Kumaraswamy P.R., Muddassir Quamar Md. India's Saudi Policy: Bridge To The Future

India’s
Saudi
Policy
Bridge to the Future
P. R. KUMARASWAMY
AND
MD. MUDDASSIR QUAMAR
India’s Saudi Policy
P. R. Kumaraswamy
Md. Muddassir Quamar
India’s Saudi Policy

Bridge to the Future
P. R. Kumaraswamy Md. Muddassir Quamar
School of International Studies Institute for Defence Studies
Jawaharlal Nehru University & Analyses
New Delhi, India New Delhi, India
ISBN 978-981-13-0793-5 ISBN 978-981-13-0794-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2
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To our guru Professor M. S. Agwani
With respect and gratitude
Acknowledgements
On the late afternoon of 23 March 2018, an Air India flight from New
Delhi arrived in the Ben-Gurion International Airport just outside Tel
Aviv and made history. The direct flight between India and Israel had an
interesting twist as it flew over the Saudi airspace. Since the early 1960s as
part of their boycott policy, Arab states have denied flights from or to
Israel accessing their airspace. As a result, flights touching Israel often take
more circuitous routes incurring cost and time overruns. The Saudi will-
ingness to bestow a rare privilege upon India’s national carrier underscores
the transformation that is taking place in India’s fortunes in the wider
Middle East, especially vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. What are the main drivers of
the Indo-Saudi relations?
Initially, the idea was to capture various aspects of the bilateral relations
within the broad historical context and India’s engagement with the most
critical Gulf Arab country. As things progressed, it was evident that the
pace and depth of the relations were shaped and influenced by New Delhi.
The ups and downs as well as the transformation have largely been due to
certain shifts in India’s priorities and approaches towards the Kingdom.
Despite many inherent advantages, for long, there was an absence of
warmth between the two, and gradual transformation has primarily hap-
pened when New Delhi began viewing the Kingdom and its strengths and
limitations without the Pakistani prism. Hence, it is more about India’s
policy than relations with Saudi Arabia.
Such an endeavour not only is a time-consuming exercise but also
requires the support, understanding and encouragement of family, friends
and colleagues. Besides, many individuals have inspired both the authors
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
and the prime credit goes to Shri Hamid Ansari, former vice-president of
India. For nearly two decades he spent a considerable amount of his time
in sharing his knowledge and understanding of the vastly complex Middle
East.
We wish to register our gratitude to Director-General of IDSA
Ambassador Jayant Prasad for his continuous support in pursuing our
research. Special mention is reserved for Deputy Director General Maj.
Gen. Alok Deb (retd.), Meena Singh Roy S Kalyanraman, S. Samuel
C. Rajiv, Rajeesh Kumar, Adil Rasheed, P. K. Pradhan and Hitakshi in the
library.
D. Shyam Babu was instrumental in both suggesting, and then training
us in, the use of Zotero for collecting and organizing academic materials.
We are thankful to Dr. Saud al-Sati, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia to India, for his help in tweaking the subtitle of the book.
We thank the library staff of Jawaharlal Nehru University, Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses and Indian Council of World Affairs. The
online MEA collection is an information mine.
We are grateful to a host of scholars, academics and diplomats who
directly or indirectly enriched our knowledge, including Professors
Girijesh Pant, Gulshan Dietl, P. C. Jain, A. K. Pasha, A. K. Ramakrishnan,
A. K. Mohapatra, and Bansidhar Pradhan and Ambassadors Ishrat Aziz,
Talmiz Ahmad, Sanjay Singh, and Ramaiah Rajagopalan. We are also
thankful to scholar friends, including Avraham Sela, Badrul Alam, C. Uday
Bhaskar, Efraim Inbar, Hayat Alvi, Hussein Solomon, Joseph Kechichian,
Muhammad Gulrez, Noor Ahmed Baba, P. K. Muraleedhar Babu, Rajesh
Rajagopalan, Santishree Pandit, Saud al-Sarhan, Saud al-Tamami, Sean
Foley, Sreeradha Datta and Vivek Mehra.
It is our privilege to have a host of well-wishers, especially Kalpana
Shukla, Jose Mathew, Alvite Singh and U. Marimuthu, who during differ-
ent times have encouraged our research pursuit.
We recognize a host of friends, including Minakshi, Dipanwita, Chetna
and Manjari, who were helpful in different stages. It is the persuasive
power of Sagarika Ghosh and her team at Palgrave which resulted in this
work reaching its logical conclusion.
Above all, the work could not have been completed without the uncon-
ditional love and support of our families and the dedication to work we
inherited from our parents.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
ix
Professor M. S. Agwani, the doyen of the Middle Eastern studies in the
country, has been our guru who passed away as the work was in progress
and we dedicate this volume to him with humility and gratitude.
As the ancient Indian scripture says, You are your friend and you are
your own enemy, all errors and omissions are ours. Ours alone.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The Nehru Era 11
3 Drifting Apart 33
4 Islamic Dimension 53
5 Pakistan Factor 83
6 Palestine Factor 109
7 The Shift 129
8 Transformation 149
9 Energy, Economics and Expatriates 169
10 International Factors 195
11 Challenges 215
xi
xii Contents
1. List of Indian Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia 223
2. Nehru-King Saud Joint Statement, 1956 225
3. Indo-Saudi Arabian Economic Cooperation Agreement,

1981 227
4. India-Saudi Joint Communiqué during the Visit of Indira

Gandhi to Saudi Arabia, 1982 229
5. Number of Haj Pilgrims from India, 1947–2017 237
6. Delhi Declaration, 2006 239
7. Riyadh Declaration, 2010 243
8. Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Official Visit of

Crown Prince, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence
Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to India, 2014 247
9. India-Saudi Arabia Joint Statement during the Visit of

Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia, 2016 251
References 259
Index 321
About the Authors
P. R. Kumaraswamy is Professor of Contemporary Middle East Studies

in Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. From 1992 to 1999
he was a research fellow at the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the
Advancement of Peace, Jerusalem. Since joining JNU in September 1999,
he has been researching, teaching and writing on various aspects of the
contemporary Middle East. His works include India’s Israel Policy (2010);
Historical Dictionary of the Arab Israeli Conflict (2015, second edition);
and Squaring the Circle: Mahatma Gandhi and the Jewish National Home
(2018). Prof. Kumaraswamy has edited many of volumes, and his research
articles have been published in a number of refereed and non-refereed
international journals. He regularly contributes to Indian as well as inter-
national media outlets. In February 2010 he set up the virtual Middle East
Institute, New Delhi (www.mei.org.in) and serves as its honorary director.
He is the editor of Contemporary Review of the Middle East and the series
editor of Persian Gulf: India’s Relations with the Region.
Md. Muddassir Quamar is an Associate Fellow in the Institute for
Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi. He holds a Ph.D. in Middle East
studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University. His doctoral thesis examined
social developments in Saudi Arabia between 1991 and 2010 within a
conceptual framework of Islamic modernism. Dr. Quamar’s areas of inter-
est include politics and societies in the Gulf, Middle East strategic affairs
and political Islam. His research papers have appeared in leading interna-
tional journals such as Contemporary Arab Affairs, Digest of Middle East
Studies, Journal of Arabian Studies and Journal of South Asian and Middle
xiii
xiv ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Eastern Studies. He has co-edited an anthology titled Contemporary

Persian Gulf: Essays in Honour of Gulshan Dietl, Prakash C. Jain and
Girijesh Pant, contributed chapters to edited volumes and regularly con-
tributes opinion articles on strategic developments in the Middle East and
India-Gulf relations. He was a visiting fellow in King Faisal Center for
Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh, and serves as associate editor of
Contemporary Review of the Middle East.
List of Figures
Fig. 9.1 India-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Trade. (Source: Directorate General

of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce & Industry,
Government of India and World Bank (https://wits.worldbank.
org/CountryProfile/en/IND))172
Fig. 9.2 Saudi Arabia’s position in India’s foreign trade. (Source:
Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce
& Industry, Government of India) 173
Fig. 9.3 Saudi share in India’s total foreign trade. (Source: Directorate
General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce & Industry,
Government of India) 173
Fig. 9.4 Saudi share in India’s total petroleum imports. (Source:
Fig. 9.5 Petroleum imports from Saudi Arabia in quantity. (Source:
xv
List of Tables
Table 9.1 India-Saudi Arabia bilateral trade (US$ million) 171

Table 9.2 India’s energy imports from Saudi Arabia (in US$ million) 177
Table 9.3 India’s crude oil imports (million tonnes) 178
Table 9.4 Import dependency for crude oil (in million tonnes) 180
Table 9.5 Share of energy in India’s foreign trade (in US$ million) 181
Table 9.6 Top five energy suppliers of India 182
Table 9.7 India’s energy-related exports to Saudi Arabia (in US$ million) 183
Table 9.8 Categorization of Saudi companies based on percentage of
Saudization under Nitaqat in wholesale and retail sector 187
xvii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Jaziratul Arab! This expression, literally meaning the Island of Arabia, has
been a common parlance in India for centuries. In that respect, the Arabian
Peninsula and Arabs have occupied a significant place in its psychology,
common sense and world-view long before the modern age. This is primar-
ily due to the strong historical linkages and cultural interactions between the
Indian subcontinent and Arabian Peninsula. Trade ties, land and maritime
forays, acquisition and dissemination of knowledge and spirituality were
some of the forces that brought the two land masses and their populations
closer and paved the way for the exchange of people, cultures, languages
and ideas. For example, Kalila wa Dimna, the most popular text for chil-
dren commonly used in the Arab world, is a translation of the ancient Indian
fable Panchatantra that travelled to the Peninsula through Arab and Persian
traders and travellers and eventually became integral to Arab folklore.
Similarly, the influence of Arab culture on southern coastal regions of
Malabar has been due to constant people-to-people contacts, and many
Arabic words and expressions are part of the common parlance in the local
vernaculars. Indeed, the expression ‘India’ is an Anglicized version of the
name that the Arabs gave to the lands beyond River Sindh, that is, Hind.
Some Arab authors also claim that India’s ancient name Bharat was also
given by the Arab traders and travellers who used to visit to the lands espe-
cially for trading spices, which in Arabic is called baharat (singular bahar).
Most interestingly, many traditional spice markets in the Arab world are
still known as souq al-hind or the Indian Market!
© The Author(s) 2019 1

P. R. Kumaraswamy, Md. M. Quamar, India’s Saudi Policy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_1
2 P. R. KUMARASWAMY AND MD. M. QUAMAR
Cultural and civilizational associations between India and Arabia

flourished primarily because of geographic proximity. The Deccan
Peninsula of India is separated from Arabia only by the Arabian Sea, thereby
making Arabia India’s maritime neighbourhood. In the pre-partition era,
the north-western part of India had land contacts with Arabia through Iran
and Mesopotamia, what is now known as Iraq. Hence, trade links between
the two flourished centuries before Christ.
These geo-historic interactions were strengthened with the advent of
Islam, and the new faith arrived on the Indian shores shortly after the
death of Prophet Mohammed. Since then the contacts between the two
transformed into cultural, religious and societal linkages, and under the
British they assumed strategic dimensions. Primarily to safeguard its com-
mercial interests in India and through the Suez Canal, Britain formulated
a policy towards the Persian Gulf which was administered and at times
shaped by its interests in India. British India having the largest concentra-
tion of Muslims added a religious dimension vis-à-vis Arabia.
The partition of the subcontinent and India’s independence in 1947
cut off direct land contacts with Arabia, and the formation of new king-
doms and sheikhdoms in the Arabian Peninsula changed the way India
and Arabia engaged. The political distancing between the two accompa-
nied the loss of geographical continuity. Driven by strong anti-imperial
and anti-colonial sentiments of the nationalist phase, independent India
and its leaders were not prepared to build on the British interests and
influence in the Gulf Arab countries. Due to their fragile domestic situa-
tions and regional threats, especially from the more powerful imperial
Iran, some of the Arab countries sought external support and patronage.
These, in turn, contributed to the psychological distance between India
and Arabia. The communal partition of the subcontinent resulted in the
former taking a negative view of religion-centric national identities. The
strong religious and traditional outlooks of the new Arab monarchies
radically differed from the modern, secular and multi-national state that
Jawaharlal Nehru and his colleagues were trying to develop. Indeed, as
will be discussed, during the Cold War the political gulf was significant and
profound than the Arabian Sea that separated India from Arabia.
The Arabian Peninsula, the land mass surrounded by the Persian Gulf,
Arabian Sea and the Red Sea, comprises of Oman, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) and Yemen in the east and south, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan
in the northwest, and Bahrain and Qatar in the eastern part protruding in
the Persian Gulf. The largest and thus far the most dominant country in
INTRODUCTION 3
the Arabian Peninsula and, according to some, the inheritor of Jaziratul

Arab, both in geographical and psychological sense, is the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia.
Thus, after the partition of the subcontinent, India and Saudi Arabia
emerged as the national inheritors of the two ancient neighbourhood
geographies and civilizations. Ideally, this should have enabled them to
maintain and consolidate their contacts towards evolving a strong political
partnership. Why did this not happen? Or what has been India’s policy
towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia?
Even though both the leaderships tried to continue historical links
through political contacts, they proved short-lived and insufficient.
A variety of factors were responsible for this, but the two most critical were
their different worldviews and the formation of a Muslim Pakistan.
Though the former during the Cold War could have been glossed over if
not ignored, both India and Saudi Arabia allowed the Pakistani factor to
dominate and in the process undermine their interests vis-à-vis one
another. Since independence, India looked at Saudi Arabia primarily
through the Pakistani prism and this lingered on until the end of the Cold
War. Despite intermittent political contacts, the ‘gulf’ between the two
could not be narrowed, let alone bridged. In a nutshell, the Kingdom
remained on the periphery of India’s overall approach towards the Middle
East. This has been the case during much of the Cold War era.
The disintegration of the USSR brought about an end to the Cold War,
resulting in fundamental structural changes in the global political order.
At that time, scholars termed the unfolding new era as ‘end of history’ or
the heralding of a ‘unipolar’ world dominated by the United States (US).
Though these prophecies proved misleading and wishful, the transforma-
tion of global politics was felt in all parts of the world. India was forced to
come to terms with the new US-dominated world and re-examine the
vintages of its past policies. Russia, the inheritor of the USSR, which for
much of the Cold War era, was India’s close friend, was weak and was
unable to help or influence other countries. Until then India relied on the
Cold War–centric non-alignment and built its reputation and influence by
extending support to underdogs and weaker parties to make its presence
felt. In so doing, it relied on the Soviet Union for nation-building proj-
ects, military capabilities and modernization. The sudden end of the Cold
War and the emergence of a weakened Russia meant that India had to
come to terms with the new world order dominated by the US.
These external changes could not have come at a worst time. The end
of the Cold War coincided with the domestic economic crisis. Despite
being the second most populous country after China, the Indian economy
remained small, heavily indebted and with a slower growth rate. Its mixed
economy model came to symbolize the inefficiency of the socialism and
exploitative nature of capitalism. The Kuwait crisis was a further burden as
it forced India to evacuate over 150,000 of its citizens from the emirate
and the additional financial loss in the form of stoppage of remittances.
These cut into India’s ability to import essential items.
Under such circumstances, the government headed by Prime Minister
P. V. Narasimha Rao decided to adopt a policy of gradual economic open-
ing and its integration with the global economy. The path chosen was to
allow privatization and reduce government control over economy and
trade. Along with the economic reform measures, Rao also recognized the
need to reorient the foreign policy both to ensure the success of the
economic reforms and to reclaim India’s position in the global politics.
The sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union also exposed the fallacy of
military might without a firm economic basis. Hence, the economic
reforms and political reorientation had to go hand in hand and their
successes were inter-dependent and closely linked. Indeed, the weakening
of India’s international influence, especially after the Sino-Indian conflict
of 1962, was due to its weak economic power.
At the foreign policy level, the post–Cold War Indian approach changed
and shed its ideological hesitation and sought friendly relations with all
major powers of the world. It strove for better relations with the US,
Western Europe, Australia, Japan and other First World countries without
abandoning its traditional constituencies in the Third World. It felt the
need to befriend not only Russia but also the newly independent former
republics of the USSR. The economic ascendance of China meant India
would have to find ways of benefitting from the former’s economic prog-
ress without undermining its interest.
This approach was more palpable in the Middle East. Both to recognize
the Arab willingness to pursue a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli
conflict and to signal a break from the past, in January 1992 India normal-
ized relations with Israel. Ending the four-decade-old recognition-
without-relations indicated New Delhi’s willingness to come to terms with
the end of the Cold War.
The shift also became necessary vis-à-vis Iran as well as oil-rich Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) states. The economic reforms grew the
INTRODUCTION 5
appetite for energy resources as the domestic resources could not cope
with the galloping hydrocarbon requirements. Until then India managed
its energy needs mainly through local production and relying on a mixed
basket of sources such as coal, wood and other traditional means. This was
no longer feasible with the pace of its economic growth, and the need for
stable sources of energy resulted in the Gulf Arab countries, which are
geographically closer and oil-rich, becoming a key player in its calcula-
tions. For their part, the Gulf countries were also looking for a stable
markets, primarily due to stagnation in their traditional markets in the
West, and began seeing India as a natural destination.
Until the 1990s, due to the weak economic basis, India’s approach
towards Arabia was marked by political rhetoric and its leaders often flagged
the absence of relations with Israel as a sign of their commitments to the
Arabs. Though it was in continuation of the anti-imperial and anti-colonial
phase of the nationalist struggle, this indicated the absence of any political
influence or interest convergence between India and the Gulf. The economic
reforms and exponential expansion of energy demands provided a much-
needed but long absent economic wherewithal to the bilateral relations.
It is mostly within this emerging context one could understand and
explain the transformation of India’s policy towards the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, which has the largest known oil reserves in the world and has been
the largest oil producer and exporter since the 1970s. Because of their
size, energy resources and relative internal resilience, the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged as the core compo-
nent of India’s new approach towards the Gulf. Though it procures the
bulk of its oil from other countries such as Iraq, Kuwait and the UAE and
gas from Qatar, India’s Middle East policy has been dominated by Saudi
Arabia and Iran.
Reforms and resultant economic growth also contributed to India’s
power aspirations and led to it seeking a strategic partnership with Gulf
Arab countries. Due to its size, location, religious importance, regional
influence and global standing, Saudi Arabia emerged central to India’s
interests in the Gulf. The Kingdom having over three million expatriate
labourers—the largest concentration of people of Indian origin outside the
country—was also important. For its part, Saudi Arabia also began looking
at India beyond the traditional prisms of being an underdeveloped econ-
omy. The September 11 terror attacks and the resultant backlash against
the Kingdom as well as Islam resulted in Riyadh adopting a Look East
policy, which had economic and strategic dimensions beneficial to India.
These paved the way for an interest convergence, and for the first time
since 1947, India and Saudi Arabia began learning to sidestep, if not
ignore, the persistent irritant that prevented them from developing closer
ties, namely, the Pakistan factor. While this was critical to the improvement
in relations, another contributing factor has been India’s growing confi-
dence. In some ways, the nuclear tests in May 1998 were a defining
moment. Though the US and its allies imposed punitive measures, India
withstood these sanctions and registered a continuous economic growth
since the early 1990s. These, in turn compelled the West, especially the
US, to come to terms with India’s growth story and in the process led to
greater regional and international engagements with New Delhi. They, in
turn, elicited a favourable response from countries like Saudi Arabia.
A politically confident and economically growing India found a willing
partner in Saudi Arabia. For long there were hesitations on both sides due
to past indifference. The visits of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the
Kingdom in 1982 and of Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal in
1981 proved insufficient to break the shackles of uncertainties and mutual
suspicions and misgivings. With hindsight, one could argue that a real
breakthrough happened in January 2001 when External Affairs Minister
Jaswant Singh visited the Kingdom. This was the first foreign minister–
level visit, also indicating the prolonged Indian apathy. Singh’s visit paved
the way for furthering the bilateral relations and shed past hesitations over
Pakistan in reaching out to the Kingdom. Even though there were
exchanges of business and trade delegations, Singh’s visit contributed to
the transformation of Indo-Saudi, and since 2001 there have been three
state visits between the two countries, including the visit of King Abdullah
to India in January 2006.
The fewer political contacts during the Cold War were accompanied by
two factors which maintained the flourishing of people-to-people con-
tacts, namely, haj and expatriate workers. The annual pilgrimage began
with the advent of Islam and the faithful assemblage of the largest congre-
gation of humanity in Mecca—the heart of Arabia—where Prophet
Mohammed was born and where he began preaching the new faith. The
Indian Muslim participation in the annual pilgrimage has always been sub-
stantial, and during the British Raj many Muslim ruling Nawabs, princes
and wealthy philanthropists generously contributed to the upkeep of the
Ka’aba and in the process earned respect and admiration of Arabs and
other Muslims.
INTRODUCTION 7
Though the records of these princes and Nawabs performing haj have
been scant, the tradition of sending family members, mainly elderly
women, along with emissaries, to Arabia has been recorded in many medi-
eval Indian texts. Many Mughal noblemen who lost favour with the rulers
and were no longer required were sent on ‘goodwill’ haj pilgrimage,
mostly never to return home given the dangerous journey. After indepen-
dence, the number of haj pilgrims persisted and with the advent of mod-
ern amenities and ease of travel, the number continued to increase. Hence,
during times of limited political interests or contacts, haj was a significant
avenue for maintaining bilateral connections between the two peoples.
The second non-official component has been the expatriate labourers.
India has a history of sending migrants to the Gulf, and even in the early
1930s when oil was discovered in the Gulf, some Indian migrants were
engaged in businesses around the nascent oil industry. This is true for the
eastern Saudi city of Dammam, where the oil industry is based at. The oil
boom of the early 1970s opened the floodgates and led to the continuous
flow of Indian workers to the Kingdom. This has not been impeded by
low political contacts and limited interest convergence during the Cold
War. India’s economic liberalization and developing energy trade were
accompanied by growing migration to the Gulf, and currently, there are
over three million Indians who are gainfully employed in the Kingdom.
These were compounded by increasing oil imports from the Kingdom
which enhanced bilateral trade.
Thus, there is a perceptible change in the importance of Saudi Arabia in
India’s foreign policy. Besides energy and expatriate components, the
Kingdom assumed political importance and both sides began exploring
other areas such as human resource development, IT, cultural ties and
above all military-security cooperation. The dilution of the Pakistan factor
enabled both countries to see collaboration in areas such as maritime secu-
rity and combating sea piracy, organized crimes, terror financing and intel-
ligence sharing. The willingness of both the countries to contain the
negative impact of the Pakistani factor resulted in the Kingdom extradit-
ing or deporting criminals wanted by India, including Fasih Mohammed
and Zabiuddin Ansari, both accused in the November 2008 Mumbai ter-
ror attack.
Since 2001 there were regular and high-level political visits between the
two. These include one royal visit by Abdullah in January 2006; two visits
by Salman (as Governor of Riyadh in April 2010 and as Crown Prince in
February 2014); two prime ministerial visits from India in February–

March 2010 and April 2016; visits by Saudi foreign minister in March
2016 and by Indian external affairs ministers in May 2013 and February
2018. Besides, oil ministers from both the countries have been visiting
one another or meeting in international forums. Moreover, the Kingdom
also hosted Human Resources Minister Arjun Singh (May 2006) and
Defence Minister A. K. Antony (February 2012), and their National
Security Advisors have been exchanging views at regular intervals. Above
all, there is a greater realization in both the countries that bilateral rela-
tions have to go beyond transactional ties towards capitalizing on the
inherent advantages of the other. These are reflected in a growing Saudi
willingness to accommodate India’s interests and concerns; the Saudi con-
demnation of Pakistan-sponsored terror attack in Uri in September 2016
and the permission granted to Air India to fly to Israel over its airspace
can be cited as an examples of Saudi flexibility towards India.
This book seeks to capture India’s Saudi policy since its independence
and analyses the trajectory of its approach towards the Kingdom. It argues
that its geopolitical outlook and foreign policy approach based on the
Cold War dynamics and the Pakistani factor prevented India from looking
at the Kingdom as a potential friend. Despite the immense possibilities
due to socio-cultural and geo-historic advantages, New Delhi could not
capitalize on the strengths primarily due to its concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan.
The gulf created due to the Indian perceptions was further strengthened
by the partisan Saudi approach over Pakistan and its desire to look at the
South Asian matrix through Pakistani prism. In short, the Pakistan factor
became a millstone around their necks and prevented any meaningful
political understanding and cooperation.
The transformation had to wait until the end of the Cold War and sig-
nificant shifts in the Indian approach towards the outside world and its
willingness to seek international influence through strength. Domestic
growth enabled India to change its view of the outside world and leverage
its influence. These, in turn, resulted in India de-hyphenating Pakistan
from its engagements with the outside world. The delink also freed Riyadh
from its traditional approach towards the subcontinent.
Why policy, not relations? The transformation of the bilateral ties, more
visible since the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is largely due
to shifts in Indian understanding of and approach towards Saudi Arabia.
The initiatives largely rested on India and its ability to understand that the
INTRODUCTION 9
basic Saudi affinity for Pakistan was primarily due to religious considerations.
Rather than demanding the outside world to choose between the two
South Asian neighbours, India recognized the wider international com-
pulsions and opted to delink Pakistan and this was more visible vis-à-vis
Saudi Arabia. Once the Pakistani factor was off the table, the Kingdom
was more receptive towards India, its challenges and opportunities. This
pattern can be noticed in much of India’s engagements with major powers
of the world. Hence, the transformation of Indian policy and the reciproc-
ity from the other side resulted in the Kingdom emerging as a key player
in India’s Middle East policy.
The volume treats the subject in four broad segments. The first one
provided the general overview of the relations since 1947 and the second
one deals with the role of Islam, Pakistan and Palestine in shaping India’s
Saudi policy. The third part deals with the shift in Indian policy and the
resultant transformation both in political and economic terms. And the
last section focuses on the role of international players and challenges fac-
ing the bilateral relations.
During his visit to India in 2006, King Abdullah observed that Saudi
Arabia sees ‘Pakistan as a brother and India a friend.’ However strong, the
former is given while the latter is a choice; ancient Indian epics are replete
with examples of friends being more dependable and enduring than blood
relatives. Over to the Volume.
CHAPTER 2
The Nehru Era
More than any other leader, Jawaharlal Nehru had a profound and lasting
impact upon India’s policy towards the outside world. His imprints on
foreign policy can be traced to the freedom struggle, and as Jayantanuja
Bandyopadhyaya observed, since the 42nd annual session of the party held
in Madras (now Chennai) in December 1927, Nehru became the “recog-
nized spokesman of the Congress on foreign affairs.” Indeed, with the for-
mation of the Foreign Department of the party in 1925, “practically every
resolution of the Congress on foreign affairs was inspired, drafted and
piloted by Nehru” (Bandyopadhyaya 1984, 286). Nehru’s influence and
domination became overwhelming after India’s independence and he con-
currently held the foreign ministry until his death in May 1964. As prime
minister cum external affairs minister, he defined not only the direction of
India’s engagements with the outside world but also its priorities.
At the time of partition of the subcontinent, India had a colonial-
diplomatic legacy, especially in the Middle East. Since the early nineteenth
century, the British policy towards the Persian Gulf was primarily directed
from India, first from Calcutta and later on from Bombay when Delhi
became the British capital in December 1911. Many elites of the future
Gulf Arab sheikdoms were educated in India or had spent a considerable
amount of time in the Western shores of the country for holiday or busi-
ness (Onley 2007), and the Indian rupee remained the legal tender in
some of these countries until the early 1960s. Above all, Indian soldiers

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_2
played a crucial part in the British campaign in the First World War, espe-
cially in the Gallipoli and Palestine campaigns. Due to imperial interests,
the British had a few missions that Nehru inherited. For example, a resi-
dent mission in Jeddah was functioning for the welfare of the Indian haj
pilgrims.
At the same time, India was not inclined to capitalize on the British
interests in the region. Driven by his anti-colonial and anti-imperialist
worldview, Nehru detested the British possessions and spheres of influence
and sought a policy that was different from and even opposed to the Raj.
At the time of independence, India had resident missions in Cairo, Tehran
and Istanbul (India, MEA 1949, 1–2) in addition to the Vice Consul in
the British Embassy in Jeddah for haj. In short, the only Indian mission in
the entire Arab world was located in the Egyptian capital. Budgetary con-
sideration and shortage of personnel inhibited New Delhi from immedi-
ately opening new missions in other parts of the region (ibid.).
This was despite India’s prolonged contacts with Islam, the predomi-
nant religion of the Middle East. The Arab merchants were trading with
India even before the birth of the new faith. Islam came to the Indian
shores shortly after the death of Prophet Mohammed. For centuries Indian
pilgrims made up a large number of hajis and their traders were active in
Jeddah, a major port city en route to Mecca. Rulers of princely states and
wealthy business communities were engaged in various philanthropic activ-
ities and contributed to the upkeep of the Grand Mosque of Mecca which
houses Ka’aba (Khalidi 2009, 55; Azaryahu and Reiter 2015, 33). Indeed,
in the pre-oil era the Saudi state thrived not only on annual British financial
assistance (Leatherdale 1983) but also from indirect support through
donations for the upkeep of Ka’aba and the businesses generated by haj-
related activities.
Despite these religious, commercial and colonial legacies, there were
little contacts between the Indian nationalists and the leaders of the nascent
Saudi state which began with the conquest of Riyadh in 1902. The politi-
cal, economic and military support from the British facilitated the Saudi
conquest of the Hejaz region, including Mecca and Medina, from the
Hashemites in the 1920s. This dependency upon the British partly resulted
in al-Saud not looking at the Indian nationalists as their natural allies.
As happened to the Zionists around the same time, any overt support for
the Indian nationalists and their struggle for freedom would have alien-
ated the al-Saud from the British and undermined their state-building
THE NEHRU ERA 13
process. Hence, they were not enamoured by Nehru’s anti-colonial and

anti-imperial legacy (Agwani 1992) and there was little interest conver-
gence between the Indian nationalist movement and the al-Saud.
This was in contrast to the contacts between the Egyptian (Sawant and
Rizvi 1980) and Palestinian nationalists (Agwani 1971; Abu-Laghod
1991) and their Indian counterparts. Interestingly some of the political
contacts between the Indian leaders, especially the Ali Brothers who led
the Khilafat Movement in the early 1920s, and Arab-Palestinian leaders
took place on the Saudi territory during the haj (Kumaraswamy 2010,
61) but there was little interaction between the Indian nationalists and
the Saudi leadership.
On the eve of India’s independence, Nehru hosted the Arab Relations
Conference in Delhi in March–April 1947 and from the Middle East del-
egates from Egypt, Iran, Turkey and the Arab League were present and
indeed a ten-member Jewish delegation from Palestine took part in the
meeting, seen as the forerunner of future Afro-Asian solidarity and Non-
aligned Movement (NAM). Saudi Arabia, which was formed in 1932, was
conspicuous by its absence (Asian Relations Organization 1948, 264–79).
One might even say that in terms of political contacts and diplomatic rela-
tions, Nehru had an empty slate vis-à-vis the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
when he became prime minister of India in 1947.
Framing the Priorities
Prime Minister Nehru was confronted with the challenge of nation-building
of a country of enormous religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and ideo-
logical diversities. The post-partition riots in which about a million people
were killed (Moon 1962) meant that inter-communal harmony acquired
paramount importance. This could only be achieved through an inclusive
India that recognizes and accepts its socio-cultural diversities and fault
lines. Incorporating over 500 notionally independent princely states into
the Indian union had to be accomplished through political accommoda-
tion and foresight. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who served as Home
Minister during August 1947 and until his death in December 1950,
was credited for the integration of these princely states into the union
(Ahluwalia 1974).
At the same, the developmental agenda was herculean and was under-
mined by the Cold War. Beginning in the post-War Europe, the power
struggle soon engulfed different parts of the world. Even before independence,
the Indian nationalists eschewed great power rivalry, and during the
Second World War, for example, the mainstream nationalists even refused
to seek the help of imperial Japan in their fight against the British (Basu
et al. 1999; Puri 1977).
To quarantine India from the Euro-centric bloc politics, Nehru con-
sciously sought to steer the non-aligned path. Far from being neutrality as
practiced by countries such as Switzerland, Nehru’s non-alignment did
not imply merely the rejection of military alliances but a nuanced response
to the power struggle between the US and USSR. Though appreciative of
the US and its liberal democracy, Nehru was opposed to Washington’s
strategy of containment of communism through military blocs and alli-
ances (Gopal 1991). On the contrary, he sought to bring in the newly
independent and decolonized countries under the umbrella of Afro-Asian
solidarity to ward off colonialism, external interference and domination.
The Western response to Nehru’s non-alignment was anything but
sympathetic (McMahon 1996). Preoccupied with the East-West tension
in Europe and the Korean crisis, the US adopted a narrower view personi-
fied by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. In his address to Iowa State
College on 9 June 1955, he declared “neutrality has increasingly become
an obsolete and except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an
immoral and short-sighted conception” (The New York Times 1959). This
if-you-are-not-with-me-then-you-are-against-me approach largely ended
India’s hopes of an enduring partnership with the US based on mutual
respect and understanding and resulted in Nehru gravitating towards
Moscow. This was concretized during the month-long visit of Nikita
Khrushchev and Nicholai Bulganin in late 1955 and paved the way for a
greater Soviet role in India’s developmental agenda (Singh 1989) and
military modernization (Conley 2001). This process eventually culmi-
nated in greater foreign policy convergences, with India emerging as a
significant partner, if not an ally of the USSR, on major international cri-
ses such as Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1966), global disarmament
debates and above all non-aligned foreign policy.
In the process, Saudi Arabia became an unintended casualty of India’s
approach towards the Cold War and was adversely affected by its priorities.
Despite the century-old religious, cultural and commercial exchanges and
contacts, India’s engagements with modern-day Saudi Arabia have been
influenced by the regional upheavals over which both the countries
adopted different and even diametrically opposite stands.
THE NEHRU ERA 15
Different Worldviews
Nehru’s worldview was shaped by India’s colonial experience. When India
joined the UN as its founding member in 1945, the world body had 51
members and it rose to 115 when Nehru passed away in 1964. Hence,
fighting colonialism had dominated Nehru’s thinking. Like India, much
of the Arab world suffered from European colonialism, which left a deep
and lasting impact upon their nation-building process. The shared anti-
colonial experience resulted in many Arab nationalist leaders and societies
seeking to befriend the Indian nationalists during the inter-war period and
sought political support in their anti-colonial struggle. Since the early
1920s, the Congress party, for example, sympathized with anti-colonial
sentiments of the region. As the doyen of the Middle Eastern studies in
the country observed, “While the nationalist movement in India sympa-
thized with the nationalist aspirations of the Arabs, the latter realized that
their own emancipation was tied up with the outcome of the Indian strug-
gle” (Agwani 1976, 63). In continuation of this process, Nehru sought to
forge closer ties with the countries of Asia and Africa and organized the
Asian Relations Conference (Asian Relations Organization 1948), weeks
before India’s independence and played a pivotal role in the first Afro-
Asian conference in Bandung in April 1955 (Appadorai 1955).
Wedded to socialism since his youth (Nehru 1964), the first prime min-
ister was not enamoured by the Arab monarchies and their feudal approach
towards nation building and social transformation (Mudiam 1994, 202–3)
As he was trying to bring about social changes within the country through
state-centric economic reforms and modernization, he was looking for allies
elsewhere. Though the newly established State of Israel was committed to
democracy, socialism and liberal values, Nehru viewed Zionism as an
“agent” of British imperialism and adopted a policy of recognition-without-
relations towards it (Kumaraswamy 2010).
Moreover, the ideological differences and competition with Pakistan
resulted in Nehru espousing secularism as an article of faith both within
and outside the country. He needed secular-national leaderships which
were committed being free from the European domination and with lesser
emphasis on conservatism rooted in religion (Balasubramanian 1980).
His close and enduring political ties with U Nu of Burma (now Myanmar),
Sukarno of Indonesia and Josip Broz Tito of the then Yugoslavia had to
be seen within their anti-colonial and secular worldviews.
Nehru’s search for similar non-aligned, socialist and secular leadership in

the Middle East left him with limited options. If the secular Turkish repub-
lic became a NATO member (Leffler 1985), the imperial Iran relied heavily
on the US to keep the Shah in power (Summitt 2004; McGlinchey 2013).
Amidst the Korean crisis, Israel abandoned its policy of non-identification
and was moving closer to the Western camp. Above all, much of the Arab
world was monarchical, feudal or both.
Under such circumstances, Nehru found an ally in the Free Officers
Movement which overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in July 1952. The
emergence of Gamal Abdul Nasser brought hopes for a secular and social-
ist leadership in the region and Nehru got attracted towards the new
Egypt. Ever since their first meeting in February 1953 in Cairo, he treated
Nasser more like a disciple and their camaraderie continued until Nehru’s
death. The Indian prime minister took Nasser with him to the Bandung
conference and introduced him to other leaders, including Chinese Prime
Minister Zhou Enlai. He often made Cairo his transit point during his
visits to Europe and the US and this increased the frequency of Nehru-
Nasser meetings.
Reflecting on this situation Onkar Marwah observed that due to “its
status in the Arab world—and also for its geostrategic location—Egypt
was an obvious choice for Indian attention, especially at a time when sev-
eral Arab countries were being persuaded to enter into military alliance by
the West” (Marwah 1973, 22). Nehru’s support for Nasser became more
pronounced during the Suez War when he unequivocally endorsed the
Egyptian sovereign rights to nationalize the Suez Canal. The move came
just days after both the leaders met in Brijuni (then known as Brioni),
Yugoslavia, on 19 July but as Nehru informed the Lok Sabha, he was not
privy to Nasser’s move (Nehru 1956).
At the time of the Suez crisis, India was one of the prime users of the
Suez Canal and as he was seeking an amicable political solution, the tripar-
tite aggression angered Nehru (Mudiam 1994, 54–55). More than the
Israeli aggression against its neighbour, he was infuriated by David Ben-
Gurion’s decision to collaborate with the British and French imperialism.
Hence, a couple of weeks after the Israeli invasion, he told the Indian
parliament that “in view of the existing passion” diplomatic exchanges
with Israel was not possible (Lok Sabha 1956, 595) and subsequently
time-is-not-ripe became the standard Indian position vis-à-vis Israel until
the normalization of relations in January 1992.
THE NEHRU ERA 17
Arab Cold War and Regional Politics

While Nehru refrained from joining hands with Nasser in the inter-Arab
tension and rivalry (Agwani 1976), India’s wider Middle East policy grad-
ually became Cairo-centric. Until the mid-1950s, its ambassador in Cairo
was concurrently accredited to Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. This arrange-
ment due to financial constraints had policy ramifications as Egyptian per-
ceptions vis-à-vis these countries significantly coloured Nehru’s approach
towards them. This was more pronounced on the Arab-Israeli conflict but
less vis-à-vis other countries; for example, during the Yemeni civil war
(1962–70) Saudi Arabia and Egypt were supporting rival Yemeni groups
and the situation was worsened by Nasser’s call for rooting out the conser-
vative monarchies from the Arab lands.
Nehru’s open support to Egypt and personal friendship with Nasser
based on non-alignment came to be viewed by Saudi Arabia and others as an
endorsement of Nasser’s threats against Arab monarchies and considerably
affected India’s fortunes, especially vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. As some observed,
“The close tie with Cairo seemed to hamper New Delhi’s interest in
cultivating other West Asian states more actively” (Heimsath and Mansingh
1971, 291). This approach “was taken amiss by many an Arab state which
otherwise swore by Arab unity and neutralism” (Agwani 1976, 72).
The pan-Arabism advocated by Nasser attracted both fellow Arab lead-
ers and Arab masses. Internal upheavals in Syria and Iraq and the consoli-
dation of Ba’athist regimes in both the countries and later-day overthrowing
of the monarchy in Libya in September 1969 were partly influenced by
Nasserism (Ajami 1974; Omar 1992). The Egyptian leader also enjoyed
considerable popular admiration and support in Arab monarchies such as
Jordan and Saudi Arabia. His regional sway expanded considerably after
the Suez crisis of 1956, when Israel sought to “limit” Nasser’s growing
status in the region (Tal 1996).
For a brief period, the al-Sauds were also favourably disposed towards
Egypt and Nasser. Saud who ascended to the throne in November 1953,
upon the death of his father and founder King Ibn-Saud, toyed with the
idea of aligning with pan-Arabism floated by Nasser (Cordesman 2003,
107; Bronson 2006, 69). During his visit to the Kingdom in September
1956, President Nasser received a hero’s welcome, especially in the newly
industrializing town of Dammam in the Eastern Province. Earlier Saudi
Arabia had taken part in the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in April
1955. Israel’s exclusion following an explicit boycott threat from the
Arab League resulted in a broader Middle Eastern representation, with

participation from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria,
Sudan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Kahin 1956). Above all, the Kingdom
was also a founding member of the NAM and attended the first summit
meeting hosted by President Tito in Belgrade in September 1961.
More substantially, Riyadh was opposed to the US-led military alliances
in the Middle East aimed at encircling and containing the USSR. The
Egyptian leader strongly argued that the military bloc would pave the way
for the return of colonialism and in his view, the newly established State of
Israel was a far greater threat and challenge to the Middle East than the
Soviet Union (Podeh 1995). This partly led to the Czech deal announced
in September 1955 whereby Nasser concluded the largest military transfer
of that time with the eastern bloc countries (Muehlenbeck 2016, 94).
The Saudi position towards bloc politics was not different from Nehru’s.
The then monarchical Iraq under the Hashemites was a prominent mem-
ber of the bloc and until the Ba’athist coup in July 1958, the organization
was known as the Baghdad Pact. Al-Saud was apprehensive that Iraq
would seek and, with the American backing, even secure the leadership of
the Arab world (Podeh 1995). There was an historic baggage. In the early
1920, Ibn-Saud defeated Sharif Hussein of Mecca—the father of King
Faisal II of Iraq and King Abdullah I of Jordan—to establish the modern
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Teitelbaum 2001). Hence, when Pakistan
joined the CENTO, the Saudi embassy in that country “took the unusual
step of issuing a press handout containing the text of the Radio Mecca
broadcast which exhorted Pakistan to withdraw from the Pact and ‘return
to the right path’” (Agwani 1976, 72).
The Saudi-Egyptian bonhomie and interest convergence over CENTO
did not last long. Since the mid-1950s, Nasser was moving closer to the
USSR with whom the Kingdom had severe differences, if not problems. In
1926, the Marxist USSR became the first country to recognize the
Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd, the precursor to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, but the Saudi-Soviet relations were anything but cordial, primarily
because of the attitude of the “Godless Communists” towards the Muslims
of USSR (Yodfat 1983; Rubinstein 1979). Only a handful and select
Muslims were allowed to go to Saudi Arabia for the annual haj pilgrimage,
and it was only after President Mikhail Gorbachev introduced glasnost in
the late 1980s, one could witness a large number of Soviet hajis (Kane
2015). Thus, Nasser’s growing proximity with Moscow unnerved the
THE NEHRU ERA 19
a l-Sauds, who were afraid of the Soviet intentions vis-à-vis the Arab world.
In the 1980s, this manifested in resolute Saudi opposition to the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and its decision to prop up, support and arm the
Afghan mujahedeen (Riedel 2014).
The al-Sauds faced the most ominous form of Nasserism in the next-
door Yemen when Egypt decided to support the republican regime of
Marshal Sallal against the forces loyal to the Imamate supported by Saudi
Arabia.1 Far from being an ideological opponent, Egypt became a secu-
rity threat as the al-Sauds have been seeing Yemen as their backwaters, if
not as the southern frontiers of Saudi Arabia (Orkaby 2017). At the
height of the Yemen Civil war (1962–70), about 70,000 Egyptian sol-
diers were fighting on behalf of the Yemen Arab Republic against the
Riyadh-backed Zaidi Imamate. Egyptian officers were also training the
army of Abdullah al-Sallal. On a few occasions, the Egyptian air force
bombed the southern Saudi town of Najran close to the Saudi-Yemeni
borders. The Egyptian involvement in Yemen ended only after the Arab
debacle in the June War of 1967, and in return, oil-rich Arab countries
agreed to provide Egypt with an annual help to the tune of US$266 mil-
lion, out of which US$154 million would come from the Kingdom
(Dawisha 1983; Sela 2002, 158–60).
Above all, willy-nilly Egypt was dragged into the power struggle within
the ruling Saudi family in the later years of King Saud’s reign. The regional
popularity of Nasserism and the overthrowing of the monarchy in Iraq had
their repercussions in the Arabian Peninsula. Some members of the al-
Saud toyed with the idea of republicanism, and under the slogan of “Free
Princes Movement” they called for reforms and even an end to the monar-
chical rule (Niblock 2006, 110; Al-Rasheed 2002, 106–10). There were
fears that Egypt, which was already active in Yemen, might direct and even
1
The civil war started after a coup d’état led by Abdullah Sallal who at the time was a
colonel in the Yemeni Army against the newly ascended Imam of the Rassidi dynasty, Imam
Muhammad al-Badr. Saudi Arabia, which had earlier fought a war with the Yemeni Imamate
to take over Najran, Asir and Jizan in 1926, along with Jordan extended support to the
Imamate fearing Egyptian and Soviet plot to throw out the monarchies from Arabian
Peninsula. The Zaidi Imamate in North Yemen was continuing since it was established in
897 AD by one of the descendants of Hasan son of Ali, the nephew and son-in-law of the
prophet and the fourth pious caliph. The Imamate had since then continued among the
Zaidi Sayyids of the Rassidi dynasty and Muhammad al-Badr proved to be the last Zaidi
Imam to rule north Yemen. See Witty 2001; Halliday 1984.
get involved in a regime change in the Kingdom (Gerges 1995). King

Saud’s preference for lineal succession only complicated the matters and
power struggle ended with the forced abdication of King Saud in November
1964 in favour of his half-brother Faisal.
Thus, since the late 1950s the Saudi-Egyptian differences pulled them
in opposite directions and their simmering differences manifested in their
differing worldview and regional political order. The pan-Arabism under
Nasser evoked considerable anxiety in Arab monarchies over their long-
term stability. The overthrowing of the Hashemites in Iraq, periodic ten-
sion and assassination attempts in Jordan (Dann 1989, 78–103) and
anti-monarchical rhetoric in the state-controlled Egyptian media (Hudson
1970) unnerved many Arab rulers (Kerr 1965). The political union
between Egypt and Syria—United Arab Republic—during 1958–61 and
the Egyptian desire to influence, if not control, events in Sudan (Lefebvre
1993) and Yemen (Dawisha 1975) raised doubts about Nasser’s long-
term strategy vis-à-vis Arab monarchies. As subsequent events proved, in
trying to fast-forward the nation-building process in the Arab world, the
pan-Arabism sought to impose a supra-regional identity when the post-
Ottoman Arab states were still struggling to evolve distinct territory-based
national identities.
The ideological tussle between republican regimes led by Nasser and
monarchies championed by Saudi Arabia assumed importance in the
wake of the Arab Cold War and growing political struggle between Cairo
and Riyadh for leadership. Despite his serious differences and discords
with rulers in Baghdad and Damascus, Nasser emerged as the principal
champion and leader of pan-Arabism. As a counter measure, some Arab
monarchies sought to forge a common cause based on religion. Ummah
or the community of believers has a stronger historic-theological basis
and pan-Islamism has a greater resonance and acceptance in the Middle
East than the alien and non-Islamic concept of watan or nationalism
based on territorial identity. The former does not recognize the territo-
rial boundaries while the latter was forced to come to terms with the
post-Ottoman Middle Eastern cartography designed and executed by
the colonial powers. Above all, the abolition of the caliphate by Ataturk
in 1924 witnessed some Arab rulers and communities trying to revive
the pan-Islamic institution under their respective leadership (Dawn
1960; Al-Rasheed et al. 2015).
Thus, both to counter Nasser and to secure legitimacy, some Arab
countries found pan-Islamism as a more attractive counter strategy; for
example, the rulers of Jordan and Morocco trace their lineage to the
THE NEHRU ERA 21
Quresh tribe, to which Prophet Mohammed belonged. In the Saudi case,

the politico-ideological marriage between the Wahhabi brand of Islam and
al-Saud family forms the basis of the modern Saudi state. Even the Shah of
Iran, who was often criticized by Egypt for his dependence upon the West,
felt threatened by Nasserism (Singh 1977). These countries who were try-
ing to forge an Islamic bloc as a counter to Nasser’s pan-Arabism were
often joined by Pakistan (Khan 2003).
At the same time, until the mid-1960s pan-Islamism remained a minor
force in the region. The pre-eminence of Nasser, wider sentiments against
imperialism, secular nature of various anti-colonial movements and wide-
spread appeal of socialism prevented pan-Islamism from emerging as a
powerful alternative. However, the pan-Arabism met its waterloo in the
June War when Israel resoundingly defeated the armies of Egypt, Jordan
and Syria. Though Nasser remained president until his death in September
1970, the secular Arab nationalism gave way to pan-Islamism driven by
Saudi Arabia. The World Muslim League formed by King Saud in 1962
took a more potent force in the Middle Eastern politics.
The unpopularity of pan-Arabism in Arab monarchies, the latter’s pref-
erence for pan-Islamism and the al-Saud-Nasser tensions over domestic
and regional developments meant that Nehru was seen in Riyadh as a
friend of the enemy than as a friend. This was compounded by the Pakistani
factor and had adverse consequences for the Indo-Saudi relations.
Writing in December 1950, an Israeli diplomat posted in Ankara
described Pakistan as India’s “centre of gravity” (Kumaraswamy 2010,
170). While Pakistan has been occupying an important place in India’s
domestic debates and foreign policy calculations, the severity of this
aspects manifests in the Middle East. Its preoccupation with Pakistan has
hampered India’s ability to approach and engage with the Arab-Islamic
world. For long, New Delhi looked at the outside world only through the
Pakistani prism, which in turn made India a hostage to Islamabad. One is
not suggesting that Pakistan is unimportant, let alone irrelevant, in India’s
geostrategic calculations but an excessive focus has hindered its ability to
develop a productive relationship with other countries. This drawback was
more visible with regard to Saudi Arabia which has been traditionally sup-
portive of Pakistan (Choudhary 1974; Weinbaum and Khurram 2014;
Razvi 1981). As would be discussed in the later section of this volume, it
was only after India was able to delink Pakistan from its bilateral engage-
ments one could notice an exponential growth in Indo-Middle Eastern
and Indo-Saudi relations.
The centrality of Pakistan in India’s political, strategic and foreign

policy calculations can be traced to the early part of the twentieth century
when India was fighting British colonialism. The Indian National Congress
which was spearheading the struggle recognized the meagre participation
of the Muslim, the largest Muslim community in the world at that time, in
the national movement. The Government of India Act of 1858 and proc-
lamation of the British in 1877 formally ended the Mughal rule, the last
Muslim Empire in India but the Indian Muslims had misgivings about the
notionally inclusive but Hindu-dominated Congress party. They were
apprehensive that the post-British political order would result in a Hindu-
dominated India and for its part, the Congress recognized that it could
not legitimately claim to be ‘Indian’ and ‘national’ without the participa-
tion of Muslims.
This understanding resulted in the Congress party endorsing and
taking part in the Khilafat struggle (Qureshi 1978; Hasan 1981; Krishna
1968) when the Indian Muslims were rallying around the caliphate then
concurrently held by the Ottoman Sultan. Mahatma Gandhi saw the
pan-Islamic demand as an opportunity to bring the Muslim masses into
the anti-British struggle and in the process dragged the Congress Party
into the Khilafat cause (Kumaraswamy 2018, 69–89). The Hindu-Muslim
unity witnessed during the Khilafat phase was short-lived and the abolition
of caliph by Republican Turkey also ended the communal unity in India.
Soon some of the leading figures in the movement such as Ali Brothers
and Mohammed Iqbal drifted towards the Pakistani nationalism spear-
headed by the Muslim League.
This trend brought the simmering Congress-League differences into the
open. The former which visualized an inclusive India found itself competing
with the League’s aspirations for a separate Muslim homeland in the subcon-
tinent. Both found the Palestinian issue useful to exhibit their pro-Muslim
credentials domestically. In the wake of the partition of the subcontinent,
the Congress-League tussle became an Indo-Pakistan political contest and
was largely played out in the Middle East. In November 1947 both coun-
tries adopted a pro-Arab position and voted against the partition plan for
Palestine, but their logics were different; for India, it was a vote for Arab
secularism and for Pakistan, it was an affirmation of its Islamic solidarity. As
discussed in a subsequent chapter, the Indo-Pakistan rivalry became more
acute and intense in the wake of the Kashmir dispute and its referral to the
UN by Prime Minister Nehru. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that
THE NEHRU ERA 23
it was a strategic mistake on the part of Nehru and not only complicated
India’s diplomatic options but also limited its foreign policy choices in the
Middle East.
The Indian apprehensions over Pakistan’s moves were compounded by
the latter’s aspirations for an Islamic bloc that would further its interest in
the Middle East. This approach coincided with the Saudi desire for pan-
Islamic politics as a counter-weight to Nasser and his pan-Arabism. This
convergence proved a formidable combination against India, especially
after the formation of World Muslim League in 1962. As Pakistani official
Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, who was the Secretary-General of the OIC
during 1985–88, aptly observed: “The guidelines for Pakistan’s diplomacy
are derived from the Pakistan movement and the concomitant historic
commitment of the Muslims of South Asia to the achievement of the
collective interests of the entire Islamic ummah of which they regard
themselves as integral component” (Pirzada 1987).2
The formation of an Islamic bloc in the form of the OIC had to wait
until after the June War but Pakistan has been pushing its Islamic agenda
since the beginning. Towards this end, since 1947 Pakistan has hosted and
organized many pan-Islamic meetings, conferences and gatherings (Khan
2003). The Saudi domestic crisis over the Free Princes in 1960 and some
of them taking refuge in Cairo resulted in Riyadh looking to Pakistani
assistance in bolstering its security capabilities. Though the details are
sketchy, the roots of the Pakistani military presence in the Kingdom can be
traced to mid-1960s, even before the oil boom.
Moreover, the Pakistani leaders were more hostile towards Nasser and
his pan-Arabism than the al-Sauds. The Egyptian disapproval of and opposi-
tion to the CENTO of which Pakistan was a principal member infuriated
the latter. Pakistani leaders did not hide their glee at the military defeat suf-
fered by Nasser during the Suez War. In a private conservation with an
Israeli diplomat at an official reception hosted for visiting Prime Minister
Nehru in Canada, one Pakistani diplomat lamented that but for the British
and French intervention the Israeli army would and should have “gone right
through to Cairo” (Kumaraswamy 2000, 27). And as discussed elsewhere
2
Interestingly, even after the partition of the subcontinent and the formation of a separate
Muslim country in 1947, Pakistani leaders tended to speak ‘on behalf’ of the Indian Muslims.
This approach has largely contributed to continuing tension between the two neighbours. In
this 1987 statement, the official was also speaking ‘on behalf of Bangladesh’ which had sepa-
rated from Pakistan in 1971.
the Pakistani factor was more visibly manifested in India’s Israel policy and
inhibited New Delhi from normalizing relations with the Jewish State until
January 1992 (Kumaraswamy 2010).
In other words, conflicting worldviews, differing regional priorities and
the Egypt-Saudi and Indo-Pakistani tensions influenced and even decided
India’s approach towards the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. How did Nehru’s
India deal with Riyadh within the complex matrix of anti-colonialism,
Nasserism, pan-Arabism, opposition to Pakistan and pan-Islamism and the
nascent pro-Soviet orientation in India’s foreign policy?
Limited Engagements Under Nehru

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys a few advantages over many other
countries vis-à-vis India. It is geographically closer and has centuries of
socio-cultural and trade ties. Indian merchants dominated the haj-related
trade and commerce during the British rule and since the late nineteenth
century, the Vice Counsel in British Embassy in Jeddah was facilitating the
haj pilgrimage. During the British rule, India had the largest Muslim com-
munity in the world. Though the partition of the subcontinent took away
that status, a large number of Muslims opted to stay behind and contrib-
uted to India’s socio-cultural diversity. Hence, as the birthplace of Islam
and home to the two holiest places in Islam, Saudi Arabia has occupied a
prominent position in the Indian society and polity. Even an atheist like
Nehru could not ignore the Islamic dimension of the Kingdom, especially
when a large number of Indians perform haj. Indeed, as discussed else-
where, India’s recognition of Israel was partly delayed due to apprehen-
sions over possible Saudi restrictions upon haj.
At the same time, Riyadh was less active and attractive than others in
furthering Nehru’s principal foreign policy agenda such as anti-colonialism,
anti-imperialism and opposition to the perpetuation of external interfer-
ence. Due to domestic and regional challenges since the early 1960s, the
Kingdom was drifting away from Afro-Asian solidarity and forging closer
strategic ties with the West. While Nehru could not ignore the Saudi par-
ticipation in Bandung and Belgrade conferences and its opposition to
CENTO, the Pakistan factor added a sense of urgency in him trying to
minimize the fallouts of the Saudi-Pakistan cooperation.
In diplomatic terms, formal relations were established in 1948 and
embassies were opened in New Delhi and Jeddah in 1957. India was one
THE NEHRU ERA 25
of the last countries to shift its embassy to Riyadh as demanded by the

