1

TOPIC/S: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE/ FISCAL AUTONOMY /JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. IN T HE MATTER OF: SAVE THE SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND FISCAL
AUTONOMY MOVEMENT S V. ABOLITION OF JUDICIARY DEVELOPMENT FUND AND
REDUCTION OF FISCAL AUTONOMY

FACTS:

This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Dev elopment Fund1 and replacing it with the
“Judiciary Support Fund.” Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be remitted to the
national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used. In the letter-petition, Mijares alleges
that he is “a Filipino citizen, and a concerned taxpayer. He filed this petition as part of his “continuing crusade to
defend and uphold the Constitution” because he believes in the rule of law. He is concerned about the threats
against the judiciary after this court promulgated Priority Dev elopment Assistance Fund case on November 19,
2013 and Disbursement Acceleration Program case on July 1, 2014. One of the proposed bills is: Ilocos Norte
Representative Rodolfo Fariñas filed House Bill No. 4690, which would require this court to remit its Judiciary
Dev elopment Fund collections to the national treasury.chanroblesv irtuallawlibrary

ISSUE: Can the court ex ercise Judicial Rev iew?

RULING:

No, the petition does not com ply with requirements of JUDICIAL REVIEW because:

There is no actual case or controversy . One of the requirements for this court to ex ercise its power of
judicial review is the ex istence of an actual controversy. This means that there must be “an ex isting case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory , lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion.” The court is not empowered to act on proposed bills.

Petitioner has no legal standing. Locus standi is defined as “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question.” Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is
passed into law. The exception on transcendental importance does not apply in this case. The events feared by
petitioner are contingent on the passing of the proposed bill in Congress. The threat of imminent injury is not y et
manifest since there is no guarantee that the bill will even be passed into law. There is no transcendental interest
in this case to justify the relaxation of technical rules.
 2

TOPICS: Judicial Rev iew/ Lis Mota of the Case

2. LIBERTY BROADCASTING V. ATLOCOM WIRELESS SY ST EM

FACTS:

Atlocom Wireless System, Inc. (Atlocom) is a grantee of a legislative franchise under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8605. 4 On October 8, 2003, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued an Order5 in NTC Case
No. 98-158 relative to the application of Atlocom for a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) As stated in the
above order, the PA shall be v alid for a period of eighteen (1 8) months, or until April 8, 2005. In a letter7 dated
April 5, 2004, Atlocom thru its counsel requested for "an ex tension of time of the allocation of the above-
enumerated frequencies and for the period for the construction and installation of the radio stations in the
condition no. 2 of the Order." Earlier, Atlocom filed an Application for Permit to Import 8 the necessary
equipment. Atlocom followed up its application for extension of PA through a letter 9 dated June 2, 2005
addressed to Deputy Commissioner Jorge V. Sarmiento. Subsequently , Atlocom filed a Motion for Ex tension of
Provisional Authority in NTC Case No. 98-158 on March 3, 2005.

ISSUE/S:

I. W/N LBNI Article XVI Section 11 (1 ) of the Constitution because it is not wholy owned by Filipino Citizens

II. W/N the court can pass on the Constitutional issues in cases involving procedural issues

RULING:

I. Unless properly raised and the very lis mota of the case, we do not pass upon constitutional issues. The
resolution of the constitutional issues must be absolutely necessary for the determination of the case.40 In the
spirit of deference to the acts of other constitutional departments and organs, issues before this Court should
address only the narrowest issues necessary to determine whether the reliefs prayed for can be granted. As in this
case, reliefs can be determined on procedural issues.

II. The main issue presented in this case is the validity of Atlocom's application for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the NTC. This issue can be resolved without passing upon the constitutionality of LBNI's franchise. The
resolution of the issue on LBNI's eligibility thus has no bearing on whether Atlocom has the right to be granted a
frequency allocation for Broadband Wireless Access by the NTC. The constitutional issue raised by the respondent
may be raised and resolved in proper cases when necessary in the future.
 3

TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW

3. SOUT HERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT

NET WORK, INC. V. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

FACTS:
This case involves the anticipatory petition of anti-terrorism law.

ISSUE: Can court exercise judicial review?

RULING:
NO, the petition does not comply with the requirements of judicial review.
A party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not
only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. Petitioners hav e not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy .  None of
them faces any charge under RA 937 2. Petitioners in G.R. No. 17 8890, allege that they have been subjected to
“close security surveillance by state security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons” and “v ehicles
with dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with military build.” .
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional
interest suffices to prov ide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. Unlike the
plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged prov isions of RA 937 2
forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activ ity that they seek to do.  No demonstrable threat has been
established, much less a real and ex isting one. Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and
supposedly being tagged as “communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution.  From
these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an adv isory opinion, which is not its function. 
A facial inv alidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional
litigation are rightly excepted. To be sure, the doctrine of v agueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control
or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby inv ade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the v agueness
doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will
accordingly refrain from that behavior, ev en though some of it is protected. A “facial” challenge is likewise
different from an “as-applied” challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant
facts affecting real litigants, a facial inv alidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its
very ex istence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activ ities
regulation. 
 4

TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW/LEGAL STANDING/SERVICE CONT RACT S-Article XII Section 2

4. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF T HE PROT ECTED SEASCAPE OF

TANON ST RAIT V. SECRETARY REY ES

FACTS:

The Government of the Philippines thru DOE entered into a Geophysical Survery and Ex ploration Contract 102
with JAPEX involv ing geological and geophy sical studies of the Tanon Strait. It involves surface geology, sample
analysis, reprocessing seismic and magnetic data, geophysical and satellite surveys, oil and gas sampling in an
agreement labeled as GSEC-1 02. GSEC-1 02 was converted to SC-46 for the ex ploration, development and
production of petroleum resources. A petition was filed in behalf of the “Resident Marine Mammals” to seek
protection of the marine species located in Tanon straits against the Department of Energy , DENR Regio VII and
Japan Petroleum Ex ploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) and Supplu Oilfield Serv ices Inc. (SOS).

ISSUES:

I. W/N the petitioners have legal standing

II. W/N SC-46 is null and void for violating Sec 2, Article XII of the 1 987 Constitution

RULING:

I. The Rules of Procedure for Env ironmental Cases allow for a citizen suit and permit any Filipino citizen, as a
steward of nature, to file an action before our courts for v iolations of our env ironmental laws; this collapses the
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. In the light
of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen as a steward of nature to bring a suit to enforce Env ironmental Laws.

II. The constitutional requirements for a valid serv ice contract for the large-scale exploration and development of
minerals, petroleum adn other mineral oils are the following:

1. crafted in accordance with the general law that will set the standard or uniform terms, conditions
2. the President shall be the signatory for the government
3. within 30 day s, the President shall report it to Congress
 5

TOPICS: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DAP/APPROPRIATION

5. ARAULLO V. AQUINO

FACTS:

Under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executiv e agency,
the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as
“savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed
to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court). Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the
GAA.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the DAP v iolates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).

II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

IV . Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operativ e Fact is applicable.

RULING:

I. No, the DAP did not v iolate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the
Ex ecutive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1 ), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no
additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned v ia the DAP.

II. No, there is no ex ecutive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to
refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which
did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was
the transfer of funds.

III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respectiv e offices”. Thus, no cross-
border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.

Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an ex isting project in
the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Ex ecutive, these projects are non-ex istent
insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these
projects may be legitimate, they are still non-ex istent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
 6

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition
of “sav ings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to
“savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of sav ings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at
the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the
middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the Ex ecutive particularly by the DBM.

IV . No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law,
such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue
collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.

V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operativ e Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to rev erse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause
more harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of
Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in
the appropriate tribunals (civ il, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
 7

TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PORK BARREL

TITLE: 6. BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

The term “pork barrel”, a political parlance of American-English origin, refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or Congressional insertions In 2005, the PDAF
introduced the program menu concept which is essentially a list of general programs and implementing agencies
from which a particular PDAF project may be subsequently chosen by the identify ing authority. This was retained
in the GAAs from 2006-2010. It was during the Arroyo administration when the formal participation of non-
governmental organizations in the implementation of PDAF projects was introduced. The PDAF articles from
2002-2010 were silent with respect to specific amounts for individual legislators. In 2011, the PDAF Article in the
GAA contained an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the V ice-
President. It also contained a provision on realignment of funds but with the qualification that it may be allowed
only once. The 2013 PDAF Article allowed LGUs to be identified as implementing agencies. Legislators were also
allowed identify programs/projects outside of his legislative district. Realignment of funds and release of funds
were required to be favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be. Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks. In 2004, several concerned citizens sought
the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of ev identiary basis regarding
illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks.

ISSUE/S:
I. Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy,
(b) the issues raised are matters of policy not subject to judicial rev iew, (c) petitioners have legal standing to sue,
(d) prev ious decisions of the Court bar the re-litigation of the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel system.
II. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for
v iolating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-delegability of legislativ e power, (c)
checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

RULING:

I. There is an actual and justiciable controversy There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in the cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties regarding the
constitutionality of the pork barrel sy stem The case is ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
laws allowing for their utilization are currently existing and operational and thereby posing an immediate or
threatened injury to petitioners. The case is not moot as the proposed reforms on the PDAF and the abolition
thereof does not actually terminate the controversy on the matter. The President does not have constitutional
authority to nullify or annul the legal ex istence of the PDAF. The “moot and academic principle” cannot stop the
Court from deciding the case considering that: (a) petitioners allege grave v iolation of the constitution, (b) the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system presents a situation of exceptional character and is a matter of
paramount public interest, (c) there is a practical need for a definitive ruling on the sy stem’s constitutionality to
guide the bench, the bar and the public, and (d) the preparation and passage of the national budget is an annual
occurrence.

Political Question Doctrine is inapplicable. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel Sy stem” is
not an issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of the government but rather a legal one which
the Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. The 1987 Constitution expanded the concept of
judicial power such that the Supreme Court has the power to determine whether there has been grav e abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality on the part of
the government.
 8

Petitioners have legal standing to Sue. Petitioners have legal standing by virtue of being taxpayers and
citizens of the Philippines. As tax payers, they are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds.
As citizens, the issues they hav e raised are matters of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest

II. The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislativ e Departments has been
violated.The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are
not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties
that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the ex ecutive department.Any prov ision
of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law v iolates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.

The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been v iolated The 2013 PDAF Article,
insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators, v iolates the principle of non-
delegability since said legislators are effectively allowed to indiv idually exercise the power of appropriation, which
– as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.

Checks and balances Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.7 9 Billion only appears as a collective
allocation limit since the said amount would be further div ided among individual legislators who would then
receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification budgeting sy stem
fosters the creation of a ―budget within a budget which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto.

The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of

checking itself or its m embers. The fact that indiv idual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the
implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing,
inv estigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.

The Congressional Pork Barrel v iolates constitutional principles on local autonomy The
Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy since it allows district
representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in utilizing public funds for local
development.
 9

TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW/ EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

7 . LOUIS “BARO K” C. BIRAOGO V. T HE PHILIPPINE T RUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

FACTS:
The Court here struck down Executive Order No. 1 (which created the Truth Commission) for v iolating the equal
protection clause. The clear mandate of the Truth Commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning
the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the
previous administration was plain, patent and manifest. According to the Court, the Arroyo administration is a
member of a class, that is, the class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include in the Commission’s mandate past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness,
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction.
Although Section 17 gives the President discretion to expand the scope of inv estigations of the Commission so as
to include acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they
would be covered in the future. This expanded mandate of the Commission will still depend on the discretion of
the President. If he decides not to include them, the prov ision would be meaningless.

