Marine Policy 68 (2016) 39–46

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Marine Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Slavery scandals: Unpacking labour challenges and policy responses

within the off-shore fisheries sector
Melissa Marschke a,n, Peter Vandergeest b
a
University of Ottawa, 120 University Private, Ottawa, ON, Canada
b
York University, 4700 Keele Road, Toronto, ON, Canada

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Over the past year, scandals around what has been labelled slave labour in the industrial fisheries sector
Received 14 January 2016 in Thailand have revealed not only the connections between northern buyers and southern labour
Received in revised form practices, but also the relative lack of research on fisheries labour in Asia and the global South. The
10 February 2016
slavery and trafficking framings pervading these depictions have been very useful for drawing attention
Accepted 10 February 2016
to and acting on criminal activities in labour recruitment and abuse, but have limits as a basis for ad-
Available online 23 February 2016
dressing the underlying causes of forced labour in fisheries. Insights from research on regional labour
Keywords: migration as well as the work of civil society organisations in Thailand suggest that broader improve-
Fish workers ments in labour relations will require changes in migration management, with a focus on addressing
Migration
vulnerabilities that restrict the abilities of migrant workers to obtain better working conditions. This
Unfree labour
analysis provides the basis for assessing the potential and limits of recent programmes to improve labour
Trafficking
IUU relations on the oceans, including anti-trafficking policies, IUU enforcement, buyer efforts to ensure that
Supply chain management supply chains do not involve forced or illegal labour relations, and Thai government actions.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction working conditions in the fishing industry. Important exceptions

Researchers who produce information about fisheries and
seafood have explored diverse topics including fisheries sustain-
ability, contributions to economic development and coastal com-
munities, changing technologies and more. For example, it is easy
to find research on small-scale marine fisheries, detailing their
contributions to livelihoods of coastal people (e.g., [1] and [2]) or
analyzing management practices with a view to promoting sus-
tainability [3]. A theme that has been markedly scarce in the pages
of this journal and other research-based publications on fisheries,
however, is information about hired workers, in particular within
off-shore fisheries in the global South. Within this journal, a few
authors have addressed maritime labour policy, for example, pol-
icy responses to the ILO's Maritime Labour Convention1 [4] and
[5]. But very few articles have focused on worker recruitment and
n creasing reliance on migrant workers who are often less than free,
Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: mmarschk@uottawa.ca (M. Marschke),
pvander@yorku.ca (P. Vandergeest).
1
Note that there are other relevant ILO conventions addressing labour in the
fisheries sector, in particular the Work in Fishing Convention 188. This convention
has received little academic analysis, in part because only six countries have ratified
it to date. However, discussions with ILO staff working on labour in fisheries sug-
gest that this policy holds significant potential, and that Thailand modelled some of
its' 2015 fisheries reform after this convention.
include Simmons and Stringer [6] on forced labour in the New
Zealand fishing industry, as well as Hara [7] on squid fisheries
workers in South Africa.
This lack of knowledge about fisheries workers came to the fore
in 2014 when the media exposed controversial ‘slave labour’
practices of migrants working in Thailand's off-shore fisheries,
linking these practices to seafood consumed in Europe by tracing
the catch to the manufacturer of feed for farmed shrimp that was
exported to Europe [8]. Media coverage began in June 2014 when
the Guardian published the results of its investigation, which
disseminated to its readership what was already known through
previous research by local NGOs and international organisations
about working conditions in the Thai fishing sector [9–15]. A series
of other media exposés followed, involving further research in
Thailand by the Guardian, the New York Times and Associated Press,
as will be elaborated below.
For the seafood industry, these media stories exposed an in-
poorly paid, and abused. Among researchers, these controversies
have highlighted how little systematic research has been done on
hired labour in fisheries, especially in the global South. Although
most workers engaged in fisheries today are still small-scale [16]
and [17, p. 60], the industrialisation of fisheries has required the
increasing employment of hired workers. Who are these workers,
how are they recruited, and what are the conditions of their

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2016.02.009
0308-597X/& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
40 M. Marschke, P. Vandergeest / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 39–46
employment? Answers to these questions should be a pre-re-
quisite to assessing how governments, the seafood industry, NGOs
and other activists might respond to the current controversies
around fisheries labour in Thailand and elsewhere.
The purpose of this paper is to review the public controversies
surrounding labour on fishing boats in Thailand; outline what is
known about fisheries workers in Thailand based on both research
and activism in that country; and, critically assess current national
and international responses to the controversies in Thailand. The
focus is workers on fishing boats; the paper does not take up la-
bour issues in the seafood processing sector. The paper argues that
the trafficking framework, and the associated language of slavery,
has been effective in drawing world-wide attention to serious la-
bour issues in the fisheries; however, if the broader conditions that
facilitate the emergence of human trafficking are to be addressed,
then policy-makers need to think about the implications of in-
creasing reliance on migrant workers and migration management.
