluntary one have in part been based on
Avicenna's contention that the universe is necessary. Indeed, the uni-
verse is necessary, but does the necessity of the universe imply that
God has to create in the manner a natural agent must act? The
question 'Does God have to create?' is an intriguing question. It can
be understood as a question asking (1) whether God is compelled or
forced to create, in the sense that there be something external to
God compelling God to create. The question may also be under-
stood to be asking (2) whether there is something in God requiring
that he create: whether God needs to create in order to be what he
is. In this way, one can take it to be inquiring whether God's being
and goodness depend on the existence of creatures.
With regard to the first interpretation of the question, whether
there is something external compelling God to create, Avicenna's
answer is an unqualified no. As should be clear from the discussion
thus far, for Avicenna nothing can compel God to create. God's will,
unlike a human will, does not have a motive or a cause. Indeed,
there cannot be anything independent of God. God does not seek
after anything, nor does he create for the sake of compensation.
Hence, there is nothing external compelling or moving God to create.
With regard to the second interpretation of the question; whether
there is something in God requiring that he create, Avicenna's answer
is again no. There is nothing in God requiring that God create the
32 Avicenna, Metaphysics lXI, p. 373.15-17.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 147
universe, because God's being and goodness do not depend on the
fact that God creates. If God is independent of the existence of other
things, then God's being good does not require that God create
other things; God is good without creating the universe. Thus cre-
ation is not a constitutive element of 'what God is,' but rather fol-
lows from it.
If God's being and goodness do not depend on the existence of
the universe, is the universe 'not-necessary'? Avicenna's answer to
this question would be no again, because the universe is God's nec-
essary concomitant. God cannot have a freedom such that he could
choose to create or not to create. For Avicenna, one may not even
consider that God could have not created, because God is necessary
in all respects. And saying that God could not have created assumes
a possibility which is laid out ahead before God. The idea that the
universe is a necessary concomitant of God does not simply take
into account God's perfections, willing and goodness in this case, but
also God's formal features, namely simplicity and necessity. Avicenna's
insistence on the necessity of the universe and this universe is closely
connected to his position regarding theological language, not because
he likens divine creative action to natural actions of inanimate beings.
Thus, the universe is necessary, because God is necessary in all
respects.
As we have seen, the fact that for Avicenna God is not an inten-
tional cause of the universe has been employed to support the argu-
ment that for Avicenna creation is a natural action. If creation is
not something intentional, then creation must be the brute emana-
tion of things. However, by denying intention to God, Avicenna sim-
ply wants to establish that other things do not constitute a final cause
for the divine will. As I have tried to show, intending something
meant two things for Avicenna. With respect to the object of inten-
tion, it implied the existence of something external to and indepen-
dent of the agent. With respect to the intending agent, it implied
that the agent is imperfect. Hence attributing intention to God with
regard to creation meant, for Avicenna, both internal and external
constraints on divine freedom. He thus argued that God is free from
such constraints, which would constitute a final cause compelling or
requiring God to create.
On the contrary, God is himself the final cause of creatures. God
does not will the universe in itself but primarily wills himself, so God
148 CHAPTER THREE
himself is the final cause of the existence of other things. 33 As an
heir to the Neoplatonic heritage, Avicenna identifies existence with
goodness. Good is what is desired, and since God is the perfect
being-even above perfection as we know it-he is the ultimate
good toward which all other things strive. They exist overflowing
from his being. 34 God, and nothing else, is the final cause of creation.
For Avicenna denial of intention on God's part does not mean
that God is a non-voluntary agent. His denial of intention has been
interpreted by some scholars to mean that God does not know and
is indifferent to the existence of the universe. One may consider will
and intention to be inseparable, or even equate intending and will-
ing and say, for example, 'if an agent wills something, then this
agent intends that it be, or that it be such and such.' Yet however
one may conceive the relationship between intending and willing,
clearly Avicenna does not consider them to be identical in regard
to God. For him, 'intending something' cannot be devoid of acting
for recompense, of seeking after something distinct from the agent.
However, willing does not have to be connected with the expecta-
tion of a gain, nor should its final cause be something distinct from
the agent. Even though he rejects the idea that God has an inten-
tion in creation, this does not make him conceive God to be indifferent
to the existence of things. Since he argues that God wills things by
willing himself, and it is his willing that allows them to exist, God
cannot be indifferent to the existence of things.
33 Na~ir aI-DIn TusI interpreted Avicenna in such a way that for him God is
only the efficient cause of the universe. For a discussion of Tusl's interpretation
see, Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna's Metaplrysics in Context (Ithaca, NY: Comel! University,
2003), pp. 186-187.
34 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.6, p. 355.6 - p. 356.5. For a thorough analysis of
Avicenna's conception of the relation between efficient cause and final cause with
regard to explanation of effect, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context,
ch. 10, pp. 181-195. The question of giving a successful account of cases where
one thing is both the efficient and the final cause of the effect had a long history
before Avicenna. In order to explain how the final cause is prior to the efficient
cause without falling into circularity and without making any of the causes superficial,
Avicenna employs his distinction between essence and existence. The final cause is
the cause of the causality of the efficient cause by its essence, and the efficient cause
is the cause of the realization of the final cause. The pair essence-existence is an
evolution of the pair thingness and existence. For an explanation of this evolution
and Avicenna's sources in developing the distinction, see Robert Wisnovsky, op. cit.,
chs. 7-9. See also his "Notes on Avicenna's Concept of Thingness (shay'iyya)," Arabic
Sciences and Philosophy 10/2 (2000), pp. i81-221.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 149
In sum, for Avicenna creation should be likened to voluntary
actions rather than to natural actions, because God is an intellect
with will. However, God's will should not be confused with human
volition. God wills only himself, and nothing else can be God's end.
His being and perfection are independent of the existence of the
universe. There is nothing external pushing God to create, nor does
God's essence require that God create. However, the universe is a
necessary concomitant of God's essence. The fact that Avicenna
argues God's independence of the existence of other things as well
as their being necessary concomitants of God-without seeing any
contradiction-may be explained by his position regarding theolog-
ical language. Since Avicenna does not take into account God's will
alone, a perfection property, but considers it together with God's
formal features when he talks about God, he can consistently main-
tain that God is independent of the universe and that the universe
IS necessary.
Avicenna's argument that the universe is necessary and that God
does not intend anything in creation caused his interpreters to think
that for Avicenna creation is more like a natural action than a vol-
untary action. Avicenna would respond to such interpretations of his
position by insisting that creation and this universe are necessary,
not because creation is the action of an agent acting through nature,
but because it is the action of a necessary, immutable and perfect
being. God is a free voluntary creator because nothing, either inter-
nal or external, requires God to create. However, given that this
universe exists and given that God is necessary in all respects, cre-
ation and this universe are necessary.
Aquinas' Position: Creation is Voluntary and Hypothetical?J Necessary
Despite the fact that Aquinas criticized Avicenna-or is interpreted
as having done so-for likening the act of creation to the actions
stemming from nature, his position conforms to Avicenna's to some
extent. For Aquinas, as for Avicenna, God is a voluntary agent, and
God's will is identical to his essence. Just like God's knowledge, God's
will is simple, i.e., God's willing of other things is included in his
self-volition, and is immutable and eternal. Aquinas' discussion con-
cerning God's freedom to create is founded upon the independence
of God from the universe. God does not have to will the existence
 11
150 CHAPTER THREE
of the universe, nor does he have to will the actual, or definite set
of, creatures, because God's being and perfection do not depend on
the existence of the universe. Up until this point, Aquinas' position
conforms to Avicenna's contention.
Beyond this, however, we can note differences. Whereas Avicenna
argues that the universe is necessary, without further explanation,
Aquinas gives a more detailed explanation of 'how the universe is
necessary,' and in what sense God has free will and free choice. He
argues that the universe is 'hypothetically' necessary, not 'absolutely,'
and that God has free choice in the sense that neither the actual,
nor any definite set of creatures, matches the infinite perfection of
God. Comparing their positions, I am going to argue that the neces-
sity of the universe defended by Avicenna corresponds to the hypo-
thetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas' terms. I will further
argue that the reason why Avicenna does not, or could not, make
such a distinction, while Aquinas does, can be traced to their strat-
egy concerning human speech about God. On the basis of his dis-
tinction between 'res signijicata' and 'modus signijicandi' in human talk
about God, Aquinas was able to consider the divine will concern-
ing creation in isolation from God's formal features, i.e., eternity,
simplicity, etc.
God Creates by Will not by Nature
Aquinas provides four arguments to show that, as far as creation is
concerned, God is a voluntary agent, not a natural agent. One of
his arguments considers the order in the universe, which must be
traced back to an intelligent agent. Both nature and will act for an
end. But while a voluntary agent knows and sets the goal for itself,
nature does not know and cannot set up a goal for itself. The end
and the means ordered to attain the end of a natural agent must
be set by an intelligent and voluntary agent. Since God is the first
efficient cause, he is an agent acting by will, not by nature. 35
The second argument that Aquinas provides to explain why God
creates by will and not by nature states that nature is determined
to one effect. The way Aquinas presents the argument in the ST
and the De potentia differ to some extent. The ST version of the argu-
35 ST la. 19, 4; De potentia Ill, IS; SeC 11, 23 [6], [8].
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 151
ment emphasizes that different things with different natures are cre-
ated by God-not simply one kind of thing. Since the nature of an
agent acting by nature is determinate, the action of a natural agent
follows in accordance with its determinate nature. However, God's
being and perfection are not limited to a definite nature, but con-
tain the whole perfection of being. "Therefore God does not act
from necessity of nature, but defined (determinati) effects proceed from
his infinite perfection by the resolution of his intelligence and will
(determinationem voluntatis)."36 In the De potentia, Aquinas distinguishes
between God's natural action and voluntary action. He reminds us
again that nature is determined to one effect. Moreover, since every
agent produces something similar to itself, "nature always produces
its equal" (natura semper Jacit sibi aequale) unless it is hindered in some
way. Hence, whatever proceeds from God naturally (naturaliter) is
equal to him. This is the Son. In contrast to the Son, creatures are
not equal to God. Moreover, among creatures there are many degrees
of inequality. Hence, God does not create the universe by natural
action, but by voluntary action. 37
Aquinas' third argument considers the relation between the divine
knowledge and the divine will. Since God's being is identical to his
intellection (intelligere), creatures exist in God's knowledge before they
exist in re. And that which exists in knowledge proceeds from knowl-
edge by means of will. Hence God creates through his will. 38
The fourth argument that Aquinas uses in the De potentia is based
on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic actions. Intrinsic
actions such as knowing and willing, remain in the agent, whereas
extrinsic actions go out from the agent to an extrinsic patient, such
as heating or moving something. Since God's action is identical to
his essence (essentia), God's action cannot be an extrinsic action going
out of him to some extrinsic patient. Thus, God's action stems from
his knowledge and will. At this point Aquinas also reminds us that
36 ST la. 19, 4; SeC 11, 23 [2], [3].
37 De potentia Ill, IS. The second argument, especially as stated in the De poten-
tia Ill, IS, and ad 7, has some bearing on Avicenna's conception of creation.
Avicenna argues that only one intellect emanates from God. Because God is absolutely
one and simple, only one simple being can immediately emanate from God. Since
the discussion of this aspect of the issue of creation is not my objective, I wish sim-
ply to indicate the importance of the context in comparing their positions. In any
case, Avicenna does not consider the first intellect to be something of the same
nature as God or a divine person.
38 De potentia Ill, IS; ST la. 19, 4; SeC 11, 23 [4].
152 CHAPTER THREE
the fact that God's action is intrinsic does not contradict the beget-
ting of the Son through God's natural action, since the Son is not
something outside the divine essence. 39 Even though the Son natu-
rally proceeds from the Father, this does not require that God's
action be an extrinsic action in the way that the action of heating
is extrinsic to the source of heat.
In order to understand what Aquinas intends when he rejects the
idea that creation is a natural action, one needs to have a firmer
grasp of the sense in which Aquinas attributes natural action to God
and of the sense in which he denies it. One must know, for Aquinas,
in what respect God's natural action is similar to God's voluntary
action, and in what respect it differs from it. In the first argument
Aquinas compares agents acting through will and through nature.
Both kinds of agents act for an end, but only a voluntary agent can
make something an end for itself because only such an agent has
knowledge. If all beings are taken into account, that which creates
the rest cannot be devoid of knowledge and will. Otherwise, there
would not be an order within the universe, since the agent acting
through nature cannot set its own goal. This indicates that in the
first argument the contrast is between 'nature' in inanimate beings
on the one hand and will in intelligent beings on the other. In this
sense, God's action is not a natural action because God has knowl-
edge and will. That is, God's nature is not like the nature of inan-
imate things. Avicenna clearly denies that God's action is like a
natural action in this sense, as discussed in the preceding section.
In the second argument, Aquinas highlights another sense of nat-
ural action. Nature as employed in the second argument is different
from nature in the first argument. In the second argument nature
refers not to the nature of inanimate beings, but rather to the nature
of an intellect. However, these two kinds of nature are similar inso-
far as natural action is (1) determined to one effect, (2) produces its
effect necessarily-since it produces its effect, unless it is hindered-
and (3) produces something equal to the agent. Aquinas approves a
natural action of God in this sense, but creation is not God's nat-
ural action in this sense either. The natural action in this sense
explains the procession of the Son, and the spiration of the Spirit.
While the Son proceeds from the Father on account of nature, the
39 De potentia Ill, 15; SeC Il, 23 [5].
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 153
unIverse comes to exist not on account of the divine nature but on
account of the divine knowledge and will. Nevertheless natural action
in this sense, for Aquinas, does not exclude knowledge and will. In
ST, when distinguishing between creatures and the divine persons,
Aquinas traces the procession of the Son to the divine knowledge,
and that of the Holy Spirit to the divine will. 40 If the Son and the
Holy Spirit are assigned to the divine knowledge and the divine will
respectively, and the world proceeds from God through his knowl-
edge and will, then what is the difference between the divine Persons
and the universe? While the divine Persons are of the same nature,
the world is not of the same nature as God. As will be discussed
below, in contrast to the procession of the divine Persons, God does
not necessarily will the universe. Moreover, while the Son is one sin-
gle procession, many effects are created through will.
Avicenna, unlike Aquinas, does not attribute a natural action to
God in this sense either. Aquinas attributes natural action to God
in order to explain the procession of the Son and the Holy Spirit
in contradistinction to the creation of the universe. That nature is
determined to one single effect, and that natural action necessarily
follows unless it is hindered are ideas that may be related to Avicenna's
concepts of the emanation of things and the necessity of creation
respectively. For Avicenna, only one simple and single being-the
first heavenly intellect-emanates from God immediately, and is cre-
ated by God necessarily. Aquinas himself indicates that the main
difference between the natural action and the voluntary action con-
cerns being restricted to one effect. While a natural action produces
one effect, a voluntary action may produce many effects at once. 4 !
Whether Avicenna's position is a target for Aquinas' arguments is
an open question, a detailed discussion of which falls outside of this
discussion. However, stating that for Avicenna the single thing that
emanates from God is not a divine Person, or something of the same
nature as God, is sufficient to justify my argument. 42
The third reason Aquinas provides to explain why creation is a
voluntary action and not a natural one is shared by Avicenna as
40 ST la. 28, 4; ST la. 27, 4. For a statement of how the procession of the Son
~nd the Holy. Spirit a.re explained through the model of knowledge and will respec-
uvely, see Bnan DaVles, The Thought if Thomas Aquinas, pp. 193-198.
41 De potentia Ill, 15, ad 7.
42 Cf. Rudi A. Te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas, (Leiden
& New York, E. J. Brill, 1995), pp. 104-105.
154 CHAPTER THREE
well. Avicenna has similar statements explaining the existence of
other things. I have not come across anything similar to the fourth
argument of Aquinas in Avicenna's texts where he explains creation.
Nevertheless, generally speaking, it does not seem to contradict
Avicenna's concept of the divine creative action.
Let us continue to explore Aquinas' concept of divine voluntary
action. The contrast between divine voluntary action and natural
action concerns necessity. Although for Aquinas divine natural action
is different from divine voluntary action, the divine will is not some-
thing distinct from, or additional to, or contrary to, the divine essence.
Aquinas rejects the idea that creation is like a natural action in the
sense that it is like the action of inanimate beings. Creation is not
a natural action in the sense that only one creature is made imme-
diately by God, and it is not a natural action in the sense that what
is created is not of the same nature as God. Moreover, creation is
not a natural action in the sense that God does not necessarily cre-
ate. But the divine voluntary action-just like the divine natural
action-stems from the divine nature, or divine essence. It follows
from this that the divine will is identical to the divine essence. The
identity of the divine will to the divine essence can be shown on the
basis of the divine knowledge and divine simplicity. God has will
insofar as he is an intelligence. Since God's knowledge is identical
to his essence, God's will is identical to his essence as well. 43 Since
God is simple and most perfect, if God has will, it must be identical
to his essence. 44 Moreover, every agent acts insofar as it is in act.
Since God is pure act, God must act through his essence. If God
creates through his act of willing, then God's will is identical to his
essence. 45 If God acts through his essence, then God's voluntary
action must be an essential, i.e., a natural, action. However, Aquinas
reserves the term "natural action" to indicate what God wills nec-
essarily. Despite the identity of the divine will to the divine nature,
the divine voluntary action indicates God's willing only insofar as it
concerns the things that God wills but which are not necessary.46
Hence, the difference between divine natural action and divine vol-
untary action concerns the necessity with regard to what God wills.
43 SeC I, 73, [2]; ST la. 19, 1.
41 SeC I, 73, [3], [5].
45 ScC I, 73, [4]; ST la. 19, 4, ad 2; De potentia Ill, 15, ad 20.
46 ST la. 19, 3, obj. 3 & ad 3; De potentia Ill, 15, ad 6.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 155
Cod)s Will Is Simple: Cod primarily and essentially Wills Himself
Before starting to discuss God's object of volition with regard to
necessity it should be recalled that for Aquinas God has one act of
willing. By this one act, God wills himself as well as other things.
While he wills himself as the end, he wills other things so that they
participate in his goodness. 47 In ST, Aquinas does not explain in
detail the unity of God's will, which includes both his self-volition
and volition concerning other things. 48 In SeC, he includes a sepa-
rate chapter on the idea that God has one act of will. 49 Aquinas
comes up with various accounts of how God wills himself and other
things. by one act of will, based mostly upon God's simplicity.50 As
God IS the end for the sake of which other things are willed the
thing desired for the sake of the end is willed if the end is willed.
Since God wills himself, by his self-volition other things are also
willed in the same act of volition. 5l If God were to will himself and
other things in different acts of the will, not by one act of will, then
there would be discursiveness in God-discursiveness which requires
movement from one to the other. Since God is free from motion ,
God wills himself and other things by the same act of will.52
The eternity and immutability of the divine will follow from the
simplicity of the divine will. All these in turn are reducible to the
simplicity of divine knowledge, as divine will is based upon divine
knowledge. When arguing for the eternity and immutability of the
divine will, Aquinas highlights the contrast between the divine act
of will and the object of God's volition. There is no correlation
between the way in which God's will is and the way in which the
objects of God's will are. Even though his will is eternal, it does not
require that the objects of his willing should be necessary. 53 Nor does
it require that they should be eternal.54 Similarly, that which is willed
by God does not have to be immutable because of the immutabil-
ity of God's will. Clarifying this argument, Aquinas points out the
47 STla.19, 2; SeC I, 75.
48 ST la. 19, 2, ad 4; ST la. 19, 5.
49 SeC I 76
50 SeC I: 76: [4], [5], [7].
51 SeC I, 76, [2].
52 SeC I, 76 [4].
53 ST la. 19, 3 obj. 1, ad 1.
54 ST la. 46, 1, ad 6.
156 CHAPTER THREE
difference between changing one's will and willing a change. One
can will contrary things to follow one after the other without chang-
ing one's will. In order to will change, God does not have to change
his will or cease to will what he willed before. Since God himself
(substantia) and his knowledge are immutable, nothing causes God to
change his will. Thus God's will is immutable as well. 55
God Freely Wills the Universe
So far, we have seen Aquinas argue that (1) God has one act of
volition, and (2) God wills himself necessarily. From these two premises
one may expect to deduce the conclusion that God necessarily wills
creatures as well. However, Aquinas rejects this conclusion and argues
that God freely wills to create. Here the question that needs answer-
ing concerns the nature of God's freedom. Aquinas' conception of
divine freedom will clarify whether the two premises above require
that God wills to create necessarily. It will also show whether his
concept of the divine freedom to create, as well as to choose, is sub-
stantially different from Avicenna's conception.
If God is free to create or not to create, then it must be granted
that there is nothing obliging God to create. God's freedom to cre-
ate may be eliminated either because of something external to God
or because of God's being itself. Aquinas does not put much empha-
sis on the question whether something external could eliminate God's
freedom to create. He simply assumes it, probably because it seemed
too obvious to require a detailed discussion.56 Aquinas mostly addresses
the question whether there is something internal to God that elim-
inates God's freedom in creation. In this respect, Aquinas considers
whether God's goodness, immutability and necessity would eliminate
God's freedom to create. It seems that the most difficult issue is to
explain how divine goodness does not rule out divine freedom.
Aquinas maintains that nothing stemming from God's nature elim-
inates God's freedom in creating. Even though God has one act of
willing, by willing himself he also wills other things, the primary
object of the divine will is divine goodness. God's will concerning
his own goodness is absolutely necessary, but it is not absolutely nec-
55 ST la. 19, 7; ST la. 19, 7, obj. 3 & ad 3.
56 De potentia Ill, 15 obj. 11; De potentia VII, 10; SeC I, 87 [3].
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 157
essary for everything that God willsY Since the divine goodness is
the proper object of the divine will, he wills his own goodness with
absolute necessity. This is similar to the human condition in that
everybody wills his own happiness necessarily. A similar relation holds
between every ability and its proper and principal object, such as
the relation of sight to color. As the proper object of the divine will,
divine self-volition is necessary. 58
Aquinas conceives the relationship between God's self-volition and
volition concerning other things in terms of final causality. By cre-
ating other things God wills to communicate his goodness.59 Although
God has one act of will in which he wills himself and other things
at once, God's will pertaining to himself and his will pertaining to
other things have different modalities. The primary object of God's
will is his own goodness, which he wills necessarily. However, God
wills other things as they are ordered to (ordinatur) his goodness as
their end, not for their own sake. They do not constitute an end
for the divine will. Here Aquinas makes a distinction between ends
and means, which can be related in one of two ways: means are
necessary in order to reach the end, or means are not necessary in
order to reach the end. The relationship between God and the world,
as the end and the means ordered to this end, is of the second
kind. 5O
Even though God creates because he is good and wills to com-
municate his goodness, God's goodness for Aquinas is not opposed
to the divine freedom in creating. The relation between God's good-
ness and his creatures is the relation between the end and the means
ordered to this end. God's goodness subsists and is complete by itself;
it is independent of the existence of other things. Thus, God's good-
ness does not require that God create,61 because if God did not cre-
ate at all, this would not make God devoid of goodness. 62 Aquinas
57 The issue of whether the divine freedom is compatible with the divine per-
fections caught the interest of modern philosophers of religion. See for example,
William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Divine Perfection and Freedom," in Reasoned
Faith: Essays in Philosophical Yheology in Honor if Norman Kretzmann, ed. Eleonore Stump,
(Ithaca & London: Comell University, 1993), pp. 223-233; Laura L. Garcia, "Divine
Freedom and Creation," Yhe Philosophical Qgarter(y 42, (Apr., 1992), pp. 191-213.
58 ST la. 19, 3.
59 ST la. 19, 2.
60 ST la. 19, 3; SeC, I, 75.
61 ST la. 19, 3; De potentia Ill, 15, ad 10.
62 Norman Kretzmann examines the consistency of Aquinas' argument with his
158 CHAPTER THREE
clearly states that the communication of goodness does not necessi-
tate that God create. Even though God creates because he wills to
communicate his goodness, the end of the divine will is not the com-
munication of the divine goodness, but, rather, the divine goodness
itself. 53
The simplicity of the divine will does not require that God's self-
volition should cause God to will other things. In explaining this
point, Aquinas makes use of the relationship between God's self-
knowledge and his knowledge of other things. Just as God knows
himself and other things by one act of knowledge, though his self-
knowledge does not cause God to know other things, he wills him-
self and other things by one act of will, and his self-volition does
not cause God to will other things. 54 Consequently, there is no dis-
cursiveness in God's will, as if he were first to will himself and then,
because of his self-volition, he were to will other things. 55
Let me repeat Aquinas' main points concerning the divine free-
dom to create. God has freedom to create, because there is noth-
ing either external or internal necessitating that God should create.
God primarily and naturally wills himself, and other things are not
the final cause of the divine will. God wills them to communicate
conception of goodness. He argues that Aquinas' "emphatic, unqualified" positive
answer to the question whether God is free to choose whether or not to create is
inconsistent with his conception of God's being "goodness itself, not merely good."
(SeG I, 38). Aquinas adopts the neo-Platonist principle-which he traces to Pseudo-
Dionysius-that goodness is by nature self-diffusive. While Aquinas takes a liber-
tarian explanation of creation by arguing for God's absolute freedom to create and
not to create, as well as what to create, this principle seems to require a necessi-
tarian line of the explanation of creation. In this way, creation would be a natural
consequence of the divine nature, since God is goodness itself, and goodness is self-
diffusive. Kretzmann considers Aquinas' attempts to remove the tension between
his conception of divine goodness and freedom of choice to create or not to cre-
ate to be counterintuitive. Kretzmann argues that "God's bringing into existence
something other than himself is among "those things which the essential nature of
his goodness includes." If so, then God is not free to choose whether or not to cre-
ate because it is included in the divine self-volition. In this case God "freely, although
nee;ssarily wills" the existence of other things. Norman Kretzman, "A General Problem
of Creation: Why Would God Create Anything at All?," in Being and Goodness, ed.
Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, London, New York: Cornell University, 1991), pp. 208-228.
See especially 215-221. I agree with Kretzmann that Aquinas' conception of divine
goodness and his concept of divine will concerning t.he unive:s~ are not quite com-
patible. However, Aquinas seems to prefer to modIfy the dlvme goodness by the
divine will.
63 De potentia Ill, 15, ad 12, ad 14.
64 ST la. 19, 5 C.
65 SeG I, 87 [4].
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 159
his goodness, but God's goodness subsists and is complete by itself.
Creatures are not constitutive of the divine goodness. Even though
by willing other things God wants to communicate his goodness,
communicating his goodness is not, again, the final cause of the
divine will. These insights are largely shared by Avicenna. As I dis-
cussed in the preceding section, he explains creation through his con-
cept of generosity and concomitance. For him, God's generosity
means that God gives being to all other things without acquiring
anything additional and without being required to do so by any
means. I have also underlined that Avicenna denies intention to God.
Avicenna does this in order to defend that other things do not con-
stitute a final cause for divine will. Aquinas shares Avicenna's VIew
that other things are not final causes of divine will.
God Has Free Choice
God wills freely not only to create but also what to create. The attri-
bution of free choice to God can be considered as a special case,
which ultimately may be reduced to God's free will. The general
statement that God has free will means that God's being and good-
ness do not depend on the existence of other things. As the more
specific statement, the idea that God has free choice means that
God's goodness does not depend on any definite set of creatures.
Furthermore, it means that creatures that are willed to exist are not
necessary, since no creature or set of creatures matches the divine
perfection. Consequently, God does not have to create the actual
universe. God's free will includes choice with regard to creatures
because they are not the end of God's will, but only the means to
the end of the divine will. 55
However, Aquinas' position in this regard may not be stretched
so far as to make divine free choice similar to human free choice.
One may consider Aquinas' arguments for the idea that God has
free choice (liberum arbitrium) to be indicating that the free choice of
God is something similar to the human experience of free choice,
choosing from among many alternative things or courses of events.
Such an interpretation of the idea of free choice was Avicenna's rea-
son for rejecting the idea that God has free choice in creation.
66 ST la. 19, 10 and ad 2; SeG I, 88 [4].
160 CHAPTER THREE
Understanding free choice in this way meant for him the existence
of possibilities independent of God. Despite his argument that God
has free choice with regard to what to create, Aquinas does not
counter Avicenna's contention. Although God is said to choose freely
what to create, creating what he creates and excluding what he does
not, this does not mean that there are alternatives before God and
God chooses one of them.57
What Aquinas seems to argue is that God could have created
things other than those he actually did, because things that exist be-
cause of God are not all of what God could create. 58 That is, cre-
ation does not exhaust God. In order to clarify this point, let us
look at the objections Aquinas considers. The freedom of the divine
will may be thought to be opposed to its immutability. If God does
67 Norman Kretzmann interprets Aquinas' contention that God has free choice
regarding what to create as if there were possible worlds which could be configured
in different ways. However, Aquinas' point in this argument is not that there are
possibilities before God but rather that no creature, or rather, no universe, matches
God's goodness and power. Norman Kretzmann, "A Particular Problem of Creation:
Why Would God Create This World?", in Being and Goodness, pp. 229-249, espe-
cially pp. 229-239. David Burrell criticizes the concept of creation as one in which
God actualizes one among possible worlds. Such a conception is contrasted with
the necessary emanation scheme, of which Avicenna is a follower par excellence.