ISSUES:
I. Can court exercise judicial review in this case?
II. Is the president v ested with power to create an office? Under what power?

RULING:

I. Y ES. Judicial rev iew requires the following: (1 ) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the v alidity of the act or issuance; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very subject matter of the case. As to standing, the Court here held that petitioners, who are
legislators, met the requirement as they are questioning the constitutionality of Ex ecutive Order No. 1 creating the
Truth Commission on the basis that the latter’s mandate constitutes usurpation of the power of the Congress.
However, with regard to the petitioner who is questioning EO No. 1 as a tax payer, the Court held that he had no
standing since he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury
attributable to the implementation of that EO. The Court took cognizance of the case as the matter involved was
of transcendental importance.
II. YES. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful execution of laws – in
this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the President’s powers as
the Chief Ex ecutive. It flows from the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article V II, Section 17
thereof. One of the recognized powers of the President is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from
the need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed or guide the President in
performing his duties relative to the execution and enforcement of laws. Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension,
the Truth Commission will not supplant the Ombudsman or the Department of Justice or erode their respective
powers. The investigative function of the Commission will complement those of the two offices. The
recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the ov erall task of the Commission to conduct a fact-finding
inv estigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits of the charges
against them, is certainly not a function given to the Commission
The creation of the Truth Commission does not fall within the President’s power to reorganize. Section 31 of the
Rev ised Administrativ e Code contemplates “reorganization” as limited by the following functional and structural
lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the President by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another; (2) transferring any function under the
Office of the President to any other department or agency or v ice versa; or (3) transferring any agency under the
 10

Office of the President to any other department or agency or v ice v ersa. This prov ision, according to the Court,
refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions. These refer to situations where a body or an office is already ex istent but a modification or alteration
thereof has to be effected.
The creation of the Commission is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely
different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Ex ecutive, while the latter finds
basis from either a v alid delegation from Congress, or the Ex ecutive’s inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
 11

TOPIC: Political question

8. Vinuya v . Executive Secretary , G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010

FACTS:
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, established for the purpose of prov iding aid to the v ictims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during WW II. According to them, during the WW II, the
Japanese army attacked v illages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the v illage.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and
OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. Howev er, officials of the Executive Department
declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for
compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan. Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in
the Treaty of Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system established by Japan, and the
brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They
allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is
possible; as such, in waiv ing the claims of Filipina comfort women and failing to espouse their com plaints against
Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against
humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine government’s acceptance of the “apologies” made by
Japan as well as funds from the Asian Women’s Fund (AWF) were contrary to international law.

ISSUE: WON the Ex ecutive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’ claims
for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:
NO. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan. Certain types of cases often have been found to present
political questions. One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that “the
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative—‘the political’—departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign
relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or inv alidate treaties
and executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its
nationals against a foreign gov ernment is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive
Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951 . The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to
question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Ex ecutive Department via the
instant petition for certiorari.
 12

TOPIC: Presidential Appointments

9. De Castro v . Judicial and Bar Council, 17 March 2010

FACTS:
These consolidated cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17 , 2010, or seven day s after the presidential election.

ISSUE: WON Section 1 5, Article VII applies to appointments to fill a v acancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the Judiciary.

RULING:
NO. Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a v acancy in the Supreme
Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary. Article VII is devoted to the Ex ecutive Department, and, among
others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is
dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in
Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have ex plicitly done so.
They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made ex plicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members
of the Supreme Court in Article V III itself, most likely in Section 4 (1 ), Article VIII. That such specification was not
done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two
months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or Acting President’s term does
not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.
 13

TOPIC: Executiv e Privilege

10. Neri v . Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, 25 March 2008

FACTS:
On April 21 , 2007 , the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with
Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S.$329,481,290 (approximately P1 6 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China. Respondent Committees initiated the investigation
by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was
among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on September 1 8, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007 .
However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he was “out of town” during the other dates. In the
September 1 8, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that
the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007 , the NEDA
acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan from the Chinese
Gov ernment. On September 26, 2007 , petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11 ) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million
in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on what they
discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In particular, he
refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

ISSUE: WON the 3 questions are considered executive privilege.

RULING:
Y ES. Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and
correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered ex ecutive priv ilege. Maintaining
the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy
decision making process. The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conv ersations and
correspondences, like the v alue which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-
making. Disclosure of conv ersations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper
her in the effectiv e discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her
conversations. The context in which executive priv ilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Given
the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot prov ide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the priv ilege is designed to
protect.
 14

TOPIC: Executiv e Privilege

11. Neri v . Senate Committee, 04 September 2008

FACTS:
On September 26, 2007 , petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11)
hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the “NBN Project”), a project awarded by the
Department of Transportation and Communications (“DOTC”) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(“ZTE”). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to
accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive priv ilege.” To be specific, petitioner refused to
answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she
directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it. Respondent Committees
persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear and testify once
more on November 20, 2007 . On Nov ember 15, 2007 , Ex ecutive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to
respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive
priv ilege.

ISSUE: WON there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by executive privilege.

RULING:
Y ES.
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a “quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
“Quintessential” is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of substance.
On the other hand, “nondelegable” means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another or, even if
delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor. The power to enter into an executive agreement is in
essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that
the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a
complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive
nature of the power.
B. The “doctrine of operational proximity” w as laid dow n precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive. In determining which test to use, the main
consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to officials who stand prox imate to the
President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their positions in the Executiv e’s
organizational structure.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in balancing
respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1 987
Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information. It is easy
to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the President’s communication with her advisor. The NBN
Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds
between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement— particularly
while official negotiations are ongoing—are matters which China will surely v iew with particular interest. There is
danger in such kind of ex posure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China. For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin
respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters
that are covered by executive priv ilege.
 15

TOPIC: Rule-m aking power of the Supreme Court

12. Petition for Recognition of Ex emption of GSIS from Payment of Docket Fees

FACTS:
The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal fees imposed on government-owned or controlled
corporations under Section 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court. The GSIS anchors its petition on
Section 39 of its charter, RA 8291 (The GSIS Act of 1 997 ). The GSIS then avers that courts still assess and collect
legal fees in actions and proceedings instituted by the GSIS notwithstanding its exemption from taxes,
assessments, fees, charges, or duties of all kinds under Section 39. For this reason, the GSIS urges this Court to
recognize its exemption from payment of legal fees. The OSG contends that there is nothing in Section 39 of RA
8291 that exempts the GSIS from fees imposed by the Court in connection with judicial proceedings. The
ex emption of the GSIS from “taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds” is necessarily confined to
those that do not involve pleading, practice and procedure. Rule 141 has been promulgated by the Court pursuant
to its exclusiv e rulemaking power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. Thus, it may not be
amended or repealed by Congress. The GSIS urges the Court to show deference to Congress by recognizing the
ex emption of the GSIS under Section 39 of RA 8291 from legal fees imposed under Rule 141. Effectively, the GSIS
wants this Court to recognize a power of Congress to repeal, amend or modify a rule of procedure promulgated by
the Court. However, the Constitution and jurisprudence do not sanction such v iew.

ISSUE: WON the Congress may exempt the GSIS from the pay ment of legal fees.

RULING:
NO. Rule 1 41 (on Legal Fees) of the Rules of Court was promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-
making powers under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees is a jurisdictional
requirement. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee that v ests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Since
the pay ment of legal fees is a v ital component of the rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, it cannot be v alidly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this
Court’s institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now the
Court’s exclusive domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, much less with the
Ex ecutive.
 16

TOPIC: Judicial Bar Council

13. Chavez v . Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, July 17 , 2012

FACTS:
This is a petition to question the composition of the Judicial and Bar Council. The issue at hand has been in
hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the
nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the
filing of this case. The issue has constantly been nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of
constitutional challenge. As the matter is of extreme urgency considering the constitutional deadline in the
process of selecting the nominees for the v acant seat of the Chief Justice, the Court cannot delay the resolution of
the issue a day longer. Relegating it in the meantime to the back burner is not an option.

ISSUES:
I. WON the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more than one (1 ) member of
Congress to sit in the JBC?
II. WON the practice of having two (2) representativ es from each house of Congress with one (1) vote each
sanctioned by the Constitution?

RULING:
I. NO. There should be only one (1 ) representative from Congress in the Judicial and Bar Council: The
unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1 ) was to have each ex-officio member as representing one co-equal
branch of government.

II. NO. By allowing both houses of Congress to have a representativ e in the JBC and by giving each representative
one (1) v ote in the Council, Congress, as compared to the other members of the JBC, is accorded greater and
unwarranted influence in the appointment of judges.
As to the effect of the Court’s finding that the current composition of the JBC is unconstitutional, it bears
mentioning that as a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is
not absolute. “The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the ex istence of a statute prior
to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot alway s be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The Court finds the exception applicable
in this case and holds that notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the
JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
 17

TOPIC: Doctrine of Separation of Powers

14. Cocofed v . Republic, G.R. Nos. 177 857-58, January 24, 2012

FACTS:
COCOFED proposes to constitute a trust fund to be known as the “Coconut Industry Trust Fund (CITF) for the
Benefit of the Coconut Farmers,” with respondent Republic, acting through the Philippine Coconut Authority
(PCA), as trustee. As proposed, the constitution of the CITF shall be subject to terms and conditions which, for the
most part, reiterate the features of SMC’s conv ersion offer, albeit specific reference is made to the shares of the 14
CIIF companies. Respondent Republic filed its Comment questioning COCOFED’s personality to seek the Court’s
approval of the desired conversion. Respondent Republic also disputes COCOFED’s right to impose and prescribe
terms and conditions on the proposed conversion, maintaining that the CIIF SMC common shares are sequestered
assets and are in custodia legis under Presidential Commission on Good Government’s (PCGG’s) administration.
It postulates that, owing to the sequestrated status of the said common shares, only PCGG has the authority to
approve the proposed conversion and seek the necessary Court approval.

ISSUE: WON to proceed with the conversion or defer action thereon until final adjudication of the issue of
ownership over the sequestered shares properly pertains to the executive branch.

RULING:
Y ES. The decision on whether to proceed with the conversion or defer action thereon until final adjudication of
the issue of ownership over the sequestered shares properly pertains to the ex ecutive branch, represented by the
PCGG. Just as it cannot look into the wisdom behind the enactment of a law, the Court cannot question the
wisdom and reasons behind the decision of the executive branch to ask for the conversion of the common shares
to preferred shares. Else, the Court would be trenching on the well-settled doctrine of separation of powers. The
cardinal postulate ex plains that the three branches must discharge their respective functions within the limits of
authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the
President, nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature
is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the judiciary to their
interpretation and application to cases and controversies.
 18

Topic: Ad Interim Appointment/Moot and Academic Principle

15. FUNA vs. VILLAR

Facts:
On February 15, 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) appointed Guillermo N.
Carague (Carague) as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of seven (7 ) years, pursuant to the
1987 Constitution. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. Meanwhile,
on February 7 , 2004, President Macapagal-Arroyo appointed Reynaldo A. V illar (Villar) as the third member of
the COA for a term of seven (7 ) years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Following the retirement of
Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of V illar as COA Commissioner, V illar was designated as
Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, V illar was
nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as ex pressly indicated in the
appointment papers, until the ex piration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2,
2011. Challenged in this recourse, V illar, in an obv ious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship,
insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7 ) years which is yet to lapse.
He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned
from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.