Borrowing from the migration scholarship in Southeast Asia, the
paper outlines some of the complex migration processes that en-
ables labour abuse, and to point to some possible ways of inter-
vening to improve these conditions. Finally, the potential impacts
and limits of anti-trafficking policies, enforcement of restrictions
of seafood from Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fish-
eries, buyer-driven programmes to ensure abuse-free supply
chains, and government action are assessed.
To gather information for this article, an extensive database
search on how the stories about labour abuse in Thailand were
presented in online newspapers was conducted2, in addition to
consulting academic publications and NGO reports. The research
by reporters and NGOs is very informative due to the considerable
effort, imagination, and courage demonstrated by these groups in
obtaining stories about the situations of specific workers, tracing
seafood produced by these workers to northern markets, and
providing support for the most abused workers. Media and NGO
publications are complemented with interviews with civil society
organisations working on labour issues in Bangkok at the end of
2015, and with scoping interviews with captains and fish workers
in ports across Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand during 2014 and
2015.
2. Reflecting on labour challenges in industrial fisheries
2.1. Workers in the thai fisheries
The fisheries sector in Southeast Asia underwent rapid in-
dustrialisation during 1950s through the 1970s, as the number of
medium to large boats ballooned, and these boats adopted more
efficient ways of locating, catching, and preserving fish [18]. Such
efficiency required hired labour. During the earlier decades of in-
dustrialisation of the fisheries, most hired workers in the Thai
fisheries were recruited from nearby coastal peoples or as mi-
grants coming from other parts of Thailand [12] and [19]. But over
time the majority of the industry has come to rely on a mostly
international migrant workforce, often poorly paid and under
highly authoritarian and unequal labour relations [12] and [20].
This turn to international migrant labour can be partly attributed
to the danger and difficulty associated with fisheries work, but
2
For the newspaper search, we used FACTIVA (a newspaper data base) to
gather newspaper articles that covered labour issues in Thailand's fisheries sector
for the past two years (from December 15, 2013 to December 14, 2015). Various
search terms ((“slave labour” OR “slave labour” OR “modern day slavery” OR “mi-
grant worker” OR “economic migration”) NEAR15 fish*) identified 420 newspaper
articles, including 278 that focused on Thailand. We have continued to monitor
media coverage since December 2015.
also with a need to reduce costs as the catch declined with the
devastation of the marine ecology due to unregulated overfishing,
especially in the Gulf of Thailand.3
It is difficult to estimate accurately the number of workers on
fishing boats, but it is likely well over 100,000. A member survey
conducted by the National Fisheries Association of Thailand (NFAT)
in 2012 estimated the total number of workers in the fisheries
sector as 143,000 workers on 9500 boats [12]. This survey would
have excluded non-members of the NFAT.
Fishing boats in the offshore sector can be classified according
to whether they are short haul (at sea for less than one month) or
long haul (at sea more than one month), with the worst labour
abuses occur on the long haul boats. In the short haul sector,
workers change employers relatively often: In an ILO survey of 600
hired fisheries workers, most of whom were employed in the short
haul sector, over two thirds had worked for their current employer
for less than one year [12, p. 41]. At the same time, employers have
been experiencing significant shortages of willing workers [12]
and (interviews in Thailand), because work and life on the boats is
both very dangerous and extremely difficult. The outcome in the
short haul sector is a situation where captains with the worst re-
putations are most likely to lose their workers, and thus go to
brokers who use coercive practices or trafficking. The individuals
who end up working for such captains are often those with little
experience, which can exacerbate abuse [11, p. 21].
At the same time, the evidence is that unfree and abusive la-
bour relations were most common on the long haul boats. For
example, the ILO survey showed that 16% of surveyed workers on
long haul boats were deceived or coerced into working on boats
against their will, compared to only about 3% among short haul
workers [12, p. 46]. Some 25% of long haul workers, and 15% of
short haul workers, reported that they were not working willingly.
The most common means of coercion was economic, or the
withholding of wages, but a significant proportion (3% overall, and
5% of workers from Myanmar) reported violence and threat of
violence. This survey most likely underestimated coercive reten-
tion of workers because it would not have had the opportunity to
interview captive workers, and because it under-sampled long
haul workers. There have also been reports of witnessed execu-
tions of fellow workers as a method of enforcing compliance [8],
[11, p. 25] and [22]. This situation is enabled, in part, because
employers can easily evade regulation given the informal nature of
recruitment [14], the distance ships travel especially in the long
haul sector, and the limited time workers spend off-shore [23].
Workers experience significant debt to pay for brokers, travel,
documentation, and so on, which results in a form of bonded la-
bour [20]. For example, according to the ILO survey about 70% of
respondents paid broker fees upfront [12, p. 49] but we can expect
that most of these workers borrowed money from other sources
[19] to make this payment. About one quarter of surveyed re-
spondents indicated that monthly wages were being deducted to
pay debts to brokers: these workers are effectively bonded to their
employers. Importantly, what the ILO survey also demonstrates is
that a range of working conditions exist, as not all workers re-
ported coercion, underpayment, or serious abuse.