Kingdom and this happened in 1985. The erstwhile mission in Jeddah was
converted into consulate to facilitate the haj pilgrimage. Between 1948
and until the present, India had 17 ambassadors to the Kingdom and all of
whom were Muslims (Annexure 1), primarily due to the need for the
envoy to travel to Mecca, which is off limits to non-Muslims.
The first political exchange between the two countries had to wait until
May 1955 when Crown Prince Faisal came to prepare for the visit of King
Saud in December, a few months after he met Nehru during the Bandung
conference (Rey 2014). Though the Nehru-Nasser friendship was blos-
soming, Saud was also friendly towards Nasser and hosted the Egyptian
leader a few weeks earlier.3
During his visit to India, Crown Prince and Prime Minister Prince
Faisal informed that “he would like his brother, the King of Saudi Arabia,
to come to India on an ‘educational tour’” (Selected Works of Jawaharlal
Nehru, Series Two, vol. 28; 222). Their conversation covered a host of
issues like recognition of communist China and historical Indian approach
towards the Middle East since the colonial phase, especially the role of
Mahatma Gandhi. Referring to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Nehru observed
that India’s sympathies
had been and were now with the Arabs, who had suffered so greatly… Time
seemed to be running in favour of the Israel and rather against the Arabs.
Israel was likely to become stronger in the military sense… Israel would
never have been formed or would have continued for long but for the sup-
port of the USA and the UK. It was these great powers that had helped
Israel in many ways. (Ibid., 226)
For his part, Prince Faisal “agreed with our [India’s] general foreign
policy of keeping free from entanglements” (ibid., 227). Nehru met
Prince Faisal again on 25 September 1956 during his visit to the Kingdom
(Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series Two, Vol. 35, 485–8).
King Saud visited India in late November 1955, and addressing a civic
reception in the Red Fort in the honour of the King, Nehru flagged
ancient linkages between the two countries and said that
3
Earlier King Saud visited Pakistan in February 1954, but a return visit had to wait until
November 1960, when he hosted President Ayub Khan.
Islam came to India peacefully. There was no fighting in its wake as it hap-
pened in other countries. Politically great emperors might stand arrayed
against one another. But Islam came to India peacefully with its message and
was greeted with friendliness by India, as it had been the tradition in this
land, and given a place in the country. Islam has existed in India since then.
(Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series Two, vol. 31: 399)
King Saud’s visit was followed by Nehru’s in September 1956 amidst

the brewing Suez crisis. Nasser had nationalized the Suez Canal and
reflecting the prevailing mood in the region, Nehru and Saud agreed on
the need for a political settlement without the threat or use of force (India,
MEA 1956). The crowning moment of the three-day visit came when the
Indian prime minister was greeted with a slogan Marhaba Rasool as-Salam
(Welcome, the Messenger of Peace). Referring to Nehru as ‘Messenger of
Peace’ evoked criticisms from Pakistan which argued that it was an affront
and insult to Prophet Mohammed, a criticism vehemently rejected by
Saudi Arabia (Heptullah 1991).
Nehru’s meeting with King Saud on 25 September 1956 was domi-
nated by the ongoing crisis in the region following Nasser’s nationaliza-
tion of the Suez Canal and both sides agreed `the legitimate rights of
Egypt.’ According to the record of their conversation, the “King had a
talk with Nasser the day before (24 September)” and briefed Nehru about
his conversation with the Egyptian leader. Domestic Indian issue also fig-
ured in their deliberations and King Saud “referred to discussions between
him and the Prime Minister about the treatment of Muslims during the
King’s last visit to India (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series Two,
vol. 35, p. 491). He expressed a hope that the assurances which the Prime
Minister had then given him were being implemented” (ibid., 491). The
leaders referred to the domestic controversy over the publication of the
book Religious Leaders authored by two Americans which evoked uproar
among the Muslims (ibid., 253–71).
In the reception given by Indian residents in Jeddah on 26 September,
Nehru remarked that the “message of religion, culture and trade that went
forth from this ancient land has great impact on the history of the world”
(ibid., 492). He went on to observe that there “are 40 million inhabitants
in India owing allegiance to this great religion, Islam… while naturally
they owe allegiance to this great religion, they are also in the political and
national fields, sons and citizens of the Indian Republic” (ibid., 492).
THE NEHRU ERA 27
The joint statement issued at the end of Nehru’s visit to the Kingdom
observed the support of both the countries for “a peaceful settlement of
the dispute relating to the Suez Maritime Canal, which is a waterway of
vital importance to their own economic well-being” and declared that
there “can be no settlement of the dispute by methods of conflict or by
denial of the sovereign rights of Egypt over the Suez Canal.. (and that) it
is possible to reach a settlement negotiated between the parties concerned
without any derogation from Egyptian sovereignty and authority and
maintaining the interests of other countries in the unrestricted use of the
canal as an open waterway” (Annexure 2).
At the same time, the Indo-Egyptian warmth was conspicuously absent
in the Indo-Saudi relations. The socialist and anti-colonial Nehru could
not find a common ground with the religious and conservative Saudi
monarchy. As some later-day critics argued, “while Nehru’s insistence on
nonalignment for India was understandable and justified, his political and
probably intellectual aversion to aligned nations did adversely affect India’s
relations with important Middle Eastern countries like Iran and Saudi
Arabia, which were otherwise well disposed towards India.” Nehru’s ‘dis-
tinction’ between ‘radical and conservative’ states in the Middle East was
termed “unwarranted” (Mudiam 1994, 18). Accusing Nehru of pursuing
a “self-righteous” attitude towards the Middle East, he argued that from
the beginning the Indian leadership “entertained misgivings about Saudi
Arabia, considering it feudal and theocratic (sic) state and was wary of
cultivating it even on bilateral terms” (Mudiam 1994, 86).
Others faulted Nehru for his apprehensions over a resurgent pan-
Islamism in the Middle East and for his failure engage more actively.
Arguing that the imperial past and the resultant nationalist and anti-
imperialist sentiments were stronger in the Arab world than religious
sentiments, they felt that it was a futile exercise on the part of Pakistan to
use Islam as a foreign policy tool to attract political support and friendship
in the Middle East (Agwani 1966).
The arguments were persuasive and logical. As the trajectory of
Islamic history unravels, pan-Islamism has been an elusive ideal. The
office of caliph which flourished for over 13 centuries is a Sunni Islamic
institution and for long did not enjoy the support or allegiance of the
largest component of the ummah, the Indian Muslims. The emergence
of Shia Islam in the immediate aftermath of Prophet Mohammed and
various sectarian divides in later centuries challenge the notion of
pan-Islamism. The entry of imperialism into the Islamic heartland was
accompanied by the notions of territorial nationalism and not religious

identities or loyalties. In the aftermath of the demise of the Ottoman
Empire, pan-Islamism emerged as a political rhetoric for narrow and
immediate goals than an attempt to bring the Muslims of the world
under one political authority. The Muslims living in different socio-polit-
ical conditions are no more united as the European Christians found out
a few centuries earlier. A host of intra-Islamic political contests, rivalries
and tensions both during Nehru’s time and later on challenge the argu-
ments of a pan-Islamic threat.
Notwithstanding these, Nehru’s views on Saudi Arabia were coloured
by the Pakistan factor and the potential damage it would have upon India’s
interest in the Middle East. Lacking ideological convergence between a
secular and inclusive India and an exclusivist conservative Wahhabi ideol-
ogy of al-Saud, his engagements with the Kingdom were limited and did
not go beyond diplomatic niceties. There were formal diplomatic relations,
commercial transactions and the continued flow of haj pilgrims but politi-
cally Nehru was drawn closer to Nasser and found intellectual comfort in
secular Arab nationalism and its cascading sway upon the Arab masses
until the mid-1960s. Though Riyadh was part of the emerging Third
World consensus, the Non-alignment was primarily the outcome of the
Nehru-Nasser-Tito triumvirate.
Nehru’s unqualified endorsement enhanced Nasser’s popularity both
inside Egypt and in the region. This, in turn, made Saudi Arabia suspicious
of India’s motives and intentions. With Pakistan’s repeated overtures for an
Islamic bloc, Riyadh primarily saw Nehru as a friend of Nasser and Egypt
while New Delhi viewed Saudi Arabia primarily as a friend of Pakistan. In
short, each saw the other as the friend of their immediate rival and threat.
Such a narrow view of the other, despite considerable interest convergence,
did not help Indo-Saudi bilateral relations.
Conclusion
As with other aspects of the foreign policy, Nehru’s approach laid the foun-
dations of India’s priority and understanding of Saudi Arabia. He was con-
cerned with containing the influence of Pakistan in the Kingdom and in
the broader Middle East; countering the negative fallouts of pan-Islamism,
especially over the Kashmir issue; and maintaining a transactional approach
towards haj and bilateral trade with Saudi Arabia. These trends and
THE NEHRU ERA 29
priorities continued even in the later part of the Cold War after Nehru.
Though there were new challenges, the post-Nehru trajectory became
more complicated and inhibited India from moving away from its limited
approach towards Saudi Arabia.
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CHAPTER 3
Drifting Apart
In many ways 1962 proved to be a defining moment in the Indo-Saudi rela-

tions and precipitated the downward slide. India’s limited bilateral political
engagements under Jawaharlal Nehru took a turn for the worst due to three
closely-knit developments, namely, domestic and regional power struggles,
the formation of World Muslim League and India’s China debacle. These,
in turn, created mistrust and contributed to both the countries drifting apart
from one another. The next high-level political engagement took more than
26 years to materialize after Nehru’s 1956 visit when King Khalid al-Saud
hosted Indira Gandhi in 1982. However, a royal visit to India had to wait
for 2006, more than half a century after King Saud’s 1955 visit.
The latter part of the Cold War was eventful and challenging for both
the countries and generated a power asymmetry that was widening and
appeared unbridgeable. From being a recipient of annual subsidy from
London in the early years of its existence, the Kingdom became a major
player in the Middle East and beyond. The commercial-scale discovery of
oil in 1938 transformed the socio-economic conditions of the predomi-
nantly tribal society. In the wake of the oil crisis of 1973 Saudi Arabia
became a power house of crude oil and a swing producer which could
determine the flow and price of oil in the international market. Already the
June War of 1967 signalled a regional shift with pan-Arabism led by Nasser
giving way to pan-Islamism championed by the al-Saud. The ascendance
of Saudi fortunes radically altered its political influence, economic power,
diplomatic clout and, above all, energy power.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_3
The power shift in favour of Saudi Arabia was sudden and came when
India’s international fortunes were sliding. Nehru’s international stature,
which contributed to India gaining a voice in various international crises
such as the Suez crisis, Vietnam War, Korean War and the Arab-Israeli
conflict, suffered a setback in 1962 over the border conflict with China.
Coming just over a year after the formation of the NAM, the conflict dam-
aged India’s international status, dented its internal confidence and in the
process made it vulnerable to external influences. New Delhi’s growing
identification with Moscow on major international issues since the mid-
1960s and the conclusion of the Friendship Treaty in 1971 were the out-
come of this susceptibility. Though the Bangladesh War of 1971 and the
nuclear test of 1975 partly restored its self-assurance, they also weakened
its diplomatic space vis-à-vis the outside world.
The growing power asymmetry became a handicap in India’s ability to
deal with the Kingdom. As the latter’s influence was on the rise, India’s
was sliding. This was the case until the end of the Cold War and the resul-
tant reorganization of India’s economic and political outlooks. For clarity,
these would be discussed within three broad themes: changing regional
climates in the Middle East and its impact upon bilateral relations; differ-
ing Indo-Saudi worldviews; and limited engagements between the two
countries. Between 1955–56 when King Saud and Prime Minister Nehru
exchanged visits and 1981–82 when Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-
Faisal and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi exchanged visits, the two coun-
tries had only limited contacts. It was only in 1975, soon after the Saudi-led
oil embargo on the US and its allies, that one of the important bilateral
political contacts took place when Saudi Petroleum Minister Ahmed Zaki
Yamani visited India.
Drifting Apart
In the early 1950s both had opposed the Western bloc politics, but gradu-
ally their worldviews differed and drifted apart. Their membership in the
emerging Afro-Asian solidarity was insufficient to cement an enduring ideo-
logical journey. The NAM held its first summit meeting in Belgrade in the
first week of September 1961, where leaders from 26 countries took part.1
1
This was slightly smaller than the Bandung conference of 1955 where 29 countries took
part. The following countries’ heads of state participated in the Belgrade summit of NAM:
Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma (now Myanmar), Cambodia, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), Congo,
Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco,
Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia,
and the following countries were represented by observers: Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador.
DRIFTING APART 35
Though Saudi Arabia was present, the Belgrade meet was a Nehru-Nasser-
Tito show. Shortly after this, India faced the border conflict with China and
this marked Nehru’s political demise internally and little influence exter-
nally. Neither NAM nor Nehru’s friendship with Nasser garnered sufficient
support for him during the Sino-Indian conflict. Reflecting on the response
from the region, one concluded:
governments as well as Press (barring a small section which was favourably

disposed towards Beijing), and the general public in the region, grasped the
true nature and meaning of Chinese threat to India. While some of them
conveyed their reactions spontaneously and unequivocally, others did so
cautiously and with reserve. But no government in the area approved of
Chinese action or rendered her any support. (Agwani 1963, 79)
Though significant, considering a vociferous Indian defence of Egypt

during the Suez crisis, Nasser’s offer to mediate was less flattering and his
four-point Colombo proposal was rejected by China (Agwani 1963, 77).
In the hour of the national crisis, Nehru was forced to reach out to Israel
with which he refused to establish normal relations and he sought and
secured limited quantities of urgently needed small arms and ammunition
(Bhattacharya 2017).
The year 1962 also marked far-reaching changes within the Kingdom. In
November 1953 upon the death of founder King Ibn Saud, his eldest son and
crown prince Saud became the ruler. Immediately, he faced a family feud with
his half-brother Faisal and other siblings over financial matters. This took a
turn for the worst when King Saud opted for common primogeniture succes-
sion, that is, within his own immediate family. Towards this end, he abolished
the post of prime minister and clipped the powers of the then Crown Prince
Faisal. The King also placed his sons in key government positions including
the ministries of defence and interior and as Governor of Riyadh.
These precipitated a power struggle and rebellion from other sons of
Ibn Saud led by Faisal. A temporary truce was reached in October 1962
with Faisal being named the prime minister and the sidelining of the sons
of King Saud from the cabinet. This did not last long and Saud was forced
to abdicate in November 1964 and was succeeded by Faisal. Primarily to
avoid similar maverick moves in future, the al-Saud institutionalized the
agnatic succession whereby the King would be succeeded by his younger
brother and not by his son. This linear succession had survived until 2017
when King Salman removed his half-brother Muqrin and he first named
his nephew Muhammad bin Nayef and then his son Mohammed as crown
prince and possible successor.
Amidst the family tussle in the early 1960s, the al-Saud also witnessed
political challenges from Egypt and its leader Nasser. Partly to consolidate
his position vis-à-vis his siblings, Saud sought to befriend Nasser, who was
more than happy to meddle (Wynbrant 2004, 215–16). By then Egypt
was militarily involved in the Yemen crisis on behalf of the revolutionary
republicans, the anti-monarchical forces led by Abdullah Sallal (Stookey
1978). Al-Sauds who shared Nasser’s opposition to military alliances
began to reconsider their position in the light of his growing popularity in
the region and his call for radical changes, including the overthrow of
monarchies (Badeeb 1986).
These resulted in Riyadh moving closer to Washington with Saud
granting the US the use of the Dhahran airport as military base (Gresh
2015, 70). This began a process of growing Saudi identification with the
US and its regional interests, and the erstwhile non-aligned approach
towards great powers gave way to growing proximity with Washington.
Despite their differences over the Palestine issue, the US emerged as
the benefactor of the Kingdom in the politico-military sense. It began
with the permission to develop the first military airfield in Dhahran in
1946 and the formation of the US Military Training Mission in Riyadh
in 1951. During the heydays of the Yemen civil war, the US emerged
as the leading military supplier to Saudi Arabia to counter the threat
from the Egyptian military presence in Yemen. Hence, in 1970 the
US provided nearly US$16 million in military aid to the Kingdom
(Cordesman 2003).
Even the sharp differences over the October War of 1973 did not
endure. Though the Kingdom imposed an oil embargo against the US for
its pro-Israeli policies and military support during the War, the oil supplies
were resumed in March 1974, shortly after the disengagement agreement
was signed between Israel and Egypt in January. Subsequently arms-for-oil
became the basis of the US-Saudi relations and were to continue well
beyond the Cold War. Indeed, the Saudi importance for the US got a
boost after the 1979 Islamic revolution in neighbouring Iran which over-
threw the Shah.
Thus, in terms of bloc politics, the Kingdom “is not exactly an ideal
reference point for the study of non-alignment, and non-alignment is
hardly a suitable context if one wants to examine Saudi foreign policy”
(Dhanani 1981, 361). At the same time, Riyadh did the bare minimum,
which kept it within the NAM but not closer to India. Though not an
DRIFTING APART 37
activist like Nasser’s Egypt, Riyadh was “active in Afro-Asian, Arab League
and non-aligned forums. They consistently championed the cause of
Palestine and Algeria, staunchly opposed the formation of any US-sponsored
military alliance, heavily contributed in money and morale towards wean-
ing Jordan away from the Baghdad Pact, and established an Arab defence
alliance against the Pact” (Dhanani 1981, 362).
As Saudi Arabia was moving closer to the West, India was gravitating
towards the USSR. Beginning with the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit in
November 1955, India’s approach towards Moscow underwent a trans-
formation. It benefitted from the Soviet willingness to take part in its
developmental programmes in the areas of defence, space and atomic
energy and in setting up public sector undertaking (PSU) companies such
as BHEL, ONGC and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. Moscow was
ready to see non-alignment in friendlier terms and this brought political
synergy between the two. This was in contrast to the if-you-are-not-with-
me-then-you-are-against-me approach of the US (Jain 1983; Dietl 1985).
The Indian shift in favour of Moscow manifested clearly in 1956.
Though Nehru was unequivocal over the tripartite aggression against
Egypt, he settled for a near silence over the Hungarian crisis which blew
out only a few days earlier.2 His unqualified support for Egyptian sover-
eignty was in contrast to his tacit endorsement of the Soviet aggression
against Hungary. Indeed, Nehru’s confidant V. K. Krishna Menon (then
Minister Without Portfolio) depicted the Soviet action as ‘an internal mat-
ter’ of the Warsaw countries (Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second
Series, vol. 35). This pattern continued over a host of international issues,
including the Czech crisis of 1966, nuclear disarmament, decolonization,
Vietnam War and extra-regional presence in the Persian Gulf and the
Indian Ocean. In these crucial international developments, the Indian
position was closer to Moscow’s than neutral. The culmination of the
process was the Havana Summit which viewed Moscow as ‘the natural
ally’ of the NAM (Vanden and Morales 1985).
The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 weakened India’s strategic calcula-
tions. If it accepted Soviet mediation in the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani
War of 1965 and concluded the Tashkent agreement (Bindra 1981), it
2
Soviet tanks entered Budapest in the early hours of 24 October 1956, hours after popular
protests were held in the Hungarian capital whereas the Israeli aggression against Egypt
began on 29 October.
moved a step closer a few years later. On the eve of the Bangladesh War of
1971, it took a strategic step and signed the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty
(India, MEA 1971). This was seen as an insurance policy against a possible
Chinese intervention on behalf of Pakistan over Bangladesh.
The pro-Soviet tilt under Indira Gandhi also had a domestic compo-
nent. The ruling Congress Party was losing its political monopoly and lost
some of the critical states during 1967 assembly elections and this had a
cascading effect upon the national politics. Internal opposition to her
leadership was brewing and resulted in Indira Gandhi opting for social
engineering that brought her and the Congress Party closer to the Indian
left. Though socialism has been the main plank of the party since the free-
dom struggle, political compulsions forced her and the Congress Party to
be increasingly reliant on the communist parties, especially in the late
1960s. Both for support in the parliament and for political legitimacy, the
Indian leadership began to view communist parties as a progressive force.
In the external realm, this meant greater leeway for the Soviet worldview.
The Sino-Indian conflict and the emerging Sino-Soviet tension and rivalry
meant that India increasingly began viewing Moscow as its ‘natural ally’
(Ray 1988).
Thus, by the late 1960s, India and Saudi Arabia found themselves firmly
entrenched in opposite camps. Their differing worldviews worsened over
the Afghan crisis when the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in December
1979 which lasted for nearly a decade. Though uneasy with the action,
India eschewed open criticisms as the Soviet military presence in
Afghanistan spurred Pakistan to drum up support and before long the US
and Saudi Arabia joined hands in the formation of the anti-Soviet mujahe-
deen forces which enjoyed political backing, military supplies and financial
support from the Kingdom (Hegghammer 2010, 25). Though formally
directed at the Soviets, these efforts considerably strengthened the
Pakistani military capabilities and emboldened its anti-India rhetoric
(Riedel 2014).
In other words, until the end of the Cold War, there was very little
common ground between India and Saudi Arabia and each one was suspi-
cious of the other, and this was reflected in their limited political
engagements. However, a far more serious challenge came in shifts in the
geostrategic regional environment in the Middle East, which worked
against India.
DRIFTING APART 39
Geostrategic Shifts
The early 1950s saw the ascendance of Nasser as his pan-Arabism held its
sway in much of the Middle East and even monarchies which were opposed
to him had to content with pockets of support for his secular nationalism.
This got a rude awakening when Nasserism was buried in the ruins of the
June War of 1967. The decisive Arab military defeat compelled Nasser and
his fellow nationalists to come to terms with the emerging Islam-dominated
political order. In return for the promise of a meagre annual support for
the states confronting Israel, Egypt was forced to recognize the emerging
Saudi-dominated regional order. The Khartoum Arab summit which met
shortly after the June War curtailed Nasser’s politico-diplomatic options.
Angered and humiliated by the military defeat, the Arab countries3 unani-
mously settled for the infamous three NOs: no recognition, no negotia-
tion and no peace with Israel (Meital 2000).
The Arab defeat also weakened Nasser’s ability to influence the
Palestinian movement. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) that
he helped to form in 1964 (Shemesh 1988) recognized the futility of
depending upon the Arab states to achieve its goals (Sayigh 1989). The
West Bank from where the Fatah movement carried out much of its
Fedayeen activities had now come under the Israeli control, and in 1969
its founder Yasser Arafat decided to join the PLO. This eventually resulted
in Fatah becoming the most dominant component of the Palestinian
movement with Arafat as its head (Shemesh 1988).
The June War was followed by two other developments that consoli-
dated the Saudi regional influence. The first was the fire in al-Aqsa Mosque
in the Israel-controlled old city of Jerusalem. On 23 August 1969, Denis
Michael Rohan, a mentally disturbed Christian Australian tourist, set fire
to the pulpit of the al-Aqsa Mosque which “destroyed part of the old
wooden root and an 800-year-old pulpit—a gift from the Islamic hero
Saladin” (Lieber 2016). The al-Aqsa Mosque is the third holiest place in
Islam after Mecca and Medina and the incident enraged the Muslim
masses across the globe. Various forms of protest actions happened in
many countries, including India. Coming in the aftermath of the Arab
defeat in the June War, this incident spurred political Islam taking the
centre stage of the Middle Eastern politics.
3
The conference was boycotted by Syria.
Sensing the opportunity, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia joined hands with
King Hasan V of Morocco and organized the first Islamic conference in
Rabat during 22–24 September 1969. While the controversy surrounding
India’s participation is discussed in a later chapter, it is essential to notice
two closely linked developments. The Rabat conference laid the founda-
tion for the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which came into
being in 1971 and was renamed as Organization of Islamic Cooperation
in June 2011. This is the largest international political group after the
NAM and from 30 members in 1971 it transformed into a 57-member
body with five countries, including Russia, as ‘observers’ (Baba 1994;
Ihsanoglu 2010). The OIC transformed the nature of international
politics, and as one observer maintained, “Without Islam the Afro-Asian
movement would probably have aborted. And without the Afro-Asian
movement there would have been no ‘non-aligned’ group of nations, and
without that group there would not have been the economic Group of
Seventy-Seven, the underdeveloped South in the current North-South
dialogue” (Jansen 1980, 96).
The ascendance of Saudi influence was accompanied by a greater influ-
ence of Pakistan upon Riyadh and its approach towards India. Amidst the
power struggle within the family, in 1962 Faisal established the World
Muslim League with Mecca as its headquarters and this was a decade
before the OIC. Though a Saudi-backed body, it had Islamic scholars
from different countries, including India, as members. However, the
fateful moment came as Saudi Arabia came under Pakistan’s spell during
the latter’s conflict with India. While Riyadh took a neutral position dur-
ing the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965, it whole-heartedly supported Pakistan
during the 1971 Bangladesh War. India’s effort for a political conversation
with the Saudi leadership before the War did not materialize and the
Indian delegation had to content itself with meeting ministry officials and
not any political leaders (Jha 1992).
The second development was the October War of 1973 which trans-
formed the international discourse on the Arab-Israeli conflict. President
Anwar Sadat’s decision to launch a surprise military attack on Yom Kippur
Day—the holiest day in the Jewish calendar—led to the critical oil-pro-
ducing countries, especially Republican Iraq and monarchical Saudi
Arabia, to launch an oil embargo on countries that were sympathetic
towards the Jewish State (Ahrari 1986). They were joined by the Shah of
Iran, who initiated a price hike. These resulted in a sudden escalation of oil
price which went up from US$3 per barrel to US$12 in 1974. The oil
DRIFTING APART 41
crisis—supply disruption and price hike—transformed the Western,

especially European, attitude towards the Arab-Israeli conflict and from
being sympathetic towards Israel, overnight the West European countries
turned to being pro-Arab and pro-Palestinian.
The newly found oil wealth resulted in Arab countries successfully con-
testing and eventually eliminating the prolonged claims of Jordan to speak
on behalf of the Palestinians, leading to the emergence of the PLO as the
‘sole and legitimate’ representative of the Palestinians. This was followed
by many Third World countries recognizing the PLO and its admission
into the UN as an observer in 1974. The oil crisis culminated in the Venice
Declaration of June 1980 when nine-member European Economic
Committee—which also included Britain, France and the then West
Germany—recognized the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people”
leading up to “right of self-determination” with the PLO being “associ-
ated with the process” (European Economic Community 1980).
These two—Islamist resurgence and oil crisis—had a profound impact
upon India and its dealings with the Middle East. First and foremost, the
Arab defeat in the June War was a setback to India’s Cairo-centric
approach since 1947. The defeat led to the demise of secular pan-Arabism
and India was forced to come to terms with the new regional order led by
Riyadh. Though the World Muslim League was functioning since 1962,
the al-Aqsa fire was an impetus to Arab monarchies to reassert their posi-
tion and to capitalize on the vacuum left by Nasser’s politico-military
defeat. Both were a severe blow to India, especially when the emerging
Middle Eastern order was in sync with Pakistan and its Islam-centric
approach to international affairs.
As the Islamic conference idea was gathering momentum, New Delhi
was keen to attend. It, however, did not fulfil the two criteria of the
organizers, namely, Muslim-majority countries and Muslim head of state.
At the same time, King Faisal recognized that a procedural approach
towards India would be a disservice to the large Muslim population.
Though the actual implications became controversial later on, India was
asked to attend.
The delay in the arrival of the official delegation led by Agriculture
Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed resulted in India being represented by its
ambassador to Morocco Gurbachan Singh, a turban-wearing Sikh
diplomat, and he made a brief speech in the inaugural session. According
to Singh, “I obviously inquired whether Pakistan was part of the unani-
mous invitation. I was told that was the case” (Baruah 2002). There were
serious disagreements; while the official narrative maintained that it was

for India, Islamabad argued that its consent was for “the representatives of
Indian Muslims to which President Yahya Khan had agreed earlier”
(Akhtar 1969, 336).
Facing domestic ire, Yahya Khan capitalized on the presence of the
non-Muslim Indian diplomat in the Islamic conference and threatened to
boycott it even after the arrival of the Muslim minister from India. The
conference which was meant to discuss the Muslim anger over the al-Aqsa
fire spent its second day in fire-fighting the Indo-Pakistan differences.
Mediatory efforts by King Faisal and others were futile and it was sug-
gested that India would be represented in a non-official capacity. To avoid
further embarrassment, India chose to ‘withdraw’ from the conference.
The Rabat episode is often remembered and recollected for its fiasco,
and in the words of veteran journalist A. G. Noorani it “ranks as a humili-
ating diplomatic debacle” (Noorani 2010). The government headed by
Indira Gandhi was cornered by the opposition in parliament and was
almost censured. The Indian anger was directed at the host Morocco for
its inept handling and at King Hussein of Jordan, who was spearheading
the Pakistani position. As a response to the fiasco, New Delhi withdrew its
ambassador and chargé d’affaires respectively from Rabat and Amman.
India was appreciative of King Faisal’s unsuccessful efforts to ameliorate
the situation and convince Pakistan towards ensuring India’s continued
participation.
There were occasional calls that India should reconsider its position
vis-à-vis the Islamic forum and could even seek an observer status, if not a
full membership (Pasha 1995, 158–59; Imam 1994).4 However, the
Rabat episode made India wary of the OIC and as discussed in a later
chapter the organization becoming the handmaid of Pakistan on Kashmir
only worsened things. Primarily due to the Rabat episode, since 1969
India has avoided international political conferences which are explicitly
Islamic.
The pro-Pakistani sentiments of the Middle East, especially Saudi
Arabia, came to the forefront in 1971 during the Bangladesh War, a major
milestone in India’s politico-diplomatic history. On 25 March that year
the Pakistani military junta headed by Yahya Khan unleashed the violence
4
On the other hand, Hamid Ansari, former Indian ambassador to Saudi Arabia and later
Vice-President, has argued that India should not seek an observer status in the OIC; see
(Ansari 2006).
DRIFTING APART 43
in the then East Pakistan which resulted in the deaths of two million per-
sons, and at least 200,000 Bengali women, mostly young and unmarried
girls, were raped by Pakistani men in uniform (Alamgir and D’costa 2011).
Much of the Middle East, notably the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, viewed
this genocide as the ‘domestic affair’ of a fellow Islamic country and hence
refused to raise their voice. Islamic solidarity prevailed over elementary
human concern and justice.
Interestingly, on 4 February 1972 Israel became the first country from
the Middle East to recognize Bangladesh, but Dhaka rejected this move.5
By the end of 1972, Republican Iraq and Yemen (Ahmed 2004, 207)
recognized Bangladesh while Egypt and Syria took similar steps after
Bangladeshi President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman met their leaders during
the fourth NAM summit in Algiers in September 1973. Rest of the Middle
East recognized Bangladesh only after the second OIC summit ironically
hosted by Pakistan in Lahore in February 1974 (Jacques 2000). Saudi
Arabia established formal diplomatic relations with Bangladesh only after
the assassination of the founder leader Mujibur Rahman in August 1975.
In other words, Bangladesh—a crowning moment in India’s foreign
policy—did not enjoy even a minimal understanding, let alone sympathy,
from Riyadh. Since the perpetrator of mass violence was an Islamic coun-
try, al-Saud opted to side with Islamabad than with the oppressed people
of Bangladesh.
The next major challenge came in 1973 through the oil crisis which was
a rude shock for India. With its low energy consumption and continued
reliance on traditional non-conventional sources, its energy demands were
not considerable. Much of its requirements were met through domestic
production. The Arab oil-producing countries, especially Iraq and Saudi
Arabia, were appreciative of India’s traditional support for the Palestinians
and this was their prime demand in enforcing an embargo against the
Western countries. Hence, India was not directly affected by the supply
shortage, but the oil crisis stunned India at two levels. One, the sudden sup-
ply disruption and price hike had a cascading effect upon its economy,
which was growing at a low annual rate of about 2 per cent. Far more
importantly, India was heavily dependent upon imports for its requirements
of oil products as domestic refineries were inadequate to meet the demands
of mass-consumed products like kerosene, lubricants and engine oil.
5
In line with the practice of many Islamic countries, Bangladesh continues to maintain that
its passports are valid for all the countries, except Israel.
The oil crisis, however, brought benefits to India and both have had
long-term implications upon the Indo-Saudi relations. As discussed in a
later chapter, the oil crisis and the resultant construction boom in the Gulf
Arab countries spurred the flow of large-scale Indian labour migration and
contributed to remittances and growth in Indo-Gulf trade. And the oil
crisis and dependence upon oil product imports also resulted in India
enlarging its refining capacity.
Though oil imports, labour migration and bilateral trade were flourish-
ing, the positions of India and Saudi Arabia on various international issues
were different and even irreconcilable. This resulted in India having to
look for a new Arab partner wedded to secularism in the post-Nasser polit-
ical order and this brought it closer to the Ba’athist Iraq. Though Syria
also had similar political credentials, Iraq had a distinct advantage in the
form of oil wealth. Thus, since the 1970s Baghdad emerged as India’s new
‘friend’ in the region and bilateral relations encompassed ‘friendly’ prices
for oil, its imports and the Iraqi support for its position on Kashmir. With
their dependence upon the Soviet weapons and systems, India began
engaging with the Iraqi military and sent advisers and technicians to
Baghdad (Jha 1992). The Iraq-Soviet Friendship Treaty concluded on
9 April 1972 was similar to the one signed by India a few months earlier.
The bonhomie resulted in the then Iraqi vice-president visiting New Delhi
in March 1974, his only other visit outside the Middle East.6
Unlike the pro-Nasser tilt earlier, India’s pro-Iraqi disposition from the
early 1970s did not harm the Indo-Saudi relations. On the contrary, it
became handy during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Apprehensive of the
Islamic revolution, the Gulf Arab countries bankrolled the Iraqi aggres-
sion and bore the cost of the war (Rubin 1989). For its part, India was
instrumental in Iraq not being named the aggressor in the non-aligned
forums. Though her mediatory efforts were unsuccessful, Indira Gandhi
ensured that NAM did not censure Baghdad but settled for demanding
Iraq, the founding member of the NAM and the newly joined Iran to
resolve their differences peacefully (Mudiam 1994). The favourable
disposition towards Iraq manifested in Indira Gandhi stepping in and
hosting the seventh NAM summit in March 1983 (Dixit 2003).
One could suggest that sympathy for the Iraqi ruler brought a tempo-
rary respite and brief interest convergence between India and Saudi Arabia.
Otherwise, during much of the Cold War, their worldviews were different
and often at cross-purposes.
6
He visited France in September 1975.
DRIFTING APART 45
Thus, since the mid-1960s India had to face a Middle East where
pan-Islamism replaced pan-Arabism as the dominant political force.
Secularism and Nasserism which made Cairo the prime focus of India’s
approach to the region were no longer feasible and beneficial. The support
for the Palestinians, a key component of its engagements with the region
since the early 1920s, took a more virulent form with India joining the
Arab-Islamic chorus of ‘Zionism is racism.’ As would be discussed the
uneven power situation, different worldviews, differing interests and the
Saudi preference for Pakistan meant that political conversations between
the two in the latter part of the Cold War were minimal.
Limited Engagements
After Nehru’s 1956 visit, high-level political contacts had to wait until
April 1981 when Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal came to India. The
timing was interesting. Though the ongoing Iran-Iraq War witnessed
some interest convergence, Faisal’s visit came amidst the Afghan crisis.
The Soviet invasion resulted in the US creating, facilitating and arming
the anti-Soviet mujahedeen forces. If Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and
later on Hosni Mubarak provided the political backing, Saudi Arabia came
up with funds (Rubin 1989). Before long the mountainous Afghan terri-
tory became the magnet for the Islamist fighters from different Arab
countries, who were later known as Afghan Arabs (Riedel 2014). After the
Soviet withdrawal, the landlocked country plunged into a civil war in
which an estimated two million were killed, maimed and several millions
were displaced (Giustozzi 2000).
The great game in the neighbourhood heightened India’s concerns,
especially when it resulted in a substantial increase in the US military and
security assistance to Pakistan. The Soviet presence became a pretext for
Pakistan obtaining billions of economic and military aid and assistance
from the US (Riedel 2014). This was also the period when Saudi Arabia
became a major benefactor for Pakistani nuclear programme, often chris-
tened as an “Islamic bomb” (Weissman and Krosney 1981; Shaikh 2002).
Though Indira Gandhi did not endorse the Soviet invasion, geopolitical
reality compelled her to be sympathetic with Moscow. Her refusal to pub-
lically criticize the Soviet action immensely strengthened Moscow’s posi-
tion internationally. Thus, as happened during the Bangladesh War, the
Afghan crisis exposed the Indo-Saudi political discord as they were back-
ing rival protagonists.
Faisal’s 1981 visit was also the first at that level since the Kingdom’s
foreign ministry was established in 1930 and sought to lower the bilateral
differences. Regional security dominated his conversation with External
Affairs Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, who referred to “a broad apprecia-
tion of each other’s role in international affairs, as well as understanding of
each other’s needs and aspirations” (India, Foreign Affairs Record 1981,
124). This indicated the inability of both sides to gloss over their differ-
ences over Afghanistan; if Faisal sought to convey his apprehensions over
the Soviet invasion of and regime change in that country, India could not
convince the Saudi leadership that the anti-Soviet militancy would deteri-
orate the regional security environment. This gulf was glossed over by Rao
referring to India’s “strong opposition to Israeli expansion” and its tradi-
tional support for the Palestinians (India, Foreign Affairs Record 1981,
125). During the visit, both sides signed the Indo-Saudi Economic
Cooperation Agreement (Annexure 3) which envisaged the formation of
a joint commission that would meet periodically. The first meeting was
held in October 1982 and interestingly between then and 2018 the joint
commission had met only 12 times (India, PIB 2018).
Once again, Prince Faisal came to India in March 1983 as the leader
of the Saudi delegation for the NAM summit which took place amidst
the ongoing Iran-Iraq War and the Afghan crisis. A vast majority of the
countries which attended the Delhi meeting were comfortable in viewing
the USSR as the ‘natural ally’ of the NAM. Hence, the Delhi summit
continued and consolidated the pro-Soviet slant on a number of issues
that affected the international situation such as nuclear disarmament,
decolonization, fight against apartheid in South Africa and of course
Afghanistan.
The most crucial moment in the bilateral relations during this period
came when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi undertook a four-day visit to
the Kingdom on 17–20 April 1982. It happened 26 years after Nehru’s
visit shortly before the Suez crisis. The Indian delegation comprised of
Finance Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee, Khurshid Alam Khan
(Minister of State for Tourism and Civil Aviation) and C. K. Jaffar Sharief
(Minister of State for Railways) as well as senior officials from various min-
isters, including M. H. Ansari, the future Indian ambassador to the
Kingdom and later vice-president of India (India, Foreign Affairs Record
1982, 133–34).
Draped in her trademark Indian sari, Mrs. Gandhi adopted herself to the
needs and social norms of the Kingdom. For their part, the al-Sauds rolled
DRIFTING APART 47
out a royal red-carpet reception, and when she arrived in Riyadh, she was
received by Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister Prince Fahd. A few
months earlier both had met during the Cancun Summit in October 1981
and sought to reach out. On 19 April Indira Gandhi had an audience with
King Khalid and both the leaders agreed on the need to ‘curb’ superpower
influence in the region. Expressing concerns over the ongoing Iran-Iraq
War, they called for ‘renewed’ efforts by NAM and OIC to bring about an
early end. The Saudi media hailed the visit as a serious endeavour to bridge
the prolonged ‘communication gap’ that existed between the two coun-
tries (Reuters 1982).
At the end of the visit, a 24-paragraph joint communiqué was issued
outlining their accomplishments, political convergences and shared world-
views. Expressing satisfaction over “the age-old Indo-Arab relations”
rooted in “history and tradition” the leaders recognized that in “recent
years” the bilateral relations “have developed into a multidimensional rela-
tions” (India, Foreign Affairs Record 1982, 134). In their view, the future
development of this would be “to the mutual benefit” of both the peoples
“on the basis of equality and mutual respect.” Recognizing that “the sta-
bility and security of the Gulf region and that of the Indian subcontinent
were closely interlinked” Indira Gandhi and King Khalid, called for “closer
and regular contacts (and) … deeper and more diversified” bilateral
exchanges towards strengthening “security and stability of their respective
regions.”
Conscious of the Saudi sensitivities, the communiqué devoted consid-
erable attention to Pakistan and recognized India’s efforts towards nor-
malization of relations with its neighbour and underscored the need to
maintain “an atmosphere conducive” for further Indo-Pakistani negotia-
tions towards attaining “non-aggression and the non-use of force.” In
their view, the consolidation of relations “would serve the interests of the
peoples” of the two South Asian neighbours. As discussed elsewhere the
Arab-Israeli conflict highlighted their interest convergence.
The joint communiqué referred to a host of other issues such as ‘great
power presence’ in the Indian Ocean, ‘situation’ in Afghanistan, the Iran-
Iraq War and the deteriorating global economy. Accepting and recogniz-
ing the mutual differences, both sides called “for a just and comprehensive
settlement” of the Afghan situation based on “the withdrawal of all for-
eign troops, strict observance of the principle of non-intervention and
non-interference and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity and non-status of Afghanistan and its membership” of the
OIC (India, Foreign Affairs Record 1982, 135).
On the bilateral relations both “expressed satisfaction” at the economic

exchanges and visualized “settling up joint ventures in the field of agricul-
ture, fertilizer and cement.” In its view Mrs. Gandhi’s visit “heralds a new
era” and was an “important step forward” in the bilateral relations and the
communiqué concluded that she had invited King Khalid, Crown Prince
Fahd and Second Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah to visit India (India,
Foreign Affairs Record 1982, 136). As subsequent events proved, only
Abdullah visited India in January 2006, more than 24 years after Indira
Gandhi’s invitation and as the Saudi monarch. As a follow-up of the visit,
on 22 May 1982 both countries signed their first ever long-term agree-
ment for oil supplies (Asian Recorder 1982, 16,640).
A cursory reading of the joint communiqué would suggest that the
leaders spent much attention on the political and international issues with
little space for bilateral matters. Out of the 24 paragraphs, only three
talked about improving economic relations, and issues such as oil, expatri-
ates or haj did not figure. One critic went to the extent of observing that
Indira Gandhi’s visit “failed to elevate to a new level the limited political
understanding that has already been established between the two coun-
tries” (Mudiam 1994, 96). This is especially true when the visit soon faded
away from public memory and the next high-level visit did not happen for
nearly two decades.
Despite these, one cannot ignore the significance of al-Saud taking that
extra step in making Indira Gandhi a special and favoured guest. It was an
earnest effort by both the countries to overcome their prolonged indiffer-
ence. The momentum was partly lost due to Indira Gandhi’s assassination
and subsequently the institutional inertia that India is known for.
Conclusion
Though Pakistan has been a dominant factor in India’s external engage-
ments, especially with Saudi Arabia since 1947, it has become more pro-
nounced since the early 1960s. Its military conflict with its neighbour in
1965 and 1971 and the emergence of the OIC resulted in India’s world-
view being a prisoner of the Pakistani syndrome. The political, economic
and strategic support that Pakistan received from al-Saud went against
India’s geostrategic calculations. As Riyadh was consolidating its military-
security partnership with the US, especially after the oil crisis, India was
moving closer to Moscow due to emerging security challenges in its
DRIFTING APART 49
neighbourhood. Thus, though both were members of the NAM, their

understanding of non-alignment and role of external players in the region
differed considerably.
Since the early 1960s the politico-diplomatic power asymmetry was
shifting in favour of Saudi Arabia. If the Sino-Indian conflict exposed
India’s security limitations, the oil crisis underscored its economic vulner-
ability. Around the same time, the defeat in June War and the sudden flow
of wealth in the 1970s transformed the Saudi political status. The oil
wealth and its traditional Islam-centric power projection resulted in the
Kingdom exercising a greater influence. Oil wealth and pan-Islamism pre-
sented Saudi Arabia as a far greater power vis-à-vis India and this asym-
metry prevented the latter from dealing with the Kingdom on an equal
footing. And this equation would continue to haunt New Delhi until the
late 1990s when economic reforms began to bear fruits and brought about
a relative power balance.
The limited political engagement and interest convergence came against
the backdrop of a greater social convergence in the form of Islamic link-
ages between the two. The centuries of people-to-people contacts flour-
ished despite political differences between the two and could have become
the basis for greater synergy between the two.
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CHAPTER 4
Islamic Dimension
Islam plays a vital role in the national identity, cultures and society of
Saudi Arabia as well as India. While the former was the birthplace of the
faith, at one time, the latter had the largest concentration of the believers.
Far from being an individual’s faith, Islam has a profound influence and
impact upon their citizens. At the same time, as will be discussed, both
the countries have been unable to benefit from this unique commonality
but came to view Islam merely as tactical and incidental and in the process
made it into a strategic liability.
Background
The centrality of Islam in the Saudi national consciousness has been widely
recognized. Religion forms its core national identity, culture, society and,
hence, worldview. Since the early seventh century, the faith has dominated
the Arabian Peninsula, and through proselytization and conquests, it
expanded to different parts of the world, including India. The centrality of
Islam in Arabia was formalized and consecrated through the 1744 agree-
ment between tribal chieftain Mohammed bin Saud and Islamic revivalist
Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. The roots of the third and modern Saudi
state are traced to the conquest of Riyadh (1902), Mecca (1924) and
Medina (1925)—the birth place of Islam—by Ibn Saud from the
Hashemites and his declaration of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd. Lack
of resources forced him to depend upon the British financial and military

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_4
assistance, but with the help of the tribal militia Ikhwan wedded to the
puritanical Wahhabi interpretations, Ibn Saud was able to expand his con-
trol over vast swaths of Arabian Peninsula and proclaim the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia in 1932. The commercial discovery of oil in 1938 added
financial clout to his religious claims.
The historical legacy, oil wealth and domestic political arrangement
resulted in Saudi Arabia emerging as a pre-eminent Islamic power since
the demise of the Ottoman Empire. The formation of the Mecca-based
Muslim World League in 1962 was aimed at propagating the Saudi version
of Islam to the outside world through a host of charity and relief activities.
Some regional developments also facilitated this trend. More populous
countries such as Egypt and Turkey were wedded to secularism while the
Shah of Iran embarked upon a modernization drive which necessitated
sidelining and even suppressing the ulema (Moaddel 1986; Faghfoory
1987). As discussed elsewhere the demise of pan-Arabism in the June War
of 1967 and the oil crisis of 1973 added to Riyadh’s diplomatic ascen-
dance, and the formation of OIC with Jeddah as headquarters was one
such outcome.
However, the Saudi monopoly proved to be brief as it was challenged
by the Ayatollah Khomeini–led Islamic revolution in neighbouring Iran.
By depicting it as ‘Islamic’, not a Shi’a, revolution, Khomeini and his fol-
lowers challenged the predominant Sunni narrative of Islam. Tehran’s
support for various Shia groups in Lebanon, Bahrain, Iraq and Yemen
since the 1980s has to be looked within this context. Besides the leader-
ship competition, before long Saudi Arabia and Iran were also presenting
themselves as the torchbearers and leaders of Sunni and Shia Islam respec-
tively. As would be discussed in a later chapter, this rivalry precipitated in
sectarian tensions and violence in different parts of the region. Though
the anti-Saudi and anti-Islamic backlash in the wake of the September 11
terrorist attacks compelled Riyadh to mellow down some of its positions
and policies, Islam continues to be the salient feature of the Saudi society,
culture, politics and foreign policy.
India’s historical trajectory has also been interwoven with Islam. The
new faith came to its shores shortly after the death of Prophet Mohammed
and, according to some accounts, during the time of the Second Caliph
Umar (r. 634–644 AD). A few Arab merchants introduced the faith to
the local rulers and population in the south-western coastal regions of
India (Malik 2008). In some ways, this was a continuation of centuries
of pre-Islamic mercantile exchanges between the Malabar traders and
ISLAMIC DIMENSION 55
their counterparts in the Arabian Peninsula, and the earliest known con-
tacts are traced to the Phoenician era (1500 BC) (Panikkar 1997, 1). In
the initial years, the contacts between Arab Muslim traders and India
were confined to the southern coastal region, and it was during the early
Umayyad period (660–750 AD), northern India was exposed to the new
faith. In 711 AD, a young 17-year-old military commander Mohammad
bin-Qasim led an expedition force to Sindh to confront the ruler Raja
Dahir “who allegedly had been harassing Arab merchant vessels return
with their cargo from (the present day) Sri Lanka and beyond in the
East” (Ishtiaq 1999). The defeat of the local chieftain brought the areas
of present-day Sindh region in Pakistan partially under the control of the
Damascus-based Umayyad and later Abbasid (75–1258 AD) Empires
and thus started the process of Islamization of the local population.
According to historians, the penetration of Islam into the subcontinent
was slow, even though towards the later part of the Umayyad rule, it
sporadically spread to different parts, primarily through the Sufi preachers
who accepted and responded to some of the socio-cultural practices of the
regions. The Arabic expression Hind referred to the lands beyond River
Sindh, and gradually the people of these areas came to be referred to as
Hindus (Ahmad 1969). In other words, the etymology of expression India
is traced to the Arab Muslim traders (Barrow 2003).
A faster and geographically vast eastward expansion of Islam from
Arabia had to wait until the Turco-Afghan conquest of north-western
India in the eleventh century and soon the faith gained strong roots and
larger territorial canvas through a mix of military conquest, political
patronization of the rulers and Sufi syncretism (Schimme 1980). Since
then large parts of India came under direct and indirect Muslim rulers
who helped the propagation of the faith to far-off areas, including the
north-east where tribal affiliation and lineage form the core community
identity. The height of the Muslim rule in India was the Mughal Empire
which ruled much of North, East and Central India between 1526 and
1857 and it ended with the advent of the British colonialism.
Though the faith was gaining new adherents, India was not under the
direct rule of Umayyad, Abbasid, Fatimid, Almohad or Ottoman Caliphs
and in the theological sense was not part of Dar al-Islam. Hence, discus-
sions on the Islamic history tend to ignore India though its Muslims vastly
outnumbered the Arabs. This reflected in the prolonged indifference of
Indian Muslims towards the Caliphate which dominated the political dis-
course of the Middle East for over 13 centuries. Meagre Muslim population
could be the initial reason but the establishment of various Islamic dynasties
since the eleventh century precluded the need for the allegiance to an
Islamic power or authority located outside India. The appearance of the
British imperialism, the defeat of Mughals in 1857 and the deposition and
exile of last Mughal ruler Bahadur Shah Zafar to the then Burma the fol-
lowing year marked a new but painful phase.
The arrival of the British rule thus marked an end of the eight-century-
old Muslim rule in northern India and the Muslims looked for solace
elsewhere. It was only then the Caliph concurrently held by the Ottoman
Empire figured in the Indian Muslim imagination. The Ottoman sultan
gradually emerged as the symbol and representative of the Islamic history,
legacy and glory (Minualt 1982, 4–7). Therefore, the British campaign
against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War was resented by the
Indian Muslims. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan—the founder of the Muslim
Anglo-Oriental (MAO) college, which later became the Aligarh Muslim
University (AMU)—captured the dilemma facing the Muslims when he
observed:
When there were many Muslim kingdoms, we did not feel much grief when
one of them was destroyed; now that so few are left, we feel the loss of even
a small one. If Turkey is conquered, that will be a great grief, for she is the
last of the great powers left to Islam. We are afraid that we shall become like
the Jews, a people without a country of our own. (Morison 1932, 95–96)
A sense of desperation set in among the Indian Muslims, and from the
elite to ordinary believers almost everyone felt that their faith was in
danger and sought to rally behind the beleaguered Ottoman Sultan cum
caliph. Muslim unity was one of the watershed moments in the Indian
nationalist struggle. Otherwise, there was a political detachment between
the Indian Muslims and the Islamic empires of the Middle East.
At the same time, a large number of Indians including Muslims enlisted
for the First World War in the British military expeditions in the Middle
East, especially the Gallipoli and Palestinian campaigns. Over 2500 Indians
lay buried in the Baghdad’s Northgate War Cemetery while thousands of
Indians were part of the British campaign that fought and freed Haifa
from the Ottoman rule in September 1918.
Moreover, the initial hesitation and delays in the issuance of the
Balfour Declaration which pledged support for a Jewish national home in
Palestine have been attributed to British officials flagging the sentiments
of Indian Muslims. They feared that granting of special privileges to Jews

in Palestine would anger the Indian Muslims. This apprehension was vin-
dicated when the Khilafat leaders viewed Palestine as an integral part of
the Jazirat-ul-Arab (literally island of Arabia or Arabian Peninsula) and
hence cannot be ceded to non-Muslim control let alone sovereignty
(Egorova 2006, 57–58). Under the spell of the Khilafat phase, Mahatma
Gandhi vehemently argued that Jewish and Christian could not claim
sovereign rights in a place that has remained under Islamic control for
centuries (Kumaraswamy 2018, 69–89).
The abolition of the Caliphate by Kemal Ataturk in March 1924 ended
the Khilafat struggle in India and this kindled a process of alienation of
the two prominent religious communities. The evolution of the Pakistani
nationalism championed by the Muslim League was partly the result of
the Muslim fears over the Hindu-dominated Congress Party replacing the
British as the new rulers of the free India. The British policy of divide-
and-r ule accentuated a long-running distrust between the two communi-
ties. For example, between 1885 when it was founded and until the
Khilafat phase the Congress Party only had three Muslims as president
(Badruddin Tyabji in 1887; Rahimtulla M Sayani, 1896; and Nawab Syed
Muhammad Bahadur in 1913). Four more were elected during the
Khilafat years, namely, Syed Hasan Imam (1918), Hakim Ajmal Khan
(1921), Maulana Mohammed Ali (1923) and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad
(1923). If Mukhtar Ahmed Ansari was elected in 1927, Azad returned as
president in 1940 and continued until the end of the Second World War
when most of the Indian leaders, including himself, Gandhi and Nehru,
were incarcerated. After Azad’s extended term ended in 1946, no Muslim
had ever been elected as president of the Congress Party since India’s
independence (India, INC 2018).
It is possible to argue over the validity of the Muslim apprehensions
over their possible marginalization in the post-British political order but
the League thrived and pandered on such fears. After Jinnah’s re-election
as League’s president in 1933, Pakistani nationalism gained momentum
and eventually culminated in the division of the subcontinent along com-
munal lines in August 1947. The partition came with geographically and
culturally different East and West wings of Pakistan separated by a sizeable
Indian territory.
The formation of Pakistan comprising of the Muslim-majority areas on
the periphery of the subcontinent was accompanied by a large number of
Muslims opting to stay in India and become a part of its multicultural
milieu. This is integral to the Indian nationalists’ view of a diverse but

inclusive India. The Bangladesh War of 1971 and the separation of Bengal
dented the idea of Pakistan and enhanced the demographic position of the
Indian Muslims. According to the latest 2011 census, Muslims constitute
the second largest religious community in India and with over 170 million
they make about 14 per cent of India’s total population (India, Office of
the Registrar General & Census Commissioner 2011). According to a
PEW study conducted in early 2015, India has the second largest Muslim
population in the world after Indonesia (Desilver and Masci 2017).
The Indian Muslims are anything but homogenous. Geographically
spread across the country, they are culturally diverse, linguistically differ-
ent and encompass various sects and branches of Islam. Though a majority
adheres to Sunni Islam, there are a considerable Shia population and fol-
lowers of other heterodox sects of Islam. India has the second largest Shia
community (PEW Research Center 2011) after Iran and has the largest
adherents of Sufis, Ismailis, Ahmadiyyas and Baha’is (PEW Research
Center 2009). Most Sunni Muslims follow the Hanafi School of Islamic
jurisprudence, and Shafi’i, Maliki and Hanbali schools are also followed in
certain parts of the country.1
Culturally the Indian Muslims observe and adapt many local traditions
and share commonalities in terms of language, dress, cuisine and even
local rituals with their counterparts from other religions. This cultural
proximity is geography specific; the food and dress habits of Muslims in
Tamil Nadu are closer to their non-Muslim neighbours than their co-
religionist in the northeast. The prevalence of the caste system can also be
attributed to local influences and the concept of hierarchy could be noticed
among the Sayyids (those attributing lineage to the Prophet or his family)
and others.
1
A number of schools of thought had developed in early years of the advent of Islam and
as the faith spread to other parts of the world and many new adherents started to study the
‘divine scriptures,’ several new interpretations of obligations, methods of prayer, and so on
became popular. Gradually, however, Muslim states started to endorse one specific school of
thought as their preferred jurisprudence and eventually, these became consolidated with a
few recognized madhab or school of jurisprudence. In the contemporary Islamic world four
Sunni, two Shiite (Ja’afri and Zaidi), two others Ibadi and Zahiri schools are recognized. In
the Indian case, the Sultanate and Mughal rulers had adopted the Hanafi School of jurispru-
dence and hence, the Hanafi School is predominantly followed among Indian Muslims,
though other schools of thought too are followed in some parts. See (Karandikar 1968;
Sharif 1997; Syed 1986; Reetz 2006.
At the same time, the Muslims of India have maintained a distinct

religio-cultural identity with Urdu—a mixture of the Indian languages,
Persian and Arabic—emerging as their most common lingua franca
(Sikand 2006). Though commonly understood and spoken in parts of the
Indo-Gangetic belt, over time Urdu came to be seen as a ‘Muslim’ lan-
guage. According to the 2001 census, there are about 52 million or 5 per
cent Urdu speakers in the country (India, Office of the Registrar General
& Census Commissioner 2001).
The socio-cultural diversity has been reflected in the political arena
wherein no single party or ideology can be seen as the representative of the
Indian Muslims. The partition along religious lines and post-partition
riots made a vast majority of them suspicious of parochial or regional par-
ties. For long, majority of them tended to support parties and leaders
committed to secularism and this meant that the Congress Party remained
their principal option. They were also wary of religion-centric parties. The
grassroots support for Muslim-centric parties such as IUML and MIM has
been confined to specific pockets of Muslim-majority parliament constitu-
encies. The voting pattern of the Muslim electorates has often puzzled
pollsters though most have tended to vote for mainstream parties in the
national elections and settle for regional parties committed to secularism
in local elections (Verma and Gupta 2016).
As a result, Islam plays a vital role in India’s engagements with the out-
side world, especially the Middle East and more so vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia,
which prides itself as the heartland of Islam.
Long before the discovery of oil, Islam has been a source of engage-
ment between India and the Arabian Peninsula and they viewed each other
through the religious prism. As referred earlier, in the nascent stages, the
al-Saud rule relied on the philanthropic support of the Indian Nizams and
business community for the upkeep of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina
(Khalidi 2009, 55; Azaryahu and Reiter 2015, 33). The continuous flow
of haj pilgrims from Indian subcontinent since the early days when Islam
came to India and the accompanying trade was partly responsible for the
transformation of Jeddah as the commercial hub of present-day Saudi
Arabia. Likewise, the Saudi interest in India has been primarily religious.
Since the early days, the Saudi rulers and community leaders looked to
India as a home to a sizeable Muslim community. Far from inter-state
visits, meetings and engagements, it has been more of an inter-community
relationship.
The people-to-people contacts became pronounced with the commer-

cial discovery of oil and the Saudi ability to manage its finances without the
British aid and assistance. This brought about a shift in Saudi outreach
activities by supporting the construction of mosques, Arabic teaching facil-
ities, the establishment of madrassas and other community welfare institu-
tions in different parts of the world, including India. While the political
engagements were limited, the non-political community-level contacts
flourished; for example, between 1932 when the Kingdom was established
and until early 2018, there were only two royal visits to India and four
prime ministerial visits to the Kingdom. During the eight decades, there
were only a few foreign ministerial exchanges between the two, mostly
after 1991. During this period of limited political engagements, Islam has
been the most dominant factor of bilateral relations even after diplomatic
relations were established in 1947. For the sake of clarity, one could iden-
tify four streams as factors which influenced the Indo-Saudi relations,
namely, Islam in Indian foreign policy, pan-Islamism, haj and religious
radicalism. The issue of Kashmir though linked to Islam is discussed within
the context of the Pakistani factor in shaping the Indo-Saudi relations.
Islam in Indian Foreign Policy