Meanwhile, Evelyn R. San Buenaventura (San Buenav entura) was appointed as COA Commissioner to serve the
unexpired term of V illar as Commissioner or up to February 2, 2011.Before the Court could resolve this petition,
V illar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to
step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar v acated his position
when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This
development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic. A case is
considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale,or when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy owing to the onset of supervening events, so that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue
would be of no practical v alue or use in such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would
be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition. As a general rule, it is not
within our charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However, in Dav id v. Macapagal-Arroyo, We
acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus:The “moot and academic” principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases,
otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved, third, when constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman
Tan and the resignation of V illar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a
moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule.

Issue: Whether or not Villar’s appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served
for four (4) y ears of his seven (7 ) y ear term as COA commissioner, is v alid in light of the term limitations imposed
under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

Ruling:
First, the discussion on legal standing.
To have legal standing, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a “direct injury” as a result of a
government action, or have a “material interest” in the issue affected by the challenged official act However, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has accorded certain individuals,
 19

not otherwise directly injured, or with material interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a
constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake.The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural
technicality in relation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involv ing a subject of transcendental import, has
waiv ed, or relax ed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, tax payers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act. In Dav id, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called “non-
traditional suitors” may be extended standing to sue, thusly :

1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obv ious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early ; and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as
legislators.

Unto the main issue.

In a mandatory tone, the aforecited constitutional provision decrees that the appointment of a COA member shall
be for a fixed 7 -year term if the v acancy results from the expiration of the term of the predecessor. We reproduce
in its pertinent part the prov ision referred to: (2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed
x x x for a term of seven years without reappointment. x x x Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. x x x

Accordingly, the promotional appointment as COA Chairman of V illar for a stated fixed term of less than seven (7 )
years is void for violating a clear, but mandatory constitutional prescription. There can be no denying that the
vacancy in the position of COA chairman when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the
ex piration of his 7 -year term. Hence, the appointment to the vacancy thus created ought to have been one for
seven (7 ) years in line with the verbal legis approach of interpreting the Constitution.
The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven
terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall alway s be for a fix ed term of sev en (7 ) y ears; an appointment
for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional.

The appointing authority cannot v alidly shorten the full term of seven (7 ) years in case of the expiration of the
term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational sy stem prescribed by the Constitution.

Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall
only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the
unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D). Any
member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
 20

TOPIC: Administrativ e Issuances (quasi-legislative power of administrativ e bodies)

16. Gawad v s. Abad

FACTS:
On March 26, 1992, Republic Act (RA) No. 7 305, otherwise known as The Magna Carta of Public Health Workers
was signed into law in order to promote the social and economic well-being of health workers, their liv ing and
working conditions and terms of employment, to develop their skills and capabilities to be better equipped to
deliver health projects and programs, and to encourage those with proper qualifications and excellent abilities to
join and remain in government service.
On September 3, 2012, respondents DBM and CSC issued one of the two assailed issuances, DBM-CSC Joint
Circular No. 1, Series of 2012, to prescribe the rules on the grant of Step Increments due to meritorious
performance and Step Increment due to length of serv ice.7 Specifically, it prov ided that "an official or employee
authorized to be granted Longev ity Pay under an ex isting law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment due to
length of serv ice." Shortly thereafter, on Nov ember29, 2012, respondents DBM and DOH then circulated the other
assailed issuance, DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1, Series of 2012.
In a letter dated January 23, 2013 addressed to respondents Secretary of Budget and Management and Secretary
of Health, petitioners expressed their opposition to the Joint Circular cited above on the ground that the same
diminishes the benefits granted by the Magna Carta to PHWs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the joint circulars regulating the salaries and benefits relied upon by public health
workers were tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

RULING:
Judicial functions involve the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and
then undertaking to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial
functions apply to the actions and discretion of public administrative officers or bodies required to investigate
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action, in their exercise of
discretion of a judicial nature. Ministerial functions are those which an officer or tribunal performs in the context
of a giv en set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard to the ex ercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done.
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may ex ercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there be a law
that gives rise to some specific rights under which adv erse claims are made, and the controversy ensuing
therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with authority to determine the law and
adjudicate the respectiv e rights of the contending parties. In this case, respondents did not act in any judicial,
quasi-judicial, or ministerial capacity in their issuance of the assailed joint circulars.
A rev iew of RA No. 7 305 and its Revised IRR reveals that the law does not similarly impose such condition on the
grant of longev ity pay to PHWs in the government service. As such, the DBM-CSC Joint Circular effectively
created a new imposition which was not otherwise stipulated in the law it sought to interpret. Consequently, the
same exception granted to the DBM-DOH Joint Circular cannot be applied to the DBM-CSC Joint Circular insofar
as the requirements on publication and submission with the UP Law Center - ONAR are concerned. Thus, while it
was well within the authority of the respondents to issue rules regulating the grant of step increments as prov ided
by RA No. 67 58, otherwise known as the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1 989, which pertinently .
The DBM-DOH Joint Circular, insofar as it lowers the hazard pay at rates below the minimum prescribed by
Section 21 of RA No. 7 305 and Section 7 .1.5 (a) of its Rev ised IRR, is declared INVALID. The DBM-CSC Joint
Circular, insofar as it provides that an official or employee authorized to be granted Longev ity Pay under an
ex isting law is not eligible for the grant of Step Increment Due to Length of Serv ice, is declared
UNENFORCEABLE. The v alidity, however, of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular as to the qualification of actual
ex posure to danger for the PHW's entitlement to hazard pay, the rates of P50 and P25 subsistence allowance, and
the entitlement to longevity pay on the basis of the PHW' s status in the plantilla of regular positions, is UPHELD.
 21

TOPIC: Bill of Rights-Due Process of Law, Reorganizing Power of the President

17 . Pichay vs Office of the Executiv e Secretary For Legal Affairs

Investigative And Adjudicatory Division

FACTS:
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative
cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit
its report and recommendations to the President.
On Nov ember 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Ex ecutive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing
the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
(ODESLA), more particularly to its newly -established Investigative and Adjudicatory Div ision (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V . Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidav it for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the
Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) among others.
Alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law,
petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ex ecutive Order No. 1 3 is unconstitutional.

RULING:
No. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Ex ecutive Department under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of Ex ecutive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1 987 , vests in
the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency.
The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his
office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
Ex ecutive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped
and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the
Office of the President is the command post of the President. Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of
its functions to a div ision specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogativ e of the President
under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.
However, the President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1 ) of
EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging
units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,
the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of
the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and v ice versa. A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate
authority but must also be pursued in good faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is
done for purposes of economy and efficiency.
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from the well
settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same
authority on which the power to appoint is vested. Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential
appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct
in office. Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA.
 22

Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an
inv estigation into matters that require his informed decision.
TOPIC: Rem oval Power of the Ombudsman

18. Office of the Ombudsman vs. Nellie R. Apolonio

FACTS:
Dr. Apolonio served as the Executive Officer of the National Book Dev elopment Board (NBDB) from 1996 to
August 26, 2002. As NBDB’s ex ecutive officer, Dr. Apolonio superv ised NBDB’s Secretariat and managed its day-
to-day affairs.
In December 2000, NBDB’s Gov erning Board approved the conduct of a Team Building Seminar Workshop for its
officers and employees.
On March 29, 1995, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued National Budget Circular No. 442
prescribing a P900.00 limit for each participant per day in any seminar/workshop/conference undertaken by any
government agency. Prior to the conduct of the workshop, some of the employees/participants approached Dr.
Apolonio to ask whether a part of their allowance, instead of spending the entire amount on the seminar, could be
giv en to them as cash. Dr. Apolonio consulted Rogelio Montealto, then Finance and Administrative Chief of
NBDB, about the proposal and the possible legal repercussions of the proposal. Concluding the proposal to be
legally sound and in the spirit of the y uletide season, Dr. Apolonio approved the request. Thus, after the end of the
workshop, SM gift cheques were distributed to the participants in lieu of a portion of their approved allowance.
On August 24, 2001, Nicasio I. Marte, an NBDB Consultant, filed a complaint against Dr. Apolonio and Mr.
Montealto before the Ombudsman. The complaint alleged that Dr. Apolonio and Mr. Montealto committed grave
misconduct, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for the unauthorized purchase
and disbursement of the gift cheques. Mr. Marte alleged that the NBDB’s Gov erning Board never authorized the
disbursement of the funds for the purchase of the gift cheques and that the purchases were never stated in Dr.
Apolonio’s liquidation report.
On August 21 , 2002, the Acting Ombudsman approved the findings of imposing the penalty of remov al against Dr.
Apolonio. The Acting Ombudsman likewise denied Dr. Apolonio’s motion for reconsideration on September 1 8,
2002. This prompted Dr. Apolonio to file a petition for rev iew on certiorari in the CA.
The CA granted the petition and imposed a penalty of suspension instead. Hence this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman have the power to directly impose the penalty of removal from office
against public officials.

RULING:
The Ombudsman has the power to directly impose administrative penalties, including removal from office. The
Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution
of a public officer or employee, in the ex ercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The challenge to the
Ombudsman’s power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only grants it
recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court. It is apparent that under RA 677 0, the
lawmakers intended to prov ide the Office of the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can
effectively carry out its mandate as protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and
employees. The Office was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. It was
giv en disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress and the
Judiciary ). Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an inv estigation when the case
so warrants. Dr. Apolonio is guilty of simple misconduct. Although her actions do not amount to technical
malversation, she did violate Section 89 of PD 1 445 when she approved the cash advance that was not authorized
 23

by the NBDB’s Governing Board. Further, since the approval of the cash advance was an act done pursuant to her
functions as executive officer, she is not merely guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the serv ice.

TOPIC: Doctrine of exhaustion of adm inistrative remedies

19. Alejandro v s. Office of the Om budsm an Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau

FACTS:
On May 4, 2000, the Head of the Non-Revenue Water Reduction Department of the Manila Water Serv ices, Inc.
(MWSI) received a report from an Inspectorate and Special Projects team that the Mico Car Wash (MICO), owned
by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate its car-wash
business in Binondo, Manila.
On May 10, 2000, the MWSI, in coordination with the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), conducted an anti-water pilferage operation against MICO.
During the anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICO's car-wash boy s indeed had been
illegally getting water from an MWSI fire hy drant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boy s and confiscated the
containers used in getting water. At this point, the petitioner, Alfredo's father and the Barangay Chairman or
punong barangay interfered with the PNP-CIDG's operation by ordering several men to unload the confiscated
containers. This interv ention caused further commotion and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-
wash boys to escape.
On August 5, 2003, the respondent Office of the Ombudsman Fact- Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after
conducting its initial investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative
complaint against the petitioner for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his
unwarranted intervention.
In its decision dated August 20, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the serv ice.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman denied in its order of
November 2, 2004.
The petitioner appealed to the CA via a petition for rev iew under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. The CA dismissed
the petition for premature filing. The CA ruled that the petitioner failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies
because he did not appeal the Deputy Ombudsman’s decision to the Ombudsman.

ISSUE:
Whether The Principle Of Ex haustion Of Administrative Remedies Requires A Request For Reconsideration From
The Office Of The Deputy Ombudsman To The Ombudsman For The Purpose Of A Rule 43 Rev iew.