Information on the significance of unfree labour and labour
abuse in the fisheries has been emerging over the past five years
through a series of reports written by international organisations
in collaboration with local NGOs (e.g., [10–12]). The key organi-
sation for drawing international attention to labour issues in the
fisheries sector in Thailand has been the Environmental Justice
3
Precise estimates of stock declines are made difficult by the biological com-
plexity of the fishery and the challenges of assessing natural productivity [21];
however the Thai Department of Fisheries estimates that the catch per unit effort
(CUPE) in the Gulf of Thailand has declined by 97% between 1961 and 2006 [22].
 M. Marschke, P. Vandergeest / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 39–46
Foundation (EJF), which has published a series of hard-hitting
reports on human trafficking and labour abuse starting in 2013
with its Sold to the Sea report.
While the initial EJF reports obtained some media coverage, it
was the 2014 Guardian article that led to the intense media cov-
erage globally. Specifically the Guardian journalists showed how
off-shore fishing boats that abused and held workers as captives
sold trash fish to processors, which was subsequently used to feed
farmed shrimp exported by major Thai companies, including the
Thai conglomerate Charoen Pokphand (CP). CP accounts for 10
percent of Thailand's shrimp exports, with customers including
retailers such as Wal-Mart, Costco, and Carrefour. CP and some
other Thai companies (prominently, Thai Union) swiftly re-
sponded, promising to ensure that their supply chains did not
involve slave labour or other labour abuses [24].
Media coverage has been sustained with more details emerging
concerning labour abuse in the seafood sector in Thailand. In
March 2015 an Associated Press (AP) investigation documented for
a global audience the living conditions of over 300 migrant
workers brought by Thai fishing boats to the Indonesian island of
Benjina, where they were held captive while onshore [25]. From
May to July 2015 the slave labour and trafficking controversies
were linked to the widely publicised plight of Rohingya refugees
fleeing anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar. Although some local
activists suggest very few if any Rohingya actually ended up
working on Thai fishing boats, the international media never-
theless linked the Rohingya to the fishing sector through the
common theme of human trafficking (e.g., [14] and [26]). In July
2015 the New York Times published its research linking fish caught
by ‘sea slaves’ on boats operating out of Thailand to pet food sold
in the United States [27]. In November 2015 Nestlé admitted that
labour abuse was found in its pet food supply chains after it
contracted the non-profit organisation Verité to look into working
conditions of fish workers in Thailand [27–29]. These international
reports garnered global attention, while drawing on the research
and findings of civil society groups in Thailand who are active in
assisting migrant workers in situations of captivity or serious
abuse.
Northern supermarkets and other buyers have reacted to these
stories in the media with repeated commitments to ensuring that
their Thailand-based supply chains were not tainted by these sorts
of practices [8] and [30]. The European Union has meanwhile is-
sued a ‘yellow’ card to Thailand under their programme to block
seafood imports from IUU fisheries, and has included labour abuse
as an issue that needs to be addressed under this policy (inter-
views in Thailand). The United States, meanwhile, downgraded
Thailand to its lowest level, Tier 3, in its 2014 annual Trafficking in
Persons (TiP) report, citing the investigations into trafficking in the
fishing industry, and it left Thailand at Tier 3 in the subsequent
2015 report [31–33]. At least in Southeast Asia, fisheries have
displaced sex work as the main sector of concern among organi-
sations whose mandate it is to combat trafficking.
2.2. Global perspectives on fisheries work
Although most recent media stories have focused on Thailand,
unfree labour and labour abuses in fisheries can be found around
the world. Both the Environmental Justice Foundation's ‘Seafood
not Slavefood’ campaign and Couper et al.'s [17] recent book on
this topic provides global examples. The broader significance of
the Thai case lies in how it has helped spark greater attention to
labour practices in off-shore fisheries around the world, and spe-
cific attention to the growing use of migrant workers who are
often less than free and subject to abuse. These labour practices
are embedded in a set of broader processes involving pressure to
reduce costs in a globalising fishing industry, and in many places,
41
declining catches due to overexploitation combined with rising
fixed costs such as fuel, maintenance and so on [17, p. 122]. Re-
cruiting comparatively low paid and vulnerable migrant workers
provides owners and captains a means for reducing labour costs in
the face of this squeeze.
In this journal, Simmons and Stringer [6] have observed that
while exploitative labour conditions in the fisheries are often as-
sociated with IUU fishing vessels, there are also significant labour
challenges aboard vessels fishing legally in New Zealand's waters,
despite the fact that New Zealand is considered a world leader in
fisheries management. In November 2015, a Guardian article on
Irish fisheries presented similar stories of bonded labour, brokers,
and debt, involving migrants from Africa and Asia; the story
mentions that these practices had spread from Scotland. The
stories about individual workers in this article echoed the in-
dividual stories of fisheries worker elicited by the media and NGOs
in Thailand regarding the nature of the abuse: long working hours,
lack of rest, cheating on wages, insufficient food and more. The
Guardian article specifically argued that these stories should be
framed as trafficking [34]:
“He appears to be a victim of human trafficking, a criminal
offence – defined as a form of modern slavery in the UK and Ire-
land – that involves the movement of people for exploitation.