He argues that in fact Avicenna's conception of creation is closer to the concept
of creation as the actualizing of a possible world. Since for Avicenna existence is
something coming to essence, Avicenna's concept of creation supposes the existence
of essences capable of existing before they come to exist. For Aquinas, however,
there is no possibility before creation except by reference to the power of God.
Burrell argues that "Avicenna's scheme" and "possible worlds treatments" take pos-
sibles to be "identifiable prior to their existing." In contrast to this, Aquinas asserts
that God creates all things, he does not simply actualize possible things existing
independently of God. David B. Burrell C.S.C., "Creation and 'Actualism': The
Dialectical Dimension of Philosophical Theology," Medieval Philosophy & Theology 4
(1994), pp. 25-41. I agree with Burrell in his interpretation of Aquinas' position
that in creating this world God does not choose one set of possibilities hanging out
there existing independently of God. However, the association between Avicenna's
emanationist scheme and the consideration of creation as actualizing one possible
world is very difficult to justify. What Avicenna meant when talking about 'exis-
tence coming to essence' is an issue of debate among scholars. Discussing it is far
beyond my scope here. For recent discussion of the issue see, Nader el-Bizri, "Avi-
cenna and Essentialism" The Review qf Metaphysics 54 (2001), pp. 753-778. As I tried
to articulate in the preceding section, Avicenna's reason for rejecting God's free-
dom to choose is that there cannot be any thing possible independent of God's
creation such that God would choose to create. Undoubtedly there is a tension
between Avicenna's rejection of possibles before God and his contention that the
possibility of things is independent of the power of the efficient cause, which I shall
explore in chapter 4.
68 ScG I, 82, [6].
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 161
not will necessarily things that he wills, then his will is open to alter-
natives. Being open to alternatives is being open to change. If God
does not necessarily will, then his will is changeable. Aquinas answers
this objection by reminding us of the difference between absolute
necessity and hypothetical (ex suppositione) necessity. God's willing of
other things is not absolutely necessary. However, it is hypothetically
necessary based on the supposition that the divine will is immutable.59
In SeC I, 82, Aquinas raises similar objections. The answers he
provides for these objections are more detailed. One of the objec-
tions proceeds in the following way: if God's will is not determined
by certain objects, then it would be disposed to opposites, and hence
it would be in potency. But since there is no potency in the will of
God, it must be determined to a definite alternative. Another argu-
ment for the changeability of God is framed along similar lines. It
is based on God's being in potency because of his being open to
willing opposite alternatives. If God is in potency, God's will must
be changeable, since potency implies movement and change. 7o The
expression 'being open to alternatives,' which is the main point of
the objection largely tallies with the idea of possible worlds, one of
which God actualizes by creating. Aquinas' answers to both objec-
tions amounts to asserting that God is independent of the existence
of the actual universe. Being open to opposites may be either from
the side of the agent or from the side of the objects. If it is from
the side of the agent, it shows the imperfection of the agent, and
that the agent is in potency. From the side of the objects of the will,
if the action of the agent depends on neither of the alternatives, this
openness to alternatives does not show an imperfection in the agent,
but rather its eminence in dominating alternatives. Aquinas gives the
example of art in which the same thing can be achieved by alter-
native tools. "This is how the divine will is disposed in relation to
things other than itself. For its end depends on none of the other
things, though it itself is most perfectly united to its end. Hence, it
is not required that any potentiality be posited in the divine will."7l
'That God's will is not determined to a certain effect but open to
alternatives' does not require that his will should be changeable.
69 ST la. 19, 7, obj. 4 & ad 4.
70 ScG I, 82, [2], [3].
71 ScG I, 82, [6].
162 CHAPTER THREE
For, if there is no potentiality in the divine will, God does not thus
prefer one of the opposites among His effects as if He should be
thought as being in potency to both, so that He first wills both in
potency and afterward He wills in act; rather, He wills in act what-
ever He wills, not only in relation to Himself but also in relation to
His effects. The reason rather is because the object willed does not
have a necessary order to the divine goodness, which is the proper
object of the divine will (...). The exclusion of the aforesaid necessity,
therefore, does not take away the immutability of the divine will. 72
Here, as his responses to the objections, Aquinas seems to argue that
the actually willed things, or their existence, is not necessary in itself.
Since God wills only himself necessarily, and God's being does not
depend on anything, God does not necessarily will them. But it also
clarifies his position, stating that the openness of God's will to alter-
natives does not mean that there are alternatives before God and
that God chooses one of them. It simply amounts to saying that
God's goodness does not depend on any definite thing-actual or
not-outside himself.
Is the Universe Necessary?
In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinas argues that the universe is not nec-
essary. This is so because God does not have to create. He argues
not only that (1) God does not have to create, but also that (2) God
does not have to create the actual universe. The straightforward con-
clusion resulting from these arguments are that God has free will
and free choice with regard to creation. The foundation of Aquinas'
argument for God's free will and free choice is that God's being and
perfection do not depend on creating something, nor do they depend
on creating the actual universe. This principle, as I stated in the
previous section, is shared by Avicenna.
For Aquinas the universe is both necessary and not-necessary. He
argues that God has free will and free choice. It is also clear that
Aquinas' arguments for the contingency of creation are founded on
the idea that God's being and perfection do not depend on the exis-
tence of other things, nor do they depend on the existence of the
actual universe. If God is free (1) to create and not to create, and
(2) to decide what to create, then neither creation, nor the actual
72 SeC I, 82, [7].
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 163
universe is necessary. But this is only one aspect of the problem.
The other aspect concerns the fact that there is a universe and that
God's will is immutable and eternal. If we consider the existence of
the universe along with the eternity and immutability of God's will,
then the universe-as it is-is necessary. It cannot not be. Now there
seem to be involved here two contradictory judgments about the
universe. The universe is not necessary, because God does not have
to create; and the universe is necessary, because it exists and God,
who created it, is eternal and immutable. In explaining in what sense
the universe is necessary and in what sense the universe is not nec-
essary Aquinas distinguishes two kinds of necessity: absolute (absolute)
and hypothetical (ex suppositione) necessity. 73
Aquinas identifies the condition of absolute necessity in the fol-
lowing way: either (1) the predicate is part of the definition of the
subject (for example, man is an animal with an absolute necessity)
or (2) the subject is part of the meaning of the predicate (for exam-
ple, 'X is a number.' X is either even or odd with absolute neces-
sity, because being even or odd is part of what "number" means).
In these two senses, the universe is not necessary. That is to say,
the world (standing for the predicate) is not part of what God is,
and God's goodness (standing for the subject) does not depend on
the existence of the universe. 74 The relationship between God and
the world as an object of volition is like the end and things ordered
to (ordinatur) that end. However, willing the end does not always
require willing the things ordered to this end. Since God's goodness
subsists (esse) and is perfect without other things, God's will con-
cerning other things is not a constitutive part of God's self-volition.
Hence the universe is not necessary in the absolute sense.
However, other things are necessary on the supposition (ex suppo-
sitione) that God cannot refrain from that which he wills, because
God's will is immutable. 75 God's eternity is also involved among the
conditions that require that things be necessary. Since God's willing
73 The distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity should be traced
back to Aristotle. In Metaphysics V.5 I015a20-b15 he discusses the kinds of neces-
sity. Absolute and hypothetical necessities are included in his quintuple division.
Hypothetical necessity in general means that in order for something to exist, certain
conditions must be met. Absolute necessity refers to things that cannot be otherwise.
74 ST la. 19, 3.
75 ST la. 19, 3; SeC I, 83 [2].
164 CHAPTER THREE
that some effect to be caused is eternal, his will concerning the exis-
tence of other things is necessary. "But it is not necessary consid-
ered absolutely, because the will of God does not have a necessary
relation to this willed object. Therefore, it is necessary by supposi-
tion."76 Thus, if God's will is considered in isolation from his immu-
tability and eternity, things are not necessary. But if it is considered
together with God's immutability and eternity-one may extend the
list under the title "God's formal features"-and the fact that he
wills the existence of other things, then the universe is necessary.
This kind of necessity is hypothetical necessity. Hence, the universe
is hypothetically necessary.
Talking About Creation: Necessi!y or Hypothetical Necessi!y
Aquinas argues that God has freedom to create and free choice,
because (1) there is nothing external compelling God to create, and
(2) God's being and perfection do not depend on the existence of
other things. Since the universe is not the end of the divine will,
God does not need to create in order to be what he is. Thus, the
universe is not absolutely necessary. The universe may be taken as
necessary only if one takes into account the fact that God willed the
existence of the universe, and that God's will i~ eternal and immutable.
Aquinas calls this hypothetical necessity as discussed above.
If Aquinas' two premises insure that the universe is not necessary,
then Avicenna would be justified if he argued that the universe is
not necessary, since he himself subscribes to these two premises on
which Aquinas founds his argument that the universe is not neces-
sary. As for Aquinas, for Avicenna there is nothing external com-
pelling God to create. God could not be creating to gain something
he acquires by creating it; otherwise God would not be truly gen-
erous. We also saw that other things for Avicenna are not the end
of God's will. However, despite his subscription to these premises,
unlike Aquinas Avicenna argues that the universe is in fact neces-
sary. Avicenna's argument that the universe is a necessary con-
comitant of God's being does not contradict his belief in the
independence of God's being and goodness from the universe. As I
76 ScC I, 83, [3].
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 165
stated when discussing Avicenna's position, a concomitant is not con-
stitutive of the thing of which it is a concomitant. Consequently, if
these two premises provide a solid ground for arguing that the uni-
verse is not necessary, then for both of them this is true. That is,
for Avicenna as well as for Aquinas, the universe is not necessary.
On these same premises, Aquinas explicitly says that the universe
is not necessary, and clarifies the sense in which the universe is not
necessary. If the existence of the universe were constitutive of God's
being and perfection, or if it were the end of the divine will, then
the universe would be absolutely necessary. Hence, the universe is
not absolutely necessary if it is considered solely in relation to the
divine will as the cause of the existence of other things, since cre-
ating the universe is not constitutive of what God is and the uni-
verse is not the final cause of the divine will. But if the universe is
considered together with the idea that God wills the universe and
that the divine will is eternal and immutable, then the universe is
hypothetically necessary.
The necessity of the universe as argued by Avicenna 77 corresponds
to the hypothetical necessity of the universe in Aquinas' theory.
Avicenna agrees with Aquinas on the point of the first premise, i.e.,
that the universe is not constitutive of God's being. God does not
need to create in order to be what he is. He agrees with him that
nothing else could be the final cause of the divine will. Furthermore,
he agrees with him on the eternity and immutability of the divine
will. Despite this agreement, Avicenna simply argues that the uni-
verse is necessary. Given his agreement with Aquinas on the premises
of his argument for the hypothetical, or conditional, necessity of the
universe, Avicenna's argument for the necessity of the universe indi-
cates that he considers the divine perfections as modified by the
divine formal features. I am not suggesting that Avicenna makes a
distinction similar to that of Aquinas. I simply want to say that the
unqualified necessity Avicenna attributes to the universe corresponds
to the hypothetical necessity of Aquinas. To see this correspondence,
let us follow Aquinas' argument. Let us assume that the universe is
necessary if it is considered not simply with regard to the divine will,
but with regard to the eternal and immutable divine will and remind
77 For a discussion of the Aristotelian roots of Avicenna's concept of necessity,
see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context, ch. 11, pp. 197-219.
 166 CHAPTER THREE
the fact that God wills the universe. Such an assumption totally is
found at the bottom of Avicenna's position when he argues that the
universe is necessary. Following Aquinas, if we call such a necessity
a hypothetical necessity, then obviously the necessity Avicenna attrib-
utes to the universe is not absolute necessity. Then within Aquinas'
conceptual framework the necessity Avicenna attributes to the uni-
verse is hypothetical necessity.
At this point, the question is why, then, does Avicenna argue that
the universe is necessary without hesitation? The reason why Aquinas
makes a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity, while
Avicenna does not can be traced to their different concepts of theo-
logical language. One should not forget that the distinction between
absolute and hypothetical necessity belongs to Aquinas. Avicenna
does not and perhaps could not make such a distinction. The dis-
tinction between absolute necessity and the hypothetical one is the
result of considering the divine will in isolation from the divine for-
mal features. While the universe is not necessary if it is considered
solely in relation to the divine will, it is necessary when considered
together with the formal features such as eternity and necessity.
Considering the divine perfections separate from their mode of being
is an application of Aquinas' understanding of predicating divine
names-of talking about God.
Let us have a closer look at Aquinas' discussion of God's will with
respect to the application of his distinction between the res significata
and the modus significandi of the divine perfections. The pure perfec-
tion terms are predicated of God and creatures analogically, i.e.,
according to similar yet different conceptions. As I argued in chap-
ter 1, for Aquinas perfections that are attributed to God are not
simple negations. They say something about what God is. As far as
the res significata of perfections are concerned, they are predicated of
God and of creatures literally. However, as far as their mode of
signification is concerned their literal predication of God is inap-
propriate, because the mode of signification in human speech can-
not match the way they truly are. We cannot express God's perfections
in the way in which they belong to God in himself. Since Aquinas
clearly distinguishes the divine will-which corresponds to the res
significata-from the manner it is in God-identity with God's essence,
eternity and immutability, which corresponds to what cannot be
expressed by the modus significandi, he was able to assert God's free-
dom and free choice, and the conditional necessity of the universe.
THE NATURE OF CREATIVE ACTION 167
In other words, Aquinas' separation of the divine will and the man-
ner in which it exists, i.e., its eternity and immutability, follows his
distinction between the res significata and the modus significandi in theo-
logical language.
Since Avicenna takes divine perfection properties insofar as they
are modified by divine formal properties he had to argue for the
necessity of the universe. In contrast with Aquinas' appreciative strat-
egy concerning the divine perfections, Avicenna pursues a reductive
strategy by taking divine perfection properties together with the
manner in which they exist. That is, even though he attributes per-
fections, such as will, power, life, etc., to God, he takes them into
account only as they are modified in the light of the divine formal
features, such as simplicity, necessity and eternity. Consequently, in
discussing creation, Avicenna does not consider the divine will, as
the cause of the existence of the universe, separately from the manner
in which it exists. As a result, while he affirms that God's being and
perfections do not depend on creatures, and that they do not consti-
tute an end for God, he argues only that the universe is necessary.
For Avicenna, one may not even consider the possibility that God
could not have created, because God is necessary in all respects.
Such a possibility is applicable only to agents that are not fully in
act. While Aquinas considers the divine perfections separately from
the manner in which they exist with respect to human vantage point,
Avicenna modifies his concept of the divine perfections in the light
of the divine formal features. Consequently, he limits human speech
to what actually is. By limiting himself with what actually is, he
argues that the universe is necessary and that God does not choose
from alternatives.
Conclusion if Chapter Three
For both Avicenna and Aquinas, creation is a voluntary act, not a
natural one. God's will is simple, eternal and immutable. The end
of God's will is himself, not other things. By willing himself, God
also wills other things. However, based on these premises, Avicenna
argues that the universe is necessary. He further argues that God
does not have free choice. Aquinas argues that the universe is not
absolutely necessary and that God has free choice with regard to
creatures. Aquinas' arguments for divine free will and free choice
168 CHAPTER THREE
are founded on the idea that God's being or goodness is indepen-
dent of the existence of other things, a principle also shared by
Avicenna. However, on the basis of this principle, Avicenna does
not come up with similar arguments concerning the contingency of
the universe and divine free choice.
The difference between Avicenna and Aquinas concerning the
necessity of the universe and God's free choice can be traced back
to their consideration of divine perfection properties. Since Aquinas
was able to consider God's will with regard to the existence of the
universe in isolation from God's formal features, i.e., immutability
and eternity, he could make a distinction between absolute and hypo-
thetical necessity. If God's will concerning the universe is taken
together with God's formal features, Aquinas argues, the universe is
necessary and God creates only this universe. This is what he means
by the hypothetical necessity of the universe. Avicenna does not make
a distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity, since he
does not consider God's will with regard to the existence of the uni-
verse in isolation from God's formal features. He takes, God's per-
fections together with how God is, i.e., necessary, immutable, eternal.
As a result, he simply argues that the universe is necessary. Given
the fact that the premises on which Aquinas establishes his position
are maintained by Avicenna as well, the necessity of the universe as
argued by Avicenna corresponds to the hypothetical necessity of the
universe in the theological language of Aquinas.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE
Throughout the preceding chapters, it has been confirmed that Avi-
cenna and Aquinas agree on important issues concerning God and
creation. To recall the main points, they agree on the point that
God is eternal and immutable. God's perfections are identical to
him. His knowledge is creative. With respect to things, the divine
knowledge is like the knowledge of the artisan, who makes what he
has in mind to be realized in the external world. Moreover, God is
a voluntary agent, not an agent acting because of his nature in the
manner of natural agents, e.g., in the manner in which fire burns.
The divine will, like the divine essence, is simple, eternal and im-
mutable. God is the sufficient cause of the universe. He does not
need anything else to cause the universe.
Despite the background they share, Avicenna argues that the uni-
verse has always existed, while Aquinas argues that the universe could
have always existed, but that the arguments brought forth to demon-
strate that the universe must have always existed are not conclusive.
According to Aquinas the idea that the universe began to exist after
non-existence is not an issue of philosophical demonstration, but an
issue of faith. Avicenna argues that the relation between God and
the universe can only be conceived in terms of being. As God is
eternally in act, he must be eternally creating. Eternity, sempiternity
and time are kinds of duration specific to different orders of being.
Since time is applicable only to some of the things in the universe,
it cannot be applied to the universe as a whole. Thus a priori, the
universe as a whole cannot have began to exist temporally after not
having existed. Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that the fundamental
relation between God and the universe must be conceived in terms
of being, but holds that the relation between God and the universe
can also be conceived in terms of time. Consideration of this rela-
tion in terms of time does not yield a necessary conclusion, how-
ever-either in favor of the thesis that the universe does not have
a temporal beginning, or in favor of the thesis that the universe
began to exist temporally after not having existed.
 170 CHAPTER FOUR
Avicenna's Position
For Avicenna, creation is the act by which God gives being to every-
thing. The relation between God and the universe is the relation
between a metaphysical efficient cause, i.e., the cause of being, and
its effect. Even though God is not related to things as they exist out-
side the divine knowledge in the same way a created cause is related
to its effect, this does not mean that God is not related to the uni-
verse at all. Like the relation between any efficient cause and its
effect, (1) God necessitates the existence of the universe; (2) God and
the universe must co-exist; (3) God and the universe are not equal,
because God is the cause and has being by himself, but creatures
owe their being to God; (4) God is the cause of the existence of the
universe, not its non-existence. For Avicenna since God is eternally
necessary in all respects, and since he created the universe, he must
have always (dii'iman) created it. Since coming to exist after not hav-
ing existed concerns the quiddities of things, and there are things
that cannot come to exist temporally after not having existed, the
universe as a whole cannot have come to exist after not having
existed. Temporal posteriority requires that the thing that comes to
be comes to be from an already existing matter. In this regard, if
the universe started to be temporally after not having existed, then
the universe does not come to exist through creation in the strict
sense, but through movement undergone by some preceding thing.
Stricdy speaking, his argument is that the relation between the Creator
and the creature cannot be construed in temporal terms. Avicenna
argues that time and movement are infinite, thereby he tries to make
an argument of reductio ad absurdum against the thesis that the uni-
verse has a temporal beginning.
What Is Creation?
Avicenna prefers the Arabic term ibdii' to express the idea of cre-
ation, corresponding to Aquinas' use of creare or creatio. I There are
other terms that can express the idea of creation in Arabic, such as
khalq and i~diith, which Avicenna also uses in various contexts. Even
I As we shall see in the next section, unlike his contemporaries, such as Bonaventure,
Aquinas understands that creation simply means giving being or the existential
dependence of the creature on the Creator.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 171
though these can be rendered as creation in general, in Avicenna's
terminology they are used in a rather technical sense. 2 It is the term
ibdii' that Avicenna uses in a broader sense to cover all kinds of
creatures with respect to their existence in the absolute sense.
Creation as expressed by the term ibdii' means, for Avicenna, to
give being in the most comprehensive sense of the word. It is more
comprehensive than similar terms, because it takes into account the
existence of all things. It accounts not only for the existence of things
that have relative non-existence but also the existence of things with-
out relative non-existence. All things are absolutely non-existent by
themselves, and they exist on account of their cause, God. This giv-
ing of being in the absolute sense is creation (ibdii'). Things exist
after not having existed, but this posteriority is an essential posteri-
ority; it is not a temporal posteriority. What belongs to things on
account of their essence is non-existence and they have existence on
account of something else, i.e., God. Since what belongs to some-
thing on account of something else is posterior to what belongs to
it on account of its essence, things exist after not-having existed. If
the posteriority of things were limited to temporal posteriority, it
would require that something exists before the thing in question.
This would nullify creation in the absolute sense (ibdii').3
Consequendy creation must be set apart from generation, and
must not be conditioned by that which applies to the realm of gen-
eration and corruption. If the temporal posteriority of the universe
is assumed, it requires at least that a material cause exist before the
universe. Then the whole universe would be conditioned by relative
non-existence, but not by absolute non-existence. However, in cre-
ation the question is absolute dependence of things on God. If cre-
ation were something like preventing a relative non-existence, it would
be more like a weak action than creation in the true sense. 4 Avicenna
explicitly states that the non-existence of things is not simply non-
existence of their form, nor is it the non-existence of their matter,
2 For a discussion of Avicenna's terminology concerning creation, see Jules Janssens,
"Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina," Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica
Medievale 8 (1997), pp. 455-477. Janssens examines Avicenna's terminology, such as
~udur, fayrj and tajallz, reflecting the emanationist conception of creation. He also
provides an examination of Avicenna's use of Qur'anic terms, which are mostly
adopted by and identified with Muslim theologians.
3 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 266.12-15. See also Metaphysics VIII.3, p. 342.15-19-
p. 343.1-6.
4 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 267.4-9.
 172 CHAPTER FOUR
but the non-existence of the whole of their being. 5 Thus, creation is
absolutely out of nothing. It is the prevention of non-existence in
the absolute sense. 6
Creation Is not a Change
For Avicenna, creation is not a change, but unlike Aquinas he does
not discuss this issue at any great length. 7 Avicenna's failure to devote
a systematic discussion of this point may be due to his rejection of
a temporal beginning to the universe: God's being beyond time and
movement removes any doubt that creation might be a change. For
him change and its corollaries start with the first celestial soul, onto-
logically well below God and even the heavenly intellects. 8 Secondly,
his distinction between efficient causes of being and efficient causes
of movement, and his identification of God as the efficient cause of
being rather than of movement, removes the possibility that creation
is an action producing change. Since he undoubtedly argues that
creation is the giving of being, he most likely did not see any point
in further discussing the issue. 9 Another reason may be that his con-
ception of possible being does not leave room for such doubt. Avi-
cenna frequently affirms that everything other than God is possible
of existence, and nothing possible of existence exists on account of
5 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII. 3, p. 342.6-1l.
6 Avicenna argues that beginning to exist after not having existed (~udiith), or
making something to exist after not having existed (iMath) may also be used. This
is the term that is usually preferred by Muslim theologians to express the relation
of the world to the Creator and its beginning. The terms iMath or ~udiith as used
by the Muslim theologians have temporal connotations. That is, the universe began
to exist temporally after not having existed. Avicenna is quite aware of the usage
of the term iMath. He argues that if the temporal implication of the term is omit-
ted then it can be used interchangeably with the term ibda'. Avicenna, Metaplrysics
VI.2, p. 266.16-17 - p. 267.1-3. For the Muslim theologians' conception of cre-
ation, see Harry Austryn Wolfson, TIe Philosoplry if the Kalam (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University, 1976), pp. 355-373.
7 That Aquinas discusses the issue specifically is very reasonable. Since he argues
that assigning a temporal beginning to the universe is possible, he is expected to
explain how this could be. Since he adopts the Aristotelian conception of time, i.e.,
time is the measure of change, he needs to explain his position by showing that
creation does not imply a change. We can identifY a tension between allowing that
the universe can begin to exist temporally after not having existed, and the dan-
ger of conceiving creation as an action of change occurring in matter existing inde-
pendently of God.
8 See Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.2, p. 383.10-17 - p. 384.1-15.
9 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VU, p. 257.7-17.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 173
itself If creation were a change then it would require that there be
something existing independently of God. By creation God would
be acting upon this independently existing thing.
Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe
Before turning to discuss Avicenna's understanding of the relation-
ship between God and the universe, it is worthwhile to discuss how
God is not related to the universe. Two seemingly contradictory
strands can be found in Avicenna's writings: (1) God is strongly
related to the universe as the cause of the universe, and many pos-
itive and negative relations are predicated of God on the basis of
universe; and (2) God is not related to the universe as it exists in re.
The thing to which God is really related is his knowledge of things,
not things as they exist in re. As stated in the second chapter, for
Avicenna God's knowledge is creative. Being a pure intellect, God
knows himself, which is identical to his being (dhiit). Through his
essence, God knows everything that is after or below himself in the
ontological hierarchy. God's knowledge of himself is the cause ('illa)
of his knowledge of other things. But even though God's knowledge
of other things comprises all things which are multiple, God's knowl-
edge of them is a simple intellectual knowledge. This simple intel-
lectual knowledge includes intelligibles which have an essential and
even a temporal order insofar as they exist in re. God bears the rela-
tion of being a principle to them, such that they are 'from God,' as
Avicenna puts it, but not 'in God.'lO God is related to his knowl-
edge of things as its origin, but God is not related to things which
exist on account of his knowledge as they exist in re, although God
is their origin as well. If God were really related to things as they
exist in re, then unacceptable conclusions would follow. For exam-
ple, God would not know things except those which actually exist
at a given time. Moreover, God would not know himself (nrifsihi) as
their principle until a certain thing actually comes to exist. Conse-
quently, he would not know his essence either, because his being
(dhiit) is the origin necessitating the existence of things, no matter
10 Avicenna, Metaplrysics VIII.7, p. 364.1-6. See also Fazlur Rahman, "Ibn Sina's
Theory of the God-World Relationship," in God and Creation, ed. David B. Burrell
and Bernard McGinn (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990),
pp. 47-49.
 174 CHAPTER FOUR
whether they exist at a given time. Hence, God is related to things
insofar as they are known by him, not insofar as they exist in re (fi
al-a'yiin).11
Paradoxically enough, Avicenna states that God has many rela-
tions to the universe. For Avicenna, the fact that God is not really
related to things as they exist in re does not eliminate the situation
that God and the universe are related to each other. Many positive
and negative relations are predicated of God, such as God's being
the origin of the universe, or God's being dissimilar to creatures.
These relations are approved only as necessary concomitants of God,
not as constitutive parts of the divine being. These relations are pred-
icated of God, since they follow the divine being as its effects. How-
ever, God's being related to the universe does not imply that he
depends on the universe. The relations are simply the effect of the
divine action. 12
Even though God is related to the universe, this relation is not
like relations holding between two things in the universe. The most
fundamental relation between God and creatures is creation, which
seemingly can be placed in the category of action-passion relations.
But creation as the divine action is not something that makes God
in someway dependent on creatures. For example, if one builds a
house, building a house perfects and changes the builder. Creating
and creatures do not perfect or change God's being. We can resolve
Avicenna's contrary statements if we say that the relations between
God and the universe, based on action and passion, are not like the
relations between creatures. If relations between creatures are taken
to be definitive regarding what a relation is, then God is not related
to the universe. God is related to the universe if the dependence
and affection are eliminated, this relation is not constitutive of his
essence. Avicenna employs his concept of necessary concomitant
I 14
);
11 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 364.7-15. See also, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.1-7.
Here Avicenna also states that God is self-subsisting by himself, not because he is
the cause of the existence of things. This is reminiscent of one of Aquinas' argu-
ments concerning why God is not really related to the world.
12 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.4, p. 343.16-17 - p. 344.1-5. See also, Metaphysics
VIII.5, p. 354.12-14. "... If you ponder upon (~aqqaqtahu) him, after the [the
affirmation of] being (inniyya) God is described (yueqf) by negation (salb) of simi-
larities (mushiibihiit) and by affirmation (fiiib) of all kinds of relations (Ujiifiit), because
everything is of him, he does not participate (mushiirik) in what is of him. He is the
origin of everything, but he is not one of the things that are after (ba'd) him."
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 175
(liizim) to explain the unique character of the relations between God
and the universe.