RULING:
The SC disagreed with the CA's application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which states
that when there is "a procedure for administrative review, x x x appeal, or reconsideration, the courts x x x will not
entertain a case unless the av ailable administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.
Administrative Order No. 07 did not provide for another appeal from the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman to
the Ombudsman. It simply requires that a motion for reconsideration or a petition for certiorari may be filed in all
other cases where the penalty imposed is not one involv ing public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more
than one (1 ) month, or a fine equiv alent to one (1 ) month salary. This post-judgment remedy is merely an
opportunity for the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, or the Office of the Ombudsman, to correct itself in certain
cases. To our mind, the petitioner has fully exhausted all administrative remedies when he filed his motion for
 24

reconsideration on the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman. There is no further need to review the case at the
administrative level since the Deputy Ombudsman has already acted on the case and he was acting for and in
behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution. It is tasked to exercise disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The
Ombudsman Act and the Local Government Code both prov ide for the procedure to discipline elective officials,
the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in cases decided by this Court.
The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupy ing positions corresponding to salary
grade 27 and higher. Consequently , as we held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez, any act or omission of a
public officer or employee occupy ing a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies.
In administrative cases involv ing the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body
where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction. In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay
Chairman, occupy ing a position corresponding to salary grade 1 4.26 Under RA 7 160, the sangguniang panlungsod
or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official.
 25

TOPIC: Powers of the Ombudsm an

20. Om budsm an v s Quimbo

FACTS:
In the Motor Pool Div ision of the Provincial Engineering Department, Catbalogan, Samar, Quimbo asked Gilda D.
Daradal to massage his forehead and nape. In the course thereof, he said, "You had been ly ing to me you have
already seen my manhood. When shall I have to see yours?" She was appalled as the utterance was made in the
presence of her co-employees. She added that by v irtue of a Memorandum, dated August 6, 1 996, Quimbo ordered
her detail to the Civ il Service Commission in Catbalogan, Samar, to perform the tasks of a male utility personnel.
Her name was removed from the payroll of the personnel of the Provincial Engineering Office from August 1 6-31,
1996 because of her refusal to submit to his sexual adv ances.
On December 9, 1998, after due proceedings, the Ombudsman-V isayas issued a resolution dismissing the case of
sex ual harassment against Quimbo but finding him guilty of oppression. The Ombudsman-Visayas imposed the
penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay.
Aggrieved, Quimbo elevated the case before the CA by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court.
On January 21 , 2005, the CA rev ersed the December 9, 1998 Resolution and the April 15, 1999 Order of the
Ombudsman-Visayas. In reversing the said ruling, the CA ratiocinated:
The Office of the Ombudsman has no power to directly impose sanctions against government officials and
employees who are subject of its investigation as its power is only limited to recommend the appropriate sanctions
but not directly to impose the same.
The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in declaring that the Ombudsman lacks the power to
directly impose administrative penalties against erring public officials or employees.

RULING:
Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority. The
challenge to the Ombudsman’s power to impose these penalties, on the allegation that the Constitution only
grants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court.
The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1 987 Constitution. The Ombudsman and
his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner
against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdiv ision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations. Foremost among its powers is the authority to
inv estigate and prosecute cases involv ing public officers and employees.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing disquisition, the CA, in the present case, gravely erred in disallowing the
Ombudsman’s motion to intervene. It failed to consider the essence of the Ombudsman’s constitutionally and
statutorily conferred powers establishing its clear legal interest in ensuring that its directive be implemented.
 26

TOPIC: Nepotism

21. Civ il Serv ice Commission vs Cortes

FACTS:
On February 19, 2008 the Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued Resolution A
2008-19 approv ing the appointment to the position of Information Officer V (IO V ) of respondent Maricelle M.
Cortes. Commissioner Eligio P. Mallari, father of respondent Cortes, abstained from voting and requested the
CHR to render an opinion on the legality of the respondent's appointment.
In a Memorandum dated March 31 , 2008, CHR Legal Div ision Chief Atty. Efren Ephraim G. Lamorena rendered
an opinion that respondent Cortes' appointment is not covered by the rule on nepotism because the appointing
authority, the Commission En Banc, has a personality distinct and separate from its members. CHR Chairperson
Purificacion C. Valera Quisumbing, however, sent respondent a letter on the same day instructing her not to
assume her position because her appointment is not yet complete.
On April 9, 2008 Velda E. Cornelio, Director II of the CSC-NCR Field Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing
that the appointment of respondent Cortes is not v alid because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under Section
9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-NCR,
Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with respect to respondent Cortes despite being a
mere member of the Commission En Banc.
Appeal was timely made before the CA but the petition was granted. Likewise was the Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this recourse.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR
is not covered by the prohibition against nepotism.

RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in fav or of a relative within
the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1 ) appointing authority ; (2)
recommending authority ; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate superv ision over
the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first
degree of consanguinity , as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.
By way of exception, the following shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1 ) persons employed in a confidential
capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the present
case, however, the appointment of respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the ex emptions
prov ided by law.
It is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments made by a group of
indiv iduals acting as a body.1 âwphi1 What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This principle is
elementary and does not need ex planation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done
indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes' appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En Banc, where his
father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the
nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still ex ists. His
mere presence during the deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast
doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc.
 27

TOPIC: Back Salaries of Governm ent Employees

22. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v . Cruz

FACTS:
The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District (CMWD), was charged with grave misconduct
and dishonesty by CMWD General Manager Nicasio Reyes. He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and damaging
statement against GM Reyes and the rest of CMWD Board of Directors which stemmed from the respondent's act
of claiming overtime pay despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized daily time record for three
working days. GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 1 5 day s. Before the expiration of his
preventive suspension, however, GM Rey es, with the approv al of the Board, found the respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service. The CSC however reversed the ruling and stated
that the respondent should not be held liable for grave misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is entitled to back salaries after the CSC ordered his reinstatement to his former
position.

RULING:
NO. The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a gov ernment employee to back salaries if he
was not exonerated of the charge against him. If the exoneration of the employee is relative (as distinguished from
complete exoneration), an inquiry into the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed
must be made. If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of a lesser gravity than the
offense charged, the employee cannot be considered exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the
lesser penalty remains the same.
 28

TOPIC: Midnight Appointments

23. VELICARIA -GERAFIL v . OFFICE OF T HE PRESIDENT

FACTS:
This case consists of consolidated petitions questioning the constitutionality of EO 2 for being inconsistent with
Section 15, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800 appointments to various positions in
several government offices. The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
reads: two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President
or acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Thus, for purposes of the
2010 elections, 10 March 2010 was the cut-off date for v alid appointments and the nex t day, 11 March 2010, was
the start of the ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an
exception to the ban on midnight appointments only “temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety .” None of the petitioners claim
that their appointments fall under this exception. On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III (President
Aquino) took his oath of office as President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30 July 2010, President Aquino
issued EO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by President Macapagal-Arroyo which
v iolated the constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners’ appointments v iolate Section 15, Article V II of the 1 987 Constitution and whether
EO 2 is constitutional.

RULING:
Y ES. All of petitioners’ appointments are midnight appointments and are void for v iolation of Section 15, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution, thus EO 2 is constitutional. Based on prev ailing jurisprudence, appointment to a
government post is a process that takes several steps to complete. Any v alid appointment, including one made
under the exception prov ided in Section 15, Article VII of the 1 987 Constitution, must consist of the President
signing an appointee’s appointment paper to a v acant office, the official transmittal of the appointment paper
(preferably through the MRO), receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee, and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee ev idenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office. The
following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which should be understood as both complete
and effective) appointment: (1 ) authority to appoint and ev idence of the exercise of the authority ; (2) transmittal
of the appointment paper and ev idence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and
(4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should alw ays apply,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. These
steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single process. There is no valid
appointment if the process lacks even one step. And, unlike the dissent’s proposal, there is no need to further
distinguish between an effective and an ineffective appointment when an appointment is v alid. The President
ex ercises only one kind of appointing power. There is no need to differentiate the exercise of the President’s
appointing power outside, just before, or during the appointment ban. The Constitution allows the President to
ex ercise the power of appointment during the period not covered by the appointment ban, and disallows (subject
to an exception) the President from exercising the power of appointment during the period covered by the
appointment ban. The concurrence of all steps in the appointment process is admittedly required for
appointments outside the appointment ban. There is no justification whatsoever to remove acceptance as a
requirement in the appointment process for appointments just before the start of the appointment ban, or during
the appointment ban in appointments falling within the exception. The existence of the appointment ban makes
no difference in the power of the President to appoint; it is still the same power to appoint. In fact, considering the
purpose of the appointment ban, the concurrence of all steps in the appointment process must be strictly applied
on appointments made just before or during the appointment ban.
 29

TOPIC: Re-appointment of Commissioners

24. FUNA v . CHAIRMAN, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISION

FACTS:
On February 15, 2001 , Pres Arroyo appointed Carague as Chairman of the COA for a term of 7 years. Carague’s
term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. On February 7 , 2004, Villar was appointed
as the third member of the COA for a term of 7 years starting February 2, 2004 until February 2, 2011. Following
the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth y ear of V illar as COA Commissioner, V illar
was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 1 4, 2008. Subsequently, on April 1 8,
2008, V illar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the
appointment papers, until the ex piration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2,
2011.

ISSUE: Whether or not a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to Chairman is
constitutionally permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of
the Constitution.

RULING:
Y ES. A commissioner who resigns after serv ing in the Commission for less than seven y ears is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not cov ered by the ban on reappointment, prov ided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unex pired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed 7 years and
prov ided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment. Reappointment found in Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX (D) means a movement to one and the same
office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving
a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment
and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
 30

TOPICS: Public Office; Multiple Offfice

25. FUNA v . EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA

FACTS:

On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). On September 1,
2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator V icente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was designated as
Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the
prohibition on the President, V ice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to
hold any other office or employment.

On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA
and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009. Petitioner argues that Bautista’s
concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in v iolation of Section 13, Article V II of the
1987 Constitution. On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not
present in this case. In fact, there no longer ex ists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in v iew of the
appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the
relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition
moot and academic. Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is
likewise moot and academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of respondent v iolated the constitutional proscription against dual or
multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants

RULING:

Y ES. The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 1 3, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution was held inapplicable to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein. The reason
is that these posts do not comprise “any other office” within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition
but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. Apart from their bare assertion
that respondent Bautista did not receive any compensation when she was OIC of MARINA, respondents failed to
demonstrate clearly that her designation as such OIC was in an ex-officio capacity as required by the primary
functions of her office as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.

However, it must be stressed that while the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the
words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both appointment and designation
because the appointee or designate performs the duties and functions of the office. The 1 987 Constitution in
prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to
the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not ev en found in Section 13, Article VII nor in
Section 7 , paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in
possession and administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties
of the office.
 31

The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the
Ex ecutive Department officials, specifically the President, V ice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants. Civ il Liberties Union traced the history of the times and the conditions under which the
Constitution was framed, and construed the Constitution consistent with the object sought to be accomplished by
adoption of such provision, and the evils sought to be avoided or remedied. We recalled the practice, during the
Marcos regime, of designating members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants as members of the governing
bodies or boards of v arious government agencies and instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. This practice of holding multiple offices or positions in the government led to abuses by
unscrupulous public officials, who took advantage of this scheme for purposes of self-enrichment. The blatant
betrayal of public trust evolved into one of the serious causes of discontent with the Marcos regime. It was
therefore quite inevitable and in consonance with the overwhelming sentiment of the people that the 1986
Constitutional Commission would draft into the proposed Constitution the provisions under consideration, which
were envisioned to remedy, if not correct, the ev ils that flow from the holding of multiple governmental offices and
employment.
 32

TOPIC: Payment of per diems of ex officio members

26. PHILIPPINE ECCONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY v . COA

FACTS:
The PEZA Board of Directors is composed of 13 members which include the Undersecretaries of the Department
of Finance, the Department of Labor and Employment, the Department of the Interior and Local Gov ernment, the
Department of Env ironment and Natural Resources, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Public
Works and Highway s, the Department of Science and Technology and the Department of Energy. Said
Undersecretaries serve in ex officio capacity and were granted per diems by PEZA for every attendance in a board
meeting. On September 13, 2007 , the PEZA Auditor Corazon V. Españo issued Notice of Disallowance Nos. 2006-
001 -101 (02-06) to 2006-021 -101 (01 -03) on the payments of per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board
for the period 2001-2006

ISSUE: Does the PEZA have legal basis in granting per diems to the ex officio members of its Board? And if there
is no legal basis, was there good faith in PEZA’s grant and the ex officio members’ receipt of the per diems?