The role of Muslims upon India’s policy towards the outside world or in
relations with a particular country has been highly contested. This is in
contrast to the recognition of the domestic-foreign policy linkage on other
segments of the Indian population. Despite differences over its extent and
usefulness the impact of Tamil Nadu politics upon India’s Sri Lankan pol-
icy has been widely recognized. While New Delhi could minimize the
impact of the Dravidian parties, its ability to pursue a policy indifferent to
Chennai is unviable. The same holds true for West Bengal when it comes
to the Indo-Bangladeshi relations; when the civil war broke out in 1971,
that state hosted over ten million refugees from the then East Pakistan.
The same can be said for Indian states bordering China, Nepal, Myanmar
and Pakistan.
The formation of a coalition governments, especially under the Congress
during 2004–14, forced even sceptics to recognize and admit the influence
of the regional parties upon New Delhi’s approach towards the neigh-
bours (Schaffer and Schaffer 2013; Maini 2011). The alliance partners
were slowing down and even sabotaged some of the policy initiatives of
the central government.
Similar arguments regarding Indian Muslims have remained an

anathema for the scholars and elites alike. Any suggestion of a religious
influence upon India’s approach towards the Middle East has been derided
as ‘right-wing argument’ or an agenda-driven exercise. This is more clearly
manifested in the arguments surrounding Israel and the prolonged absence
of Indo-Israeli relations. The support and sympathy of the Hindu right for
Israel and Zionism are easily attributed to their ‘shared’ anti-Muslim prej-
udices. Similar arguments of Congress-Arab linkage due to the pro-Muslim
position of the former are dismissed as mischievous and conspiracy. The
suggestions that democratic India will have to listen and accommodate the
views of its Muslim population on issues pertaining to the Middle East
have been loathsome and politically incorrect for the Indian elite (Prashad
2015). The eagerness to fight right-wing arguments has resulted in them
belittling the obvious: as a democratic country, India will not be able to
ignore the voice of a sizeable section of its population.
The normalization of Indo-Israeli relations has forced some to refer
to the domestic dimension elliptically. During his visit to Israel in July
2000 External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh publicly referred to
“domestic politics” as the factor for prolonged non-relations (Varadarajan
2005) and reflecting on Prime Minister skipping Ramallah during his
Israel visit in July 2017, a former diplomat noted that Modi “is not wor-
ried about vote-bank politics” (Sood 2017). However, such sentiments
are an exceptions and even those who attribute the pro-Israeli policies of
the US to its Jewish population do not like a similar comparison between
the Muslim population and India’s Middle East policy (Sarkar 2017;
Kattan 2017).
At the same time, it is essential to recognize that there are no systemic
scientific studies examining the link between the domestic Muslim com-
munity and India’s foreign policy. When the idea was still unpopular
among the Indian academia, Appadorai observed that the “impact of the
presence of a large Muslim minority in India on India’s foreign relations is
perhaps best seen in India’s relations” with the Middle East (Appadorai
1981, 148). Citing some of the prominent examples, Appadorai observes,
the Indian Muslims were with the Government of India in its pro-Arab
policy is evident; they were against the creation of the State of Israel; they
were against establishing diplomatic relations with it, they supported the
Government of India’s policy in regard to the Suez crisis and they supported
the Government of India’s policy in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict of
1967. (Appadorai 1981, 159)
One can stretch this argument to say that partly to accommodate the
Muslim views the government adopted a policy that it did.
Is there an Islamic dimension in India’s Saudi policy? It would be naïve
to suggest otherwise. Islam was less relevant in its dealings with Nasser’s
Egypt or Ba’athist Iraq and Syria, but this has never been the case with
Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it is equally irresponsible to argue that it
was exclusively dominated by the Islamic dimension. If Islam is not the
only factor, it is a dominant one. Religion has been a critical factor in the
evolution of India’s perception of the Kingdom and Islamic-religious par-
adigm has both positively and negatively affected and shaped the Indo-
Saudi relations. The importance of Saudi Arabia in Indian strategic
calculations has been heavily influenced by the Islamic factor.
Pan-Islamism
Pan-Islamism in the political sense of the word is as old as the faith itself.
As Bernard Lewis put it eloquently, Prophet Mohammed “established a
state during his lifetime, in which he did the things that statesmen do. He
commanded armies, he made war, he made peace, he collected taxes, and
he dispensed justice” (Lewis 2010, 70). Institutionalized through the
office of caliph after the Prophet’s death in 632 AD, pan-Islamism has
championed the cause of ummah, the inclusive community of believers.
The formation of various Islamic empires in the Middle East since the
mid-seventh century was primarily an effort in this direction. In the wake
of the Turkish abolition of the caliphate in 1924, the Hashemites and later
on al-Saud sought to revive the institution under their tutelage but in vain
(Nafi 2015; Teitelbaum 1998; Liebl 2009; Lewis 1933).
The Indian Muslims who rallied behind the Ottoman caliph during the
Khilafat Movement were not enamoured by the Hashemite claims as they
viewed the Sharif Hussein as the “stooge” of the British and Christians
and a usurper (Qureshi 1999, 83–84). In their view, the Sharif of Mecca
was set up to challenge, weaken and eventually unseat the legitimate
Ottoman caliph (Meleady 2016). There was a sense of relief among the
Khilafat leaders when al-Saud took over Mecca, and as one League func-
tionary remarked in December 1924, Hussein’s removal was “unwept,
unhonoured and unsung” (Pirzada 1982, II:14–15).
However, the abolition of the Caliphate by Ataturk removed the pan-
Islamic agenda and the Indian Muslims had to cope up with the Congress-
League tussle over India’s future. The partition of the subcontinent and
the formation of Pakistan posed new challenges to the Indian Muslims and
limited the scope for pan-Islamism especially when the Hindu right was
challenging their commitment and loyalty to India. Though a large num-
ber of Hindus and Sikhs were also killed during the post-partition riots, the
communal division of British India was a trauma for Indian Muslims, the
primary victims of the communal frenzy. Partly to assuage their feelings
and fears, India moved somewhat cautiously towards the Middle East,
especially vis-à-vis normalization of relations with Israel. Though anti-
colonialism and anti-imperialism were commonly used, domestic consider-
ations were equally crucial for Nehru’s recognition-without- relations
policy regarding Israel.
Simultaneously, pan-Islamism has been in vogue in the Middle East
even before the rise of Arab nationalism and the subsequent emergence of
pan-Arabism. Leaders such as Jamaluddin Afghani (1838–97) sought to
create a pan-Islamic awareness to counter European colonialism (Ozcan
1997). Indeed, much of anti-colonial discourse in the Middle East in the
early twentieth century had an Islamic dimension. Though Afghani’s ideas
were popular among the Muslim intellectuals of that time, they were
unable to transform into a mass movement. The emergence of fissures and
tensions among different Muslim communities, especially between the
Arabs and Turks—the followers of the same Sunni faith—led to the germi-
nation of nationalistic ideas in different parts of the Middle East. The
debate remained confined to pan-Islamic prisms and the fissures cantered
around the question of leadership of the ummah. The end of the First
World War, the abolition of Caliphate and intensification of Arab-Jewish
conflict in mandate Palestine continued to be debated in pan-Islamic
terms. However, the Second World War and the formation of Israel has-
tened the transformations to pan-Arabism and this manifested most sig-
nificantly in the rise of nationalist-military leadership. They pushed
pan-Islamism to the backburner in local and regional politics with Arabism
and pan-Arabism gaining popularity and secularism and socialism became
rallying points for the Arab masses.
Unlike other countries, Egypt has history to bank upon and emerged as
the centre of Arab unity against colonialism and hegemonic Western
designs. The failure of the Arab countries, including Egypt, to prevent the
formation of Israel in 1948 galvanized popular anger against the
conservative rulers who were dependent upon the colonial powers and
their largesse for survival. The Arab humiliation in 1948 paved the way for
the Free Officers Revolution of July 1952 and soon saw the emergence of
Nasser. His military ‘defeat’ against the tripartite aggression in 1956

catapulted him as the leader of the Arab masses beyond Egypt. Though
not everyone was enamoured by his meteoric rise, for over a decade follow-
ing the Suez War, Nasser symbolized Arab nationalism and pan-Arabism.
As discussed earlier, the Saudi policy on issues such as anti-imperialism,
decolonization, opposition to Western-sponsored military alliances or
non-alignment was not different from Nehru’s. However, the conserva-
tive and non-secular Saudi polity meant that there was little politico-
ideological convergence between New Delhi and Riyadh, and since the
early 1950s Nehru gravitated towards Nasser-led secular Arab nationalism
and socialism. This phase ended in the aftermath of the June War of 1967
when Israel dealt a devastating blow to pan-Arabism personified by
President Nasser. Hiding behind the anti-Israeli rhetoric, the leaders of
the 1952 revolution failed to transform the socio-economic conditions of
the ordinary Egyptians and to bring about far-reaching structural changes.
Therefore, the Arab defeat in 1967 abruptly ended the journey of pan-
Arabism. The decimation of the Arab armies not only undermined the
position of Nasser as the regional leader but also dealt a fatal blow to the
ideas of secularism.
The shifting regional climate offered an opportune moment to Saudi
Arabia and its claims for the leadership of the Arab and Islamic world. The
nascent oil wealth added to the Saudi appetite. Pan-Islamism has been a
recurrent theme in the Arabian Peninsula. Amidst the First World War, the
British encouraged the Sharif Hussein of Mecca to rebel against the
Ottoman rule (Wilson 1991), but when he was proving to be weak and
inefficient, London sided with the al-Saud and facilitated the formation of
the Kingdom of Hejaz and Nejd in 1925 which later became the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. After the end of the Second World War, with the US play-
ing the midwife, Britain encouraged the formation of the Baghdad Pact in
1955 composed of monarchical Iran and Iraq and pro-Western Pakistan
and Turkey (Mawby 2005). The formation of the military bloc composed
of conservative rulers with Pakistan as its core unnerved India and forced
it to reach out to secular Arab nationalists.
Despite its opposition to the Baghdad Pact (later renamed as CENTO),
Saudi Arabia continued its efforts towards pan-Islamism as a counter to
pan-Arabism. Nasser’s anti-monarchical rhetoric, his calls for the
overthrowing of monarchies and aspirations for feudalism giving way to
socialism unnerved many Arab rulers who viewed pan-Arabism with great
suspicion (Tibi 1981). During the heydays of Nasserism, al-Saud and
other monarchies were grudgingly playing a secondary role in regional

politics. Military coups and turmoil in Syria and Iraq and their cascading
effect on Arab societies at large alarmed them and contributed to what
E. H. Kerr called The Arab Cold War (Kerr 1965). However, the fire in
the al-Aqsa, Islam’s third holiest site in East Jerusalem, in August 1969
provided an opportune moment for the Arab monarchies to revive their
pan-Islamic agenda and this led to the first Islamic summit in September
that year and the subsequent formation of the OIC.
As discussed earlier, since independence India’s policy towards the Arab
world in general and Saudi Arabia in particular has been shaped by New
Delhi’s concerns over a possible Islamic bloc with Pakistan as the pivot.
This apprehension was not unfounded as Pakistan was able to court the
Middle Eastern countries by leveraging its Muslim identity. This strategy
brought some friends, but its efforts towards an Islamic political bloc had
to wait until the late 1960s.
For its part, India was concerned that Pakistan would become a hand-
maid of a pan-Islamic alliance and would undermine its interests in the
Middle East. This propelled India to be vociferous in its opposition to the
US-led and Pakistan-included military alliances and its unequivocal
endorsement of Nasser’s leadership as the vanguard against the Western
imperialism. As discussed in the chapter on Pakistan, New Delhi’s nervous
reaction to the first Islamic summit in Rabat in September 1969, the
unfolding Indo-Pakistan diplomatic tussle at the meeting, its eventual
‘withdrawal’ from it and the diplomatic embarrassment it faced (Noorani
1970; Singh 2006; Baruah 2002) highlighted India’s dilemmas over a
pan-Islamic alliance and its consequences.
As a result, the emerging pan-Islamic solidarity accompanied by overall
conservatism in the Middle East region inhibited the Indo-Saudi relations
since the late 1960s. As discussed in the next chapter, the body adopting
a pro-Pakistani position on Kashmir issue and its frequent condemnation
of India over its human rights records only made matters worse. The OIC
played into Pakistani hands and transformed Kashmir into an international
issue thereby harming the Indian interests.
Moreover, even without the Pakistani factor pan-Islamism have been
prime factors for the Kingdom vis-à-vis India and remained a main attrac-
tion until the late 1990s when India’s economic strength began to increase.
India’s large Muslim population meant that Riyadh would not be able to
ignore New Delhi and its Islamic importance. At the same time, it was
unable to wish away the Pakistani concerns and its ‘brotherly’ ties. Some
suggest that King Faisal personally intervened to invite India for the
Rabat meeting as he felt that a country of 60 million Muslims could not
be ignored on technical grounds (Pasha 1995). He also did not wish to
be seen to be abandoning the Indian Muslim community that became a
minority due to partition at the altar of Pakistan. King Faisal’s mediatory
efforts in Rabat proved insufficient to placate President Yahya Khan to
conceding to India’s presence at the Islamic summit (Pasha 1995;
Noorani 2010).
At a bilateral level, Saudi Arabia has been seeking to leverage the Indian
Muslim population to further its regional and global interests. Its leaders
have been making favourable statements concerning India’s ability to pro-
mote the welfare of its Muslim population. For example, during his visit to
India in 1955, King Saud observed: “I desire to say to my Muslim breth-
ren all over the world with satisfaction that the fate of Indian Muslims is in
safe hands.”2 The joint communiqué issued in April 1982 during the visit
of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the Kingdom remarked that the
growth in bilateral relations “would not only be to mutual benefit and
advantage but would also contribute to the strength, security and stability
of their respective regions” (Annexure 4).
While the details are sketchy, Saudi Arabia has been a major source of
financial support for many charitable Muslim organizations in India that
are working for the uplift of disadvantaged sections of the community.
Some of the prominent organizations which benefit or in the past benefit-
ted from Saudi financial largesse include Al-Jamiya Al-Islamia and Islamic
Mission Trust (Malappuram, Kerala), the Islamic Welfare Trust and the
Mujahideen Arabic College (Palakkad, Kerala), Jamia Sanabil and Jamia
Millia Islamia (New Delhi), Jamia Salafiya (Banaras, Uttar Pradesh) and
the pan-India Ahl-e-Hadith movement (Sikand 2005, 2016; Jaffrelot
2017). Through the building of mosques, madrassas and Arabic learning
institutions and the distribution of the holy text, Saudi Arabia has been
reaching out to the poorer and grassroots of the Indian Muslim popula-
tion (Sikand 2016; Jaffrelot 2017).
However, until the 1990s when the economy became the pre-eminent
Indian attraction for the outside world, the Islamic dimension proved to
be an impediment in the Indo-Saudi relations. While the government-to-
government contacts were ‘correct’, minimal and sparse, the bilateral ties
benefited from the large-scale people-to-people contact manifested
through haj.
2
The Hindu, 11 December 1955 cited (Mudiam 1994, 87).
Haj Pilgrimage
Since Prophet Mohammed began this practice in 632 AD, the annual haj
pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina has been the largest assembly of human-
ity. Over centuries the gathering of believers from around the world also
provided opportunities for trade, exchange of ideas and people-to-people
contacts. It attracted traders and merchants from various parts of the
world and commercial contacts, in turn, paved the way for the introduc-
tion of Islam to the subcontinent. Indian merchandise, especially spices,
cereals, perfumes and silk, were sought after by the Arab and other mer-
chants who travelled to Mecca and Medina during haj.
Until the discovery of oil, haj had been the primary source of revenue
for the fledging Saudi state. Rich Indian Nawabs (members of the aristo-
cratic gentry similar to the peerage system in Britain) and princes donated
large sums of money for the upkeep of various Islamic holy sites in the
Middle East, including the Ka’aba, the sanctum sanctorum in Mecca. Such
philanthropic contributions earned them the respect of the community
both in India and in the Middle East (Ahmad 1969). Despite the geo-
graphical distance and the arduous travel routes, the Indian Muslim nobles
undertook the visit to Mecca during the haj season as it was not only con-
sidered an obligatory part of the faith but also seen as an act that absolves
the faithful from all worldly sins and ensures heavenly abode in the after-
life. Most of these nobles, because of their wealth and philanthropic activi-
ties, were welcomed with warmth by the Hashemite rulers of Hejaz and
sometimes even given family audience, a rare occurrence given that the
Sharifs were considered to be the highest in Muslim social hierarchy.3
The oil boom of the 1970s and the transformation of the global econ-
omy have changed the nature of haj but it still spurs local trade. Though the
revenue generation through haj has been less significant to Saudi economy,
it is still substantial. For example, haj-related revenue accruing to Saudi
Arabia in 2016 was estimated at US$50 billion and Saudi experts estimate
that by 2022 with the expansion of the Masjid al-Haram nearing comple-
tion, the haj-related revenues could rise to US$150 billion (Al-Thaqafi
2017, 150). As the custodian of the two holy mosques, Saudi Arabia has
been benefitting from the haj and the year-round umrah pilgrimages in
enhancing its global positions and relations with other countries.
3
Some of the accounts of haj pilgrimage undertaken by Nawab Sikandar Begum of Bhopal
in 1864 indicate the warmth and respect shown by the Sharif family to the Begum in Mecca
(Lambert-Hurley 2007).
The flow of Indian pilgrims to Hejaz has been noted since the early
days of Islam and in the 1920s some of the political contacts between
Indian and Arab leaders occurred during haj; for example, the Ali
Brothers—leaders of the Khilafat movement—met Al-Haj Amin al-
Husseini, the Arab leader who was fighting the Jewish homeland project
in Palestine during haj (Kupferschmidt 1978). Over the years, India has
been sending one of the largest contingents. Following partition,
14,000 Indians performed haj in 1948 and this number has been
increasing since then (Annexure 5) and has been helpful in forging
closer socio-cultural bonds especially when the political contacts were
minimal.
Towards facilitating haj pilgrimage, India retained the Vice Consul in
the British Embassy in Jeddah which functioned during the British rule
and in 1948 it was made a consulate. As its diplomatic footprints in the
region expanded, the mission was upgraded as an embassy in 1957. In the
early 1980s, the Saudi government advised all foreign missions to shift to
the capital and the Indian embassy was moved in 1985. Meanwhile, due
to the historical association and economic and haj consideration, the
Indian mission in Jeddah became a consulate and continues to operate in
the port city. More than a foreign policy agenda, haj is a domestic issue for
the Indian government, and hence as early as in 1948 it established a
Central Haj Committee with Mumbai as headquarters and branches in
different parts of the country for local administration. As of 2017, there
are 31 haj offices in the country.
For socio-economic and political considerations the Union Government
has been facilitating haj by arranging international travel and local logisti-
cal support in the Kingdom. While Islam demands the faithful to perform
haj at least once in one’s lifetime subject to their ability, a vast majority of
the Indian Muslims could not afford it. For centuries, most hajis took
boats to Jeddah and this relatively less expensive mode of travel was dis-
continued in 1995 due to MV Akbari, the ship which used to transport
them, growing old. Hence, since 1996 hajis travel by air and this led to
government bearing a portion of the air travel in the form of subsidy.
Responding to a Special Leave Petition filed by the government of
India in a case pertaining to allocation of seats to private operators for haj
pilgrimage in Maharashtra, in May 2012 the Supreme Court ruled against
haj subsidy and ordered the government to “progressively reduce the
amount of subsidy so as to completely eliminate it within a period of 10
years from 8 May 2010” (India, Rajya Sabha 2013a). Though this move
was justified (Vijetha and Ali 2012) in the name of secularism and the
need for the state to stay away from personal beliefs of its citizens, the
removal of the subsidy would be a hardship for many ordinary Muslims.
The number of Indian haj pilgrims has significantly increased in the past
two decades and so have the travel costs. For example, in early 1990–91
about 25,000 Indian Muslims travelled to Saudi Arabia for haj, while in
2010 the number had increased to 170,000. Likewise, the cost of travel
has shot up from about INR 17,000 (US$700) in 1990 to INR 55,000
(US$850) which means the overall subsidy cost for the exchequer has
increased from INR 10.5 crore (US$4.2 million) in 1994 to INR 685
crore (US$105 million) in 2011 (India, SCI 2011).
Due to cost considerations, in 2011 Air India lost its monopoly over
haj pilgrims and the Haj Committee signed an agreement with Saudia as
the official carrier for the Indian hajis. The subsidy removal as demanded
by the courts and loss of lucrative contract by Air India had compelled the
government to revive the earlier practice of maritime travel. With the
advancement of technologies and seaborne innovations, a large number of
pilgrims can travel to Jeddah within 2–3 days and this practice is scheduled
to resume in the coming years (PTI 2018).
In addition, the government has been providing additional help in the
form of medical support to the hajis and had been compensating them in
cases of accidents and calamity. In 1958, for example, following a fire in
the haj site, a sum of ₹5000 was provided to affected Indian pilgrims
(India, MEA 1959), and likewise, about 45 Indian nationals were killed in
a stampede during the 2015 haj. Indian officials have been periodically
visiting the Kingdom to supervise the facilities and amenities available for
the hajis (India, MEA 1961).
As highlighted in Annexure 5, there is a continuous increase in the
number of Indian hajis and from about 12,000 in 1950 it rose to 20,000 in
1960 and nearly to 100,000 in 2000. It reached a record number of
171,671 in 2010 and for a while, the number remained the same. However,
due to the ongoing expansion work in the Masjid al-Haram around
Ka’aba, in 2014 the Saudi authorities reduced the total number of pil-
grims to two million and imposed a cut and this resulted in a drop in
Indian pilgrims. In 2016, “a total of 135,904 Indian pilgrims performed
haj, out of which 99,904 hajis went through Haj Committee of India and
36,000 through private operators” (India, MEA 2017a). The haj quota is
often decided on a year-on-year basis and it enables Indian leaders and
officials to engage with the Kingdom. With the near completion of the
expansion work in Masjid al-Haram and the consequent increase in its

capacity, the 2017 quota for the Indian hajis was increased to 170,000
(PTI 2017a) and 175,000 for 2018 (PTI 2018).
At the same time, there are many controversies surrounding haj. Given
the importance of the pilgrimage for Muslims, haj has evolved into a
patronage system and in a landmark judgment in October 2011 the
Supreme Court curtailed the number of VIPs going for haj on the govern-
ment quota, which it termed wasteful upon the exchequer and a ‘bad
religious practice.’ Observing that goodwill haj visit which began in 1967
following the Indo-Pakistan war a couple of years earlier, the Court felt
that the patronage system only benefitted politicians and bureaucrats and
hence had to be scrapped (PTI 2011). In a subsequent judgment in July
2012, it also set limits on the discretionary quotes exercised by various
state functionaries.4
For long, Indian hajis were given temporary passports to facilitate their
travel to the Kingdom, but due to concerns over terrorism and human
trafficking, in 2009 Saudi Arabia decided to discontinue this practice and
insisted on regular travel documents. This posed some problems for pil-
grims whose applications were stuck in the system but since then all
Indians going for haj use standard passports issued by the government of
India (India, Rajya Sabha 2013b).
Despite these controversies and drawbacks, haj has been a significant aspect
of the religious bond between the two countries. In addition to the annual
pilgrimages, like their counterparts from other countries, Indian Muslims
also travel to Mecca and Medina throughout the year to perform umrah.
Though not mandatory, this is considered an important religious practice
among the Muslims and is preferred by celebrities whose presence during
the haj would be distracting and challenging in terms of crowd management.
Nearly 300,000 Indians perform umrah every year. If one includes both
these categories, about 450,000 Indians go to Mecca annually. Thus, haj and
umrah have provided a strong impetus to the bilateral relations by facilitating
a continuous flow of Indians to Mecca since the early days of Islam.
Radicalism
Of late, religious radicalism among a section of the Indian Muslims has
been magnified due to reports that some citizens have joined the ranks
of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Singh 2015). Media
4
Accordingly, the quota for the President was set at 100 seats; Vice-President and Prime
Minister 75 seats each; and External Affairs Minister 50 seats (India, Rajya Sabha 2015).
reports suggested that the security agencies have put several hundred
Muslim youths under scanner for online radical activities and a few doz-
ens have been detained. Some have even been arrested during their
transit at airports in Gulf countries and Turkey and were deported back
to India (Singh 2017).
The phenomenon of radicalism is neither new nor confined to the
Muslim community of the country. In the early 1980s, India was nearly
wrecked by the militancy among its Sikh population, leading to the assas-
sination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Likewise, the spread of ethnic
conflict in Sri Lanka into the Indian soil resulted in the killing of former
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a Tamil female suicide bomber. Extremism
among the majority Hindu population culminated in the destruction
of the four-century-old Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in December 1992.
If Christian extremism is not uncommon in the north-eastern part of the
country, some of the anti-Tamil violence in Sri Lanka and anti-Rohingya
violence in Myanmar have been spearheaded by Buddhist monks.
Therefore, it is essential to be cautious while discussing extremism among
Indian Muslims.
India’s syncretic culture and secular polity largely kept the Muslim
secured and relatively immune from Islamic radicalism common in differ-
ent part the world, especially the Middle East and Europe. They have
eschewed from militant jihadi groups such as al-Qaida. Despite the fre-
quent militancy in Kashmir since the early 1990s, no Indian has ever
known to have joined the jihad in Afghanistan which attracted thousands
of Arabs who later came to be known as Afghan Arabs. While the menace
of terrorism has been spreading in different parts of the world, very few
have any Indian links or connections.
At the same time, many terror attacks within the country are linked to
various Muslim outfits and organization, supported or funded by Pakistan
with local logistical support. One such group, the Indian Mujahedeen,
had become notorious for carrying out small-scale attacks at crowded
public places in many parts of India. It remained active between 2007 and
2010 and was eventually neutralized by security measures.
In recent years, the ISIS has managed to attract many Muslim youths
to its ranks and this has been attributed to technological advancements in
communication and online radicalization. It has been argued that one of
the primary reasons for the success of ISIS in drawing the Indian youths has
been the spread of Salafi and Wahhabi Islam in certain parts of the country
(Safi 2016; Jaffrelot 2017). This is more palpable in Kerala due to close
links between many Salafi preachers based in Saudi Arabia and other parts
of the Gulf. Many return migrants from the Gulf show far more religiosity
than their counterparts in the state or even compared to their lifestyle
before migration. Not every Salafist or Wahhabist become naturally radical
or extremists, but according to media reports, the maximum number of
Indians who joined ISIS or were inclined towards it came from Kerala
(Safi 2016).
Many scholars, analysts and security experts are of the view that Saudi
Arabia has been and continues to be a significant source of radicalism
among the Indian Muslim through its dawah (preaching) and charitable
activities. In the last couple of decades, the country has witnessed a spurt
in Salafi Islamic practices and some also see its influence in the rise of jihad-
ism in Kashmir (Dehlvi 2016). In some cases, the Salafism has been attrib-
uted to Gulf returnees after their long stint in the Kingdom (Philip 2016;
Jaffrelot and Louër 2017; Ullekh 2013). For example, Kerala which is
traditionally recognized for its progressive views towards women is becom-
ing conservative and has witnessed a noticeable increase in the number of
women abandoning the traditional dress in favour of hijab (Meleady 2016).
There is no information in the public domain to suggest that India has
raised its concerns over Salafi influences in the country with the Saudi
authorities. However, growing intelligence cooperation between the two
governments, especially since 2008, suggests that both are aware of the
long-term implications of the extremism. In recent years Saudi Arabia has
been a victim of Islamic extremism. Fighting terrorism and combating
radicalism figure prominently in the joint declarations and official state-
ments. The frequent appointment of serving police officials as ambassadors
to Riyadh (e.g. T. T. P. Abdullah and Ahmad Javed) does suggest New
Delhi’s concerns over possible Saudi links to extremism.
The links between Saudi Islam and Islamic radicalism worldwide are
more complicated than the day-to-day engagements between states and
governments. Those who see a symbiotic link attribute it to the prolonged
Saudi endeavour to promote its puritanical Salafi-Wahhabi Islam. The
al-Saud’s desire and determination to make this to be the most authentic
version of Islam has been a source of radicalism among Muslims world
over, especially among the Sunni Muslims.
Such perceptions are not without a foundation. The Wahhabi interpre-
tation of the faith presents a radical view of other Muslim groups such as
Shias, Sufis and Ahmadiyyas as well as towards non-Islamic faiths such as
Judaism, Christianity and other religions.5 Both as a source of legitimacy

and as state policy, Saudi Arabia has invested considerable human capital
and material resources in promoting its version of Islam (Maclntyre 2013).
Much of these indoctrination-oriented activities were carried out as part of
charitable and dawah activities.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia alone cannot be held responsible for the
religious radicalism among the Indian Muslims. Ahl-e-Hadeeth or Ahle
Hadees (People of Hadith) movement, which is also puritanical, gained
ground in the country in the eighteenth century around the same time as
Wahhabism was spreading in the Arabian Peninsula. Evidences suggest
that some of the scholars who influenced Muhammed bin Abdul Wahhab
in his earlier years when he was studying in Medina were of Indian origin
(DeLong-Bas 2004, 20–21). There were also religious revivalist move-
ments such as Jamat-e-Islami (Islamic Society) and Tablighi Jamat
(Outreach Society) which emerged entirely from within India, especially
when the Arabian influences in the subcontinent were limited (Sikand
2002; Ahmad 2009). For example, Jamat-e-Islami, Tablighee Jamat,
Deobandi (those who adhere to the Deoband School) and Ahl-e-Hadeeth
movement are variations of radical Islam and emerging indigenously they
remain relevant in contemporary India. There have been similar radical
and orthodox Islamic movements in southern India such as the Kerala
Nadvathul Mujahideen (KNM), Karnataka Salafi Movement (KSM) and
Popular Front of India (PFI). In other words, religious radicalism among
Indian Muslims is not entirely of foreign or Saudi origin but has also been
local as in other parts of the world (Agwani 1986).
The question of Wahhabi influence in India came to the forefront pri-
marily in the early 1970s when a large number of Indian Muslims started
emigrating to Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf Arab countries in search
of livelihood. Many of them transformed their lifestyle in tune with the local
customs and religious milieu. As a result, they returned with greater conser-
vatism when they left the Indian shores. This has been noticeable among
the Keralite migrants (Hassan 2016). This is arguably due to the growing
influence of the Saudi version of Islam in India (Safi 2016; Jaffrelot 2017).
Anecdotal evidences suggest some links as a majority of Indian youths who
5
For a glimpse of Wahhabi thought or views on Sufi, Shi’ite or Muslims of other sects and
people of non-Islamic faiths, see the fatwas issued by Abdulaziz Bin-Baz, the former Grand
Mufti of Saudi Arabia (1993–99) and other scholars at the Dar al-Ifta of Saudi Arabia (KSA
2018).
have joined the ISIS ranks or travelled to Syria and Iraq to live in the Islamic
State, hail from Kerala (PTI 2017b), a state which contributes over half the
Indian migrant labourers to the Gulf (Rajan 2004).
Moreover, Wahhabism has emerged as one of the most powerful fun-
damentalist trends in modern Sunni Islam. Within this, there are radical
groups such as Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith, PFI, KSM, and KMK which are
partly inspired by the Saudi Wahhabi ideology. There is no direct and
conclusive evidence to suggest that the Saudi government, its senior offi-
cials, influential princes or private citizens have been directly involved in
the promotion of radicalism in India. At the same time, the general per-
ception is different. Many informed observers believe that Saudi Arabia
has been the harbinger of radical Islam especially through the promotion
of Wahhabi Islam. Besides providing Arabic and Quranic education in the
home countries, Riyadh offers a large number of scholarships to madrassa
students to study in the Islamic University located in Medina, often iden-
tified as a major source of radicalization among the Muslim youths
(Preckel 2013).
The Saudi involvement and funding in jihad in Afghanistan and build-
ing of mosques and religious seminaries in other parts of the world have
been identified as the primary cause for radicalism. Above all, 15 out of the
19 hijackers who carried out the September 11 terror attacks in the US
were Saudi citizens and some studies have accused the Saudi educational
system of fomenting extremism among the Muslim youths (Shea and
Al-Ahmed 2006).
Global backlash over the September 11 forced the Kingdom to distance
itself from the jihadi groups and compelled it to initiate actions against
individuals and groups responsible for fomenting terrorism and extremism
both within and outside the kingdom. This was also partly due to the
Kingdom being at the receiving end of terrorism, especially during
2002–04. Moreover, the growing criticism of the West of radicalism in
Islam could not be merely dismissed as Islamophobia (Akbarzadeh and
Mansouri 2010).
These, in turn, forced the al-Saud to initiate a spate of measures to com-
bat the negative stereotype not only against the Kingdom but also against
Islam. These include revision of school curriculum, reforms in the educa-
tional system, introduction of new teaching methods, removal of hateful
references to other religions and faiths (Prokop 2003; Basbait and Wilson
2005; Le-Renard 2008; Quamar 2016), improvements in the conditions
of the Shia minority in the country (Kechichian 2013; Alshamsi 2012) and
the organization of international inter-faith dialogues (Thompson 2014).

The past is too long to be overcome, and despite the noticeable shifts and
changes, many Indian intellectuals, journalists and the wider public con-
tinue to view the Kingdom as a promoter of radical Islam within India
(Habib 2014; Raman 2015; Nanjappa 2014).
Partly as a response to these lingering suspicions, during the April 2016
visit of Prime Minister Modi to Riyadh, both countries agreed to work
together and cooperate in stopping online radicalization and pursue intel-
ligence sharing to counter extremism and fight terrorism (India, MEA
2016). In recent years, the Kingdom has been helping India in the fight
against radicalism and organized crimes by extraditing those accused of
organized crimes in India (India, MEA 2017b).6
Conclusion
Islam as a vibrant religion and shared cultural heritage provide India and
Saudi Arabia with a unique opportunity to find common grounds. In the
past, it has played a significant role in making India policy towards Saudi
Arabia primarily through haj pilgrimage. However, due to Pakistan factor
and Saudi-Pakistan enthusiasm for pan-Islamism, this common heritage
became a strategic liability. With the changing geopolitical and regional
dynamics and the growing criticisms of Pakistan over its continued sup-
port for radical Islam and jihadi terrorist groups, India and Saudi Arabia
can find common grounds based on the Islamic heritage and its positive
influence upon their citizens.
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CHAPTER 5
Pakistan Factor
For long, Pakistan has occupied a pivotal place in shaping India’s foreign
policy and they were partly shaped by it. India’s self-perception of inclu-
sive nationalism was accompanied by Pakistan’s Islam-centric overtures to
the Middle East. These led to Pakistan looming large in India’s view of the
outside powers and their interests, involvements and interactions with
them. In some ways, it was a continuation of the nationalist struggle; after
1947 the pre-partition political rivalry between the Congress Party and
Muslim League was prominently played out in the Arab-Islamic Middle
East where both countries sought to use their respective national creden-
tials, namely, inclusive nationalism by India and Islamic identity by
Pakistan, in furtherance of their national interests. This competition got a
boost over the Kashmir issue that both were staking claims and seeking the
support of the Islamic countries of the Middle East.
More than seven decades after the departure of the British from the
subcontinent, the Kashmir dispute has no sign of a resolution and the
diplomatic maneuvers of both the countries in the Middle East persist. At
the same time, concerning the Middle East in general and Saudi Arabia,
in particular, one could mark three distinct phases of the Indo-Pakistan
relations. The first phase corresponded with the partition of the subconti-
nent and continued until the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 during which
India was relatively better off than Pakistan as the latter’s efforts for a

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_5
pan- Islamic alliance ran against the dominant pan-Arabist discourse.

Nasserism and his brand of secular, socialist and pan-Arabism also prevailed
over the US-sponsored Cold War–centric military alliances.
The second phase began with the Arab military defeat in the June War
and the ushering in of the resurgent pan-Islamism spearheaded by Saudi
Arabia. If the Rabat Islamic summit signalled the ascendance of conserva-
tive forces, the Saudi claims for leadership were cemented by the oil boom.
This was the fructification of continued Pakistani efforts for a pan-Islamic
bloc partly both to consolidate its influence and to overcome its strategic
vulnerability vis-à-vis India. The formation of OIC provided an institu-
tional framework for Pakistan to further its anti-India agenda in the latter
part of the Cold War.
The third phase of the Pakistani factor in India’s foreign policy calcula-
tions began with the end of the Cold War and had two distinct features.
New Delhi’s willingness to delink Pakistan from its Middle East policy
partly contributed to the normalization of relations with Israel. India’s
aspiration for a significant role in Asia and beyond came into conflict with
its preoccupation with Pakistan and boxed it within the subcontinental
politics. However, a formal delink had to wait until the late 1990s when
economic reforms began showing results. After decades of being an aid
recipient, India was slowly becoming an economic power and potential
market for the outside world, including the oil-producing Arab Gulf
countries. The decoupling of Pakistan from the region became pro-
nounced following the visit of External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh to
the Kingdom in January 2001.
For clarity, these developments are organized into four subthemes,
namely, Kashmir issue, Indo-Pakistani wars, the formation of OIC and its
implications and the shift in the trajectory of Indo-Saudi relations in the
wake of the delink.
Kashmir Issue
The partition of British India along religious lines was accompanied by the
erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir becoming vital for the
national ethos of India and Pakistan and a bone of contention. The
Himalayan state of Kashmir comprised of three distinct ethno-religious
subdivisions: the Muslim-majority Kashmir, Hindu-dominated Jammu
and the largely Buddhist Ladakh. The overall population was predomi-
nantly Muslim but was ruled by a Hindu king, Raja Hari Singh. Both
PAKISTAN FACTOR 85
India and Pakistan laid claims to Kashmir, located on their demarcation

line as outlined by the Radcliffe Boundary Commission. As a Muslim-
majority state, its inclusion with Pakistan was essential for the Muslim
League, which fought for a Muslim ‘homeland’ in the subcontinent.
Likewise, the Congress Party’s aspirations for an inclusive India would be
strengthened by the inclusion of the Muslim-majority state into India.
Both the countries, thus, viewed the inclusion of Kashmir as the raison
d’être of their legitimacy and even existence.
In the wake of the cross-border infiltration backed by the Pakistani
army, on 26 October 1947 Raja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of
Accession and thereby joined Kashmir with the Indian union. This move
was supported by the National Conference, the dominant political force at
that time, headed by Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah (Lamb 1966; Rai
2004). Not happy with the turn of events, the regular Pakistani army
crossed the borders of the State of Kashmir towards a forcible annexation
with Pakistan. This resulted in New Delhi sending its troops to defend
Kashmir, which now had become a part of the Indian union.
As the fighting was progressing, on 31 December 1947, the prime min-
ister referred the Kashmir issue to the UN Security Council with a request
to restrain Pakistan from aiding and supporting its nationals and tribesmen
from its Northwest Frontier region who had invaded Jammu and Kashmir,
which India called an “act of aggression.” Responding to this, on 21 April
1948 the UNSC adopted Resolution 47 which proposed a three-stage
solution: withdrawal of “tribesmen and Pakistani nationals” from Jammu
and Kashmir; upon the completion of the first stage, India would with-
draw its own forces from the state “progressively to the minimum strength
required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and
order.” Once these conditions are fulfilled and the situation became con-
ducive, the UNSC demanded that India “should undertake that there will
be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold
a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State
to India or Pakistan” (UNSC 1948). In subsequent years, the UNSC did
not adopt any resolutions on this matter, primarily because of the Soviet
veto in favour of India (Bakshi 1998) but the subject remained on the UN
agenda since then.
The ceasefire came into force on 1 January 1949 and position held by
both the armies in Kashmir came to be known as Line of Control (LoC).
This brought about a de facto partition of the State of Kashmir and various
bilateral efforts towards reaching an amicable settlement have been futile.
Both countries have fought two major wars in 1965 and 1971 and near
nuclear confrontation in 1998. There were periodic cross-border tension
and Pakistan-supported infiltrations into India which often resulted in ter-
rorism, with 26 November 2008 terror attacks in Mumbai being the dead-
liest one (Dwivedi 2008). In the wake of the Bangladesh War of 1971,
both concluded the Shimla Accord of 1972 whereby they agreed to resolve
the Kashmir dispute bilaterally, but this commitment has not inhibited
Pakistan from raising the issue in various international forums, especially
the OIC.
When India referred the Kashmir issue to the UN in December 1947,
the world body had 57 members, including eight (Egypt, Iran, Iraq,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey and Yemen) from the Middle East.
The latter has been the prime focus and even constituency of Pakistan’s
foreign policy. As discussed elsewhere, the most visible manifestation of
this can be located in India’s attitude towards Israel (Kumaraswamy 2010,
167–70). Despite the absence of any bilateral problems or disputes, India
was wary of befriending the Jewish State lest Pakistan could capitalize on
it. Two of Nehru’s biographers—Brecher (1968b, 130) and Gopal (1980,
170)—identify Pakistan as one of the prime reasons for Nehru’s reluctance
to establish diplomatic relations with it. The potential ‘mischief’ Pakistan
could play in the Middle East over the Indo-Israeli ties has been flagged
by others (Heptullah 1991, 161–63; Srivastava 1992).
The Pakistani factor was also responsible for India agreeing to Israel’s
exclusion from the Bandung Conference of April 1955. As Nehru’s
confidant Krishna Menon told Michael Brecher, erstwhile Burma (now
Myanmar) was keen to invite Israel for the Afro-Asian meeting of inde-
pendent states and
[w]e said our position is the same but we have got to carry the Arabs with
us. We will do whatever the Conference (Bogor) agrees but we will vote for
an invitation to Israel. And we were three to two, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka),
Burma and India for, and Pakistan and Indonesia against; but Pakistan was
the leader. They made propaganda against us and issued leaflets terming us
a pro-Jewish country. (Brecher 1968a, 52)
Likewise, in a controversial remark to a Mumbai-based weekly, in June

1982 Israeli Consul Youssef Hassain accused the Indian leaders of being
“afraid of Arabs, they are afraid that Iraq will cancel their contracts, Saudi
Arabia will stop accepting labourers … India is always asking for floor at
PAKISTAN FACTOR 87
the UN and other international forums to denounce Israel and prove to

the Arabs that you are doing more than Pakistan. That way you think you
will impress the Arabs” (Sunday Observer 1982). Similar criticisms have
been levelled by the opposition parties, but when there was no relation,
this was a careless and Hassain was declared persona non grata. For the
next six years, Israel was unable to send his successor to its consulate in
Mumbai.
The Indian apprehension over Pakistan, however, was not unfounded.
Despite differences over its excessive flagging of Islam, the Arab-Islamic
Middle East was favourably inclined towards Pakistan. In 1955 the latter
joined Iraq, Iran and the UK to form the US-sponsored Baghdad Pact.
When Iraq left it after the July 1958 military coup, the bloc was renamed
CENTO. The military alliance was part of the post-War US strategy of
containment of Soviet Union, but Pakistan used it to pursue its anti-Indian
policies. Furthermore, in July 1964, Pakistan joined Turkey and Iran to
form the Regional Cooperation and Development (RCD) and this body
survived the Islamic revolution and the end of the Cold War.
At the same time, the US-led anti-Soviet bloc politics placed Pakistan at
odds with some of the prominent players in the Middle East. Not only
Nasser but also King Saud was opposed to the alliance politics. The latter
felt that Israel and its aggressive policies were more severe to regional sta-
bility than the threats posed by the Soviet hegemony. Such a reading of
the bloc politics brought some Arab leaders, especially Nasser, closer to
Nehru’s India which opposed such a Cold War–centric worldview. They
feared that the bloc politics would not only expand the Euro-centric Cold
War into other parts of the world but also divert precious national resources
away from nation-building.
Pakistan, however, was treading a different course and at times even went
against Nasserism. Perceived vulnerability against India was compounded
by the early demise of its founder Mohammed Ali Jinnah in September
1948, just over a year after Pakistan’s emergence. This plunged the coun-
try into a spiral of political instability, impeded democratic governance and
eventually led to prolonged military rule. Unlike Republican Turkey,
Pakistan could not benefit from the military rule in terms of institution
building, a process that could have shored up democratic governance in
later years. Thus, its pro-Western orientation was accompanied by a more
conservative approach towards the Middle East. Though it resolutely
opposed recognition of Israel, Pakistani leaders were not enamoured by
Nasser. During the Suez War, it was disappointed that Israel did not
advance towards Cairo and topple Nasser (Hashmi 2011). The Pakistan
factor in India’s calculations became more prominent in the late 1960s.
Indo-Pakistan Wars
The gradual tension between Nasser and Arab monarchs became condu-
cive for Pakistan, and prominent Middle Eastern countries were helpful
to it during conflicts with India. The outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan War
in September 1965 posed a challenge to the Middle Eastern countries as
most of them, including Nasser’s Egypt, were not prepared to support
Nehru earlier over the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 (Agwani 1963). The
situation was more challenging in 1965 when neutrality, let alone sup-
port for India, would have meant opposition to a fellow Muslim state of
Pakistan. India was not ‘happy’ with the stands taken by Jordan and
Saudi Arabia during the War (Jain 1992) but could not express its views
and alienate them further. At the same time, India was appreciative of
the role played by Nasser in the Casablanca Arab summit in the same
month in facilitating ‘a balanced’ position on the Indo-Pakistan War
(Agwani 1963).
Things became complicated in 1971 when the Indo-Pakistan War led
to the breakup of Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh. Much of the
Islamic world was a mute spectator and was not prepared to interfere in
the ‘internal’ affairs of a fellow Islamic country. They refrained from
appreciating, let alone supporting, India’s efforts in safeguarding the lives
and dignity of the Muslims of the then East Pakistan or later Bangladesh.
Some countries provided limited medical supplies to India, which housed
over ten million Bengali refugees in the wake of the March crackdown. As
External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh informed the parliament, “Our
relations with countries of West Asia have been traditional. Our indepen-
dence gave a new dimension to them, and our relations were established
not only at the political and cultural planes but led to a growing economic
exchange between us, which has been of mutual benefit. No passing feel-
ing of disappointment should mar these close relations which are in our
mutual interest” (India, MEA 1972, 102).
Pakistan received political and military support from its RCD allies,
Iran and Turkey (Chopra 1992, 60–61), while Saudi Arabia denounced
India for its ‘aggression’ against a Muslim country (Saliba 1972; Ahmad
PAKISTAN FACTOR 89
1982). Siding with Pakistan over the Bangladesh crisis, Riyadh warned
India not to take undue advantage of its good relations with the Muslim
world. The Kingdom reiterated this position in the UN and its permanent
representative flagged that the UNSC had “passed resolutions reaffirming
the right of Kashmiri people to self-determination” (Mudiam 1994, 90).
The UN never invoked the idea of self-determination for Kashmir, but
Saudi Arabia sought to expand the plebiscite provision tailored to Pakistani
needs selectively. According to Riyadh, there were no reason for India to
‘attack’ East Pakistan except for its desire to ‘dismember’ Pakistan and
‘tarnish (its) Islamic creed” (Saliba 1972).
Similar position was adopted by others who were leaning towards
Pakistan over Bangladesh, and in the words of one observer, “[t]here was
no question where the sympathies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia lay ….
(both) strongly denounced the Indian aggression as treacherous and con-
trary to all international conventions and human values” (Saliba 1972,
131). Indeed, Gulf Arab monarchs, especially Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE collected a sum of US$200 million, not an inconsiderable
amount in 1971, for Pakistan to help “repulse the Indian invaders” (Saliba
1972, 131).
If these bilateral efforts were insufficient, Riyadh took the lead in the
OIC. Meeting in Jeddah in early 1972, the third meeting of Islamic for-
eign ministers declared “its full support for Pakistan, its territorial integ-
rity, national sovereignty and independence and urged all peace-loving
nations which respect moral values to support the Muslim nations in
maintaining peace and security of the Islamic territories and Muslim peo-
ple and to uphold the principle of non-interference in their internal affairs
in accordance with human values and the principles of the United Nations
Charter.” Pretending to be oblivious to the ground realities in South
Asia, they pledged to “send a delegation of conciliation composed of six
members of the Conference, Algeria, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco, Somalia
and Tunisia to Islamabad and Dacca to bring about reconciliation between
estranged brothers” (OIC 1972). At the same time, recognizing the large
number of Pakistani prisoners of war held by India, Islamic foreign min-
isters issued a veiled threat and urged India “to stop all acts of hostilities
and to take all necessary steps to repatriate without delay all prisoners of
war and civilian detainees in accordance with the Geneva Conventions” so
that “the existing relations between Muslim States and India might not be
affected.”
In the words of one Pakistani observer,
The Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and the debacle of East Pakistan were a
traumatic experience for Pakistan. Saudi Arabia stood by Pakistan during
this difficult period. The Saudi Government and people extended moral and
material aid to Pakistan whose international position had been adversely
affected following the military action in the then East Pakistan. Saudi Arabia
refused to recognize Bangladesh until the Pakistan Government gave the go
ahead signal. It also extended full diplomatic backing to Pakistan in the
extremely difficult negotiations it conducted with India in the aftermath of
the fall of Dacca.
Saudi Arabia’s relation with Pakistan after the secession of the Eastern
Wing continued on the old footing. The two countries cooperated closely at
the third Islamic Summit which was held in Lahore in February 1974. King
Faisal headed the Saudi delegation to that historic conferences in person and
also led the Friday congregational prayers at the Badshahi Mosque. (Ahmad
1982, 53)
This trend continued during the later years of the Cold War when
India’s politico-economic influence, especially vis-à-vis the Middle East,
was limited.
The Kargil conflict of 1999 witnessed a different trend and the response
of the Middle East was more nuanced and less restrained towards India.
C. Raja Mohan writes
Pakistan had expected support not only from China but also the Islamic
world that it has nurtured as an ideological constituency. But Pakistan found
the going tough even in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC)
which in an unusual move watered down the Pakistani resolutions against
India during the Kargil crisis. In a very significant development, Saudi
Arabia played a very quiet but important role in encouraging Pakistan to see
reason and accept the inevitable step of retracing its steps back to the LoC. A
top member of the Saudi Royal family accompanied Mr. Nawaz Sharif on his
way back home from Washington where he had signed a document of sur-
render of sorts. (Raja Mohan 2000)
Besides, Saudi Arabia joined President Bill Clinton and nudged Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif to accept the ceasefire and pull out the Pakistani
army from the Kargil and withdraw to the LoC (Raja Mohan 2000).
Though it was supportive of Pakistan over the nuclear tests, Riyadh was
concerned over cross-border tension escalating into a war between two
PAKISTAN FACTOR 91
nuclear-armed countries (Shakoor et al. 1999). Amidst the tension and
violence along the Indo-Pakistan borders, Prime Minister Sharif v isited
the Kingdom and held consultations with Saudi leadership and this con-
tributed to the withdrawal of Pakistani troops to the LoC and the
de-escalation of the Kargil crisis (Shakoor and Mahmood 1999).
A much greater manifestation of the Pakistani factor in India’s engage-
ments with Saudi Arabia, however, has reflected through the OIC and
the latter’s approach towards Indo-Pakistan tension, with Riyadh being
the pivot.
The Rabat Fiasco