Whether the person consented to the journey is not relevant: key
factors can include whether they were deceived, or their vulner-
ability or rights abused; how far they were controlled; and whe-
ther working and living conditions amount to exploitation.”
Media accounts of unfree labour in the fishing industry almost
always invoke the language of slavery and trafficking, often
drawing on the ILO definition of trafficking [6, p. 75–76] which
links it to forced labour. The ILO defines forced labour as “all work
or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of
any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself
voluntarily”.4 This framing can be contrasted with academic re-
search on labour migration in Southeast Asia that questions the
idea that we can clearly distinguish between situations where
workers are forced to accept restrictions on mobility, and situa-
tions where workers voluntarily agree to these restrictions in or-
der to obtain employment.
2.3. Migration research in Southeast Asia
Migration scholars often argue that human trafficking needs to
be reframed as a labour migration issue, in which workers should
be positioned not as trafficked victims but as a labour migrants
who need improved working conditions [36] and [37]. This argu-
ment has been made primarily in relation to sex work [38] and
[39] but also extends to other sectors where unfree or bonded
labour is prevalent. A trafficking framework, according to migra-
tion scholars, does not account for the wide variety of situations of
migrant workers, nor does it account for the agency of workers as
they seek to better their working conditions [36, p. 88]. Instead, a
trafficking framework divides migrants into mutually exclusive
categories (trafficked or not trafficked) that do not neatly fit the
reality of their experiences [40]. The language of ‘forced labour’,
and especially that of “slavery” similarly views migrants as victims
in need of rescue, rather than as agents. It also does not consider
the broader conditions of migration that leads to forced labour—a
comment that is particularly pertinent for the fisheries sector,
where there is a need to move beyond moral panics about specific
cases of extreme labour abuse, to thinking about how and why
labour abuse has become so prevalent in the fishing industry
4
See Introduction to International Labour Standards. Conventions and Re-
commendations [35].
42 M. Marschke, P. Vandergeest / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 39–46

globally.
This broader critique of the trafficking framework is referenced
by Derks [19] in her study based on interviews with men from
Cambodia who worked in the fisheries in Thailand. Derks [19, p.
916] recommends an examination of processes of both mobilisa-
tion and immobilisation among workers, which better captures
the inherently contradictory and fluid labour relations in the
fishery. Derks goes on to detail how threats of extortion by police,
and detention and deportation by the Thai government, particu-
larly for migrants lacking full documentation as migrant workers,
serve to limit migrant movements within port. This immobility
increases dependence on captains, who can often make arrange-
ments with police to protect workers against raids. Even in cases
where migrants are registered, employers who invested in paying
for the registration may hold onto such papers for a time period to
ensure a worker does not leave his boat find work elsewhere [19,
p. 296]. Many workers are further tied to specific boats because
they are paid on a profit sharing basis after a fixed period that
ranges from 12 to 30 months. While profit sharing arrangements
have been a common practice in Southeast Asia for centuries [41,
p. 278], this system was based on higher catch levels that what is
obtained in today's highly depleted fisheries. In addition, the shift
away from local workers who might be known to the captain, to
highly marginalised migrant workers, has made it easier for cap-
tain to cheat workers.
Another dimension of mobility is the role of brokers, debt and
bonded labour [15,36] and [42]. As we mentioned above, most
workers find work through brokers or recruiters; workers are
more likely to rely on brokers when they are relatively new and
have not yet developed their own social networks in the ports [15]
and [20]. Brokers are often former fishers who know how to or-
ganise the recruitment, transport and employment of migrant
fisheries workers. To pay broker fees and other costs associated
with migration, workers borrow money, typically from informal
sources, including in their home villages. This creates a situation in
which migrant workers do not want to return home unless they
have at least generated enough income to pay off these debts [19].
This is an important reason why escaped or rescued workers may
not want to be returned to their home villages.
Simmons and Stringer's [6] account of Indonesian workers on
Korean owned boats operating in New Zealand waters describe
many of the same practices for immobilizing, as does recent
Guardian newspaper coverage of off-shore fisheries workers in
Ireland mentioned above: fisheries workers obtain work through
brokers, pay them a fee and then pay off the fee against wages.