RULING:
NO. The lack of legal basis to grant per diems to ex officio members of the PEZA Board, including their
representatives, has already been in the case of Bitonio, Jr. where we held that the amendatory law, purposely
deleted the last paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7 916 that authorized the grant of per diems to PEZA Board
members as it was in conflict with the proscription laid down in the 1 987 Constitution. Neither can this Court give
credence to PEZA’s claim of good faith. In common usage, the term “good faith” is ordinarily used to describe that
state of mind denoting “honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put
the holder upon inquiry ; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another,
ev en through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts
which render transaction unconscientious.” Definitely, PEZA cannot claim that it was not aware of circumstances
pointing to the possible illegality of the disbursements of per diems to the ex officio members of the Board. In
Civ il Liberties Union, this Court clarified the prohibition under Section 1 3, Article VII of the Constitution and
emphasized that a public official holding an ex officio position as provided by law has no right to receive
additional compensation for the ex officio position.
 33

TOPIC: Access to information on m atters of Public Concern

27 . (NONE) 28. IDEALS, Inc. V. PSALMS

FACTS:
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management (PSALM) is a Gov ernment Owned and Controlled Corporation
created by virtue of the EPIRA law. Said law mandated PSALM to manage priv atization of NPC. When PSALM
commenced the privatization, an inv itation to bid was published and the highest bidder K-Water was identified.
The sale to K-Water was sought to be enjoined by petitioners who contend that PSALM gravely abused its
discretion when, in the conduct of the bidding it violated the people’s right to information without hav ing
previously released to the public critical information about the sale.

ISSUE:
I. Can the bid documents, etc. used in the on-going negotiation for the privatization and sale of Angat hydro plant
be accessed v ia the right to information?
II. Is the duty to disclose information the same with the duty to permit access to information on matters of public
concern?

RULING:
I. Yes. The court reiterated that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like priv ileged information, military and diplomatic
secrets and similar matters affecting national security and public order.

II. No. Unlike the disclosure of information which is mandatory under the Constitution, the other aspect of the
people’s right to know requires a demand or request for one to gain access to documents and paper of the
particular agency. Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions involv ing public interest, while the duty
to allow access has a broader scope of information which embraces not only transactions involv ing public interest,
but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of the government agency.
 34

TOPIC: Limitations on Foreign Participation

29. NARRA NICKEL MINING V REDMONT

FACTS:
Redmont is a domestic corporation interested in the mining and exploration of some areas of Palawan. Upon
learning that those areas were already covered by MPSA applications of three other allegedly Filipino
corporations: Narra, Tesoro, and McArthur, it filed a petition before the Panel of Arbitrators of the DENR seeking
to deny their permits on the ground that these corporations are in reality foreign-owned. MBMI, a 100% Canadian
Corporation owns 40% of PLMC which owns 5,997 shares of Narra; 40% of MMC which owns 5,997 shares of
McArthur; and 40% of SLMC which owns 5,997 shares of Tesoro.
Aside from MPSA these three corporations also applied for FTAA with the Office of the President. In their answer,
they countered that the liberal control test must be used in determining the nationality of a corporation and that
the nationality is no longer in question because of their subsequent application for FTAA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case has become moot because of the conversion of MPSA to FTAA

RULING:
NO. There are certain exceptions to mootness principle and the mere raising of an issue of mootness will not deter
the courts from try ing a case when there is a v alid reason to do so.
The Supreme Court noted that a grave v iolation of the Constitution is being committed by a foreign corporation
through a myriad of corporate layering under different, allegedly, Filipino corporations. The intricate corporate
lay ering utilized by Canadian company, MBMI is of exceptional character and involves paramount public interest
since it undeniably affects the ex ploitation of our country ’s natural resources. The corresponding actions of
petitioners during the lifetime and existence of the instant case raise questions as to the principles which should
be applied in cases with similar issues. No definite ruling on such principle has been pronounced by the court;
hence, the disposition of the issues or errors will serve as a guide to the bench, the bar, and the public. Finally, the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review since the Canadian company MBMI can keep on utilizing dummy
Filipino corporations through various schemes of corporate layering and conversion of applications to skirt the
constitutional prohibition against foreign mining in Philippine Soil.
 35

TOPIC: Limitations on Foreign Participation in Public Utilities

30. GAMBOA V TEVES

FACTS:
This is a petition to nullify the sale of shares of stock of Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation
(PTIC) by the government of the Republic of the Philippines, acting through the Inter-Agency Priv atization
Council (IPC), to Metro Pacific Assets Holdings, Inc. (MPAH), an affiliate of First Pacific Company Limited (First
Pacific), a Hong Kong-based investment management and holding company and a shareholder of the Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).
The petitioner questioned the sale on the ground that it also involved an indirect sale of 12 million shares (or
about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares) of PLDT owned by PTIC to First Pacific. With the this sale,
First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the
total common shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81 .47 %. This, according to the petitioner, v iolates
Section 11, Article XII of the 1 987 Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public
utility to not more than 40%.

ISSUE: Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refer to the total common shares
only, or to the total outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and non-voting preferred shares) of
PLDT, a public utility ?

RULING:
[The Court partly granted the petition and held that the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors of a public utility, or in the
instant case, to the total common shares of PLDT.]
Section 11, Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1 987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of
public utilities. The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the
total outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares [of PLDT].
Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or management of the
corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of directors because it is the board of directors that
controls or manages the corporation. Mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino-owned
“capital” required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock,
coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the constitutional
mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is “considered as non-Philippine national[s].”
To construe broadly the term “capital” as the total outstanding capital stock, including both common and non-
voting preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of the Constitution that the “State shall develop
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” A broad definition
unjustifiably disregards who owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily equates to control of the
public utility. It is the clear language of the Constitution: to place the control of public utilities in the hands of
Filipinos.
Thus, respondent Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED to apply this definition
of the term “capital” in determining the ex tent of allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company, and if there is a v iolation of Section 11 , Article XII of the Constitution, to impose
the appropriate sanctions under the law.
 36

TOPIC: Exceptions to State’s Immunity from Suit and Exhaustion of Administrative Rem edies

31. VIGILAR V AQUINO

FACTS:

Petitioner Angelito M. Twaño, then Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-District Engineer of the (DPWH) 2nd Engineering
District of Pampanga sent an Invitation to Bid to respondent Arnulfo D. Aquino, the owner of A.D. Aquino
Construction and Supplies. The bidding was for the construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the Porac River.
The project was awarded to respondent and a “Contract of Agreement” was executed.

The project was duly completed and a Certificated of Project Completion was thereafter issued. However, Aquino
claimed that PhP1 ,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners refused to pay the amount. He thus filed a
Complaint for the collection of sum of money with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga.

Petitioners, for their part, set up the defense that the Complaint was a suit against the state; that respondent failed
to ex haust administrative remedies; and that the "Contract of Agreement" covering the project was void for
v iolating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the proper appropriation and the Certificate of Av ailability of
Funds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrines of State Immunity from Suit and of Ex haustion of Administrative Remedies
find application in this case.

RULING:

NO. Firstly , petitioners claim that the Complaint filed by respondent before the Regional Trial Court was done
without ex hausting administrative remedies. Petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim
before the Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. However, it has been established that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules.
In Republic of the Philippines v . Lacap, this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely :
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative
act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretriev ably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make
the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the doctrine
may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts v iolate due process; (i) where the issue
of non-ex haustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy ; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings. In the
present case, conditions (c) and (e) are present.

The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To delay the
proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice
respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the v alidity and the enforceability of the
"Contract of Agreement" entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the
ex pertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH. In Lacap, this Court said: It does not involve an ex amination
of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties. There is a question of law when the doubt or
 37

difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts. Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative authorities. The final decision
on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Ex haustion of administrativ e remedies does not
apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. The issue does not require technical
knowledge and ex perience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Neither can petitioners escape the obligation to compensate respondent for services rendered and work done by
inv oking the state’s immunity from suit. This Court has long established in Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu, and recently
reiterated in Heirs of Pidacan v. ATO, that the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
 38

TOPIC: Doctrine of Prim ary Jurisdiction

32. PROVINCE OF AKLAN V JODY KING CONST RUCTION

FACTS:

The Prov ince of Aklan (petitioner) and Jody King Construction and Development Corp. (respondent) entered into
a contract for the design and -construction of the Caticlan Jetty Port and Terminal in Malay , Aklan. In the course
of construction, petitioner issued v ariation/change orders for additional works. The scope of work under these
change orders were agreed upon by petitioner and respondent.

Thereafter, respondent made a demand for payment of petitioner’s unpaid balance. It filed a collection case in the
Regional Trial Court. However, petitioner denied any unpaid balance and interest due to respondent. It asserted
that the sums being claimed by respondent were not indicated in Change Order No. 3 as approved by the Office of
Provincial Governor. Also cited was respondent’s June 10, 2003 letter absolving petitioner from liability for any
cost in connection with the Caticlan Passenger Terminal Project. The Regional Trial Court of Marikina ruled in
favour of herein respondent and issued a writ of attachment. Petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has primary jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

NO. COA has primary jurisdiction over private respondent’s money claims Petitioner is not estopped from raising
the issue of jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination
requires the ex pertise, specialized training and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies, relief must first be
obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy is supplied by the courts even if the matter may well be
within their proper jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been
placed within the special competence of an administrativ e agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim is
sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body
for its v iew or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadv antaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.

As can be gleaned, respondent seeks to enforce a claim for sums of money allegedly owed by petitioner, a local
government unit. Under Commonwealth Act No. 327 , as amended by Section 26 of Presidential Decree No.
1445, it is the COA which has primary jurisdiction over money claims against government agencies and
instrumentalities. Further, Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTC’s
jurisdiction over the matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this,
we need only state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot
be waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power
between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties. Respondent’s collection suit
being directed against a local government unit, such money claim should have been first brought to the
COA. Hence, the RTC should have suspended the proceedings and refer the filing of the claim before the COA.
Moreover, petitioner is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction ev en after the denial of its notice of
appeal and before the CA.
 39

There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the
part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting
to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretriev ably prejudice the
complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
(e) where the question involv ed is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f)
where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where
the controverted acts v iolate due process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has
been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy ; (k) when strong public
interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. However, none of the foregoing circumstances is
applicable in the present case.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. All
the proceedings of the court in v iolation of the doctrine and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and
void. Thus, the Writ of Execution issued in v iolation of COA’s primary jurisdiction is void.
 40

TOPIC: State’s immunity from suit

33. AIR T RANSPORTATION OFFICE V SPOUSES DAVID AND RAMOS

FACTS:
Spouses Dav id and Elisea Ramos (respondents) discovered that a portion of their land was being used as part of
the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office
(ATO). Respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in
consideration of the amount of P77 8,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written
demands; this prompted respondents to file an action for collection.
In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation
No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the respondents affected
portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action
without the State’s consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of
governmental functions.

ISSUE: Whether the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.