Pan-Islamism has been a dominant feature of the Pakistani nationalism
since the early 1920s. During the closing stages of the First World War, the
Muslim League rallied around the beleaguered Ottoman Caliph who was
threatened by the British imperialism and post-war cartography. Coming
in the wake of the British commitment towards a Jewish national home in
Palestine, the Khilafat movement spearheaded the Indian Muslim senti-
ments against colonialism (Niemeijer 1972). Until then the Muslim atti-
tude towards the British was lukewarm; though resenting over the demise
of the Mughal Empire, the Muslim aristocrats and landed gentry were not
drawn towards anti-British sentiments. Anti-Ottoman war efforts trans-
formed the erstwhile indifference and the Muslim masses rallied around
the caliphate.
With the abolition of the caliphate by the Turkish Republic in 1924,
Palestine became the only external agenda of the League and it became
vociferous in its condemnation of the Balfour Declaration and periodically
called for its abrogation (Pirzada 1976). The Palestine issue was also a use-
ful camouflage for the League to establish its anti-imperial credentials
when it was working closely with and benefitting from the British rule. For
example, during the Second World War the entire leadership of the
Congress party, including Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana
Abul Kalam Azad and their followers were incarcerated while the League
was allowed to function and hold its meetings regularly.
In the wake of the partition of the subcontinent, Pakistan incessantly
flagged its Islamic credentials to the point of offending some Arab leaders.
Upset over this King Farouk of Egypt reportedly observed that Islam was
“born” on 14 August 1947, the day Pakistan became independent
(Mudiam 1994, 39). The Islamic world became Pakistan’s prime attraction
and it has been advocating a pan-Islamic bloc which could provide an

institutional framework to counter India’s influence in the region. Nehru
referring the Kashmir question to the UN added a sense of urgency as
Pakistan could count on the support of the Arab-Islamic countries in the
world body; from 7 in 1945, the number of the Muslim-majority coun-
tries in the UN stands at 49 in 2017.
The first step in this direction was the World Muslim Congress held in
Karachi in February 1949, a few months after the UNSC resolution on the
Kashmir which among others advocated plebiscite. This was aimed at
reviving the Motamar Al-Alam Islami (World Islamic Conference) which
was set up in Mecca in 1926 after the abolition of the caliphate (Pirzada
1987, 21). This was followed by the International Islamic Economic
Conference in the same city in November–December that year. In 1952
Pakistan unsuccessfully tried to organize a conference of Muslim countries
“to examine the possibility of establishing a system of high-level consulta-
tions on matters of common interests” (Pirzada 1987, 25). As these efforts
did not result in institutionalizing an Islam-centric political body, Pakistan
shifted its attention to the decolonized Muslim countries of Asia and the
Middle East and took an active part in the Islamic conferences of
Mogadishu (December 1964) and Mecca in April 1965.
The turning point for the Pakistani endeavours came with the Arab
military defeat in the June War and the fire incident in the al-Aqsa Mosque
on 21 August 1969 (Lieber 2016). The latter spurred King Faisal of Saudi
Arabia and King Hasan of Morocco to organize an Islamic response to the
incident that affected the Muslim masses across the globe. Coming in the
wake of the June War, the fire infuriated the Arabs over the Israeli control
of the Islamic holy sites in the old city of Jerusalem. In early September six
countries met in Rabat to finalize the agenda and modalities of an Islamic
summit and interestingly Pakistan was not among the participants.1 The
disappointment over its exclusion from the preliminary meeting partly
explains Pakistan’s assertive position in the full conference later that month
over the participation of India.
As subsequent events proved, though the al-Aqsa fire spurred the
meeting, the first Islamic summit symbolized and has been remembered
more for the Indo-Pakistani political contest in the Arab-Islamic world.
There are controversies and discrepancies over the Indian presence at
1
The six countries were Morocco and Saudi Arabia representing the Arabs, Niger and
Somalia representing Africa and Iran and Malaysia representing Asia.
PAKISTAN FACTOR 93
Rabat. India did not fulfil either of the two criteria laid down by the
preparatory meeting, namely, Muslim-majority country or Muslim as the
head of state. Though Muslims are the largest minority, India is not a
Muslim-majority country; Zakir Hussein had passed away in May that year
and V. V. Giri had taken over as president (Mansingh 1984, 211).
At the same time, India’s largest Muslim population could not be
ignored when a summit was to deliberate the conditions of the ummah
and to evolve a response to various problems facing Muslims, especially
the al-Aqsa fire and its consequences. Indeed, some of the largest protests
against the incident took place in India and an estimated ten million
people took part in a mass rally held in Calcutta (now Kolkata) on 29
August (Kumaraswamy 2010, 210). Though it was not a member of the
UN Security Council, India took the floor to describe the incident as “a
direct consequence of the illegal occupation of Israel of Jerusalem and
other Arab areas. Israel thus could not be absolved of its responsibilities
for the incident of 21 August 1969” (Kumaraswamy 2010, 211).
Taking this into consideration, one account suggests that King Faisal
felt that “India should be invited since it had strongly supported the Arab
cause” on issues that were part of the expanded agenda of the conference,
that is, “Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories (and the) restora-
tion of the rights of the Palestinian people” (Noorani 2010). Acting upon
the ‘invitation’ from the organizers, India had nominated Union Minister
of Industrial Development Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed as its representative for
the conference. Pending his arrival in Rabat, India was presented by its
“fully bearded and turbaned Sikh” ambassador to Morocco, Gurbachan
Singh (Mansingh 1984, 212).
In the plenary session which began on 23 September, Ambassador
Gurbachan Singh stated:
It is a matter of gratification that the interest and concern of the people of

India, particularly her 60 million Muslim citizens, in the grave happenings
in West Asia have been recognized and that India has been invited to partici-
pate in this Conference. I should like to convey to Your Majesty, and
through you to this august gathering, our satisfaction at the unanimous
invitation which has been conveyed to the Government of India. The
Government and the people of India who have throughout been gravely
concerned at the serious situation in West Asia have been deeply shocked
and pained at the most recent outrage perpetrated in the holy city of
Jerusalem. We feel that the continued occupation of Arab lands by Israel and
particularly of the city of Jerusalem, in defiance of U.N. resolutions, is a

matter of utmost concern. The shocking incident of setting fire to the
ancient shrine of al-Aqsa, which came as the most recent climax, makes it all
the more imperative that the Security Council’s resolution, calling upon
Israel to vacate this aggression, should be implemented. We sincerely hope
and pray that the deliberations of this Conference will lead to the conclusion
of the grave crisis which exists in West Asia. India as always, will be prepared
to play its part in seeking such as solution. (Pasha 1995, 193)
He informed the conference that the leader of the Indian delegation

was on his way and would join the deliberations later that day.
General Yahya Khan, the military ruler who represented Pakistan,
found the presence of the Sikh diplomat at the Islamic summit incongru-
ous and bizarre and objected to India’s presence. He refused to take part
in the deliberations until India’s withdrawal or removal. He would not
budge even after the arrival of the Muslim minister from India. This led to
a crisis and organizers, especially Saudi Arabia, resorted to hectic media-
tory efforts to placate Yahya Khan.
To soothe Pakistani objections, Ahmad was asked to participate as
‘observer’ and not as a full member. Alternatively, it was suggested that
‘Muslim community’ and not the government of India would be repre-
sented. Conceding to such demands meant ceding sovereign rights to oth-
ers in determining who represented the country in international forums
and India refused to participate as an observer (Singh 2006). Indeed, the
second day of the conference was spent in entirety towards working out a
face-saving formula that would pacify Pakistan but would also be honour-
able to India. However, having made Islam its core identity and foreign
policy instrument since 1947, Pakistan could not accept to be a part of an
Islamic forum with India as a full member. That would have challenged
the historical legacy of Pakistan and its claims to be the representative of
the Muslims of British India.
While Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed was subsequently elected President of
India in August 1974, the Rabat summit proved to be a major humiliation
for India. ‘Gate crashing,’ ‘snub’ and abandonment of secularism were
some of the expressions used to describe its eagerness to participate in the
explicitly pan-Islamic meet. Reflecting on the diplomatic fallouts, former
Indian Foreign Secretary J. N. Dixit lamented, “We botched up the
opportunity by indulging in an impractical exercise in assertive secularism
by deciding to depute our Sikh Ambassador in Morocco to represent India
PAKISTAN FACTOR 95
at this meeting. Pakistan took full advantage of this ineptitude of our and
ensured our exclusion from the OIC, despite our having the second larg-
est Muslim population in the world” (Dixit 1996, 240).
Though the al-Aqsa fire was the stated objective, the broader political
agenda of the Rabat conference was obvious. It was meant to formalize
the demise of secular Arab nationalism and herald the Islamic resurgence
in the Middle East and beyond. While Ba’athist Iraq and Syria stayed away
from Rabat, Egypt was presented not by President Nasser but by his dep-
uty Anwar Sadat. Above all, the Indo-Pakistan rivalry hijacked the sum-
mit’s focus and agenda. However, Pakistan’s prolonged efforts towards a
pan-Islamic bloc bore fruits in 1972 with the formation of the Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC), renamed as Organization of Islamic
Cooperation in 2011. Since its establishment, the organization has been
periodically making statements critical of India on Kashmir and occasion-
ally on the conditions of the Indian Muslims.
OIC and India
From the beginning, the OIC has been functioning as a handmaid of
Pakistan. Reflecting the Pakistani position the declaration issued at the
end of the first Islamic summit mentioned that the attendees included the
representatives “of the Muslim community of India” (OIC 1969).
Pakistan’s membership was accompanied by its citizens holding key posi-
tions in the organization and Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada served as Secretary
General during 1984–88. India’s non-membership meant that the organi-
zation which functions by consensus does not have to accommodate or
reflect New Delhi’s position. For example, the Iraqi membership pre-
vented the OIC from declaring it as the ‘aggressor’ over its eight-year-
long war with Iran (Al-Ahsan 2004; Sharqieh 2012). Though some
countries have been sympathetic towards it, India’s counter-narratives do
not find a place in the OIC deliberations. Thus, most OIC summits, for-
eign ministers meetings and other gatherings routinely contain critical and
unfriendly references about India, especially over Kashmir and occasion-
ally on other domestic developments in India.
In the initial years, the OIC has been relatively silent on India. For
example, the second OIC summit which met in Lahore in February 1974
saw the entry of Bangladesh but did not refer to India (OIC 1974). India’s
troubles began with the onset of insurgency in Kashmir in the summer of
1990. Coming in the wake of the Soviet pull-out from Afghanistan and
the return of Afghan Arabs to their homes, this period saw a massive influx
of Pakistan-backed militants into Kashmir and the insurgency dominated
much of the 1990s (Ganguly 1996). As India was coming to terms with
the end of the Cold War and initiating economic reforms, Kashmir became
its primary foreign policy challenge (Ganguly and Bajpai 1994). Reflecting
these sentiments, the Dakar summit which met in December 1991 urged
India “to allow International Human Rights Groups and Humanitarian
Organizations to visit Jammu and Kashmir” and urged the Secretary
General of the OIC to send a three-member “fact-finding mission” to the
state (OIC 1991).
A far more severe issue confronted India when Hindutva elements
demolished the controversial four-century-old Babri Masjid in Ayodhya
on 6 December 1992. This led to a spate of communal violence in differ-
ent parts of the country wherein the Muslims bore the brunt of mob
frenzy and an estimated 1000–2000 people, predominantly Muslims,
were killed in the post-demolition communal violence (Graff and
Galonnier 2013; State Bureau Reports 2011).
India’s diplomatic fortunes were already low due to the ineffective
handling of the Kuwait crisis (Malik 1991). The mosque demolition
evoked considerable anger and displeasure in many Arab and Islamic
countries, but given the magnitude of the problem, the response was more
palatable and manageable. Partly siding with the explanations offered by
the government of P. V. Narasimha Rao, a statement issued by the Saudi
Foreign Ministry “expressed deep sorrow over the attempts by some irre-
sponsible elements in India intending to harm the sentiments of Muslims
and attack their faith” (Pasha 1995). The GCC of which Saudi Arabia is a
key member adopted a resolution on “Aggression against the Babri
Mosque” in its 13th summit held in Abu Dhabi in December 1992. Using
a stronger language, it called on the Indian government to take immediate
steps to protect the Muslim minority population and restore confidence
among them (Pasha 1995, 26–27).
The 21st Foreign Ministers Conference held in Karachi in April 1993
“strongly condemned the destruction of the historic Babri Mosque in
Ayodhya by the extremist Hindus and called upon the Government of
India to reconstruct the Babri Mosque at its original site” (OIC 1993).
The seventh OIC summit which met in Casablanca in December 1994
clubbed India with situations in “Palestine … Bosnia-Herzegovina” and
expressed “its deep concern over the killing of the Muslims and the aggres-
sion against their holy places… (and) renewed its call upon the Government
of India to reconstruct the Babri Mosque at its original site” (OIC 1994).
PAKISTAN FACTOR 97
India has to invest considerable political capital and diplomatic engage-

ments to placate the anger of the OIC members and restore confidence
among the governments in the Persian Gulf region. These efforts coin-
cided with New Delhi trying to reorient and reinvigorate its foreign policy
in the light of the end of the Cold War. Though Pakistan has been project-
ing India as an unsafe place for the Muslim, the diplomatic damage was
limited and not irreversible. A few months after the Babri Masjid demoli-
tion, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited Iran in September 1993 and
met senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and
this was the first high-level political exchange between the two since the
Islamic Revolution of 1979. This was followed by the visit of President
Hashemi Rafsanjani to India in April 1995, and besides expressing an
understanding of the government’s position, he went on to declare that
“being a Muslim and also an Iranian, I wish for peace and harmony in
India.” “To the great relief of Indians, Rafsanjani said that he hoped that
India’s detractors would not succeed in spreading disinformation and
hatred on contentious issues like the Babri Mosque and Kashmir” (Maitra
and Maitra 1995, 37). One of his crucial itineraries was a visit to Lucknow,
the pre-eminent centre of Shia theology, located about 130 kilometres west
of Ayodhya (Gupta 1995). In subsequent years, the Kashmir issue contin-
ued to remain a significant agenda of the OIC and a headache for India.
Ironically the end of the Cold War which brought about significant
changes in India’s foreign policy also coincided with Pakistan intensifying
its efforts in the OIC in pursuance of its anti-India agenda. This process
began in the sixth summit held in Dakar in December 1991, the first post–
Cold War summit held against the backdrop of the liberation of Kuwait
earlier that year. For the first time in its history, the OIC adopted a resolu-
tion on Kashmir sponsored by Pakistan. Though the text is not available in
the official OIC site (OIC 1991), Pakistan Horizon referred to the resolu-
tion which it said was “adopted” at the summit. In the light of the discrep-
ancy the entire text as carried by Pakistan Horizon is reproduced here:
The resolution (OIC 1992) read:
Reaffirming the principles and objectives of the Organization of Islamic

Conference which emphasize the common goals and destiny of the peoples
of the Islamic Ummah,
Emphasizing the purposes and principles of the UN charter and recalling
the UN resolutions relevant to the Jammu and Kashmir,
Recalling that the Shimla agreement signed between the Governments
of India and Pakistan called for a final settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir
issue,
Reaffirming also the importance of the universal realization of the right

of peoples to self-determination enshrined in the charters of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference and the United Nations, expressing concern at
the alarming increase in the indiscriminate use of force and gross violations
of human rights committed against innocent Kashmiris,
1. Calls for a peaceful settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir issue in
accordance with the relevant UN resolutions and as agreed upon in
the Shimla agreement.
2. Calls to end gross violations of human right of the Kashmiri people
and calls for the respect of their human rights, including the right of
self-determination.
3. Calls upon India to allow International Human Rights groups and
humanitarian organisations to visit Jammu and Kashmir.
4. Notes the continuation of dialogue between India and Pakistan and
encourages further negotiations with a view to resolving their out-
standing differences through peaceful means and affirms that a sus-
tained dialogue is essential to address the core of the problems and
to remove the basic causes of tensions between India and Pakistan.
5. Expresses its deep concern at the prevailing tension that threatens
security and peace in the region.
6. Calls upon India and Pakistan to redeploy their forces to peacetime
locations.
7. Endorses the decision of the 20th Islamic conference of forcing min-
isters to send a good offices mission under the Chairman of the
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers with a view to easing the
tension between the two countries and to promote a peaceful
settlement.
8. Requests the Secretary General to send a three-member fact finding
mission to visit Jammu and Kashmir as decided by the 20th Islamic
Conference of Foreign Ministers, and submit a report to the
Secretary General.
9. Also requests the Secretary General to present his report on the
implementation of the provisions of this resolution at the 21st
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers and at the Seventh Islamic
Summit.
10. Decides to consider the Jammu and Kashmir dispute at the 21st
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers and at the Seventh Islamic
Summit.
Since then a pattern has emerged in the OIC discussions concerning
India. The organization does not consider the State of Jammu and Kashmir
to be an integral part of India and depicts it as “India-occupied Jammu and
Kashmir,” refers to “various resolutions adopted by the UNSC,” supports
PAKISTAN FACTOR 99
the “self-determination” of Kashmiris, flags “human rights violations”

committed by security forces and urges India to accept and cooperate with
the OIC “fact-finding team.”
It is essential to remember that there were considerable criticisms within
India over the human rights situation in Kashmir, especially since the out-
break of violence in the 1990s. Wanton killing of the civilian population,
prolonged incarceration and controversial implementation of various insur-
gency-centric legislations, custodial deaths, absence of meaningful political
dialogue and other forms of restrictions and curbs have evoked criticisms
from different human rights groups within the country. The establishment
of the National Human Rights Commission in October 1993 was partly a
response to the human rights violations in Kashmir (Arun Ray 1997).
However, interference in the sovereign jurisdiction is inherently prob-
lematic and could boomerang. The human rights conditions in a number
of OIC countries, including Pakistan, are anything but exemplary. Over
the years, citing their track records, many have questioned the UNHRC
membership of some of the OIC members (Sampathkumar 2017). In
some sense, the outbreak of widespread protests in many Arab countries
since 2011 was a no-confidence against their human rights records (Ismael
and Ismael 2013). Though India might ‘object or reject’ the unwanted
meddling, continuous tension and unrest in Kashmir are an open invita-
tion for the OIC to interfere.
Similarly, the resolution on Kashmir adopted by the 21st Islamic for-
eign ministers meeting held in Karachi in April 1993, shortly after the
Ayodhya controversy, called on member states “to take all necessary steps
to persuade India to cease forthwith the massive human rights violations
of the Kashmiri people and to enable them to exercise their inalienable
right to self-determination as mandated by the relevant resolutions of the
Security Council” (OIC 1993). Since then it has become regular and
Islamic foreign ministers meetings adopt long resolutions on Kashmir. As
a member of the group, Pakistan has hosted many Islamic gatherings;
besides the second summit in Lahore in February 1974, it hosted foreign
ministers meetings in December 1970 (Karachi), May 1980 (Islamabad),
April 1993 (Karachi), and May 2007 (Islamabad). Nomination of its
members to key positions in the organization and its persistence result in
Kashmir figuring prominently in the OIC deliberations.
While the Kashmir issue has to be resolved independent of the OIC,
these resolutions are a diplomatic embarrassment for India and hog media
limelight, especially when a particular country adopts unfriendly postures
towards India. Egged on by Pakistan, some draw a parallel between
Kashmir and Palestine to corner India. Very often the OIC’s criticisms of
India over Kashmir, for instance, appear along the Organization’s criticisms
of the Israeli policies vis-à-vis Palestinians. For example, in July 2017 as
Prime Minister Modi was meeting Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel, Iran’s
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei spoke of “oppressed Muslims” in different
parts of the world, including Palestine and Kashmir (Chaubey 2017).
It is naïve for India to expect that the OIC would ‘abandon’ Pakistan
or adopt a more balanced position on Kashmir. However, over the years
there have been examples when key members of the OIC felt it prudent to
back India on this vexed issue. In April 1994, Iran, for example, urged
Pakistan to abandon its plans to refer the Kashmir issue to the then
UNCHR (later renamed as UNHRC) (Bhadrakumar 2005). In October
2016, Bahrain rejected Pakistani depiction of its infiltrators into Kashmir
as “freedom fighters” (PTI 2016). Above all, as the OIC was adopting
anti-India resolutions, the trajectory of India’s relations with some of the
critical members of the group, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, has been on
the rise and this at times has unnerved some Pakistani officials (PTI 2017).
The reason for the overall improvements in Indo-Middle Eastern and
Indo-Saudi relations since the late 1990s has to be located within a policy
shift that had occurred in New Delhi. While Pakistan has been its principal
security concern, Pakistan-centric approach to the outside world had only
harmed India’s interests as the binary approach only highlighted differ-
ences and sidelined interest convergences. Over the years, Pakistan has
been like a long shadow, and the more India is concerned about it, the
longer it grows. Pakistan has managed to capitalize on India’s anxieties
and apprehensions vis-à-vis the Islamic countries. Moreover, the preoc-
cupation with Pakistan does not tally with India’s power ambitions, espe-
cially since its economic ascendance; rivalry with Pakistan confines it
within the subcontinent and runs counter to its aspirations to be a more
responsible Asian player. In other words, if India were to be a continental
player, it would have to look beyond competing with Pakistan.
Thus, delinking Pakistan from its worldview and engagements with the
Arab-Islamic Middle East has become logical and even inevitable. The late
1990s also witnessed a significant improvement in its economic power. Not
only India weathered the US-led international sanctions over the nuclear
tests, but it also registered a higher growth beyond the traditional ‘Hindu
rate of growth’ that stagnated at 3.5 between the 1950s and 1980s.2
2
The term ‘Hindu rate of growth’ was popularized by Indian economist Raj Krishna in
1970s when despite all the planned development steps India’s growth rate remained stag-
nant. For details, see Virmani (2006, 25).
PAKISTAN FACTOR 101
The political compulsions to minimize the Pakistani influence upon its

relations with the outside world and economic growth resulted in India
de-hyphenating Pakistan from its engagements with the Middle East. As
discussed elsewhere, the process began with the visit of External Affairs
Minister Jaswant Singh to the Kingdom in January 2001 and has been
continuing since then. This is not to suggest that Pakistan has become
irrelevant in its foreign policy calculus but India’s worldview is less deter-
mined by the Pakistan factor.
Such an approach has also pleased Riyadh as it was no longer forced to
choose between the two South Asian neighbours, an Islamic ally or a part-
ner for the future development. Gradually, Saudi Arabia began viewing the
two South Asian countries under two distinct prisms. Reflecting this, on
the eve of his visit to India in 2006, King Abdullah referred to Pakistan as
a brother and India as a friend (NDTV 2006); the former is a given, over
which one has no control, but the latter is choice and hence is more endur-
ing. Similarly speaking to the media in New Delhi in early 2016, Saudi
Foreign Minister Adel al Jubeir remarked: “Pakistan is a historic ally and
will remain so. Our relations with Pakistan do not come at the expense of
our relations with India. India is a strategic relationship in all fields” (sic
Bagchi 2016).
The shift in India’s thinking has been favoured by an upsurge of differ-
ences and tensions between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia over a host of issues.
Since 1996, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi were the only other powers which
recognized the Pakistan-backed Taliban rule in Afghanistan but September
11 terror attacks forced the Gulf Arab monarchies to reverse their erst-
while benevolent approach to extremism and their recognition was quietly
withdrawn two weeks after the September 11 attacks (Burns and Wren
2001). Pakistan providing sanctuary to Osama Bin-Laden and its pro-
longed denial of him living in the country until his killing by the US
Special Forces in May 2011 had few takers.
Partly to overcome the negative stereotypes against Wahhabi Islam, al-
Saud began taking steps in fighting religious extremism both within and
outside the Kingdom. This, in turn, resulted in Riyadh increasing its secu-
rity cooperation with India and extradited or expelled many persons
wanted for terrorism or other criminal offenses in India. Zabiuddin Ansari,
who was holding Pakistani passport, was deported despite objections from
Islamabad (Tankel 2012). Reflecting on this, head of the National Security
Advisory Board Naresh Chandra remarked that “there’s a genuine con-
cern in the Saudi establishment that things may get out of hand” in
Pakistan in fighting militant proxies (Wright 2012). Far from Pakistan

countering India through Saudi Arabia, the latter is ‘balancing’ Pakistani
ineptitude in fighting extremism by cooperating with India. Ansari’s
deportation was followed by two other wanted persons being sent to India
(SPA 2017) resulting in former Pakistani general Talat Masood to lament
that relationship with Saudi Arabia “is no longer a monopoly of Pakistan”
(Wright 2012).
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s refusal in early 2015 to join the Saudi
military campaign against Yemen did not go down well among the Gulf
Arab rulers. Riyadh’s disappointment was acute since it was its intervention
that saved Sharif’s life when General Pervez Musharraf carried out the mili-
tary coup October 1999. Moreover, until his return to Pakistan in 2007,
Riyadh hosted and protected Sharif. Upset over the Pakistani snub, Emirati
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash observed: “The vague
and contradictory stands of Pakistan and Turkey are an absolute proof that
the Arab security—from Libya to Yemen—is the responsibility of none but
Arab countries” (Staff Report 2015). Pakistan has also been non-commit-
tal about the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance against the ISIS that
excluded Iran and Syria despite former Pakistani Army Chief Raheel Sharif
being named as its commander-in-chief (Hussain 2017). Above all, in
February 2017 Saudi Gazette reported that during the previous four
months about 39,000 Pakistani citizens were deported for “violating the
rules of residence and work” but added “the involvement of a number of
Pakistani nationals in some terrorist actions orchestrated by Daesh, the
so-called IS, is a cause of public and societal worry” (Al-Shihri 2017).
Conclusion
There are clear indications that the Pakistani factor upon Indo-Saudi rela-
tions has been diminishing since the late 1990s. While the references to
Kashmir in the OIC deliberations have been on the rise, their effect upon
the bilateral relations between India and key Muslim countries, including
Saudi Arabia, have been minimal. In its multilateral diplomacy the
Kingdom defers to Pakistan over Kashmir, but bilaterally it has been prag-
matic and non-polemical vis-à-vis India. Since the visit of King Abdullah
in January 2006 to India, both countries have been highlighting their
‘strategic partnership’ that encompasses greater political understanding,
economic partnership and energy security cooperation.
PAKISTAN FACTOR 103
So long as it was preoccupied with Pakistan, India found limited avenues

to engage with Saudi Arabia. Its decision to delink Pakistan from its broader
Middle East policy and the Saudi desire to Look East for stable energy-
economic partnerships came around the same time and proved to be com-
plementary. If the OIC offers a multilateral forum for Pakistan to engage
with Riyadh, in recent years New Delhi has been using G-20 to continue
its politico-economic dialogue with the Kingdom. Indeed, much of the
improvement, diversification and expansion of Indo-Saudi relations have
been the direct result of India’s willingness and ability to delink Pakistan
from its Middle East policy. The former was a political move but was facili-
tated by its economic growth. Through its brother-friend approach towards
the two contentious neighbours, Saudi Arabia also managed to reorganize
its priorities. While Pakistan has been a stumbling block, both countries
found a common cause in the Palestinian issue which has been one of the
few areas of Indo-Saudi interest convergence since 1947.
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CHAPTER 6
Palestine Factor
The Palestinian cause occupies a significant place in the foreign policy

formulations of India as well as Saudi Arabia and has been one of their
shared agenda. The Palestinian statelessness figures prominently not only
in their foreign policy discourses but also in all significant bilateral
statements and communiqués. India’s prolonged absence of diplomatic
relations with Israel was in sync with the Saudi approach towards the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and the post-1992 Indo-Israeli bonhomie has not
marginalized the Palestinian issue in the Indo-Saudi ties. Though not
identical, both the countries followed a similar trajectory of being sympa-
thetic towards the Palestinians.
India and Palestine
Since the early 1920s, the Palestinian question has been a primary foreign
policy agenda of the Indian nationalists and gradually became a domestic
political contest. In the light of the separate religion-centric nationalism
championed by the Muslim League, the Zionist aspiration for a national
home in Palestine was sucked into the Congress-League competition for
the support of the Indian Muslims. After the partition of the subcontinent
it became a politico-diplomatic contest between India and Pakistan in the
Arab Islamic world.
This resulted in two prominent features in the India’s approach towards
the Middle East, especially during the Cold War years. One, it refrained

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_6
from establishing diplomatic relations with Israel and its recognition of

Israel on 17 September 1950—incidentally, the day future Prime Minister
Narendra Modi was born—was not followed by the establishment of
normal diplomatic relations (Kumaraswamy 1995). For the next four
decades, New Delhi followed a recognition-without-relations policy until
relations were established in January 1992 (Kumaraswamy 2010; Blarel
2014). Even minimal diplomatic exchanges with the Jewish State were
seen a dilution of and an insult to the Palestinian cause. Only at the end of
the Cold War was India able to adopt a policy of balance vis-à-vis the
Israeli-Palestinian equation.
Correspondingly since the days of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru,
India’s engagements with the Middle Eastern countries had the Palestinian
flavour. This was more pronounced towards Nasser’s Egypt but could be
noticed with other countries as well. This was often expressed through the
demand for the ‘implementation’ of the UN resolutions; for example, during
the second summit held in Cairo in October 1964 the NAM declared that
[t]he Conference condemns the imperialist policy pursued in the Middle

East and in conformity with the character of the United Nations decides to:
1) Endorse the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine
to their homeland and their in alienated right to self-determination;
2) Declare their full support to the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle
for liberation from colonialism and racialism. (India, MEA 1981, 21)
The Palestinian issue figured prominently in various official statements

issued during Prime Minister Nehru’s engagements with foreign leaders;
the Nehru-Nasser joint communiqué during the latter’s visit to Delhi in
April 1960 noted that both leaders “reiterated their view that the question
of Palestine should be solved in conformity with the provisions of the UN
Charter, the resolutions of the UN and the principles unanimously
adopted at the Bandung Conference of 1955 for peaceful settlement of
the Palestine question” (India, Foreign Affairs Record 1960).
The same trend was followed by his successors, especially Indira Gandhi
and Rajiv Gandhi. In September 1974, Foreign Minister Swaran Singh
told the UN General Assembly:
The situation in the Middle East may freeze into another period of neglect,
if the momentum towards a solution of the basic problems slows down. Only
the rapid and full implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967)
can lead to a just and enduring peace. The restoration of the legitimate
PALESTINE FACTOR 111
rights of the Palestinian people is another cornerstone in the structure of a

lasting peace. Israel’s refusal to vacate Arab territories captured as a result of
aggression is a continuing provocation to the Arab States and negates the
principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. If the catastrophe
of another war in the Middle East is to be avoided, Israel should end its
aggression and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people should be
restored to them. (UNGA 1974, 207)
It is, however, possible to identify a pattern. The nomenclature of the

Indian support has been evolutionary and reflected the prevailing interna-
tional position vis-à-vis the Palestinians.
In the initial years, it mostly talked about the ‘implementation’ of the
UN resolutions. The Arab countries interpreted this to mean UN General
Assembly Resolution 194 of December 1948 that established a condi-
tional Palestinian ‘right to return’ to their homes but they carefully skipped
the other and more important General Assembly Resolution 181 that
approved the partition of Palestine. The Arab rejection and hence the
non-implementation of the latter was largely responsible for the prolonged
stateless of the Palestinians. Until the June War of 1967, if Egypt admin-
istered the Gaza Strip, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had occupied
and annexed the West Bank including the East Jerusalem. Thus, the Arab
liability for the Palestinian stateless was profound and the Indian endorse-
ment of the ‘implementation’ of the UN resolutions was in sync with Arab
interpretations and logic.
Until the early 1970s, the Palestinian issue was seen as a refugee issue
and this was reflected in the UN Security Council Resolution 242 adopted
in the wake of the June War of 1967. Unanimously adopted on 22
November that year, it affirmed its support `achieving a just settlement of
the refugee problem.’ The oil crisis of 1973 and the newly-found wealth
of important Arab countries—notably Saudi Arabia—transformed the
political discourse on Palestine, and the international community began
recognizing the political rights of the Palestinians and their inalienable
right to statehood. The Israeli control of the whole of mandate Palestine
in the wake of the June War made things a lot easier and ending the occu-
pation and implementation of UNSC 242 became the prominent agenda
for India and most of the Third World countries. Over time, even the PLO
endorsed the implementation of Resolution 242, which only flagged the
refugee rights of the Palestinians.
In subsequent years, the Israeli aggression and settlement policies
became prominent in India’s bilateral engagements with the Arab world as
signs of interest and policy convergence. They were pronounced in the

1970s and 1980s when anti-Israeli rhetoric was politically correct in the
discourses of the NAM and various other UN forums. This trend reached
its crescendo in November 1975 when India joined other Third World
countries and voted for the General Assembly Resolution that depicted
Zionism as racism (Lewis 1976).
Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao’s decision to normalize relations
meant that the former position of outright condemnation of Israel was no
longer possible; for example, on 25 May 1967, more than ten days before
the June War, India depicted Israel as the ‘aggressor.’ Normalization
removed this option. Thus, since 1992 it presents a more nuanced bal-
ance vis-à-vis Israel and its conflict with the Palestinians. Endorsing and
shoring up support for the two-state solution became the dominant
Indian discourse. Rather than blaming Israel for everything, New Delhi
began counselling restraint and caution on both sides towards reaching a
peaceful and negotiated political settlement. Like Saudi Arabia, for exam-
ple, its initial response to the Second Lebanon War of 2006 was more
restrained and balanced than its subsequent condemnation of Israel
(India, MEA 2006c).
At the same time, since the early 1990s official statements issued during
India’s bilateral engagements with the Middle East have been uneven and
less consistent. Its support for the Palestinians came with its endorsement
of the two-state solution and its support for the ‘secure and recognized’
borders as envisaged in UNSC Resolution 242. At times, there were direct
references to both Israel and Palestine coexisting side by side, and at oth-
ers, there were no direct or indirect references to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. It also endorsed the Palestinian cause without any direct refer-
ences to Israel. The following are some of the examples of this somewhat
uneven presence of the Palestinian issue in the Indo-Middle Eastern
engagements since the early 1990s.
• Despite the past anger over the Iraqi aggression of 1990, in the joint
statement issued at the end of Kuwaiti Emir Al-Sabah’s visit to India
in 2006 both countries pledged their “support for the establishment
of a sovereign, independent, united and viable state of Palestine
within a reasonable timeframe through a negotiated settlement
within secured and recognized borders as envisaged in the Quartet
Roadmap and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.” Both
leaders “condemned the killing of innocent civilians” but due to
Kuwaiti sensitivities, the statement made no direct reference to Israel

(India, MEA 2006b). Similar approach of a reiteration of support for
the Palestinians without any direct reference to Israel can also be
noticed in the official Indian statements issued during Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to Syria in November 2003 (India, MEA
2003b); and the India visit of Bahraini Crown Prince (January
2014).
• The Palestinian issue has been figuring prominently in its engage-
ments with Egypt. The joint statement issued at the end of President
Hosni Mubarak’s visit (November 2008) reiterated their support for
“a sovereign, independent, viable, contiguous and united State of
Palestine living within secure and recognized borders, side by side at
peace with Israel as endorsed in the Quartet Roadmap and United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1397 and 1515” (India, MEA
2008). Likewise, during the visit of President Fattah el-Sisi in
September 2016 both pledged support for “an independent sover-
eign Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, living side-by-
side with the State of Israel, within secured and recognized borders”
(India, MEA 2016d).
• New Delhi Declaration issued at the end of Iranian President
Mohammed Khatami’s visit in January 2003 had no reference to
Palestine (India, MEA 2003a). This pattern was maintained during
the visit of Turkish President Abdullah Gul in February 2010 (India,
MEA 2010a) and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in April 2017
(India, MEA 2017); Crown Prince Salman of Bahrain in March
2007; Omani Deputy Prime Minister Sayyid Fahd Bin Mahmoud Al
Said in December 2007; Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in
August 2013; Prime Minister Sheikh Jabar of Kuwait in November
2013; King Hamad of Bahrain in February 2014; of Qatari Emir
Tamim bin Hamad in 2015 and of President Hassan Rouhani of Iran
(February 2018);
• Since assuming office Prime Minister Modi had visited eight coun-
tries in the Middle East; there were no references to Palestine in the
joint statements issued at the end of his visits to the UAE (India,
MEA 2015a), Iran (India, MEA 2016b), Qatar (India, MEA 2016c),
the UAE (February 2018) and Oman (February 2018).
• Above all, for over a decade India has been referring to East Jerusalem
as the capital of the future Palestinian state and this position was
maintained in multilateral forums such as BRICS and IBSA. In the
initial months, even Prime Minister Modi continued this pattern with
President Pranab Mukherjee (India, MEA 2015b) and Vice-President
H. M. Ansari (Ansari 2016) flagging East Jerusalem. In a significant
departure, in May 2017 with President Mahmoud Abbas standing by
his side, Prime Minister Modi declared India’s support to the
Palestinians without any reference to East Jerusalem (Kumaraswamy
2017a) and this was subsequently maintained in the BRICS summit
held in Xiamen, China, in September 2017 (Kumaraswamy 2017b).
In other words, since the early 1990s, adhocism appears to be the criti-
cal trend regarding the inclusion or exclusion of the Palestine issue in
India’s engagements with the Middle East. It is a fixed agenda in its inter-
actions with countries like Egypt and Syria even after normalization of
relations with Israel but has been sporadic with others. All the significant
joint statements with Iran—during the visit of President Khatami to New
Delhi in January 2003, of Prime Minister Modi to Tehran in May 2016
and of President Rouhani in February 2018—had no direct or indirect
reference to Palestine. The Palestinian issue rarely figured in engagements
with Oman, Qatar and the UAE while Kuwait saw its inclusion despite
tensions with the Palestinian leadership over the Iraqi invasion.
The prevailing political climate appears to the key factor in the inclu-
sion or exclusion of Palestine in joint statements. While its absence does
not indicate abandonment or reversals, non-inclusion also signals that
both parties agreeing to disagree when their differences are insurmount-
able or when they could not agree on a common text. For example, the
political leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been vehemently
opposed to the existence of Israel and seeks to resolve the Palestinian
problem only through the annihilation of the ‘Zionist entity’ (Teitelbaum
and Segall 2012). This is in contrast to the Indian position of a Palestinian
state coexisting with Israel. In recent years, the public rhetoric of
President Erdogan towards Israel has been unfriendly and this perhaps
prevented India from finding a common ground with Iran or Turkey and
hence the absence of any reference to the Palestinian issue in the official
statements.
This, however, is not the case vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia. Since the time of
Nehru, the Indo-Saudi joint statements devoted considerable attention
and care to the Palestinian question. The interest convergence during the
pre-1992 era was significant. As discussed earlier, their worldview during
the Cold War was different and both were trying to present a different and
even antithetical image of themselves to the outside world; a conservative
Wahhabi state as opposed to a secular and inclusive India. Their shared
membership of the NAM was insufficient as they were politically closer to
rival blocs. Above all, the Pakistan factor considerably undermined their
ability to develop closer political ties. Under such circumstances of ideo-
logical and political differences, the Palestinian cause offered the much-
needed comfort and interest convergence. Therefore, as would be
discussed, all the significant bilateral statements contained obligatory refer-
ences to Palestine, though they were reflecting the prevailing political cli-
mate and terminology. The Indo-Israeli normalization made this position
more nuanced, echoing each other’s sensitivities and divergent interests.
Saudi-Palestine Linkage
Like other Arab countries, Saudi Arabia has a long association with and
commitment to the Palestinian cause. The establishment of the third Saudi
state in 1932 coincided with the commercial discovery of oil and the initial
problems of territorial consolidation and state building. Despite the politi-
cal rivalry with the Hashemites, the Saudi position was sympathetic and
extended limited support to the Palestinians during the days of mandate
Palestine (Hirst 1974). However, Ibn-Saud, the founder King of Saudi
Arabia, was aware of the global power politics, ambitions of regional lead-
ers, the significance of the Palestinian concerns for Muslims and the inter-
ests of his newly formed Kingdom. Hence, despite his sympathetic attitude
towards the Palestinian cause (Labelle 2011), he kept Saudi involvement
in the conflict limited.
The Palestine issue has also been a significant area of disagreement in the
Saudi-US relations. The meeting on USS Quincy in Egypt’s Great Bitter
Lake on 14 February 1945 between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and
King Ibn-Saud is often seen as the beginning of the strategic partnership
between the two (Cordesman 2010). Since then they have survived many
tumultuous events. Roosevelt was returning from the Yalta Conference
where the US, USSR and Great Britain discussed the post-War reorganiza-
tion of international order and heard the vehement Saudi opposition to the
idea of finding a homeland for the Jews in Arab Palestine (Lippman 2005).
For his part, the US president assured the monarch that he “would do
nothing to assist the Jews against the Arabs and would make no hostile
move to the Arab people” (Labelle 2011, 261). Soon afterwards, Roosevelt
promised the Saudi monarch that he “would take no action, in my capacity
as Chief of the Executive Branch of this Government, which might prove
hostile to the Arab people” (Taylor 2015).
History, however, took a different trajectory. Shortly after the Yalta
Conference, President Roosevelt passed away and was succeeded by Harry
S. Truman. His firm but tacit assurance of support to Chaim Weizmann
paved the way for the Zionist leadership opting for the unilateral declara-
tion of independence just hours before the British departure from man-
date Palestine. As a founding member of the Arab League, Saudi Arabia
was vehemently opposed to the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine and
voted against the partition plan which was endorsed by the majority mem-
bers of the UN (UNISPAL 1979). When full-fledged Arab-Israeli hostili-
ties began on 15 May 1948, Saudi Arabia joined other Arab countries and
sent a small contingent of forces which fought under the Egyptian com-
mand in the eastern sector of mandate Palestine.
The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 also highlighted the Arab weakness,
internal disharmony and hence defeat. The formation of Israel was accom-
panied by rest areas of mandate Palestine coming under Egypt and Jordan;
while the former kept the Gaza Strip under its military control, the latter
annexed the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. The Hashemite control
of the Old City of Jerusalem also included the third holiest Islamic shrine
the al-Aqsa Mosque and came to be seen as a subtle challenge to the Saudi
control of Mecca and Medina. The All-Palestine Government proclaimed
in Gaza City on 22 September 1948 (Shlaim 1990) was quickly recog-
nized by Saudi Arabia but the Jordanian decision to annex the West Bank
in the wake of the Jericho Conference of December 1948 ended the pros-
pect of the independent Palestinian entity.
Thus, when the UN-initiated armistice talks began in the Rhode Islands
on 12 January 1948, Riyadh was in favour of a peaceful resolution of the
problem. In a letter addressed to the UN on 8 February 1949, Saudi
Arabia informed that it would accept “the decisions which have already
been adopted or which may be adopted by the Arab League, in respect to
the situation in Palestine” (UNGA 1948). This was followed by a similar
move by Iraq, which also sent troops to ‘liberate’ Palestine. It was only
after that Egypt became the first Arab country to sign the Armistice
Agreement with Israel on 24 February and was followed by Lebanon,
Jordan and Syria.
The Free Officers coup witnessed the emergence of Nasser and Israel’s
decision to launch the Suez War in collaboration with Britain and France
catapulted him into being the first mass Arab leader. Nasser’s regional
domination, socialist ideas and regional ambitions unnerved the Saudis
and pushed them closer to the US and yet, Palestine remained a core Saudi
concern. If the June War marked the political decline of Nasser as well as
Egypt, the October War transformed the Saudi economic power.
Capitalizing on these advantages since the early 1970s Saudi Arabia has
emerged as the dominant player in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and
efforts towards its resolution.
Though reluctant to follow the footsteps of President Anwar Sadat and
his separate peace with Israel, Saudi Arabia has been less hostile towards
the Camp David Agreements than Iraq, Syria or the PLO were. Not join-
ing the rejectionist forces, on 7 August 1981 the then Crown Prince Fahd
unveiled a peace plan which offered a tacit but firm Arab recognition of
Israel (Tanner 1982; Razvi 1981; Dhanani 1982). Using the phraseology
of the UNSC Resolution 242 the plan declared: “All States in the region
should be able to live in peace in the region” (UN 1981). This was unac-
ceptable to countries like Iraq and Syria and forced Riyadh to water it
down. Stopping short of normalization with Israel, the Arab summit which
met in Fez in September 1982 declared inter alia, “The establishment by
the United Nations Security Council of guarantees of peace between all
States of the region, including the independent Palestinian State” (Arab
League 1982). Interestingly this proposal came within weeks after the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and was overshadowed by the massacre of
Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps later that month.
The Saudi leadership played an important role in the convening of the
Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, cosponsored by the US and
USSR. It leveraged the liberation of Kuwait by the UN-backed and US-led
alliance to seek a political settlement to the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian
conflict (Dawisha 1983). Its support and endorsement were critical for the
international legitimacy for the Oslo process (Kostiner 2009). During the
crucial stages of the Camp David talks in September 2000, President Bill
Clinton reached out to Saudi Arabia to nudge Yasser Arafat (Clinton
2004, 541).
A more notable Saudi role in the peace process had to wait until the
September 11 terror attacks in the US. The Saudi responsibility in this
problem began in the 1980s during the Afghan crisis when Riyadh
provided political, ideological, financial and military support to Afghan
mujahedeen. After the Soviet withdrawal, the Afghan Arabs as they were
termed returned to their home countries and created havoc especially in
Algeria and Egypt. So long as the repercussions of Saudi-supported
extremism stayed away from its shores, the US was mostly indifferent
towards Wahhabi Islam and its negative and harmful impact upon societ-
ies, Muslim and non-Muslim alike.
The September 11 attacks altered the American view and the magni-
tude of the attacks transformed the Western perception of the Kingdom
and its complicity in the radicalization of Muslim societies across the
world. The criticisms against the al-Saud soon became a backlash against
Islam itself. Mainstream American scholars and media began highlighting
the philosophical incompatibility and incongruity between Western
liberalism and Saudi-Wahhabi conservatism on a host of issues such as
freedom, democracy, governance, human and gender rights (Cox and
Marks 2003). Indeed, the roots of some of the Islamophobia in the West
can be directly traced to the September 11 terror attacks (Zúquete 2008).
Partly to rehabilitate the Kingdom in the eyes of the West, in February
2002, the then Crown Prince Abdullah tossed his ideas with noted jour-
nalist Thomas Friedman which gradually developed into Abdullah Plan
(Friedman 2002). Unlike the earlier ones, this plan offered a conditional
normalization between Israel and the wider Islamic world. A modified and
diluted version was adopted in the Arab summit held in Beirut in March
2002. Among others it offered to consider “the Arab-Israeli conflict
ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security
for all the states of the region” and “establish normal relations with Israel
in the context of this comprehensive peace” (UNGA 2002). While hailed
by a number of world leaders, the Arab Peace Plan of 2002 did not elicit
the necessary support from Israel and hence has primarily remained an
academic exercise (Israel, MFA 2002; Teitelbaum 2009; Podeh 2014).
Moreover, there were noticeable absentees in the Beirut summit; if Yasser
Arafat was confined to his Ramallah compound by the Israeli military,
King Abdullah of Jordan and President Mubarak of Egypt were absent to
show solidarity with the Palestinian leader and both countries were repre-
sented by their prime minister (Jeffery 2002). Hence, although President
George H. W. Bush ‘praised’ the initiative,1 his 2004 statement which
outlined the American support for a two-state solution had no reference
to Abdullah Plan or Arab Peace Initiative (Freedman 2005).
1
The New York Times, 22 February 2002, quoted in (Teitelbaum (2009).
Similarly, the Saudi leadership has been seeking intra-Palestinian

reconciliation and the most prominent step in this direction was the Mecca
Accord of February 2007. Responding to internal tension, especially in
the Gaza Strip following the Hamas victory in the January 2006 elections,
King Abdullah invited the leaders of Hamas and Fatah for a meeting in
Islam’s holiest site and this resulted in a four-point agreement of coopera-
tion and national unity. However, shortly afterwards the deal collapsed
with Hamas militarily taking over the Gaza Strip in June that year. This led
to a strange situation of two Palestinian administrations; the internation-
ally-recognized PNA is governing the West Bank while the Hamas is
administering the Gaza Strip. Since then Saudi Arabia has mostly been less
active in the Israeli-Palestinian track.
Palestine and Indo-Saudi Relations

For over four decades, India and Saudi Arabia treaded the similar path vis-
à-vis Palestine, albeit with nuanced differences. While the former had rec-
ognized Israel in 1950, the latter reflected the prevailing consensus among
the Islamic countries that the formation of the Jewish State in the land
which is considered a part of the Islamic waqf was an insult and injustice
and hence could not be acceptable. Through its recognition-without-
relations policy, India conveyed that even minimal relations with Israel
would be tantamount to being anti-Palestinian.
The Arab oil embargo instituted during the October War of 1973
underscores the benefits of India’s pro-Arab position regarding the
Palestinians. The oil crisis and supply disruptions compelled many West
European countries and Japan to revisit and radically alter their position
on the Arab-Israeli conflict in favour of the Palestinians. The economic
compulsions of price rise led to Palestinian statelessness receiving a favour-
able treatment in the Western governments and societies. The Arab coun-
tries also temporarily overcame their power struggle and politicking and
rallied behind the PLO and the Rabat Arab summit held in October 1974
recognized the PLO as ‘sole and legitimate’ representative of the
Palestinian people and set the stage for the admission of the PLO as an
‘observer’ of the UN the following month.
Though the oil crisis and price rise were an enormous economic hard-
ship, India was less hassled over the Palestinian issue as it has taken a pro-
Arab position since the early 1920s. The admission of the PLO into the UN
saw India moving closer towards the PLO and formal agreements to this
effect were signed by India’s ambassador in Lebanon S. K. Singh on 10

January 1975 (Asian Recorder 1975). This paved the way for the PLO
opening an office in New Delhi, which was more substantial in diplomatic
terms than the information offices that the organization had set up in some
Western capitals at that time. Weeks after returning to power in January
1980, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi upgraded the Palestinian mission and
bestowed all diplomatic privileges commensurate to the UN missions in the
country. In the wake of the Algiers Declaration of November 1988, India
was among the first countries to recognize the State of Palestine and has
been hosting Arafat and later his successor Abbas as the head of state.
Meanwhile, in June 1982, amidst the Lebanon War, India expelled the
Israeli Consul in Mumbai over his impertinent media remarks about New
Delhi competing with Islamabad in seeking favours from the Arab world
(Ward 1992, 119). Later on, in November that year when India hosted
the Ninth Asian Games in Delhi, a new sports body for the continent—
Olympic Council of Asia—was formed from which Israel was formally
excluded. This ensured that Israel could not participate in all the subse-
quent Asian Games (Kumaraswamy 2002).
In short, since the closing stages of the Second World War, the
Palestinian issue has been a foreign and domestic agenda of Saudi Arabia
and took a more concrete role in the wake of the oil crisis and emerging
Saudi influence within and beyond this region. Thus, the converging
Indo-Saudi position vis-à-vis the Palestinian cause has been a positive ele-
ment in the otherwise dialogue of the deaf and figured prominently in all
the major political engagements between the two.
In his address during the banquet in honour of visiting Saudi Foreign
Minister Saud al-Faisal in April 1981, Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha
Rao reminded that India’s “support for the Arab cause, emanating from
the principles and values so dear to us, has been firm and consistent”
(India, Foreign Affairs Record 1981, 124). Criticizing “Israel’s expan-
sionism,” he conveyed India’s support for the Palestinians “to regain
their inalienable rights including the right to a nation-state” (India,
Foreign Affairs Record 1981, 125). In appreciation of this stand, Rao felt
that the Arabs have a “perceptible understanding of India’s policies and
requirements.”
The Palestinian issue figured in the joint communiqué issued during
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s visit the following year. Both sides
“expressed their deep concern over situation arising from the aggressive
acts by Israel and its repeated violations of the resolutions of the UN and
other world bodies.” Coming weeks before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon,
both countries felt that “a just and durable peace in the Middle East”
would be possible only “on the basis of the immediate and complete with-
drawal by Israel from all Arab territories occupied by it since 1967, includ-
ing Jerusalem; and the restoration of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian
people, including their right to return to their homeland and establish
their independent state” (India, Foreign Affairs Record 1982, 134–35).
They also reiterated their position of the PLO being “the sole and legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinian people” and called for its “full and
equal” participation in all efforts for “a just and lasting” peace.
Furthermore, both the leaders were critical of some of the controversial
decisions of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin such as “the annexa-
tion of Jerusalem and Golan Heights and perpetuation of its illegal
occupation … attack on the al-Aqsa mosque … (and) grave situation
caused by Israel in Lebanon.” They lamented that “despite numerous
resolutions adopted in the UN by overwhelming majority, Israel persists in
its acts of illegal occupation and change the status of the city of Jerusalem.”
Mrs. Gandhi also welcomed the eight-point peace plan outlined by Prince
Fahd in August 1981 as “a constructive initiative towards achieving a just
and durable solution to the Middle East problem.”
Subsequently, there were no high-level political exchanges between the
two sides for nearly two decades until the visit of External Affairs Minister
Jaswant Singh in January 2001. During this period both sides were preoc-
cupied with domestic and regional tensions and conflicts and the breaking
down of the Euro-centric ideological divide. As discussed elsewhere, India
was tied down with internal political crises and severe economic hardships,
leaving little scope for high political exchanges with Saudi Arabia.
Jaswant Singh’s visit in January 2001 was a path-breaking moment in
the sense that India began to view the Kingdom without the traditional
Pakistani blinkers. Only a few months earlier, Singh became the first
Indian Foreign Minister to visit Israel. Conscious of the Saudi position,
Singh flagged India’s “very strong and historical and cultural ties with the
people of Palestinian” and it being sensitive “to the interests of the
Palestinian people” even before Indian independence. He referred to
Arafat’s frequent visits to India and his own “detailed dialogue” with the
Palestinian leaders a few months earlier. Expressing concern over the cycle
of violence, Singh observed that peace “requires the strict and full imple-
mentation of the various agreements between the principal parties
concerned.” He declared, India “associates itself with the struggle of the
Palestinian people and the realization of their cherished aspiration for

their own sovereign state on the basis of a comprehensive peace” (Strategic
Digest 2001, 445).
The visit of King Abdullah in January 2006 as the chief guest of the
Republic Day celebrations came when Riyadh was trying to rehabili-
tate itself in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks. Through the
Abdullah plan referred earlier, it was signalling a greater accommoda-
tion with Israel. In the Delhi Declaration both King Abdullah and Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh hailed the “Beirut Arab Peace Initiative and
the (Quartet) Road Map” and given their “complementarity” both lead-
ers hoped that these two plans “would invigorate the peace process” and
would lead to “the establishment of a viable and independent State of
Palestine living in peace and prosperity within secured borders side by side
with Israel” (India, MEA 2006a, emphasis added).
The Riyadh Declaration endorsed by King Abdullah and Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh in March 2010 reflected similar shared position. Both
leaders referred to the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 as well as the Arab
Peace Initiative and hoped for “the early resumption of the peace pro-
cess.” Urging the need to resolve “the key issues of the dispute” both
called for “a definite timeframe leading to the establishment of a sover-
eign, independent, united and viable Palestinian state.” Though there was
no direct reference to Israel, the leaders registered their support for “the
two-state solution” (India, MEA 2010b).
The Palestine issue figured during the visit of the then Crown Prince
Salman to India in February 2014. Nearly a decade after its uneventful
journey since the Beirut summit, both sides called for “a just, comprehen-
sive and lasting peace in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative” of
2002. In tune with the prevailing view in New Delhi, both countries reit-
erated their support for “the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,
including their establishment of their independent, united and viable state
with East Jerusalem as its capital” (India, MEA 2014).
Even Prime Minister Modi who often displayed his public admiration
for Israel could not ignore this pattern. The joint statement issued at the
end of his visit to the Kingdom in April 2016 referred to the Arab Peace
Initiative and extended support to the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian
people, including the establishment of their independent, united and via-
ble state with East Jerusalem as its capital” (India, MEA 2016a). It would
be interesting to watch how India navigates its decade-long phraseology
of ‘East Jerusalem’ with the Kingdom after Modi dropped it during the
visit of President Abbas in May 2017, just weeks before visiting Israel.
Conclusion
During much of the Cold War, the Indo-Saudi relations were dominated
more by contrasts than by convergences. Internally there were societal and
ideological differences and externally there were limited interests and pol-
icy convergences which prevented them from developing meaningful
political exchanges. Though both were members of the NAM, their views
and interpretations differed considerably. Saudi support for Pakistan, both
political and strategic, undermined India’s trust in the al-Saud leadership,
and until its economic liberalization, India’s financial clout was negligible.
For its part, Riyadh was apprehensive of India’s close politico-strategic ties
with Moscow, especially over issues such as Arab radicalism and later on
the Afghan crisis.
Under such circumstances of limited interest convergence and political
exchanges, the Palestinian issue became their most visible common
agenda. India’s support for the political rights of the Palestinians and its
prolonged refusal to normalize relations with Israel were not dissimilar to
the Islam-based Saudi opposition to Israel and its right to exist. As a result,
there was a considerable interest convergence, especially until the Indo-
Israeli normalization of 1992. India’s decision to shift its policy towards
Israel came against the backdrop of the Madrid conference, diminishing
role of Palestine in inter-Arab dynamics and the emergence of a world
order dominated by the US. Saudi Arabia was a party to some of these
changes and could not fault India for its shift on Israel.
Above all, since the early 1980s, Saudi leaders have been indicating a
conditional acceptance of Israel and this became more useful in the post-
1992 era when India sought to balance its newly found bonhomie with
Israel with its traditional support for the Palestinians. Reflecting this shift,
the Indo-Saudi joint statements referred to `the two-state solution’ and
their mutual commitments towards a peaceful resolution of this conflict.
Thus, while they highlighted their common interests, the repeated empha-
sis on the Palestinian issue also reveals the lack of political convergence
elsewhere. This was more prominent during the Cold War years when
India’s economic interactions and relevance vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia were
limited and skewed in favour of oil imports. These were to change and
change dramatically with the end of the Cold War and the opening of new
avenues for India.
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CHAPTER 7
The Shift
Both India and Saudi Arabia were immensely affected by the sudden
collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the consequent end of
the Cold War. Like much of the international community, Indian leaders
and policy analysts were unable to foresee the unravelling events in Eastern
Europe since the late 1980s. The Soviet Union which challenged the West
both militarily and ideologically crumbled suddenly and by the end of
1991 disintegrated into 15 independent states, with weakened Russia
emerging as its successor state. The end of the bipolar order that domi-
nated world politics since the end of the Second World War was hailed as
a defining moment in history and was viewed as the heralding of the
American century (Evans et al. 1998; Harvey 2003), unipolar world
(Waltz 1993) and even the end of history (Fukuyama 1989). As later
events proved, such arguments were premature, but the disintegration of
the USSR marked the end of the Cold War. In the Middle East, this coin-
cided with the Kuwait crisis and the weakened USSR joined hands with
President George H. W. Bush to repulse the Iraqi aggression through the
UN-backed Operation Desert Storm (Evans 1992; Lambeth 1992;
Spielman 1990).
The period between 1989 and 1991 was also politically tumultuous
in India’s history and witnessed severe social upheavals, tensions and
violence. The Congress Party, which dominated the post-independent
landscape, lost the 1989 Lok Sabha elections and paved the way for unsta-
ble coalition governments in Delhi. The two union governments headed