Simmons and Stringer [6] document how a group of workers in
New Zealand, who left a boat citing severe abuse, did not want to
return to Indonesia for fear that the broker (or agent) would
confiscate family property against unpaid debts,
Understanding fishing work through the lens of migration
provides guidance for what sort of policies and practices might
improve the situation of fishing workers. We do not suggest
abandoning the language of trafficking, for both practical and legal
reasons outlined below. We are less sure about the language of
slavery. Although the jarring language of slavery has been effective
in provoking international attention to labour issues in the fish-
eries sector in Thailand, it does not translate well in Thailand
especially given the country's distinct history of slavery, where it
had quite different meanings from how it was used in Britain and
the United States [43]. The term is also too unequivocal to describe
the complex situations of the majority of migrant workers who
may not be ‘slaves’ but are experiencing some kind of immobility
and abuse.
3. Responses to fisheries labour scandals
In the following section we draw further insights from the Thai
case to assess how international and national policy responses can
improve (or could potentially improve) the working conditions of
workers in the fisheries sector in Thailand, and elsewhere. Table 1
provides a brief sketch of some key policy responses, their
strengths and limitations, focusing specifically on anti-trafficking
actions, EU policies to restrict imports of seafood from IUU fish-
eries, and buyer efforts to ensure that supply chains do not involve
forced or illegal labour relations. We also pay attention to aspects
of the Thai response, specifically updated government policy.
3.1. Anti-trafficking
An anti-trafficking approach is appropriate in extreme labour
abuse cases, since this involves rescue and safe houses, which has
been vital for some fish workers (see the EJF series). Anti-traf-
ficking laws and policies have been a key resource for the main
Thai NGO (the Human Rights and Development Foundation) that
has provided legal representation for abused or trafficked workers,
or pursued cases against employers and brokers participating in
criminal trafficking of workers.
Where an anti-trafficking approach is less helpful, however, is
in establishing worker rights, or in changing the broader situation
that is creating opportunities for traffickers. Without these chan-
ges, arresting one set of traffickers will likely only create space for
a new set of traffickers to move in and take their place, as hap-
pened in the case of horrific abuses in the Thai port of Kantang as
documented by the EJF, and as described to us during interviews
with civil society groups involved in that case. The trafficking
frame by itself does not address broader labour migration pro-
blems, tends to position workers as victims or potential victims,
and the brokers as criminal traffickers, in each case simplifying
what are very complex processes that often do not fit these

Table 1
Key policy responses, assessing strengths and limitations.

Policy response Strengths Limitations of this approach

Anti-trafficking
IUU
Traceabilty and buyer action with Large buyers have considerable leverage with both suppliers and
respect to supply chains
Thai government policies
Forces people to pay attention; key for handling worse case
scenarios.
Requires traceability; updates fisheries management practices;
brings in ecology.
government, and are also able to work with domestic civil so-
ciety groups. Civil society partners are developing innovative
approaches that might better identify labour abuses than simple
inspections.
Can address ecological decline with recently updated fisheries
policy; can address broader migration policies that produce
vulnerabilities to abuse.
Does not directly address broader migrant labour policies.
Is focused on fisheries management, labour issues are an add-on.
Does not directly address broader migrant labour policies.
Influence can be limited to suppliers who sell to those buyers
imposing requirements. Does not directly address broader mi-
gration policies.
Difficult to impose real change because of lack of coordination
among relevant agencies, security fears and prejudice/xenopho-
bia, ‘self-interest among individual agencies’, and inertia.
 M. Marschke, P. Vandergeest / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 39–46
categories. For example, as we described above, simply positioning
brokers as criminals does not allow for policy changes that would
find ways of reducing worker vulnerabilities to brokers whose
roles cannot easily be eliminated [36].
3.2. IUU enforcement
The European Union (EU) has developed a set of aggressive
regulations to restrict imports of seafood produced by fisheries
that are labelled as illegal, unreported and unregulated [44]. In
April 2015 the EU issued a yellow card for Thailand, putting
Thailand on formal notice for not taking sufficient measures in the
fight against IUU fishing, warning that trade sanctions would be
imposed within six months unless Thailand significantly reforms
its fishery5. A significant proportion of Thailand's seafood exports
go to Europe, so the threat of sanctions poses a serious risk to the
industry [45] and [46].
In response the military government established the Command
Centre for Combating Illegal Fishing (CCCIF) on May 1, 2015, using
powers it had given itself through Article 44 of the interim con-
stitution that came into force in July 2014. This article allows the
government to issue orders that can override usual government
laws and procedures if deemed necessary for national stability; it
is very controversial because it is also being used to curtail aca-
demic and press freedoms in Thailand.6 The government assigned
the Royal Thai Navy to operate this centre, reporting directly to the
Prime Minister, and all other relevant government units were re-
quired to cooperate with the Navy. The CCCIF mandate includes
inspections to check on mandatory registration of fishing boats,
compliance with fisheries regulations such as those on fishing
gear, and compliance with labour regulations. Reports in local
newspapers indicate that many thousands of boats may have been
forced to stop fishing—up to 8000 according to one report [48].