RULING:
Y ES. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of
the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution. This is based on the political truism that
the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong.
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from
suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the
agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is v iolated. However, the need to
distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one
performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its
function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.
In our v iew, the CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the
Gov ernment not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activ ity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the
State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit.
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s property. The doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an
instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen. In exercising the right of eminent domain, the Court
ex plained, the State exercised its jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary rights, or jus gestionis; yet,
ev en in that area, where private property had been taken in expropriation without just compensation being paid,
the defense of immunity from suit could not be set up by the State against an action for payment by the owners.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by
the passage of Republic Act No. 9497 , otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.
 41

TOPIC: Creation/ conv ersion of cities, municipalities, and barangays

34. UMALI v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to
declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly
urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of
2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters
therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1 991 . Respondent COMELEC, acting on
the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-07 97 which provides that only those registered
residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the said plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Gov ernor of Nuev a Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration,
maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect the mother province of
Nuev a Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conv ersion in question does not involve the creation of a new
or the dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional prov ision calls for the people of the local
government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights
and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted
to refer to the qualified voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component
city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the v arious adverse effects of
the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the political and economic
rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.

ISSUE:
Whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can
participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.

RULING:
Qualified registered voters of the whole province of Nueva Ecija can participate in the plebiscite. The phrase "by
the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 of the LGC should be construed in a manner that will avoid conflict with
the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a
city is an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit provision under Sec. 10, Art. X of the
Constitution that the voters in the "political units directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such
construction should be avoided in v iew of the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by
the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be converted
to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec.
453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. The entire province of Nuev a Ecija will be directly affected by the
conversion of Cabanatuan. Duties, priv ileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to Cabanatuan City
if it is converted into an HUC. In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the prov ince of Nueva
Ecija, the city will be separated from the territorial jurisdiction of the prov ince, as earlier explained. The prov incial
government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic serv ices for the city residents’ benefit. Ordinances
and resolutions passed by the provincial council will no longer cover the city . Projects queued by the prov incial
government to be executed in the city will also be suspended if not scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing
functions outside the bounds of its territorial jurisdiction, and from expending its limited resources for ventures
that do not cater to its constituents. In v iew of these changes in the economic and political rights of the province of
Nuev a Ecija and its residents, the entire prov ince certainly stands to be directly affected by the conversion of
Cabanatuan City into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the qualified registered voters of
Nuev a Ecija should then be allowed to participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
 42

TOPIC: Local Governm ent Autonomy

35. PIMENTEL V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target beneficiaries dubbed as
"Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino". It was later renamed as "Pantawid Pamily ang Pilipino Program" (4Ps). This
government intervention scheme, also conveniently referred to as CCTP, "prov ides cash grant to extreme poor
households to allow the members of the families to meet certain human development goals." Eligible households
that are selected from priority target areas consisting of the poorest provinces classified by the National Statistical
Coordination Board (NCSB) are granted government subsidy for its basic needs. Congress, for its part, sought to
ensure the success of the CCTP by providing it with funding under the GAA of 2008 in the amount of
P298,550,000.00. This budget allocation increased tremendously to P5 Billion Pesos in 2009, with the amount
doubling to P1 0 Billion Pesos in 2010. But the biggest allotment given to the CCTP was in the GAA of 2011 at
Twenty One Billion One Hundred Ninety -Four Million One Hundred Seventeen Thousand Pesos
(P21 ,194,117 ,000.00). Petitioner Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a former Senator among others, challenged before the
Court the disbursement of public funds and the implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to hav e encroached
into the local autonomy of the LGUs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the P21 Billion budget allocation under the DSWD in the GAA is v iolative of Art. II Sec.
25 and Art X Sec. 3 of the Constitution in relation to Sec. 17 of the LGC providing for the recentralization of the
national government in the delivery of basic serv ices already devolved to the LGUs.

RULING:

No. The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments. However, the
essence of this ex press reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of
basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU. The Court held in Ganzon v . Court of Appeals that while it is
through a sy stem of decentralization that the State shall promote a more responsive and accountable local
government structure, the concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into
"mini-states." We ex plained that, with local autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than "to break up the
monopoly of the national government over the affairs of the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever
"the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government
units." In Pimentel v . Aguirre, the Court defined the ex tent of the local gov ernment's autonomy in terms of its
partnership with the national government in the pursuit of common national goals, referring to such key concepts
as integration and coordination. Thus: Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government
has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdiv isions. The purpose of the delegation is to
make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social
development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be
 43

integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in
the President and Congress.

Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of prov iding basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is,
thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned. Ev ery law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden
of prov ing the inv alidity of the prov isions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an
intervention program formulated by the national government itself but implemented in partnership with the local
government units to achieve the common national goal dev elopment and social progress can by no means be an
encroachment upon the autonomy of local gov ernments.
 44

TOPIC: Power of T axation

36. CITY OF IRIGA v s. CASURECO III

FACTS:
CASURECO III is an electric cooperative duly organized and ex isting by virtue of Presidential Decree (PD) 269, as
amended, and registered with the National Electrification Administration (NEA) it is engaged in the business of
electric power distribution to v arious end-users and consumers within the City of Iriga other municipalities of
Camarines Sur otherwise known as Riconanda area.
Sometime in 2003, petitioner City of Iriga required CASURECO III to submit a report of its gross receipts for the
period 1997 -2002 to serve as the basis for the computation of franchise tax es, fees and other charges. 6ςrνll The
latter complied but later on refused to pay said tax es on the ground that it is an electric cooperative prov isionally
registered with the Cooperative Dev elopment Authority (CDA), ςrνll and therefore exempt from the payment of
local taxes.
Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of local taxes against CASURECO III before the RTC, citing its power to
tax under the Local Gov ernment Code (LGC) and the Revenue Code of Iriga City. νllςrνll
In its Answer, CASURECO III denied liability for the assessed taxes, asserting that the computation of the
petitioner was erroneous because it included 1 ) gross receipts from serv ice areas beyond the latter’s territorial
jurisdiction; 2) taxes that had already prescribed; and 3) taxes during the period when it was still exempt from
local government tax by virtue of its then subsisting registration with the CDA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not CASURECO III is exempt from pay ment of taxes by v irtue of its registration with CDA .

RULING:
NO. CASURECO III is not exempt from payment of franchise tax
The Court reiterates that a franchise tax is a tax levied on the exercise by an entity of the rights or privileges
granted to it by the government. In the absence of a clear and subsisting legal prov ision granting it tax exemption,
a franchise holder, though non-profit in nature, may validly be assessed franchise tax by a local government unit.
PD 269 granted registered electric cooperatives registered several tax privileges, one of which is exemption from
the pay ment of "all national government, local government and municipal taxes and fees, including franchise,
filing, recordation, license or permit fees or taxes.” However, The Cooperativ e Code was subsequently passed and
it prov ides that electric cooperatives registered with the NEA under PD 269 which opt not to register with the CDA
shall not be entitled to the benefits and priv ileges under the said law.
Thereafter, the LGC took effect, and Section 1 93 thereof withdrew tax exemptions or incentives prev iously enjoyed
by "all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations, with the
exception of those registered under the Cooperative Code, among others.
In Philippine Rural Electric Cooperatives Association, Inc. (PHILRECA) v. The Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, the Court held that the tax privileges granted to electric cooperatives registered
with NEA under PD 269 were v alidly withdrawn and only those registered with the CDA under RA 6938 may
continue to enjoy the tax priv ileges under the Cooperative Code.
Indisputably, petitioner has the power to impose local tax es. The power of the local government units to impose
and collect taxes is derived from the Constitution itself which grants them "the power to create its own sources of
revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the Congress may
prov ide." This explicit constitutional grant of power to tax is consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy
and decentralization of governance. With this power, local government units hav e the fiscal mechanisms to raise
the funds needed to deliver basic serv ices to their constituents and break the culture of dependence on the
national government.
 45

37 . SMART COMMUNICATIONS v MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR BATANGAS

Topics:

A. Local T axation
B. Constitutionality of Statutes

Facts:

Smart constructed a telecommunication tower within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Malv ar. The
construction of the tower was for the purpose of receiving and transmitting cellular communications within the
covered area. Smart received from the Permit and Licensing Div ision of the Office of the Mayor an assessment of
Php 389,950.00 for Smart’s tel tower.

Smart filed a protest claiming lack of due process in the issuance of closure notice. In the same protest, Smart
challenged the v alidity of Ordinance No 1 8 on which the assessment was based.

Issues:

1. w/n the fees imposed under ordinance no. 1 8 are taxes?

2. w/n ordinance No. 1 8 is v alid and constitutional?

Ruling:

1. No. The fees imposed under Ordinance No 1 8 are not taxes.

In this case, the primary purpose of Ordinance No. 1 8 is to regulate the placing, stringing, attaching,
installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph, and telephone wires, conduits,
meters and other apparatus listed therein which includes Smart’s Telecommunications Tower. Clearly,
the purpose of the assailed Ordinance is to regulate the enumerated activ ities particularly related to the
construction and maintenance of v arious structures.

The fees in Ordinance No 1 8 are not impositions on the building or structure itself; rather they are
impositions on the activity subject of the government regulation such as the installation and construction
of the structures.

2. Yes. Ordinance No 18 is valid and constitutional. Smart contends that Ordinance No. 1 8 v iolates Sections
130(b)(3) 27 and 1 86 of the LGC since the fees are unjust, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory. Aside
from this bare allegation, Smart did not present any ev idence substantiating its claims. Significantly,
Smart failed to cite any co nstitutional prov ision allegedly violated by respondent when it issued
Ordinance No. 1 8.

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of v alidity. The question of reasonableness though is open to
judicial inquiry . Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow in
writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive, arbitrary,
unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is that factors rele v ant to
such an inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made subject to
imposition.
 46

Doctrine/ Constitutional Bases:

A. Section 142 of the Local Government Code grants municipalities the power to levy taxes,
fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces.

— Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that “each local government unit
shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall
accrue exclusively to the local government.”

Consistent with this constitutional mandate, the LGC grants the taxing powers to each
local government unit. Specifically, Section 142 of the LGC grants municipalities the
power to levy taxes, fees, and charges not otherwise levied by provinces. Section 143 of the
LGC provides for the scale of taxes on business that may be imposed by municipalities
while Section 147 of the same law provides for the fees and charges that m ay be im posed
by municipalities on business and occupation.

B. To justify the nullification of the law or its implem entation, there must be a clear and
unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of the Constitution.

—In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court
must sustain legislation because “to invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an
affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it but also of the executive
which approved it. ” This presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when
such a conclusion is reached by the required m ajority may the Court pronounce, in the
discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.
 47

38. LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF T HE PHILIPPINES v . DENR and Secretary

Topic: General Supervision of Local Governments & Autonomous Regions - Art. X, Sec. 4 & 16

NAT URE OF T HE CASE

Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, pray ing that the Court order the following:
(1 ) declare as unconstitutional Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of R.A. 7 160 (Local Government Code) and Section 24 of
R.A. 7 076 (People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1 991 );
(2) prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over prov inces; and
(3) declare as illegal the DENR Secretary ’s nullification, voiding and cancellat ion of the Small-Scale Mining
permits issued by the Prov incial Governor of Bulacan.