The underlying relation of God to the universe, as Avicenna con-
siders it, is that of metaphysical efficient cause. Avicenna makes a
distinction between two senses of efficient cause, one being meta-
physical and the other physical. Whereas in the context of meta-
physics an efficient cause is the cause that gives existence to a being
distinct from itself, an efficient cause in the context of physics is the
cause that gives movement to a being that already exists. I3 Avicenna
emphasizes the point that metaphysical efficient cause and its effect
are absolutely distinct beings. Neither the efficient cause nor its effect
receive each other, nor are they conjoined (muqiirana) to each other. 14
The causal relation between God and the universe can be put in
the group of action-passion in the Aristotelian triple division of rela-
tions. I5 Even though Avicenna does not state it explicitly, this model
underlies his discussion of the relation between the Creator and the
universe. God is the efficient and the final cause of the universe and
the universe is the effect of the divine action.
Since the relation between God and creatures is the relation
between an efficient cause and its effect, what holds true between
an efficient cause and its effect must also be true between God and
the universe. When discussing creation, Avicenna, most of the time,
uses rather inclusive language. He talks in terms of agents and patients
categorically. Then he adds his specific qualifications concerning the
relation between God and the universe. Avicenna argues that between
an efficient cause and its effect the following must hold: (1) causes
necessitate their effects. Whereas God is a self-necessary being, the
13 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.l, p. 257.7-17.
Avicenna, Metaphysics VI. I , p. 259.11-19. Michael Marmura notes how Avicenna
insists on this point. Michael Marmura, "The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality in
Avicenna," in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of George F. Hourani, ed.
Michael E. Marmura (New York: SUNY, 1984), pp. 172-173. Also seeJulesJanssens,
"Creation and Emanation in Ibn Sina," pp. 458-459.
15 Aristode, Metaphysics, V.15, 1029b25-I021bll. Avicenna is very much Aristotelian
with respect to his conception of relatives and the category of relation. We find the
Aristotelian triple division of relatives, i.e., quantity, action-passion, and resemblance
or non-mutual relations. However, in Avicenna's discussion, non-mutual relations
do not have the specific importance that they have in Aquinas' discussion of the
relation between God and the universe. Michael Marmura, "Avicenna's Chapter,
"On the Relative," in the Metaphysics of the Shifii'," in Essays on Islamic Philosophy
and Science, ed. George F. Hourani (Albany: SUNY, 1975), pp. 83-99, especially
first part, pp. 83-87.
 176 CHAPTER FOUR
universe is necessary by something else, i.e., God. (2) Causes and
their effects co-exist. If what we call a cause exists and the effect
does not exist, then the cause is not actually the cause. Effects need
their cause not simply to begin to exist; they also need their cause
in order to continue to exist and act. (3) Their co-existence does not
require that they be on par with, or equal to, their cause. (4) The
efficient cause is the cause of only the existence of its effect, not its
preceding non-existence. Nor is the efficient cause the cause of the
fact that the effect 'begins to exist after not-having existed.'
Causes Necessitate Their Effects
Things that are possible to exist are effects and need a cause to
make them exist. For Avicenna, necessity is almost interchangeable
with existence as far as it concerns things, not propositions. Saying
that a cause makes its effect exist is equivalent to saying that a cause
necessitates its effect. All existent things can be divided into two
groups: (1) necessary to exist by itself and (2) possible to exist, if con-
sidered by itself alone. The thing that is possible to exist, if consid-
ered by itself, cannot be impossible in itself Otherwise it could not
exist at all. There cannot be more than one being that is necessary
to exist, if considered by itself 16 Unlike things that are possible to
exist, the self-necessary being cannot have a cause making it exist. 17
Things that are possible to exist, if considered in themselves, are
dependent on some extrinsic cause in both their existence and non-
existence. When explaining the existence of something possible to
exist, what we consider in the mind is the quiddity of the thing.
Since the quiddity of the thing is not sufficient to explain or cause
its existence or non-existence, it must be determined or specified by
something else. IS The existence of the effect is traceable to the cause
making it exist, and its non-existence to the non-existence of its
cause. 19 Since the sheer possibility of something does not make the
thing exist, it must have been necessitated by a cause if it actually
exists. As a result every possible thing that exists is necessary by
something else. If we apply this analysis to creation, God, as the
efficient cause, necessitates the existence of the universe. 2o
16 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.11-18.
17 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 38.1-10.
18 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 38.11-18 - p. 39.1-4.
19 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 39.5-16.
20 Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.6, p. 37.6-10. Avicenna's distinction between necessary
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 177
Causes and Their Effects co-Exist
The efficient cause and its effect, Avicenna argues, must co-exist.
The co-existence may be considered with regard to the beginning
of the effect, such that given the cause, the effect exists, without a
temporal gap between the existence of the cause and the effect. It
may also be considered with regard to the continuity of the exis-
tence of the effect, such that as long as the effect exists, its cause
must be existing. That is, the effect does not become independent
of its cause after beginning to exist. One can think of cases where
the efficient cause exists, but its effect does not exist. The effect may
begin to exist temporally after the existence of the efficient cause.
Consequently, one must qualify the co-existence between the cause
and its effect by saying that the efficient cause insqfar as it is the
efficient cause must co-exist with its effect. 21
For Avicenna, co-existence of the efficient cause and its effect does
not simply concern the 'beginning' of the effect, but also its contin-
uing to be what it is. Avicenna develops an argument to this effect
on the basis of his distinction between necessary and possible being.
Everything existing is necessary, either by itself, or on account of its
cause. Without reference to the causal activity of the efficient cause,
the effect is simply possible. It does not exist unless it is made nec-
essary by its cause. Since after beginning to exist the effect does not
become necessary by itself either on account of its quiddity or on
and possible is one of the troublesome issues. Following this distinction, Avicenna
talks about the properties of possible things and how they are related to being. One
of the serious objections to such a talk about possible things is that non-existent
possibles cannot even be referred to before they exist. For an argument saying that
such things cannot be referred to before their existence see Barry Miller, A Most
Unlikely God (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame, 1996), pp. 29-33.
One may distinguish between talking about possible beings categorically and talk-
ing about non-existent individuals. In that case, Avicenna's talk about properties of
possible beings may escape Miller's objection. Some scholars interpret Avicenna's
conception of possibility as if there is a realm of possible beings and God actual-
izes them by bringing existence to them. Avicenna's argument that the possibility
of things does not concern the power of the agent, which we shall talk about below,
is one of the supporting elements in this regard. However, as we have seen in chap-
ter 3, Avicenna denies the freedom of choice to God, simply because there cannot
be a realm of possible things before God so that God may choose which ones of
them to actualize. For discussions on this issue, see Gerhard Smith, "Avicenna and
the Possibles," the New Scholnsticism, XVII (1943), pp. 340-357; Francis A. Cunningham,
"Averroes vs. Avicenna on Being," TIe New Scholastieism XLVIII (1974), pp. 184-218;
Beatrice Zedler, "Another Look at Avicenna," TIe New Scholasticism L (1976), pp.
504-521.
21 Avicenna, Metaphysics VU, p. 259.11-19 - p. 260.1-4.
 178 CHAPTER FOUR
I'
account of its properties, it always needs its cause as long as it exists. 22
The condition of co-existence between a cause and its effect is
not simply limited to the relation between God and the universe,
but it is applicable to any case where a causal relation is concerned.
Avicenna examines some counter-examples to show that efficient
causes and their effects must co-exist. For example, a builder is the
efficient cause of the building. However, the building survives the
builder. A father is the efficient cause of his son, but the son may
live after the death of his father. 23 In fact, Avicenna argues, the
22 Avicenna, Metaphysics VLl, p. 261.5-16 - p. 262.1-5. Avicenna's argument to
this effect runs as following: He refers to some people arguing that the need of the
effect to have its cause is for beginning to exist. But after beginning to exist the
effect does not need the cause anymore. If the effect needs the cause only in order
to begin to exist, then the cause is prior to (mutaqaddiman) the effect, but does not
co-exist (ma'an) with the effect. Avicenna argues that this is incorrect. He offers the
following argument, which assumes the convertibility of necessity and existence. In
order for something to continue in existence, it must be necessary: so the being
that comes to exist after not having existed is either (I) a necessary being, or (2)
not a necessary being. Since nothing possible exists simply by being possible, he
does not discuss the second option further. If (I), i.e., it is a necessary being, then
(1.1) either it is a necessary being by itself because of its quiddity, or (1.2) it is not
a necessary being by itself. If it were a necessary being by itself, it could not have
begun to exist. Hence, (1.1) is false. If it is not a necessary being by itself, then it
is a necessary being (1.2.1) on the condition that it begins to exist after not hav-
ing existed, or (1.2.2.) on the condition of one of its properties, or (1.2.3) on the
condition of something distinct from it. The condition (1.2.1) is not acceptable,
because 'coming to exist after not having existed' (~udi1th) is not something neces-
sary by itself so that it could necessitate the thing coming to exist on its own. When
the thing comes to exist after non-existence, the non-existence of the thing ceases
to be the case. Hence 'coming to exist after not having existed' cannot be the con-
dition insuring the existence of the thing. One may argue that the condition of
'coming to exist after not having existed' is not the cause of the existence of the
thing, but rather the thing has undergone 'coming to exist after not having existed.'
Then 'coming to exist after not having existed' is a property that is included in
(1.2.2). On p. 261.17-19, Avicenna starts examining (1.2.2). If (1.2.2) holds, then
either (1.2.2.1) the properties insuring the existence of the thing are the properties
of its essence not insofar as the thing exists-thus its essence necessitates the exis-
tence of the thing-or (1.2.2.2) these properties come to exist and belong to this
thing when the thing exists. This last division parallels the first division (I) and (2)
(p. 262 lines 1-5). Hence (1.2.2.1) is not the case. If (1.2.2.2) is assumed, then either
(1.2.2.2.1): there are infinite number of properties of this thing and they are not
necessary by themselves, or (1.2.2.2.2): there is a property of the thing which is
necessary by something else (1.2.2.2.1) cannot be the case. Since all of them are
possible to exist, they cannot make the thing necessary, hence existent. Hence
(1.2.2.2.2) holds. The thing that comes to exist after not having existed remains in
existence by something else. Hence, (1.2.3) is true, that is, the thing that comes to
exist is necessary by something else. Consequendy it remains in existence by some-
thing else.
23 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 264.5-8.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 179
builder is not the cause of the subsistence of the building. The builder
is the cause of the movement of the material making up the build-
ing. But the organization of the building-materials in a certain way,
and the conditions of the configuration of the building, are the causes
of the subsistence of the building. Causes contributing to the sub-
sistence of the building are simultaneous with the subsistence of the
building. 24 In the case of father-son relations, the father is only the
cause of the movement of the semen towards a definite direction.
From then on, Avicenna argues, for each specific situation there can
be assigned a cause, or causes, that exists simultaneously with the
effect in question. 25 Avicenna traces this co-existence between causes
and effects up to the giver of forms, which governs what happens
in the sublunar world. True (baq'iqiyya) causes, he maintains, co-exist
with their effects. Causes that precede their effects are either acci-
dental causes or specifying causes (mu'qyyinat).26
One possible objection to the condition of co-existence is that if
efficient causes must co-exist with their effects, then for any present
effect now an infinite number of causes must actually exist. To
counter this Avicenna makes a distinction between essential and acci-
dental causes,27 and between immediate and remote causes. Essential
causes, which co-exist with their effects, are finite. Auxiliary and
preparative causes, which precede their effects and which are acci-
dental, may be infinite. As far as particular things are concerned,
their causes may be infinite, some of them temporally prior to their
effects which have come to exist after not having existed. However,
even for the things that come to exist after not having existed, the
causes that make them necessary and actually exist must co-exist
with them. 28 Since things subject to generation and corruption are
things coming to exist after not existing, their causes also come to
exist after not having existed. Even though an effect can be traced
back to infinitely many causes, which must co-exist with their effects,
no effect requires that an infinite number of actual causes exist for
24 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 264.9-11.
25 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 264.12-14.
26 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 265.1-5.
27 Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that God is the essential cause of the universe.
For what an essential cause is and how Aquinas has this conception, see William
L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton & London, 1975), pp. 18-25.
28 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.2, p. 365.6-11.
180 CHAPTER FOUR
it. Only the immediate and the essential cause of something must
co-exist with it. Each essential cause co-exists with its effect. Through
movement both the cause and effect cease to exist but new causes
and new effects emerge through continuous renewal. The former
cause becomes the remote cause of the new effect. Movement is the
participating or conserving cause of the order of the realm of gen-
eration and corruption. Hence, for any effect only its immediate and
essential causes must co-exist with it. 29
Avicenna distinguishes between the things that are subject to gen-
eration and corruption and those that are not, the latter being free
of time, matter, and movement. Ungenerable things exist without
the mediation of matter and change; they co-exist with their cause.
In contrast to them, things that are subject to generation and cor-
ruption are conditioned not simply by the existence of their essen-
tial efficient cause, but also their immediate causes. They must come
to exist after not having existed. This is why Avicenna traces the
continuity of the building made by a builder to the giver of forms.
While the properties of the material making up the configuration
are the immediate causes of the continuity of the building, the giver
of forms is the one that gives this particular form to this material.
Let us consider the case of an individual man: (1) Brian who is the
son of (2), the son of (3), the daughter of (4) the son of (5) John.
The existence of Brian is conditioned not simply by the existence of
his essential cause, ultimately God, but as well by his immediate
cause (2). (2) in turn is conditioned by the existence of God and (3)
so on and so forth.
The conception of the relations between an efficient cause and its
effect does not involve a temporal gap between the existence of the
efficient cause and its effect as such. The efficient cause simply by
being what it is can be an efficient cause. However, not all efficient
causes must be efficient cause simply by their existence. If one sets
up the condition that there be a temporal gap between the existence
of the efficient cause and its effect this would be a limited viewpoint.
This conception, which Avicenna states to have been adopted by
the majority-which refers to theologians-requires that the effect
be temporally after the existence of the efficient cause. On this con-
dition, the cause is simply the cause of the beginning of the effect.
29 Avicenna, Metaphysics V1.2, p. 265.17-19 - p. 266.1-8.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 181
Its remaining in existence does not depend on the cause. He argues
that this condition requires that there be something that goes along
with the cause which has no part in the existence of the effect, i.e.,
the preceding non-existence of the effect. 30
For Avicenna, within such a limited conception of the efficient
cause, moreover, every efficient cause must be potential and change-
able. The implication of this argument is serious. If the conception
of an efficient cause is limited to the causes whose effects follow later
on, then God cannot be the efficient cause of the universe. On this
conception, the cause would not be an efficient cause, at the out-
set. It would become an actual efficient cause, only when its effect
begins to exist. Furthermore, the cause would become an actual
cause by something happening to the cause, such as volition, or com-
pulsion. And the action of the efficient cause would take place because
of this thing happening to the efficient cause. Hence, according to
such a conception, the efficient cause is an efficient cause after hav-
ing been a potential efficient cause. 3 ! Since nothing new or addi-
tional can happen to God, on this condition God cannot be the
efficient cause of the universe.
The co-Existence if Causes and Their E.ffects Does not Require that
They Be Equal
If the cause and the effect are simultaneous, one can object by say-
ing that there is no ground to identify one as the cause and the
other as the effect. 32 Although the cause and its effect co-exist and
there is no temporal gap between their existence, this does not mean
that they are on the same level. The cause and its effect are not
equal because while the effect exists simultaneously and on account
of the cause, the cause exists only simultaneously with the effect. Co-
existence does not suffice to explain the causal relation between the
30 Avicenna, Metaphysics VU, p. 263.3-11. See also, Avicenna, Ishiiriit V, pp.
147-148.
31 Avicenna, Metaphysics VU, p. 263.12-18.
32 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV, p. 167.60-8. This objection may refer to the posi-
tions of Muslim theologians. Michael Marmura traces two objections which Avicenna
discusses to Baqillanf, an Ash'arite. One of the arguments concerns the necessary
connection between the cause and the effect, the other concerns the co-existence
of causes with their effects. Michael Marmura, "The Metaphysics of Efficient Causality
in Avicenna," in Islamic Theology and Philosophy: Studies in Honor qf George F Hourani,
ed. Michael E. Marmura (New York: SUNY, 1984), pp. 184-186.
182 CHAPTER FOUR
twO. Based solely on co-existence, if one takes the cause away, then
the effect is taken away. But then if one takes the effect away-accord-
ing to the rule of co-existence-the cause is also taken away. As a
result, what is supposed to be the cause depends on the effect as
much as the effect depends on the cause. Avicenna answers this
objection by saying that one cannot take the effect away unless the
cause is prevented from being the cause, or is already removed. 33
Neither does the fact that both cause and effect are necessary
mean that they are equal. The co-existence of an effect and its cause
concerns their 'duration,' but not their subsistence or having exis-
tence. If the cause exists, the effect simultaneously exists. "They exist
together (maCan) in time, or in sempiternity (dahr) , or something else.
But they are not together with respect to having (buJul) existence."34
As far as existence is concerned, while the effect becomes necessary
on account of the cause, the cause is not necessary on account of
its effect. The cause is either necessary by itself, or it is necessary
on account of its own cause. But it is not necessary on account of
its effect. Everything existing-except for the self-necessary being-is
possible in itself, i.e., without reference to its cause. If it is taken
with the existence of its cause, then it becomes necessary by some-
thing else. In any pairing of an efficient cause and its effect, the
effect is necessary with reference to its cause, but not vice versa.
Hence, the cause and the effect are not equal, although they co-
exist and they both are necessary. 35
TIe Efficient Cause Is the Cause on[y if the Existence if Its Effict
The cause has a part only in the existence of the effect, not in its
non-existence. Avicenna considers the existence and the non-existence
33 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 167.9-16; p. 169.3-5 and 9-13.
34 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.I, p. 167.2-3. There is a hidden problem here. If
both the effect and the cause have the same kind of being, such as being tempo-
ral or sempitemal, then it is conceivable that both the cause and the effect 'exist
together.' However, if the cause and effect are not of the same genus, or of the
same order of being, how can they be temporally simultaneous or co-existing? I
I
i;
want to simply point out the problem, the discussion of which goes far beyond my
objectives. Although this is a problem for Avicenna in this context, because of the
co-existence of the cause and its effect, this is also applicable to the thought of
many philosophers and theologians. This is true especially with regard to the divine
knowledge of things and God's intervention in history, such as his response to
prayers.
3S Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.3, p. 274.7-17.
11
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 183
of the effect as separate units. Since not all efficient causes exist for-
ever, and since not all efficient causes are unstoppable from exert-
ing their causal activity, some effects may come to exist temporally
after not having existed. In such cases, if the cause is not such that
it immediately causes its effect, the cause must become an actual
efficient cause. No matter whether the effect exist simultaneously
with the cause or it comes to exist later on, the relation of the effect
to the cause concerns its existence. The cause has a part in the exis-
tence of the effect,36 but it does not have a part in the non-exis-
tence of the effect. Since the cause is the cause of the being of the
effect, it does not have a part in the preceding non-existence of the
effect insofar as it is the efficient cause of the effect. The preceding
non-existence can have a cause, which can be simply the non-exis-
tence of the cause. It may also be due to something preventing the
cause from exercising its causal power. In this case, the cause does
not exist as the cause, though it exists without being a cause. Hence,
the existence of the effect is on account of a cause, i.e., the exis-
tence of the cause. The non-existence of the effect is, again, on
account of a cause. Its cause is the non-existence of the causeY
The compound made up of 'preceding non-existence' and 'poste-
rior existence' cannot be traced to one cause. Within the universe,
there are things the quiddities of which require that they temporally
begin to be after not having existed. There are also things that can-
not begin to exist after temporal non-existence. All of them can be
traced to their cause. However, if the prior non-existence and the
posterior existence of the effect is taken as a compound, it cannot
be traced to a single cause. Each part of the compound, then, can
be traced to its own cause. The effect taken by itself is simply what
is possible to exist. It does not reveal anything about whether it actu-
ally exists or not. Its existence or non-existence is due to the exis-
tence or non-existence of the cause. The cause is the cause of the
existence of the effect, even if the effect begins to exist after not hav-
ing existed despite the prior existence of the cause. The non-exis-
tence of the cause is the cause of the non-existence of the effect.
However, 'beginning to exist after not having existed' is not some-
thing possible to exist among other things. Rather it is something
that supervenes on some of the things that are possible to exist.
36
37
Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.!, p. 260.1-4.
Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.I, p. 260.5-11.
184 CHAPTER FOUR
Thus, there is not one single cause for the fact that 'something begins
to exist after not-having existed. 38
The claim that 'the preceding non-existence' and 'the posterior
existence" of an effect cannot be traced to a cause needs some fur-
ther explanation. The cause in this statement does not refer to one
entity with regard to its quiddity. It rather refers to all the condi-
tions under which the cause exerts its causal activity. As will become
clear through the discussions of divine immutability, for Avicenna
God is the cause of the universe by willing it to exist. He might
have been the cause of its non-existence by not willing it, but if at
first he willed not to create, in order to be the cause of the universe
God must have a new volition different from the former. Thus 'a
cause' in this context includes all that makes the cause a cause, not
simply an entity without reference to its causal activity.
The compound made up by the 'preceding non-existence' and
'posterior existence' concerns the quiddity of things that exist. What
Avicenna intends by saying this may be exemplified by comparing
'a man' to 'a heavenly intellect.' Man, a rational animal, if he exists
outside the mind, exists as composed of form and matter, a mater-
ial and temporal thing with a certain bodily construction brought
forth through generation. A heavenly intellect, however, is not a
material and temporal thing. If it exists outside of the mind, it exists
without reference to time. If the effect is such that its quiddity requires
that this effect may exist as something material and temporal, then
the effect may begin to exist after temporal non-existence. In the
preceding non-existence of the effect, the cause does not have any
involvement. The cause has a part only in its existence. Since 'begin-
ning to exist after not having existed' (buduth) concerns the quiddity
of the thing in question, it does not concern the power of the agent.
It is not something that can be done. Within the universe, the quid-
dities of some things are such that they cannot exist, except after
preceding non-existence. 39 These consist of the things in the sub-
38 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.I, p. 260.12-17; p. 261.4.
39 In this context Aquinas' analysis of the constraints on God's creative activity
may provide clarification. He maintains that "[n]ecessity arises from the end when
the intention of the end cannot be fulfilled, either not at all or not conveniently,
without this or that thing. It remains therefore that necessity in God's works can-
not arise except from the form which is the end of operation ... thus we might
say, for instance, supposing that God intends to make a man, that it is necessary
and due that he give him a rational soul and an organic body, without which there
is no such thing as a man." De potentia Ill, 16.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 185
lunar realm, also known as the realm of generation and corruption.
Some other things, however, cannot begin to exist temporally after
not having existed. Things in the supralunar realm, which are not
subject to generation and corruption, belong to this category. Hence
some of the things in the universe must necessarily (wiijib t/aruratan)
exist 'after temporal non-existence' ('adam) , and some others must
necessarily exist 'not after temporal non-existence. '40
Arguments fir the Sempitemi!J qf the Universe
For Avicenna, the world is not eternal in the technical sense of the
word. As discussed in chapter 2, for him, eternity (qidam) belongs
only to God. Being eternal, for him, is to exist by itself and to have
full perfection of being. In this sense only God is eternal, i.e., prior
to all other beings. The universe, in the sense of everything other
than God, may be characterized as sempiternal. Sempiternity, for
Avicenna, is not infinite temporal duration. Rather it is above time,
and is a non-temporal duration. Sempiternity is applicable to the
vertical order of the universe, beginning from prime matter and
going up to the first intellect. Within sempiternity, temporal things
and time exist. Time is applicable only to things that are subject to
generation and corruption. As the measure of movement, time is
applicable to things that are subject to change. Since not all things
in the universe change and are thus temporal, the basic argument
of Avicenna is that considered as a whole, time is not applicable to
the universe; it is rather a part and applicable to only some part of
the universe. From there on, based on this conception of movement,
he argues for an infinite temporal duration. But this latter again
applies only to part of the universe. Further arguments, based on
divine immutability and the nature of time, are meant to show the
absurdity of a temporal beginning to the universe.
Minimal adjustment is sufficient to apply the foregoing explana-
tion of the relations between an efficient cause and its effect to the
relation between God and the universe. The preceding four rela-
tions between an efficient cause and its effect are assumed in all
arguments. In addition to this, that God is not like any other efficient
cause must be underlined. In this respect, Avicenna reminds us that
40 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.!, p. 262.6-14.
186 CHAPTER FOUR
God is necessary in all respects, i.e., God is fully in act eternally.
By implication, God is immutable, and nothing new may happen to
God. Thus, Avicenna argues, since God exists always and is the
essential cause of the universe, God always (dii'iman) causes the uni-
verse to exist. 41
The First Argument: Time and Temporal Beginning Are not Applicable to
All Things
Avicenna draws a fundamental distinction among the things in the
world: (1) things the quiddities of which require that they cannot
come to exist after temporal non-existence, and (2) things that must
begin to exist after temporal non-existence. 42 In other words, there
are things that do not need a substratum in order to exist, and there
are things that need a substratum in order to exist. This corresponds
to the distinction between ungenerable and generable things. Heavenly
intelligences, souls, and bodies, as well as movement and time, are
included in the first category. As we saw in chapter 2, Avicenna
divides things with regard to duration into three categories: eternal,
sempiternal and temporal. 43 God is at the highest level, he is the
eternal being who is self-subsistent and all-necessary. At the other
end of the chain of being there are the things that are subject to
generation and corruption. These are temporal things the quiddities
of which require that they begin to exist after temporal non-exis-
tence. All things which are in between God and the things in the
sublunar world are sempiternal. These are the things the quiddities
of which require that they be non-temporal, and that they must not
come to exist after temporal non-existence.
One must ask why the quiddity of something must require that
it be without temporal beginning, or that it be with a temporal
beginning. In order to answer this question, Avicenna discusses the
41 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.1, p. 373.13-18.
42 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.l, p. 262.6-14.
43 Avicenna's triple division of the hierarchy of being possessing three types of
duration may not be coherent, since heavenly bodies and heavenly intellects may
not quite fit the same kind of duration. See Faz1ur Rahman, "Ibn Sina's Theory
of the God-World Relationship," pp. 43-46. Faz1ur Rahman compares Avicenna's
conception of dahr to Proclus' concept of 'perpetual becoming.' He argues that while
Proclus considers 'perpetual becoming' within time, Avicenna places it beyond time.
According to this interpretation, which seems justified to me, if we render Avicenna's
term 'dahr' as 'sempiternity' in English, then sempiternity is not infinite temporal
duration. It is rather a kind of non-temporal duration. Hence time and movement
is applicable neither to sempiternal beings nor to the eternal being, i.e., God.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 187
relationship between the possibility of something and its actual exis-
tence. Everything other than God, considered in itself, is possible of
existence. Something that is possible to exist is also possible not to
exist. If it is not possible to exist before it actually exists, then it
cannot exist. The possibility of existent things must precede them,
either temporally or essentially. Hence, in order for something to
exist it must be something possible to exist before it actually exists.
In this context, Avicenna divides things into three categories: (1)
something possible to be a substratum, (2) something possible to exist
in a substratum, and (3) something possible to exist without a sub-
stratum. 44 In order for things to exist through a substratum, e.g.,
stone, wood and man, their substratum must exist. The possibility
of their existence is in their substratum. Unless their substratum
exists, they have no possibility of existing.
The possibility of things that exist without a substratum cannot
be temporally prior to them, because they do not exist through a
substratum where their possibility is found. The possibility of things
that exist in a substratum is in their substratum. 45 Things that exist
through a substratum, that is, things that are subject to generation
and corruption begin to exist after temporal non-existence. But those
that exist without a substratum cannot begin to exist after non-exis-
tence in the temporal sense. 46
Avicenna places the possibility of material things in prime matter,
but also considers placing the possibility of things in the power of
the agent. The latter is what Aquinas argues when refusing one of
the arguments for the sempiternity of the world. For Avicenna the
possibility of something cannot be reduced to the power of the agent.
The agent can do only what is possible. If one defines the possible
in terms of the power of the agent, saying that 'power is applicable
only to something possible' this declaration would mean 'power is
applicable only to that to which power is applicable.' If possible is
what can be done and the impossible what cannot be done, then if
we doubted whether something can be or cannot be done, we could
not reach the resolution of this doubt at all. Hence, the possibility
of things must be different from the power of the agent to make
44 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 177.5-12.
45 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 177.13-20 - p. 178.1-5.
46 Avicenna, Metaphysics IY.2, p. 177.6-8; p. 182.7-18.
188 CHAPTER FOUR
them. That something can be done necessarily follows from its being
possible. Something 'is possible' with regard to itself, and 'can be
done' with regard to the power of the agent. Therefore, the possi-
bility of things is distinct from the power of an agent over it. 47
Special emphasis may be appropriate regarding the beginning of
movement and time. They do not exist through a substratum. In
the Aristotelian spirit, Avicenna defines time as the measure of move-
ment with regard to before and after. Time co-exists with move-
ment. Movement is not one of the things that are subject to generation
and corruption and it does not have a temporal beginning. 48 Avicenna
reaches this conclusion through his arguments that every movement
requires a preceding movement.