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_7
by V. P. Singh (December 1989–November 1990) and Chandra Shekar

(November 1990–June 1991) were minority ones and were bogged down
in a host of domestic issues and controversies (Chakrabarty 2006). As a
result, foreign policy challenges, especially the Kuwait crisis, did not elicit
adequate attention. The urgency of bringing home an estimated 150,000
citizens stranded in Kuwait resulted in India adopting positions which
gave the impression that it was tacitly endorsing the Iraqi invasion. The
financial cost of evacuation and immediate unemployment of Gulf return-
ees became a social and economic burden and unintentionally ushered in
the liberalization of the economy which would transform the fundamental
nature of the Indo-Saudi relations. Things, however, took time.
Jaswant Singh “will be the first ever Indian External Affairs Minister to
visit Saudi Arabia,” remarked a keen observer of India’s foreign policy
strategy in October 2000, which “reflects the dismal record of political
engagement between two very important neighbours” (Raja Mohan
2000). This was despite three visits by Prince Faisal to India in the 1980s
and reflected the unease and indifference with which India approached the
Kingdom. The Euro-centric Cold War reaching South Asia through the
Afghan crisis and the resultant Pakistan-Saudi bonhomie were the primary
reasons for the lack of political moves from New Delhi. This was com-
pounded by its limited political influence and leverage vis-à-vis the oil-rich
monarchy.
However, with hindsight, one could argue that Jaswant Singh’s visit
was the turning point in the bilateral relations. A spate of meaningful
political exchanges and a more confident economic approach towards one
another began with this visit. The economic reforms introduced by Prime
Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao started to show results in the late 1990s
and the Indian economy was growing at a faster rate than any time since
1947. Singh’s visit also signalled a calibrated approach towards the
Pakistani factor in shaping India’s foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis the
Middle East.
Since the early 1990s, Prime Minister Rao and his successors have been
navigating the challenges posed by the end of the Cold War and their focus
was primarily aimed at the US which has acquired a near monopoly in global
affairs. The period between the liberation of Kuwait in February 1991 and
the September 11 attacks in 2001 was the highpoint of American political
power. Having found itself on the ‘losing’ side of the bloc politics, much
of the Indian attention was towards the US for political support and eco-
nomic assistance from the Britten Woods Institutions. The disintegration
THE SHIFT 131
of the USSR was a severe security challenge as military supplies were

disrupted and India had to negotiate independently with newly indepen-
dent former Soviet republic for the urgently needed spare parts and
maintenance. Domestically the 1990s also witnessed political instability,
communal violence and social upheavals which in turn have slowed down
the reform process.
Interestingly, the decision of Vajpayee government to exercise the
nuclear option and conduct the Pokhran-II in May 1998 proved to be a
blessing in disguise. In its immediate aftermath, the US led the interna-
tional uproar and sanctions and for the first time in its history, India was
almost alone in the international scene; if the nuclear haves do not wish
to lose their hegemony to India, the nuclear have-nots were peeved at
India abandoning its decades-long opposition to nuclear weapons. In its
initial response to the tests the Clinton Administration announced its
determination to ‘stop, freeze and rollback’ (Kampani 2001) India’s
nuclear capabilities led to a host of stringent economic sanctions and
political isolation. There were apprehensions within the country that
India was “weaker and much more vulnerable to external powers and
arms twisting” than it was before the nuclear tests (Ram 1999). This was
also the most controversial foreign policy decision since 1947 as everyone
was not enamoured by the NDA government’s decision to conduct
the tests (Ram 1999). Moreover, this time around, India did not have the
benefit of Moscow’s support as Russia was yet to come out of the
economic quagmire that led to its collapse and disintegration.
The vulnerability to the US-led sanctions (Morrow and Carriere 1999;
Rennack 2003) ironically proved to be a boon. The impending political
isolation and clouds of possible surrender to the Washington Consensus
meant that India would have to reorient its worldview and act differently.
A militarily strong country without economic strength would have trans-
formed India into another Soviet Union with all its negative consequences.
With social unrest in different parts of the country, economic vulnerability
accompanied by political surrender would have been catastrophic. Ironical
as it sounds, the US-led sanctions forced India to reach out to countries
that would help its economic needs and priorities. And Saudi Arabia
became a potential partner in the Middle East.
There are others who are ideologically less rigid, but concerning Islam
and energy resources, Saudi Arabia became the most crucial player, espe-
cially if India were to abandon its traditional preoccupation with Pakistan.
In 1999 both joined the new Group of 20 or G-20 as founding members.
Though annual summit meetings became the norm only in 2008 the
forum of major economies representing nearly 70 per cent of the world
population and 85 per cent of the gross world product, signalled the
arrival of new India on the global scene. It was no longer a country of
snake charmers and a perennial aid recipient, and the icing on the cake
came in March 2000 when President Bill Clinton visited India and
addressed the joint session of parliament. This was less than two years after
his rhetoric of sanctions and isolation of India over the nuclear tests.
Shifting Sands
There were limited political exchanges between India and Saudi Arabia
after the visit of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to the Kingdom in April
1982. As discussed earlier, the long-winding 26-point joint declaration
issued during her visit (India, Foreign Affairs Record 1982) dealt with
many international issues but was economical on the bilateral relations.
Differing worldviews and limited interest convergences prevented any
meaningful dialogue. Prince Saud al-Faisal, who became the first Saudi
Foreign Minister to visit India in April 1981, headed the Kingdom’s del-
egation for the NAM summit hosted by Mrs. Gandhi in March 1983. In
subsequent years, however, there were no political contacts between the
two countries.
One had to wait more than a decade after the Berlin Wall to see a
meaningful engagement. The visit of Jaswant Singh initially scheduled for
October 2000 had to be postponed to January 2001 due to last minute
scheduling issues. Only a few months earlier, Singh became the first Indian
foreign minister to visit Israel wherein he flagged the domestic Muslim
population as an essential reason for the prolonged absence of diplomatic
relations (Varadarajan 2005).
On the eve of Singh’s original schedule to the Kingdom, an unnamed
official told The Hindu that “[i]t is not necessary to underestimate the
nature of the Saudi Arabia’s relationship with Pakistan (but) … It is also
not necessary to limit Indo-Saudi relations within the box of Saudi-
Pakistan relations” (Raja Mohan 2000). Jaswant Singh, however, was
more forceful in delinking Pakistan. Speaking to reporters in Riyadh at the
end of his January 2001 visit, he observed that concerns over the Pakistani
factor regarding his visit “would be misreading India’s intentions and
belittling the wisdom of Saudi leadership.” According to him, his “visit to
Saudi Arabia stands on its own, and is not directed at any third country”
THE SHIFT 133
(Raja Mohan 2001). Reflecting a new approach towards New Delhi, the
al-Saud rolled out a royal welcome, and in an unprecedented gesture the
visiting Indian minister had an audience with Crown Prince Abdullah,
who was officiating due to the health situation of King Fahd, as well as
Defence Minister Sultan, Interior Minister Nayef and others (India, MEA
2001, 39–40).
During the visit both sides exchanged views on a host of international
issues, including the then ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and
according to one Indian official, “there was not (sic) single negative vibra-
tion” between the two sides (Raja Mohan 2001). As a personal gesture,
Singh was gifted with two royal horses by the hosts (The Hindu 2001).
Addressing the Council of Saudi Chambers of Commerce, Singh recalled
“the six millennia over which India has established close bonds with the
Arabian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula” (Strategic Digest 2001, 441)
and reminded the visits of Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi and how
the latter “had the privilege of being hosted by the then Crown Prince
Fahd, today the distinguished and justly admired King of this great coun-
try” (Strategic Digest 2001, 442). Underscoring the challenges of the
new millennium and globalization, Singh observed that given “the energy
resources available in the Kingdom and the human and technological
resources available in India, the potential for our cooperation is infinite.
We must work towards its full realization” (Strategic Digest 2001, 446).
Jaswant Singh’s visit proved to be “ground breaking” (Gopal 2017) as
it marked a new phase of periodic and sustained political engagements.
If one excludes the P-3 (namely, the US, Russia and China), India had
more high-level bilateral political exchanges with Saudi Arabia than with
any other major power. Meetings and exchanges between Indian and
Iranian leaders attract considerable attention and commentaries in the
West (Boulden 1996; Fair et al. 2004) but New Delhi and Riyadh have
been slowly making up for the prolonged neglect, suspicion and the resul-
tant indifference. For example, between Jaswant Singh’s visit in January
2001 and until his abrupt removal from office in April 2015, Prince
Faisal—the world’s longest-serving foreign minister—had visited India
thrice, in February 2006, February 2008 and December 2008.
In subsequent years, as Prince Faisal scaled down his foreign trips due
to health issues, his trips to India also ceased. His successor Adel bin
Ahmed al-Jubeir took time to visit India and his March 2016 trip (India,
MEA 2016a) was a preparatory one for Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the
Kingdom the following month. Before becoming King, Salman had visited
India twice: first as the four-decade incumbent g overnor of Riyadh in

April 2010 (India, MEA 2010) and then as the Crown Prince in February
2014 (India, MEA 2014a, b); and his visit as King is expected sometime
in 2018. Furthermore, Riyadh hosted Foreign Ministers Pranab Mukherjee
in April 2008 and Salman Khurshid in May 2013. Surprisingly, Sushma
Swaraj, who had visited more countries in the first three years of her ten-
ure than any of her predecessors, had to wait until February 2018 to visit
the Kingdom.
The Indian accommodation of the Saudi interests and regional con-
cerns came to the forefront when New Delhi hosted Shaikh Khalid bin
Ahmed bin Mohamed al-Khalifa, the foreign minister of Bahrain, in March
2011 (India, MEA 2011b). A couple of days before al-Khalifa’s visit, the
Secretary General of the Saudi National Security Council Prince Bandar
bin-Sultan came and met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (India, MEA
2011a). The timing and sequencing of both the visits are interesting. Only
a few weeks earlier the city centre in Manama witnessed a large mass dem-
onstration similar to the one seen in Tunis and Cairo which led to the
overthrowing of Zine el Abidine Ben-Ali and Hosni Mubarak respectively.
Thus, the visit of the Bahraini foreign minister to New Delhi could be
directly linked to the welfare of an estimated 400,000 Indians working in
the Kingdom. Their continued presence has been economically crucial for
India and for the long-term stability of Bahrain. A sudden departure of
Indian workers would have precipitated a crisis and plunged its already
vulnerable economy.
However, Prince Bandar’s visit days before al-Khalifa’s adds a twist.
Since protests began in Tahrir Square on 25 January 2011, Saudi Arabia
has been nervous over the Arab Spring. When similar demonstrations
started in Manama on 14 February, Riyadh was wary. The Shia-majority
Saudi eastern province has been witnessing periodic protests and unrests
since the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran. Therefore, under the ambit of
GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force (PSF), on 14 March Saudi troops crossed
the 25-km King Fahd Causeway that separates the two kingdoms and
entered Bahrain. And Prince Bandar’s New Delhi visit came less than two
weeks after Saudi Arabia demonstrated its determination to shore up sup-
port for the beleaguered Bahraini ruler.
However, the most visible manifestation of growing political ties was
the three state exchanges between the two countries, namely, the visits of
King Abdullah in January 2006 and of Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh
in March–April 2010 and of Prime Minister Modi in April 2016.
THE SHIFT 135
Delhi Declaration, January 2006

The most crucial moment in the bilateral relations came when King
Abdullah was given the honour of being the chief guest in the Republic
Day celebrations in January 2006. Ever since the practice began in 1950,
India has been hosting heads of state and government both to spice up the
occasion and to convey the importance it attaches to the visiting dignitary.
For long, the Middle Eastern leaders were conspicuously absent from the
pageantry and despite the widespread perception about the Nehru-Nasser
friendship, the honour eluded the Egyptian leader. In 2001, Algerian
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika became the first Middle Eastern leader to
be the chief guest and this was followed by Iranian President Mohammed
Khatami in 2003, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in 2006 and Emirati
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayad al-Nahyan in 2017.
Thus, in January 2006, King Abdullah became the third leader from
the region and the first Saudi monarch to witness the ceremonial Republic
Day parade where India exhibits not only its cultural diversity but also its
military might. Abdullah was the second Saudi monarch to visit India and
the first one since the visit by his half-brother Saud in 1954. Indeed, dur-
ing her visit to the Kingdom in 1982, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
invited the then King Faisal, Crown Prince Fahd as well as the “Second
Deputy Prime Minister” Abdullah to visit India (India, Foreign Affairs
Record 1982, 136). Only Abdullah could make the trip and that too
34 years after the original invitation. The visit had all the pomp and pag-
eantry associated with the occasion, but in line with his orthodox beliefs,
the Saudi monarch refrained from paying homage to Mahatma Gandhi in
Rajghat. King Abdullah was not disrespectful towards the leader of
India’s freedom struggle, but floral tributes to the black marble marking
Gandhi’s memorial are construed as idol worship and hence unacceptable
in Wahhabi Islam.
The highlight of the visit was the Delhi Declaration wherein both Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and King Abdullah pledged “to work together
closely for the welfare and benefit of their people and for peace and stabil-
ity in the region and the world” (Annexure 6). The leaders reiterated their
commitment to “tolerance, harmony and diversity between societies and
the importance of dialogue.” While this has been the traditional Indian
position reflecting its religious and cultural diversity, its inclusion in the
Declaration signalled a Saudi shift towards socio-religious accommoda-
tion. For decades, Islam, as practiced in Saudi Arabia, has been exclusive
and the state and its ulema refused to recognize diversity and tolerate and
accept even Shi’ism with the respect it deserves. Depicting even the People
of the Book, followers of the other two Abrahamic faiths (Jews and
Christians), in a derogatory manner has not been uncommon in Saudi
textbooks (Shea and Al-Ahmed 2006).1 This Saudi worldview got a rude
shock with the September 11 terror attacks and the resultant backlash
forced the al-Saud to fight and dilute religious extremism in the education
system (Prokop 2003). The newly found Saudi commitment for “toler-
ance, harmony, diversity and dialogue” (India, MEA 2006a) was the
reflection of this changing reality (Hussain 2016, 164–65).
Moreover, terrorism has become a menace for Kingdom, especially
since the Khobar Towers bombing in June 1996 where 19 US service
personnel were killed and over 300 wounded. In the wake of the
September 11 attacks leniency towards terrorism was a political liability
and the Delhi Declaration referred to terrorism as “scourge of all man-
kind” and vowed to “combat and eradicate the menace of terrorism” and
to cooperate in fighting “international crimes like money laundering,
drugs and arms smuggling in a sustained and comprehensive manner.”
The subsequent Saudi willingness to quietly extradite persons wanted by
India for criminal offenses was the outcome of this shift. Some of those
sent back to India had Pakistani connections and made the turnaround
even more interesting.
On the energy front, both were appreciative of each other’s position;
the Saudi willingness to be “a trusted and reliable source” for the interna-
tional market and India’s efforts towards “a regional forum for dialogue
among Asian oil and gas producers and consumers” were complementary.
Both pledged to develop “a strategic energy partnership” that would
encompass, green energy, upstream and downstream joint ventures in
both the countries “as well as in third countries.” The Kingdom declared
its intention to invest in “oil refining, marketing and storage” in India and
the later in setting up of joint ventures “for gas-based fertilizer plants” in
the Kingdom.
In recent years, the Kingdom has been expanding its educational infra-
structure towards meeting the growing domestic population and demands.
1
The treatment of Hindus as people of the book is complicated. Historically Muslim
dynasties in India treated them as dhimmis primarily due to political and administrative con-
siderations but despite this, the ulema has refused to accept them as People of the Book due
to theological incompatibility between the Abrahamic faith and polytheistic Hinduism.
THE SHIFT 137
Though the scope and nature of its knowledge economy are different
from similar efforts by Qatar and the UAE, India sees an opportunity in
the Kingdom’s efforts towards modernising its educational system. Hence,
it promised to “assist in setting up an ICT Centre of Excellence” and
other institutions of higher learning. Both also pledged to cooperate in
areas such as health services, tourism, agriculture research and cultural
exchanges.
Conscious of the traditional Saudi commitments to the Palestinian
cause, the Delhi Declaration “emphasized the importance of the Beirut
Arab Peace Intuitive (2002) and the Road Map (2003)” and felt that “the
complementarity between the two plans would invigorate the peace pro-
cess in the Middle East, and would lead to the establishment of a viable
and independent State of Palestine living in peace and prosperity within
secured borders side by side with Israel.” A formal reference to Israel in
Delhi Declaration came when countries like Kuwait avoided similar prac-
tice (India, MEA 2006b). Referring to the ongoing violence in Iraq, India
and Saudi Arabia hoped that “Iraq would turn a new page in history that
would assure its security, unity, territorial integrity and prosperity, and
respect for its sovereignty and independence.”
In short, though delayed King Abdullah’s visit established a framework
for a holistic cooperation in many political and economic arenas. As subse-
quent events proved, both sides did not walk the talk and hence the prog-
ress has been slow. The importance that India attached to Saudi Arabia
manifested when Vice-President M. Hamid Ansari represented India
during the funeral of King Abdullah in January 2015 (Sachdev 2015;
Taneja 2015).
Riyadh Declaration, 2010

The reciprocal Indian prime ministerial visit, the third since 1947, took
place shortly after Abdullah’s when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh vis-
ited the Kingdom in February–March 2010. The three-day visit was pre-
ceded by the visit of External Affairs Minister Mukherjee in April 2008
and Human Resources and Development Minister Arjun Singh in May–
June 2006 and of Prince Saud al-Faisal in February 2008. Prime Minister
Singh was given the rare honour of addressing the Majlis al-Shura and
was conferred an honorary doctorate by the King Saud University based
in Riyadh. One cannot ignore the irony of the occasion. The leader of
the largest democracy in the world was addressing the nominated

parliament with limited consultative and recommendatory powers which
at that time had no female members.2
In line with the earlier example, both the leaders endorsed the Riyadh
Declaration towards ushering in A New Era of Strategic Partnership
(Annexure 7). This they hoped would mark a new phase “in keeping with
the changing realities and unfolding opportunities” and in accordance
with “the civilizational, historic and cultural links” between the two coun-
tries and their people. They called for the full implementation of the Delhi
Declaration “through exchange of visits at the ministerial, official, busi-
ness, academic, media and other levels.” By then the G-20, in which both
are founding members, had institutionalized the annual summit meetings
and the leaders pledged to work towards bringing about a transformation
“in the global economic order, including continuous coordination within
the framework of the G-20 framework.”
Both agreed to work “towards strengthening their strategic partner-
ship” in “infrastructure, energy and development” and referred to the
Kingdom “meeting India’s increasing requirement of crude oil supplies.”
As with the Delhi Declaration, both the leaders “noted that tolerance,
religious harmony and brotherhood, irrespective of faith or ethnic back-
ground, were part of the principles and values of both countries.” They
went on to add that these “are the same principles advocated by the initia-
tive of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques for dialogue among dif-
ferent faiths and beliefs.” This was an explicit reference to and the Indian
endorsement of the National Dialogue initiated by King Abdullah in
2003 whereby he engaged with Shia leaders of his country. This move
paved the way for small improvements in the social conditions of the Shia-
minority population and their inclusion in the Majlis al-Shura. However,
in the light of the sectarian discord in the Middle East following the Arab
Spring such promises and improvements have become a distant memory.
By 2010, the demise of the Oslo process was apparent and both sides
squandered the gains of the historic handshake on the Lawns of the White
House on 13 September 1993. Hence, Riyadh Declaration called “for
the early resumption of the peace process” towards establishing “a sover-
eign, independent, united and viable Palestinian state, in accordance with
2
The first Majlis al-Shura with a four-year term was established in 1993 and 30 female
members were appointed only in 2013 when the strength of the council was increased from
120 to 150.
THE SHIFT 139
the two state solution.” Both declared Israeli settlement activities in the
Occupied Territories as “a fundamental stumbling block” for the peace
process.
Moreover, for quite sometime, especially since the September 11
attacks, the Kingdom has been at the receiving end of international
criticisms over its endorsement of and ideological and financial support to
various Islamist movements across the globe (Crane et al. 2009, 43–58).
The involvement of Muslim militant groups and individuals in some of the
terror attacks accentuated the negative image of Saudi Arabia and even
Islam. Hence, recognizing the phenomena of “terrorism, extremism and
violence” which “threatens all societies” both leaders vowed that these
actions should “not be linked to any race, colour or belief.” In combating
the menace, both pledged to exchange information relating to “terrorist
activities, money laundering, narcotics, arms and human trafficking.”
Both leaders took note of the growing international concerns over the
Iranian nuclear programme and by the time Singh visited Riyadh the UN
Security Council as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency had
adopted a number of resolutions and imposed sanctions against Iran.
Reflecting these concerns, the Riyadh Declaration called for a resolution
of the problem “peacefully through negotiation” and urged Iran to work
towards removing “regional and international doubts about its nuclear
programme.” At the same time, it also recognized the right of “Iran and
other countries” to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the violence-
ravaged Iraq and Afghanistan, it called for “security and stability.”
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit was followed by the visit of the
then Crown Prince Salman to India in February 2014. The joint state-
ment issued at the end of his visit reiterated the commitment of both
countries outlined in Delhi and Riyadh Declarations (Annexure 8). It also
directed the General Investment Authority in Saudi Arabia (SAGIA) and
Invest India to facilitate two-way investments in “petrochemical indus-
tries, pharmaceuticals (and) medical equipments.” Riyadh reiterated its
“commitments to meet any future requirement of India” for crude oil.
This vague and open-ended commitment came against the backdrop of
growing uncertainties over India’s ability to import oil from Iran due to
US-led sanctions. As discussed in a later chapter, the spurt in the Saudi
share in India’s oil imports was partly due to the Kingdom stepping in to
make up for the drops in imports from Iran.
During Salman’s visit both sides also signed an MoU on Defence
Cooperation which promised to “institutionalize and strengthen” bilateral
defence cooperation and “promote cooperation in defence industry,

science, technology and transfer of technology” (India, MEA 2014a, b).
A lesser noticed element in the joint statement was their mutual pledge
“to transform the buyer-seller relationship in the energy sector to one of
deeper partnership.” In line with the then Indian practice, the support for
the Palestinian cause came with an interesting twist. Both sides called for
“a just, comprehensive and lasting peace” to the Palestinian issue “that
guarantees the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the
establishment of their independent, united and viable state with East
Jerusalem as its capital.” Unlike the previous occasion, the joint statement
made no direct reference to Israel.
Abdullah’s daughter Princess Adelah headed a Saudi delegation of
Advisory Committee of Saudi National Museum and Heritage Preservation
Society to India in September 2012 (India, MEA 2013, 44–45). This was
a rare sign of women empowerment in the Kingdom. While the contours
of Prime Minister Modi’s Middle East policy and his extensive engage-
ments with the Kingdom are discussed in a later chapter, for continuity, his
Saudi visit in April 2016 is discussed here.
Joint Statement, 2016

The joint statement signed by Prime Minister Modi and King Salman on
3 April 2016 is an interesting read as it contained not only areas of Indo-
Saudi commonalities but also the dichotomy between Modi’s domestic
and foreign policies (Annexure 9). It makes customary remarks about the
Delhi and Riyadh Declarations signed by their predecessors and “close
interlinkage” between the stability of the Gulf region and the Indian
subcontinent. Security cooperation, which has become a hallmark of
Modi’s engagements with the Middle East, could also be noticed here
and 9 out of the 36 points of agreement pertain to security arena. A few
months before Modi’s visit, the then Mumbai Police Commissioner
Ahmad Javed was named ambassador to Riyadh (India, MEA 2015c;
FirstPost 2015), highlighting the importance of security cooperation
with the Kingdom.3
3
However, this was not the first time a serving police officer was appointed as ambassador
to Saudi Arabia, and in 1968 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent the then Director General
of Tamil Nadu Police T. T. P. Abdullah to Riyadh and he was renominated in May 1981 for
another term.
THE SHIFT 141
In recent years, especially since the Delhi Declaration of 2006, there

were no direct or indirect references to Pakistan in Indo-Saudi joint
statements. This would change subtly this time and both leaders used
“menace of extremism and terrorism” to convey their disapproval and
“called on all states to reject the use of terrorism against other coun-
tries, dismantle terrorism infrastructure where they happen to exist and
to cut off any kind of support and financing to terrorists operating
and perpetrating terrorism from their territories against other states;
and bring perpetrators of acts of terrorism to justice.” The phraseology
was a reiteration of the traditional Indian position vis-à-vis Pakistan and
the latter’s endorsement of, if not logistical support for, various terror
acts carried out against India. Indeed, “bringing perpetrators of acts of
terrorism to justice” is a euphemism for its demand for the trial or
deportation of Hafiz Saeed suspected to be the mastermind of the 26
November 2008 terror attack in Mumbai that killed at least 166 per-
sons (Express Web Desk 2016b). Growing discord between Riyadh and
Islamabad over a host of issues such as sectarianism and Yemen crisis
could be cited as the possible reason for al-Saud agreeing to Modi’s
phrasing.
Moreover, Modi’s rhetoric against terrorism found a receptive audience
in Riyadh, which was facing the menace both internally and in the region.
Terrorist violence undermines the Saudi regional interests, especially in
Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria and some of them were attributed to
Iran. While some of them affected its strategic interests in these countries,
others were the result of its prolonged support to extremism since the
Afghan days of the 1980s. Thus, terrorism was no longer an external phe-
nomenon but a threat to its interests. This resulted in Modi and Salman
agreeing to “strengthen law-enforcement, anti-money laundering, drug
trafficking and other transnational crimes.” Towards this end, an MoU on
“Cooperation in the Exchange of intelligence related to Money
Laundering, Terrorism Financing and Related Crimes” was signed during
Modi’s visit (India, MEA 2016b). In short, though the target of their
primary concern varied, both agreed to fight against state-sponsored ter-
rorism directed at their respective interests.
Both leaders agreed to work towards preventing the use of cyberspace
“for terrorism, radicalization and for disturbing social harmony” and “to
counter radicalization and misuse of religion by groups and countries for
inciting hatred, perpetuating and justifying terrorism for pursuing political
aims.” Besides tough security measures, they called for “exchanges and
dialogues between religious scholars and intellectuals in both countries

and the organization of conferences and seminars to promote values of
peace, tolerance, inclusiveness and welfare, inherent in all religions.”
The otherwise standard statement assumes importance if seen within
the context of the worldview of the signatories. ‘Tolerance and inclusive-
ness’ are not the expression one would generally associate with the Wahhabi
state and even the hardened friends of al-Saud would not rate highly on
these scores. When it comes to Shias and non-Muslims or even the People
of the Book or Dhimmis, the Wahhabi ideology is anything but tolerant.
The same compulsion is also visible in the Indian Prime Minister agree-
ing to the phrasing. Domestic critics have been accusing Modi of being
promiscuous in tolerating and hence facilitating vigilantism by Hindu
extremism within the country. For narrow electoral considerations, he has
been seen to be appeasing the Hindu electorates.4 The absence of any
Muslim candidates in crucial state elections in Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat
in 2017 was a glaring reminder, and the prime minister who was otherwise
hyperactive in the social media has been slow in responding to some of the
anti-Muslim vigilantism. The joint statement in Riyadh which praised ‘tol-
erance and inclusiveness’ underscored a distinct pattern and even dichot-
omy in Modi’s position; he has been ‘exclusive’ internally but ‘inclusive’
externally. While skipping Iftar parties hosted even by the president, Modi
has been visiting mosques during his foreign visits.5
At some level, Modi’s religiosity has not been different from the al-
Sauds’, and protocols and diplomatic niceties have not inhibited him
from practising his beliefs and customs. For example, his maiden visit to
the US in September 2014 coincided with the navratri during which
some orthodox Hindus refrain from regular meals. During the nine-day
festivity Modi “eats only once selected fruit in the evening along with
lime juice. He will be avoiding grains and pulses” (Express Web Desk
2016a). Hence, the official ‘dinner’ hosted by President Barrack Obama
had to be tailored to suit Modi’s food demands, resulting in the First
Lady giving it a miss. Hence, referring to “shared civilizational ties (and)
common heritage,” the Indo-Saudi joint statement observed: “A broad
4
In the past, the Congress party has been accused of appeasing the Muslim population for
electoral considerations.
5
Accompanied by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in September 2017, Modi visited
the Sidi Saiyyed Mosque in September 2017, built in 1573. This was the first time Modi had
visited a mosque in India as prime minister (Amrita Ray 2017).
THE SHIFT 143
approach of humanism and tolerance and conviction that faith should

unite rather than divide can be a positive factor in international relations.”
Would Pundit Nehru use a similar expression in underlining the shared
Indo-Saudi worldview? Not just the leaders of both the countries, even
times have changed since then.
Referring to the MoU on defence cooperation signed in February 2014,
when King Salman was the Crown Prince and Defence Minister, the lead-
ers agreed “to intensify bilateral defence cooperation through the exchange
of visits by military personnel and experts, conduct of joint military exer-
cises, exchange of visits by ships and aircrafts, and supply of arms and
ammunition and their joint development.” This was perhaps more than
any Indian leader had ever committed vis-à-vis an Arab power. Even the
military cooperation with Iraq in the 1970s only witnessed Indian advisers
(Jha 1992). Modi’s commitment for joint military exercise should be seen
as a response to the Saudi strategy to dilute its dependence upon the US
for security guarantees. His visit came amidst growing discord between the
al-Sauds and the Obama administration over the Iranian nuclear deal
(McElroy 2013) and concerns that Washington has shifted its priorities
from the Arab to Persian power in the Gulf region. However, the reference
to arms supplies and joint production appears to be a long-term option for
India in the light of its desire to manufacture the bulk of its defence
requirements indigenously through the Make in India programme.
Besides cooperation in maritime security, the leaders pledged “to pro-
mote bilateral collaboration for humanitarian assistance and evacuation in
natural disasters and conflict situation.” A year earlier, India evacuated
6688 persons, including 1947 belonging to 48 other countries from con-
flict-ridden Yemen (India, MEA 2015b). Most of them were airlifted from
Sana’a while some were taken by ships from Port of Aden. At that time,
the Arab coalition force led by Saudi Arabia was carrying out aerial bomb-
ing over areas held by the Houthi rebels. Recognizing the need for Saudi
assistance, on 30 March 2015 Prime Minister Modi telephoned King
Salman, briefed his rescue plan, requested and secured Saudi “support and
cooperation in the evacuation of Indian citizens from Yemen” (India,
MEA 2015a).
Regarding the bilateral trade, the leaders committed to increasing it
from the US$39 billion in 2014–15, but this could happen if India suc-
ceeds in getting “Saudi Aramco, SABIC and other Saudi companies in
invest in the infrastructure sector” in the country. Keeping this in mind,
the joint statement explicitly identified “railways, roads, ports and
shipping” as the priority areas for India. Once again both emphasized the
need “to transform the buyer-seller partnership in the energy sector” and
identified “training and human resource development and cooperation in
research and development” and regular consultations under “India-Saudi
Arabia Ministerial Energy Dialogue” but no major announcements were
made during the visit.
Wooing the diasporic population has become integral to Modi’s foreign
engagements and his visit to Saudi Arabia was not an exception. Even
though he could not address an open audience as happened in Madison
Square or other avenues, the joint statement addressed Modi’s concerns and
declared: “Recognizing the vibrant people to people contact that provided
strong bonds between the two countries, the leaders lauded the valuable
role of the Indian community in Saudi Arabia and its contribution to the
progress and development of both India and Saudi Arabia.” During the visit
both countries signed an agreement on labour cooperation for the recruit-
ment of General Category Workers (India, Ministry of Overseas Indian
Affairs 2014) and to establish a joint Working Group on Consular issues for
periodic consultations. Modi also thanked the Saudi authorities for their
“excellent arrangement” for the haj and umrah pilgrims from India.
On the international situation, both leaders discussed the ongoing crisis in
Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen and given their different approaches, they set-
tled for advocating a peaceful resolution of these conflicts. On the question
of Palestine, the joint statement reiterated their support for “a just, compre-
hensive and lasting peace in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative and
the resolutions of international legitimacy” towards guaranteeing “the legiti-
mate rights of the Palestinian people.” Continuing with the practice of the
UPA government in India, the statement called for “an independent, united
and viable (Palestinian) state with East Jerusalem as its capital.” Interestingly
a year later, Modi would drop references to “East Jerusalem” during the visit
of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to India (Kumaraswamy 2017).
Conclusion
The bilateral relations have transformed considerably since the 2001 visit of
Jaswant Singh to the Kingdom. There were more high-level visits and
exchanges afterwards than in the previous five decades. The shift was
primarily India’s with Saudi Arabia responding favourably. If the economic
growth made India an attractive market, New Delhi’s determination to
delink Pakistan from its foreign policy engagements made things comfort-
able for the Kingdom. Both sides recognized the need to diversify the areas
THE SHIFT 145
of cooperation and began evolving positions that were not radically differ-
ent from one another. In the past, the Cold War divide precluded a shared
worldview and this has not been the case during the past decade. Despite
nuanced differences over issues such as Iranian nuclear controversy and civil
war situations in some parts of the Middle East, both the countries are com-
mitted to the territorial integrity of the post-Ottoman states in the region.
Greater confidence on the part of India and the Saudi desire to diversifica-
tion are complementary as both recognize the need to transform the buyer-
seller energy relations and expand into other forms of economic and strategic
partnership. Even if the progress had been limited and less inspiring, the
road-map is clear. This was possible primarily because of the critical shift in
India’s foreign policy, namely, delinking Pakistan from its dealings with the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and more robust engagements since May 2014.
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CHAPTER 8
Transformation
While the end of the Cold War posed new challenges to both the countries,
as discussed earlier, their responses took time to materialize. India’s
economic ascendance could be noticed only in the early years of the
twenty-first century, and around the time, Saudi Arabia also faced interna-
tional backlash over the September 11 terror attacks. The initial politico-
economic engagements in the mid-1990s began bearing fruits. India
initiated steps that went beyond the traditional triad—energy, expatriates
and remittances—and sought partnership with the Kingdom. Towards
partaking in the Saudi moves in the direction of knowledge economy,
India offered to cooperate in the field of education, and India’s Minister
of Human Resource Development Arjun Singh visited the Kingdom in
May–June 2006. The visit of King Abdullah in January 2006 is often seen
as the turning point and was followed by the visit of Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh to Riyadh in early 2010.
However, a far-reaching transformation of India’s overall approach
towards the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, had to wait until the elec-
tion of Narendra Modi as prime minister. There has been a perceptible
change towards the wider region after 2014. A quantum jump in India’s
diplomatic engagements has fundamentally altered India’s view of the
region and in turn brought about a higher visibility to New Delhi in the
political circles of crucial players. While the long-term sustainability and
hence benefits are too early to foresee, the change is perceptible, especially for
a region that remained geographically closer but politically distant for India.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_8
Except for the bonhomie exhibited during the Nehru-Nasser phase, the
Middle East had never figured prominently in Indian diplomatic radar and
even that phase was not without its share of difficulties. Perceived sympathy
for Nasser became problematic when Saudi-Egyptian differences flared up
and India found itself at the receiving end when Riyadh moved closer to
Pakistan. Otherwise, the Middle East has been in a diplomatic limbo dur-
ing much of the Cold War and did not receive attention commensurate to
its importance, both in the regional context and towards India. And this
was to change after 2014.
Modi’s Approach to Middle East

Though there were visits by leaders and officials to the region, prime min-
isterial visits assume importance primarily because they set the direction
and agenda of bilateral engagements and provide the impetus to the oth-
erwise lethargic process entangled in bureaucratic cobwebs. The frequency
with which the prime minister meets a foreign leader becomes a sign of
importance that country attracts in India’s foreign policy calculations.
According to Egyptian journalist Mohammed Heikal, between February
1953 and July 1955 alone, Nehru and Nasser had met as many as eight
times (Heikal 1973, 280). This provided the template for the Nehru-
Nasser bonhomie whose influence continued even after Nehru’s death in
May 1964.
Seen in that context, the pre-2014 Indian engagement with the Middle
East does not correspond to the platitudes that one finds in official state-
ments. The rhetoric of ‘extended neighbourhood,’ ‘civilizational ties’ or
‘historical links’ does not correspond to high-level political visits to the
region. Besides Egypt, Prime Minister Nehru visited Saudi Arabia (1956)
Iran (1959), Lebanon (1956 and 1960) and Syria (1956, 1957), (UAR)
(1960), Sudan (1957), Iran (1959 and 1963) and Turkey (1960). His
successor Lal Bahadur Shastri went to Cairo for the second NAM summit
in September 1964. As prime minister, Indira Gandhi visited Egypt (1966,
1970), Lebanon (1971), Algeria (1973), Iran (1974), Iraq (1975), Kuwait
and UAE (1981), Saudi Arabia (1982), and Libya and Tunisia (1984).
If Prime Minister Morarji Desai went to Iran in June 1977, Rajiv
Gandhi undertook visits to Egypt and Algeria (June 1985), Oman
(November 1985), Syria (June 1988), and Turkey and Jordan (July 1988).
P. V. Narasimha Rao went to Tunisia (1992), Iran (1993), Oman (1993)
and Egypt (1995). The perceived Indian sympathy for Iraq during the
TRANSFORMATION 151
Kuwait crisis resulted in Prime Minister I. K. Gujral not being able to visit
any countries along the Persian Gulf but he did visit Egypt in 1997. Atal
Bihari Vajpayee visited Iran (2001) Syria (2003), Morocco (1999), Turkey
(2000 and 2003) and Oman (1998). During his decade-long tenure,
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Saudi Arabia (2010), Oman and
Qatar (2008), Egypt (2009) and Iran (2012). In addition to these state
visits, Indian leaders attended multilateral forums and meetings hosted by
the Middle East countries, such as NAM summits.
There has been a quantum jump in foreign travels by Indian leaders
after Modi was elected. Since becoming prime minister on 26 May 2014,
he undertook 9 foreign visits in the same year, 29 in 2015, 19 in 2016 and
14 in 2017 and thus by early 2018, he became the most widely travelled
Indian leader since independence. His maiden visit to the Middle East,
however, had to wait more than 15 months after he assumed office.
A couple of days after his second Independence Day address, he embarked
on a two-day visit to the UAE, India’s largest trading partner in the world
after China. Given the regional tension and rivalry, the Emirates was the
least controversial and most appropriate destination for his maiden visit.
Since then, however, he has visited eight countries, and out of them, he
undertook four standalone visits to Saudi Arabia (April), Iran (May) and
Qatar (June) in 2016 and Israel in July 2017. In early 2018 he visited
Palestine, the UAE and Oman. He went to Turkey in November 2015 for
the G-20 summit in Antalya.
Before discussing the pattern and contours of Modi’s Middle Eastern
journeys, it is essential to examine the recent trends in Indian visits to the
region. Though the political contacts were minimal, the Arab Spring pro-
tests sparked off a distinct pattern. In December 2010, a marginalized
Tunisian vegetable vendor Mohamed Bouazizi unintentionally sparked off
popular protest which soon spread to other Arab countries and came to be
known as Arab Spring (Dabashi 2012; Haseeb 2014; Kamrava 2014;
Bayat 2017). Just days before this, in the last week of November, President
Pratibha Patil undertook a visit to the UAE and Syria. Between then and
until the arrival of Modi, senior Indian leaders only visited non-Arab
Islamic countries, namely, Iran and Turkey, and skipped the entire Arab
world. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh attended the 16th NAM summit
hosted by Tehran in August 2012 and this was converted into a state visit
and he met and interacted with senior Iranian officials, including Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
(Ashwarya 2016; Ningthoujam 2013). Vice-President M. Hamid Ansari
represented India in the inauguration of President Hasan Rouhani in

August 2013. Turkey was the other country which hosted President
Pranab Mukherjee in October 2013, and weeks before the Arab Spring
protests Vice-President Ansari visited Ankara in October 2011.
During the same period, India hosted Palestinian President Mahmoud
Abbas (September 2012), Bahraini Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-
Khalifa (May 2012), Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi (November
2013) Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa (February 2014) and the
then Saudi Crown Prince Salman (February 2014).
In short, between December 2010 and May 2014, Indian president,
vice-president and prime minister skipped the entire Arab world. Political
engagements were confined to visits by the external affairs minister to
Turkey (May 2011), Israel and Palestine (January 2012), Egypt (March
2012), Iran (May 2013), Saudi Arabia (May 2013), Iraq (June 2013),
Turkey (July 2013), Bahrain (December 2013) and Morocco, Tunisia and
Sudan (January 2014) or by minister of state for external affairs to Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE. This was the sorry state of
affairs until the arrival of Prime Minister Modi. Thus, India’s first signifi-
cant political visit since late 2010 with the Arab world had to wait until
August 2015 when Prime Minister Modi went to the UAE.
At the same time, even before his maiden visit, Modi exhibited his
agenda for the region, especially the energy-rich Persian Gulf. On July 3,
he met Omani Minister Responsible for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi,
the first foreign dignitary from the region to meet the Indian leader.1 A
few months later, Modi met the then Saudi Crown Prince Salman during
the G-20 meeting in Brisbane.
It is possible to identify a pattern in Modi’s engagements with the
region.
• Until 2018, Modi has been undertaking standalone visits to the

region and this included his July 2017 visit to Israel when he skipped
Palestine. He did the same while visiting Palestine in February 2018.
• If one excludes his Israel visit and the one to Turkey for the Antalya
G-20 meeting in November 2014, Modi’s sojourns took him to
critical countries along the Persian Gulf, namely, the UAE, Saudi
Arabia, Iran, Qatar and Oman.
1
On June 9 Prime Minister Modi met Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi who
came as a special envoy of President Xi Jinping.
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• Security cooperation has figured prominently in all the joint state-

ments issued at the end of Modi’s visits and they encompass a wide
range of issues including cooperation in counter-terrorism, cyber
security, sea-lane communication, anti-piracy, terror financing,
money laundering and intelligence sharing. The emergence of the
Islamic Caliphate and its radial impact upon the youth within and
outside the region has spurred a greater emphasis on fighting reli-
gious extremism and radicalism.
These are accompanied by a fundamental transformation in the Indian

approach. It is not a country or even issue specific but is development
driven. Even Modi’s engagements with Israel dwell more about soft issues
like agriculture, desalination, recycling and waste management than hard-
core security issues. His support for Palestine is economical and skill devel-
opment than political rhetoric against oppression and occupation. In other
words, economic cooperation has become the key driver of India’s engage-
ments with the Middle East.
This manifested in the high-profile political engagements with the
broader region, some of whom did not see senior Indian officials since the
days of Nehru. Emirates, which has been among the top three trading
partners of India for the past two decades, hosted Indira Gandhi in May
1981 and none for the next 34 years. A summary of the political visits
from India since May 2014 is necessary to place Modi’s engagements with
Saudi Arabia in a broader context.
• President Pranab Mukherjee: Jordan, Palestine and Israel (October

2015)
• Vice-President M. Hamid Ansari: Morocco (May–June 2016);
Tunisia (June 2016); Algeria (October 2016).2
• External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj: Iran (April 2016); Egypt
(August 2015); UAE (November 2014); Oman (February 2015);
Turkey (January 2015); Bahrain (September 2014); Palestine
(January 2016); Israel (January 2016); Bahrain (January 2016 India-
Arab League Ministerial Meeting); Saudi Arabia (February 2018)
• Minister of Defence Manohar Parrikar: Oman, UAE (May 2016)
• Minister of Home Rajnath Singh: Israel (November 2014)
• Minister of Road Transport Nitin Gadkari: Iran (May 2015 and
December 2017)
2
The Vice-President also represented India during the funeral of King Abdullah in January
2015.
Other meetings:
• External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Israeli Foreign Minister

Avigdor Lieberman, UN, October 2014
• Modi and Iranian President Hasan Rouhani, BRICS summit, Ufa,
Russia, July 2015;
• Modi-Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, UNGA September
2014
• Modi-Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, Singapore, March 2015,
funeral of Lee Kuan Yew
• Modi-Palestinian President Abbas UNGA September 2015
• Modi-Egyptian President Fattah el-Sisi, UNGA September 2015
• Modi-King Hussein of Jordan, UNGA, September 2015
In addition, in January 2017 India hosted Emirati Crown Prince

Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan as the chief guest of the Republic Day
celebrations.
During the same period India hosted Israeli President Reuven Rivlin
(November 2016); Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (May 2017);
Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani (March 2015); Emirati crown
prince (February 2016 and January 2017); Emirati foreign minister
(September 2015); Iranian foreign minister (August 2015); Bahraini foreign
minister (February 2015); Qatari prime minister (December 2016); Egyptian
president (September 2016); Turkish foreign minister (August 2016); Saudi
foreign minister (March 2016); Syrian foreign minister (January 2016); for-
eign minister of Jordan (December 2017); Qatari foreign minister (August
2017); Turkish president (May 2017); Israeli prime minister Benjamin
Netanyahu (January 2018); and King Abdullah of Jordan (February 2018).
In short, it is with this hyperactive diplomatic environment one has to
contextualize the growing political ties between India and Saudi Arabia.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was the first country in the region with
which Prime Minister Modi sought political engagement and has been
using G-20 summits to regularly meet the Saudi leadership. During the
Brisbane meet in November 2014, he met the then Crown Prince Salman.
This was repeated in Belek in Turkey the following year. By then Salman
had become King after the passing away of his half-brother Abdullah. In
the Hangzhou G-20 meet in September 2016, Modi met the then Deputy
Crown Prince Mohammed bin-Salman who later became crown prince in
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June 2017. No such meeting, however, took place when the G-20 leaders
met in Frankfurt in July 2017 a junior minister headed the Saudi delega-
tion. These meetings took a substantial shape when Modi visited the
Kingdom in April 2017 (discussed in the previous chapter).
Besides his personal style of diplomacy and fondness for personal chem-
istry, Prime Minister Modi has been helped by far-reaching changes both
within and outside India.
Decisive Mandate
For the first time in three decades, the 2014 Lok Sabha elections offered
a decisive mandate in favour of a single party and paved the way for politi-
cal cohesion and direction. The decimation of the Congress Party and the
marginalization of various regional and region-based parties meant that
coalition compulsions would not subvert or undermine more significant
policy issues, as was the case in recent decades. At times, coalition compul-
sions resulted in foreign policy receiving lesser attention than it deserved
and coalition firefighting inhibited a more active engagement with the
outside world. As a result, some of the well-intended domestic and foreign
policy initiatives could not be implemented due to coalition partners pull-
ing the government in different directions (Chakrabarty 2014; Sridharan
2014; Malik and Malik 2014).
During the decade-long UPA government, for example, India had five
external affairs ministers, namely, Natwar Singh (May 2004–November
2005), Manmohan Singh (November 2005–October 2006), Pranab
Mukherjee (October 2006–May 2009), S. M. Krishna (May 2009–
October 2012) and Salman Khurshid (October 2012–May 2014). Out of
them, Mukherjee and Khurshid spent a considerable amount of their time
and energy in managing periodic coalition crises. Hence, ministerial-level
visits to the Middle East during UPA rule were confined to Iran, Israel-
Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia Morocco, Tunisia and
Turkey. In addition, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visited Saudi Arabia
in February–March 2010 and attended the NAM summit in Tehran. After
much delay, Defence Minister A. K. Antony visited Saudi Arabia in
February 2012. As president, Pratibha Patil visited Syria and UAE
(November 2010) and Pranab Mukherjee went to Turkey (October
2013). Otherwise, there were no high-level political exchanges between
India and the Middle East during 2004–14.
During much of the period, the Middle Eastern region was looked after
by Minister of State E. Ahamed, who represented the Indian Union
Muslim League in the UPA coalition. Because of electoral consideration,
he pursued a policy that eschewed any formal contacts with Israel even
though India has formal and robust military ties with it. Moreover, because
of his junior protocol status, he was not able to meet or establish contacts
with senior leaders and officials of the region.
The decisive popular mandate removed this uncertainty, and initial
media speculations about tensions between Prime Minister Modi and
External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj proved to be unfounded and they
have found a way to work in tandem as manifested by a spate of foreign
visits undertaken by both the leaders. Between May 2014 and December
2017, for example, Swaraj has made 47 overseas tours, including 7 coun-
tries in the Middle East.
Crisis and Opportunities
The dawn of the twenty-first century proved to be ominous for the
turbulence-ridden Middle East. If the al-Aqsa intifada which broke out
in September 2000 marked the end of the Oslo peace process, the terror
attacks in the US a year later constrained public space in the West and
unleashed an adverse reaction against some of the Islamic countries in
the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and the faith itself. Indeed,
some of the negative stereotypes against Islam and the Islamophobia can
be directly linked to the September 11 terror attacks. The Bush
Administration opted for War of Terror (Rajwade 2006; Cady 2008) as
its response and launched a military campaign against Afghanistan
(October 2001) and later Iraq (March 2003). These, in turn, plunged
the entire region into an endless spiral of violence and the after effects
are still reverberating even after the US pulled out its military from these
two countries.
Since then some of the older issues were rekindled and new ones sur-
faced making the region extremely unpredictable, unstable and fearful. A
century after the Sykes-Picot cartography, the Westphalian order is erod-
ing and the state system is collapsing in many parts of the Middle East.
Even in the best of times, some post-Ottoman states had not accepted the
finality of the colonial boundaries and have sought to subvert them by
invoking ‘historic’ and ‘natural’ claims over their immediate neighbours or
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parts of them. Territorial expansion at the cost of their neighbours has

been a mainstream political discourse in many Arab and non-Arab coun-
tries and some of them even sought to alter the status quo through wars
or unilateral actions.
Seen in this context, one could identify four significant issues which
have dominated the Middle Eastern landscape in the 2000s and have
partly contributed to or enhanced Modi’s engagement strategy.
Diminishing Influence of the US The most profound development of the

early twenty-first century has been gradual and, one might say, an unstop-
pable decline of the American economic and hence strategic power. Only
a decade earlier, the US influence was seen unquestionable and enduring
to the point that some even depicted it as the ushering in of an ‘American
century,’ and a ‘unipolar world’ was a foregone conclusion. The disinte-
gration of the USSR and the ‘demise’ of the state-controlled socialist eco-
nomic model led to the chorus of ‘end of history’ and the heralding of the
unquestionable ascendance of the free market economy under democratic
liberalism. All these hopes and dreams were buried with the destruction of
the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001.
If the largest terror attack in history not only jolted the domestic con-
fidence, the reaction of the Bush Administration precipitated the down-
ward sliding of the American power, preponderance and international
influence. The two ill-planned military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq
proved to be costly both in human and in material terms and exposed the
hollowness of the strategic thinking in Washington. Far from enhancing
the American power, these interventions eroded its strategic influence and
raised doubts over its decision-making process. The accusations of weap-
ons of mass destructions levelled against Iraq in the United Nations proved
to be false as intelligence assessments were tailored to the political demands
of the Bush Administration.
The September 11 attacks also exposed the prolonged benign American
approach towards religious extremism supported and propagated by its
friends and allies. Under the ambit of energy security for itself and its
European allies, various US administrations have adopted Nelson’s Eye
policy towards the negative impact of Wahhabi Islam. The Afghan Arabs
returning to their home countries in the early 1990s was not a wakeup
call. At the same time, the American economy was jolted by the crisis in the
aviation industry and the subprime mortgage crisis, eventually resulting in
an economic recession from which the US had not recovered completely.