THE PARTIES
Petitioner: League of Prov inces - a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under the Local
Gov ernment Code; it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Prov ince of Bulacan; it states that
its petition is a collective action of all prov inces through the Leauge, as a favorable ruling will benefit all provinces
and all local governments
Respondent: DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes
Other parties:
 Golden Falcon Mineral Ex ploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) – applicant for a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); filed before Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Regional Office
No. III (MGB-RO); application was denied twice
 Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) – applicants for Quarry Permit; filed before the Prov incial
Env ironment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
 Atlantic Mines and T rading Corporation (AMTC) – applicant for Exploration Permit; filed before the
PENRO of Bulacan

THE FACT S
 Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO
 April 29, 1998 - MGB-RO denied Golden Falcon’s application for FTAA on for failure to secure the required
area clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO.
 Golden Falcon appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau -Central Office (MGB-CO)
 February 10, 2004 - pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS filed with the PENRO of Bulacan
their applications for quarry permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA application.
 July 16, 2004 – MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcon’s appeal
 September 13, 2004 - AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration permit
covering the same subject area.
 Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for quarry
permits – the contention was the date the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to other permit
applications from other parties
 October 1 9, 2004 - upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated that the
denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen day s after Golden Falcon
received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcon’s application became
open to permit applications only on that date.
 Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that the
subject area becam e open for new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998
(MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of denial on July 1 6, 2004 was a mere reaffirmation of
the MGB-RO’s April 29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29.
 Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for quarry perm it,
now apparently conv erted to applications for small -scale mining permit, to the Governor of
Bulacan.
 PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said applications.
 Ev entually, the Governor issued the small-scale mining permits.
 AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary
 48

 The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the governor’s issuance of
small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area was open to mining
location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence, the applications for quarry
permit filed on February 10, 2004 were null as these were filed when the area was still closed to mining
location. On the other hand, AMTC filed its application when the area was already open to other mining
applicants, hence, its application was valid. The small-scale mining permits were also issued in v iolation of
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7 07 6 and beyond the authority of the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7 942 because
the area was nev er proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program.

THE ISSUES

1. Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to ex ecutive control, not
merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary substituted
the judgment of the Provincial Gov ernor of Bulacan.

2. Whether or not Section 17 , b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small -Scale
Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional,
as the Constitution states that the President (and Ex ec Depts) has the power of superv ision only, not
control over acts of LGUs

THE RULING:

DENR Sec’s act was v alid and authorized pursuant to its power of rev iew under the RA 7 076 and
its IRR; Assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality , hence, are not
unconstitutional.
 Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the prov inces is granted by three statutes:
(1 ) R.A. 7 061 or The Local Government Code of 1991 ; (2) R.A. 7 07 6 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of
1991 ; and (3) R.A. No. 7 942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
 “Control” - the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter
 “Superv ision” - the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in
accordance with law.
 The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to the
adm inistrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make
local gov ernments within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but it is still
subject to limitations, like following national policies or standards and those provided by the Local
Gov ernment Code, as the structuring of LGUs and the allocation of powers/responsibilities/resources among
the LGUs and local officials are placed by the Constitution to Congress under Article X Section 3.
 It is the DENR which is incharge of carry ing out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise
the ex ploration, development and autilization of the countrry’s natural resources, pursuant to the prov isions
of Section 17 , b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale mining law by the
provincial governm ent is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR. The LGC
did not fully devolve to the provincial government the enforcement of the small -scale m ining
law.
 RA 7 076 or the People’s Sm all-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented by the
DENR Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7 07 6). Section 24 of the law
makes the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct superv ision and control of the
Secretary , its powers and functions subject to rev iew by the same.
 Under Section 1 23 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications should be filed with the PMRB and
the permits shall be issued by the prov incial governor, for applications outside the mineral reservations.
 DENR Administrativ e Order No. 34 (1 992) which contains the IRR of RA 7 07 6 likewise prov ides that the
DENR Secretary shall exercise direct superv ision and control over the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program,
and that the Prov incial/City Mining Regulatory Board’s (PMRB) powers and functions shall be subject to
review by the DENR Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 or the Rev ised IRR of the Philippine
 49

Mining Act of 1995 prov ides that applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Prov incial
Gov ernor/City Mayor through their respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas outside the Mineral
Reserv ations, and further, that the LGUs in coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve
applications for small-scale mining, sand and gravel, quarry xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.

 Petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not confer upon DENR and DENR
Secretary the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify , void, cancel the permits issued by the Prov incial Governor or
small-scale mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit because the DENR Secretary was
granted the power of review in the PMRB’s resolution of disputes under Sec. 24 of RA 7076
and Section 22 of its IRR. The decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify and cancel the
Governor’s issuance of perm its em anated from its power of rev iew under RA 7076 ad its IRR.
Its power to rev iew and decide on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining Permits by the
Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the determination of what the law is and
what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the matter in controversy and on the basis
thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respectiv e rights.

 The DENR Secretary ex ercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent
necessary in settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-
judicial power of the DENR can neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the
Prov incial Governor in issuing Sm all-Scale Mining Perm its nor “control” over the said act of
the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of the AMTC over conflicting
claim s based on the law.

 In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the grounds
raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17 b(3)(iii) of the LGC and Section 24 of RA
7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of the law.

Hence, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

 50

39. JAPSON v COMELEC and JAMES TY

Topics:

A. Citizenship Retention and Re- Acquisition Act of 2003; RA 9225

B. Election Law; Residence; Animus Rev ertendi;
C. Judgments; Adm inistrativ e Agencies; Commission on Elections (COMELEC);

FACTS:

 Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of 14 May 2007 .

 Japzon instituted before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify and/or cancel Ty ’s Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground of material misrepresentation. He averred that

o Ty is a US citizen and had been residing in the USA for the last 25 years.

o When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy he falsely represented therein that he was a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar (“Barangay 6”), for one y ear before 14 May
2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.

o While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided in Barangay 6 for a period of one year immediately preceding the date of election as required
under Section 39 of LGC

o Reacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile at Barangay 6.

o He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise
known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition A ct of 2003

 Ty admits that he had indeed lost his Philippine citizenship when he was naturalized as a US citizen. However,
he alleges that prior to the election, he had successfully reacquired his Filipino citizenship as shown by his act
of executing an Oath of Allegiance to RP and a duly notazaried Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He had
also complied with the 1-year residencey rule as shown by the following:

o CTC from Barangay 6 (March 2006)

o Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct 2005)

o Registered voter at Brgy 6 (July 2006)

 Pending this case, Ty won the elections.

 COMELEC 1 st Div ision ruled for Ty .

 COMELEC En Banc affirmed.

ISSUE:

WON Ty complied with the one (1 ) year residency requirement under the Local Government Code.

Ruling:
 51

Y ES. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or
"habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi).

A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and
continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court
already acknowledged that for an indiv idual to acquire American citizenship, he must establish residence in the
USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, then he must hav e necessarily
abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of choice.

Ty ’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 had no automatic impact or effec t on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in
Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein
shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his
birth.

Ty ’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in Barangay 6 became apparent when, immediately after
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
application that his residence in the Philippines was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007 , Ty voluntarily
submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by pay ing
community tax and securing CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as Barangay 6.
Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6.

Doctrines/Constitutional Bases:

A. Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it m ention any effect of such reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born
Filipino.

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs the manner in w hich a natural born Filipino
may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides
for his rights and liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said statute would reveal that
it does not at all touch on the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of its
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of
Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No.
9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent w ith the general
intent of the law to allow for dual c itizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time,
both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either in the Philippines or in the
foreign country of which he is also a citizen.

B. The principle of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an
“intention to return” to the place where he seeks to be elected. Corollary to this is a
determ ination whether there has been an “abandonment” of his former residence which
signifies an intention to depart there from .
 52

The Court explained that in order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or
bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the
old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary ; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

C. Findings of facts of quasi-judicial Agencies

The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the specific matters
entrusted to their jurisdiction accorded by this Court not only respect but even finality if they are
supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is
necessary . Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial ev idence, or that
amount of relevant ev idence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
 53

40. Nicolas Lewis v COMELEC

Topic: Citizenship; RA 9225; RA 91 89

Facts:

Petitions for certiorari and mandamus for exercising their rights to suffrage under the Ov erseas Absentee Voting
Act or RA No. 91 89. Petitioners are dual citizens who retained or reacquired Philippine Citizenship under RA No.
9225, or Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. COMELEC denied their petitions on the ground
that they fail to meet the qualification of 1 -year residency required by the Section 1 , Article V of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not dual citizens may exercise their right to suffrage as absentee voters even short of 1 -year residency
requirement.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no provision in the RA 9225 requiring duals to actually establish residence and phy sically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote.

Congress enacted RA 91 89 pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, identify ing in its Section
4 of the said Act who can vote under it, among others, are Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in
another country opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule under the Section 5(d) of the same Act.

By applying the doctrine of necessary implication, Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to actual
residency requirement of Section 1, Article 5 of 1987 Constitut ion, with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad.
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents in another country may be allowed to vote even though they do not
fulfill the residency requirement of said Sec 1 Art V of the Constitution.

Doctrine/Constitution al Basis:

There is no prov ision in the dual citizenship law—R.A. 9225—requiring “duals” to actually establish residence and
phy sically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise the right to vote —on the contrary, R.A. 9225, in
implicit acknowledgment that “duals” are most likely non­residents, grants under its Section 5(1 ) the same right of
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. 91 89.

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 91 89 and the ex pansion of the scope of that law with
the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the
absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
 54

41 . Abdul Gaffar v COMELEC

Topic: Election Law ; Comelec - Failure of Election

Facts:

The Comelec en banc ruled a failure of elections in precinct No. 6a/7 a, Lanao del Sur. On the second instance
stated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, that is, the election in any polling place had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, v iolence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes. The Election on said precinct was disrupted by a commotion, was untimely suspended
and never resumed. The Comelec decision, consequently nullified the proclamation of herein petitioner Dibaratun
as winner.

Petitioner Dibaratun contended that Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in declaring a failure of elections for acting on herein respondents’ petition even if such petition was
filed out of time.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring a failure of elections

Ruling:

The Court finds the petition for declaration of failure of elections under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code to
be in order, and it was properly disposed of by the COMELEC en banc.

Doctrine/Constitutional Basis:

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) v ested with broad power to enforce all the laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of elections as well as the plenary authority to decide all questions affecting elections except the
question as to the right to vote.

Three instances when a failure of elections may be declare d by the Commission : (1 ) the election in
any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure, v iolence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes; (2) the election in any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed
by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure, v iolence, terrorism , fraud or
other analogous causes; or (3) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canv ass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure,
v iolence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

Two conditions before Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can act on a v erified petition seeking
to declare a failure of elections.

(1 ) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fix ed by law, or ev en if there was voting, the
election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the elections. The
cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure, v iolence, terrorism, fraud or
other analogous causes.
 55

42. Abraham Mitra v COMELEC

Topic: Election Law

Doctrine:

1. Under the evidentiary situation of the case, there is clearly no basis for the conc lusion that
Mitra deliberately attem pted to mislead the Palawan electorate.

Republic Act No. 7 160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does not abhor this intended
transfer of residence, as its Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to be a resident of the local
government unit where he intends to run for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election. In other words, the law itself recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or
residence, but imposes only the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of
course, as a continuing requirement or qualification, the elected official must remain a resident there for
the rest of his term.

Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to qualify as Governor in light of
the relatively recent change of status of Puerto Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized
city whose residents can no longer vote for provincial officials he had to abandon his domicile of origin
and acquire a new one within the local government unit where he intended to run; this would be his
domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence, which the COMELEC
correctly invoked, requires the following:

(1 ) residence or bodily presence in a new locality ; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile

2. Mitra has been proclaim ed winner in the electoral contest and has therefore the m andate
of the electorate to serve

We have applied in past cases the principle that the manifest will of the people as ex pressed through the
ballot must be given fullest effect; in case of doubt, political laws must be interpreted to giv e life
and spirit to the popular m andate. Thus, we have held that while provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are in mandatory terms, it is an established rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that
mandatory prov isions, requiring certain steps before elections, will be construed as direc tory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the people.

3. Misrepresentation of COC
Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and
criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as ex pressed
in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on
the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality , on the other, we believe
and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will.