On the basis of the discussion above, Avicenna's argument can
be constructed as follows:
(1) God is the efficient cause of the universe and the universe is
the effect of the divine creative action. (2) Beginning to exist tem-
porally after not having existed concerns the quiddity of existing
things. (3) Only things that can exist in a substratum can begin to
exist after not having existed. (4) There are things in the world the
quiddities of which require that they exist without a substratum, (5)
Hence the universe cannot have begun to exist temporally after not
having existed.
In this argument, (2) states that the universe's beginning to exist
after not having existed cannot be traced to the divine action. One
may object that God is not simply the cause of the existence of
things with quiddities which require that they are not after tempo-
ral non-existence, but God is also the cause that determines which
quiddities existent things should have. In a sense God is the designer
of the quiddities of things. Nevertheless, even if this argument is
granted, the fact that there exist things that cannot come to exist
temporally after not having existed (4) makes this objection ineffective.
The things indicated in (4)-the things the quiddity of which requires
existence without a substratum-cannot begin to exist temporally
after not having existed.
47 Avicenna, Metaphysics IV.2, p. 181.6-16 - p. 182.1-6. See also, Avicenna,
Mabda' wa Ma'iid, pp. 40-41.
48 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 381.8-11; p. 374.17-19. It is generated by the
soul of the first celestial sphere, both of which are sempiternal. See also, Avicenna,
Metaphysics IX.2, p. 383.10-17 - p. 384.1-9; p. 386.14 - p. 387.3.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 189
The Second Argument: Temporal Posteriori!)! Requires a Change in God
That the universe begins to exist temporally after not having existed
is not compatible with the immutability and eternity of God. As
stated above, for Avicenna causes and effects are simultaneous.
'Existing after not having existed,' as a compound, cannot be traced
to a cause. Avicenna's support for this claim is that the cause is the
cause of the existence of the effect, not its preceding non-existence.
If, despite the existence of the cause, the universe did not exist at
first-on the assumption of God's immutability-it could not come
to exist at all. Or, if the universe has begun to exist after not hav-
ing existed, then the universe as a whole must be something gener-
able that needs the existence of a substratum that exists before it. 49
If the universe begins to exist after not having existed, then God
is not immutable. Consequently, either its cause must begin to exist
after not having existed, or there must be a chain of remote and
close causes leading to the existence of the effect. Since none of the
parties debating the beginning of the universe would accept that God
begins to exist after non-existence, this may be dismissed. If, despite
the existence of God, the universe does not exist, in order for the
universe to begin to exist, some other cause must come to exist. This
new cause is the immediate cause of the universe,5o in addition to
the existence of the essential cause, i.e., God. This immediate cause
in turn needs its own immediate cause ad irifinitum. Members of this
chain come and cease to exist through movement, which itself does
not begin to exist after not having existed. 51 Thus, if the universe
begins to exist temporally after not having existed, then God is not
the sole cause of the universe. Clearly this is not the conclusion
acceptable by defenders of the thesis that the universe began to exist
after temporal non-existence.
If God is the sole cause of the universe, and if, given the cause,
i.e., God, the universe does not exist, then God must change so that
the universe comes to exist. God is a necessary being, the necessi-
tating agent of all other things. If God did not at first necessitate
all things existing on account of him and then did this later, God
would have two states: (1) one state in which he does not create,
and (2) another state in which he creates. If God has two states , he
49 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 374.1-6; p. 376.7-9.
50 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 374.8-10.
SI Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 374.17-19; p. 375.1-4 and 9.
 IT
I
190 CHAPTER FOUR
would change from being not the creator to being the creator. If
one conceives divine will to create to be identical with God, then
God must change in order to create. Or if one conceives the divine
will to create as something separate from God's being, then there is
no doubt that it would be additional to God. In any case, whether
one conceives the divine will to create the universe as something
identical to God's being or something distinct from God, it must be
new. The divine will itself must come to exist after not having
existed. 52 However this contradicts divine immutability and necessity
in all respects.
In order to explain both that the universe as a whole does not
begin to exist and that within the universe some things begin to exist
after not having existed without affecting the divine immutability,
Avicenna reminds us of the distinction between the vertical and hor-
izontal orders of things. There are things which are immediately
given existence and there are things produced by the mediation of
some of the things in the former group, i.e., matter, movement. At
the vertical level which concerns the existence of things which are
given existence immediately, things cannot come to exist after not
having existed. If they came to exist after not having existed, then
there must be a reason to prefer the non-existence of the things at
first. Since their existence depend solely on the divine will but does
not require time or matter, at first God must have willed not to cre-
ate , and then must have willed to create. Were God to will not to
create and then to create, he would be changeable, because the
divine will is not something apart from God's being, in the manner
where the object of volition is something outside of him. 53 Hence,
as far as the vertical order of things is concerned, the immutability
of the divine will requires that the universe cannot begin to exist
after not having existed. At the horizontal level, however, things that
are subject to generation and corruption need their essential cause
as well as their immediate causes, such as movement and time. Their
beginning to exist after non-existence does not oppose to the neces-
sity and immutability of the divine will.
Another argument for the thesis that the universe does not have
a temporal beginning is based on God's relation to the universe. If
the universe comes to exist after not having existed (~adatha), then a
52 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 376.10-17.
53 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 377.4-7.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 191
new relation (nisba) occurs to God, the relation of being the creator
of the universe. This must occur to his essence (dhiit) and be in his
essence (dhiit). If it is outside of the divine being, i.e., if this relation
does not occur to God but to something else, then this is not the
relation that is sought after. This is because the relation that is sought
after is the relation that should explain the existence of everything
other than God. If this relation is not in God, then it must be in
something else which is distinct from God. Since creation includes
everything, nothing other than God can be the origin of this relation. 54
Avicenna is so certain about the demonstrative power of his argu-
ment that he maintains that one cannot possibly deny it. He confirms
that without something new happening to the cause, nothing can
come to exist after non-existence. One may deny this with the tongue,
but cannot escape from acknowledging it in one's conscience (rjamfr).
God is immutable, and nothing possible can exist by itself Avicenna
implies that if the universe as a whole were conditioned to come to
exist after not having existed, then now it would not exist at all. 55
But is Avicenna's argument sufficient to justify his conclusion?
Does the claim that 'the cause is the cause of the existence of the
effect' contradict the claim that 'the cause can be the cause of the
existence of the effect as well as its preceding non-existence'? If causes
that act simply on account of their nature are considered, this seems
to be the case. The cause causes the existence of the effect unless
it is prevented. But does it apply, in the same way, to the divine
action, which stems from divine knowledge and will? In order to get
a firmer grip on this question, let us break it into two smaller pieces,
reflecting the two alternatives the question implies. (1) Why cannot
God be such that he wills not to act at first, and later on he wills
to act? (2) Why cannot God be the cause of the preceding non-exis-
tence and then the existence of the effect by one act of will? That
is, why cannot God, as a voluntary agent, cause the effect to be
such that it exists temporally after not having existed?
Avicenna argues that if an agent does not cause the effect at first
and then later causes the effect, this agent is a potential efficient
cause at first and then becomes an actual efficient cause. He states
that the majority of people have such a conception of an efficient
54 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 377.18-19 - p. 378.1-4.
55 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 377.8-17.
192 CHAPTER FOUR
cause. He argues that no matter whether the efficient cause is a
cause acting on account of its nature or on account of its will, if
the cause does not cause the effect simply when it itself exists, then
the cause is a potential efficient cause. As long as the cause does
not actually cause the effect, it is a potential cause of the effect.
Additionally, if the cause does not cause the existence of the effect
when it itself exists, then the cause must become an actual efficient
cause by something occurring to it, such as a new nature, or a new
volition, or something else. Hence, according to such a conception,
the efficient cause, in the same manner as the effect, begins to act
by becoming an actual efficient cause after being a potential efficient
cause. 56 Moreover, in this conception, the efficient cause acts on
account the thing that occurs to it. 57
In light of the foregoing, let us come back to question (1), i.e.,
why cannot a voluntary cause be such that it wills not to act at first,
and later on it wills to act? This may be applicable to voluntary
causes in general, but it cannot be accepted with regard to God.
For Avicenna, God cannot will not to act at first and will to act
later on. Otherwise God would be, at first, the potential efficient
cause of the universe, then the actual efficient cause. This would
require that God be changeable. Furthermore, it would require that
God have his perfections in a manner similar to creatures. That is,
God's perfections would not be identical to his being, but rather the
relation between his being and his properties would be similar to
the relation between a created subject and its accidents. Moreover,
God would then be acting for the sake of something else, that is,
for the sake of the thing that occasions him to act.
As for question (2), i.e., why cannot God be the cause of the pre-
ceding non-existence and then the existence of the effect by one act
of will? Avicenna does not seem to consider this form of the ques-
tion specifically. This may be due to the fact that he was not aware
of the question in this form, or that he did not consider it to be
substantially different from the previous form of the question. It is,
in fact, the argument Aquinas comes up with, as will be discussed
in the following section. However, Avicenna's argument that 'the
quiddity of some things require that they must not be after tempo-
ral non-existence' turns out to be a kind of reply to this. Avicenna
56 Avicenna, Metaphysics VI.!, p. 263.3-1l.
57 Avirpnn~ Mdnhhvsics VI. I. D. 263.12-14.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 193
maintains that there cannot be such a temporal, or any kind of, gap
between God's willing something to be and its existence, because
the divine knowledge of things is identical to the divine willing, the
latter being identical to making them exist. 58 If the divine will con-
cerns the making of creatures, then he must have made them exist
by willing them. Otherwise, one can ask questions about the timing
of creation.
Avicenna argues that if God's volition concerning the universe is
identical with making it, i.e., God does not have a purpose which
he would reach by creating the universe or a benefit God expects
by creating,59 then the following questions can be asked: (1) why did
God not create the universe before he did? (2) did God think the
moment when he created the universe was more suitable? (3) did
the time when the universe could exist begin when God created it?
(4) and finally, was God unable to create the universe before? These
questions may sound absurd. However, Avicenna argues that they
are all valid questions and applicable to all times, if the universe is
assumed to be after its preceding temporal non-existence. 60
The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leads to Impossible Conclusions
Avicenna questions the applicability of time to the whole universe
and attempts to deduce absurdities from the assumption that the
universe began to exist after not having existed on the basis of the
nature of time. One of his arguments is based on the non-existence
of time without the existence of movable things (3.1). He argues, by
assuming that time is the measure of movement, and exists as super-
vening on movement and movable things, if no movable thing exists,
there cannot be two distinct instants of time, by which the tempo-
ral posteriority of the existence of the universe may be traced. 61
Another argument of Avicenna concerns the priority of God to
his effects (3.2.1). He asks the question 'by what is God prior to his
action (aj'alahu) that comes to exist after not having existed (~aditha)?'
Avicenna's use of the word 'action' needs to be interpreted. For him
God is eternal and God's action is identical to himself in the strict
58 Avicenna, Metaphysics VIII.7, p. 366.14-15; IX.l, p. 378.14-16.
59 Since God does not benefit from the existence of the universe and cannot be
seeking after a purpose in creating, divine volition is identified with making crea-
tures exist. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.l, p. 378.15 and p. 379.2-3.
60 Avicenna, MetapfFysics IX. 1, p. 378.15-16 - p. 379.1-2.
61 Avicenna, MetapfFysics IX.l, p. 378.8-9.
192 ClL<\PTER FOUR
cause. He argues that no matter whether the efficient cause is a
cause acting on account of its nature or on account of its will, if
the cause does not cause the effect simply when it itself exists, then
the cause is a potential efficient cause. As long as the cause does
not actually cause the effect, it is a potential cause of the effect.
Additionally, if the cause does not cause the existence of the effect
when it itself exists, then the cause must become an actual efficient
cause by something occurring to it, such as a new nature, or a new
volition, or something else. Hence, according to such a conception,
the efficient cause, in the same manner as the effect, begins to act
by becoming an actual efficient cause after being a potential efficient
cause. 56 Moreover, in this conception, the efficient cause acts on
account the thing that occurs to it. 57
In light of the foregoing, let us come back to question (1), i.e.,
why cannot a voluntary cause be such that it wills not to act at first,
and later on it wills to act? This may be applicable to voluntary
causes in general, but it cannot be accepted with regard to God.
For Avicenna, God cannot will not to act at first and will to act
later on. Otherwise God would be, at first, the potential efficient
cause of the universe, then the actual efficient cause. This would
require that God be changeable. Furthermore, it would require that
God have his perfections in a manner similar to creatures. That is,
God's perfections would not be identical to his being, but rather the
relation between his being and his properties would be similar to
the relation between a created subject and its accidents. Moreover,
God would then be acting for the sake of something else, that is,
for the sake of the thing that occasions him to act.
As for question (2), i.e., why cannot God be the cause of the pre-
ceding non-existence and then the existence of the effect by one act
of will? Avicenna does not seem to consider this form of the ques-
tion specifically. This may be due to the fact that he was not aware
of the question in this form, or that he did not consider it to be
substantially different from the previous form of the question. It is,
in fact, the argument Aquinas comes up with, as will be discussed
in the following section. However, Avicenna's argument that 'the
quiddity of some things require that they must not be after tempo-
ral non-existence' turns out to be a kind of reply to this. Avicenna
56 Avicenna, Metapl!Jsics VU, p. 263.3-11.
57 Avicenna, Metapl!Jsics VI. I, p. 263.12-14.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 193
maintains that there cannot be such a temporal, or any kind of, gap
between God's willing something to be and its existence, because
the divine knowledge of things is identical to the divine willing, the
latter being identical to making them exist. 58 If the divine will con-
cerns the making of creatures, then he must have made them exist
by willing them. Otherwise, one can ask questions about the timing
of creation.
Avicenna argues that if God's volition concerning the universe is
identical with making it, i.e., God does not have a purpose which
he would reach by creating the universe or a benefit God expects
by creating, 59 then the following questions can be asked: (1) why did
God not create the universe before he did? (2) did God think the
moment when he created the universe was more suitable? (3) did
the time when the universe could exist begin when God created it?
(4) and finally, was God unable to create the universe before? These
questions may sound absurd. However, Avicenna argues that they
are all valid questions and applicable to all times, if the universe is
assumed to be after its preceding temporal non-existence. 6o
The Third Argument: Temporal Beginning Leads to Impossible Conclusions
Avicenna questions the applicability of time to the whole universe
and attempts to deduce absurdities from the assumption that the
universe began to exist after not having existed on the basis of the
nature of time. One of his arguments is based on the non-existence
of time without the existence of movable things (3.1). He argues, by
assuming that time is the measure of movement, and exists as super-
vening on movement and movable things, if no movable thing exists,
there cannot be two distinct instants of time, by which the tempo-
ral posteriority of the existence of the universe may be traced. 61
Another argument of Avicenna concerns the priority of God to
his effects (3.2.1). He asks the question 'by what is God prior to his
action (rif'alahu) that comes to exist after not having existed (~aditha)?'
Avicenna's use of the word 'action' needs to be interpreted. For him
God is eternal and God's action is identical to himself in the strict
58 Avicenna, Metapl!Jsics VIII.7, p. 366.14-15; IX.I, p. 378.14-16.
59 Since God does not benefit from the existence of the universe and cannot be
seeking after a purpose in creating, divine volition is identified with making crea-
tures exist. Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 378.15 and p. 379.2-3.
60 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 378.15-16 - p. 379.1-2.
61 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 378.8-9.
194 CHAPTER FOUR
sense. He seems to be speaking here not of the divine action in the
strict sense, but the effects of the divine action. Is God prior to the
universe by his being (dhiitihi) or by time? Since all the effects owe
their being to him (kii'ina 'anhu) and God is eternal, he is prior to
the universe with regard to being, not with regard to time. 62
One may also consider why God should not be prior to the uni-
verse with regard to time in addition to his priority with regard to
being (3.2.2). If God is assumed to be prior to the universe by both
essence and time, then the situation can be described as following:
(1) There is a time when God exists, and the universe does not exist.
(2) Now God exists and the universe exists. Statement (1) indicates
a past time when God existed but the universe did not. When (2)
is true, (1) is no longer true. This implies that there was a time with
finite duration before the existence of the universe. In turn this
implies that there was an existence (kawn) before creatures were cre-
ated (khuliqa), since time does not exist on its own. This existence
must have finite duration, since at the beginning of the existence of
the universe this time-period, during which 'God was' and 'the uni-
verse was not,' ended. Since such an assumption would require that
some creature exists before creation, God cannot be prior to the
universe by time. 63
By the co-existence rule between cause and effect, if time begins,
the cause of the time, i.e., God, must have begun to exist, or have
become an efficient cause, at that instant (3.2.3). Of course, one may
reject the co-existence rule. However, Avicenna argues that if God's
priority to the universe with respect to time is such that 'he was,
and there were no creatures,' this implies more than that time had
a beginning. The statement that 'he was and creatures were not'
does not mean that 'simply God existed,' or 'God existed alone.'
Rather, Avicenna argues that when the universe begins to exist,
God's essence is realized (M~il).64 Since before the universe begins
to exist God does not create the universe, God's act of creation is
not realized. Since God's action is identical to his being, his being
is realized after creating the universe. Here Avicenna does not dis-
tinguish between the divine action and the effect of the divine action,
and he maintains that God's willing to create is identical with the
62 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 379.4-8.
63 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 379.7-12.
64 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 379.14-19.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 195
existence of what he has willed to create. Aquinas rejects such a
requirement. For him since God is not really related to the uni-
verse, even though the divine will is eternal and God's act of cre-
ation is identical to God, the fact that the effect of the divine action
begins to exist after not having existed does not contradict divine
immutability.
Assuming that God is temporally prior to the universe requires
that God cannot be prior to the universe with regard to being
(3.2.4.1). That is, if temporal priority applies to God, then God can-
not be eternal. If by God's temporal priority to the universe one
means that there was a time when God existed but the universe did
not exist, then three things are implied: (1) God's existence, (2) the
non-existence of the universe and (3) a time period before the uni-
verse began to exist. This priority of God to the universe in terms
of time does not simply imply the beginning of time, but rather a
time period in which God could have created. This would mean that
God's priority can be measured and quantified by something imper-
manent, something subject to renewal, which time is. Hence, if God
is assumed to be prior to the universe by time, this implies that God
is not absolutely prior to the universe but only temporally prior.
Since time is attributed to God, and since there are two different
situations so that we say 'God was, and the universe was not' and
now 'God is and the universe is,' God's duration is assumed to be
a temporal duration, which is not the duration of something per-
manent (thabiit).65 Avicenna states, "If you have realized (ta~aqqaqta)
[this], you have known that, according to their position, the first is
prior to creatures not by absolute priority (sabqan mut/aqan), but by
temporal priority, which includes (ma'ahu) movement and bodies
(ajsiim), or one body."66
Avicenna provides another argument to deduce absurdities based
on the assumption that God is temporally prior to the universe. If
God is assumed to be temporally prior to the universe, this implies
that God is not absolutely prior to creatures, but this indicates that
God is prior only to this universe (3.2.4.2). Since time is the mea-
sure of movement, there must be something the movements of which
make time exist before this universe. Since time is the measure of
65 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX.I, p. 380.1-8.
66 Avicenna, Metaphysics IX. I, p. 380.9-10.
 196 CHAPTER FOUR
the movement, there must be something movable during the non-
existence of the universe which, when its movement is measured,
allows God's duration is quantified as well.
Let me remind essential points in Avicenna's arguments for the
sempiternity of the universe. For him, God is the metaphysical efficient
cause of the universe. What applies between a cause and its effect
is also applicable between God and the universe. Avicenna advances
four rules that hold between causes and effects. These are (1) causes
necessitate their effects; (2) causes co-exist with their effects; (3) causes
are prior to their effects with regard to being, not with regard to
time; and (4) causes are causes of the existence of their effects, not
their preceding non-existence. These four rules apply between God
and the universe, granted that God's relation to the world has its
own specific aspects that must be taken into account.
For Avicenna, the universe must be sempiternal, because there are
sempiternal beings. In addition to the four rules mentioned above,
Avicenna maintains that the temporal posteriority concerns not the
cause but the quiddity of things. Some of the things in the universe
must begin to exist after temporal non-existence, and yet some oth-
ers must not begin after temporal non-existence. Things that must
begin to exist after temporal non-existence are material, changeable
things, i.e., things that are subject to generation and corruption. The
condition of some of the things in the universe cannot be applied
to the whole universe. Thus although some things in the universe
begin to exist temporally after not having existed, the universe as a
whole cannot have begun to exist temporally after not having existed.
If one admits that the universe began to exist after not having
existed, for Avicenna, this implies various unacceptable results. It
requires that God's will is changeable, and that God is first a poten-
tial cause of the universe, then its actual cause. Furthermore, the
assumption that the universe began to exist after not having existed
is also self-defeating, because one cannot make such an assumption,
unless one also assumes that there is a time period-hence some
movable thing-existing before the universe. Thus, on this assump-
tion God is not temporally prior to all other things, i.e., the uni-
verse, but only this universe.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 197
Aquinas' Position
Before tackling the question whether the universe has always existed,
Aquinas' position concerning the nature of creation should be stated
in its essential points. This will help us grasp to what extent his posi-
tion accords to that of Avicenna, and to identify what the major
differences between Avicenna's and Aquinas' positions are. It will
also provide a guide to assess whether Aquinas' refutation of argu-
ments for the sempiternity of the universe are successful.
Aquinas' discussion of the sempiternity of the world makes up only
a small part of his writings on creation. He wrote on all issues essen-
tial to religious teachings, such as creation out of nothing, God's cre-
ating without intermediaries, God's ability to create many things,
etc. 57 I want to highlight four main points that characterize Aquinas'
conception of creation: (1) Creation is existential dependence, (2) cre-
ation is not a change, (3) creation is a relation, (4) whether the uni-
verse is sempiternal, or it has begun to exist temporally after not
having existed, cannot be demonstrated through rational arguments.
Aquinas emphasizes that creation is neither motion, nor change from
one type of existence to another. It is simply a relation between God
and the universe. While it is not a real relation ]ram God to creatures, it
is a real relation ]ram the universe to God. For Aquinas, that the universe
has not always existed, i.e., is not sempiternal, cannot be proven
through philosophical demonstration. This is because God creates
by his will and all properties of the universe, including its duration,
are determined by the divine will. Since God creates freely, not nec-
essarily, the duration of the universe cannot be known through inves-
tigating the divine will. 58
67 For more inclusive studies of Aquinas' theory of creation see Steven E. Baldner
& William E. Carroll, "Introduction," in their translation of Aquinas on Creation:
Writings on the "Sentences" qf Peter Lombard, Book 2, Distinction 1, Qyestion 1, pp. 22-62;
Etienne Gilson, The Christian philosoplry qf St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L. K. Shook
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1994), pp. 120-160.
68 Moses Maimonides is considered to be one of Aquinas' sources of influence
in regard to his agnostic position. See David Burrell, "Aquinas and the Islamic and
Jewish Thinkers," in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann
and Elenore Stump (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993),
pp. 70-74. For Maimonides' theory concerning creation, see Andrew L. Gluck,
"Maimonides' Arguments for Creation Ex Nzhilo in the Guide if the Perplexed," Medieval
Philosophy and Theology 7 (1998), pp. 221-254; William Dunphy, "Maimonides' Not-
So-Secret Position on Creation," in Moses Maimonides and his Time, ed. Eric L. Ormsby
 198 CHAPTER FOUR
VVhat Is Creation?
Creation primarily concerns the being of things, not their duration.
Only God is the self-subsisting being, which does not owe its being
to anything else. No other thing is identical with its own existence,
but exists by participating in existence. And all things existing by
participation must be caused by God who is being in the fullest
sense. 59 All things including prime matter exist on account of cre-
ation. 70 In considering creation, one looks not at specific features of
already existing things, or any particular thing which comes to exist
in the already existing universe; the whole universe is taken into con-
sideration. Thus creation designates the emanation (emanatione) of all
being (entis) from a universal cause, the causal power of which reigns
over all things. This universal cause is God, and the coming forth
of all things into existence (emanatione) is creation. 71
Creation is out of nothing. Since creation designates the fact that
everything comes to be-ing, then everything must be coming to be
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987), pp. 151-172; Arthur
Hyman, "Maimonides on Creation and Emanation," in Studies in Medieval Philosophy,
ed. John F. Wippel (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1987),
pp. 45-61. Gluck and Dunphy interpret Maimonides' position to be similar to that
of Aquinas. They argue that Maimonides maintains that there is no demonstration
either for or against "creation," e.i., beginning of the universe temporally after not
having existed. Arthur Hyman states four propositions summarizing Maimonides'
view: "(I) God brought the world into existence after absolute non-existence; (2)
He brought everything into existence through His will and volition (though, as has
already been noted, His wisdom was operative as well); (3) He brought everything
into existence out of nothing; and (4) time is created, so that, whatever one's the-
ory, creation must be considered as atemporal." (p. 49). I cannot further enter into
Maimonides' position. But as Hyman interprets it, Avicenna would endorse all of
these propositions wholeheartedly. The fourth proposition might be most welcomed
by him, because Avicenna's main point in his theory is that time is not applicable
to the whole universe, let alone divine action. Hyman reminds us that Maimonides
considers the second proposition to be the major difference between his position
and that of Aristotle and emanationists. As I have tried to show in chapter 3, for
Avicenna, who can be included among the emanationists, divine will and necessity
do not exclude each other. Hyman argues that through the sharp distinction made
by Maimonides between the temporal and the atemporal realms, "it makes no sense
to ask: 'what did God do before He created the world?' or 'why did God create
the world at one time rather than another'." (p. 53). Avicenna raises such ques-
tions concerning time, because he thinks that the conception of creation as the exis-
tence of the universe after temporal non-existence rests on unwanted assumptions
regarding divine action. It implies that divine action is like human actions condi-
tioned by the pre-existence of time and matter.
69 ST la. 44, I.
70 ST la. 44, 2, c.
71 ST la. 45, I; SeC Il, 15; De potentia Ill, 14, ad s. c. (= sed contra) 8.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 199
from non-being. Consequently, there is no being presupposed in cre-
ation, no being from which the universe is made. Just as a man
becomes a man out of what is not-man, everything comes to be out
of what is non-being, which is identical to nothing. Hence every-
thing comes to exist by creation from nothing, i.e., out of nothing. 72
Creation out of nothing (ex nihilo) denies the existence of anything
preceding the existence of the universe. The preposition "ex" may
be considered to imply the existence of a material cause, out of
which things are created. However, when something is said to be
made from nothing (ex nihilo fieri), the preposition "ex" signifies a
sequence, not a material cause, e.g., noon comes from dawn. This
expression can be considered either to modify, or be modified by
the expression "nihil." According to the first view, the actual situa-
tion is connected to what precedes: the universe exists, and it is pre-
ceded by nothing. Following the second view, such a sequence is
denied, because there is nothing preceding the universe. Thus it
means the universe is not made from something pre-existing. 73 The
priority and posteriority here is an essential priority and posterior-
ity, since what belongs to something on account of itself is essen-
tially prior to what belongs to it on account of something else. Before
they are created, things in themselves are nothing; they do not exist.
They exist because God created them. 74
72 ST la. 45, I; De potentia Ill, I, c.; SeC Il, 16. In SeC, Aquinas provides vari-
ous arguments why creation must be out of nothing, i.e., not something already
existing. In some of them, he argues that otherwise creation would be the same as
movement, in some of them he argues that in contrast to causes of movement God
must be the cause of being, and still in some others he argues that movement does
not explain the existence of things.
73 ST la. 45, I, ad 3; De potentia Ill, I, ad 7. See also Steven E. Baldner &
William E. Carroll (trans. & ed.), Aquinas on Creation Writings on the "Sentences" of Peter
Lombard 2.1.1, p. 67: "Because of these two points, creation is said to be "out of
nothing" [ex nihilo] in two ways. On the one hand, the negation [in the word "noth-
ing"] denies the relation implied by the preposition "out of" [ex] to anything pre-
existing. Thus, the creature is said to be "out of nothing" because it is "not from
something pre-existing." And this is the first point. On the other hand, the order
of creation to a pre-existent nothing remains affirmed by nature, such that creation
is said to be "out of nothing" because the created thing naturally has non-being
prior to being. If these two points are sufficient for the meaning of creation, cre-
ation can be demonstrated and in this way philosophers have held [the doctrine
of] creation."
74 Aquinas, On the Eternity of the World, trans. Steven E. Baldner & William E.
Carroll, in Aquinas on Creation Writings on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard 2.1.1, p. 119;
De potentia Ill, 14 ad 7. Essential priority of nothingness in things is reminiscent of
Avicenna.
200 CHAPTER FOUR THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 201

Creation Is not a Change In change the beginning point of the change and the end point fall
in the same ontological order, in that both exist. In creation, how-
That creation is not a change is immediately implied by the fact
ever, there is nothing existing to begin with, simply something comes
that creation is not out of pre-existing matter. In this respect, Aquinas'
to exist. 79
affir~ation that creation is not a change must be considered as part
of hIS a.rgument that creation is not out of some pre-existing thing.