Far from being a security threat, the September 11 dealt a devastating
blow to the American economy, the raison d’être of the American pre-
eminence after Second World War.
This declining American economic power and hence political influence
manifested in the Middle East since 2001. Far from achieving any strategic
gains, the US-led invasion of Iraq which began in March 2003 plunged
the latter into a sectarian divide and endless cycle of violence. The removal
and eventual execution of Saddam Hussein in December 2006 reopened
the sectarian divide latent since the formation of the Iraqi state in 1932.
The mounting American casualties and the cost of the campaign eventu-
ally forced President Bush to withdraw American military presence in that
country, a process that was completed by his successor Barrack Obama in
December 2011.
The post-2001 American policy resulted in two negative concerns in
the region. The US intervention destroyed the post–Second World War
Westphalian order in the Middle East and raised doubts about the viability
of Iraq and in the process other states in the region. As would be dis-
cussed, these concerns were heightened in the wake of the Arab Spring
protests. Moreover, the Operation Iraqi Freedom unveiled by President
Bush transformed that country as the first Shia-majority Arab state in the
political sense of the term. In the process, the US actions have embold-
ened the power and position of Iran, thereby rekindling the traditional
Arab-Persian rivalry.
While trying to pull out the US forces from Afghanistan and Iraq, the
Obama administration got itself estranged from its traditional ally Israel over
the peace process. During his eight years in office, President Obama had to
content with Benjamin Netanyahu as Israel’s prime minister; traditional
bonhomie between the two leaders was absent, and they disagreed and
publicly clashed over a host of issues, including the peace process and the
Iranian nuclear programme. As would be discussed, some of the Arab pow-
ers were also unhappy over Obama’s handling of Iran or the Arab Spring.
As a result, the US wielded little influence over many events in the
region or was unable to shepherd them to the benefit of its allies and
friends. On the contrary, through a policy of omissions and commissions
since 2001 various US administrations have emboldened countries which
were unfriendly or hostile towards its traditional friends. The re-entry of
Russia into the Middle Eastern affairs was partly facilitated by successive
American failures over Iran, Syria and Arab-Israeli conflict (Trenin 2018;
Shabaneh 2015).
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It is, however, premature to write off the US domination in the Middle

East, especially in the oil-rich Persian Gulf region. Though Russia and
China have made forays, their role and influence are limited. Their influ-
ence is more visible in the Syrian crisis and less over Iran. Despite its bon-
homie with both these countries especially over the nuclear controversy,
Iran does not visualize any role for these or other extra-regional players in
the Gulf region, which it considers to be its exclusive sphere of influence.
Thus, diminishing American influence in the Gulf is accompanied by the
inability of any other country or constellation of powers to replace
Washington.
It is under such challenging times, India has been increasing its political
engagements with the Middle East and Gulf region. The emergence of
Indo-US strategic partnership consecrated in the nuclear deal in 2005
came in parallel to lessening American interest and influence in the Middle
East. Russia is seeking to expand its influence through its traditional arms
sales diplomacy as manifested in its agreements with pro-Western coun-
tries like Egypt and Turkey while China is trying to consolidate its eco-
nomic ties through the One-Belt-One-Road initiative. For its part,
Pakistan is trying to flag its Islamic brotherhood as its time-tested approach
towards the region.
Thus, without being able to piggyback on the American influence,
India will have to navigate competition from other powers, especially
Russia, China and Pakistan in forging closer ties with the region. This
would be extremely difficult and challenging vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia as
other players are equally attractive for Riyadh and competitive for India.
New Delhi would have to compete with Russia’s energy capabilities,
China’s economic strength and Pakistan’s Islamic credentials as it tries to
woo the al-Saud.
Iranian Nuclear Deal The decade-long controversy over the Iranian

nuclear programme led to the political settlement in the form of the nuclear
agreement finalized in June 2015 (Kumaraswamy 2016). Concluded
between Iran and the P5+1 powers the JCOPA placed restrictions upon
Iran’s nuclear installations and brought them under the IAEA inspection.
The deal was approved by the UNSC in January 2016 and paved the way
for the removal of multilateral sanctions and the dilution of some of the
unilateral Western sanctions (Shank 2015; Perkovich 2016).
At the same time, the political settlement did not go down well with
some of Iran’s neighbours who saw the JCOPA as a sign of a fundamental
shift in the American policy. Coming from different angles, both Israel
(Rajiv 2016) and Saudi Arabia (Pasha 2016) feel that the nuclear deal had
legitimized the advances made by Iran in the nuclear technology and in
the process had only delayed the weaponization process (Inbar 2017).
Obama’s reluctance to accommodate their concerns over Iranian behav-
iour and involvement in many crises in the region such as Bahrain, Iraq,
Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Yemen meant that the war-weary US had
abandoned a stricter approach and in the process admitted and even facili-
tated the Iranian regional hegemony. Some of the recent low-level con-
tacts between Saudi Arabia and Israel (Heller and Kalin 2017) are directly
linked to their mutual concerns over the US policy towards Iran.
India seeks closer ties with all the major players of the puzzle, namely,
Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia. During the decade-long controversy over
the nuclear programme, India maintained close ties with Israel while
ignoring the latter’s concerns over the Indo-Iranian ties. It continued
energy imports from Iran and initiated economic engagements, including
the development of the Chabahar Port and energy exploration (Rizvi and
Behuria 2016; Singh Roy 2013). Simultaneously, it suspended the export
of energy products to Iran, reduced oil imports from that country or opted
for rupee payment of its oil imports when pressures from the US became
unbearable (Purushothaman 2012; Ningthoujam 2018). Though Iran
was disappointed over India’s votes in the IAEA and UNSC, New Delhi
maintained the lines of communication and cooperation with Tehran.
Contrary to initial euphoria, the nuclear deal and the subsequent relax-
ation of sanctions did not bring about a fundamental change in the Indo-
Iranian equation. Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, felt let down by
the US and its reluctance to make Iran accountable for its involvement and
interference in various Arab crises from Syria in the north to Yemen in the
south. The growing Iranian influence in Iraq and Syria and its meddling in
events in Bahrain and Yemen have severely undermined the Saudi interests.
The ascendance of Prince Mohammed after his father Salman became King
in January 2015 coincided with a more assertive, aggressive and militarily
robust Saudi strategy against Tehran (Hannah 2016; Kanner 2017). A sig-
nificant reason for the Saudi-Qatari spat since June 2017 was Iran and the
perceived Qatari sympathy for the ayatollahs (AFP 2017; Regencia 2017).
The Saudi-Iranian rivalry and tension are the root cause of the sectar-
ian tension in the Middle East. The Shia-Sunni differences are as old as
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Islam and raised their head whenever Muslim rulers sought to covet the
territories of their co-religionists. The differences and customs between
the two are neither new nor insurmountable as they are not different and
distinct faiths. At the same, since the Islamic revolution, the Shia-Sunni
differences took definite political overtones with Iran and Saudi Arabia
clamouring for the leadership of the respective communities. Them being
immediate neighbours and having vital interest in the Gulf made the com-
petition intensely political. The Shia population in some of the Arab
countries—especially in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iraq—became the
casualties and some of the religious restrictions facing them can be directly
linked to the Iranian revolution and the desire of the Iranian ayatollahs to
‘export’ and revolutionize the Arab monarchies.
In short, India is seeking closer ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia as they
are vehemently opposed to Iran and its regional aspirations beyond its
borders. While New Delhi has successfully managed the India-Israel-Iran
triangle, India-Saudi Arabia-Iran triangle is more complex and challeng-
ing. While both are energy powers, the Kingdom is also home to over
three million Indian expatriate labourers. So long as it is not forced to
choose, India would be happy to maintain close ties with both the Gulf
powers. At the same time, driven by its regional ambitions, Iran is not an
easy partner to deal with and has been cantankerous at times. It is notori-
ous for its desire to meddle in the affairs of other countries and has been
interfering in the domestic affairs of a host of countries in the region,
including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and
Palestine. In some cases, it endorses rival factions in a foreign country,
thereby contributing to its domestic instability.
The Shia-Sunni rivalry is also a domestic challenge for India. With an
estimated population of 20–25 million India has the third largest Shia
population in the world after Iran and Pakistan (PEW Research Center
2009). This figured prominently during the nuclear controversy and
Indian leaders argued that New Delhi would not be able to ignore the
domestic sympathy for Iran while deciding the official position (Karthikeya
2010). In other words, India would not be able to take sides in the Saudi-
Iranian tension without precipitating in a domestic backlash.
Arab Spring Protests Since the self-immolation of Bouazizi sparked off

the upheaval in Tunisia, various Arab countries witnessed popular pro-
tests against the rulers. Issues such as good governance, youth unem-
ployment, empowerment and economic betterment have been their
prime demands and most were leaderless protests. While the monarchies—
rich or poor—survived, the Arab Spring became a significant challenge
for one-party republican regimes. There were regime changes in Tunisia,
Egypt, Libya and Yemen, and some of the rulers were brought down by
protests and others were forced out by external intervention. The reluc-
tance of the rulers to listen to demands for change plunged countries
like Libya, Syria and Yemen into a civil war and sectarian and tribal
violence.
The popular demands for democracy, employment, empowerment and

economic rights are universal, and at least in the initial stages Arab Spring
mostly remained peaceful and inclusive. Citizens belonging to different
religious, ethnic and social groups were protesting against the authoritar-
ian rulers who were indifferent towards popular yearning for change.
Above all, they were not religious or sectarian protests.
Concerning its content and approach, the Arab Spring reflected some
of the core Indian values and principles since the days of its freedom
struggle and should have evoked its support, understanding and empa-
thy. This, however, did not happen. This was primarily because of two
closely linked factors. Philosophically India has eschewed from interfering
in the internal affairs of other countries. While being proud of its democ-
racy and diversity, since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian leaders have
avoided a prescriptive approach to the political system of other countries.
Unlike some Western countries, especially the US, democracy promotion
has never been a part of India’s foreign policy agenda. Though, some
Indian leaders showed interests (Mazumdar and Statz 2015) in the con-
cept of democracy promotion floated by the US (Akbarzadeh et al. 2012)
externally-induced regime change has never been India’s option. Thus,
Indian leaders have been reluctant to pass any judgment on or advice to
Arab rulers who were facing popular protests.
Furthermore, India’s prime concern vis-à-vis the Arab Spring protests
was the welfare of its citizens in countries facing protests and unrest. Their
safe evacuation meant that India would not make provocative statements
or remarks which would harm and hamper the process. Hence, a mild
Indian ‘advice’ to Mubarak to listen to the voices of his people had to wait
until the completion of the evacuation. This became prominent towards
the Gulf Arab states which have a sizeable Indian population. While its
travel advisory on Yemen had to wait until July 2015, it was more
circumspect vis-à-vis other countries. In tune with its opposition to foreign
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interference, India avoided making any direct or indirect statement that

might be construed as Indian prescription for the upheaval. Far from
being indifferent, it has been adopting a “studied silence” towards the
Arab Spring (Kumaraswamy 2012).
Even seven years after Bouazizi’s death, the Arab world is muddling
along a host of crises, upheavals, tensions and uncertainties. While the
process of regime change has been halted after Yemen, the journey towards
democratization has been sliding back and leaders who came to power
squandered the initial gains of these protests. Oil-rich monarchies settled
for their time-tested option of co-opting their citizenry through economic
largesse. For example, Saudi Arabia, which witnessed some demonstra-
tions mainly in the Shia-majority Eastern Province, had distributed
US$100 billion to its citizens since 2011 to ward off protests.
The third wave of democracy which Samuel Huntington visualized
(Huntington 1991) continues to skip the Arab world or would take a
longer time to manifest. The Arab world requires a non-intrusive but
understanding partnership which would enable them to meet the aspira-
tions of their citizens without societal turmoil.
Marginalization of Arab-Israeli Conflict While the Palestinian stateless

continues to dominate international discourses on anti-colonialism, its
resonance in the Middle East politics has dwindled in recent years. The
Madrid peace conference and Oslo process which began at the end of the
Cold War generated worldwide euphoria over a possible and honourable
political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian
issue. There was a genuine and substantial popular sentiment for the two-
state solution through respect and accommodation. Things, however, did
not work out the way both peoples have hoped for. The removal of prin-
cipal players, Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 by assassination, Yasser
Arafat in November 2004 because of illness and the electoral debacle of
Shimon Peres in 1996, had derailed the process. Furthermore, unlike
Rabin, Ehud Barak could not make the general-to-diplomat transition and
the failure of the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000 spurred the
al-Aqsa intifada and buried the Oslo process.
Since then, the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have been dithering,

only to be marked by a cycle of violence, often in the form of Israeli mili-
tary actions against the Gaza Strip. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilat-
eral disengagement from the Gaza Strip had lessened the Israeli problem
but added to the hardship of the Palestinians in that area. The electoral
victory of Hamas in January 2006 and its non-acceptance by the Fatah
had only fractured the Palestinian national movement. Far from uniting
against the occupation, the Palestinian allegiance was divided among the
Fatah-led PNA which controls the West Bank and the Hamas-administered
Gaza Strip.
Thus, since 2006 Palestinians have two distinct political arrangements
headed by two prime ministers. The PNA enjoys international legitimacy,
but its political and diplomatic leverages have weakened considerably by
the challenge posed by Hamas. The latter controls Gaza and its support
base is confined to regional mavericks like Iran and Syria (until the civil
war). Despite efforts by various players, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
the Palestinian leaders have been unable to unite even in their struggle for
statehood. Though the power struggle is as old as the birth of Hamas in
early 1988, it has worsened since the death of Arafat. In terms of charisma,
international appeal and support base, Abbas is a diminutive figure and has
no established a power hierarchy. For example, since becoming president
in January 2005, Abbas came to India as many as five times but was unable
to set foot in the Gaza Strip even once.
The inter-Palestinian differences and discord come against the back-
drop of popular protests in the Arab world which unnerved many Arab
rulers. Issues such as territorial integrity, state survival and regime preser-
vation have become more critical for them than the political rights of the
Palestinians. Not that they have become less committed to the Palestinian
cause but they have more pressing and critical issues on their table than
the Palestinians statelessness. This, in turn, has resulted in Palestinian issue
figuring less prominent in the inter-Arab discourses and relations with the
outside world. As discussed earlier, this is reflected in India-Middle East
relations. While the Palestinians issue figures prominently in New Delhi’s
engagements with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and it is less so with other
countries.
Seen in the broader regional context, one could notice some essential
features in Indo-Saudi relations under Modi. Through intense political
engagements, he is trying to forge closer economic cooperation with the
Kingdom. Such contacts also proved useful during the evacuation of its
citizens from Yemen in April 2015. According to External Affairs Minister
Sushma Swaraj, Prime Minister Modi called King Salman and sought his
assistance. While expressing his inability to halt the military campaign
against the Houthi rebels, the Saudi monarch recognized and accepted
TRANSFORMATION 165
the Indian request and offered a week-long safe passage and stopped aerial
bombing between 9.00 and 11.00 AM which enabled India to carry out
the evacuation (PTI 2018a). The discussions on two-way investments
involving ARAMCO are a move towards transforming the bilateral rela-
tions beyond the present transactional mode. The impending visit of King
Salman would accelerate some of these projects.
Conclusion
Prime Minister Modi’s engagements with Saudi Arabia are part of his
political visits and contacts with the broader Middle East. Recognizing the
regional diversity and prolonged neglect, India is seeking to depoliticize
its ties and move away from the traditional preoccupation with the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the resultant balancing. The economic relations have to
go beyond trade and energy imports and should involve two-way invest-
ments: upstream projects in Saudi Arabia and downstream ones in India.
Strategic energy reserves would be one such venture which would
strengthen the Indo-Saudi relations. At the same time, given the pro-
longed neglect, indifference and mutual suspicion, the journey will not be
easy. How far have the economic ties progressed in recent years?
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CHAPTER 9
Energy, Economics and Expatriates
Long before the formation of the third Saudi state in 1902, there were
flourishing trade and commercial relations between the Indian subconti-
nent and the Arabian Peninsula. The cultural and civilizational linkages go
back to the third millennium before Christ, and Indian and Arab traders
transited through land and sea and paved the way for a continuous
exchange of goods and ideas (Ahmad 1969; Heptullah 1991, 1–2).
Maritime trade between the two flourished during the medieval times and
the advent of European colonialism in the sixteenth century eclipsed the
leadership position of the Indian and Arab traders (Al-Naqeeb 1990;
McKay and Scott 2014). At the same time, the presence of Indian mer-
chants now under the British control, patronage and influence continued
in various trading centres in the Arabian Peninsula. Indian merchants—
mainly, the Gujaratis, Parsis, Sindhis and Khojas—played a crucial role in
trade and commerce in Jeddah, Muscat, Kuwait and Dubai. The port cit-
ies along the Persian Gulf—the Trucial States as they called—were admin-
istered by the British from Bombay and the Indian rupee was the legal
tender in some parts of the Gulf until their independence.
As discussed earlier, independent India was not prepared to capitalize
on the colonial contacts, influence and interests in the Gulf Arab coun-
tries. Driven by the prevailing anti-colonial instincts, it abandoned the
political capital in the region and viewed the Arab monarchies merely as a
Western clientele. Jawaharlal Nehru’s anti-colonial and anti-imperial
worldview provided little common ground for a political conversation

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_9
with the Gulf Arab rulers. Thus, during the Cold War years, political
engagements between India and the Saudi Arabia were minimal, if not
non-existent.
Despite this political gap, trade and commerce continued for centuries,
especially between the Western coastal regions of India and the Gulf. This
was equally true for Saudi Arabia. The situation changed dramatically
when India began to liberalize its economy, a phase that also coincided
with the end of the Cold War. If the oil crisis of 1973 exposed India’s
vulnerability to its energy dependence upon the region, the economic
reforms of the 1990s contributed to its economic growth and resultant
political influence. Both these developments had a profound impact upon
the Indo-Saudi relations. Indeed, since 2006, the Kingdom has been
among the top five trade partners of India and the largest supplier of crude
oil. With a sizeable Indian expatriate workforce, the Kingdom is also one
of the biggest sources of remittances. The economic component of the
bilateral relations can broadly be divided into three categories, namely,
trade and commerce, energy supplies and expatriate labour force.
Bilateral Trade
Since the mid-1970s, Saudi Arabia has been one of India’s major trading
partners due to energy imports, but the overall trade was small. Despite
being the second most populous country in the world after China, India
was unable to make a mark on international trade primarily due to its weak
economic basis and slow growth rate. When economic reforms were intro-
duced in 1991, its overall foreign trade stood at US$42 billion with an
annual economic growth rate of 1.1 per cent. It had to wait until 2002 to
register US$100 billion foreign trade and reached close to US$800 billion
in 2011–12 before global recession set in.
This pattern can be noticed in the Indo-Saudi relations. As highlighted
in Table 9.1 and Fig. 9.1, the volume of trade witnessed tremendous
growth during the past two decades. In 1991–92, it stood as low as 1.5
billion dollars and crossed the 2 billion mark in 1996–97. Between 2000
and 2006, the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) discontin-
ued the practice of identifying sources of India’s energy trade and this
resulted in Indo-Saudi trade figures showing a drop, reaching US$1.4
billion in 2000–01. As the energy trade began to increase, the past practice
of identifying the sources of supplies was restored in 2006 and signalled
the real swing in favour of Saudi Arabia. This coincided with the visit of
ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND EXPATRIATES 171
Table 9.1 India-Saudi Arabia bilateral trade (US$ million)

Year Export Import Total Trade India’s total Saudi Rank
trade balance foreign share
trade in
India’s
foreign
trade
(%)
1991–92 351.98 1109.34 1461.32 −757.36 45,163.70 3.20 8

1992–93 455.23 1374.63 1829.86 −919.40 45,540.98 4.01 8
1993–94 510.75 1221.59 1732.34 −710.84 54,984.74 3.15 8
1994–95 435.66 1273.07 1708.73 −837.41 68,290.63 2.50 9
1995–96 480.82 1367.21 1848.03 −886.39 72,581.40 2.55 8
1996–97 577.18 1819.65 2396.83 −1242.47 72,602.36 3.30 8
1997–98 689.89 1720.17 2410.06 −1030.28 76,269.47 3.16 9
1998–99 774.29 1831.47 2605.76 −1057.80 75,607.43 3.45 8
1999–2000 742.50 2419.24 3161.74 −1676.74 86,560.55 2.79 9
2000–01 822.94 621.12 1444.06 201.92 95,096.74 1.52 17
2001–02 826.43 463.99 1290.42 362.44 95,240.00 1.35 21
2002–03 940.74 504.72 1445.46 436.02 114,131.57 1.27 19
2003–04 1123.31 737.77 1861.08 385.54 141,991.66 1.31 19
2004–05 1412.06 1301.15 2713.21 110.91 195,053.37 1.39 19
2005–06 1809.77 1632.34 3442.11 177.43 252,256.26 1.36 20
2006–07 2590.77 13,355.33 15,946.10 −10.764.56 312,149.29 5.11 4
2007–08 3711.16 19,470.30 23,181.46 −15,759.14 414,786.19 5.59 4
2008–09 5110.38 19,972.74 25,083.12 −14,862.36 488,991.67 5.13 4
2009–10 3907.00 17,097.57 21,004.57 −13,190.57 466,824.31 4.50 4
2010–11 4684.40 20,385.28 25,069.68 −15,701.40 619,584.68 4.05 5
2011–12 5683.29 31,817.70 37,500.99 −26,134.41 795,283.41 4.72 4
2012–13 9785.78 33,998.11 43,783.89 −24,212.33 791,137.23 5.53 4
2013–14 12,218.95 36,403.65 48,622.60 −24,194.70 764,605.09 6.36 4
2014–15 11,161.43 28,107.56 39,268.99 −16,946.13 758,371.89 5.18 4
2015–16 6394.23 20,321.33 26,715.56 −13,927.10 643,296.76 4.15 4
2016–17 5134.63 19,945.17 25,079.80 −14,810.54 660,599.58 3.80 4
Source: Directorate General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India
and World Bank (https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/IND)
King Abdullah to India and in 2006–07 bilateral trade crossed US$15

billion. In the next two years it witnessed a 60 per cent increase to reach
US$25 billion in 2008–09. After a slight decline in the following year, it
rose to US$36 billion in 2011–12 and jumped to US$43 billion and
US$48 billion in 2012–13 and 2013–14, respectively. This happened
60,000.00
50,000.00
40,000.00
US$ Million
30,000.00
20,000.00
10,000.00
0.00
2000-01
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1994-95
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2007-08
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
1999-2000
Export Import Total Trade
Fig. 9.1 India-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Trade. (Source: Directorate General of

Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India and
World Bank (https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/IND))
when there was a slight dip in India’s overall trade with the outside world.
Indeed, 2014 was the highpoint of the two-way trade, and subsequently
the trade started to decline partly due to the global recession and low oil
price and hovered around the 2008–09 figures of US$25 billion.
A healthy trade since 2006, accompanied by a massive import of petro-
leum and high oil prices, contributed to a shift in their relative impor-
tance; Saudi Arabia has emerged as India’s fourth largest trading partner
during the last decade while India became the fifth largest export destina-
tion for the Kingdom. As shown in Fig. 9.2, it has been maintaining the
fourth position among India’s trade partners since 2006, except for 2010
when it fallen by one place. Though the Saudi share in India’s overall trade
has dropped from the high of 6 per cent in 2013–14 to 3.8 per cent in
2016–17 (Fig. 9.3), primarily due to low oil price, in the broader Middle
East the Kingdom is second only to the UAE in trade terms.
As shown in Table 9.1, the bilateral trade increased ten folds between
1996–97 and 2016–17. Indeed, the figure reached US$48 billion in
2013–14 before sliding, primarily due to falling oil prices. Nevertheless, as
25
20
15
Rank
10
Fig. 9.2 Saudi Arabia’s position in India’s foreign trade. (Source: Directorate
General of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of
India)
3
Percent
2
0
1994-95
2007-08
1991-92
1992-93
1993-94
1995-96
1996-97
1997-98
1998-99
1999-2000
2000-01
2001-02
2002-03
2003-04
2004-05
2005-06
2006-07
2008-09
2009-10
2010-11
2011-12
2012-13
2013-14
2014-15
2015-16
2016-17
Fig. 9.3 Saudi share in India’s total foreign trade. (Source: Directorate General
of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India)
would be discussed, the Kingdom continued to be the largest supplier of

oil to India and the quantity of fuel (Table 9.3) imports from the Kingdom
remained stable. While the trade figures grew substantially, the quantum
of oil imports only changed marginally; in 1991–92 India imported
US$800 million worth of crude oil from the Kingdom and this reached
US$14 billion in 2016–17. This is reflected in the Saudi share in India’s
overall foreign trade; it stood at 3.2 per cent in 1991–92 and rose to 3.8
per cent in 2016–17 (Fig. 9.3). Thus, the fluctuations in the trade figures
have been primarily the result of changes in oil prices discussed in the next
section. For Saudi Arabia, India is the fifth largest export market, account-
ing for about 8 per cent of its total global trade, while India ranks ninth in
terms of Saudi imports, making up 4 per cent of the total goods imported
by the Kingdom (WITS 2015).
At the same time, the balance of trade is skewed in favour of the
Kingdom owing to India’s oil imports, which form the bulk of the bilat-
eral trade. As of 2016–17, Saudi Arabia is the 14th largest market for
Indian goods and account for 1.8 per cent of its global exports and is the
source of 6 per cent of imports into India. In 2016–17, India’s imports
from Saudi Arabia stood at US$19.5 billion while its exports were at
US$5.13 billion or a third of its imports. Major Indian imports comprise
of crude oil, organic chemicals, fertilizers, dry fruits, nuts and pearls. On
the other hand, India’s exports mainly consist of cereals, building materi-
als, edible oil, animal and dairy products, sugar, vegetables, coffee, tea and
spices. It must be remembered that a significant portion of these products
are meant for the consumption of the Indian expatriate community who
are more comfortable or used to household and food items they are accus-
tomed to in their home states. After reaching a high of 6.36 per cent in
2013–14, India’s exports to the Kingdom have also declined. If the low oil
price is directly responsible for declining imports, it had a cascading impact
upon India’s exports to Saudi Arabia.
The two-way flow of investments plays a small but significant role in
shaping the bilateral trade. When harnessed properly this would be the
game-changer in the bilateral relations and make a multifaceted one.
While visiting the Kingdom in April 2008, the then Foreign Minister
Pranab Mukherjee indicated that India’s infrastructure projects would
require and “can absorb US$500–600 billion” in the coming decades
(India, MEA 2008). In the words of one observer, “unlike being a
buyer-seller relationship, India is now looking at making investments”
(Aneja 2008).
Since the opening of its economy in 1991, the Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) from the Kingdom has been slow and even negligible. Between
2000 and September 2017, Saudi companies have invested just US$78
million in various projects in India, including US$14 million since April
2016 (India, DIPP 2018). The Kingdom, which is known for its largest oil
reserves in the world, ranks 50 in terms of FDI investments in India and
accounts for a meagre 0.02 per cent of total FDI inflows in the last 17 years.
The situation has marginally improved in the previous three years, inciden-
tally coinciding with the election of Narendra Modi as prime minister.
Since May 2014, India has been attracting Saudi investments in construc-
tion, infrastructure, petroleum and other allied sectors, and between April
2014 and March 2017, the FDI from Saudi sources totalled US$35 mil-
lion, nearly half the total investments since 2000 (India, DIPP 2018).
At the same time, the Indian investments in the Kingdom have been
significantly extensive and varied. The data put out by the Saudi Arabian
General Investment Authority (SAGIA) indicates that as many as 426
licenses have been issued between 2010 and April 2015 to Indian compa-
nies for joint ventures or full-owned subsidies which would bring invest-
ments worth US$1.62 billion into the Kingdom (India, MEA 2016a).
These licenses were issued to various public and private Indian companies
in diverse sectors such as management and consultancy services, construc-
tion projects, telecommunication, information technology, pharmaceuti-
cal. Moreover, partly due to the procedural and logistical issues, several
Indian companies such as Punj Llyod, Lulu Hypermarket, TCIL, Al
Kabeer, JN Holding, Simplex Infrastructure have established collaborative
ventures with local Saudi companies and have been working in the
Kingdom in areas such as education, designing, consultancy, financial ser-
vices and software development. Prominent Indian companies such as
Wipro, Tata Motors, New India Assurance, TCS, Godrej, Larsen &
Toubro, Shapoorji Pallonji SBI and Air India have been operating in the
Kingdom and cater to the requirements of the Saudi as well as expatriate
population.
A spurt in the volume of trade and increasing two-way investments can be
noticed since the visit of Prime Minister Modi to the Kingdom in April 2016.
A few days before Modi’s visit, the Petroleum Ministry sent a delegation
comprising of officials from Indian Oil Corporation (IOC) and Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC)—both among the Fortune 500
Companies identified by Forbes—to explore the cooperation and investment
possibilities in the energy sector. India has been negotiating with SAGIA to
increase the flow of Saudi investments for its energy and infrastructure devel-
opment programmes.
Saudi Arabia, however, is a notable absentee in India’s aviation sector
which has attracted the attention and investments from other Gulf airlin-
ers. The Open Sky policy introduced by the government in June 2016 and
the exponential increase in the number of Indian travellers have resulted
in India becoming an attractive destination for airliners like Emirates,
Etihad and Qatar Airways. In recent years, they have increased the num-
ber of flights, destinations and seats available between India and their
home ports and this has resulted in investments in Indian airlines such as
Jet Airways. Given its conservative business practices, Saudia is unlikely to
benefit from the new situation.
Energy Supplies
Energy trade constitutes the essential component of the Indo-Saudi eco-
nomic relations. Since independence, India has been a net energy importer
and its demands could not be met only through domestic production.
Until the introduction of economic reforms and the consequent jump in
its energy consumption, it was able to manage with just about a third of
oil needs having to be imported. Even the oil crisis of 1973 was a financial
burden and not a security challenge as it had become in later decades. This
changed dramatically after 1991 and its energy consumption and hence
demand far outpaced domestic supplies.
According to BP Statistical Review of World Energy in 2015 India over-
took Japan and became the third largest oil consumer in the world after
the US and China (BP 2017; PTI 2016b). Its crude oil demands increased
by 8 per cent in 2015 to reach 4.1 million barrels per day (bpd), only lag-
ging behind the US (19.39 million bpd) and China (11.96 million bpd).
Domestic as well as international estimates suggest that India’s import
dependency upon oil and gas would continue to increase. According to
the Paris-based International Energy Agency, India’s dependence on oil
imports will continue to increase and can reach up to 88 per cent by 2047
(IEA 2015). Its overall energy imports, including oil, gas and coal, which
were 38 per cent in 2017, are also expected to increase up to 57 per cent
(India, NITI Aayog 2018).
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is the largest producer and exporter of
crude oil and accounts for about one-fifth of proven oil reserves. At the
current rate of production its reserves could last for 70 years (Kemp 2016).
The growing Indian demands and Saudi resourcefulness are complemen-

tary and would be a key to any strategic partnership between the two. As
a result, since the oil crisis of 1973, energy supplies were the driving force
behind the Indo-Saudi ties and are unlikely to change despite India’s plans
for diversification of supplies. As reflected in Tables 9.2 and 9.3 and
Figs. 9.4 and 9.5, the Saudi share in India’s total energy imports has been
increasing and make up about one-fifth of its total crude imports.
This brings in the question of India’s energy security to the fore and its
growth story cannot be divorced from the energy security concerns. Since
the 1990s, its import dependency for crude oil has been growing (Table 9.4)
and it crossed the 75 per cent in 2005, and according to the Paris-based
Table 9.2 India’s energy imports from Saudi Arabia (in US$ million)
Year Oil imports Total oil Saudi share Imports from Share of oil in
from Saudi imports in total oil Saudi Arabia imports from
Arabia imports (%) Saudi Arabia
(%)
1996–97 1464.37 11464.58 12.77 1819.65 80.47

1997–98 1396.93 10,067.73 13.88 1720.17 81.20
1998–99 1570.33 8043.17 19.52 1831.47 85.74
1999–2000 2154.97 14,350.16 15.02 2419.24 89.07
2000–01 267.06 17,545.13 1.52 621.12 42.99
2001–02 171.75 15,771.74 1.08 463.99 37.01
2002–03 193.60 19,680.59 0.98 504.72 38.36
2003–04 301.36 22,700.20 1.32 737.77 40.85
2004–05 562.63 34,818.64 1.61 1301.15 43.24
2005–06 796.51 50,310.05 1.58 1632.34 48.79
2006–07 12,264.67 61,778.87 19.85 13,355.33 91.83
2007–08 17,755.00 86,384.04 20.55 19,470.30 91.19
2008–09 18,386.52 103,933.77 17.69 19,972.74 92.05
2009–10 15,390.04 96,321.12 15.98 17,097.57 90.01
2010–11 17,932.31 115,929.02 15.47 20,385.28 87.97
2011–12 28,302.37 172,753.93 16.38 31,817.70 88.95
2012–13 29,896.53 181,344.67 16.49 33,998.11 87.94
2013–14 32,781.57 181,382.59 18.07 36,403.65 90.05
2014–15 23,212.88 156,400.01 14.84 28,107.56 82.59
2015–16 15,177.91 96,953.06 15.65 20,321.33 74.69
2016–17 15,555.75 103,068.99 15.09 19,945.17 77.99
Note: During 2000–06 the Government of India did not publish country-wise break of oil imports and
this showed an artificial dip in oil imports from Saudi Arabia
Table 9.3 India’s crude oil imports (million tonnes)

Year Imports from Saudi Arabia Total imports Saudi share (%)
1996–97 1.10 33.71 3.26

1997–98 2.97 34.40 8.49
1998–99 3.29 39.81 8.26
1999–2000 1.49 57.81 2.58
2000–01 0.93 74.10 1.26
2001–02 0.72 78.71 0.91
2002–03 0.65 81.99 0.79
2003–04 1.02 90.43 1.13
2004–05 1.47 95.86 1.53
2005–06 1.70 99.41 1.71
2006–07 1.57 111.50 1.41
2007–08 1.88 121.67 1.55
2008–09 25.92 132.78 19.52
2009–10 26.88 159.26 16.88
2010–11 26.29 163.60 16.07
2011–12 31.87 171.73 18.56
2012–13 34.97 184.80 18.92
2013–14 39.32 189.24 20.78
2014–15 34.49 189.43 18.21
2015–16 39.59 202.85 19.52
2016–17 39.33 213.93 18.66
IEA, it would reach 90 per cent by 2040 (IEA 2015, 118–19). In recent
years, around 60 per cent of India’s hydrocarbon imports is met by the
countries along the Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia being the lead supplier.
The Kingdom is also the leading supplier to China and Japan.
As highlighted by Table 9.3, the Saudi share in India’s energy imports
hovers around 20 per cent but has been gradually declining and dropped
to 16 per cent in 2006–07. This is partly due to India’s diversification
efforts and the re-entry of Iraq, India’s traditional oil supplier until 1990,
into the energy market. However, the US-led international sanctions
against Iran over the nuclear controversy forced India to look for alterna-
tive sources and in 2011 Saudi Arabia stepped in and doubled its supplies
to India and the annual export of Saudi crude to India reached more than
800,000 bpd (Table 9.2). At the same time, due to price considerations,
the bulk of India’s oil imports is met through spot purchases and New
Delhi is yet to move in the direction of long-term energy deals with
Riyadh.
25
20
15
10
Percent
5
Fig. 9.4 Saudi share in India’s total petroleum imports. (Source: Directorate
India)
250
200
150
100
50
Imports from Saudi Arabia (Million Ton) Total Imports (Million Ton) Saudi Share (%)
Fig. 9.5 Petroleum imports from Saudi Arabia in quantity. (Source: Directorate
India)
Table 9.4 Import dependency for crude oil (in million tonnes)
Year Consumption Imports Dependency (%)
1998–99 72.53 39.81 55

1999–2000 76.94 57.81 75
2000–01 84.48 74.10 87
2001–02 87.64 78.71 89
2002–03 115.03 81.99 71
2003–04 123.81 90.43 73
2004–05 129.84 95.86 73
2005–06 131.60 99.41 75
2006–07 145.49 111.50 76
2007–08 155.79 121.67 78
2008–09 161.67 132.78 82
2009–10 186.55 159.26 85
2010–11 196.99 163.60 83
2011–12 204.12 171.73 84
2012–13 219.21 184.80 84
2013–14 222.50 189.24 85
2014–15 223.24 189.43 84
2015–16 232.86 202.85 87
2016–17 249.94 213.93 85
Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, http://ppac.org.in/content/3_1_

Petroleum.aspx
The Saudi share in India’s crude oil imports is slightly higher than its
share in India’s hydrocarbon imports. This is because Qatar meets India’s
demands for LPG and LNG. Between 2008–09 and 2016–17, India’s
overall crude oil imports increased from 130.04 million tonnes to 214.92
million tonnes or an increase of 60 per cent; during the same period sup-
plies from Saudi Arabia increased from 25.92 million tonnes to 39.33
tonnes, or an increase of 51 per cent (Fig. 9.5).
Towards seeking self-sufficiency in oil products, India has been expand-
ing its petrochemical industry and refining capacity. For long, India was
heavily dependent upon imports for oil products, and due to a substantial
increase in its refining capacity this dependency has been reduced consid-
erably. The shift also resulted in India emerging as a major producer and
exporter of oil products, which since 2009–10 have become its largest
export commodity (Table 9.5). The share of energy-related Indian exports
has increased from negligible 1.5 per cent in 1996–97 to 11.68 per cent
in 2016–17. At one time, it accounted for one-fifth of India’s total exports.
Table 9.5 Share of energy in India’s foreign trade (in US$ million)
Year Energy exports Total exports Share Energy imports Total imports Share
1996–97 516.43 33,469.95 1.54 11464.58 39,132.41 29.29

1997–98 394.51 34,784.98 1.13 10,067.73 41,484.49 24.27
1998–99 141.07 33,218.72 0.42 8043.17 42,388.71 18.97
1999–2000 90.86 36,822.49 0.24 14,350.16 49,738.06 28.85
2000–01 1930.98 44,560.29 4.33 17,545.13 50,536.45 34.72
2001–02 2182.93 43,826.72 4.98 15,771.74 51,413.28 30.68
2002–03 2707.21 52,719.43 5.13 19,680.59 61412.14 32.04
2003–04 3734.28 63,842.55 5.85 22,700.20 78,149.11 29.04
2004–05 7140.36 83,535.94 8.55 34,818.64 111,517.43 31.22
2005–06 11,866.56 103,090.53 11.51 50,310.05 149,165.73 33.73
2006–07 18,859.44 126,414.05 14.92 61,778.87 185,735.24 33.26
2007–08 29,085.43 163,132.18 17.83 86,384.04 251,654.01 34.33
2008–09 28,437.09 185,295.36 15.35 103,933.77 303,696.31 34.22
2009–10 29,036.24 178,751.43 16.24 96,321.12 288,372.88 33.40
2010–11 42,735.89 249,815.55 17.11 115,929.02 369.769.13 31.35
2011–12 57,391.88 305,963.92 18.76 172,753.93 489,319.49 35.30
2012–13 62,105.45 300,400.58 20.67 181,344.63 490,736.65 36.95
2013–14 64,685.27 314,405.30 20.57 181,382.56 450,199.79 40.29
2014–15 57,619.99 310,338.48 18.57 156,399.98 448,033.41 34.91
2015–16 31,231.49 262,290.13 11.90 96,953.02 381,006.63 25.45
2016–17 32,277.00 276.280.29 11.68 103,068.9 384,319.29 26.82
Above all, for the past two decades Saudi Arabia has been among the top
five crude oil suppliers to India and since 2006–07 has been its largest sup-
plier (Table 9.6).
The growth in the export of petroleum products, in turn, has contributed
to the increase in India’s total crude oil imports. The increase in oil imports
is influenced not only by growing domestic consumption but also by the
appetite of its refining capacity (Table 9.6). Correspondingly one could
notice an increase in India’s petroleum product exports to Saudi Arabia;
from a meagre US$0.94 million in 1996–97 it rose to US$6.9 billion in
2013–14 (Table 9.7). Since then there has been a decline and it dropped to
US$530 million in 2016–17. This is largely due to falling oil prices, though
it still makes up nearly 10 per cent of India’s exports to the Kingdom.
At the same time, energy imports are responsible not only for India’s
massive trade imbalance vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia but also for the skewed
nature of the bilateral trade. Indeed, India’s imports were almost exclusively
Table 9.6 Top five energy suppliers of India

Year First Second Third Fourth Fifth
1996–97 Nigeria Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Australia

1997–98 Saudi Arabia Nigeria Australia Kuwait UAE
1998–99 Saudi Arabia Kuwait Nigeria UAE Australia
1999–2000 Nigeria Saudi Arabia UAE Kuwait Iran
2000–01 Unspecified Australia Saudi Arabia China UAE
2001–02 Unspecified Australia China Saudi Arabia UAE
2002–03 Unspecified Australia Saudi Arabia China Egypt
2003–04 Unspecified Australia Saudi Arabia China Indonesia
2004–05 Unspecified Australia China Saudi Arabia Indonesia
2005–06 Unspecified Australia Indonesia Saudi Arabia China
2006–07 Saudi Arabia Nigeria Iran Kuwait Iraq
2007–08 Saudi Arabia Iran UAE Nigeria Kuwait
2008–09 Saudi Arabia Iran UAE Kuwait Nigeria
2009–10 Saudi Arabia Iran Kuwait Nigeria Iraq
2010–11 Saudi Arabia Nigeria Kuwait UAE Iran
2011–12 Saudi Arabia Iraq Kuwait UAE Nigeria
2012–13 Saudi Arabia Iraq Kuwait UAE Qatar
2013–14 Saudi Arabia Iraq Kuwait Qatar Nigeria
2014–15 Saudi Arabia Iraq Nigeria UAE Qatar
2015–16 Saudi Arabia Iraq Nigeria Qatar UAE
2016–17 Saudi Arabia Iraq UAE Iran Nigeria
energy-related, and for long, they accounted for over 90 per cent of India’s
imports. Only since 2013, one could notice signs of diversification but the
crude oil still is the significant Indian import from the Kingdom and in
2016–17 it accounted for nearly 78 per cent of India’s total imports.
Moreover, in recent years the energy trade showed signs of a new phase,
partly because of Riyadh showing interest in investing in downstream
activities in India and upstream joint venture in the Kingdom. In 2012,
during the visit of Deputy Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources
Abdul Aziz bin Salman al-Saud, India invited Saudi equity participation in
downstream projects in the country. There are suggestions that as part of
its diversification plan, Saudi ARAMCO has been exploring investment
opportunities in upstream and downstream projects in India (`Saudi
Aramco to Invest in OpaL to Gain Indian Market Access’ 2017; PTI
2017b) and possible Indian investments in ARAMCO (Reuters 2017).
India is also seeking Saudi partnership in increasing its strategic energy
reserves from 10 days of stocks to 50 days (Verma 2016).
Table 9.7 India’s energy-related exports to Saudi Arabia (in US$ million)
Year Petroleum- Total Saudi share in Exports to Share of
related exports petroleum- total Saudi petroleum-
to Saudi related petroleum- Arabia related exports
Arabia exports related exports to Saudi
(%) Arabia (%)
1996–97 0.94 516.43 0.18 577.18 0.16

1997–98 0.44 394.51 0.11 689.89 0.06
1998–99 0.34 141.07 0.24 774.29 0.04
1999–2000 0.08 90.86 0.09 742.50 0.01
2000–01 0.13 1930.98 0.01 822.94 0.02
2001–02 0.09 2182.93 0.00 826.43 0.01
2002–03 24.35 2707.21 0.89 940.74 2.59
2003–04 41.40 3734.28 1.11 1123.31 3.69
2004–05 1.36 7140.36 0.02 1412.06 0.09
2005–06 24.81 11,866.56 0.21 1809.77 1.37
2006–07 69.93 18,859.44 0.37 2590.77 2.67
2007–08 648.63 29,085.43 2.23 3711.16 17.48
2008–09 1390.53 28,437.09 4.89 5110.38 27.20
2009–10 965.20 29,036.24 3.32 3907.00 24.70
2010–11 700.73 42,735.89 1.64 4684.40 14.96
2011–12 1573.07 57,391.88 2.74 5683.29 27.68
2012–13 5136.70 62,105.45 8.27 9785.78 52.50
2013–14 6883.13 64,685.27 10.64 12,218.95 56.33
2014–15 5570.40 57,619.99 9.67 11,161.43 49.90
2015–16 1455.95 31,231.49 4.66 6394.23 22.77
2016–17 530.83 32,277.00 1.64 5134.63 10.34
Expatriates
For centuries India has been sending migrants to different parts of the
world. Many communities from Arabia, Persia and Central Asia have come
and settled in India during the ancient and medieval periods. Traders from
the Arabian Peninsula used to travel to Southern and Western coastal
regions for maritime trade and some made India home. A robust Hadhrami
community from Yemen has settled in parts of the Malabar coasts and
Hyderabad. Some of them from Bahrain, Oman, Trucial States had lived
in Bombay (renamed Mumbai in 1995) during the British period and had
established successful businesses. After India’s independence, many con-
tinued to live and work in the city but gradually started to shift bases in the
emerging cities in the newly independent Gulf Arab states in the 1960s
and 1970s.1 Similarly, Indians have been emigrating to different parts of
the world, primarily for economic reasons and the presence of people of
Indian origin in South Africa, Uganda, South Pacific and the Caribbean
can be cited as examples. Some of them moved voluntarily while others
were taken as indentured labourers during the British rule.
The Indian migration to the Gulf Arab countries is distinct and recent.
This largely began in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent
construction boom in oil-rich Gulf Arab countries. The sudden accumula-
tion of wealth came against the backdrop of the meagre domestic popula-
tion who practised a nomadic lifestyle and relied on fishing and pearl trade.
Most Gulf Arab countries had no basic amenities and the sudden oil wealth
resulted in a massive transformation in terms of infrastructure and lifestyle.
This necessitated in the influx of a large number of expatriate workers,
initially from the neighbouring Arab countries and gradually from the
subcontinent and beyond (Halliday 1984; McMurray 1999; Weiner 1982;
Jain 2005).
Unlike the earlier trends, the new Indian migration to the Gulf Arab
countries has been exclusively economic and though many managed to
stay longer, most often it is temporary. A large segment of them filled the
blue-collar jobs, which the native Arabs found too demeaning or least
remunerative. According to one estimate, the number of Indian migrants
to the Gulf Arab countries swelled from 123,000 in 1975 to 705,000 in
1983 (Nuri 1992, 48). A majority of the early migrants were unskilled and
semi-skilled workers and were employed in building and road construc-
tion, hotels, departmental stores and oil companies. They belonged to
states such as Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Punjab, Goa and
Tamil Nadu but more than half of them hail from Kerala. Gradually their
origin diversified and a large portion of them became skilled workers, with
a considerable number of professionals engaging in white-collar jobs such
as medicine, hospitality, engineering, management, teaching, accountancy.
The number of Indian expatriate community has been swelling since the
mid-1970s and is estimated to be nearly 8.5 million in 2017, including
about 3 million in Saudi Arabia alone (India, Rajya Sabha 2017).
1
One of the famous personalities of Saudi heritage and a doyen of Indian theatre is
Ebrahim Alkazi, whose father belonged to the Qassim region of central Arabia and settled in
India in late nineteenth century and established a successful business. See Business Wire
(2017) and Alam (2017).
Indians have been living in the Hejaz region even during the British Raj
and were primarily engaged in trade, education or religious activities.
Some were also employed in the oil industry then maintained by the newly
christened Aramco (1944) that was earlier known as California-Arabian
Standard Oil Company (CASOC) and was a wholly owned subsidiary of
Standard Oil of California (SoCal). Though actual numbers are not avail-
able, at the time of India’s independence a larger number were present in
the Eastern and Western coast of the Kingdom and other parts of the
Persian Gulf region. As one of the earliest Annual Report of the MEA
noted “Indian’s residents there, for the most part for purposes of trade or
in the Persian Gulf, as workers, are the object of special solicitude of our
representatives” (India, MEA 1949).
The Indian engagements with the economic and social life of Saudi
Arabia, especially in the Hejaz region, were considerable even before the
oil boom. While haj vessels also brought food and other consumables,
affluent Indian pilgrims were sought after by the Saudis and many Indian
spice and cereal merchants had established a flourishing business in the
Kingdom (Sayeed 2007).
In the wake of the oil and construction boom, the Indian migration to
Saudi Arabia started to increase. In 2000 the government appointed a
High-Level Committee on Indian Diaspora to assess the impact of the
Indian migrants upon the country’s economic development. It concluded
that the flow has seen steady increase since 1975. In the case of Saudi
Arabia it rose from 34,500 in 1975 to 100,000 in 1979; to 270,000 in
1983, to 380,000 in 1987; to 600,000 in 1991 and to 1.2 million in
1999.2 In the words of one Indian diplomat,
1988 was the first year when I went to Saudi Arabia. The total number of
Indians then in Saudi Arabia was 400,000. I left Saudi Arabia after four years
in 1992. The total number of Indians then was 700,000. I went back to
Saudi Arabia in 2000. The number of Indians then was 1.2 million. I left
Saudi Arabia sometime in 2004 and the number of Indians then was 1.5
million. Today (that is April 2013) … it is 2.45 million. So, as you can see,
consistently over the last two decades the number of Indians who have
found work in Saudi Arabia has only increased. (India, MEA 2013b)
2
Figures taken from various annual reports published by the Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India.
By 2015, this has reached 2.8 million and as of 2017 more than 3 mil-
lion Indians are gainfully employed in the Kingdom (India, Rajya Sabha
2018).
Indians comprise the largest expatriate community in Saudi Arabia and
the Kingdom also has the largest concentration of people of Indian origin
outside the country. As of 2017, the Saudi population comprises of 32
million residents, including 20 million citizens and 12 million expatriates
(KSA, General Authority for Statics 2015). Thus, Indians make up nearly
one-fourth of the expatriate population and about 10 per cent of the total
resident population of the Kingdom. A vast majority of the Indians or
almost 80 per cent have been engaged in industrial and construction sec-
tors while about 10 per cent are involved in white-collar jobs. The remain-
ing 10 per cent comprises of skilled professionals including doctors,
engineers, scientists, managers and educationalists (India, MEA 2016b).
These apart, media often speak of a large number of illegal migrants, that
is, workers whose visa has expired.
The Indian migrant workers have been participating in the develop-
ment work of the Kingdom and are respected for the skills, hard work and
apolitical nature. Though the actual breakup is not available, a significant
section of the migrants are Muslims, but there are also a considerable
number of expatriates who belong to other faiths. Given the conservative
nature of the Saudi society, the religious diversity of the Indian migrant
workers should not be dismissed easily. The presence of a large number of
Indians and the historical-cultural relations add to the immense goodwill
for India in the Kingdom. Technical competence, work culture and
law-abiding nature are often cited as the reasons for the Saudi preference
for Indian workers (Azhar 2016; Rahman 2009; Abraham 2012).
At the same time, in recent years the Kingdom has been facing many
domestic crises and regional challenges which have an adverse impact
upon the expatriate population, including Indians. Falling oil prices,
increase in native population and upsurge in educated unemployment
have forced the Saudi government to look to the nationalization of the
labour force (Hussain 2014a, b; Schuettler 2015; Alsheikh 2015; Sadi
et al. 2013). In the early stages, the focus was on education and skill devel-
opment of the native population towards replacing the expatriate labour
force. Progressively industries and private sectors are encouraged to
employ Saudis for all possible jobs, including those that were not previ-
ously considered ‘respectful’ for a Saudi national such as employment in
shops and supermarkets.
When these efforts proved inadequate, a new Saudization process called

Nitaqat was introduced in June 2011 towards achieving greater represen-
tation for the citizens in the labour market (Ramady 2013; Lodi 2018;
Al-Asfour and Khan 2014). It outlined a number of reward and punish-
ment mechanisms towards encouraging the Saudi companies and busi-
nesses to hire a fixed portion of nationals at all levels of employment.
Accordingly, a differing percentage, depending on the size of the organi-
zation, availability of qualified local labour force in the field and number
of expatriates already employed in the company, was fixed for employing
Saudis. Organizations were categorized in five different groups based on
the number of employees; companies with 3000-plus employees were
considered Huge, 500 plus were termed as Large, 50–499 as Medium,
Small with 10–49 employees and Very Small for organizations with 9 or
fewer employees. Further, these companies were classified into four colour
bands with separate privileges and curbs based on the level of Saudization
(Table 9.8).
As a result, a number of Indians had to return home as their employers
were forced to reduce the expatriate workforce and 75,000 lost their jobs
in 2013 and another 150,000 illegal Indian workers either had to return
home or were allowed to correct their status by changing their visa type or
transferring their iqama (local residency permit) to other companies (PTI
2013a, b, c; Bagchi 2017). Ironic as it sounds, the introduction of Nitaqat
had not decreased the flow of Indians to Saudi Arabia or other countries
of the Gulf, which also introduced similar provisions. In 2011, alone
289,297 low and unskilled persons were given emigration clearance by the
Indian labour ministry for work in Saudi Arabia (India, MEA 2013a, 39).
Table 9.8 Categorization of Saudi companies based on percentage of Saudization

under Nitaqat in wholesale and retail sector
Percentage of Saudization
Categories Red Yellow Green Green-premium
Number of employees From To From To From To
10–49 0 4 5 9 10 26 27
50–499 0 4 5 16 17 33 34
500–2999 0 9 10 23 24 34 35
3000+ 0 9 10 24 25 36 37
Source: Sadi (2013)

As a study on the Indian migration indicates, Saudi Arabia has been the
most favourite destination for the Gulf migration from India. The size of the
migrants going to the Kingdom has been progressively increasing since
1975 and this is especially true for the ECR category migrants (Jain 2005).
Under this category, for example, more than 99,000 emigrated to the
Kingdom in 2002; this number rose to 121,000 in 2003 and to 134,000 in
2006. In the following year close to 200,000 sought emigration clearance
for employment in Saudi Arabia and the number increased to 228,000 in
2008, 281,000 in 2009 and to 275,000 in 2010. It peaked at 357,503 in
2012, a year after the introduction of Nitaqat, and slightly dropped to
354,169 in 2013 and to 329,937 in 2014.3 Since then the number of Indian
expatriates arriving in the Kingdom has been severely restricted due to the
economic slowdown brought by low oil price. Hence, in 2016 the number
of Indians seeking emigration clearance for travel to Saudi Arabia came
down to 165,356 or just 50 per cent of the 2014 figures (Bagchi 2017).
The economic slowdown in the oil-rich Gulf Arab countries and the fall
in the number of Indians emigrating to the region have an adverse impact
upon the remittances that India receives from its expatriate workforce.
India has been one of the highest recipients of remittances from abroad,
and with about US$68.9 billion in 2015, it reached the top slot (PTI
2016a). In the past, the Gulf remittances enabled the Indian government
to tide over the balance of payment problems. The economic conditions
facing Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries had affected the flow.
Though India retained the top slot, the flow dropped to US$62.7 billion
or a drop of nearly 9 per cent in 2016 (PTI 2017a). A large chunk of this
remittance came from the Gulf and in 2015 Indian workers in Saudi
Arabia alone sent home US$11.25 billion, the third largest flow after the
UAE and the US (The World Bank 2017).
One of the major irritants in the Indo-Saudi relations has been the
treatment of Indian workers. While most of them have a satisfactory expe-
rience, they have to suffer hardships due to geographical conditions, cul-
tural differences, harsh working conditions and unfamiliarity with the
Arabic language. There have been unpleasant experiences due to exploita-
tion and ill-treatment of domestic workers or sexual harassment. At times,
qualified migrants are forced to work as farmers, industrial labourers, con-
struction workers, drivers or even as shepherds. There are frequent media
3
Figures are taken from various annual reports published by the Ministry of External
Affairs, Government of India.
reports of exploitation by employment agents in India who feed false

information about salary, working conditions or the nature of work. Like
other countries of the world, the Saudi labour laws are favourable to
national employees and do not always protect the expatriates’ rights. A
recurring problem has been the Kafala (sponsorship) system which pre-
vents the migrant workers from changing his/her job without the consent
of the original employer on whose work visa he/she came to the Kingdom.
To mitigate the problem, during the visit of Prime Minister Modi in April
2016 an agreement on labour cooperation was signed to streamline the
recruitment of the general category of workers and prevent exploitation.
Conclusion
In terms of economy, energy and expatriates, the Kingdom has been impor-
tant to India for long, especially after the oil boom. They flourished even in
the absence of close convergence of interests or limited political interactions.
They provide a stable economic basis for the bilateral relations. The eco-
nomic reforms, accelerated demand for more energy resources and eco-
nomic growth have enhanced India’s relative importance vis-à-vis Saudi
Arabia. They also coincided with the Look East approach of the al-Sauds
spurred by a host of regional and international developments. Since the visit
of King Abdullah to India in 2006, both countries have recognized that lack
of sustained political engagements had resulted in both countries maintain-
ing only a buyer-seller relation dominated by the energy trade. While com-
mercial commitments can be continued without any political component,
the transformation of the economic element into strategic partnership pre-
supposes an active political involvement and direction which would make
the relations more holistic, inclusive and two-way process. In pursuing this
path, India, however, faces many challenges and competition from other
regional and international powers.
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EXPIMP/Partner/all/Product/Total
CHAPTER 10
International Factors
The prevailing regional and global climate has partly influenced India’s
understanding of and approach towards Saudi Arabia. For long, Pakistan
has been a major contributing factor and a stumbling block in India fully
capitalizing on the opportunities presented by the Kingdom. However,
there are other factors and issues which contributed to the prolonged
Indian ‘neglect’ of the Kingdom and the removal or minimizing of these
has partly contributed to the upward swing in the bilateral relations.
During the Cold War era, the politics in the Gulf has been major impedi-
ments to India’s view of Riyadh. Despite the socio-religious and energy-
economic attractions, in foreign policy terms, the Indo-US differences on
Saudi Arabia were so overwhelming that New Delhi did not go beyond a
transactional approach towards the Kingdom.
The end of the Cold War coincided with the emergence of two players
with whom India has to negotiate carefully, if it were to enhance its influ-
ence over Riyadh, namely, People’s Republic of China and Iran. A subtle
Sino-Indian competition has been building up in the Gulf region where
both the countries are actively pursuing various energy security strategies.
The other major player in the Indo-Saudi relations is the Islamic Republic
of Iran, whose regional ascendance has been complicating the Saudi rela-
tions with the outside world, including India. How did the US, China and
Iran influence and even shape Indo-Saudi relations?