The government has also updated labour and migration reg-
ulations, and set up ‘One Stop’ migrant worker registration centres
in the 22 coastal provinces specifically for fisheries workers, and
‘Port-In Port-Out’ fishing boat inspection centres along the coast7
[49]. The One Stop worker registration centres allowed workers to
register (or be registered by employers) for two three-month
periods. Additionally, the government issued a Ministerial Reg-
ulation specifically for labour protection in the fisheries, which
included mandated minimum rest times of 10 h per 24 h, payment
of minimum wages, written contracts and more.8
The intense controversies that have accompanied these po-
licies, which included an attempted ‘strike’ by the industrial fish-
ing boats, makes it clear that the threat of EU sanctions is forcing a
reorganisation of Thailand's fisheries sector [51]. These changes
have been welcomed by many groups in Thailand, including or-
ganisations of small-scale fishers who see any attempt to regulate
and reduce the industrial fishing sector as benefitting them. At the
same time, views among civil society groups on the effectiveness
of these changes for improving working conditions has been
mixed. On one hand, observers point to how improved regulation
and monitoring of fishing sector will enable better monitoring of
working conditions, while a reduced fishing fleet might also
5
When significant progress is observed, a country will be issued a green card
such as the Philippines in April 2015. Conversely, Cambodia was issued a red card in
November 2013, with all fisheries products being banned to the EU.
6
See for example: Benar News “University a Bastion of Freedom in Junta-Ruled
Thailand, Professor Says” [47].
7
Based on an announcement Thai Embassy Mission of Thailand to the Eur-
opean Union (http://www2.thaiembassy.be/updates-on-thailands-protection-of-la
bour-in-fishing-industry/) as well as interviews in Bangkok and various media
stories.
8
See ‘Ministerial Regulation concerning Thai Labour Protection in Sea Fishery
Work B.E. 2557’ [50].
43
benefit workers indirectly in that any resulting improvement in
catch could in theory enable higher wages for workers receiving
profit-shares. Other observers, however, state that even the new
stricter regulations are easy to evade. Compliance with regulations
such as minimum rest times, not to mention wages and so on
implies access to and communication with workers. Critics in-
dicated that boat captains can ensure that their workers are not
present during inspections, and even if they are present, language
barriers would prevent any meaningful communication between
workers and inspectors. Finally, the current response is enabled by
the presence of a non-democratic government that is using its
powers to override usual government procedures, leaving the long
term sustainability of this approach open to question.
More generally, the European IUU regulations do not specify
compliance with labour laws or regulations [52]. In Thailand, the
controversies around worker abuse have effectively forced the
question of labour into IUU policies. But addressing labour is not a
necessary response for handling IUU, as can be seen in recent cases
in Asia where yellow cards were lifted by the EU (e.g., in the
Philippines or South Korea) [53]. Another challenge of the IUU
approach is that it only applies to fish exported to the global North,
in particular the European Union. Countries that have a lower
dependency on exports are unlikely to take sectoral action: Cam-
bodia, who has been red-carded by the EU, is an example of this.
3.3. Buyer supply chain requirement
Another significant international response to the labour con-
troversies has involved large-scale buyers working to ensure that
their seafood suppliers are not using trafficked, abused, or un-
derage workers. There are two basic approaches for doing so: one
is through third party certification, and the second is through di-
rect regulation of suppliers, often by working through agencies or
non-profit organisations who specialise in labour protection.
Our research in Thailand suggests that private third party cer-
tification for wild capture fisheries9 has very limited potential in
the near term future; indeed, certification was not mentioned
during any of our meetings with local civil society organisations.
This should not be surprising given that first, the main wild caught
fisheries certification scheme, that of the Marine Stewardship
Council (MSC), has not certified any fisheries in Thailand and is not
likely to have a presence there in the near future; and in any case,
it has excluded social standards from its programme.10 Friend of
the Sea's Sustainable Seafood Programme does include social
standards [55] and [56] including basic labour standards. Unlike
the MSC, Friend of the Sea is active in Thailand, having certified
one clam fishery, and 14 processing companies for Skipjack, Al-
bacore, and Yellowfin tuna and clams. Even so, its coverage of the
fisheries remains very limited.
The increasing direct involvement by buyers and their con-
tracted non-profit partners is having a more immediate impact in
Thailand. The international media reports linking seafood to ‘slave
labour’ in Thailand have prompted buyers to act forcibly to protect
9
In contrast to the wild caught fisheries, private and government sustainability
certification for farmed fish (aquaculture) are achieving widespread coverage in
Thailand, as the sector directly exports most of its product to international buyers
who are requiring these certifications. However, they do not currently include la-
bour standards with respect to the fisheries that produce the trash fish that com-
prises a key ingredient in the feed for Thailand’s shrimp farming sector [13]). A
potential exception may be future certification under the Aquaculture Stewardship
Council: its standards for feed are evolving and suppliers will need to conform to
approved certification schemes which could potentially include labour standards.
But as of the end of 2015, these developments to our knowledge were not relevant.
10
Although MSC has developed a separate policy that denies MSC certification
to companies prosecuted for forced labour in the past two years (since the Thai
labour scandal). See: “MSC Board Announces Clear Policy on Forced Labour” [54].