If .creat~on were a change, it would imply that something already Creation as the Relation between God and the Universe
eXIsted mdependent of God, something from which God created the
Since creation is not a change, if one eliminates the idea of change
universe. 75 The principle 'nothing comes from nothing' may be raised,
in conceiving creation, what is left is the creator, the created thing,
on the authority of ancient philosophers, as contradicting the posi-
and the relations between them. Creation is a relation between the
tion that creation is out of nothing. This principle, however, applies
agent and the patient. so But the relationship between God and the
only to the forthcoming of particular effects from particular causes.
world is not reciprocal. Whereas the relation of God to the universe
It does not apply to the whole being of all things existing on account
is not a real relation, but a conceptual one; the relation of the uni-
of God. 76
verse to God is a real relation.
Another objection Aquinas discusses is based on the analysis of
In order to have a better grasp of Aquinas' conception of the rela-
the terms of creation. If creation is to make something from noth-
tions between God and the universe, we need to highlight his con-
ing, by creation the thing created 'becomes' something. But 'becom-
ception of relation in general and identify the place of relations
ing' is change, and change supposes that the subject precedes the
between God and the universe within this context. Aquinas was one
end .of the action. Thus God does not create out of nothing. For
of the pioneering theologians, in the Medieval Christian world, to
Aqumas the mistake in this objection is to consider creation as a
use Aristode's theories in this regard. sl
~nd of change. Creation is not change, even though it is conceived
m such a manner. Unlike various kinds of change, e.g., accidental
Real Relations if God
an~ substantial, in creation it is not some part of things but their
Aquinas follows the Aristotelian triple division of relations in gen-
enure substance that is produced. The preceding non-existence and
eral, though he modifies Aristode's theory in important ways.S2 In
following existence of things can be understood as a change from
Metaphysics V,S3 Aristode divides relations into three kinds on the basis
nothing to .something by the human intellect, but this is only in our
of their foundations: numerical, causal and psychological. In the first
understanding, and by extension in our expression. 77
division, Aristode includes not only "stricdy numerical relations,"
Creation is an instantaneous act that does not take place in time.
such as 'greater than,' 'equal to,' but some other relations such as
It is not a process, which takes time, such that the beginning and
"specific identity, qualitative similarity, and qualitative equality," on
the end of which could differ. If it were a process taking up time,
then creation as the act by which creatures come about would be
prior to the created thing. This would require the existence of some
79 SeC 11, 17, [3].
subject prior to the created thing. However this is contrary to what 80 ST la. 45, 3.
creation is. 7s Unlike an action causing a change, in creation the two 81 • Some s~holars argu? th~t Aq~inas did not raise all the relevant questions con-
cermr;tg relatlOn.s, and ~lS diSCUSSIOns are ambiguous. For example, see Mark G.
ends with regard to the created things are not in the same category. Henmnger, Relatwns: Medzeval TheorteS 1250-1325 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989) (Henceforth
Relations), p. 13; Earl Muller, "Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas's
U~?erstanding of G?d's Relation to the World," Theological Studies .5.6/4 (1995).
Mark G. Hennmger, Relatwns, pp. 17-18 and 33-39. For a cntIcal assessment
75 ST la. 45, 2; SeC 11, 17, [2], [4]. of Aquinas' transformation of the notion of relation in his metaphysics of creation
76 ST la. 45, 2, ad I. see Jan ~ertsen, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Wtry qf Thought (Leiden, Ne~
77 ST la. 45, 2, obj. & ad I; SeC 11, 18, [2], [3]. York: Bnll, 1988), pp. 168-170, 274-275.
78 SeC 11, 17, [5]; ST la. 45, 3, ad 3. 83 Aristode, Metaphysics V.15, 1029b 25-1021b 11.
202 CHAPTER FOUR
the grounds that "all refer to unity."84 The second division includes
relations whose foundations are "the accidents of action and passion
and active and passive potencies," for example the thing that heats
and the thing that is heated, the thing that cuts and the thing that
is cut. The third class consists of the relations between a measure
and the measured thing, and example of which is the relationship
between the thing known (measure) and the knower (whose knowl-
edge is measured by the thing known).85
Not all relations are real relations. Whether a relation is a real
relation or a conceptual one depends on the related things and the
foundation of the relation. For medieval theologians and philoso-
phers, including Aquinas, in a relation there are three elements: the
sulject, which has the relation to the term, on the basis of a fiundation.
For example a and b have a relationship of similarity, because both
are white. The subject a bears the relation of similarity, R, to the
term b, on the basis of the foundation of being white, inhering in a
as an accident. B bears the relation of similarity, R', to a, on the
basis of the foundation of being white, inhering in b as an accident. 86
For Aquinas, "a relation R of a to b is real only if a and b are really
distinct extra-mental things, and there is a real extra-mental foun-
dation in a for R." Aquinas also held that a relation R of a to b or
a relation R' of b to a is a relation of reason only if either (i) a
and/or b is not real, or (ii) a and b are not really distinct, or (iii)
there is no real foundation in a for R or in b for R'. 87
84 Mark G. Henninger, Relations, p. 6.
85 Ibid., p. 7.
86 Henninger, Relations, p. 5.
87 Henninger, Relations, p. 7; ST la. 13, 7. See also ST la. 28, 1; Earl Muller,
"Real Relations and the Divine: Issues in Thomas's Understanding of God's Relation
to the World," pp. 675-676. The condition for real relations, as Henninger for-
mulates it, i.e., extra-mentality, is a bit problematic. His formulation works when
he tries to explain Aquinas' position concerning the relations between God and the
world, but if one requires the same condition, i.e., the relata must be distinct extra-
mental things, and there must be a real extra-mental foundation in the subject,
then the relations among the divine persons turn out to be non-real. This is because
the divine Persons are not three distinct beings. In ST la. 28, 1, when explaining
why relations among the divine Persons are real, Aquinas argues that those rela-
tions are real because the divine Persons have an identical nature. This simply
requires that in order to have real relations to each other, relata must be of the
same order of being. However, in addition to the requirement that both relata must
be of the same order, the thing that is really related to the other must also in some
way depend on the other. One may consistently apply these two conditions to the
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 203
The relations among divine Persons are real relations, although
God is not the subject in which accidents inhere. For Aquinas, there
are two kinds of relations that concern God: (I) relations among the
divine Persons, and (2) God's relation to the universe through cre-
ation. Whereas the relations among divine Persons are real, God's
relation to the universe is not a real relation. It is a conceptual rela-
tion, or a relation of reason. In explaining why the divine Persons
are really related without God's being subject to accidents inhering
in him, Aquinas distinguishes between relatives-terms that belong
to the category of relation-and relations supervening on other cat-
egories of accidents, such as quantity and quality. Only relative terms
can indicate conceptual not real relations, even though they are by
no means limited to this. Relative terms do not indicate or require
that something inhere in the subject. In contrast to relative terms,
terms expressing relations supervening on other accidental categories
(e.g., similarity based on quantity, quality) do require and indicate
something inhering in the subject.
As far as the divine Persons are concerned the relative terms sig-
nify a real relation. Relatives, terms expressing pure relations, indi-
cate only a reference to something else by their meaning, such as
father implying having a son. What a relative term often signifies
may be simply in the mind (ipsa apprehensione rationis), but it may sig-
nify something real as well. If the thing a relative term signifies is
simply in the mind without referring to something real, such a rela-
tion signified by this relative term is a conceptual, or logical, rela-
tion (relatio rationis tantum). Man is related to animal as a species to
its genus. Since 'animal' as such does not have a real existence when
we speak of man as a rational animal, man taken as a relative term
signifying a relation to animal as such does not indicate a real rela-
tion. Whereas animal, when we speak of a rational animal, does not
exist as simply being animal, man exists in re. Hence they are not
of the same order. However, the divine persons are of the same
order and have the same nature, one being the principle of what
proceeds from it. Thus, concludes Aquinas, the relations arising from
the divine processions must be real.88 As God cannot have accidents,
in God all real relations are identical with the divine nature. The
relations among the divine Persons and to the relations between God and the uni-
verse. See ST la. 13, 7; De potentia VII, 8-10.
88 ST la. 28, 1.
 204 CHAPTER FOUR
divine nature and the relations in God are identical III reality but
differ only in our understanding. 89
How God Is Related to the World
The idea that the universe is really related to God but God is not
really related to the universe was an idea common among many
medieval philosophers. 90 Aquinas conceives the relations between God
and the world as the third category in Aristotle's division. However,
the third category in turn may be considered as a specific case within
the second category, i.e., relations based on action and passion.
Aquinas definitely places the relations between God and the universe
in the category of action and passion in a broader sense. He even
criticizes Maimonides for failing to see this. 9 ! In the third group of
relations, in Aristotle's division of relations in Metaphysics, the rela-
tions between relata are not mutual. While one of the two related
things bears a real relation to the second, the second is not really
related to the first. The relations between God and the universe are
of this kind.
Aquinas brings in two arguments to explain why God is not really
related to creatures. An agent and patient are mutually related (1)
89 ST la. 28, 2. For the reality of relations among the divine Persons without
implying there be three distinct natures or three gods, see also Brian Davies, 7he
7hought if 7homas Aquinas, pp. 198-202.
90 Henninger, Relations, p. 31. In modern times this proposition has been criti-
cized, especially on the ground that it is a consequence of the commitment to the
divine immutability. Henninger, op. cit., p. 32. Henninger discards the view that
Aquinas' rejection of real relations from God to creatures stem from his view that
God is immutable. Since the universe cannot come to exist unless God creates it,
no change in the status of the universe with regard to existence occurs by itself.
Even if Aquinas does not explicitly use the immutability of God in denying that
God is really related to the universe, it is in the background. Since according to
faith, the universe was created temporally after not being created, if God were really
related to the world, then upon creation God would have acquired a new relation.
This contradicts the belief in divine immutability. Henninger argues that for Aquinas
something can be really related to something else without any change in the sub-
ject. If God were not the creator of the universe, then this would hold. For exam-
ple, John grows old, and Adam becomes equal to John in size. Even though Adam
did not change, he bears the real relation of being equal to Adam. However, if
God did not create, the world would not exist. Hence the change implied by the
beginning of the world's existence would not be a mere Cambridge change. If God
were to have real relation to the world, and if God created the world after not
having created it, then it would imply a change in God. Henninger, Relations, pp.
21-22; 32-33.
91 De potentia VII, 10. See also Earl Muller, "Real Relations and the Divine: Issues
in Thomas's Understanding of God's Relation to the World," pp. 676-678.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 205
if there is mutual dependence between the relata, and/or (2) if they
are of the same order of being. One of Aquinas' arguments is that
the agent and the patient must be ordered to each other so that
they are mutually related to each other. In the relations based on
action and passion, while in some cases both the agent and the
patient mutually depend on each other, in some cases the patient
depends on the agent, but the agent does not depend on the patient.
By the action of the agent, the patient may be perfected as well as
the agent itself. Or the patient might move the agent. This may be
found especially, as Aquinas puts it, in univocal agents. That is,
mutual dependence is characteristic of cases where the agent and
patient are of the same order of being. For example by producing
something in its own species, the agent preserves the perpetuity of
its species. For the cases in which one of the relata is not really
related to the other, Aquinas gives the example of knowledge. While
the knower, by the act of knowledge is related to the object of knowl-
edge, the thing known is not related to the knower. This is because
the act of knowing is an intellectual act and in no way touches the
thing known. The act of knowing is not something intervening and
common between the two relata. While the knower is related to thing
known through the act of knowing, in the thing known there is noth-
ing corresponding to the act of knowing. Hence the thing known is
not related to the knower, because there is no foundation in it to
provide a relation to the knower. 92
Since none of the aforementioned conditions are true for God,
God is not really related to the universe. God does not depend on
the universe in any way. God does not acquire anything by creat-
ing; his actions are supremely liberal. God acts without moving, with-
out being changed. Furthermore God and the universe are not of
the same order of being. The universe does not exist on account of
God's nature, but on account of his will and knowledge. Consequently,
the universe is not another God but a creature. These two premises
justify the position that God is not really related to the universe,
although the universe is really related to God. God does not act
through an action "proceeding from God and terminating in the
creature, but his action is his substance and whatever is in him is
92 De potentia VII, 10.
 206 CHAPTER FOUR
wholly outside the genus of created existence by which the creature
is related to God. "93
Aquinas raises an objection highlighting the difficulty of using the
model of knower and the thing known to reflect the relations between
God and the universe. On this model the knower is related to the
thing known but the thing known is not really related to that by
which it is known. God is the knower with respect to the creatures,
and things are the objects which are known with respect to God.
Consequently God must be related to the universe. In answering this
objection, Aquinas notes the dissimilarity between divine knowledge
and human knowledge of things. While divine knowledge is the mea-
sure of things, human knowledge is measured by them. Hence as
the measured thing is related to the measure , but not vice versa ,
things are really related to God, but God is not really related to
them. Since God knows other things by knowing himself, the rela-
tion of the divine knowledge is not directly to things but to the
· .
d lvme essence. 94 At most one can say that there is a real relation
between God himself and his knowledge of things. But one may not
posit a real relation from God to things as they exist outside God's
knowledge. 95 Yet even this cannot be said in the case of God, because
in God knowing and what is known are identical. 96 Henninger cor-
rectly notes that for Aquinas non-mutual relations between the knower
• 93 De potentia V~I, l~, c., ad 6;. S! la. 13, 7; ST la. 28, I, ad 3. Henninger con-
sld:rs these premIses, l.e., God IS mdependent of the universe, and God and the
umve:se are not of.the same order of being, to be parts of separate arguments to
estabhsh t~a.t God IS not really r:lated to the universe. He argues that the argu-
ment .that smce God and the umverse do not belong to the same order of being,
God IS not really rel~ted to the universe' is more radical and fully developed than
the other.. See ~em~mger, Relations, p. 33, footnote: 55. However, this argument, if
taken by Itself, Imphes that the universe can be 'not really related to God' as well.
That 'while from the side of God there is nothing extra-mental, but creatures exists
In re' does not constitute a justifYing ground for the non-mutual relations either
since being mental by itself does not justify that the relations between two thing~
be non-mutual. Otherwise relations in the Trinity would not be real. See, ST la.
28, I, ad 4. Moreover God's knowledge of things and human knowledge cannot
be comp~red in this respect. ~hile in the human case the knower is really related
to the thmg he knows, God IS not really related to things existing on account of
the divine knowledge and will. Hence these two premises must be taken together.
94 De f!otentia VII, 10, 5 and ad 5. W~at Aquinas argues amounts to saying that
the relatlOns betw~en God and the umverse are not reciprocal. See Sara Grant,
Towards an Alternatwe Theology (Bangalore, India: Asian Trading Corporation, 1991),
pp. 35-52.
95 ST la. 28, I, ad 4.
96 ST la. 28, 4, ad l.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 207
and the object known in the usual sense do not hold between God
and the universe. 97 If this were to be applied to God and the uni-
verse-God being the knower and the universe being the object
known-then God would be, at first sight, really related to the uni-
verse, while the universe would not be really related to God.
Dependence of the universe on God for its existence and the
difference between God and the universe in the ontological hier-
archy make up ground that justifies the real relation of the universe
to God. While creatures are really related to God, the Creator is
only conceptually related to creatures. As stated above, Aquinas uses
two premises in arguing that God is not really related to the uni-
verse: (1) God does not depend on the universe, and (2) the uni-
verse and God are not of the same order of being. The universe
totally depends on God in its existence. The universe is not of the
same order of being as God. These two insure that the universe is
really related to God. 98
97 Henninger, Relations, p. 33.
9B ST la. 13, 7; De potentia VII, 9, c. In De potentia VII, 9, Aquinas uses an argu-
ment based on the order among things. The universe is ordered to God as its prin-
ciple. But God is not ordered to the universe. Hence the order among things
parallels the dependence and independence between them. See also, De potentia VII,
10. Of course, that God is not really related to the universe while the universe is
really related to God follows from his premises. However, the first premise reduces
'relation' to 'dependence.' This may not be easily acceptable. P. T. Geach in Logic
Matters (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980) criticizes it
sharply: "We must take it as a way of saying that some relational propositions latch
on to reality in a way that others do not. This difference would have to hold
between true relational propositions, and even between pairs of logically equivalent
true propositions; for clearly "God providentially governs the world" is logically
equivalent to "The world is providentially governed by God", but by the Thomistic
theory only the second of these propositions predicates a 'real' relation, though both
are true." Geach blames interpreters of Aquinas rather than Aquinas himself
(p. 318). "If a relational proposition indeed made no predications about A or B,
but only affirmed a relation 'between' them, then it would be quite unintelligible
how, if true, the proposition could correspond to a reality in A rather than to a
reality in B; and of the two converse relations, alike holding 'between' A and B,
one could not very well be more 'real' than the other" (p. 319). Harm Goris, in
his Free Creatures qf an Eternal God: 77wmas Aquinas on God's Foreknowledge and Irresistible
Will (pp. 24-28), responds to this objection of Geach. He argues that Aquinas
intends "to consider the semantics of words that signify relations," not to make a
distinction "between relations as real entities." (p. 24). Moreover, "The distinction
serves to indicate how a specific group of divine names, viz. terms that signify a
relation, fall short in signifYing the divine essence." (p. 25). His explanation is not
quite convincing, because as he immediately states, all our talk about God, all names
we predicate of him, fail to express the divine essence perfectly.
208 CHAPTER FOUR
That God is not really related to the universe does not prevent
the predication of relative terms of God and creatures. As God is
the origin and the principle of all things, God bears to the universe
a relation of being the origin as well as the relation of being different
from the universe. In fact, an infinite number of relations exist
between God and the universe. 99 Consequently, relatives, such as
Lord-servant, Creator-creature and cause-effect, apply to God and
the universe without requiring that God and the universe be equal. IOO
By positing one of the relatives in things such as creature and ser-
vant, one posits the counterparts of those relatives, such as Creator
and Lord, in God. This does not require, however, that the subjects
of the relations be equal. The relationship between Creator and crea-
ture is not similar to the relationship between any cause and its
effect, e.g., father and son, since God is not a univocal cause with
regard to the existence of the universe. That is, the effect, which is
creation, is not another god. 101 Consequently, even though creator
and creature are relative terms--if one affirms one, the other is
affirmed by it-still this does not require that both must be affirmed
in the same way. 102
Anything that is said of God on the basis of the existence of crea-
tures outside the divine knowledge is said ex tempore, not eternally.
Some of the divine actions are internal actions, such as knowing and
willing, and do not require the existence of anything outside of God.
These names are said of God eternally. Yet some other divine names
are such that there must be something corresponding to them out-
side God, for example creating and forgiving. 103 They refer to divine
actions in relation to creatures. God's names that require the exis-
tence of creatures are not said of God eternally. They are said of
God not because God is really related to things, but because things
are really related to God. Following the creaturely conditions, we
can predicate of God terms implying temporal sequence, change,
etc. Thus the terms predicated of God on the basis of the existence
of creatures are said of God from time, in accordance with crea-
99 De potentia VII, 8.
1110 De potentia VII, 8, ad I and ad 2.
1111 De potentia VU, 10, 3 and ad 3.
1112 De potentia VII, 10, 12.
1113 For Aquinas' distinction between God's aetions that require an object outside
the divine knowledge and those that do not, see SeG 1, 79 [9]; SeG I1, 13 & 14;
Harm Goris, Free Creatures DJ an Etemal God, p. 23.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 209
turely conditions, not from eternity.104 Aquinas' distinction between
the divine names that are said of God from time (ex tempore) and
those that are said from eternity conforms to his distinction between
real relations and relations of reason. The relations implied by the
divine names that are said of God from time are relations of reason. 10"
Aquinas interprets creation in accordance with the non-reciprocal
character of the relations between God and creatures. He argues
that creation does not place anything real in God, while it denotes
something real in creatures. Creation may be taken in the active
sense denoting the action of the agent, i.e., to create, and it may
be taken in the passive sense denoting the action of the patient, i.e.,
to be created. Following the active sense of creation, if God were
really related to creatures, this would rule out creation as temporal
in the passive sense. This is so because if God is really related to
the universe and if the universe has a temporal beginning, then some-
thing temporal would be in God, i.e., a new relation. One may
o~ject that if on this ground such a relation is not real in God, then
neither should it be real in creatures. 106 In his reply to this objec-
tion, Aquinas states that creation in the active sense is God's action,
"which is his essence with a relationship to a creature." vVhile God's
relation to the world is merely conceptual, the relation of creatures
to God is real. 10] Their relation to God is real, because creatures
really depend on theIr . creator-Hot h erwIse
. t h ey wou Id not eXIst.
. IOS
Another o~jection to the reality of creation is that if creation is real,
it can be considered as a reality mediating between God and crea-
tures. But since creation is not eternal, it cannot be in God. It is
not in the creature either. Otherwise another creation would be
required for creation, ad infinitum. Hence creation is not something
real. I09 In reply to this objection, Aquinas reminds us that creation
should not be understood as a change. In the passive sense, creation
Ill' ST la. 13, 7.
IlIj For a lueid articulation of the conformity of the real and non-real relations
of God to the distinction between the divine names said of God from time and
from eternity, see D. J. \Vennemann "Saint Thomas' Doctrine of Extrinsic Denom-
ination as Mecliate Correspondence in Naming God I,x Tempore," 'The il.fodern Schoolman
LXV (.January, 1988), pp. 119 129.
IlIb ST la. 45, 3, obj. 1.
1117 S'F la. 45, 3, ad 1.
tOH SC'G 11, 18, [41.
1()lJ ST la. 45, 3, obj. 2.
210 CHAPTER FOUR
is in the creature and, in this sense, is co-created with creature.
There is nothing additional to the created thing as a relation. Just
as accidents and the forms of things do not exist by themselves, but
with a substance, creation in the passive sense is not something exist-
ing by itself. Since things have relations with reference to another
thing, a relation is by itself referential. A relation does not need
another relation in order for two things to be related. Hence no fur-
ther creation is needed for creation. 110
Aquinas' argument that God is not really related to the universe
as it exists in re is important for his position concerning the begin-
ning of the universe. As will be shown in the next section, Aquinas
distinguishes between the divine actions, such as knowledge and will,
and the effect of the divine action. The universe, as it exists in re,
is the effect of the divine act of knowing and willing. By arguing
that God is not really related to the world, Aquinas provides grounds
for keeping the divine immutability intact. III
The Sempitemiry qf the Universe Is Possible but not Necessary
Aquinas takes an agnostic position concerning the beginning of the
universe. Such a position amounts to saying that neither the propo-
sition that the world began temporally after not having existed, nor
the proposition that the world has always existed can be demon-
strated through philosophical argumentation. Taking eternity in a
broader sense, Aquinas states that nothing besides God is eternal
(aetemum) , and that arguing this does not contradict reason (impossi-
bile). That is, the arguments for the sempiternity of the universe do
not yield a necessary conclusion. Hence arguing that the universe
has not always existed is reasonable. 112 His argument that rejecting
the sempiternity of the universe is reasonable may also be applica-
ble to his rejection of the position that the temporal beginning of
the universe can be demonstrated by rational arguments. That is,
arguments aiming to establish that the universe began to exist tem-
110 ST la. 45, 3, ad 2; SeC II, 18, [4J; De potentia VII, 9, ad 2; De potentia rn, 3,
ad 2. For a discussion of Aquinas' theory that creation in the passive sense and
the cr:atures are co-created, and how the relation of creation might be prior, or
postenor, to the creature, see F. D. Wilhelmsen, "Creation as a Relation in Saint
Thomas Aquinas", 77ze Modem Sehoolman 56 (1979), pp. 107-33.
III De potentia VII, 8, ad 5.
'" ST la. 46, I.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 211
porally after not having existed do not yield a necessary conclusion. 113
Aquinas argues that something can be possible in three senses: (l)
with regard to the power of the agent; or (2) with regard to its terms,
i.e., the universe and being sempiternal; or (3) with regard to a sub-
stratum. It is possible for the universe to have always existed in the
sense that God could have it so. It is also possible for the universe
to have existed sempiternally in the sense that the terms 'world' and
'being sempiternal' do not contradict each other, as does the idea
of a square triangle. However, the world is not possible to be sem-
piternal in the sense that there is a passive potency, a substratum
by which the universe could have always existed. The possibility of
the sempiternity of the universe contradicts the truth of the Catholic
faith only in this third sense. 114
For Aquinas, it is possible that the universe has always existed.
But it is not necessary that the universe has always existed. Aquinas
deduces from the position that the world is not absolutely necessary
that the world does not have to be sempiternal. If the existence of
the universe is necessary, then it is necessary either by itself, or by
something else. If the universe were necessary by itself, then it would
not need an efficient cause giving it existence. 115 Since the universe
is not necessary by itself, it needs an extrinsic cause so that it could
exist. Properly speaking, it is the divine will which is the cause of
things and from which the necessity of things is derived. Since in
the absolute sense God wills necessarily only himself, he does not
have to will the existence of the universe, and he does not have to
will an everlasting (semper) universe. The world exists so long as God
wills it to exist. Thus one does not have to accept that the world
has always existed. 116
113 ST la. 46, 2.
114 De potentia Ill, 14. John Wippel traces the increasing sharpness of Aquinas'
position concerning the possibility of the universe to have always existed. Wippel
argues that until Aquinas wrote the De potentia Ill, 14, he defended only the posi-
tion that no one successfully demonstrated that the world began to be. But in De
potentia Ill, 14 he comes very close to asserting "an eternally created effect" is pos-
sible. And in the De aetemitate mundi, Aquinas is quite satisfied with asserting the
possibility of the sempiternity of the world. See John F. Wippel, A1etaphysieal 77zemes
in 7homas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1984),
pp. 191-214.
11\ SeC II, 31 [2].
lib ST la. 46, I; SeC II, 31, esp. [3] and [5].
212 CHAPTER FOUR
From the side of the agent, we cannot reach a necessary conclu-
sion concerning the duration of the universe. The existence of the
universe, considered as a whole, depends absolutely on the divine
will, and we cannot assign any necessity in any way. Since God does
not necessarily will the universe, and we cannot inquire into mat-
ters which God freely wills, we cannot reach a demonstrative con-
clusion regarding the duration of the universe on the basis of the
divine will. ll7
Such an argument cannot be provided on the basis of the uni-
verse, either. Aquinas distinguishes between the case of particular
things within the universe and the universe as a whole. We can
explain why a particular thing is such and such, or that it came to
exist through something else (relating it to its causes), or by taking
the order of the universe into account. However, if we want to
explain the properties of the universe, such as its beginning after not
having existed, we cannot refer to any creature as being the reason
why the universe is such and such. Moreover, neither the divine
power nor the divine goodness can be the reason for a particular
disposition of the universe. The sole reason for the existence of the
universe and the properties it has, e.g., the particular size of the
heavens, is the divine will. The universe exists with its structure and
properties because God willed it to be so. Just as the distance between
stars-even if this can be attributed to their nature-does not limit
the divine will, neither does the question of the time of the universe.
This is even truer, because, for example in the heavens there is no
possibility for a different quantity, or a different accident. Since time
and place are not intrinsic to things, their nature as it is given does
not require a definite time or place. Thus determining the duration
of the universe depends absolutely on the divine will. Consequently,
rational arguments based on the properties of the universe do not
yield a necessary conclusion as to whether the universe is sempiter-
nal, or has a temporal beginning. 118
Let me summarize my discussion of Aquinas' conception of cre-
ation and his position regarding the sempiternity of the universe.
Aquinas agrees with Avicenna that creation in the philosophical sense
is an existential dependence of the effect on its cause. Coming to
117 ST la. 46, 2.
118 De potentia Ill, 17.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 213
exist anew, or beginning to exist temporally after not having existed,
is not included in the conception of creation, which can be argued
on philosophical grounds. Creation is a non-reciprocal relation of
dependence the universe bears to God. While God is not really
related to the universe, the universe is really related to God. Conse-
quently, the names attributed to God on the basis of the existence
of creatures are said of God from time, not from eternity. Since
God is not really related to the universe as it exists in re, the emer-
gence of creatures does not imply any change in God.
On philosophical grounds, it is possible that the universe has always
existed. However, there can be no philosophical argument to demon-
strate that the universe has always existed. This is, because no demon-
strative argument can be provided either on the basis of the agent,
or on the basis of the universe. On the one hand, the divine free
will is the cause of the universe, and we cannot inquire into the
divine will with respect to things God freely wills. On the other
hand, we cannot explain the dispositions of the universe as a whole,
including its duration, on the basis of a cause within the Ulllverse,
as we do with regard to particular things in the universe.