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_10
The US
Since the end of the Second World War, the US has dominated the Middle
Eastern landscape. Through a host of political strategies, military arrange-
ments, sustained arms sales and energy security linkages, the US has pos-
ited itself as a Middle Eastern power with vital stakes and influence. For
decades, Washington has been able to manage and balance its strategic
interests vis-à-vis Israel and the energy interest vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.
Despite substantial differences between its two interlocutors, the US pre-
vailed as a security guarantor to the Kingdom as well as the Jewish State,
and this balancing was viewed enviously by other great powers, especially
the USSR. Occasional differences and tensions did not impede the US
from following a policy whereby both these Middle Eastern countries felt
beholden to Washington. For example, the Arab anger over President
Richard Nixon rushing emergency military supplies during the October
1973 War was not that damaging. Before long, the US emerged as the
principal military supplier to both sides of the Arab-Israeli divide.
The ascendance of the US influence in the Middle East during the Cold
War was partly facilitated by the omissions and commissions of other
powers. Post-War Britain could not retain its economic strength and was
forced to give up its colonial positions that culminated in the East of Suez
policy completed in 1971 (Peden 2012; Darby 1970; Roucek 1968). Its
misadventure, in collaboration with France and Israel, against President
Gamal Abdul Nasser over the Suez Canal proved disastrous as Britain had
to surrender to the dictates of President Dwight Eisenhower (Beck 2009;
Peterson 1997). This largely marked the end of British dominance in the
Middle East and its limited sway was confined to monarchies such as
Bahrain, Jordan and Oman. Traditionally the French influence was
confined to pockets such as Algeria and Lebanon, which also diminished
after the Suez War.
The Soviet role was more complicated. Joseph Stalin played a midwife
when the UN General Assembly adopted the partition plan in November
1947 as he viewed the Jewish State as a potential ally. This was mostly due
to the socialist orientation of the Labour Zionism which dominated the
pre-state Jewish community in Palestine and later on the State of Israel.
After the communist revolution in China, Moscow even witnessed initial
diplomatic contacts between Israel and the leadership of the People’s
Republic of China. Growing political differences over Cold War issues
such as the Korean crisis did not impede Israel and USSR from maintain-
INTERNATIONAL FACTORS 197
ing formal and relatively friendlier relations until the mid-1960s. The sud-
denness of the June War and the Arab military debacle pushed Moscow to
a corner and was forced to exhibit its support and commitment to its Arab
allies. On 10 June, a day before the ceasefire, the USSR broke off relations
with Israel and its Warsaw Bloc allies followed suit with only Romania
adhering to an independent course.1 This phase continued until October
1991, when bilateral relations were re-established and paved the way for
USSR co-sponsoring—along with the US—the Middle East Peace
Conference in Madrid later that month.
Thus, between June 1967 and October 1991, the USSR did not have
diplomatic relations with Israel and this precluded Moscow from playing
any role in peace-making efforts. The end of the Cold War was also marked
by the disintegration and disappearance of the USSR. Until the emergence
of Vladimir Putin in 2000 and resurgent oil prices, Russia remained a mar-
ginal player in global politics, especially in the Middle East. Since its
return, Moscow’s role has primarily been confined to Syria and to a lim-
ited extent towards Iran (Freedman 2018).
While these enhanced the US domination in the Middle East, there has
been only limited policy convergence, especially with India over Saudi
Arabia. In the initial years, the al-Sauds were opposed to the US-led mili-
tary alliances, especially Baghdad Pact/CENTO but fears over Nasserism
and his brand of republicanism unnerved the conservative ruling family.
Military coup in Iraq in 1958 brought it closer to Pahlavis of Iran and dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s both these countries emerged as the close allies
of the US and worked in tandem with Washington. Thus, even the oil
crisis of 1973 where Riyadh disapproved the US policy towards Israel did
not rupture the US-Saudi relations. If converging energy interest formed
the basis, the US consolidated the ties through sustained arms supplies
towards modernizing the Saudi military.
The military-security ties got a boost in 1953 when the United States
Military Training Mission (USMTM) was established in the Kingdom.
This proved vital when the US trained the Afghan Mujahedeen in the 1980s
and organized the military campaign against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in 1990–91. The presence of foreign armies, especially women and non-
Muslim combatants in the Islamic holy land, spurred anti-regime protests
inside the country led by the conservative ulema from the Sahwa m ovement
1
This proved useful in the 1970s when President Anwar Sadat embarked upon his peace
overtures towards Israel that culminated in the Camp David accords of 1978.
as well as the al-Qaida leader Osama bin-Laden. Domestic criticisms

largely forced the Kingdom to scale down the US military presence and
eventually in 2003 all the remaining US combat forces were withdrawn
except for a small number training and support role for the
USMTM. Though it was a major setback, the US strengthened its military
bases in Bahrain which also hosts the headquarters of Fifth Fleet and the
al-Udeid air base in Qatar.
Against this background, some of the strategic choices of Riyadh ran
counter to New Delhi. If in the 1950s and 1960s, Nasserism dominated
the Indian approach towards the Middle East, the 1970s saw the
oil-for-arms linkage which made Saudi Arabia becoming closer to the
US. This manifested in the Afghan crisis when India and Saudi Arabia
found themselves in opposite camps. Riyadh was the lead player in the
US-led campaign against the Soviet invasion and provided political legiti-
macy, financial support and above all military training and supplies to the
Afghan Mujahedeen who were fighting the Soviets.
This enabled Pakistan playing an active role in shoring up anti-Soviet
forces and in the process ingratiating itself to the US. The formation of the
US-Saudi-Pakistan alliance resulted in Islamabad receiving more than
US$7.5 billion worth of direct military assistance and billions of dollars’
worth in arms under the pretext of “fighting” the Soviets (Riedel 2014).
Some of these weapons were paid for by Saudi Arabia (Weinbaum and
Khurram 2014). The long-term effect of the Saudi involvement in
Afghanistan was felt a decade later in the form of al-Qaida, formed and
headed by Saudi billionaire Osama bin-Laden (Hoodbhoy 2005).
The post–Cold War Saudi-US bonhomie that lasted a decade came
under stress due to five significant developments that underscored their
discords. One, the September 11 terror attacks fundamentally transformed
the public opinion in the US and erstwhile indulgence towards Saudi
conservatism gave way to a backlash and sustained campaign against the
Kingdom as well as its brand of Islam. This resulted in the al-Saud charting
a Look East Policy (Gause III 2011; Patrick 2016) and exploring non-
Western partners (Ottaway 2009). Though they were not in a position to
replace the US as the security guarantor, countries like China and India
became attractive options to shore up Saudi wealth in the form of invest-
ments. Greater Saudi political engagement with Asia indeed began after
the September 11 attacks (Al-Tamimi 2014; Olimat 2015).
Two, the removal of Saddam Hussein from power by the US-led inva-
sion plunged that country into a civil war. The introduction of p
arliamentary
democracy had one unintended consequence and harmful effect for the
Kingdom, namely, it transformed Iraq into a Shia Arab country. Though
demography was in their favour, for decades, the Shias of Iraq were mar-
ginalized and deprived of their due share of political power. Operation
Iraqi Freedom empowered the Iraqi Shias and in the process spurred a
Sunni backlash which first manifested as sectarian violence but eventually
culminated in the emergence of ISIS (Gerges 2017).
Three, the poorly planned American military campaign in Iraq and
Afghanistan in the wake of the September 11 attacks exposed the policy
paralysis in Washington. At one level, the Bush Administration sought to
‘respond’ to the largest terror attacks on its soil by launching two costly
wars. These attacks against al-Qaida positions in remote Afghan moun-
tains brought little strategic let alone political dividends and resulted in
Saddam Hussein being falsely accused of possessing and developing
‘weapons of mass destruction.’ He was even blamed for perpetuating the
September 11 attacks. Intelligence reports were substantially tweaked
under the pressures from the Bush Administration and the US commit-
ted a sizeable military force overseas without clearly defined political
goals, operational plans or even an honourable exit strategy. After an esti-
mated death of over 250,000 persons, including 4500 US military per-
sonnel (and 32,000 wounded) (“Iraq Body Count” n.d.), and spending
about US$1.7 trillion in that country, the US pulled out its combat forces
from Iraq in 2011 without accomplishing any tangible military, political
or diplomatic gains. This US misadventure in Iraq conveyed two critical
messages to Saudi Arabia and other regional players; one, Washington
would be unable to provide a clear-headed leadership towards a major
international crisis and that it lacked the political will and economic
power to pursue a sustained military campaign; and two, the ill-planned
US strategy would be a recipe for regional disorder.
Four, even before the Iraqi catastrophe could be digested, the region
witnessed popular protests in different Arab capitals and the US once
again failed to provide a leadership role. Saudi Arabia and other Arab
monarchies felt let down by President Barrack Obama’s somewhat late
decision to ‘abandon’ Hosni Mubarak, who had furthered the American
interests in the region for three decades. Erstwhile American policy rever-
sals over Taiwan and the Shah of Iran reverberated in public memory.
Obama’s subsequent decision to swiftly embrace Mohammed Morsi’s
election in 2012 also did not go down well in Riyadh (Gause III 2011,
2014). Likewise, the American policy vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis proved to
be directionless as well as ineffective (Humud et al. 2018).
Five, if these setbacks and policy weaknesses were insufficient, the US

modified its former position and reached a political accommodation with
Iran over the nuclear controversy. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action (JCPOA) was concluded between the Islamic Republic and P5+1
countries (permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany)
in July 2015 (US Department of State 2015) overriding the concerns of
Saudi Arabia as well as Israel. Iran’s ambitions and its direct involvement
in many regional tensions and conflicts such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
Bahrain and Yemen had unnerved the Kingdom (Cambanis 2015;
Fathollah-Nejad 2017; AFP 2017). Costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan,
prolonged domestic economic slowdown, war fatigue and lack of wide-
spread support for overseas campaigns appeared to have prevented the
Obama administration from pursuing a robust, if not a confrontationist
policy, over the nuclear controversy. Hence, it settled for a diplomatic
solution to close the decade-old nuclear file.
Therefore, a host of regional developments, especially in the Persian
Gulf region have been taking place without an American leadership role.
On the contrary, many policies pursued by the Obama administration have
been resented by the friends and foes alike. The weak and ineffective
American leadership has resulted in Russia’s ascendance as a pivot to any
possible resolution of the Syrian civil war and the emergence of Iranian
hegemony in the Gulf. None of the major conflicts in the region, espe-
cially in Iraq, Syria and Yemen could be resolved without the Iranian
cooperation or active involvement. Thus, while no other power or constel-
lation of powers are in a position to replace the US, the politico-diplomatic
influence of Washington in the Gulf has been dwindling, thereby encour-
aging countries like Iran while causing anxieties among traditional allies
like Saudi Arabia.
The shale oil and fracking has transformed the international oil scene
(Ramady and Mahdi 2015) which was already under pressure due to the
weak economic growth in the OECD countries since 2008. The US is
projecting itself as a net energy exporter thereby undermining the decade-
old energy dynamics in the US-Saudi relations (Sergie 2014; Clemente
2017). The economic situation has also weakened the traditional American
support for European energy security despite the latter being a “free rider”
(Goldberg 2016).
Interestingly, the dwindling American influence in the Gulf region
comes at a time when there is increasing political convergence and under-
standing between New Delhi and Washington. Though alliance would be
a misnomer, the growing strategic convergence and engagements between
the former rivals have been substantial (Raja Mohan 2016; Rajagopalan
2017; Madan 2014). India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 were the turning
point and resulted in both countries seeking to discover and in the process
accommodate each other’s security concerns. The Indo-US civil nuclear
agreement of 2005 formalized their newly found friendship and since then
there have been growing political, military and strategic understandings
between the two.
Thus, India’s greater strategic engagement with the US comes at a time
when the latter’s influence in the Gulf region is on the wane. If the Gulf is
losing its erstwhile sheen, the US is increasingly seen as a less dependable
ally by the conservative regimes. Therefore, India will have to deal and
consolidate its ties with Saudi Arabia without benefitting from the pro-
longed American presence and influence in the region.
China
The end of the Cold War and the diminishing influence of Pakistan upon
India’s foreign policy coincided with the People’s Republic of China
emerging as the new player in the Persian Gulf region. Though the Chinese
diplomatic engagement with the Middle East originated in the Bandung
Conference of 1955 (Shichor 1979, 55), its fortunes in the Gulf region
had to wait until the 1970s. Up to that point Republican Iraq which rec-
ognized the PRC in 1958 was the only Gulf country with which it had
formal political relations. The process began with the Kuwaiti recognition
in 1971 and was followed by the establishment of ties with Iran (1971),
Oman (1978), the UAE (1984), Qatar (1988) and Bahrain (1989).
Though there were military transactions during the Iran-Iraq War
(1980–88), the Sino-Saudi normalization had to wait until the dying days
of the Cold War (Al-Tamimi 2014). Amidst the growing tensions over
Iraqi claims on Kuwait on 21 July 1990 both countries announced the
establishment of diplomatic relations and since then progress has been
significant and encompasses economic, political, energy and cultural
aspects.
As Joseph Cheng observes,
In view of the setbacks in relations with the West because of domestic tur-
moil, China was eager to secure diplomatic achievements in the Third
World. It was said that diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia would facili-
tate Chinese Muslim to attend the haj, sending Islamic scholars to partici-
pate in Islamic conferences abroad, dispatching trade delegations to Riyadh,
and even selling missiles to the country. (Cheng 2016, 37)
This phase which began in the mid-1990s also coincided with China
emerging as the net oil importer, with Saudi Arabia emerging as one its
biggest suppliers.
Since then China has been making serious inroads in the Middle East
and seen the energy-rich Gulf countries as essential allies in its global eco-
nomic ambitions (Olimat 2015). The Gulf countries supply nearly
50 per cent of its total oil imports and are a significant market for the
Chinese goods; for example, while the global economic growth has been
sliding since 2008–09, the Sino-Gulf trade has gone up from US$127 bil-
lion in 2008 to US$193.35 billion in 2015 (China 2016). China has
invested considerably in various infrastructure development projects in
Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE as well as in Israel. Some of the
major projects include
• Jiangsu Provincial Overseas Cooperation & Investment Company

(JOCIC) signed a US$300 million deal to operate various firms at
the Khalifa Industrial Zone Abu Dhabi (Kizad)
• China’s COSCO shipping deal to operate a new container terminal
at Khalifa Port, the second busiest port in the UAE to Dubai, for the
next 35 years at a cost of US$738 million
• To develop a port and industrial centre at Duqm, Oman with invest-
ments of US$10 billion
• A US$20 billion joint investment fund with Saudi Arabia
• To build the Lusail Stadium as a joint venture between Qatari firm
HBK Contracting and the China Railway Construction Corporation
(CRCC) which will host the 2022 FIFA final
• A US$200 million factory in Bahrain International Investment Park
(BIIP) by Chinese fibreglass manufacturer CPIC in partnership with
Abahsain Fiberglass Middle East.
Since 2013 China has been building the Gwadar Port in Pakistan,
which started to operate partially in November 2016 and would enable
China to bypass the highly congested Malacca Straits for its energy trade
from the Gulf. The ambitious One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) plan unveiled
in 2013 by President Xi Jinping is the latest addition to its desire to
enhance economic engagements with the region through a host of road,
rail and port facilities in the Gulf (Cafiero and Wagner 2017).
In sheer economic terms, China has been a bigger player in the Gulf
than India. For example, in 2015–16 the Sino-GCC trade stood at
US$200 billion as against US$120 billion of India. The Sino-UAE trade

is marginally higher than Indo-UAE trade but is higher than India’s trade
with all the Gulf countries especially Iran and Iraq (China 2016). The low
oil price has considerably helped both these rivals who depend heavily
upon the region for their hydrocarbon needs. The Gulf countries meet
about 50 per cent of India’s oil needs and 70 per cent of its gas require-
ments and this is 50 and 60 per cent respectively for China (Bender and
Rosen 2015). For now, Beijing’s approach towards the GCC states,
according to some observers, is to maintain a “delicate balance” and to
“avoid confrontation with the United States while limiting its regional
hegemony” (Cheng 2016). Simultaneously, it seeks to expand the foot-
prints of its interests and influence towards cultivating “a good interna-
tional image” (Cheng 2016).
At the same time, any possible energy supply disruptions or price escala-
tion would intensify the Sino-Indian competition and rivalry in the Gulf.
Because of the economic and power asymmetry, the regional and interna-
tional equations are tilted in favour of Beijing. Furthermore, many Chinese
projects in the region are accompanied by the use of Chinese labourers
(Shichor 2017) and this would have a long-term impact on the flow of Indian
expatriates to the Gulf Arab countries. In Iraq where the Chinese companies
are involved in various construction projects, there are about 10,000 Chinese
workers (Hayoun 2014) and the same holds true for Iran (Azad 2017). In
the GCC countries, where the bulk of the Indian workers are employed,
there are about 500,000 Chinese labourers, mostly involved in projects
undertaken by Chinese companies (Teslik 2008; Al-Ubaydli 2015).
These Chinese engagements in the region manifest in the introduction
of Yuan as the currency of transaction and the first such endeavour was
introduced in Qatar in April 2015 (Staff 2016). Iran which faced difficulties
due to the US and EU sanctions, has been switching to Yuan-based trade
(Jegarajah 2017). There are suggestions that Yuan could be added to the
basket of currencies in other countries, both for diversification and to
reduce their overdependence upon the dollars and euros (Staff 2016).
Such an option would be extremely advantageous to China as it has a
more favourable balance of trade with all these countries; for example,
China had a trade surplus of US$18 billion in 2015 vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia
when India’s total trade with the Kingdom stood at just US$26 billion.
The Sino-Saudi relations which began only in 1990 have progressed
considerably. Saudi Arabia looks at China as a stable market for its oil
exports and seeks closer ties towards maintaining peace and security in the
Gulf. On the other hand, Beijing views the entire Gulf as an “extension of
China’s neighbouring areas” (Cafiero and Wagner 2017; Zhu 2010).
China became a net oil importer in 1993 and this intensified its engage-
ments with the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia (Pant 2006). China depends
heavily upon the region for its energy security, and its overall dependency
on oil imports is expected to rise to 77 per cent of its consumption by
2020 (Slav 2017) and Saudi Arabia is its biggest supplier (Staff 2017a).
Besides energy, China has an enormous trade and economic interest in the
Kingdom. Though Saudi Arabia looks to both India and China favourably
and is building stronger ties with them, the latter is far ahead through its
participation in mega projects in Saudi Arabia. During the visit of Chinese
Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli in August 2017, both sides established a joint
US$20 billion investment fund and signed many mega economic project
estimated at US$70 billion (Gao 2017).
Like most countries of the world, China is the largest trading partner of
Saudi Arabia and also its biggest oil importer. In recent times, both have
improved their defence and security ties. Between 2008 and 2011, for
example, the Kingdom bought weapons worth US$700 million from
China (Jin 2016). In August 2017, both signed an agreement to cooper-
ate in nuclear energy. This is a significant development as the Kingdom has
been trying to enhance its nuclear expertise as it fears that the nuclear deal
would result in Iran acquiring nuclear weapons capability (Said 2017).
The King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA-CARE),
the national body responsible for the nuclear programme, has been hold-
ing consultations with Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), especially the US,
Japan, China, South Korea and Russia, and had elicited a favourable
response from South Korea and China (Staff 2011). During Vice-Premier
Gaoli’s visit in mid-2017, the state nuclear project developer China
National Nuclear Corp (CNNC) signed a memorandum of understanding
with the Saudi Geological Survey (SGS) “to explore and assess uranium
and thorium resources” in the Kingdom (Staff 2017b).
India does not seem to be perturbed by the Sino-Saudi economic
engagements, but the growing Chinese strategic interests in the region
and connectivity projects are a challenge, especially when the US influence
in the region is on the decline (Al-Tamimi 2012, 6). Though Saudi Arabia
does not directly come under the OBOR initiative, a week before the May
2017 meeting of the Belt and Road Forum (BRF), Chinese ambassador in
Riyadh Li Huaxin observed that by connecting the OBOR and the Saudi
Vision 2030 “together, it will create very good opportunities for both sides
and not just the two sides, even other sides will benefit from this
connection” (Hassan 2017). This sentiment was reflected by Minister of
Energy, Industry and Natural Resources Khalid al-Faleh who represented
the Kingdom in the BRF meeting in Beijing. Flagging both these initia-
tives, he observed that “Vision 2030 and this (OBOR) initiative are top
priorities when speaking about economic integration as this would enable
us to utilize the Kingdom’s unique location at the nexus of three conti-
nents, Asia, Africa and Europe. The Kingdom’s great and scalable infra-
structure is another asset that would ease the flow of goods and
commodities very efficiently among the three continents” (SPA 2017).
At the same time, Islam proves to be a negative factor in the Sino-Gulf
and Sino-Saudi relations. The situation of the Muslim-majority Xinxiang
province has been a serious concern for China and often leads to policies
and situations that are at odds with the OIC. Over the years, China has
restricted the supply of Quran donated by Saudi Arabia for distribution
(Arab News 2017a, b) and curtailed the flow of religious preachers into
the country (Al-Sudairi 2014). The Chinese media often speak of restric-
tions being imposed upon its Muslim citizens, especially during the month
of Ramadan (AP 2015). The involvement of some of its citizens in the
ISIS and other militant groups has increased the Chinese anxiety and
counter-measures (Chaziza 2016). Because of China’s global status, the
OIC, which often flags the situation in Kashmir, remains silent regarding
the Uighur Muslims. The conditions of Muslims are a fault line between
China and Saudi Arabia that both countries are carefully sidestepping at
present but this might blow up if they do not handle it prudently.
Islamic Republic of Iran

During much of the Cold War, Saudi Arabia and imperial Iran were on the
same page and were part of the twin pillars of the US strategy in the Gulf.
Both were also close friends and allies of Pakistan, and as discussed earlier,
this partly contributed to limited political exchanges between these two
monarchies and India. The Islamic revolution of 1979 transformed not
only Iran but also the regional political climate. The revolutionary fervour
within the country resulted in Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his
followers hoping for a similar socio-political transformation in the
neighbouring Arab monarchies and this, in turn, revived the historical
Arab-Persian rivalries and tensions (Mabon 2015; Furtig 2006). The
Iranian revolution also spurred the Shias populations in Arab countries,
especially Saudi Arabia, demanding more rights and empowerment.
The end of the Cold War coincided with Iran partly abandoning its
hostility towards both the superpowers and treading a path of pragmatism
and accommodation towards its neighbours. It also sought stable new
friends for its oil exports as well as for trade and market access. Around the
same time, India began exploring new friends in the region. Orphaned by
the sudden disappearance of the USSR, India was confronted with its
traditional friend Iraq coming under UN sanctions after the Kuwait crisis.
Hence, India and Iran, who were looking for new friends, found one
another and energy became a component of their growing friendship since
the early 1990s. There were as many as seven major political exchanges
between the two since the end of the Cold War.2 Despite the clergy domi-
nation of the Iranian polity and society, the Indian leaders and elites have
been flagging civilizational linkages and the Iranian pragmatism to seek
closer ties with Tehran.
However, the nuclear controversy since 2003 had considerably affected
and slowed down the pace of Indo-Iranian relations and partly contrib-
uted to the near abandonment of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline
(Purushothaman 2012). The US pressures also resulted in India voting
against Iran both in the International Atomic Energy Agency and in the
UN Security Council. The economic sanctions by the US and EU impeded
India’s ability to pay for the oil imports from Iran and stop the exports of
oil products to the Islamic republic. Indeed, the failure of the realization
of energy partnership visualized in the Delhi Declaration signed during
the visit of President Mohammed Khatami in January 2003 (India, MEA
2003) could be blamed on the US factor.
In addition, New Delhi misread the signals from Washington and
ignored factoring in the US-Iran tensions when it was seeking closer ties
with both the parties. The Indian desire to obtain civilian nuclear technol-
ogy from the US while being indifferent towards the American concerns
over the Iranian nuclear controversy proved naïve and short-sighted. This
approach severely curtailed India’s diplomatic space vis-à-vis both the par-
ties. The US pressure tactics and the threat of Iran-related sanctions
became the compelling factors for the Indian votes in the IAEA and
UNSC and these, in turn, robbed India of any diplomatic leverage against
both these countries (Dutta 2005).
2
These were the visits by President Hashmi Rafsanjani (April 1995), President Mohammed
Khatami (January 2003) and President Hasan Rouhani (February 2018) to India and Prime
Ministers P. V. Narasimha Rao (September 1993), Atal Bihari Vajpayee (April 2001),
Manmohan Singh (August 2012) and Narendra Modi (May 2016) to Iran.
At the same time, the conclusion of JCPOA and the lifting of multilat-
eral sanctions against Iran have spurred greater Indian engagements with
Tehran, including its commitment to building the Chabahar Port and
energy exploitation. The expansion of the Chabahar—whose phase one
was inaugurated in December 2017—and its connectivity plans with other
parts of Iran and Afghanistan through Indian investments have run into
delays due to various problems, including the Iranian penchant for rene-
gotiations of agreements and the slow Indian bureaucracy. The bilateral
relations remain stable and Prime Minister Modi’s May 2016 visit seemed
to have smoothened things but the situation has become uncertain with
the lingering question of the nuclear deal in the wake of the strong state-
ments emanating from the Trump administration.
India’s growing politico-energy engagements with Iran, however, coin-
cide with rising Arab-Persian and especially Saudi-Iranian tension and
rivalry. The siege of Mecca in November 1979 (Trofimov 2007) and the
riots in the Shia-majority Eastern province of Saudi Arabia (Jones 2006),
though not directly related to Iran, sent shock waves in the monarchy. The
Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 and the formation of the GCC
the following year added to regional tensions and rivalry. Though there
were attempts in the 1990 for rapprochement, the revolutionary Shia-
Islamist regime in Tehran and the status quoist Sunni Islamist monarchy
in Riyadh could never come to terms with one another. In other words, if
India had ‘Pakistan’ problem clouding its foreign policy, Saudi Arabia
carries the Iran ‘problem’ in dealing with the outside world.
The role and influence of Iran upon Indo-Gulf relations has become
complicated and even troublesome. In the 1950s and 1960s India’s
engagements were Cairo-centric and this shifted to Baghdad in the 1970s
and 1980s and the relations were primarily economic with a limited politi-
cal component. However, with the Iran-Iraq War and the Kuwait crisis,
India was looking for an alternate economic partner at the end of the
Cold War and so was Iran. Under such circumstances, both countries
explored the possibility of bringing in the Iranian gas to India through the
IPI pipeline passing through Pakistan. Due to security concerns, pricing
issues and the US pressure, this project never materialized (Sahay and
Roshandel 2010). However, Iran continued to be India’s primary trading
partner, and though the US pressures dipped the quantity of crude
imports, Iran has been among the largest suppliers of crude oil to India
(Ray Dadwal 2015). As its energy trade with Iran was affected by the
US-led international sanctions, the Indo-Saudi economic ties continued

to flourish and at times the Kingdom stepped into bridge the shortfall due
to drop in oil imports from Iran.
While the US has been a factor in Indo-Iranian relations, New Delhi
would have to accommodate the Saudi concerns vis-à-vis the Islamic
republic. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has intensified in the wake of the Arab
Spring and the perceived Iranian involvement in a host of trouble spots.
Moreover, the 2015 nuclear deal has convinced the Kingdom that the
diplomacy merely delayed the weaponization process of Iran and spurred
it to embark upon its own nuclear programme (Hannah 2016).
Besides the differences over the Iranian nuclear ambitions, there are
other factors which accentuated the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Tehran has been
able to gradually increase its regional profile and influence through its
proxy Hezbollah in Lebanon or by supporting militant organization such
as Hamas in Palestine. After the US-led invasion that removed Saddam
Hussein from power, Iran has emerged as the dominant player in the
domestic politics of Iraq and the emergence of ISIS only enhanced Iran’s
grip over its neighbour. Tehran not only extended political support to the
beleaguered government in Baghdad but provided military training and
arms to Shia militants, most importantly the Popular Mobilization Force
(PMF), to fight against the ISIS and supplement the efforts of the Iraqi
security forces (Patty 2017; Malik 2017; Beehner and Bruno 2008).
Similarly, the civil war in Syria had led to Iran gaining significant politi-
cal and security foothold in that country (Bassiri and Pantucci 2016). It
has been accused of intervening in Bahrain through the Shia opposition
groups to destabilize the al-Khalifa rule. The Iranian political and logisti-
cal support has emboldened the Houthi movement into precipitating the
Yemen civil war. Thus, during the past decade events in Iraq, Lebanon,
Syria, Palestine, Bahrain and Yemen had led to significant mistrust, tension
and problems between the two Persian Gulf nations. Saudi Arabia and its
allies have been accusing Iran of trying to Persianize the Gulf and create a
sectarian discord towards enhancing its regional influence and hegemony.
From the Iranian viewpoint, Saudi Arabia has not only been financing
various Sunni-jihadist elements but has also been the force behind the mod-
ern Jihadist ideology that has led to the scourge of terrorism and emergence
of al-Qaida and ISIS (Zarif 2016). As discusses elsewhere, Saudi Arabia
alone does not have the monopoly over the rise of fundamentalism within
Islam. Besides Wahhabism, there were other similar movements which
emerged in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reflecting a puritanical
approach. The Ahl-e-Hadith and Jamat-e-Islami movements in India,

Sansui movement in North Africa, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Shia
revivalist movement in Iran have also contributed to radical thoughts
among Muslim societies.
Thus, the mutual anger and resultant regional tension between the two
Islamic neighbours have become a headache for India. It has strategic
interests in both these countries. In addition to energy security, the wel-
fare of the Indian expatriates, trade and investment considerations, India
needs Saudi cooperation in fighting terrorism and radicalism. At the same
time, it has strategic interests in maintaining close ties with Tehran because
it sees the Islamic republic critical to reaching out to Afghanistan and
Central Asia. If Saudi Arabia is helpful in limiting the Pakistani factor,
India needs Iran to circumvent Pakistan vis-à-vis Afghanistan.
Moreover, there is also a domestic consideration. While much of the
170-million-strong Muslim population are adherents of Sunni Islam,
India also has a sizeable Shia population. According to a PEW estimate,
there are about 20–25 million Shia Muslims in India and this is third only
to the Shias of Iran (PEW Research Center 2009). During the nuclear
controversy leaders flagged the Shia component and argued that India
would not be able to be indifferent towards this internal dimension (Khare
2005). Any mishandling of the Saudi-Iranian tension and sectarian divide
in the Middle East could spiral into a domestic issue within India.
Conclusion
Besides Pakistan, there are other factors which weigh heavily upon the
Indo-Saudi relations. Though the Indo-US interests convergence has
enhanced, the diminishing American interests and influence in the Gulf is
bad new for India, especially when it seeks closer and strategic ties with
Riyadh. Piggy bagging on the American presence would have been easier
than trekking a lonely journey. This is all the more relevant when Iran is
opposed to the entry of extra-regional powers into Gulf politics. The
growing Chinese economic forays and its emergence as a major player in
various mega projects in the region pose a serious challenge to India’s
desire to expand its footprints. The introduction of Chinese workforce,
though small at present, would be a challenge to the Indian expatriate
community in the long run. Already they are facing difficulties in the wake
of the Arabization of the workforce and the entry of Arab women in the
labour market. The daunting challenge to India would come from the
Iranian angle and the growing tension between Tehran and Riyadh over
regional supremacy and domination. Both these powers are crucial for
India’s growth story, but if India were to be forced to choose, would it be
Riyadh or Tehran? There lies the litmus test for the Indian diplomacy.
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CHAPTER 11
Challenges
India’s challenges in transforming its relations with Saudi Arabia into a

political friendship through stable and sustained economic partnership
come against the backdrop of many bilateral, regional and international
problems. Some are structural and organizational over which India has no
influence, let alone control; some are insurmountable and some require a
fundamental shift in how India looks at and deals with the outside world.
As it was progressing economically, India has been witnessing a turbulent,
less stable, muddier, complex Middle East with growing regional uncer-
tainty and external intervention. Internal cohesion in some gave way to
blurring allies and friends and frenemies and strange bedfellows replace
traditional friends and enemies. Monarchies are drifting towards socialism
and accountable governance while republican regimes are more comfort-
able with dynastic politics and crony capitalism.
Much of these flux in the Middle East are linked to two catalytic events
in recent years. The first one was the September 11 terror attacks, which
raised doubts about the traditional American approach towards ‘friendly’
dictators and extremism. National interest and energy security consider-
ations subsumed the ideological and philosophical differences between the
West and the conservative Arab monarchies. The age of pretention was
shattered when the Twin Towers collapsed. However, the manner in which
the Bush Administration responded to the largest single act of terrorism
became the remedy worse than the disease. The War on Terror, first in
Afghanistan and then in Iraq, created a backlash from which the Middle

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2_11
East never recovered and was partly responsible for the mushrooming of
extremist ideologies, terrorist actions, sectarian divide and continuing
unrest. The September 11 attacks also contributed to a resurgent backlash
against Islam and Muslims in different Western countries, often termed as
Islamophobia. The sense of grievance has been the theme song of both sides
with limited self-reflection and appreciation of the grievances of the other.
The second major development was internal and came in the form of
the Arab Spring. Beginning with Tunisia, protests spread to different parts
of the Arab world, and even oil-rich Gulf Arab countries known for their
cradle-to-grave welfare arrangement did not escape from its spell. Only
Qatar, the country with the highest annual per capita income of over
US$125,000, did not witness any popular dissent.
The monarchies weathered the storm by resorting to economic largesse
and limited co-option, with poorer ones like Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco
and Oman receiving financial support that ensured regime survival.
Republican regimes were less fortunate as they opted for a militant
response to political and economic grievances of their citizens. Thus, while
the eight Arab monarchies survived, all the republican regimes plunged
into an endless cycle of internal violence, civil war and ruptures. States
such as Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen no longer control their post-Ottoman
boundaries which heralded their existence. At the same time, more than
seven years later the Arab Spring has no clear roadmap, irreversible mile-
stones or accomplishments towards a more democratic political system.
Demographically small Tunisia remains the only major achievement, with
the Ennahda adopting a more flexible and democratic approach in refrain-
ing from imposing Islamism upon the secular public.
The upheavals in the Arab world and the inability of the rulers to
accommodate popular demands for change and reform paved the way for
external interference and intervention. The three non-Arab countries
sought to leverage the chaos for their advantage; if Israel wanted Hosni
Mubarak to survive, Iran and Turkey tried to work towards regime changes
in some of the key Arab countries. Disregarding their historical dishar-
mony with the Arab worlds, they attempted to offer their political history
as ‘model’ for the leaderless Arab Spring protests; the cleric leadership in
Iran sought to depict the Islamic revolution and Shia concept of resistance
and justice as the roadmap for the Arab masses, while Recep Tayyip
Erdogan urged the Arabs to emulate the success of the AKP. Both these
countries downplayed, if not ignored, the historic Arab-Ottoman and
Arab-Persian discords and ayatollahs also ignored the Shia-Sunni divide.
CHALLENGES 217
If the Arab countries were unable to meet the challenges of the Arab
Spring, outside powers contributed to continued tension in the Middle
East. The US, which has retained considerable influence in the region
since the end of the Second World War, has been the main culprit. During
the crucial moments, the Obama administration was dithering in its
responses to the popular demand for change. It was torn between stand-
ing by its long-standing allies like Mubarak and endorsing American values
such as democracy, human rights and good governance. In the process, it
disappointed both sides and came to be blamed for the continued sliding
and political instability. Its military involvement, especially in Iraq in 2003,
has been responsible for the revival of sectarianism and emergence of
extremist groups such as ISIS. If Washington pursued an ineffective policy
towards the Syrian civil war, Russia and China prevented any meaningful
international action by backing the beleaguered Assad regime. Thus, far
from resolving the problem, the Syrian crisis was spurred by external inter-
vention, including some Middle Eastern countries, which backed rival fac-
tions, thereby creating the largest humanitarian disaster since 1945.
Thus, for nearly two decades the Arab world is going through an inter-
nal churning. The September 11 attacks resulted in internal debates, not
always positive or progressing, within Islam, and the Arab Spring rekin-
dled traditional regional rivalry and sectarian divisions. If one locates the
Saudi policy within this broad regional context, it is possible to identify
some challenges facing India in the coming years.
Regional Challenges
The first and the foremost challenge facing India is the sectarianism, espe-
cially in the Persian Gulf region whose stability is vital for its economic
growth and progress. While the internal schism is as old as Islam itself, the
Shia-Sunni tension in the modern Middle East is often traced to the
Islamic revolution in Iran. Gradually it receded from public discourse until
its resurrection in the wake of the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.
President George W. Bush’s democracy promotion model resulted in the
political assertion of Iraq’s Shia majority and transformed the country as
the first Arab Shia state in the political sense. This led to the political
construction of Shia crescent which loosely included near contiguous
Shia-dominated countries and areas of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain, the
Eastern province of Saudi Arabia and Yemen.
Directly or indirectly, Iran has been interfering in these areas or

influencing their Shia population. This, in turn, contributed to the sectar-
ian tension in the region, with Iran and Saudi Arabia seeking to champion
the interests and causes of the Shia and Sunni populations, respectively.
The Saudi-Iranian tension and rivalry are responsible for the continuation
of the civil wars in Syria and Yemen and other tensions in the region, espe-
cially in Bahrain and Iraq.
India seeks close relations with all the countries along the Persian Gulf.
They meet a large chunk of India’s hydrocarbon needs and in the process
make the region India’s largest trading partner. Iran has a strategic role to
play in India’s relations with Central Asia, Afghanistan as well as Pakistan.
The Gulf Arab states have an equally substantial part in the form of labour
migration, remittances and investment opportunities. Thus, India seeks
closer ties with the Arab and non-Arab countries along the Gulf.
The domestic dimension of the sectarian politics in the Gulf should not
be underestimated let alone ignored. If India has the second largest
Muslim population after Indonesia, it also has the third largest Shia popu-
lation after Iran. Siding with one or the other parties in the sectarian divide
in the Gulf would have unexpected cascading effect upon the Muslims of
the country. With the periodic rise of communal tensions in different parts
of the country, sectarian stress over the Persian Gulf is the last thing India
needs. Hence, a regular appreciation and evaluation of the sectarian genie
in the Middle East without involvement would be the golden middle path
for India.
This in practical terms would mean India coming to terms with the
Saudi apprehensions of the Iranian hegemony not only in the Gulf but
also beyond. With its core attributes of regional power—territory, popu-
lation and natural resources—Iran has the political will and desire for
regional domination. Indeed, the Islamic republic is the only country in
the entire Middle East which seeks and wields influence far beyond its
immediate borders and from Syria in the North to Yemen in the South it
influences many regional developments. Apprehensions over this largely
contribute to a more aggressive policy on the part of Saudi Arabia.
Indeed, the internal tensions within the GCC are partly due to differ-
ences between Saudi Arabia and Qatar over latter’s approach towards
Iran. While siding with Riyadh is not an option, New Delhi will have to
understand, and if possible appreciate, the Saudi fears over possible
Iranian hegemony in the Gulf.
CHALLENGES 219
Second, India’s forays into the Gulf, especially since the ascendance of
Narendra Modi, come at less advantageous times. Since 1945 the US has
functioned as a Gulf power, often by forging closer ties with Iran, Saudi
or with both. Much of the post–Second World War events in the Persian
Gulf were designed, delivered or shaped by Washington. If Britain and
France played second fiddle, the USSR and later on Russia had a marginal
role in the Gulf. The Bush administration’s responses to the September
11 terror attacks in the form of ill-planned and costly wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq dented the American power and contributed to continuous slid-
ing of its influence in the Middle East. Indeed, since 2003 the US had
limited influence on a host of regional developments, including the never-
ending Arab-Israeli conflict. Even the political deal over the Iranian
nuclear controversy has been primarily due to the American recognition
of its dwindling regional influence and its inability to pursue costlier mili-
tary option or prolonged economic sanctions against Iran. Indeed, a
quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War, the US has succeeded
in alienating its friends and enemies alike; if the former felt let down, the
latter are emboldened.
This weakening American influence, especially in the Persian Gulf,
coincided with India’s more active engagements. Within four years after
assuming office, Prime Minister Modi, for example, visited all the major
Gulf countries and signalled his desire to engage with them economically.
Moving away from erstwhile hesitation, he has shown a willingness to
cooperate with Saudi Arabia and others in a host of security issues such as
joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, potential arms exports, coun-
terterrorism, sea piracy, money laundering, terror financing, organized
crimes as well as religious extremism. India would have to pursue them
without piggybacking on the US. Furthermore, India would have to
enhance its engagements with Saudi Arabia while facing competition from
three sources; the traditional rival Pakistan has been joined by Russia and
China whose economic clout vis-à-vis Riyadh far exceeds India’s.
Third, the delinking of the Pakistan factor was the real catalyst in the
transformation of India’s Saudi policy. This approach not only enabled
India to look at the real potentials of the bilateral relations but also resulted
in Riyadh taking a more sanguine attitude towards India and its potentials.
Not having to choose between an Islamic Pakistan and more powerful
India, the Kingdom began responding to the latter’s needs and priorities.
Granting of over flight facilities for Indian flights to Israel, for example,
indicates the Saudi willingness to treat India as a special friend. Likewise,

the Saudi assistance was critical for the evacuation of the Indian citizens
from the war-ravaged Yemen.
If India were to continue the positive trajectory, it would have to view
some of the traditional components of the Indo-Saudi relations as assets
and game changer. If Islam is central to Saudi social identity and political
existence, it is also the continuous linkage between India and Arabia. The
rivalry with Pakistan and Cold War worldviews resulted in India ignoring
or not utilizing Islam as the most enduring component of Indo-Saudi rela-
tions. Some of the internal reforms initiated by Crown Prince Mohammed
bin-Salman are modernization efforts aimed at transforming the conserva-
tive society and its adherence to a broader interpretation of the faith.
While visualizing non-Islamic places of worship is premature and unrealis-
tic, tolerance and acceptance of the other have become integral parts
of Saudi engagements, especially with India. Some of the recent measures
in breaking down and lowering of gender discriminations are aimed at
establishing a more inclusive Saudi society.
At the same time, none should underestimate the conservative backlash
against reforms, especially when the clergy is the primary losers of the
reform measures. As Iran has periodically reminded, the clerics live in a
different time zone and are slow to change.
Thus, besides enhancing the bilateral relations, the focus on the Islamic
dimension of the ties would yield two other gains. It could contribute to
and consolidate the reformist measures in the Kingdom and in the process
to hasten the pace of change that the young prince seeks to accomplish.
This does not imply positive statements or endorsement of various mea-
sures but demand for a more active Indian engagement with the Kingdom
and the different segment of the population. In practical terms, this means
visits not being confined to ministries of foreign affairs, finance, petro-
leum or defence but would include fields such as education, culture, skill
development, women empowerment, youth, sports and so on. A more
holistic approach would not only enhance the bilateral relations but also
provide greater legitimacy and support for the reformist segment of the
Saudi society.
Above all, an increased role for Islam would also enable India to flag
some of its serious but unspoken concerns over the Saudi influence in the
radicalization of segments of the Indian Muslim population. The Gulf
returnees are often blamed for the rise of conservatism in states like Kerala
CHALLENGES 221
and conservative teachings in madrasas in different parts of the country.

While the September 11 attacks curbed official Saudi financial support to
various radical Muslim groups, private contributions appear to be continu-
ing. By formally flagging the Islamic dimension, India would be able to
underscore its concerns over religious extremism, especially when it is also
a major security concern for the Kingdom.
Four, facing stiff competition from others, especially China, India
would have to reassess its traditional ways of fulfilling its foreign commit-
ments. Walking the talk is a major Indian problem and most projects do
not go beyond promises and intensions. Kal, the Hindi word for yesterday
as well as tomorrow, symbolizes the traditional Indian approach to time.
The Saudi modernization which began with the oil boom was possible
because of the timely execution of projects and hence expecting the
Kingdom to wait ad infinitum is neither practical nor realistic.
Furthermore, scale and size have not become integral to Indian business
culture. Only a handful of companies—mostly banks and oil c ompanies—
figure in Forbes 500 companies. Even if Riyadh is prepared to divert some
of its sovereign wealth funds, there are no appropriate avenues capable of
absorbing them. The delays in the flow of US$75 billion pledged by the
UAE in August 2015, for example, aptly capture the gulf between Indians’
dream and absorptive capacity. Either India should scale down its expecta-
tions or scale up its size. This gulf is true also for the private companies and
most of the top ten Indian conglomerates have no presence in the interna-
tional market.
The cobweb of judiciary compounds the time and scale dimensions. In
recent years, in the name of social equity and transparency, courts have
struck down some of the projects which saw significant foreign invest-
ments. If India were to attract Saudi investments, especially in various
infrastructure projects, there has to be protection against unnecessary liti-
gations and possible cancellations. While democracies cannot predict or
block judicial interventions, certain level playing fields and international
arbitration mechanism become inevitable.
Five, India’s foreign engagements have been marked by relations than
by policies and this is more visible in the Middle East. Keeping in tune
with the constant challenges of the region and its power aspirations, India
would have to evolve a more coherent and holistic policy towards some of
the principal countries of the region. This is valid for Saudi Arabia. Such a
policy will not be ad hoc but is capable of recognizing occasional
disagreements or differences between the two. A matured partnership

would be able to absorb occasional shocks: for example, India’s ties with
Iran (for Riyadh) or Saudi statements in OIC in support of Pakistan (for
New Delhi).
One is not suggesting that a secular India could view largely conserva-
tive Saudi Arabia as an ally, but there are far too many interest convergen-
ces which should enable India to transform the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
as its dependable friend and vice versa. And that choice is primarily India’s!
Annexure 1
List of Indian Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia
Prof. Abdul Majeed 1948–49

Dr. Manzar Ahsan 1949
Mustafa Kamal Kidwai July 1951 to January 1961
M.N. Masood July 1961 to December 1964
Midhat Kamil Kidwai January 1965 to December 1968
T.T.P. Abdullah December 1968 to August 1973
Zaheer Ahmad December 1973 to September 1975
M. Hamid Ansari November 1975 to April 1976
M.A. Qureshi April 1976 to January 1978
A. K. Hafizka June 1978 to April 1981
T.T.P. Abdullah May 1981 to February 1985
Mahmood Bin Muhammad February 1985 to March 1987
Ishrat Aziz April 1987 to January 1994
M. Hamid Ansari January 1995 to November 1999
Talmiz Ahmad January 2000 to July 2003
Kamaluddin Ahmed July 2003 to September 2004
M.O.H Farook September 2004 to December 2009
Talmiz Ahmad January 2010 to August 2011
Hamid Ali Rao September 2011 to April 2015
Ahmed Javed February 2016 till date
Source: India, Embassy of 2017a

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Annexure 2
Nehru-King Saud Joint Statement, 1956

Prime Minister Nehru visited Saudi Arabia on 24–28 September 1956.
During his stay in Saudi Arabia the Prime Minister held talks with His
Majesty King Ibn Saud and the following joint statement was issued by
them on 28 September:
Accepting the invitation of His Majesty King Saud during his visit to India
last year the Prime Minister of India has visited Saudi Arabia from 24
September to 28 September. On this occasion His Majesty the King and the
Prime Minister considered recent developments in the international situa-
tion as well as the further growth of friendly relations between their two
countries. His Majesty the King and the Prime Minister declare their adher-
ence to the declaration made by the Bandung Conference which laid down
the principles which should govern international relations. These include
respect for fundamental human rights and the purposes and principles of the
Charter of the United Nations, respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of all nations, recognition of the equality of all races, abstention
from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country
and refraining from acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any country. They are
resolved to promote co-operation between their two countries in every field
on the basis of these principles.

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226 Annexure 2
Both Saudi Arabia and India are deeply interested in a peaceful settle-
ment of the dispute relating to the Suez Maritime Canal, which is a
waterway of vital importance to their own economic well-being as also to
that of many other countries in the world. There can be no settlement of
the dispute by methods of conflict or by denial of the sovereign rights of
Egypt over the Suez Canal. The right of all countries to free navigation
through the canal on payment of reasonable dues has been accepted. His
Majesty the King and the Prime Minister are convinced that, in spite of the
difficulties and tensions that have arisen over this question, it is possible to
reach a settlement negotiated between the parties concerned without any
derogation from Egyptian sovereignty and authority and maintaining the
interests of other countries in the unrestricted use of the canal as an open
waterway. They share the hope that there will be no recourse to political
and economic pressure in dealing with this matter, as such pressure would
only retard a peaceful settlement, apart from having other undesirable and
far-reaching consequences.
His Majesty the King and the Prime Minister reiterate their resolve to
work together in the common interests of their two countries and of
peace, progress and freedom in the world.
September 28, 1956 Jeddah

Source: India, MEA 1956
Annexure 3
Indo-Saudi Arabian Economic Cooperation

Agreement, 1981
Following is the text of a press release issued in New Delhi on 14 April
1981:
India and Saudi Arabia today signed an agreement of economic and
technical cooperation. The agreement was signed by Shri P. V. Narasimha
Rao, Minister of External Affairs on behalf of the Government of India
and Prince Saud Al-Faisal, Foreign Minister for the Government of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
The agreement envisages formation of a Joint Commission to meet
alternately in each other’s country at the request of either Party for con-
sultation as to the measures and means to be adopted for the consolidation
and promotion of the economic and technical cooperation between them.
The two countries are to exert their efforts to promote and consolidate
the economic and technical cooperation between them in a spirit of mutual
understanding land in accordance with the laws and regulations prevailing
in their respective countries.
The fields of cooperation mentioned in the agreement, include as an
example, the following items:
• Encouragement of the establishment of agricultural, animal hus-

bandry, industrial and technical development projects between the
two countries.

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228 ANNEXURE 3
• Encouragement of the exchange of information relating to scientific

and technical research.
• Encouragement of the exchange of various goods and products
between them.
• Encouragement of the exchange and training of technical staff required
for specific cooperative programme.
Joint Ventures
The two countries will promote the encouragement of economic and
technical co-operation between the institutions of each other’s country,
including legal entities and establishment of joint ventures and companies
in the different spheres.
India and Saudi Arabia will also encourage investment and flow of capi-
tal between their respective countries.
Exchange of visits by economic and technical representatives and dele-
gations between the two countries are also to be encouraged.
This Agreement will come into force, and becomes effective on the
date of exchange of the instruments of ratification in accordance with their
respective procedures.
Source: India, Foreign Affairs Record 1981
Annexure 4
India-Saudi Joint Communiqué During the Visit

of Indira Gandhi to Saudi Arabia, 1982
Following is the text of Joint Communique signed during the official visit
of the Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia from 17–20 April 1982:
1. At the invitation of His Royal Highness Crown Prince Fahd bin

Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Deputy Prime Minister of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, Her Excellency Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Prime
Minister of the Republic of India, paid an official visit to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 17th April to 20th April, 1982,
corresponding to 23rd to 26th of Jumad Al-Thani 1402 Hijra.
The Prime Minister of India and the accompanying delegation
were accorded a warm welcome reflecting the traditional ties of
friendship and cooperation existing between the two countries.
2. The Prime Minister of India and His Royal Highness Crown
Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz held detailed discussions covering a
wide range of subjects of common interest. They expressed satis-
faction at the development of bilateral relations between the two
countries. The discussions revealed a close similarity of views on a
wide range of international issues. The talks were held in a frater-
nal atmosphere of cordiality, mutual trust and understanding.