44 M. Marschke, P. Vandergeest / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 39–46
their reputations by seeking ways of ensuring that their supplies
cannot be linked to these labour practices [57]. We can mention
several notable initiatives. The first involves a group of major
buyers (including Marks and Spencer, Sainsbury's, Walmart, and
TESCO) who are working with the Thai-based NGO Issara on a pilot
project in which migrant workers can call in complaints about
working conditions on a twenty-four hour hotline (interviews).
The data collected from this hotline enables Issara staff to tie
worker complaints to specific fishing boats or onshore processing
facilities, and these complaints are then taken to the employers
and buyers, or to enforcement authorities where severe abuse is
reported, as in the case of the Kantang port, as described in a re-
cent EJF report11. This approach, they argue, is better than ‘naming
and shaming’, as it allows factories, fishing companies, and buyers
to work with Issara to systematically address the problems iden-
tified. They also argue that the approach is more effective than
simply auditing or inspecting boats, where government inspectors
are unlikely to identify violations of labour laws and regulations
(see also Marx and Wouters [59] on the problems with auditing for
labour standards in complex supply chains).
Issara is not the only organisation partnering with buyers to
create or identify supply chains not tainted by labour abuse. For
example, a group of seafood producers, major northern-based
retailers, government units, and NGOs (including Oxfam, EJF,
WWF, and others) set up the “Shrimp Sustainable Supply Chain
Task Force” in July 2014. The task force has undertaken a series of
actions with respect to traceability and vessel monitoring, Fish-
eries Improvement Projects, and lobbying for legal changes to
fisheries laws. The task force has also created a Feed Supply Chain
Traceability Validation Programme, and will being a six-month
review of this programme in early 2016.12
Because these programmes are just beginning, and because of
corporate confidentiality, we do not have a lot of specific in-
formation on what these programmes have achieved. However,
most observers in Thailand are optimistic that they are having or
will have a significant impact, although there are also criticisms of
some programmes for their exclusion of local civil society groups
who are working directly with migrant workers.13 Even so, these
programmes are also limited in important ways in terms of their
potential to address broader labour problems in the fisheries
sector in Thailand and internationally. These schemes potentially
exclude fisheries oriented to buyers that do not demand com-
pliance with labour standards, as well as fisheries in countries that
do not export a significant part of their seafood production. Finally,
like the enforcement approach of the CCCIF (above, Section 3.2),
buyer-driven programmes14 do not directly address the underlying
conditions that produce vulnerabilities, and the potential for
traffickers to benefit from stepping in to supply labour to fishing
boats as well as employers in other sectors.
3.4. Government action
The various limits to private sector or non-profit action that we
mention above indicates that a broader government response to
11
In its End-of-Pilot Review, covering the period January 2014-June 2015, Is-
sara noted that 3.8 million migrants received the hotline number and a total of
3237 calls were received (874% or 27% of which were related to the seafood in-
dustry) originating from 49 out of Thailand’s 76 provinces [58, p. 9].
12
For further details, see http://js.undercurrentnews.com/wp-content/up
loads/2015/05/SSSC-Task-Force_Overview-and-Progress_May-2015_Short_Master_
180515-11.pdf
13
See “Migrant workers body concerned at exclusion from Thai labour task
force” [60].
14
A caveat is that efforts like the task force mentioned above can work with or
lobby government to change the broader policies that facilitate labour abuse, al-
though the focus on shrimp will likely limit this impact.
labour abuse is crucial to addressing the conditions that facilitate
labour abuse in the fisheries sector. Currently, international pres-
sure from both importing governments and seafood buyers has
forced a Thai government response that is specific to the fisheries
sector. But it is unclear whether this government response is
sustainable over the long run given its reliance on the rather
draconian Article 44. Many observers in Thailand whom we in-
terviewed also expressed scepticism about the suitability of Navy
personnel for inspecting fishing boats for migrant labour relations
as well as for compliance with rules and regulations that are
normally under the mandate of other government agencies such
as the Department of Fisheries. It is also questionable whether an
enforcement approach can reach the very top of criminal networks
that organise trafficking or forced labour [15] and [61]. Notably,
the police officer in charge of Thailand's fish worker trafficking
investigation recently fled to Australia where he plans to seek
refugee status, saying he fears for his life.
Civil society groups in Thailand who work with migrants
identify the following conditions as contributing to worker vul-
nerability (interviews): a lack of documents legalising their work
in Thailand and/or various restrictions in the legal documents;
workplace isolation (such as on boats or farms); a lack of Thai
language ability necessary for obtaining assistance if a worker is in
an abusive situation; lack of education; and specific gender-based
vulnerabilities. Any long-term effort to address labour abuse in
fisheries needs to take account of these conditions: these are the
broader conditions of migration in Thailand, across many sectors.