Countering Avicenna's Arguments fir the Sempiternity qf the Universe
Since I am comparing Aquinas' position to that of Avicenna with
regard to the temporal beginning of the universe, I will not attempt
to cover all that Aquinas discusses in this regard. Aquinas brings in
almost all of Avicenna's arguments for the sempiternity of the uni-
verse as objections in questioning whether the world has always (sem-
per) existed. However, they may not conform to Avicenna's arguments
exactly, since Avicenna is not the only person whose arguments
Aquinas wants to refute.
Countering the First Argument
Aquinas raises objections from the conception of possibility and the
existence of ungenerable things. These are related to Avicenna's first
argument for the impossibility of a temporal beginning of the uni-
verse. As already stated, he argues that God is the cause of every-
thing. Some of the possible things must begin to exist temporally
after not having existed, yet some others must not have a temporal
214 CHAPTER FOUR
beginning. Those that begin to exist after a preceding temporal non-
existence need a substratum in which their possibility resides before
they begin to exist. And those that do not need an immediate, or
preparative, cause cannot begin to exist after temporal non-existence.
Highlighting the issue in question based on the possibility of the
universe, Aquinas raises the following objection: if the world has not
always existed, and since it is not impossible to exist, then the world
must have been possible before it began to exist. Its possibility means
it had the potency to exist. Its potency requires a substratum, which
is matter. Since matter cannot be found without form, the assump-
tion requires that there existed a body before the universe. I 19 Aquinas'
objection pardy captures Avicenna's point. Avicenna would add that
given such a conception, the whole universe would be treated like
a generable thing. Given the existence of God, the efficient cause of
the universe, if something does not exist by simply being possible,
two alternatives result: (l) either the possibility of the universe must
be in matter, or (2) God is the potential efficient cause of the uni-
verse at first. I will have the opportunity to discuss this second point
later. The first alternative is the issue of concern here. The possi-
bility of the universe must be in matter, because only things that
need an immediate cause besides the essential cause may come to
exist temporally after not having existed. If the world began to exist
temporally after not having existed, such an assumption would posit
the existence of a substratum before the universe. Thus, God would
not be the creator of all things. It would also require that the whole
universe is subject to generation and corruption.
Aquinas argues that the possibility of the world before it began
to exist does not require a substratum. The possibility of the uni-
verse does not have to be traced to a passive potency. But this pos-
sibility is traced to an active potency, residing in the power of the
agent. Or one may even dispense with the reference to the power
of the agent, and consider the possibility of the world in the sense
of 'not impossible.' In this respect, that the subject and the predi-
cate of the statement, 'the world exists,' do not contradict each other
is sufficient to justifY the possibility of the universe before its exis-
tence. 120 However, from Avicenna's perspective both of Aquinas'
119 De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 10; ST la. 46, obj. I. Sce also, De potentia Ill, 17,
obj. 11.
120 De potentia Ill, 17, ad 10; Ill, I, ad 2; ST la. 46, ad I. For a similar argu-
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 215
explanations for the possibility of the universe before it began to
exist are not acceptable. Given the cause of the universe, if the uni-
verse depended only on God, not requiring a substratum and tem-
poral order, it must have existed immediately. Given the cause, if
the universe still remains non-existent, then it would mean that God
is not the cause of the universe. Thus, the universe is impossible,
not in itself, but because of the non-existence of its cause. Aquinas'
argument that a voluntary agent can determine the time when it
begins to exist is the way out from this dilemma.
Avicenna's argument for the thesis that some things must not be
after temporal non-existence can be found in a slighdy different man-
ner dispersed throughout the objections that Aquinas discusses. In
De potentia, referring to Avicenna, Aquinas states that effects are nec-
essary given the existence of their cause. If, given the cause, the
effect still remains possible, then some other cause would be needed.
Since God is the sufficient cause of the universe, and God has always
(semper) existed, concludes the objection, the universe has always
existed. 121 Aquinas brings in a similar objection in ST. But in ST,
the argument concludes that since God is eternal (ab aetemo), the uni-
verse is eternal (ab aetemo).122 Since both Aquinas and Avicenna agree
that the universe is not eternal in the strict sense, I take the eter-
nity attributed to the universe in this argument in the sense of sem-
piternity. In ST, Aquinas raises the objection based on the nature
of ungenerable things. Ungenerable things do not begin (incoepit) to
exist. Matter and heavens are ungenerable. Hence, the universe did
not begin (incoepit) to exist. 123 This basically echoes Avicenna's con-
tention that time is not applicable to all things in the universe. Hence
if we take 'incoepit' in Aquinas' text in the sense of temporal begin-
ning, it comes down to saying that ungenerable things cannot have
a temporal beginning.
In replying to this objection, Aquinas acknowledges that every
effect is necessary (necessariam habitudinem) on account of its natural
ment see, Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence if the Philosophers, ed., trans. & annot. Michael
Marmura (Utah: Brigham Young University, 1997), p. 42. The argument placing
the possibility of things in the agent may be traced to Philoponus. See Herbert A.
Davidson, 'John Philoponus as a Source of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Proofs of
Creation," Journal if the American Oriental Sociery 89/2 (1969), p. 360.
12l De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 4.
122 ST la. 46, obj. 9.
123 ST la. 46, obj. 3. See also, De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 2.
 216 CHAPTER FOUR
or voluntary cause. God does not cause the universe by necessity of
his nature, but by his will. Consequently, it is not necessary that
ungenerable things exist whenever the divine nature (natura) existed.
However, the effects of God follow in accordance with the divine
will, in the manner God willed them to exist. 124 Aquinas maintains
that in arguing that matter and the heavens do not begin to exist,
Aristotle's point was that they are not generated. 125 But it does not
contradict the theory that everything is produced in existence through
creation. 126
Aquinas' answer to the question does not seem to adequately
address the crux of the debate. Two main points need to be high-
lighted: (1) God is the voluntary agent of the universe, and (2) every-
thing began to be through creation. As for the first point, that the
universe is the effect of God, a voluntary agent explains well enough
that the universe depends on the divine will. The divine will deter-
mines how and when the universe exists. The implication of this
view will be discussed further below. As for the second point, even
if one grants that Aristotle may not be of help as an authority, on
this issue, the debate is not resolved. Avicenna acknowledges, just as
Aquinas does, that everything is created by God and depends on
God with regard to its existence. But Avicenna rejects that ungener-
able things can be assigned a temporal beginning. If time is applic-
able only to generable things, then temporal beginning cannot be
assigned to ungenerable things. Thus, the issue of debate is not
whether everything owes its being to God, but is rather whether
everything can have a temporal beginning.
Countering the Second Argument
As discussed in the preceding section, Avicenna's second argument
is based on the immutability of God. Based on his conception of
the relation between causes and effects-that is, causes and effects
co-exist and the cause is the cause of the existence of the effect not
its.previous non-existence-Avicenna argues that the universe al~ays
eXIsted. The universe exists now, but if, at first, God existed and the
124 De potentia, Ill, 17, ad 4.
125 F A '
or nstotI'd' .
e S lSCUSSlOn f h .
0 t e generatIOn of matter and heavens sec, Physics
I, 4. 192a28 and De caelo I, 3. 270a13-22 respectively.
126 ST la. 46, ad 3.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 217
universe did not exist, a change in God would be required. God
must have willed first the previous non-existence and then the exis-
tence of the universe. Furthermore, with the beginning of the uni-
verse, a new relation would occur to God. More importantly, a
temporal beginning of the universe implies a time before the exis-
tence of the universe, which raises further questions, such as why
God did not create before.
Some of objections on the basis of the divine immutability, which
are discussed by Aquinas, concern various divine perfection proper-
ties. Since an immutable agent always produces the same effect unless
it is prevented, and since God cannot be impeded, God seems to
have always (semper) created the universe from eternity (ab aeterno).127
This objection concerns divine power in combination with the divine
immutability. With reference to Augustine (Confissions VII, 4) Aquinas
raises an objection based on the identity of the divine power, will,
and action. God must have willed to create the universe from eter-
nity, otherwise he would change. If he willed the universe from eter-
nity, since there is no impotence in God, then the universe appears
to have existed from eternity (ab aeterno).128 If God did not create at
first and then created, he would be moving from potency to actu-
ality. Since God is immutable, he seems to have created from eter-
nity.129 Furthermore if God willed to create from eternity, there is
no reason why God should delay the creation of the universe. 13o
Some other objections based on the divine immutability concern
the emergence of the universe existing in re, taking into account the
relative names expressing relation between God and creatures. If
God is said to be Lord from eternity (ab aeterno), then creatures must
have existed from eternity. Since being Lord implies having subjects,
and since God is eternally Lord, then creatures must have existed
from eternity. 131 Another objection in the same vein considers God's
being the cause of the universe. This, in fact, better reflects the
Avicennan spirit, emphasizing the relationship of cause and effect
between God and the universe. If God were not eternally the cause
of the universe, then at first he must have been its potential cause
m De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 6. See also ST la. 46, I, obi. 10.
L'H De potentia Ill, 17, obi. 9.
"" De potentia IIl, 17, obi. 12.
1\(1 De potentia IIl, 17, ohj. 22.
III De potentia Ill, 17, obj. 21.
218 CHAPTER FOUR
and then its actual cause. Since nothing is a cause unless it has an
effect, the world seems to be created by God from eternity (ab
aetemo).132 Moreover, since God creates through his knowledge, and
knowledge is related to the thing known, and since relatives are
simultaneous, it appears that God created from eternity.133
Given that God is the voluntary agent of the universe, if the uni-
verse begins to exist after not having existed, this implies a change
at least with regard to time, as well as a supposition of a time period
before the universe. For example, "he who plans to build a house
tomorrow and not today, anticipates something tomorrow that is
non-existent today, and at least he expects that today will pass and
tomorrow will come. Since time is the measure of change, this requires
a change before the universe begins to exist."134 Despite the eternity
of the divine will to create the universe, if he did not create from
eternity, then something must have pushed God to create the world
when he created it. But since there cannot be anything before cre-
ation, it appears that the world was made from eternity.135 This
objection concerns Avicenna's argument that if the universe began
to exist after not having existed, then one can ask questions, such
as why God did not create before, whether he could not create it
before, or whether something arose that pushed God to create.
Avicenna also asks how an instant of time can be distinguished from
another in the non-existence of temporal things.
In responding to the objections concerning the immutability the
divine perfections, Aquinas distinguishes between the divine perfec-
tions referring to the divine actions and the effects of the divine
actions. Aquinas underlines the fact that God is the voluntary agent
of the universe, as he reminded us when dealing with part of the
first argument. A voluntary agent, through its will, determines not
only the form of the effect, but also its place, time and other con-
ditions. Consequently, although God is immutable and willed the
universe eternally, it does not follow that the universe must exist for-
ever (semper).136 That is, that God's will is eternal does not require
1:;,De potentia IH, 17, obj. 26.
131 De potentia IH, 17, obj. 19.
11+ ST la. 46, I, obj. 6; ST la. 46, I, obj. 5.
I'; De potentia III, 17, obi. 13.
1% De potentia In, 17, ad 6; ST la. 46, ad 10. For a similar argument sce, al-
Ghazalr, The Incoherence if the Philosophers, pp. 13-17.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 219
that God willed the universe to exist forever (semper).137 If God did
not create the world at first and created it later on, would it require
that God move from potency to actuality? Or would it require any
change in God? Aquinas' distinction between God's action and the
effect of his action is sufficient to respond these objections. Aquinas
argues that if God were to begin acting later on, or begin a new
action when the universe begins to exist, then it would require that
God move from potency to actuality. However, God's action is eter-
nal, because it is his very substance. Although God does not begin
acting with regard to himself, he may be said to begin to act with
reference to the effect. Since the effect follows the condition of the
action~in this case a voluntary action which determines not only
the form but also the time and other properties of the effect~the
beginning of the universe after temporal non-existence does not
require that God move from potency to actuality.138 God's will is
eternal and he acts eternally, but he determines the time when the
effect begins to exist. Hence the beginning of the universe after tem-
poral non-existence does not require that God's will be changeable
or that God move from potency to actuality when the universe begins
to exist.
Aquinas also responds the objection which asks why God would
wait to create. The objection runs as follows: if God had the power
to create the universe, and he also knew it and willed it, then there
is no reason why God would wait to create the universe. Aquinas
refers this objection to Augustine and argues that by this statement
Augustine wanted to prove the co-eternity of the Son with the Father
and the co-equality of the Son to the Father. Since the Son is of
the same nature as the Father, this holds true. But since the uni-
verse is not of the same nature with God, there is no reason requir-
ing that God create the universe immediately, without waiting. 139
Aquinas does not find any serious challenge in objections based
on the divine immutability with regard to the emergence of the uni-
verse existing in re. Relative terms require that both relatives should
exist. Thus one may argue that in order for God to be Lord, there
must exist at least one subject. Aquinas maintains that if lordship is
III De potentia nI, 17, ad 9.
t:JK De potentia IH, 17, ad 12.
It'l De potentia nI, 17, ad 22.
220 CHAPTER FOUR
"regarded as consequent to the action whereby God actually gov-
erns creatures, then God was not Lord from eternity." But 'being
lord' may also be taken in the sense of having power to govern from
eternity. On this interpretation, in order for God to be Lord, the
universe does not have to actually exist from eternity, except poten-
tially.140 Similarly, on the assumption of the temporal posteriority of
the existence of the universe, God was not always (semper) the cause,
since the universe did not always actually exist. However, this does
not mean that God was a potential cause, because God is always
(semper) in act. God may be said to be a potential cause only with
regard to the effect of his action, i.e., the universe. 141 Here Aquinas
does not provide a further explanation of why God's being a poten-
tial cause with regard to the effect does not cause a problem. But
his position may be constructed on the basis of his conception of
the divine names. Some divine names are said eternally, some are
not. While Avicenna considers the existence of the effect in re to
imply a new relation to God, hence a change in the cause, Aquinas
does not see any trouble in the existence of the effect in re. Since
for both of them God is not related to the universe in the usual
sense, Aquinas' reply is sufficient. That is, the posterior emergence
of the effects of the divine action does not require that God be at
first a potential cause and then an actual cause when the effects
come to exist. Otherwise, a similar problem would be posed for
Avicenna's position as well. This time the problem would concern
not the beginning of the whole universe, but the beginning of par-
ticular things within the universe. The objection linked to the rela-
tion between the knowledge and the object of knowledge does not
require that the universe should always exist. The relation between
the divine knowledge and things and between human knowledge and
things are opposites. While our knowledge of something requires the
existence of the object of knowledge, the divine knowledge does not
require that what he knows exist outside the divine knowledge. 142
What applies between the divine will and the object of volition is
applicable here between divine knowledge and the object of that
knowledge.
IHI De potentia Ill, 17, ad 21.
1+1 De potentia Ill, 17. ad 26.
1+2 De potentia Ill, 17, ad 19.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 221
Using the distinction between God's action and the effect of the
action, Aquinas rejects the implication of even an imaginary time or
change of time on the assumption that the universe began to exist
after not having existed. The objection was that even if a voluntary
agent may delay the action without itself being changed, this implies
a change in time, and a time period before the action takes place.
Aquinas maintains that unlike a particular agent acting through mat-
ter and in time, God, by creating, produces all things including time.
God as the universal cause cannot be considered to be acting now
and not before. God acts eternally without any change, but the effect
of his action takes place according to God's will. And a universe
that begins to exist temporally after not having existed shows the
divine power more evidently.143 Even if one grants that God's will
to create the universe is eternal, and God does not move from
potency to actuality when the universe begins to exist, one may ask
why God chose the moment when the universe began. Did some-
thing push God to create at that moment? In responding to this
Aquinas states, in a manner similar to the preceding response, that
this argument assumes that the agent acts in time and not as the
cause of the time itself. l44
These two responses of Aquinas are not satisfactory, because Avi-
cenna's point is not merely a question of something pushing God at
that moment to create. Aquinas' distinction between the divine action
and the effect of the divine action does not presuppose a time period.
But if the agent may determine that the effect may come to exist
temporally after having not existed, this assumes the existence of a
time period before the effect begins. Avicenna's point is that the
assumption of temporal posteriority of the universe requires the uni-
verse could begin to exist at various times. If so, why does God pre-
fer the moment at which the universe actually begins? It amounts
to saying: the assumption of temporal posteriority of the universe
assumes God to be like an agent acting in independently existing
time. So, each blames the other for likening God to a temporal
agent.
In ST la. 46, I, ad 6.
144 De potentia In, 17, ad 13.
222 CHAPTER FOUR THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 223

Countering the Third Argument universe. If God precedes the world by duration as well as by his
nature, then there must have been a duration prior to that of the
Avicenna's third argument is mainly an attempt to deduce unac-
world, such that there would be a before and an after in duration
ceptable conclusions on the basis of the conception of time. One of
which is what time is. Thus, on this assumption, the universe would
his arguments to this effect is that time does not have a temporal
be. preceded by time, movement, and movable things. Hence the
beginning. Without. the existence of temporal things there can be no
UnIverse has not begun to be after temporal non-existence. 148
time, and no two instants of time can be distinguished. If God is
. In replying to the objection that any new change requires a change
prior to the universe by time as well as by being-which follows
m the cause as well as in the effect, Aquinas restates the position
from the assumption of temporal posteriority of the universe-then
th~t God, t~e prime mover, is absolutely changeless. Although the
God cannot be absolutely prior to the universe. But he can be tem-
pnmary subject of change is changeable, it does not begin to exist
porally prior to this universe. Hence the assumption that the uni-
through change, but through creation. Aquinas argues that the move-
verse began to exist after temporal non-existence is self-defeating.
ment has always been there since the beginning of the existence of
Temporal posteriority of the universe may also be considered in
mov~ble, things. But it does not exist apart from the movable things. 149
the following way: The universe did not exist at first, and then it
Aqumas answer does not seem to meet the expectation of Avicenna's
existed. This latter can be considered as a change, caused by God
argument. The crucial point is that, if the effect of the divine action
as the agent creating the universe. But nothing changes unless the
did ~ot exi~t at fi~st, then it begins to exist. From Avicenna's per-
changing thing and the agent causing the change alter from one
spective, thIS reqUIres that some new thing should happen to God
state to another. Alteration from one state to another is change. As
to make God create. But Aquinas' response is, since God is the vol-
a result, the beginning of the universe after not having existed implies
unta:r c,au~e .of t~e universe he determines when the universe begins.
a change before it, ad irifinitum. If there is always change, then there
Aqumas dIstmctIOn between the divine action and the effect of the
is always something changeable. The objection concludes that the
divine action defeats Avicenna's argument for the implication of two
universe or something other than God has always existed. 145 Time
situations in ?od. !hat is, if the universe begins to exist temporally
is always at its beginning and its end, because it is the instant which
after not haVIng eXIsted, there would be two situations: (l) God exists
is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Hence, time
without the universe, and (2) God exists with the universe. Since
never begins and ends, but exists always. Since there is no time with-
A~cenna and Aquinas agree that God is not really related to the
out movement and movable things, which are included in the uni-
eXIste~ce of things in re, Aquinas' response is quite satisfactory. The
ver~e, the universe should have always existed. 146 Another objection,
postenor emergence of the universe does not imply a relation in
whIch better captures Avicenna's contention, concerns the priority
God, such that this relation would require a change in God.
of God to the universe. God precedes the world either by nature
Responding to the objection intended to prove that time does not
(natura), or by duration (duratione). If God precedes the world just as
begin and cease to exist, Aquinas states that this objection is circu-
any cause precedes its effect which co-exists (coaevum) with its cause,
lar. If one supposes that time always exists, then one has to con-
t~en l:od prec~des the uni~erse only by nature (natura), not by dura-
clude that there is no beginning and no end of time. But if one
tion. Then smce God eXIsts from eternity (ab aeterno), so does the
su~poses th.at. movement neither always existed nor will it always
eXIst, then ~t IS n~t necessary that every instant is a beginning and
14S ST la. 46, I, 5. The argument for the infinity of change is referred to Aristotle an end. It IS pOSSIble, however, that there is a first moment which
PhySICS VIII.!, 251 a8-28. '
• 146 De potentia H!, 17, obj. 15;. ST la. 46, I, 7. This objection of Aquinas con-
IS only the beginning, and there is a last moment which is ;nly the
slde.rs ~he concept~on of tlll~e bemg always at its beginning and at its end, never
begmnmg or ceasmg to eXIst. Smce, tIme never begins nor does it end conse-
quently, movement and movable things do not begin or cease to exist. Thus the
whole world does not have a temporal beginning. ' 111l De potentia IH, 17, obj. 20; STla. 46, I, obj. 8.
147 De potentia HI, 17, obj. 20; ST la. 46, I, obj. 8. 119 ST la. 46, I, ad 5.
224 CHAPTER FOUR
end. 150 Thus if one does not take the sempiternity (aetemitas) of move-
ment as a given, one does not have to accept that each moment is
a beginning and an end in motion. Mter all, Aristotle's point in his
argument is not to show that time always existed, but rather to show
that time and movement go together. If one is taken to be always,
the other must be taken in the same way.15l Avicenna's point is not
that the sempiternity of movement and time should be taken as a
given, rather his point is that if something comes to exist after not
having existed, this implies a change and the existence of a time
period before its coming to exist. Granting Aquinas' response that
God might have planned the existence of the world such that it
comes to exist at such and such time, the implication of change in
God is eliminated. However, the idea of a time before the existence
of the universe remains. From this point, one may again argue that
since time is the measure of change, and change does not exist
without changeable things, the temporal posteriority argument is self-
contradictory.
Regarding the objection whether God preceded the world by being
only or by being as well as by time, Aquinas states that God is
before the world by duration. But the term 'before' indicates the
priority of eternity, not the priority of time. Aquinas' answer so far
is a bit ambiguous. None of the parties debate that God is eternal.
If one considers God's being and eternity separately, then it would
be easy to assert God's priority to the universe by both nature and
duration, since God's duration is eternity. Thus, what Aquinas says
so far does not contradict Avicenna's thesis. However, what if God
is considered to be temporally prior to the world? Since God's dura-
tion is not measured by time, God is not temporally prior to the
universe. But then, how can the temporal posteriority of the begin-
ning of the universe be explained? The temporal posteriority of the
universe requires assumption of a time-period before the beginning
of the universe. Aquinas argues that this time before the universe is
not a real time, only an imaginary time. "We can imagine an infinite
space of time running with eternity and preceding the beginning of
time."152 Aquinas gives the example of saying, 'there is nothing beyond
1;11 De potentia Ill, 17, ad 15.
151 ST la. 46, I, ad 7. See also, Aristotle, Physics VIII.!, 25IbI0-28.
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 225
the heavens.' In such a statement, the term 'beyond' indicates an
imaginary place. 15 :J
Remarks on Arguments Conceming Sempitemiry
Aquinas' argument that while we can trace particular things to their
cause, we cannot trace any disposition of the universe, including its
duration, to a cause other than the divine free will is not a con-
vincing argument to refute Avicenna's argument for the sempiter-
nity of the universe. That time is the measure of change is granted
by Avicenna as well as Aquinas. Change in turn occurs in change-
able things, and requires a pre-existing subject. That creation is not
a change is again granted by Avicenna as well as Aquinas. The exis-
tence of non-temporal things is also granted by both of them. Hence
saying that the divine will freely determines the duration of the uni-
verse does not solve the problem. If time were applicable to all
things, and were not the measure of change, then the universe could
begin to exist temporally after not having existed. However, in this
case, temporal posteriority would lose its distinctive feature.
From Avicenna's perspective, on Aquinas' account all things are
considered like things subject to generation and corruption, which
are only part of the universe. If the Aristotelian definition of time
is granted by both of them, i.e., the measure of change according
to before and after, and if it is applicable to only things in move-
ment, then Aquinas seems to be pushing too hard, as he also fol-
lows the triple division of things into eternal, sempiternal, and temporal.
152 De potentia Ill, 17, ad 20; ST la. 46, I, ad 8. al-GhazalI adopts a similar
strategy when he discusses the issue in his Tahiifut al-Faliisifit. In his Medieval Islamic
Controversy between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Jjmii' and Ta'wfl in the Conflict between al-
GhaZiilz and Ibn Rushd, (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1989), lysa A. Bello discusses
al-Ghazal1's and Averroes' positions concerning the sempiternity of universe. He
attempts to vindicate al-Ghazal1's position. However, his discussion is confusing and
does not provide a clear and consistent examination of the issue. See especially,
pp. 83-110.
1',3 For a similar reply to Avicenna's argument, see al-GhazaII, The Incoherence q!
the Philosophers, pp. 30-36. AI-GhazalI considers this kind of time 10 be imaginary
and gives a detailed explanation of the analogy between the time bcfore thc uni-
verse and the place beyond the universe.
226 CHAPTER FOUR
If time is applicable only to some of the things belonging to the uni-
verse, then it cannot be applicable to all of them. Hence, Aquinas'
counter-argument for the possibility of the temporal beginning of the
universe does not seem to successfully defeat Avicenna's argument.
Although both Aquinas and Avicenna think that God is not related
to the universe in such a way that this relation posits anything exter-
nal to God, Aquinas pursues logical consequences of this argument.
Despite his position concerning the relation between God and the
universe existing outside the divine knowledge, Avicenna argues that
if the universe begins to exist temporally after not having existed,
this would imply a new relation occurring to God. Thus, it would
require that God is not immutable. By distinguishing between the
divine action and the effect of the divine action, Aquinas provides
a satisfactory response to this argument of Avicenna. Whereas the
divine action and will are eternal, and thus exist forever, the effect
of the divine action does not have to exist forever. Consequently,
the beginning of the universe after not having existed does not require
that God change or move from potency to actuality. The distinc-
tion between the action and the effect of the action, in a sense,
depends on Aquinas' argument that God is the voluntary cause of
the universe. By his distinction between the action and the effect of
the action, Aquinas goes in the opposite direction of Avicenna's argu-
ment. Avicenna argued that there cannot be any gap between the
action and the emergence of the effect of the action. His main rea-
son for this argument is the inconceivability of a time before the
existence of universe, or rather the inapplicability of time to non-
temporal beings.
Aquinas' distinction between a voluntary agent and a natural agent
is his major counter argument. If successful, it counters the demon-
strative force of Avicenna's argument for the sempiternity of the uni-
verse. By distinguishing between agents acting by nature and agents
acting by volition, Aquinas hits the core of Avicenna's theses: (I)
that as a compound 'existence after non-existence' cannot traced to
one single cause, and (2) that true agents and their effects co-exist.
But can one grant this? In the case of a natural agent, if there is
no impediment, its effect follows the existence of the agent imme-
diately. For a voluntary agent, however, this does not have to be
the case. A voluntary agent can determine when its effect begins to
exist. For example, take a man planning to do something next week.
Such a planning sounds familiar to us. But one should carefully
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 227
examine the example. The plan, in the example, is carried out in
the already existing world. The man, in the example, carries out his
plan within the universe. That is, there exists time, independent of
this man, and no matter what the realized plan is, it is a kind of
movement. The realization of the plan is a movement of already
existing conditions, or things, from one state to another, or from
having one form to having another. Simply speaking, the carrying
out of the plan requires the existence of matter and time in the
human case. Thus, what happens in the example is 'existence after
movement,' but not 'existence after non-existence,' in the true sense.
In Avicenna's terms, it is 'existence after relative non-existence,' but
not 'existence after absolute non-existence.'
To what extent is such planning applicable to creation of the uni-
verse by God? Can it be freed from the creaturely conditions, i.e.,
the requirement of matter and time existing independently of the
man in the example? If, as a voluntary agent, God planned the uni-
verse to begin to exist temporally after not having existed, does this
require the existence of time and matter existing independently of
creation? I believe it does. If there is no preceding time, then the
universe does not begin to exist temporally after not having existed.
If there is time before the universe, then, according to the definition
of time, there is a changeable thing before the universe. Thus, the
model of a voluntary agent cannot be applied to creation unless one
allows for the existence of time and temporal things before the uni-
verse. Even though Aquinas does not accept such an assumption of
time and matter, the conception of a voluntary agent determining
its effect temporally after not having existed includes the assumption
of time and temporal things independent of this voluntary agent.
Aquinas acknowledges the assumption of time once. If God is said
to be prior to the universe with regard to time as well as with regard
to his being, then the existence of time before the universe is assumed.
Aquinas maintains that this time is only in the imagination. But if
the time before the universe is only in the imagination, then the
temporal posteriority of the universe must be in the imagination as
well. That is, if the time preceding the universe is imaginary, then
the posteriority of the time when the universe begins is also imagi-
nary, because there is no time to which the world can be posterior.
If the time before the universe, and the posteriority of the instant
when the universe begins, is imaginary, then the temporal beginning
of the universe does not take into account what really exists. One
228 CHAPTER FOUR
may conclude that the posteriority of the universe is only in the
imagination. However, this is not the conclusion Aquinas would like
to argue for.