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230 ANNEXURE 4
3. The Prime Minister of India was received by His Majesty King

Khaled bin Abdul Aziz. They had a warm and friendly exchange
of views.
4. The following participated in the talks from the Saudi side:
(1) His Royal Highness Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Second
Deputy Prime Minister & Head of the National Guard; (2) His
Royal Highness Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, Minister of
Defence& Civil Aviation; (3) His Royal Highness Prince Saud Al
Faisal, Minister of Foreign Affairs; (4) His Excellency Sheikh
Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Minister of Petroleum & Mineral Resources;
(5) His Excellency Sheikh Mohammed Aba Al Khail, Minister of
Finance & National Economy; (6) His Excellency Sheikh Hussain
Mansouri, Minister of Transport; (7) His Excellency Dr. Ghazi Al
Gosaibi, Minister of Industry & Electricity; (8) His Excellency
Sheikh Abbas Al Ghazzawi, Head of Afro-Asian Departments in
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The following participated in the talks from the Indian side:

His Excellency Mr. P. K. Mukherjee, Minister of Finance; (2) His
Excellency Mr. Khurshid Alam Khan, Minister of State for Tourism
& Civil Aviation; (3) His Excellency Mr. C. K. Jaffar Sharief,
Minister of State for Railways; (4) His Excellency Dr. P. C.
Alexander, Principal Adviser to the Prime Minister; (5) His
Excellency Mr. T. T. P. Abdullah, Ambassador of India, Jeddah.
(6) His Excellency Mr. K. V. Ramanathan, Secretary, Department
of Chemicals & Fertilizers; (7) His Excellency Mr. R. Bhandari,
Secretary (ER), Ministry of External Affairs; (8) His Excellency
Mr. L. Kumar, Secretary of Petroleum; (9) His Excellency Mr.
Abid Hussain, Secretary, Ministry of Commerce; (10) Dr.
Mahfooz Ahmad, Economic Adviser in the Department of
Economic Affairs; (11) His Excellency Mr. K. K. S. Rana, Joint
Secretary to Prime Minister; (12) His Excellency Mr. M. H.
Ansari, Joint Secretary & Chief of Protocol, Ministry of External
Affairs; (13) His Excellency Mr. U. C. Tiwari, Additional
Information Adviser to Prime Minister; (14) His Excellency Mr.
S. K. Arora, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs; (15) His
Excellency Mr. M. S. Aiyer, Joint Secretary, Ministry of External
Affairs; (16) Mr. Y. M. Tiwari, Deputy Chief of Mission, Jeddah.
5. The two sides recalled with profound satisfaction the ageold Indo-
Arab relations which are deep rooted in history and tradition.
ANNEXURE
4 231
They stressed the fact that during recent years, India’s traditional
relations have developed into a multidimensional relationship with
Saudi Arabia as also with other Arab countries. The two sides reit-
erated their belief that further development of these relations will
be to the mutual benefit of the peoples of both countries on the
basis of equality and mutual respect.
6. The Crown Prince particularly welcomed the visit of Prime
Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi to Saudi Arabia at this critical junc-
ture when the prevailing hostilities and tension in the region posed
a very grave threat to regional and international peace. The Crown
Prince and the Prime Minister recognised that the stability and
security of the Gulf region and that of the Indian sub-continent
were closely interlinked. In this context they emphasised the need
and importance of closer and regular contacts as also of deeper
and more diversified exchanges between India and Saudi Arabia as
well as with other countries of the region. These would not only
be to mutual benefit and advantage but would also contribute to
the strength, security and stability of their respective regions.
. The Indian side outlined the recent developments in connection
7
with the normalisation of relations amongst the countries of the
Indian sub-continent and stressed India’s desire to work with all
her neighbours for achieving peace and harmonious relationship
in the region. The Saudi side expressed the hope that efforts
being made by countries in the sub-continent to normalise rela-
tions will soon lead to an atmosphere of peace, understanding
and good neighbourliness.
8. The two sides reviewed developments in regard to the normalisa-
tion of relations between India and Pakistan initiated by the two
countries. They underlined the importance of maintaining an
atmosphere conducive to further negotiations between India and
Pakistan to attain the objectives of nonaggression and the non-
use of force through mutually acceptable arrangements. The
Indian side explained in this context its proposal to conclude a
treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation with Pakistan. It was
agreed that the consolidation of India and Pakistan relations
would serve the interests of the peoples of the two countries and
would contribute to – security, stability and peace in South Asia
and in the entire region.
232 ANNEXURE 4
9. Both sides noted with concern the marked deterioration in the

international environment, the persistence of unresolved p roblems,
and the emergence of tensions in new areas. They emphasized the
need to strengthen and promote international peace and security
and reiterated their commitment to the principles and aims of the
United Nations. They felt that in this field of acute international
tension, the movement of non-aligned countries and the policy of
non-alignment play a vital role in the promotion of international
peace, cooperation and progress. The two sides emphasised the
need to reassert the role of the Non-aligned Movement as an inde-
pendent non-bloc factor in international relations and as a positive
force for the preservation and strengthening of peace and security
in the world. Both sides expressed the conviction that the Non-
aligned Movement will be further strengthened at the forthcom-
ing Summit Meeting scheduled to take place at Baghdad in
September 1982.
10. The two sides noted with concern the deteriorating situation in
West Asia and emphasised that it is a source of grave danger for
the peace and security of the region and the entire world as well.
They expressed their deep concern over the situation arising from
the aggressive acts by Israel and its repeated violations of the reso-
lutions of the UN and other world bodies. They reiterated their
firm conviction that a just and durable peace in the Middle East
can be achieved only on the basis of the immediate and complete
withdrawal of Israel from all Arab territories occupied by it since
1967, including Jerusalem; and the restoration of the inalienable
rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to return to
their homeland and to establish their independent state. The two
sides reiterated their full support for the PLO which is the sole
and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and its par-
ticipation as a full and equal party in all efforts towards the
achievement of a just and lasting peace in the region.
11. The two sides strongly condemned the Israeli actions of annexa-
tion of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights and perpetuation of its
illegal occupation, as a blatant violation of international laws and
conventions and a serious threat to world peace. The two sides
noted with grave concern that despite numerous resolutions
adopted in the UN by overwhelming majority, Israel persists in its
acts of illegal occupation and changing the status of the city of
ANNEXURE
4 233
Jerusalem. They also condemned the attack on the Al Aqsa

Mosque which is yet another instance of Israeli provocative and
aggressive actions. The grave situation caused by Israeli actions in
Lebanon, in particular the attacks launched by it last year, and the
ever-present threat of further invasion, was also discussed. They
expressed their support for the unity, territorial integrity and sov-
ereignty of Lebanon.
12. The Saudi side expressed deep appreciation of India’s consistent
and firm policy of supporting the Arab cause. The Indian side
reiterated that this policy, based on principle, would continue.
The Indian Prime Minister also welcomed the eight-point Arab
Peace Plan as a constructive initiative towards achieving a just and
durable solution to the Middle East problem.
13. The two sides noted with grave concern the increasing escalation
of great power presence in the Indian Ocean area against the
declared wishes of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian
Ocean. They called on the great powers to progressively reduce
and eventually eliminate their military presence from the Indian
Ocean. The two sides reaffirmed the – need to intensify efforts for
the speedy implementation of the declaration of the Indian Ocean
as a zone of peace as contained in the 1971 UN General Assembly
resolution on the subject.
14. They reaffirmed that the security and stability of the Gulf area is
the responsibility of the Gulf States only, without any foreign
interference or intervention. In this context, the Saudi side
explained the objectives of Gulf Cooperation Council. The Indian
side welcomed the establishment of the GCC and appreciated the
resolve of its members to keep the region free from any outside
interference.
15. Noting with grave concern the situation in Afghanistan, the two
sides called for a just and comprehensive settlement of the ques-
tion on the basis of the withdrawal of all foreign troops, strict
observance of the principles of non-intervention and non-inter-
ference, and full respect for the independence, sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, non-aligned status of Afghanistan and its
membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference.
16. The two sides expressed their deep concern over the Iran Iraq conflict
which has lasted for over 19 months and which constitutes a grave
threat to the peace and security of the region. They urged Iran and
234 ANNEXURE 4
Iraq to resolve their differences peacefully. The two sides expressed

full support for the efforts being made by the Committee set up by
the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned
Movement to bring an end to the conflict between Iran and Iraq.
17. The two sides agreed that the tensions and confrontation in

Southern Africa cannot be eliminated nor peace established with-
out the liberation of Namibia from the illegal occupation of South
Africa and the dismantling of the structure of apartheid in South
Africa. The two leaders called for total support to the decisions
taken by the Non-aligned Foreign Ministers’ meeting recently
held in Algiers in April 1981 and all UN resolutions in this regard.
18. The two sides noted with deep concern the deterioration in the
world economy, and disturbing trends in multilateral economic
cooperation. They regretted that the burden of adjustment has
been passed on to the developing countries. They called for an
early commencement of Global Negotiations for International
Economic Cooperation for Development and stressed the need
for concurrent efforts to achieve progress in areas of critical
importance to developing countries such as food, energy, finan-
cial- flows and trade in the forthcoming conferences and meet-
ings of specialised agencies.
19. The two sides emphasised the need for further strengthening of
economic and technical cooperation among developing countries
which would contribute to the development of the solidarity and
collective self-reliance of developing countries and reduce their
vulnerability to pressures from and events in developed countries.
They expressed their determination to contribute jointly with
other developing countries to the implementation of the Caracas
Programme of Action adopted by the High Level Conference on
Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries held in
May 1981.
20. The Indian side expressed great appreciation for the assistance
extended over the past few years by the Saudi Fund for
Development. The Saudi side assured the Indian side that this
assistance would continue to be extended on the same basis as
before to contribute towards development projects in India.
21. The two sides expressed satisfaction that over recent years, there
has been a significant increase in economic exchanges between
the two countries. They also agreed that in view of the rapid eco-
Annexure
4 235
nomic developments taking place in both countries, there are vast

possibilities for a further increase in economic exchanges and
their diversification in the areas of investments, Joint Ventures
and increased participation of organisations in projects. The two
sides identified specific areas of cooperation. Discussions were
held with the private sector in Saudi Arabia on setting up joint
venture projects in the field of agriculture, fertilisers and cement.
It was proposed that a delegation of Saudi businessmen and
industrialists should visit India to explore further possibilities of
mutually beneficial economic cooperation. The delegation will
visit India shortly.
22. The two sides noted with satisfaction that the Agreement on,
Economic and Technical Cooperation signed in New Delhi last
year during the visit of the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia has
now been ratified by both the countries. The two sides agreed
that the first meeting of the Indo-Saudi Joint Commission estab-
lished under the Agreement on Economic and Technical
Cooperation will be held in October 1982.
23. Saudi Arabia and India expressed profound satisfaction with the
positive outcome and results of official visit of Her Excellency
Shrimati Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, to the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia which heralds a new era in Indo-Saudi relations.
This visit is an important step forward in the development of
increased understanding and cooperation between the two
countries.
24. Her Excellency Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of
India, expressed sincere gratitude to the leadership and people of
Saudi Arabia for the warm welcome accorded to her and her del-
egation. She extended cordial invitations to His Majesty Khaled
bin Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, to His Royal Highness
Crown Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Deputy Premier of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to His Royal Highness Prince
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, Second Deputy Premier to visit India.
The invitations were accepted with pleasure and the visit would
take place at mutually convenient dates.
April 20, 1982 Jeddah

Source: India, Foreign Affairs Record 1982
Annexure 5
Number of Haj Pilgrims from India, 1947–2017

Year Number of India Haj Pilgrims
1947 NA
1948 14,110
1949 NA
1950 12,500
1951 NA
1952 8000
1953 NA
1954 7300
1955 9200
1956 13,454
1957 14,000
1958 17,609
1959 19,000
1960 20,695 (third largest contingent after UAR and Yemen)
1961 21,357 (third largest)
1962 21,084 (second largest)
1963 15,000
1964 NA
1965 NA
1966 NA
1967 NA
1968 NA
(continued)

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238 Annexure 5
(continued)
Year Number of India Haj Pilgrims
1969 15,000
1970 NA
1971–1989 NA
1990 24,227 (Haj Committee)
1998 95,119
1999 98,072
2005 127,000
2006 147,000
2007 157,000
2008 175,000
2009 165,000
2010 171,671
2011 170,362
2012 169,971
2013 170,025
2014 135,914
2015 135,868
2016 135,904
Source: Annual Reports, Ministry of External Affairs, India; and Haj Committee of India
Annexure 6
Delhi Declaration, Signed by King Abdullah bin

Abdulaziz Al Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh of India
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Al Saud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia held historic meetings with the
President of the Republic of India, His Excellency Dr. A.P.J. AbdulKalam
and the Prime Minister of the Republic of India, His Excellency Dr.
Manmohan Singh during his State visit to the Republic of India from 24
to 27 January, 2006. The two sides exchanged views and had in-depth
discussions that touched upon the mutual interests of both countries as
well as the security, stability, peace and prosperity in the whole region.
Realizing that this visit heralds a new era in India-Saudi Arabia relations
and constitutes a landmark in the development of increased understand-
ing and cooperation between the two countries and creation of a mutu-
ally beneficial partnership,
Reflecting the view that both countries are developing a broad strategic
vision, and are determined to work together closely for the welfare and
benefit of their peoples and for peace and stability in the region and the
world,
Desirous of building upon and expanding the close ties and friendship and
the many commonalties between the two countries and peoples,

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240 ANNEXURE 6
Affirming their commitment to the ideals of tolerance, harmony and

diversity between societies and the importance of dialogue and peaceful
resolution of disputes,
Conscious of their responsibility for promoting peace, stability and secu-
rity in the region and the world,
Recognizing the close inter-linkage of the stability and security of the Gulf
region and the Indian sub-continent and the need for maintaining a
secure and peaceful environment for the development of the countries
in the region,
Desirous of further strengthening people-to-people ties,
The two sides have agreed as follows:

Exchanges of high-level bilateral visits and consultations should be
intensified in order to give an impetus to and expand the scope of bilateral
cooperation and understanding.
Terrorism is a scourge for all mankind and there is a need to intensify
and coordinate bilateral, regional and global cooperation to combat and
eradicate the menace of terrorism.
The two Governments would closely and actively cooperate to fight the
menace of terrorism and other transnational crimes like money launder-
ing, drugs and arms smuggling in a sustained and comprehensive manner.
The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between Saudi Arabia
and India on Combating Crime will help in the fight against terrorism,
extremism and criminal elements. The two countries shall make concerted
efforts for an early realization of the proposals to conclude a Comprehensive
Convention on International Terrorism which is before the UN General
Assembly, and the setting up of an International Counter-Terrorism
Centre as called for by the International Conference on Counter- Terrorism
held in Riyadh in February 2005, in response to the idea proposed by
King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud.
To expand and diversify mutual trade and investments and, noting with
satisfaction the signing of agreements regarding Promotion and Protection
of Investments and Avoidance of Double Taxation, called for the explora-
tion of investment opportunities in all sectors, including infrastructure, in
both countries.
Both sides affirmed the importance of stability in the oil market for the
world economy. The Indian side expressed understanding and apprecia-
tion of the balanced petroleum policy of Saudi Arabia which is considered
a trusted and reliable source of oil supplies to international markets in
Annexure
6 241
general and the Indian market in particular. In this context, the Saudi side
appreciated the Indian initiative to initiate a regional forum for dialogue
among Asian oil and gas producers and consumers.
Both countries will develop a strategic energy partnership based on
complementarity and interdependence. The elements of this partnership
would include, inter alia:
1. Reliable, stable and increased volume of crude oil supplies, through

“evergreen” long-term contracts.
2. Cooperative and joint ventures, both in the public and private sec-
tors, in the upstream and downstream oil and gas sectors in India
and Saudi Arabia as well as in third countries.
3. Saudi investments in oil refining, marketing and storage in India,
subject to commercial viability.
4. Setting up of India-Saudi ventures for gas-based fertilizer plants in
Saudi Arabia.
The two governments would encourage and support entrepreneurs in

both countries to harness each other’s strengths for mutual benefit and
promote economic cooperation actively.
The two countries would work for closer cooperation in the field of
technology, in particular in the field of information and communication
technology, agriculture, bio-technology, and non-conventional energy
technologies. India will assist in setting up an ICT Centre of Excellence as
well as institutes of higher learning, involving both education and research,
in the field of technology in Saudi Arabia. India would offer opportunities
for Saudi students to pursue Post-Graduate and Doctorate level studies in
technical institutions in India, and enhance cooperation in human resource
development related to telecommunications. It was agreed that an
Educational Exchange Programme between the two countries should be
finalized and concluded at an early date.
The two countries would explore the prospect of cooperation in the
health sector to realize the promising possibilities for enhancing coopera-
tion in this sector, including health services, exchange of health personnel,
health education and pharmaceuticals.
It was agreed that cooperation in the field of science and technology,
tourism, youth affairs and sport, agriculture research and education, tech-
nical education and vocational training and other fields of mutual benefit
242 Annexure 6
should be intensified through signing of agreements and memorandum of

understanding as necessary.
The two sides agreed to cultivate and encourage cultural exchanges
between the two countries, both at official and popular levels.
The meetings of the bilateral Joint Commission will be held frequently
and regularly, and the next meeting of the Joint Commission to be held
later in 2006 has been tasked to ensure follow-up and implementation of
the decisions taken by the two leaders during King Abdullah’s visit to
India.
In the field of political cooperation, both sides exchanged views about
international developments, especially those related to the Middle East,
and affirmed their commitment to the principles of international legality
and the importance of maintaining international peace and stability. The
two sides agreed to work together towards resolving outstanding conflicts
in the world through peaceful means.
Both countries emphasized the importance of the Beirut Arab Peace
Initiative and the Road Map. They realized that the complementarity
between the two plans would invigorate the peace process in the Middle
East, and lead to the establishment of a viable and independent State of
Palestine living in peace and prosperity within secure borders side by side
with Israel.
With regard to the Iraqi situation, both sides expressed their hope that
Iraq would turn a new page in history that would assure its security, unity,
territorial integrity and prosperity, and respect for its sovereignty and
independence.
The two sides welcomed the ongoing dialogue between India and
Pakistan and their continued efforts aimed at settling the outstanding
issues between the two countries.
Done in New Delhi on the 27th of January, 2006 corresponding to
27th of DhulHijja, 1426 H.
Prime Minister of the Republic Dr. Manmohan Singh

of India
King of the Kingdom Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
of Saudi Arabia
New Delhi
January 27, 2006
Source: India, MEA 2006a
Annexure 7
Riyadh Declaration: A New Era

of Strategic Partnership
At the invitation of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King

Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, the Prime Minister of the Republic of
India, His Excellency Dr. Manmohan Singh paid an official visit to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 13-15/3/1431H corresponding to
February 27–March 1, 2010.
During the visit, the Prime Minister of India addressed the Majlis Al-
Shoura, and received the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Petroleum and
Mineral Resources and Commerce and Industry. An honorary doctorate
was conferred upon the Prime Minister by King Saud University.
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz
Al Saud and the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh held in
depth discussions on a wide range of issues in an atmosphere of utmost
warmth, cordiality, friendship and transparency. They asserted that strong
bilateral ties between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of
India were to the benefit of their peoples and of all humanity.
The two leaders were unanimous that the visit of the Custodian of the
Two Holy Mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud to India in
2006, and the current visit of the Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan
Singh to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia heralded a new era in Saudi-India
relations, that is in keeping with the changing realities and unfolding

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244 Annexure 7
opportunities of the 21st century. This would be in accordance with the

civilizational, historic and cultural links which bind them and their regions.
The two leaders reviewed the status of implementation of the historic
Delhi Declaration signed on 27/12/1426H corresponding to 27 January
2006, and expressed their satisfaction at the steady expansion of Saudi-
India relations since the signing of the Delhi Declaration. They re-
emphasized the importance of full implementation of the Delhi Declaration
through exchange of visits at the ministerial, official, business, academia,
media and other levels.
Keeping in view the development of relations between the two coun-
tries, and the potential for their further growth, the two leaders decided to
raise their cooperation to a strategic partnership covering security, eco-
nomic, defence and political areas.
The two leaders reiterated their mutual desire to develop as knowledge-
based economies based on advances in the areas of information technol-
ogy, space science and other frontier technologies. They welcomed the
agreements signed between the two sides in the field of Research and
Education, Information Technology and Services, Science and Technology,
and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
Both leaders emphasized the importance of developing a /broad-based
economic partnership that reflects the ongoing transformation of their
economies, and the changes such transformation are /bringing about in
the global economic order, including continuous coordination within the
framework of the G-20 process. They welcomed the outcome of the 8th
Session of the Joint Commission for Economic, Trade, Scientific, Technical
and Cultural Cooperation held in Riyadh in October, 2009.
The two leaders stressed on continuing to work towards strengthening
their strategic partnership by meeting the two countries’ vast requirements
relating to infrastructure, energy and development, by augmenting the
flow of their investments into each other’s countries, and enhancing the
bilateral trade in accordance with the potential and size of their economies.
In this regard, the two leaders invited the private sector in the two coun-
tries and the Saudi – India Business Council to increase their efforts to take
advantage of the investment opportunities provided by the two countries.
The two leaders further emphasised the importance of strengthening the
strategic energy partnership based on complimentarity and interdependence,
as outlined in the Delhi Declaration, including meeting India’s increasing
requirement of crude oil supplies, and identifying and implementing specific
projects for cooperation including in the areas of new and renewable energy.
India invited Saudi Arabia to participate in crude storage facilities in India.
ANNEXURE
7 245
They directed the Joint Working Group on Energy to continue adopting all
appropriate means to achieve the same.
The two leaders agreed on the role and importance of the youth in
consolidating and strengthening the relations between their peoples, and
directed the concerned authorities to prepare necessary programmes for
activating this role in the framework of Memorandum of Cooperation in the
educational field signed between the two countries in 2006, and also pro-
viding all necessary facilities to their students studying in both countries.
The two leaders mandated the Saudi-India Joint Commission to con-
tinue follow up of the implementation of this Declaration to build this
strategic partnership.
The Prime Minister of India expressed his gratitude and appreciation
for the excellent efforts made and services provided by the Saudi authori-
ties to the Haj and Umra pilgrims from India.
The two leaders welcomed the level of existing cooperation in defence
fields between the concerned authorities in the two countries, and agreed
to continue strengthening this cooperation in a way that realizes their
common interests.
The two leaders noted that tolerance, religious harmony and /brother-
hood, irrespective of faith or ethnic background, were part of the princi-
ples and values of both countries. These are the same principles advocated
by the initiative of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques for dialogue
among different faiths and beliefs.
The two leaders renewed condemnation of the phenomena of terrorism,
extremism and violence affirming that it is global and threatens all societies
and is not linked to any race, color or belief. The international community
must, therefore, resolutely combat terrorism. The two sides agreed to
enhance cooperation in exchange of information relating to terrorist activi-
ties, money laundering, narcotics, arms and human trafficking, and develop
joint strategies to combat these threats. They welcomed the signing of the
Extradition Treaty and the Agreement for Transfer of Sentenced Persons.
In the course of discussions on regional and international issues, the
peace process in the Middle East was high on the agenda. The two leaders
reviewed ongoing efforts and the latest developments, and expressed hope
for the early resumption of the peace process in accordance with the UN
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the Arab Peace Plan with
a view to address all the key issues of the dispute comprehensively and
within a definite timeframe leading to the establishment of a sovereign,
independent, united and viable Palestinian State, in accordance with the
two state solution.
246 Annexure 7
The two leaders emphasized that continued building of settlements by

Israel constitutes a fundamental stumbling block for the peace process.
The two leaders emphasized the importance of regional and interna-
tional efforts focusing on making the Middle East and Gulf Region free of
all nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction.
The two leaders reiterated their support for ongoing international
efforts to resolve the issues relating to Iran’s nuclear programme peace-
fully through dialogue and called for continuation of these efforts. They
encouraged Iran to respond to those efforts in order to remove regional
and international doubts about its nuclear programme, especially as these
ensure the right of Iran and other countries to peaceful uses of nuclear
energy according to the yardsticks and procedures of International Atomic
Energy Agency and under its supervision.
The two leaders discussed the situation in Afghanistan and called for the
preservation of Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence. They
expressed their full support for the efforts aimed at helping Afghanistan to
develop its infrastructure and achieve social and economic development.
They supported the efforts of the people of Afghanistan to achieve stability
and security, protected from exploitation by the terrorist organizations,
while upholding the values and principles of the Constitution of Afghanistan.
The two leaders discussed the situation in Iraq and expressed hope that
the forthcoming elections will enable the people of Iraq to realize their
aspirations by achieving security and stability, strengthening territorial
integrity and consolidating its national unity on the principle of equality of
rights and obligations among all Iraqis irrespective of their faith and sect.
The Prime Minister of India conveyed his deep gratitude and apprecia-
tion to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques for the warm and gra-
cious hospitality extended to him and the members of his delegation
during his official visit to the Kingdom.
Signed this Sunday, February 28, 2010 (14 RabeaAlawal, 1431H) in
Riyadh.
Prime Minister of the Republic Dr. Manmohan Singh

of India
King of the Kingdom Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
of Saudi Arabia
Riyadh
March 1, 2010
Source: India, MEA 2010b
Annexure 8
Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Official

Visit of Crown Prince, Deputy Prime Minister
and Defence Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia to India (26–28 February 2014)
At the kind invitation of Hon’ble Vice President of the Republic of India,
Shri M. Hamid Ansari, His Royal Highness Crown Prince Salman Bin
Abdulaziz Al-Saud, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was on a three-day official visit to India begin-
ning 26/4/1435H, corresponding to 26 February 2014.
During the visit, His Royal Highness called on Hon’ble President of
the Republic of India, Shri Pranab Mukherjee. He also held bilateral dis-
cussions with Hon’ble Vice President, Shri M. Hamid Ansari and Hon’ble
Prime Minister of India, Dr. Manmohan Singh.
The discussions were held in the spirit of the strong friendship that
binds the two countries. During the talks, the two sides expressed their
happiness with the rapid expansion of the friendly relations between the
two countries in all fields. They underlined the remarkable growth in bilat-
eral trade as also in fields of energy, scientific and cultural exchanges and
security cooperation, since the historic visit of the Custodian of the Two
Holy Mosques King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud to India in 2006,
which witnessed the signing of “Delhi Declaration” laying the foundation
for establishing a strategic partnership and developing cooperation

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248 ANNEXURE 8
between the two countries in various fields, and the landmark visit of the
Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh to the Kingdom in 2010, during
which “Riyadh Declaration” was signed, which further deepened bilateral
cooperation in all fields.
Both sides stressed the importance of strengthening the strategic part-
nership and its further development in all areas, to serve the common
interests of the two countries and their peoples. They praised the positive
outcome of the 10th meeting of the Saudi-Indian Joint Commission held
in Riyadh in January 2014, and its recommendations for enhancing coop-
eration in economic, commercial, investment, cultural and technological
fields.
The two sides agreed upon the importance of encouraging the busi-
ness communities in the two countries to increase their investments and
to take advantage of the existing investment opportunities in Saudi
Arabia and India, especially in the fields of infrastructure and technol-
ogy transfer, as also to further consolidate cooperation in the areas of
skilled human resources in information technology, electronics and
telecommunications.
The two sides directed the authorities concerned in both countries to
finalize the framework agreement between the General Investment
Authority in Saudi Arabia (SAGIA) and Invest India, which will facilitate
investments by the private sectors in the two countries, especially in the
fields of the petrochemical industries, pharmaceuticals, medical equip-
ments, and for the establishment of joint ventures in these fields. The two
sides agreed to address the issues hindering the growth and flow of invest-
ments and promotion of trade between the two countries.
The two sides expressed their satisfaction over the developing defence
cooperation between the two countries, especially in the fields of exchange
of expertise and training. In this context, they welcomed the signing of a
Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation between the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Republic of India.
Both sides renewed their condemnation of the phenomena of terror-
ism, extremism and violence, affirming that it is global and threatens all
societies and is not linked to any race, colour or belief.
The two sides expressed satisfaction at the growing bilateral trade in the
energy sector, with Saudi Arabia being the largest supplier of crude oil to
India. The Indian side appreciated the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for being
a reliable source of crude oil. On its part, the Saudi side reiterated its com-
mitment to meet any such future requirements of India, as embodied in
ANNEXURE
8 249
the Delhi (2006) and Riyadh (2010) declarations. The Indian side also
expressed its appreciation for Kingdom’s laudable efforts in providing nec-
essary supplies to bring about stability in world oil markets.
As outlined in the Delhi (2006) and Riyadh (2010) declarations, the
two sides agreed to explore ways and means to transform the buyer-seller
relationship in the energy-sector to one of deeper partnership focusing on
investment and joint ventures bilaterally and also in third countries. They
agreed to hold further discussions on this during the next meeting of the
annual India-Saudi Arabia energy consultations.
The Indian side thanked the Saudi leadership for hosting a large Indian
community and for ensuring their continued welfare and wellbeing.
In the field of media and cultural cooperation, the two sides agreed on
strengthening cooperation in the area of radio and television, as also in
fields of media coverage, exchange of programs and training. They agreed
on exchanging expertise in the regulation of audiovisual media between
the concerned regulatory bodies of the two countries, as well as on activa-
tion of the agreement signed between Saudi Press Agency (SPA) and the
Press Trust of India (PTI). The two sides emphasized the importance of
continued promotion of cultural cooperation and exchanges between the
two countries, in the framework of the Memorandum of Cooperation
signed in 2010.
The Saudi side informed that the Kingdom has initiated the necessary
steps to transfer a number of Indian prisoners, in implementation of the
agreement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons signed in 2010 in Riyadh.
The two sides discussed a number of regional and international issues
of mutual interest, including the developments in Syria, the Iranian nuclear
issue and the situation in Afghanistan, in the light of their common inter-
est in the region’s stability, peace and security.
Regarding the Palestinian issue, the two sides expressed their hope for
achieving a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in accordance with the
Arab Peace Initiative and the international legitimacy, in a way that guar-
antees the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the estab-
lishment of their independent, united and viable state, with East Jerusalem
as its capital.
The two sides expressed grave concern over the seriousness of the situ-
ation in Syria and emphasised the urgent need to stop the killing of inno-
cent people. The two sides supported full implementation of the Geneva
Communiqué of 30 June 2012, which called for negotiations between all
parties, leading to the formation of a transitional governing body.
250 ANNEXURE 8
His Royal Highness Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz, Deputy

Prime Minister and Minister of Defence expressed his thanks and appre-
ciation for the Hon’ble President, Hon’ble Vice President and Hon’ble
Prime Minister of the Republic of India for the warm hospitality extended
to him and the accompanying delegation.
New Delhi
February 28, 2014
Source: India, MEA 2014b
Annexure 9
India-Saudi Arabia Joint Statement During the Visit

of Prime Minister to Saudi Arabia (April 3, 2016)
At the invitation of the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques His Majesty
King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Hon’ble Prime Minister of the
Republic of India, Shri Narendra Modi paid a two-day official visit to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia from 2 to 3 April 2016.
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques received Prime Minister Shri
Narendra Modi on 3 April at the Royal Court. The two leaders held dis-
cussions in the spirit of the strong friendship that binds the two countries
and their peoples. During the visit, Prime Minister Modi also met with His
Royal Highness Prince Mohammed bin Naif bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud,
Crown Prince, Deputy Premier & Minister of Interior and His Royal
Highness Prince Mohammed bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, Deputy
Crown Prince, Second Deputy Premier & Minister of Defence. Prime
Minister Modi also received Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of
Health & Chairman of the Executive Board of Saudi Aramco.
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz
and Prime Minister Modi exchanged views on bilateral, regional and multi-
lateral issues of mutual interest. The two leaders underlined the close and
friendly bilateral ties, deep-rooted in shared history and sustained and nour-
ished through growing economic partnership, multi-faceted cooperation
and vibrant people to people contacts. The wide-ranging and constructive

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252 Annexure 9
discussions were held in a cordial atmosphere and enabled better under-

standing and appreciation of each other’s concerns and perspectives, recog-
nizing the close interlinkage of the stability and security of the Gulf region
and the Indian subcontinent and the need for maintaining a secure and
peaceful environment for the development of the countries of the region.
Both leaders expressed appreciation for the successful transformation of
bilateral relationship in political, economic, security, defence, manpower
and people to people exchanges, in recent years, which have enriched
bilateral ties. They expressed satisfaction at the regular exchange of high-
level visits between the two countries, underlining that the Delhi
Declaration (2006) and the Riyadh Declaration (2010) elevated the mutu-
ally beneficial bilateral relations to the level of ‘Strategic Partnership’.
Cognizant of their responsibility for promoting peace, stability and
security in the region and the world, the two leaders emphasized the
importance of further cementing bilateral strategic engagement, including
in the areas of security and defence cooperation, to serve the common
interests of the two countries and their peoples.
Prime Minister Modi acknowledged that the MoU on Defence
Cooperation signed during the visit of His Majesty King Salman bin
Abdulaziz Al Saud to India in February 2014 as the then Crown Prince,
Deputy Premier and Defence Minister of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
was an important milestone in strengthening the strategic partnership
between the two countries. The two leaders agreed upon the need to
intensify bilateral defence cooperation, through exchange of visits by mili-
tary personnel and experts, conduct of joint military exercises, exchange
of visits of ships and aircrafts and supply of arms and ammunition and their
joint development. They also welcomed the decision for convening of the
second meeting of Joint Committee on Defence Cooperation in Riyadh to
follow up on the visit of Prime Minister Modi.
The two leaders agreed to enhance cooperation to strengthen maritime
security in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean regions, vital for the security
and prosperity of both countries. They further agreed to promote bilateral
collaboration for humanitarian assistance and evacuation in natural disas-
ters and conflict situations.
The two leaders expressed strong condemnation of the phenomenon of
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, irrespective of who the perpe-
trators were and of their motivations.
Affirming that the menace of extremism and terrorism threatens all
nations and societies, the two leaders rejected totally any attempt to link
Annexure
9 253
this universal phenomenon to any particular race, religion or culture. They

called on all states to reject the use of terrorism against other countries;
dismantle terrorism infrastructures where they happen to exist and to cut
off any kind of support and financing to the terrorists operating and per-
petrating terrorism from their territories against other states; and bring
perpetrators of acts of terrorism to justice.
The two leaders agreed to further strengthen cooperation in combating
terrorism, both at the bilateral level and within the multilateral system of
the UN. The two leaders called upon the international community to
strengthen multilateral regimes to effectively address the challenges posed
by terrorism. The two sides agreed to work together towards the adoption
of India’s proposed Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism in the United Nations. The Prime Minister lauded Kingdom’s
efforts at fighting terrorism in all its aspects and its active participation in
international efforts towards this end. The Indian side was briefed on the
Kingdom’s initiative in bringing together Islamic Alliance against
terrorism.
Acknowledging and commending their strong bilateral security coop-
eration, the two leaders agreed to enhance cooperation in counter-
terrorism operations, intelligence sharing and capacity-building and to
strengthen cooperation in law enforcement, anti-money laundering, drug-
trafficking and other transnational crimes. They welcomed the signing of
an MOU on cooperation in exchange of intelligence related to money
laundering, related crimes and terrorism financing. The two sides further
agreed to take action against illegal transfer of money.
Both leaders agreed to promote cooperation in cyber security, includ-
ing prevention of use of cyber space for terrorism, radicalization and for
disturbing social harmony. The two leaders directed their relevant agen-
cies to coordinate efforts to counter radicalization and misuse of religion
by groups and countries for inciting hatred, perpetrating and justifying
terrorism for pursuing political aims. The two leaders welcomed exchanges
and dialogue between religious scholars and intellectuals of both countries
and the organization of conferences and seminars to promote values of
peace, tolerance, inclusiveness and welfare, inherent in all religions.
Reiterating the significance of regular bilateral interactions in reinforc-
ing the momentum for bilateral cooperation, the leaders noted with satis-
faction the increase in high-level exchanges between the two countries in
recent years. They underlined the importance of regular exchange of visits,
including at the levels of ministers and senior officials.
254 Annexure 9
Both leaders appreciated the well-functioning bilateral institutional

mechanisms in the field of trade & investment, energy, defence and
manpower. They noted that new and potential areas of cooperation iden-
tified during the meetings held under these mechanisms had a construc-
tive effect on the expanding bilateral ties and further called for effective
implementation of the decisions made under the framework of these
mechanisms.
The two leaders welcomed the positive outcomes of the 11th session of
the Joint Commission Meeting held in New Delhi in May 2015 and its
Review Meeting held in Riyadh in December 2015. The two leaders man-
dated the Saudi-India Joint Commission to continue follow up of the
decisions taken at the highest levels for cementing the bilateral strategic
partnership.
Acknowledging the on-going positive transformation of the economies
of India and Saudi Arabia, the two leaders emphasized the importance of
expanding trade and investment ties to drive the strategic engagement
forward. They directed their Finance and Trade Ministers to work together
to find ways and means to substantially increase the flow of bilateral invest-
ments and growth of trade ties.
Acknowledging the steady increase in bilateral trade over the last few
years, the two leaders expressed satisfaction at the USD 39 billion trade in
2014–15. Taking note of the excellent trade and economic engagement,
with the two countries being among the top trading partners for each
other, the two leaders agreed upon the need to further strengthen these
ties, particularly through diversifying non-oil trade.
Both leaders expressed satisfaction at the growing presence of Indian
and Saudi companies in each other’s market and agreed to further encour-
age trade promotion measures and participation in fairs and exhibitions.
They welcomed the meeting of Saudi India Business Council in New
Delhi in December 2015 and agreed that Council was a useful platform
for furthering trade and economic cooperation.
The two sides conveyed satisfaction at the holding of the 4th India
GCC Industrial Forum at King Abdullah Economic City, Jeddah in
November 2015. The Saudi side thanked India for active participation of
a large number of Indian companies in the International Fairs and
Exhibitions held in Riyadh and Jeddah.
The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman Bin Abdulaziz
lauded the strong growth shown by Indian economy and expressed appre-
ciation for Prime Minister Modi’s remarkable vision for the future of the
Annexure
9 255
country. He commended Prime Minister Modi’s worthy initiatives of

“Start Up India”, “Make in India”, “Smart City”, and “Clean India”,
noting their strong potential to provide Indian economy a positive thrust
for growth.
The Indian side highlighted the key initiatives taken by the Government
of India to improve the ease of doing business in the country and India’s
key efforts to simplify and rationalize existing rules and relax the foreign
direct investment norms in key areas, including railways, defence and
insurance. Inviting Saudi Arabia to be a partner in India’s growth story,
Prime Minister Modi encouraged Saudi Aramco, SABIC and other Saudi
companies to invest in the infrastructure sector in India and to participate
in projects creating mega industrial manufacturing corridors, smart cities
as well as the Digital India and Start up India programmes.
The Saudi side expressed its interest in investing in infrastructure devel-
opment in India, especially in priority areas such as railways, roads, ports,
and shipping. The Saudi side welcomed interest of Indian side in investing
in the Kingdom, especially taking advantage of the competitive investment
opportunities offered by the Saudi economic and Industrial cities.
Both leaders also welcomed the signing of the framework agreement
between the General Investment Authority in Saudi Arabia and Invest
India aimed at facilitating investments by the private sectors in the two
countries.
Keeping in view the importance of energy security as a key pillar of the
strategic partnership, the two leaders expressed satisfaction at their grow-
ing bilateral trade in the energy sector, acknowledging Saudi Arabia as the
largest supplier of crude oil to India.
The two leaders agreed to transform the buyer-seller relationship in the
energy-sector to one of deeper partnership focusing on investment and
joint ventures in petrochemical complexes, and cooperation in joint explo-
ration in India, Saudi Arabia and in third countries. The two sides also
agreed to focus on areas of training and human resources development
and cooperation in research and development in the energy sector. In this
regard, the two leaders expressed the need for regular meetings under the
umbrella of India-Saudi Arabia Ministerial Energy Dialogue.
The two leaders agreed to strengthen cooperation between educational
institutions, universities and higher research institutions of the two
countries.
Both leaders emphasized the importance of continued promotion of
scientific and technological collaboration, including in the areas of renew-
256 Annexure 9
able energy including solar, Information and Communication technology,

space technology, sustainable development, arid agriculture, desert
ecology, urban development, healthcare and bio-technology. The two

sides further agreed to collaborate on areas of food security.
The Saudi side appreciated the initiative taken by the Prime Minister of
India leading to the formation of International Solar Alliance. They
acknowledged the importance of this Alliance in advancing new solar
technologies worldwide.
Recognizing the vibrant people to people contacts that provided strong
bonds between the two countries, the two leaders lauded the valuable role
of the Indian community in Saudi Arabia and its contribution to the prog-
ress and development of both India and Saudi Arabia. They welcomed the
signing of an agreement on labour cooperation for recruitment of General
Category Workers. Both sides also welcomed the establishment of a Joint
Working Group on Consular issues under the umbrella of the India-Saudi
Arabia Joint Commission to discuss consular issues on a regular basis.
Prime Minister Modi conveyed his sincere appreciation for the excel-
lent arrangements made by the Saudi authorities for the comfort of the
Haj and Umrah pilgrims from India.
The two leaders noted that India and Saudi Arabia have shared civiliza-
tional ties over history that are enriched by the movement of goods, peo-
ples and ideas. They believed that this common heritage can be drawn
upon to strengthen their convergence on approaching contemporary chal-
lenges. A broad approach of humanism and tolerance and a conviction
that faith should unite rather than divide can be a positive factor in inter-
national relations.
The two leaders discussed regional and international issues of mutual
interest, including the security situation in West Asia, Middle East and
South Asia, in the light of their common interest in the regional and global
peace, security and stability. Referring to the earlier declarations with
regard to the situations in Yemen and Syria, they called for the implemen-
tation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions (2216, 2254 and
2268). They also expressed grave concern regarding security situation in
Libya and Iraq. In this regard, they reiterated the importance of peaceful
resolution of these issues through dialogue and political negotiations.
During their discussions on regional issues, the two sides emphasized
the importance of the principle of good neighbourliness, non-interference
in internal affairs, respect of independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity and resolution of dispute through peaceful means.
Annexure
9 257
The two sides expressed their hope for achieving a just, comprehensive
and lasting peace in accordance with the Arab Peace Initiative and the
resolutions of international legitimacy, in a way that guarantees the legiti-
mate rights of the Palestinian people, including the establishment of their
independent, united and viable state, with East Jerusalem as its capital.
Both leaders emphasized the importance of an effective multilateral sys-
tem, centred on a UN reflective of contemporary realities, as a key factor
in tackling global challenges. They stressed upon the urgent need to pur-
sue UN reforms, including of the Security Council through an expansion
in both categories of its membership, to make it more representative,
credible and effective.
The leaders agreed that the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Saudi Arabia
helped in further consolidating and deepening the strategic partnership
framework and further development of excellent bilateral relations in all
spheres, to serve the common interests of the two countries and their
peoples.
Prime Minister Modi expressed his sincere gratitude to His Majesty the
King for the warm welcome and gracious hospitality. He invited His
Majesty the King to pay an official visit to India at mutually convenient
time, which was gladly accepted.
April 3, 2016 Riyadh

Source: India, MEA 2016c
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Index1
A Arab Spring, 134, 138, 151, 152, 158,

Abdullah, Crown Prince, 48, 72, 161–163, 208, 216, 217
118, 133 Arabian Peninsula, 1–3, 19, 19n1,
Abdullah, King of Saudi Arabia, 6, 7, 53–55, 57, 59, 64, 73, 133,
9, 101, 102, 119, 122, 134, 135, 169, 183
137, 138, 140, 149, 153n2, Arab–Israeli conflicts
171, 189 Arab–Israeli War of 1948, 116
Afghan Arabs, 45, 71, 96, 118, 157 Arab–Israeli War of 1967, 83
Afghani, Jamaluddin, 63 Arab–Israeli War of 1973, 40, 119
Afro-Asian movement, 40 Arafat, Yasser, 39, 117, 118, 120, 121,
Ahl-e-Hadeeth or Ahle Hadees 163, 164
(People of Hadith) movement, 73 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 57, 91
Ahmed, Fakhruddin Ali, 41, 93, 94
Ali Brothers, 13, 22, 68
Aligarh Muslim University B
(AMU), 56 Babri Masjid demolition, 71, 96, 97
Ali, Maulana Mohammed, 57 Baghdad Pact, 18, 37, 64, 87, 197
Ansari, M. Hamid, 42n4, 46, 114, Bahrain, 2, 113, 134, 141, 152, 153,
137, 151–153, 230, 247 155, 160, 161, 183, 196, 198,
Antony, A. K., 8, 155 200–202, 208, 216–218
Arab League, 13, 18, 37, 116, 117 Balfour Declaration, 56, 91
Arab Peace Initiative, 118, 122, 144, Bandung Conference of 1955, 25,
242, 249, 257 34n1, 86, 110, 201
1
Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-0794-2
322 INDEX
Bangladesh War of 1971, 34, 38, 40, E

42, 58, 86 Enlai, Zhou, 16
Barak, Ehud, 163
Begin, Menachem, 121
Bin-Laden, Osama, 101, 198 F
bin Nayef, Muhammad, 35, 133 Faisal, King of Saudi Arabia, 40–42,
bin-Qasim, Mohammad, 55 66, 90, 92, 93, 135
British proclamation in 1877, 22 Al-Faisal, Saud, 6, 34, 45, 120, 132,
Bulganin, Nicholai, 14 137, 227, 230
Bush, George H. W., 118, 129, Farouk, King of Egypt, 91
156–158, 199, 215 Free Officers Movement, 16
Free Princes Movement, 19, 23
Friendship Treaty of 1971, Indo-
C Soviet, 38
California-Arabian Standard Oil
Company (CASOC), 185
Camp David Agreements, 117 G
CENTO, 18, 23, 24, 64, 87, 197 Gandhi, Indira, 6, 33, 34, 38, 42,
China National Nuclear Corp 44–48, 66, 71, 110, 120, 121,
(CNNC), 204 132, 133, 135, 140n3, 150, 153,
China, People’s Republic of 229–235
Sino-GCC trade, 202 Gandhi, Mahatma, 22, 25, 57,
Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, 4, 35, 91, 135
37, 38, 49, 88 Gandhi, Rajiv, 71, 110, 150
Sino-Saudi relations, 203, 205 Glasnost, 18
Sino-UAE trade, 203 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 18
Clinton, Bill, 90, 117, 131, 132 Government of India Act of 1858, 22
Cold War, 2–4, 6–8, 13, 14, 17–24, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC),
29, 33, 34, 36, 38, 44, 45, 84, 4, 96, 134, 203, 207, 218,
87, 90, 96, 97, 109, 110, 115, 233, 254
123, 129, 130, 145, 149, 150,
163, 170, 195–197, 201,
205–207, 219, 220 H
Congress Party, 15, 22, 38, Hadhrami community, 183
57, 59, 83, 85, 91, 129, Haj
142n4, 155 benefits to Saudi Arabia, 67
businesses through, 12
controversies surrounding, 70
D Indian mission, 12, 68
Delhi Declaration, 2006, 135–137, Hasan V, King of Morocco, 40
141, 244, 247, 252 Hashemites, 12, 18, 20, 53, 62, 67,
Dulles, John Foster, 14 115, 116
INDEX 323
Hindu–Muslim unity, 22 Economic Cooperation Agreement,

Hungarian crisis, 37 1981, 227–228
Huntington, Samuel, 163 Energy Dialogue, 144, 255
Hussein, Saddam, 158, 198, 199, 208 engagements between two
countries, 14, 34, 38, 91, 153,
154, 164, 170, 185
I geostrategic regional differences, 38
Ibn-Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, 17, India’s pro-Iraqi disposition and, 44
18, 35, 53, 54, 115, 225 India-Saudi Arabia-Iran triangle, 161
Imam, Syed Hasan, 57 India-Saudi Joint Communiqué,
India’s approach towards the 1982, 66, 229–235
Middle East Indira Gandhi’s era, 48, 235
diminishing US influence and, 196 Islamist resurgence and oil crisis, 41
expatriate workers, 6, 184 Kuwait crisis, 96
foreign visits, 151, 156 Modi, Narendra, 8, 133, 134,
Israeli–Palestinian negotiations, 140, 141, 143, 144, 149,
133, 163 152–154, 164, 165, 251,
Middle East policy, 5, 9, 17, 61, 252, 254–257
103, 140 Pakistan factor, 6, 28, 75,
Modi’s approach, 150–155 83–103, 219
Palestinian issue, 164 Palestinian issue and, 109
political exchanges, during political exchanges, 25, 121, 123,
2004–2014, 155 132, 133
role and influence of Iran, 207 regional challenges in
Indian Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, transforming, 186
42n4, 223–225 Riyadh Declaration, 2010, 122,
Indian foreign policy, 60–62 137–140, 248, 252
Indian migration to Gulf Arab Riyadh Joint Statement, 2016,
Countries 140–144
economic slowdown in Gulf Arab US-led sanctions, 139
countries and, 188 Indo-Arab culture, 47, 230
Saudization impact, 44, 185, 188 Indo-Iran relations, 160, 206, 208
Indian Mujahedeen, 71 Indo-Israeli relations, 61, 86, 109,
Indian Muslims 115, 123
haj, 6, 67–69 Indo-Pakistan relations, 22, 24, 42,
religious radicalism, 60, 70, 73 65, 83, 91, 95
India-Saudi Arabia Indo-Pakistan Wars
Arabic learning institutions, 66 1965, 40, 88
Arab–Israeli conflict, 4, 25, 61, 109 1971, 88, 90
Charitable Muslim organizations, 66 Kargil conflict of 1999, 90
Delhi Declaration, 2006, 141, Indo-Palestine relations,
244, 252 9, 109–115
324 INDEX
Indo-Saudi trade relations Islamic radicalism, 71, 72

bilateral trade, 28, 44, 170–176, in Saudi national consciousness, 53
181, 248, 255 Saudi version, 54, 73
collaborative ventures, 175 Wahhabi interpretations, 54, 72
crude oil, 138, 139, 170, 174, 180, Islamic extremism, 72
181, 248, 255 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS),
downstream and upstream projects, 70–72, 74, 102, 199, 205,
136, 165, 182, 241 208, 217
energy supplies, 170, 176–182
engagements with economic and
social life of Saudi Arabia, 185 J
expatriate workers, 170 Jamat-e-Islami (Islamic Society),
India’s imports from Saudi Arabia, 73, 209
174, 181, 182 Jazirat-ul-Arab, 57
investments, 165, 176, 182, 228, Jiangsu Provincial Overseas
241, 244, 248, 254, 255 Cooperation & Investment
maritime trade, 169, 183 Company (JOCIC), 202
Open Sky policy, 176 Jihadism, 72
petroleum, 172, 175, 179, 181, 240 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty, 38 (JCPOA), 200, 207
Indo-US civil nuclear agreement of Jordan, Hashemite Kingdom of, 111
2005, 201 Al-Jubeir, Adel bin Ahmed, 101, 133
Iqbal, Mohammed, 22
Iranian nuclear programme,
139, 158, 159 K
Iran–Iraq War, 44–47, 201, 207 Kalila wa Dimna, 1
Iran, Islamic Republic of, 5, 114, 195, Karnataka Salafi Movement (KSM),
205–209 73, 74
Islamic Revolution of 1979, 36, 97, Kerala Nadvathul Mujahideen
134, 205 (KNM), 73
Iraq, 2, 5, 17–20, 34n1, 40, 43, 44, Khalid, King of Saudi Arabia, 47, 48, 59
62, 64, 65, 74, 86, 87, 95, 116, Khan, General Yahya, 42, 66, 94
117, 137, 139, 141, 143, 144, Khan, Hakim Ajmal, 57
150, 152, 155–158, 160, 161, Khatami, Mohammed, 113, 114, 135,
178, 197, 199–203, 206, 208, 206, 206n2
215–219, 233, 234, 242, 246, 256 Khilafat movement, 13, 62, 68, 91
Iraq–Soviet Friendship Treaty, Khobar Tower bombing, 136
1972, 44 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 54, 205
Islam Khrushchev, Nikita, 14
Ayatollah Khomeini-led Islamic Khurshid, Salman, 134, 155
revolution, 54 King Abdullah City for Atomic
in India, 73 and Renewable Energy
in India’s foreign policy and, 60–62 (KA-CARE), 204
INDEX 325
Korean crisis, 14, 16, 196 Nehru Era

Krishna Menon, V. K., 37, 86 approach to Arab Cold War and
Kuwait crisis, 4, 96, 129, 130, 151, regional politics, 17–24
206, 207 foreign policy convergences, 14
Indo-Palestinian relations,
109, 111, 123
L Indo-Saudi relations, 21, 27, 33, 44
Look East policy, 5, 198 interactions between Indian
nationalists and Saudi
leadership, 13
M Middle East policy, 17
Malabar region, influence of Arab nation-building process, 15
culture, 1 non-alignment path, 14, 17, 64
pre-Islamic mercantile exchanges, 54 oil imports, labour migration and
Marwah, Onkar, 16 bilateral trade with Saudi, 44
Masood, Talat, 102 Pakistan factor, 24, 28
Mecca Accord, 119 political differences, 12, 13, 15,
Modi, Narendra, 8, 61, 75, 100, 110, 16, 20
113, 114, 122, 133, 134, power shift in favour of Saudi
140–144, 142n5, 149–157, 164, Arabia, 34
165, 175, 189, 206n2, 207, 219, ties with the countries of Asia and
251, 252, 254–257 Africa, 15
Mohammed, Fasih, 7 Nehru, Jawaharlal
Motamar Al-Alam Islami (World on Arab–Israeli conflict, 17, 25, 34
Islamic Conference), 92 meeting with King Saud, 26
Mubarak, Hosni, 45, 113, 118, 134, support for Nasser, 16
162, 199, 216, 217 view on Zionism, 15
Mukherjee, Pranab, 114, 134, 137, worldview, 15–16, 87
152, 153, 155, 174, 230, 247 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 100, 154, 158
Muslim Anglo-Oriental (MAO) Nitaqat, 187, 188
College, 56 Non-aligned Movement (NAM), 13,
Muslim rule in India, 55 18, 34–37, 34n1, 40, 43, 44, 46,
47, 49, 110, 112, 115, 123, 132,
150, 151, 155, 232, 234
N Noorani, A. G., 42, 65, 66, 93
al-Nahyan, Crown Prince Mohammed Nuclear test of 1975, 34
bin Zayed, 135, 154
Narasimha Rao, P. V., 4, 46, 96, 97,
112, 120, 130, 150, 206n2, 227 O
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 16, 196 Olympic Council of Asia, 120
pan-Arabism, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, Oman, 2, 113, 114, 150–153, 183,
33, 39, 64, 84 196, 201, 202, 216
326 INDEX
One-Belt-One-Road (OBOR) Q
initiative, 159, 202, 204, 205 Qatar, 2, 5, 113, 114, 137, 151, 152,
Operation Desert Storm, 129 180, 198, 201–203, 216, 218
Operation Iraqi Freedom, 158, 199
Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC), 40, 90, 95, 97 R
Islamic bloc, 23, 95 Rabat fiasco, 91–95
Rabin, Yitzhak, 163
Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur, 43, 186
P Religious revivalist movements, 73
Pakistan factor Riyadh Declaration, 2010, 122,
differences and tensions between 137–140, 248, 252
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 101 Rohan, Denis Michael, 39
India’s foreign policy and, 84, 130 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 115, 116
in Indo-Pakistan relations, 83
Kashmir issue, 86, 88
OIC and, 95–102 S
Pakistani nationalism, 91 Sadat, Anwar, 40, 45, 95, 117, 197n1
al-Saud leadership and support for Sahwa movement, 197
Pakistan, 123 Salafism, 72
Palestine Liberation Movement (PLO), Salman, King of Saudi Arabia, 7, 25,
39, 41, 111, 117, 119–121, 232 35, 113, 115, 122, 133, 139–141,
Palestinian issue 143, 152, 154, 160, 164, 165,
Abdullah Plan, 118, 122 235, 247, 250–252, 254
Arab countries’ interpretation, 111 Al Saud, Abdulaziz, 239–243, 246, 247
Indo-Middle Eastern engagements Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of
since 1990s, 112 family feud, 35
Indo-Saudi relations, 119 Iran rivalry, 160, 207, 208, 218
Saudi involvement in Israeli- military campaign against Yemen, 102
Palestinian conflict, 112 regional turmoil, 201
Saudi–US relations, impact on, 115 relations with China, 201, 203, 204
UN resolutions, 111 Saudi involvement and funding in
Pan-Arabism, 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, 33, jihad, 74
39, 41, 45, 54, 63, 64, 84 al-Saud leadership and support for
Pan-Islamism, 20, 21, 24, 27, 28, 33, Pakistan, 123
45, 49, 60, 62–66, 75, 84, 91 Saudi-Soviet relations, 18
as a counter to pan-Arabism, 64 terrorism and, 72, 74, 136, 139,
Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai, 13 208, 253
Pirzada, Syed Sharifuddin, 23, 62, 91, US-Saudi relations, 36, 197
92, 95 Saudi Arabian General Investment
Pokhran-II nuclear tests, 131 Authority (SAGIA),
Popular Front of India (PFI), 73, 74 139, 175, 248
INDEX 327
al-Saud, Khalid, 12, 33, 47, 48, 59 United States Military Training
September 11 terror attacks, 5, 74, Mission (USMTM), 197, 198
101, 117, 118, 122, 136, 149, US-Iran tensions, 206
156, 198, 215, 219 US-Saudi relations, 36, 197, 200
Sharif, Raheel, 102
Sharon, Ariel, 163
Shia community, 58 V
Shia-Sunni rivalry, 161 Venice Declaration of June 1980c, 41
Singh, Arjun, 8, 137, 149
Singh, Gurbachan, 41, 93
Singh, Jaswant, 6, 61, 84, 101, 121, W
130, 132, 133, 144 Wahhab, Muhammad bin Abdul,
Singh, S. K., 120 21, 28, 53, 54, 71, 73,
Singh, Swaran, 88, 110 73n5, 74, 101, 115, 118, 135,
Suez Canal crisis, 16, 26 142, 157
Swaraj, Sushma, 134, 153, 154, Washington Consensus, 131
156, 164 Watan, 20
Weizmann, Chaim, 116
T
Tablighi Jamat (Outreach Society), 73 Y
Tashkent agreement, 37 Yamani, Ahmed Zaki, 34, 230
Tito, Josip Broz, 15, 18 Yemen, 2, 19, 19n1, 20, 34n1, 36, 43,
Truman, Harry S., 116 54, 86, 102, 141, 143, 144,
160–164, 183, 200, 208,
216–218, 220, 256
U Yemeni civil war (1962-1970), 17
U Nu of Burma, 15
United Arab Emirates (UAE), 2, 5,
89, 113, 114, 137, 150–153, Z
155, 172, 188, 201, 202, 221 Zionism, 61, 112

Kumaraswamy P.R., Muddassir Quamar Md. India's Saudi Policy: Bridge To The Future

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India’s

India’s Saudi Policy

ISBN 978-981-13-0793-5 ISBN 978-981-13-0794-2 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018947394

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019

Cover credits: thedafkish / Getty Images

2 The Nehru Era 11

9 Energy, Economics and Expatriates 169

1. List of Indian Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia 223

2. Nehru-King Saud Joint Statement, 1956 225

3. Indo-Saudi Arabian Economic Cooperation Agreement,

4. India-Saudi Joint Communiqué during the Visit of Indira

5. Number of Haj Pilgrims from India, 1947–2017 237

6. Delhi Declaration, 2006 239

7. Riyadh Declaration, 2010 243

8. Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Official Visit of

9. India-Saudi Arabia Joint Statement during the Visit of

P. R. Kumaraswamy is Professor of Contemporary Middle East Studies

Eastern Studies. He has co-edited an anthology titled Contemporary

Fig. 9.1 India-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Trade. (Source: Directorate General

Table 9.1 India-Saudi Arabia bilateral trade (US$ million) 171

© The Author(s) 2019 1

Cultural and civilizational associations between India and Arabia

the Arabian Peninsula and, according to some, the inheritor of Jaziratul

February 2014); two prime ministerial visits from India in February–

The Nehru Era

© The Author(s) 2019 11

process. Hence, they were not enamoured by Nehru’s anti-colonial and

Nehru’s search for similar non-aligned, socialist and secular leadership in

Arab Cold War and Regional Politics

Arab League resulted in a broader Middle Eastern representation, with

get involved in a regime change in the Kingdom (Gerges 1995). King

Quresh tribe, to which Prophet Mohammed belonged. In the Saudi case,

The centrality of Pakistan in India’s political, strategic and foreign

Limited Engagements Under Nehru

of the last countries to shift its embassy to Riyadh as demanded by the

King Saud’s visit was followed by Nehru’s in September 1956 amidst

accompanied by the notions of territorial nationalism and not religious

Conley, J. M. (2001). Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Lessons

Qureshi, M. N. (1978). The Indian Khilafat Movement (1918–1924). Journal of

In many ways 1962 proved to be a defining moment in the Indo-­Saudi rela-

© The Author(s) 2019 33

governments as well as Press (barring a small section which was favourably

Though significant, considering a vociferous Indian defence of Egypt

crisis—supply disruption and price hike—transformed the Western,

serious disagreements; while the official narrative maintained that it was

On the bilateral relations both “expressed satisfaction” at the economic

neighbourhood. Thus, though both were members of the NAM, their

Badeeb, S. M. (1986). The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict over Yemen, 1962–1970.

© The Author(s) 2019 53

of Indian Muslims. They feared that granting of special privileges to Jews

milieu. This is integral to the Indian nationalists’ view of a diverse but

At the same time, the Muslims of India have maintained a distinct

The people-to-people contacts became pronounced with the commer-

Islam in Indian Foreign Policy

Similar arguments regarding Indian Muslims have remained an

Nasser. His military ‘defeat’ against the tripartite aggression in 1956

other monarchies were grudgingly playing a secondary role in regional

expansion work in Masjid al-Haram and the consequent increase in its

Judaism, Christianity and other religions.5 Both as a source of legitimacy

the organization of international inter-faith dialogues (Thompson 2014).

India, MEA. (1959). Annual Report, 1958–59. New Delhi.

Nafi, B. M. (2015). The abolition of the Caliphate in historical context. In

2 The Nehru Era 11

9 Energy, Economics and Expatriates 169

1. List of Indian Ambassadors to Saudi Arabia 223

2. Nehru-King Saud Joint Statement, 1956 225

3. Indo-Saudi Arabian Economic Cooperation Agreement,

4. India-Saudi Joint Communiqué during the Visit of Indira

5. Number of Haj Pilgrims from India, 1947–2017 237

6. Delhi Declaration, 2006 239

7. Riyadh Declaration, 2010 243

8. Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Official Visit of

9. India-Saudi Arabia Joint Statement during the Visit of

Table 9.1 India-Saudi Arabia bilateral trade (US$ million) 171

In many ways 1962 proved to be a defining moment in the Indo-Saudi rela-

pan- Islamic alliance ran against the dominant pan-Arabist discourse.

India twice: first as the four-decade incumbent g overnor of Riyadh in