As an example, Thai registration documents name the em-
ployer, to whom a worker is effectively tied if they want to remain
legally registered (see also [62, p. 21]): workers cannot legally
leave an employer unless they first prove the employer has abused
them (which is very difficult for the vast majority of workers with
no access to legal assistance). Activists argue that documents that
would allow migrant workers to find work without restrictions
would make a significant contribution to enabling them to avoid
the worst employers. A key obstacle to enacting these sorts of
policies, however, is that the government in Thailand sees the
presence of large numbers of migrant workers from neighbouring
countries (and from Myanmar in particular given historical ani-
mosities) as a security threat [62, p. 8]. This has been especially the
case since the military took power following the 2014 coup d’état.
For example, the police and other government agencies see the
legal ties to employers as a way of using employers to help control
‘foreign’ workers (interviews). The ILO considers this concern with
security as partly responsible for the highly complex and ex-
pensive registration process under MOUs with neighbouring
countries for managing migration, which has resulted in the vast
majority of migrant workers simply avoiding the process, creating
a very large ‘irregular’ migrant population in Thailand. Many have
registered temporarily in ‘one stop’ centres created by the military
government to try to address situation, but they often fail to
maintain registration due to expensive requirements to report
every three months.
Government policies towards migrant workers create many of
the vulnerabilities for migrant workers [42] and, opportunities for
traffickers or brokers. These vulnerabilities need to be addressed
through changes in migration management that enable migrants
to easily register, change employers, and reduces the role of bro-
kers. One can imagine other innovative programmes—for example,
making credit available from formal sources might enable workers
to free themselves from the restrictions that accompany informal
debt relations. Meaningful migrant worker reform needs to ac-
count for migrants' hopes and aspirations [42], and enable them to
act to obtain safe and well remunerated work.
 M. Marschke, P. Vandergeest / Marine Policy 68 (2016) 39–46
4. Moving forward
The current scandals about slave labour in the fisheries in
Thailand needs to be located in increasing reliance on margin-
alised migrant workers, not just in Thailand, but in industrialised
fisheries globally. Migrant workers are recruited in ways that often
render them highly vulnerable to labour abuses. This means that
addressing the conditions that create vulnerabilities of migrant
workers should be front and centre of any fisheries-sector policy
reform, with enforcement as a backup where broader policies fail
to reign in trafficking. While stronger enforcement against traf-
fickers and abusive employers who do not follow international or
national labour standards and laws are important, effective long-
term action depends on enabling migrant workers to improve
their working conditions. In other words, workers should be po-
sitioned as active agents looking for good working conditions, not
just as victims of slavery and trafficking.
International responses, including IUU enforcement and buyer
requirements concerning labour standards, can make a difference
for many fisheries workers, and it is possible that these improve-
ments could also positively impact fisheries workers not included
in the supply chains subject to these regulations. But we have
shown that each of these approaches are also limited with respect
to addressing the underlying conditions that produce labour
abuse. IUU is limited because labour relations are an add-on, and
because it can only be leveraged where fisheries are particularly
dependent on exports to the EU. Private sector action by corporate
buyers and NGO partners are similarly limited in that this ap-
proach will likely produce export-oriented enclaves with im-
proved labour relations, while the majority of the fisheries and fish
workers may not be affected—unless the private sector takes on
lobbying government for broader changes in migration
management.
This review of the migration literature highlights the com-
plexity of processes leading to labour abuse, and argues that there
cannot be one clear, easy fix. Improvements will take a concerted
effort that engages government migration policies, but also in-
volves those who can pressure government as well as demand
appropriate labour relations in their supply chains. The develop-
ment process for such policies also needs to involve local civil
society organisations who are most aware of the situation on the
ground, and ideally incorporate organised labour movements, al-
though hired workers are currently not organised in most Asian
countries. Key to any initiative is to connect definitions of inter-
national conventions and national laws to migrants’ own under-
standing of fairness and dignity [42, p. 236].
In concluding, it is worth noting that in Thailand and many
other countries, labour abuse and unfree labour is partly the re-
sults of overfishing and the need to compete in a global market for
seafood. Policies that reduce fishing effort by reducing the in-
dustrial fishing fleet (such as the IUU policy) would also indirectly
reduce pressure to treat workers as a variable cost that can be
squeezed. An indirect benefit would also be to enhance the still
vigorous small-scale fisheries sector, that provides more employ-
ment and local benefits than the large-scale fishing sector, and is
more oriented to domestic markets.
Acknowledgements
This paper has been written as part of the research programme
New Directions in Environmental Governance. We thank team
members Dr. Simon Bush, Dr. Derek Hall, Courtney Kehoe and
Yavanna Puts for their discussions and insights. Courtney Kehoe
provided invaluable assistance with data management, analysis,
45
and field research. In Thailand, we thank those individuals in civil
society organisations who generously took the time to meet with
one of the authors, to provide insights into fisheries and migrant
work that have been incorporated into this paper. We also thank
anonymous reviewers for their comments. The authors gratefully
acknowledge the financial support provided by Canada's Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC).
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