From another perspective, one can ask whether an imaginary ele-
ment can be used in an argument which is designed to show that
something is in fact the case. That is, in the argument all the other
elements either refer to existents or their properties that exist out-
side the mind of the one who argues. It is agreed that God really
exists, that the universe really exists, and that time is a property of
temporal things and part of the external world. A statement simply
expressing an imaginary state of affairs cannot be used as part of
an argument to indicate a state of affairs in the real world. For
example, let's imagine that John robbed Adam of a hundred dol-
lars. From this premise, ceteris paribus, it does not follow that John
must be punished indeed. His punishment can be justified only in
our imagination, because stealing from Adam took place only in the
imagination, and we know that John has not committed robbery in
fact. There is no ground to punish John for robbing Adam's money
in reality, because John did not in fact commit the crime. Thus, if
the time after which the universe began to exist is imaginary, then
the universe did not really begin to exist temporally after not hav-
ing existed.
Conclusion qf Chapter Four
Avicenna and Aquinas have similar views on important aspects of
their theories concerning creation. They agree that creation is the
existential dependence of the creature on the creator. Creation is
out of nothing, it is not a change and there is nothing independent
of God's bestowal of being. However, while the existential depen-
dence of all things on God is the only meaning of creation for
Avicenna, Aquinas distinguishes between the philosophical and the-
ological senses of creation. For Aquinas, on philosophical grounds,
only the posteriority of the universe with regard to being can be
established. The temporal posteriority of the universe cannot be
demonstrated by rational argumentation. In contrast to Aquinas,
Avicenna defends the position that the universe does not have a tem-
poral beginning.
The difference between their positions does not have much to do
THE BEGINNING OF THE UNIVERSE 229
with their conceptions of God. Both of them agree on the immutabil-
ity of God, and their conception of divine immutability is consistent
with their views concerning beginning of the universe, even though
they argue contradictory positions. The only exception to this agree-
ment between them may be Aquinas' distinction between on the one
hand those divine names that do not concern the existence of the
universe in re at all, and those which are related to the actual exis-
tence of things, such as Creator and Lord, on the other. They agree
that God is not really related to the world. However, Avicenna argues
that the temporal beginning of the universe after not having existed
would imply a new relation occurring to God. Rejecting Avicenna's
argument, Aquinas maintains that the posterior emergence of the
universe does not posit a new relation requiring that God be change-
able. He takes full advantage of the argument that God is not really
related to the universe.
The difference in their positions regarding the question whether
the universe must have always been concerns their conception of the
things in the universe, and the applicability of time to all things.
While Avicenna takes a strict position and rejects that time is applic-
able to all things in the universe, Aquinas is inclined to apply time
to all of them. On Avicenna's position, simply the existence of sempi-
ternal things would be enough to say that the universe is sempiternal.
Another difference may concern not strictly their conceptions of
God, but their positions regarding the extent of the applicability of
human experience to God, or their answer to the question 'To what
extent may creaturely conditions be applied to conceiving God or
divine actions?' Perhaps Aquinas' strongest counter-argument is that
a voluntary cause can will something such that it begins to exist
temporally after not having existed, and God is a voluntary agent
as far as the existence of the universe is concerned. Avicenna would
argue against this and say that for such a conception of the volun-
tary agent, the existence of matter and time-which exist indepen-
dently of the action of the agent-are essential. These cannot be
eliminated so that the conception of voluntary agent can be applic-
able to God to explain creation without reservation.
Avicenna is, again, strict with regard to the unacceptable impli-
cations of the idea of the temporal posteriority of the beginning of
the universe. In contrast to Avicenna, Aquinas adopts a lenient atti-
tude. He argues that the time implied in God's temporal priority to
the universe is only in the imagination.
230 CHAPTER FOUR
Aquinas' arguments for the possibility of the temporal beginning
of the universe enrich the discussion. However, for a convincing
argument in this respect a more fundamental modification of the
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic heritage is required. As long as one
clings to the definition of time in the Aristotelian sense-as the mea-
sure of movement, which is applicable to the lowest part of the uni-
verse-and to the triple division of duration, it seems very difficult
to argue for the possibility of the temporal posteriority of the uni-
verse as a whole.
I Having established that Avicenna's theological statements and those
CONCLUSION
I have argued that Thomas Aquinas' theories concerning God and
creation can be philosophically assessed as much as Avicenna's the-
ories can be. This argument is based on the fact that Avicenna and
Aquinas have similar positions regarding human knowledge and dis-
course about God. Both argue that we do not know God in him-
self and that our knowledge of God is derived from creatures. They
also share the insight that perfections which are predicated of God
are not predicated of God and of creatures univocally. Avicenna's
theory of tashkrk is to some extent similar to Aquinas' theory of ana-
logical predication. However, it is not as developed as Aquinas' the-
ory of analogical predication so as to yield definite criteria concerning
theological statements.
of Aquinas are equally examinable from a philosophical perspective,
I have attempted to trace a further similarity between Avicenna's
and Aquinas' teachings in chapter 2. I have shown that they have
similar conceptions of God's simplicity, necessity, immutability, eter-
nity and knowledge. Discussion of their conception of God through
examining divine formal features helped us to better understand their
positions concerning theological language. In the first chapter, I
argued that Avicenna's theory of tashkrk and Aquinas' theory of ana-
logical predication are similar in denying that terms are predicated
of God and of creation univocally, but the similarity between their
positions is limited. Avicenna and Aquinas follow quite divergent
paths with regard to theological language. In order to avoid the
deception of expressing God in human terms, Avicenna takes a reduc-
tive strategy in the light of the divine formal features. He considers
divine perfection properties insofar as they are modified by divine
formal features, i.e., as necessary, eternal etc. By taking divine attrib-
utes only insofar as they are modified by divine formal features,
which belong exclusively to God, he intends to maintain the difference
between God and creatures and the inadequacy of human language
to talk about God. In contrast, Aquinas considers divine perfection
properties in both ways, i.e., with and without being modified by
divine formal features. Thus although Avicenna and Aquinas have
j
232 CONCLUSION
a similar conception of God, they have divergent pOSItiOns regard-
ing theological language. The difference between their positions
regarding theological language influences not only their talk about
God, but also their theories of creation.
Discussion of their conception of divine formal features and divine
knowledge was also intended to be a preliminary step in studying
their conception of divine creative action and their positions regard-
ing the beginning of the universe. Given the similarity of their con-
ception of God, one could examine their positions regarding the
nature of divine creative action and the beginning of the universe.
That is, using the common conception of God one could decide if
Avicenna's or Aquinas' position regarding the divine creative action
and the beginning of the universe is more coherent with this com-
mon conception.
Contrary to the widely shared interpretation of Avicenna's posi-
tion, I argued that Avicenna's conception of the divine creative action
is not substantially altered in Aquinas' thought. Avicenna and Aquinas
agree on basic issues in this regard, such as God's being a free cre-
ator and not needing to create other things. In fact they have sim-
ilar positions even with regard to the necessity of the universe.
Nevertheless, Avicenna could say only that the universe is necessary.
He could, thus, address only philosophical concerns because of his
reductive strategy concerning divine perfection properties. Aquinas
asserted both the contingency of the universe as well as its neces-
sity. Thus he was able to address both philosophical and religious
concerns. I argued that the difference between their positions despite
the fact that they accept similar premises is due to their positions
regarding theological language. By his theory of analogical predica-
tion, Aquinas was able to predicate perfections of God and of crea-
tures without thereby violating divine simplicity. Aquinas distinguishes
between res significata and the modus significandi of the perfections. He
argues that when we predicate perfections-which we know through
creation--of God, we affirm of God only their res significata not their
creaturely modus significandi. Hence he could predicate perfection prop-
erties of God without being compelled to take them together with
divine formal features. It shows that Avicenna's and Aquinas' theo-
ries regarding creation are closely connected to their positions regard-
ing theological language.
In chapter 4, I argued that Avicenna and Aquinas agree on the
basics concerning the conception of creation-creation is out of noth-
CONCLUSION 233
mg, IS not a movement-although they disagree about whether the
universe has a temporal beginning. Avicenna strongly believes that
the universe cannot have a temporal beginning. Contrary to Avicenna,
Aquinas argues that whether or not the universe has a temporal
beginning cannot be established on philosophical grounds. Conse-
quently, he argues that the view that the universe cannot have a
temporal beginning-which is what Avicenna defends-cannot be
demonstrated rationally. I have argued that Aquinas' responses do
not successfully refute Avicenna's arguments.
The disagreement between Avicenna and Aquinas regarding the
beginning of the universe does not have much to do with their con-
ception of God. In this regard, one might consider Aquinas' use of
divine will to refute Avicenna's argument for the sempiternity of the
universe. Aquinas' major counter-argument employs God's being a
voluntary agent. As I discussed Aquinas' use of divine will to explain
the posteriority of the universe heavily relies on human experience
of volition, which operates within an already existing universe.
However, for the divine volition no independent universe, and hence
no time, exists, such that a definite future point of time may be
applicable for planning the beginning of the universe. Yet this does
not imply a major difference between them with regard to the nature
of divine volition.
Avicenna's position regarding the beginning of the universe is more
consistent with the Aristotelian conception of time combined with
the Neoplatonic triple division of the duration of things, i.e., eter-
nal, sempiternal and temporal. Since both Avicenna and Aquinas
adopt the Aristotelian conception of time and the Neoplatonic triple
division of beings, Avicenna's position shows more consistency, stat-
ing that temporal posteriority is not applicable to the universe as a
whole.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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- - . Studies in the History qf Philosophy and Religion. Ed. Isadore Twersky and George
H. Williams. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1973.
- - . 7he Philosophy qf the Kalam. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1976.
Yates, John C. 7he Timelessness qf God. London: 1990.
Zedler, Beatrice. "Another Look at Avicenna." the New Scholasticism L (1976), pp.
504-521.
"St. Thomas, Interpreter of Avicenna." the Modern Schoolman 33 (1955-1956),
pp. 1-18.
- - . "Why Are the Possiblcs Possible?" the New Scholasticism (1981), pp. 113-130.
"Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the 'Dc Potentia Dei.'" Traditio 6 (1948),
pp. 105-1.')9.
j
 INDEX OF AUTHORS
Aertsen, Jan 201 n. 82
Albert the Great 3, II
Algazel 20 n. 41
Alston, William P. 55~56, 62-63,
63 nn. 88-89, 64, 64 nn. 90~93,
65, 65 nn. 94-97, 66, 66 nn.
99-101,67-68,68 n. 102, 71-72,
75
Ammonius 6
Anawati, G. C. II nn. 30-31,
12 n. 32, 139 n. 18
Anselm 108 n. 90
Aristode 2, 2 n. I, 4, 4 n. 9, 6-8, 8
n. 20, 9, 9 nn. 21-24, 39, 39 n. 35,
40, 86 n. 18, 87, 87 n. 21, 88
n.27, 89, 95 n. 53, 104, 106 n. 84,
109 nn. 93-94,114, 114 n. Ill,
117 n. 120, 134 n. 2, 163 n. 73,
175 n. 15, 198 n. 68, 201,
201 n. 83, 204, 216, 216 n. 125,
222 n. 145, 224, 224 n. 151
Augustine 3, 9, 9 n. 25, 10, 108
n. 90, 217, 219
Averroes 14 n. 36, 20 n. 41,
30 n. 13, 37 n. 28, 177 n. 20,
225 n. 152
Baldner, Steven E. 20 n. 42, 197
n. 67, 199 nn. 73-74
el-Bizri, Nader 160 n. 67
Boethius 43, 43 n. 39, 108, 108 nn.
90-91, 109, 109 nn. 91-92, 110
n. 95, 112 nn. 102, 106
Brown, Patterson 105 n. 80, 106 nn.
80-81, 84
Burns, Robert 81-82 n. 3
Burrell, David B. ix, II n. 32, 19,
19 n. 38, 39 n. 32, 55 n. 70, 80, 80
nn. 1-2, 100 n. 62, 109-10 n. 91,
III n. 101, 112 n. 106, 136 n. 9,
160 n. 67, 173 n. 10, 197 n. 68
Cajetan 64, 64 n. 91
Carroll, William E. 20 n. 42,
197 n. 67, 199 nn. 73-74
Clement 6
Cunningham, Francis A 177 n. 20
Davidson, Herbert A 3 n. 4, 7 n. 18,
8 nn. 18-20, 9 nn. 21-23, 10 n. 27,
20 nn. 41-42, 87 nn. 20-21, 24, 88
nn. 27, 30, 89 nn. 31-32, 133 n. I,
215 n. 120
Davies, Brian 42 n. 36, 107 n. 85,
108 n. 90, 153 n. 40, 204 n. 89
Dunphy, William 197-98 n. 68
Duns Scotus 100 n. 62, 134 n. 2
al-Farabr 2, 2 n. 2, 89
Frank, Richard 83 n. 9
Garcia, Laura L. 157 n. 57
Gardet, Louis 13, 13 nn. 34-36, 14
n. 36, 136 n. 9
Geach, P. T. 207 n. 98
al-Ghazalr 3, 12 n. 32, 20 n. 41,
96 n. 54, 218 n. 136, 225 nn.
152-53
Gilson, Etienne 4 n. 7, 10 n. 29, II
nn. 2, 10-11, 14 n. 36, 134,
197 n. 67
Gluck, Andrew L. 197-98 n. 68
Goichon, A-M. 3, 3 nn. 5-6, II
nn. 31-32, 37 n. 28, 139 n. 17
Goris, Harm 55, 56, 59, 59 nn.
79-82, 60, 60 nn. 83-84, 61,
61 nn. 85-87, 62, 75, 109 n. 92,
III n. 101, 207 n. 98, 208
n. 103
Grant, Sara 206 n. 94
Gundissalinus 12 n. 32
Henninger, Mark G. 201 nn. 81-82,
202 nn. 84, 86-87, 204 n. 90, 206,
206 n. 93, 207 ~ 97
Hibbs, Thomas 55 n. 70
Hourani, George F. 175 n. 15
Hyman, Arthur 134 n. 2, 198 n. 68
Iskenderoglu, Muammer 238
J anssens, J ules I 75 n. 14
John of Damascus 3
Judy, Albert 19, 19 nn. 39-40,
82 n. 5
j
244 INDEX OF AUTHORS
Kant, Immanuel 106 n. 80
Kenny, Anthony 106 n. 80
Kretzmann, Norman 47 n. 49, 108
nn. 90-91, 109 n. 91, 110 nn. 95,
97, 157-58 n. 62, 160 n. 67,
197 n. 68
Leaman, OliveI' 134 n. 2
Lee, P. II n. 31
Louth, Andrew 21 n. 43, 133 n.
MacDonald, Scott 158 n. 62
Macierowski, Edward Michael I I
n. 31, 82 n. 5, 84 n. 10
MacIntosh, J. J. 106 n. 81
Mahdi, Muhsin 2 n. 2
Marmura, Michael E. 3 n. 3,
II n. 31, 95-96 n. 54, 175 nn.
14-15, 181 n. 32, 215 n. 120
Maurer, Armand II n. 30, 43 n. 39
May, Gerhard 5 n. 11,6 n. 14
McGinn, Bernard 39 n. 32,
173 n. 10
McGinnis, Jon 96 n. 54
McInerny, Ralph 64 n. 91, 68 nn.
103-104, 69, 69 nn. 105-106
Miller, Barry 177 n. 20
Moonan, Lawrence 43 n. 39,
124 n. 140
Morris, Thomas V. 239
Muckle, C. S. B. 20 n. 41
Muller, Earl 20 I n. 81, 202 n. 87,
204 n. 91
O'Callaghan, John 55 n. 70
O'Meara, Dominic J. 7 n. 17, 10
n. 28, 140 n. 19
Ormsby, Eric L. 197 n. 68
Philo 6, 6 n. 13, 9
Philoponus, John 2 n. 2, 3-7, 8
n. 18, 10, 215 n. 120
Pieper,Josef 55-56,56 n. 71,57,57
nn. 72-76, 58, 58 nn. 77-78, 75
Pines, S. 240
Plato 2,4,4 n. 8, 5, 5 n. 11,6-7,
10, 90 n. 37
Plotinus 2, 6-7, 7 n. 17, 10, 28 n. 6,
90 n. 37, 140 n. 19
Proclus 2, 2 n. I, 6, 10, 186 n. 43
Pseudo-Dionysius 3, 48 n. 52, 78,
158 n. 62
Rahman, Fazlur 39 n. 32, 97 n. 56,
173 n. 10, 186 n. 43
Reisman, David C. 96 n. 54
Rofougaran, Nicolas Louis 95 n. 53,
100 n. 62
Rolnick, Philip A. 55 n. 70
Rowe, William L. 157 n. 57, 179
n. 27
Sadra, Mulla 12 n. 32
Sezgin, Fuat 3 n. 3
Simplicius 6
Smith, Gerhard 177 n. 20
Sorabji, Richard 3 n. 4, 4 n. 10,
5 n. 12,6 nn. 13-16, 7 n. 18,
9 nn. 24, 26, 10 n. 27, 86 n. 18,
90 n. 37
Stump, Eleonore 63 n. 88, 108 nn.
90-91, 109 n. 91, 110 nn. 95, 97,
157 n. 57, 197 n. 68
Synesius of Cyrene 6
Taylor, Richard C. 2 n.
Te Velde, Rudi A. 48 n. 52,
100 n. 62, 133 n. I, 153 n. 42
Themistius 10
Van Riet, S. 87 n. 19
Van Steenberghen, F. 240
Verbeke, Gerard 12 n. 32,86 n. 19,
144 n. 30
Wennemann, D. J. 209 n. 105
Wilhelmsen, F. D. 210 n. 110
Wippel, John F. 43, 43 nn. 39-40,
45 n. 46, 51 n. 59, 134 n. 2,
198 n. 68, 211 n. 114
Wisnovsky, Robert ix, 148 nn. 33-34,
165 n. 77
Wolfson, H. A. 30 n. 13, 33 n. 18,
37 n. 28,48 n. 51, 172 n. 6
Yates, John C. 109 n. 92
Zedler, Beatrice 11, II n. 32, 13, 13
n. 33, 134, 134 nn. 2-3, 135, 135
nn. 4-8, 140 n. 19, 177 n. 20
INDEX OF TOPICS
ab aetemo 215,217-18,222
abad 90, 90 n. 36
Abrahamic religions II n. 32, 19-20
absolute non-existence 171, 198 n. 68,
227
accidental causes 179
actions stemming from nature 139,
139 n. 18, 149
actual efficient cause 181, 183,
191-92
actual universe 131, 135, 159,
161-62
actuality 9,102-103,107,113,117
n. 120, 217, 219, 221, 226
aevum 112-13
affirmation 4, 84-85, 96, 122,
174 n. 12, 200
affirmative theology 59
aiJad 39
aj::li' 31
analogates 64 n. 91, 68-70, 78
analogical predication 16-18, 20,
25-26, 37 n. 28, 39-41, 43 n. 39,
51, 51 nn. 58-59, 52, 55, 55 n. 70,
56, 58-59, 64 n. 91, 68, 70-71, 76,
78, 81, 120, 124-26
analogy 37 n. 28,40,51,51-52
n. 60, 55 n. 70, 56, 64, 64 n. 91,
66-67,69, 75-76, 225 n. 153
appreciative 18, 81, 124 n. 140, 125,
167
approbation 139-40, 140 n. 20
'iiqil 114 n. 113, 122
'aql 96 n. 56, 114 n. 113, 122
artisan model 7, 10
beginning of the universe 1-2,
8 n. 18, 7, 9, 15, 17-18, 79-80,
112, 189, 198 n. 68, 210, 217,
219, 222, 224, 229, 232-33
bi'lji'l 36
Book of Causes 2 n.
causal order 25, 40
coming to exist 8, 107, 170,
178 n. 22, 179, 224
concept of generation 8
conceptual relation 203
concomitance 140 n. 19, 141,
143-45, 159
concomitants 27, 29, 31, 94, 98
n. 60, 131, 135, 140, 144-45, 149,
174
Conftssions 9 n. 25, 217
constituent parts 31, 35
contemplation model 10
contingency 61, 133, 168, 232
contingency of creation 20, 162
correlative 122
created universe 20, 133
creative action ix, 2, 10, 13, 119,
188, 232
creaturely implications 81
dahr 90 n. 36, 92 n. 49, 93, 182,
186 n. 43
cjariirf 87, 87 n. 20
De trinitate 43, 43 n. 39
Demiurge 5-6
dhiit 27, 31, 32, 82 n. 4, 94,
95 n. 53, 96 n. 56, 101, 122,
142-43, 145, 173, 191
discourse about God 25, 59, 72, 75,
231
discursive 97 n. 56, 115-16
divine actions 208, 210, 218, 229
divine attributes 1-2, 19-20, 76,
122-23, 123 n. 137, 124, 231
divine creative action I, 10, 12,
17-18,79, 147, 154
divine essence 28 n. 6, 42, 43 n. 40,
45, 61 n. 86, 71, 98, 1l7-18 n. 120,
123, 152, 154, 169, 206, 207 n. 98
divine formal features I, 17, 18 n. 37,
34, 48, 50, 77, 79, 80 n. 2, 81,
120-21, 124, 124 n. 140, 126-27,
132, 136, 145, 165-67, 231-32
divine freedom 133, 147, 156-57,
157 n. 57, 158
divine goodness 29, 156--58, 158
n. 62, 159, 162, 212
divine knowledge 17,57,75,79,98,
101, 123, 126, 136, 140 n. 19,
145-46, 151, 153-55, 169-70, 182
j
 246 INDEX OF TOPICS
n. 34, 191, 193, 206, 206 n. 93,
20~ 208 Q 103, 220, 226, 232
divine necessity 86, 120
divine perfection properties I, 18
n. 37, 34, 120-21, 123-24, 126,
132, 145, 167-68, 217, 231-32
divine perfections 17, 20, 25, 29, 47,
50, 56, 59-60, 62-75, 77, 84, 124,
124 n. 140, 126, 145, 157 n. 57,
165-67, 218
divine persons 153, 202 n. 87, 203,
203 n. 87, 204 n. 89
divine properties 33, 34, 80, 120
divine self-knowledge 98
divine simplicity 14, 19 n. 39, 50,
71-75,81 n. 3, 99, 104, 120-21,
124-26, 135, 154, 232
divine will 79, 120-21, 123,
124 n. 140, 132-33, 134 n. 2, 136,
136 n. 9, 137-38, 140-41, 145-47,
150-51, 153-58, 158 n. 62, 159-62,
164-67, 169, 190, 193, 195, 197,
198 n. 68, 211-13, 216, 218, 220,
225, 233
efficient cause 133, 137, 148 nn.
33-34, 150, 160 n. 67, 170, 175-78,
180-82, 185, 188, 191-92, 194, 196,
211,214
emanation 4, 6, 99, 100 n. 62,
134-35, 138, 140, 145, 147, 153,
198
emanationist cosmology 13
ens commune 84
equivocally 50-51, 51 n. 58, 76
esse sine additione I 04
essence of God 35, 131-32
essential cause(s) 179 n. 27, 180, 186,
189, 190, 214
essential posteriority 171
eternal 13, 18, 20, 48, 50, 77, 80-81,
90, 90 n. 36, 91, 93, 93 n. 50, 94,
99,108-109, 109 n. 91, 110, 110
n. 95,111-12,112 n. 106, 113,
118,118 n. 122, 119 n. 126, 126,
132-33, 135-37, 149, 155, 163-65,
167-69, 185-86, 186 n. 43, 193-95,
209-10, 215, 218-19, 224-26, 231,
233
eternality 32, 79, 90
eternity I, 2 n. 2, 8 n. 19, 18 n. 37,
50, 67, 73, 80-81, 91, 93, 100,
105-106, 109-10, 110 n. 95,
111-12,112 nn. 102, 106, 113, 117,
118 n. 122, 120, 124 n. 140, 126,
132, 136, 150, 155, 163-68, 185,
189, 209, 209 n. 105, 210, 213,
215,217-18,220,222,224,231
everlasting 211
ex nihilo 199, 199 n. 73
ex tempOff 208-209
existence after non-existence 4,
226-27
existential priority 38, 92
fallacy of equivocation 51, 51 n. 58,
76
final cause 7, 133, 138, 147-48, 148
n. 34, 158-59, 165, 175
formal features 67, 80, I1I n. 101,
120, 146-47, 149, 164, 166, 168
formal properties 18, 34, 80
free choice 132, 143, 150, 159-60,
160 n. 67, 162, 164, 166-68
free creator 11 n. 32, 133, 140, 143,
232
generation and corruption 9, 35, 89,
95, 95 n. 54, 96, 96 n. 54, 101,
107,112-13,171,179-80,185-88,
190, 196, 214, 225
generosity 141-43, 145, 159
Genesis 5
gharatj 137, 141-42
God as free creator 20, 133
God as natural agent 20, 133
God as the efficient cause 7, 172
God's concomitants 145
God's creative action 131-32, 135
God's creative knowledge 57
God's duration 195-96, 224
God's essence 26-27, 40, 42-45, 60,
74-75, 80, 97, 97 n. 57, 99,
103-104, 104n. 75,114,117
n. 120, 125, 131, 138, 141-43,
145, 149, 166, 194
God's eternity 89-91, 93 n. 50, 105,
108, 108 nn. 90-91, I11 n. 101,
112-13,118,163
God's free will 159, 162
God's freedom 86, 131, 133, 141,
149, 156, 160 n. 67, 166
God's goodness 156-57, 159, 160
n. 67, 162-63
God's immateriality 113
God's knowledge 19, 50, 56, 64, 72,
81, 93-95, 95 nn. 53-54, 96 n. 54,
97, 97 n. 56, 98, 99, 99 n. 61, 100,
INDEX OF TOPICS
100 n. 62, 101, 112-16, 116 n. 120,
117,117 n. 120, 118, 118 nn. 120,
122,119,119 n. 126, 123-24, 126,
137-38, 139 n. 16, 140 n. 20, 149,
151, 154, 173, 206, 206 n. 93
God's necessity 79, 86-87, 101,
105-106, 106 n. 84, 126, 156, 231
God's perfections 29, 41, 48-50, 55,
62-64, 67, 75, 121, 125, 138, 147,
166, 168-69, 192
God's self-knowledge 81, 94, 97-99,
99 n. 61,114,116,117 n. 120,
137-38, 158
God's simplicity 49, 59, 79, 81,
81 n. 3,87 n. 24, 98, 101, 107,
110 n. 99, 116, 121, 126, 138-39,
155, 231
God's will 50, 123, 131-32, 136-39,
139 n. 16, 140, 140 n. 20, 141,
146, 149, 154-59, 161-64, 166-68,
196, 218-19, 221
huwa huwa 27
hypothetical necessity 124 n. 140,
132, 150, 161, 163, 163 n. 73,
164-66, 168
ibdii' 13, 170-71, 172 n. 6
irjiifa 29-30, 30 n. 13, 31-33
'ijiib 84, 174 n. 12
immaterial substances 91
immediate cause(s) 92 n. 43, 180,
189-90, 214
immutability 93, 110, 120
immutability of God 9, 50, 61, 73,
75, 79-80, 86, 89, 100-101, 105,
106 nn. 84-85,109-11, I11 n. 101,
113, 117-18, 126, 132, 137, 155-56,
160, 162-68, 184-85, 189-90, 195,
204 n. 90, 210, 216-19, 229, 231
immutable 18, 48, 50, 77, 80-81, 86,
94,99, 105-106, 106 n. 84, 107-13,
132, 136-37, 145, 149, 155-56, 161,
163-65, 167-69, 186, 189, 191, 204
n. 90, 217-18, 226
imperfection 27, 54, 59-60, 63, 96,
126, 143, 161
impossible 87, 187
innryya 82 n. 5, 83, 83 n. 9, 88 n. 25,
174 n. 12
intellect 43, 54, 77, 80, 84 n. 10, 85
n. 15, 89, 96, 96 n. 56, 97-98, 107,
114,114 n. 113, 117-18 n. 120,
119, 122-23, 134 n. 2, 139 n. 18,
247
140, 149, 151 n. 37, 152-53,
172-73, 184-85, 186 n. 43, 200
intention 64 n. 91, 132-33, 135-36,
136 n. 9, 138-39, 139 nn. 16, 18,
141-42, 147-48, 159, 184 n. 39
kamiil 28, 32, 36
Kitiib fi al-Khayr al-MaM 2 n. I
lawiil;iq 85
lawiizim 27, 29, 31
mabda' 94, 123
miihryya 36, 82 nn. 4-5, 83 n. 9, 105
n. 75
Maimonides 3, 12 n. 32, 19 11. 38,
37 n. 28, 43 nn. 39-40, 47, 48 nn.
51-52, 51 n. 58, 80 n. I, JOO n. 62,
I11 n. 101, 134 n. 2, 197-98 n. 68,
204
ma'qul 100, 114 n. 113, 122
maujud 31,87, 137
meaning of creation 4, 199 11. 73,
228
modality of being 86, 88-89
modus significandi 52-53, 63, 65, 68-69,
77, 150, 166-67, 232
motion 5,8-9, 110, 155, 197,224
mujarrad 84, 85 n. 16
mumkin 87
mushiirun ilayhi 84 n. 10
Muslim theologians 3, 3 n. 3, 10,
13,95 n. 54,171 n. 2,172 n.6,
181 n. 32
mustal;fl 87
mutakhayyal 96
natural action 10, 18, 20, 134 n. 2,
135-36, 139, 139 n. 18, 140,
140 n. 19, 146-47, 149, 151-54
natural agent 135, 139 n. 18, 141,
146, 150-51, 169, 226
nature of creative action ix, 1-2
nature of divine creative actiofl 15,
127, 232
nature of God 9
nature of things 8, 106 n. 84-
nature of time 8, 185, 193
necessary being 30, 32-33, 3 5 - 36 ,
39 n. 32, 82, 82 n. 5, 83, g3 n. 10,
84 84 n 10 85-86 87 n 24, 88
nn'. 24, 27, 89, 105,' 105 ~. 80,
106, 106 n. 80, 146, 178 n. 22,
189
 248 INDEX OF TOPICS
necessary emanation 20, 133,
136 n. 9, 160 n. 67
necessary of being 82, 82 n. 5, 83,
85, 87 n. 24, 100, 122
necessity 17, 18 n. 37, 32, 34-35, 50,
67, 80, 83 n. 10, 86, 86 n. 18, 87
nn. 20, 24, 88, 88 n. 25, 89, 101,
105, 105 n. 80, 106 nn. 81, 84,
118, 120, 124, 124 n. 140, 131,
133-34, 134 n. 2, 138, 145-47,
154-55, 157, 161-63, 163 n. 73,
164-65, 165 n. 77, 166-67, 176,
178 n. 22, 184 n. 39, 190,
198 n. 68, 211-12, 232
necessity of being 33, 34, 82,
82 n. 5, 83, 84 n. 10, 85
necessity of creation 153
necessity of nature 13, 134-35,
136 n. 9, 151
necessity of the universe 4, 131-33,
135, 143, 146-47, 150, 165-68, 232
negation 28, 32-33, 33 n. 18,
43 n. 39, 44, 46-48, 48 n. 51, 50,
54, 76-77, 80, 84, 93, 103, 107,
Ill, 121-22, 166, 174 n. 12,
199 n. 73
negative element 17,25,41,55,59,
73
negative terms 4, 28 n. 6, 46-47
Neoplatonic 2 n. 1, 5, 18, 20-21, 21
n. 43, 110, 112, 133, 133 n. 1, 148,
230, 233
ni;::.am 100
non-being 33, 88, 122, 199,
199 n. 73
non-voluntary agent 148
nothingness 9, 199 n. 74
omnipotent 31-32, 124
omnitemporality 108, 112,
112 n. 102
participation 102-103, 116-17
n. 120, 198
passive potency 211, 214
perfection(s) 8, 25-26, 28, 28 nn. 6,
8, 29, 34-36, 37 n. 28, 38, 40-41,
45-48, 48 nn. 51-52, 49, 49 n. 53,
50-51, 51 n. 58, 52, 52 n. 60, 53,
53 n. 64, 54, 55 n. 70, 56, 60, 60
n. 84, 62-64, 64 n. 91, 65-78,
80-81, 102, 107, 121-22, 125-26,
132, 137-38, 140, 142, 148-51, 162,
164-67, 185, 192, 231-32
perfection properties 8, 20, 32, 36,
40, 45, 48-49, 52, 64, 66, 71, 77,
80-81, 120, 125-26, 232
perfection terms 51, 51 n. 58, 53-56,
59-60, 65, 68-73, 77, 120, 166
Platonic forms 98
Platonic ideas 97-98
positive 25-26, 28 n. 6, 29-30,
30 n. 13, 31-33, 33 n. 18, 34, 36,
41-43, 43 n. 40, 44, 46, 54-55, 59,
71-73, Ill, 141, 143, 158 n. 62,
173-74
positive attributes 47, 76
positive properties of God 32, 47
possibility 9, 88, 88 n. 25, 89,
134 n. 2, 147, 160 n. 67, 167,
172,176,177 n. 20,187-88,211,
211 n. 114, 212-15, 215 n. 120,
226, 230
possibly 9, 88
posteriority 26, 37-41, 90 n. 36,
91-92, 170-71, 199, 228, 233
potential efficient cause 181, 191-92,
214
potentially 9, 39, 220
prime matter 6, 8, 47 n. 49, 185,
187, 198
priority 26, 37, 37 n. 28, 38-41, 90,
90 n. 36,91-92, 193-94, 199, 199
n. 74, 222, 224
properties 25, 28-30, 30 n. 13,
31-33, 33 n. 18, 34-37, 39, 41, 46,
47 n. 49, 48, 49 n. 53, 74, 76, 78,
80, 84-85, 96, 100 n. 62, Ill, 116
n. 120, 120-22, 177 n. 20, 178, 178
n. 22, 180, 192, 197, 212, 219, 228
qaJrj 141
qidam 32, 90, 90 n. 36, 91-93, 93
n. 50, 185
quidditative 42-45, 56
quiddities 82, 102, 170, 183-84, 186,
188
ratio 60, 69-71, 74
ratio propria 56, 64 n. 91, 68--69, 69
n. 106, 70-71, 73
real relations 202, 202 n. 87, 203,
204 n. 90, 209
reductio ad absurdum 170
reductive 121
reductive strategy 18, 18 n. 37, 81,
123, 126, 132, 167, 231-32
relata 202 n. 87, 204-205
INDEX OF TOPICS
relation(s) 26, 29-30, 30 n. 13,
31-34,48 n. 51,51 n. 60, 52, 61,
64, 76-77,98-100, 100 n. 62,
118-19,119 n. 126, 120-21, 123,
144, 148 n. 34, 151, 157, 161-62,
164-66, 169-70, 172 n. 6, 173-74,
174n. 12, 175, 175n.15, 178,
180-81, 183, 185, 190-92, 196-97,
199 n. 73, 201, 201 nn. 81-82, 202,
202 n. 87, 203, 203 n. 87, 204, 204
nn. 89-90, 205-206, 206 nn. 93-94,
207, 207 n. 98, 208-10, 210 n. 110,
213, 216-17, 220, 223, 226, 229
relation of reason 202-203
relationship 7, 9, 12 n. 32, 13, 34,
37 n. 28, 38, 41, 51, 56, 64, 70, 77,
91-95, 97, 97 n. 57, 98-99, 115,
124, 131, 144, 148, 157-58, 163,
173, 187, 202, 208-209, 217
relative non-existence 171, 227
remote causes 179
res significata 52-53, 63, 65, 65 n. 96,
67-69, 69 n. 106, 70-73, 75, 77,
150, 166-67, 232
rirjii 139, 140 n. 20
salb 32, 174 n. 12
Samad 33
~elf-necessary being 84 n. 10, 86,
88,88 n. 27,89,94,106,175-76,
182
self-necessity 80, 83, 86, 88-89, 106
self-subsistence 89
self-subsisting form 102
self-volition 131, 138, 146, 149, 155,
157-58, 158 n. 62, 163
semper 90 n. 36, 211, 213, 215,
217-20
sempiternal 8, 89, 93, 111-12, 146,
182 n. 34, 185-86, 186 n. 43, 188
n. 48, 196-97, 211-12, 225, 229,
233
sempiternity 8-9, 38, 79-80, 92
n. 49, 93, 112, 118 n. 120, 169,
182, 185, 186 n. 43, 187, 196--97,
210--11,211 n. 114,212-13,215,
224-25, 225 n. 152, 226, 233
sifat 32
similarity 15, 17, 29, 31-32,40-41,
45-46, 51 n. 58, 63-64, 66--67, 76,
86, 93, 103, 112, 114 n. 113, 116,
201-203, 231-32
simplicity 17, 34-35, 39, 48-49, 53,
67, 73, 77, 80, 82 n_ 3, 89, 96-97,
249
99, 101, 107, III n. 101, 113, 116,
120, 124, 145-47, 150, 155, 158,
167
substratum 30, 97-98, 186-89, 211,
214-15
sufficient cause 10, 169, 215
synonyms 49
tashkik 26, 37, 37 n. 28, 38-40,
76-78, 16, 231
temporal beginning 1, 5-6, 18, 79,
82 n. 3, 92, 169-70, 172, 172 n. 7,
185-86, 188, 190, 209-10, 212-13,
215-17, 222, 222 n. 146, 226-29,
233
temporal non-existence 183-89,
192-93, 196, 198 n. 68, 214-15,
219, 222-23
temporal posteriority 13, 97 n. 57,
171, 193, 196, 220-22, 224-25,
227-30, 233
temporal priority 13, 38, 92,
92 n. 43, 195, 229
temporal succession 116
theological language 1, 15, 17-19,
25-26, 40-42, 56, 60, 62-63, 74,
76, 78-79, 81, 120, 126, 131-32,
147, 149, 166-68, 231-32
theological statements 26, 41-42, 59,
62-63, 65, 70-71, 73-75, 78, 120,
231
Theology if Aristotle 6
Timaeus 4 n. 8, 6
time ix, 5-9, 18, 90-92, 92 nn. 45,
49, 93, 96, 101, 108-12, 112 n. 106,
113,118,118 nn. 120, 122, 119,
169-70, 172 n. 7, 180, 182, 184-86,
186 n. 43, 188, 190, 193--96, 198
n. 68, 200, 208-209, 209 n. 105,
212-13, 215-19, 221-22, 222
n. 146, 223-25, 225 n. 153,
226-30, 233
univocal predication 52, 53 n. 64,
64 n. 91, 65, 65 n. 96, 68, 76
univocally 25, 36, 50, 51 n. 58,
56, 60 n. 84, 65-66, 68, 70, 74,
76-77, 125, 231
unknowability of God 55 -56, 58,
61, 75
unspecified existence 103
vertically ordered 92
voluntary act 132, 139, 167
250 INDEX OF TOPICS
voluntary action 10, 18-19, 132-33,
13S, 137-38, 140, 149, ISI-S4, 219
voluntary agent 14, 81, 136, 138,
I49-S0, IS2, 169, 191, 2IS-16,
218, 221, 226-27, 229, 233
ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY AND SCIENCE
wajib 87, 87 n. 20 TEXTS AND STUDIES
wajib al-wujud 33, 82, 82 n. S
wujud 31, 36
ISSN 0169-8729
8. Fakhry, M. Ethical Theories in Islam. Second expanded edition. 1994.
ISBN 90 04 09300 I
9. Kemal, S. The Poetics ofAlfarabi andAvicenna. 1991. ISBN 90 04 093710
10. Alon, I. Socrates in Medieval Arabic Literature. 1991. ISBN 90 04 09349 4
11. Bos, G. Qusta ibn Liiqa s Medical Regimefor the Pilgrims to Mecca. The Risala fi
tadblr safar al-hajj. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09541 1
12. Kohlberg, E. A Medieval Muslim Scholar at Work. Ibn Tawiis and his Library.
1992. ISBN 90 04 09549 7
13. Daiber, H. Naturwissenschaft bei den Arabern im 10. Jahrhundert n. Chr. Briefe
des AM I-Fa1:ll Ibn al-'AmId (gest. 360/970) an 'A1:ludaddaula. Herausgegeben
mit Einleitung, kommentierter Ubersetzung und Glossar. 1993.
ISBN 90 04 097554
14. Dhanani, A. The Physical Theory of Kalam. Atoms, Space, and Void in Basrian
Mu'tazilI Cosmology. 1994. ISBN 90 04 098313
15. Abii Ma'sar. The Abbreviation ofthe Introduction to Astrology. Together with the
Medieval Latin Translation of Adelard of Bath. Edited and Translated by Ch.
Bumett, K. Yamamoto and M. Yano. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09997 2
16. Sabiir Ibn Sahl. Dispensatorium Parvum (al-Aqrabadhrn al-saghlr). Analysed,
Edited and Annotated by O. Kahl. 1994. ISBN 90 04100040
17. Mar6th, M. Die Araber und die antike Wissenschaftstheorie. Ubersetzung aus
dem Ungarischen von Johanna Till und Gabor Kerekes. 1994.
ISBN 90 04 10008 3
18. Ibn AbI al-Dunya. Morality in the Guise ofDreams. A Critical Edition of Kitab al-
Manam, with Introduction, by Leah Kinberg. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09818 6
19. Kiigelgen, A. von. Averroes und die arabische Moderne. Ansatze zu einer Neube-
griindung des Rationalismus im Islam. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09955 7
20. Lameer, 1. Al-Farabr and Aristotelian Syllogistics. Greek Theory and Islamic
Practice. 1994. ISBN 90 04 09884 4
22. Adang, C. Muslim Writers on Judaism and the Hebrew Bible. 1996.
ISBN 90 04 10034 2
23. Dallal, A.S. An Islamic Response to GreekAstronomy. Kitab Ta'drl Hay'at al-Ajl.ak
ofSadr al-Shari'a. Edited with Translation and Commentary. 1995.
ISBN 90 04 09968 9
24. Conrad, L.I. (ed.). The World of Ibn Tufayl. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
I:Iayy ibn Yaqsan. 1995. ISBN 90 04101357
25. Hennansen, M.K. (tr.). The Conclusive Argument from God. Shah Wall Allah of
Delhi's lfujjat Allah al-Baligha. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10298 I
26. Abrahamov, B. Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur'an in the
Theology ofal-Qasim ibn Ibriihrm. Kitab al-Mustarshid. 1996.
ISBN 90 04 10408 9
 27. Wild, S. (ed.). The Qur'an as Text. 1996. ISBN 9004 103449
46. Swartz, M. A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism. Ibn al-Jawzi's Kitab
28. Riddell, P.G. and T. Street (eds.). Islam: Essays on Scripture. Thought and
Akhbar as-Sirat. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123768
Society. A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. lohns. 1997. ISBN 9004 10692 8
47. Kusuba, T. and D. Pingree. Arabic Astronomy in Sanskrit. AI-BiIjandi on Tadh-
29. Jolivet, 1. and R. Rashed (eds.). (Euvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-
kira II, Chapter 11 and its Sanskrit Translation. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124756
Kindi. Volume 1. L'Optique et la Catoptrique, Edited by R. Rashed. 1997.
48. iskenderoglu, M. Fakhr aI-din al-Riizi and Thomas Aquinas on the Question ofthe
ISBN 90 04 09781 3
Eternity ofthe World. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124802
30. Rudolph, U. Al-Miituridi und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand. 1997.
49. Reisman, D.C. The making of the Avicennan Tradition. The Transmission, Con-
ISBN 90 04 10023 7
tents, and Structure ofIbn Sina's al-Muba!).al~H (The Discussions). 2002.
31. Endress, G. and J. A. Aertsen (eds.). Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition.
ISBN 90 04125043
Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy ofIbn Rushd (I 126-1 198).
50. Behloul, S.M. Ibn Hazms Evangelienkritik. Eine methodische Untersuchung.
Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996).
2002. ISBN 90 04 125272
ISBN 90 04 11308 8
51. Charette, F. Mathematical Instrumentation in Fourteenth-Century Egypt and
32. Elmore, G.T. Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time. Ibn al-'Arabi's Book of
Syria. The Illustrated Treatise ofNajm ai-Din al-Misri. 2003.
the Fabulous Gryphon. 1999. ISBN 90 04109919
ISBN 90 04130152
33. Abii Ma'sar. Kitiib al-milal wa-d-duwa!. Arabic text edited by K. Yamamoto with
52. Reisman, D.e. (ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Confer-
an English translation by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Bumett. 1999.
ence of the Avicenna Study Group. 2003. ISBN 9004 129782
ISBN 90 04 10725 8
53. Kahl, O. Siibur Ibn Sah!. The Small Dispensatory. 2003. ISBN 90 04129960
34. Albumasar. De Magnis Coniunctionibus (On the Great Coniunctions). Latin text
54. Bumett, C., 1.p. Hogendijk, K. Plofker and M. Yano. Studies in the History ofthe
edited by Ch. Bumett and Arabic-Latin, Latin Arabic Glossaries by K. Yamamoto
Exact Sciences in Honour ofDavid Pingree. 2004. ISBN 9004 132023
and Ch. Bumett. 1999. ISBN 90 04 110747
56. McGinnis, 1. (ed.). Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval
35. Stroumsa, S. Freethinkers ofMedieval Islam. Ibn al-Rawandi, Abii Bakr al-Razi,
Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. 2004.
and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. 1999. ISBN 90 04 113746 ISBN 90 04 139605
36. King, D.A. World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca.
57. Eschraghi, A. Frilhe Saibi- und Biibi-Theologie. Die Darlegung der Beweise fUr
Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science. 1999. ISBN 9004 113673
Mu!).ammads besonderes Prophetentum (Ar-Risiilafi Itbat an-Nubuwa al-Ijiissa).
37. Bar-Asher, M.M. Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imiimi Shiism. 1999.
2004. ISBN 90 04 140344
ISBN 90 04 11495 5
58. Acar, R. Talking about God and Talking about Creation. Avicenna's and Thomas
38. Sayyid Jalal aI-Din Ashtiyani et al. Consciousness and Reality. Studies in Memo-
Aquinas' positions. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14477 3
ry ofToshihiko Izutsu. 2000. ISBN 90 04 115862
59. Akasoy, A. Philosophie und Mystik in der spiiten Almohadenzeit. Die Siciliani-
39. Schmidtke, S. Theologie, Philosophie und Myslik im zwolfershiitiSchen Islam des
schen Fragen des Ibn Sab'jn. 2005. ISBN 90 04 145222
9.115. Jahrhunderts. Die Gedankenwelten des Ibn Abi rumhiJr al-Ahsa'i (urn
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838/1434-35 - nach 906/1501).2000. ISBN 9004115315
und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und SchluBlehre. 2005.
40. Griffel, F. Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die Entwicklung zu al-Gazalis Urteil
ISBN 90 04145885
gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen. 2000.
62. Mourad, S.A. Early Islam between Myth and History. AI-l:Iasan al-Basri (d.
ISBN 90 04 115668
IlOH/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship.
41. Heemskerk, M.T. Sufftring in the Mu'tazilite Theology. 'Abd al_Jllbbar's Teach-
2005. ISBN 90 04 148299
ing on Pain and Divine Justice. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11726 I
42. Rashed, R. and H. Bellosta. 1briihim 1bn Sinan. Logique et GeOlnetrie au xe
Siecle. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11804 7
43. Tamer, G. Islamische Philosophie und die Kriseder Moderne. Das Verhiiltnis von
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44. Genequand, e. Alexander ofAphrodisias on the Cosmos. 200 I.
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45. Calverley, E.E. and J.W. Pollock. Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam.
Volume one. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12381 4
Volume two. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123822
27. Wild, S. (ed.). The Qur'an as Text. 1996. ISBN 90 04 103449 46. Swartz, M. A: . ..
28. Riddell, P.G. and T. Street (eds.). Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and Akhbar as S' Medieval Cntlque of Anthropomorphism. Ibn al-Jawzl's Kitab
.- .Ifat. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123768
Society. A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns. 1997. ISBN 9004 106928 47. Kusuba, T. a n d . .
29. Jolivet, 1. and R. Rashed (eds.). CEuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al- kira II Ch D. Pmgree. ArabIC Astronomy in Sanskrit. AI-BitjandI on Tadh-
Kindt. Volume 1. L'Optique et la Catoptrique. Edited by R. Rashed.1997. 48 isken~e valPter 11 and its Sanskrit Translation. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124756
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ISBN 90 04 09781 3 Eternity oif h a r al-dm al-Razl and Thomas Aqumas on the Question ofthe
30. Rudolph, U. Al-Miiturtdt und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand. 1997. 49. Reisman ~ e World. 2002. ISBN 90 04124802 .
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tents, and St
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31. Endress, G. and J. A. Aertsen (eds.). Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition. ISBN 90 04 %c~~~e 30fIbn SIna's al-Mubaha!at (The Discussions). 2002.
Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy of Ibn Rushd (1126-1198). 50. Behlolll, S-rvt Ib
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9004125272
ISBN 90 04113088 51. Charette F , .<
32. Elmore, G.T. Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time. Ibn al-'Arabj's Book of Syria. 'the I1l LVlathem a t'Ica I mstrumentatlOn
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the Fabulous Gryphon. 1999. ISBN 90 04 10991 9 ISBN 90 0411lstrated Treatise ofNajm aI-DIn al-MISrl. 2003.
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an English translation by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Bumett. 1999. ence of the ~~i(ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Confer-
ISBN 90 04 10725 8 53. Kahl () S-b' cenna Study Group. 2003. ISBN 90 04 129782
, . a ur lb S
34. Albumasar. De Magnis Coniunctionibus (On the Great Coniunctions). Latin text 54. Burnett C J n ahl. The Small Dispensatory. 2003. ISBN 90 04 129960
edited by Ch. Bumett and Arabic-Latin, Latin Arabic Glossaries by K. Yamamoto Exact S, . ·,.P. .Rog end"k IJ, K . PI 0 fker and M. Yano. Studies in the History ofthe
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and Ch. Bumett. 1999. ISBN 90 04110747 56. McGin ' J Onour ofDavid Pingree. 2004. ISBN 9004132023
nIS, . (ed) I t . . .
35. Stroumsa, S. Freethinkers ofMedieval Islam. Ibn al-RawandI, Abu Bakr al-RazI, Islam. Proceed' '. n erpretmg AVlcenna: SCIence and Philosophy in Medieval
and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. 1999. ISBN 90 04 113746 ISBN 9004 I mgs of the Second Conference ofthe Avicenna Study Group. 2004.
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36. King, D.A. World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca. 57. Eschraghi, A. Friihe - . _ __ .'
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37. Bar-Asher, M.M. Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imiimt Shiism. 1999. 2004. ISBN 9 eres Prophetentum (Ar-RIsalafi Itbat an-Nubuwa al-ljiissa).
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ISBN 90 04 11495 5 58. Acar, It Talki g b
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ry of Toshihiko Izutsu. 2000. ISBN 90 04 115862 59. Akasoy ; ;h~ns. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14477 3
39. Schmidtke, S. Theologie, Philosophie und Mystik im zwolfershiitischen Islam des schen", . hllos O'Phi e un d Mys t'k' I m
der spaten
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ISBN 90 04 115668 110H1728CE) ly 151am between Myth and History. AI-Hasan al-Basrl (d.
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42. Rashed, R. and H. Bellosta. 1briihlm Ibn Siniin. Logique et Geometrie au xe
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43. Tamer, G. Islamische Philosophie und die Krise der Moderne. Das Verhaltnis von
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44. Genequand, C. Alexander ofAphrodisias on the Cosmos. 2001.
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45. Calverley, E.E. and J.W. Pollock. Nature, Man and God in Medieval1s1am.
Volume one. 2002. ISBN 9004123814
Volume two. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123822
27. Wild, S. (ed.). The Qur'an as Text. 1996. ISBN 90 04 103449
28. Riddell, P.G. and T. Street (eds.). Islam: Essays on Scripture, Thought and
Society. A Festschrift in Honour of Anthony H. Johns. 1997. ISBN 90 04 106928
29. Jolivet, 1. and R. Rashed (eds.). CEuvres philosophiques et scientifiques d'al-
Kindi. Volume 1. L'Optique et la Catoptrique. Edited by R. Rashed. 1997.
ISBN 90 04 09781 3
30. Rudolph, U. Al-Miituridi und die sunnitische Theologie in Samarkand. 1997.
ISBN 90 04 10023 7
31. Endress, G. and J. A. Aertsen (eds.). Averroes and the Aristotelian Tradition.
Sources, Constitution and Reception of the Philosophy ofIbn Rushd (1126-1198).
Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Averroicum (Cologne, 1996).
ISBN 90 04113088
32. Elmore, G.T. Islamic Sainthood in the Fullness of Time. Ibn al-'Arabl's Book of
the Fabulous Gryphon. 1999. ISBN 90 04109919
33. Abu Ma'sar. Kitiib al-milal wa-d-duwal. Arabic text edited by K. Yamamoto with
an English translation by K. Yamamoto and Ch. Bumett. 1999.
ISBN 90 04 10725 8
34. Albumasar. De Magnis Coniunctionibus (On the Great Coniunctions). Latin text
edited by Ch. Bumett and Arabic-Latin, Latin Arabic Glossaries by K. Yamamoto
and Ch. Bumett. 1999. ISBN 90 04110747
35. Stroumsa, S. Freethinkers ofMedieval Islam. Ibn al-Rawandi, Abu Bakr al-Razi,
and Their Impact on Islamic Thought. 1999. ISBN 90 04 11374 6
36. King, D.A. World-Maps for Finding the Direction and Distance to Mecca.
Innovation and Tradition in Islamic Science. 1999. ISBN 90 04113673
37. Bar-Asher, M.M. Scripture and Exegesis in Early Imiimi Shiism. 1999.
ISBN 90 04 11495 5
38. Sayyid Jalal aI-Din Ashtiyani et al. Consciousness and Reality. Studies in Memo-
ry of Toshihiko Izutsu. 2000. ISBN 90 04 115862
39. Schmidtke, S. Theologie, Philosophie und Mystik im zwolfershiitischen Islam des
9./15. Jahrhunderts. Die Gedankenwelten des Ibn Abi rumhur al-Ahsa'i (urn
838/1434-35 - nach 906/1501).2000. ISBN 90 04 11531 5
40. Griffel, F. Apostasie und Toleranz im Islam. Die Entwicklung zu al-GazalIs Urteil
gegen die Philosophie und die Reaktionen der Philosophen. 2000.
ISBN 90 04 115668
41. Heemskerk, M.T. Suffering in the Mu'tazilite Theology. 'Abd al-Jabbar's Teach-
ing on Pain and Divine Justice. 2000. ISBN 90 04 11726 I
42. Rashed, R. and H. Bellosta. Ibriihlm Ibn Siniin. Logique et Geometrie au xe
Siecle. 2000. ISBN 90 04 118047
43. Tamer, G.Islamische Philosophie und die Krise der Moderne. Das Verhaltnis von
Leo Strauss zu Alfarabi, Avicenna und Averroes. 2001. ISBN 90 04120297
44. Genequand, C. Alexander ofAphrodisias on the Cosmos. 200 I.
ISBN 90 04 119639
45. Calverley, E.E. and J.W. Pollock. Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam.
Volume one. 2002. ISBN 90 04123814
Volume two. 2002. ISBN 90 04 123822
46. Swartz, M. A Medieval Critique of Anthropomorphism. Ibn al-Jawzl's Kitab
Akhbar a~-SiIat. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12376 8
47. Kusuba, T. and D. Pingree. Arabic Astronomy in Sanskrit. AI-Bitjandi on Tadh-
kira 11, Chapter 11 and its Sanskrit Translation. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124756
48. iskenderoglu, M. Fakhr ai-din al-Riizi and Thomas Aquinas on the Question ofthe
Eternity ofthe World. 2002. ISBN 90 04 124802
49. Reisman, D.C. The making of the Avicennan Tradition. The Transmission, Con-
tents, and Structure ofIbn Sina's al-Mubaha!at (The Discussions). 2002.
ISBN 90 04125043
50. Behloul, S.M. Ibn lfazms Evangelienkritik. Eine methodische Untersuchung.
2002. ISBN 90 04 125272
51. Charette, F. Mathematical Instrumentation in Fourteenth-Century Egypt and
Syria. The Illustrated Treatise of Najm ai-Din al-Misr!. 2003.
ISBN 90 0413015 2
52. Reisman, D.C. (ed.). Before and After Avicenna. Proceedings of the First Confer-
ence of the Avicenna Study Group. 2003. ISBN 90 04 129782
53. Kahl, O. Siibur Ibn Sahl. The Small Dispensatory. 2003. ISBN 90 04 129960
54. Bumett, c., IP. Hogendijk, K. Plofker and M. Yano. Studies in the History of the
Exact Sciences in Honour ofDavid Pingree. 2004. ISBN 90.04 132023
56. McGinnis, I (ed.). Interpreting Avicenna: Science and Philosophy in Medieval
Islam. Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study Group. 2004.
ISBN 90 04 13960 5
57. Eschraghi, A. Friihe Saibi- und Biibi-Theologie. Die Darlegung der Beweise fur
Mui:lammads besonderes Prophetentum (Ar-Risiilafi Itbat an-Nubuwa al-/jii!)sa).
2004. ISBN 90 04 140344
58. Acar, R. Talking about God and Talking about Creation. Avicenna's and Thomas
Aquinas' positions. 2005. ISBN 90 0414477 3
59. Akasoy, A. Philosophie und Mystik in der spiiten Almohadenzeit. Die Siciliani-
schen Fragen des Ibn Sab'in. 2005. ISBN 90 04 145222
60. Schock, C. Koranexegese, Grammatik und Logik. Zum Verhiiltnis von arabischer
und aristotelischer Urteils-, Konsequenz- und SchluBlehre. 2005.
ISBN 90 04 145885
62. Mourad, S.A. Early Islam between Myth and History. AI-Hasan al-Basri (d.
IIOH/728CE) and the Formation of His Legacy in Classical Islamic Scholarship.
2005. ISBN 90 04148299