Facts:

When his COC for the position of Gov ernor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra was the incumbent
Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City . He was elected Representativ e as a domiciliary
 56

of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislativ e district for three (3) terms immediately before the
elections of 2010.

On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitra’s second term as Representativ e), Puerto Princesa City was
reclassified as a "highly urbanized city " and thus ceased to be a component city of the Prov ince of Palawan. The
direct legal consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of Puerto Princesa City residents from v oting for
candidates for elective provincial officials.

On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra applied for the transfer of
his Voter’s Registration Record from Precinct No. 037 20 of Brgy. Sta. Monica, Puerto Princesa City , to Sitio
Maligay a,Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Prov ince of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the
position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.

Issue:

Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan

Ruling:

Yes. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme Court ruled that Mitra did
not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency requirement as mandated by the Constit ution.

In any action involv ing the possibility of a rev ersal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost
effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound
public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so
patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giv ing
effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic
institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.
 57

43. Comerciante v s. people

Doctrine:

 For arrest in flagrante delicto to operate, tw o (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or w ithin the view of the
arresting officer.
 While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere
suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him.
 Police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. There should be "presence of more than
one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal
activity."

Facts:

An information was filed charging comerciante of v io lating RA 9165 for illegally possessing shabu. According to
the Prosecution, Comerciante and a certain Dasilla were spotted standing and showing improper and unpleasant
movements with one of them handling plastic sachets to the other by PO3 Calag and Agent Radan while they were
patrolling the area while on their way to v isit a friend.

Dasilla filed a demurrer to ev idence, which was granted and resulted to his acquittal. However due to
Comerciante’s failure to file his own demurrer, the RTC considered such r ight as waiv ed and ordered him to
present his evidence.

According to comerciante, PO3 Calag was looking for a certain Barok who was a notorious drug pusher in the area,
he and Dasilla were just standing in front of the jeepney when they were arrested, the officers claimed to have
confiscated from them illegal drugs and asked them for money , and for their failure to accede to the demand they
were then brought to the Police station and were charged of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.The RTC found
Comerciante guilty and held that PO3 Calag conducted a v alid warrantless arrest, the CA affirmed the
Comerciante’s conv iction.

Issue:

Whether or not a v alid warrantless arrest was conducted

Held:

No. For a warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the v iew of the arresting
officer. It is necessary that an officer’s personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is
absolutely required. Based on the testimony of PO3 Calag on direct ex amination the Court finds it highly
implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect v ision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30
kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white cry stalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets
held by Comerciante. V erily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the
latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, ev en if Comerciante and his c ompanion were
 58

showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in
order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest.

Also, the prosecution’s assertion of a Stop and frisk was also invalid. The court discussed that in such cases a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, that although it does not
hav e to be probable cause, but it cannot be a mere suspicion. In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's
acts of standing around with a companion and handing ov er something to the latter do not constitute criminal
acts. These circumstances are no t enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activ ity which would
constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on the former. In this light, the
"stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed unlaw ful.
 59

44. People vs. Lara

Doctrine:

 Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed w aived.
 A police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.
 Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line -up is
not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counse l guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage.

Facts:

An information was filed against Lara charging him for robbery with Homicide. According to the witnesses of the
prosecution, SUmulong was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Alli ed Services, Inc. he withdrew the amount of
230,000.00 and rode a pick-up truck and was accompanied by Bautista. Suddenly Lara appeared at the front of
the passenger side and while pointing a gun asked for the money, Sumulong then threw the bag to Bautista who
went out of the truck and ran, Lara ran after him and then Sumulong alson get out of the truch to inform the office
and when he came back he saw Bautista dead. He was then accompanied to the Police station and while on the
way he saw Lara, he alerted the officers with him and Lara was then apprehended. On his defense, Lara asserted
that he was on his cousin’s house when the police came and asked for him and was then brought to the Police
station. RTC conv icted Lara rejecting his alibi. On appeal, Lara pointed several errors. First, that he was arrested
without a warrant and the circumstances does not justify a warrantless arrest. Second, he was not assisted by a
counsel when he was placed in the line -up. Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt. Fourth, the trial court
erred in discounting his witness.

The CA affirmed Lara’s conv iction, that any objection to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been
raised in a motion duly filed before the accused enters his plea, otherwise it is deemed waived.

Issue:
Whether or not Lara’s contention of illegal arrest may be raised for the first time on appeal
Whether or not when Lara was identified in the police line -up without the assistance of a counsel is v alid.

Held:

No. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through compulsory process such as a warrant of
arrest or through his v oluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. Any objection
to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon entering a
plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes him invoking a ny irregularities that may have
attended his arrest. Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground to reverse and set aside
a conv iction that was arriv ed upon a complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error.

No. the right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being
made to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. Contrary to Lara’s
claim, that he was not prov ided with counsel when he was placed in a police line -up did not invalidate the
 60

proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at the police line -up without the assistance of counsel did not
render Sumulong’s identification of Lara inadmissible. As this Cour tprev iously ruled in People v. Amestuzo:

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1 ), Art. III of the 1 987 Constitution, or the
so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation.
Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the
interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line -up is
not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People v s. Lamsing and in the mor e recent case
of People v s. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during custodial investigation
and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification in a police line -up because it is not part of the
custodial investigation process. This is because during a police line -up, the process has not yet shifted
from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is
interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line -up.
 61

45.Chavez v s. Gonzales

Doctrine:

 restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests,
i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational
connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; (b) the
balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social v alues
and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observ able in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear and present danger rule which
rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will
likely lead to an ev il the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences
sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence ex tremely
high.
 Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
adv ance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from
government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is
wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the gov ernment. Thus, it precludes governmental
acts that required approv al of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication
including the payment of license taxes for the pr iv ilege to publish; and even injunctions against
publication. Ev en the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the
discontinuation of their printing and publication, are deemed as prev ious restraint or censorship. Any
law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits
an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.
 it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be
permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful ev aluation of the challenged act as
against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.
 it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of
speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1 ) a content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner,
and under well defined standards;or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction
is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. [ The cast of the restriction determines the test
by which the challenged act is assayed with.
 When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation , only a substantial
governmental interest is required for its v alidity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to
suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an
intermediate approach somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and
the compelling interest standard applied to content -based restrictions. The test is called intermediate
because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the restrictions
be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the
suppression of expression.
 On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and inv asive impact. Only when the
challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality .
 Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content -based restraint will be struck down.
 when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate
review. A content-based regulation , however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is
 62

measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if
justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor v ague

Facts:

Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station DZMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties to the
conversation discussed rigging the result of the 2004 elections to favour President Arroy. On June 6, 2005,
Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacanang Palace where he played before the
presidential press corps two compact disc recording of the conversations between a woman and a man. Bunye
identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that the contents of the second case had
been spliced to make it appear that President Arroyo was talking to Garcilliano. NTC issued a press release
warning radio and television station s that airing the Garci tapes will be a cause for suspension, revocation and/or
cancellation of the license or authorization issued to them. NTC officers met with the officers of the broadcasters
group KBP to dispel fear of censorship.

Issue:

WON the act of NTC is considered as prior restraint

WON the statement of NTC is considered as content-based prior restraints which transgress the constitution.

Ruling:

Yes. Prior restraint refers to official gov ernmental restrictions on the press or other forms of ex pression in
adv ance of actual publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government
censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the
ex ecutive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Giv en that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is
the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, and any
act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows,
it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain prev ious restraints may be permitted
by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate
test by which it should be measured against. When the speech restraints take the form of a content -neutral
regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity. On the other hand, a governmental
action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its
inherent and inv asive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it
pass constitutional muster. With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of
harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about especially the gravity and the imminence o f the
threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot
be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a
reality already on ground. Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be
subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content -based restrictions. The acts of respondents
focused solely on but one object a specific content fix ed as these were on the alleged taped conversations between
the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely prov ide regulations as to the time, place
or manner of the dissemination of speech or expression.

Yes. we hold that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed
up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the
ex ercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice,
while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media.Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and
 63

on behalf of the gov ernment in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act
does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non
formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvent ion of the prohibition on
prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible
forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The warnings given to media came
from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast
media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Ex ecutive, who wields the awesome
power to prosecute those perceived to be v iolating the laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP inex plicably
joined the NTC in issuing an ambiv alent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left
alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of some
media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.

The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitution al acts should always be exercised with care
and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery
constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone. Issues revolv ing
on their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of
each case. But in cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we
should be swift in striking them down as nullities per se. A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a
blow too late.
 64

46. Pollo vs Dav id

Doctrine:

 ex istence of priv acy right under prior decisions involved a two -fold requirement: first, that a person has
ex hibited an actual (subjective) ex pectation of privacy ; and second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective)
 Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations
of employees in the priv ate sector, may be reduced by v irtue of actual office practices and procedures, or
by legitimate regulation.
 a search of an employees office by a supervisor will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up ev idence that the employee is guilty of work -related
misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a non-investigatory work-related purpose.


Facts:

Petitioner is a former Personnel Specialist of the CSC. On Jan. 3, 2007 , an unsigned letter complaint was
addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Dav id regarding employees who were allegedly lawyering for an
accused government employee. Respondent formed a team to conduct an investigation and specifically to back up
all files in the computer found in the Legal Division where the petitioner was assigned. It was found that most of
the back up files containing files copied from the computer assigned and being used by the petitioner were draft
pleading in connection with admin cases in the CSC. Dav id issued a show cause order against petitioner.
Petitioner filed his Comment, deny ing that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter -complaint which
had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with cases in the CSC.
He accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files
in his computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-
incrimination. He asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave.
and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would v iolate his
constitutional right to priv acy and protection against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He
pointed out that though government property , the temporary use and ownership of the computer is ceded to the
employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. CSC issued a
resolution finding a prima facie case against the petitioner and charging him with dishonesty etc. Petitioner filed
an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without
basis having proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court. CSC found Pollo Guilty of dishonesty. Petition for certiorari filed by herein
petitioner was dismissed by CA.

Issue:

WON the search conducted on the office computer of the petitioner was valid.

Ruling:

Yes. The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable
searches and seizures. To establish a violation of rights, it must be proved that he had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the searched or the item seized. Public employees expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file
cabinets, like similar ex pectations of employe es in the private sector, may be reduced by v irtue of actual office
practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective)
ex pectation of priv acy either in his office or government -issued computer which contained his personal files.
Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his
 65

office was alway s locked and not open to other employees or v isitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords
or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files. The CSC in this case had
implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no ex pectation of priv acy in anything they
create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer
resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on -the-spot inspections may be done to
ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimat e business purposes. Further, A search by a
government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. As already
mentioned, the search of petitioners computer was justified there being reasonable ground for suspecting that the
files stored therein would y ield incriminating ev idence relev ant to the investigation being conducted by CSC as
government employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous complaint. This situation clearly falls under
the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches
 66

47 . People v s Cogaed

Doctrine:

 probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a
hunch will not v alidate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
ex perience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
 For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
 Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is
compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting
the public.
 Ev idence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as ev idence because it is "the only
practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Facts:

Police Inspector Bay an received a tex t message from an unidentified civ ilian informer that one Buya would be
transporting marijuana from La Union. PSI Bayan organized a check point in order to intercept the suspect. A
passenger jeepney arrived at the check point. The two passengers of the jeepney one of which is Cogaed we re told
to open their bag. Upon opening of the bags, three brick of marijuana were discov ered. Police officer arrested and
brought them to the police station. Cogaed and Day ao were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
The case was dismissed against Dayao because he was only 14 at the time. RTC found Cogaed guilty. The trial
court judge initially found Cogaed’s arrest illegal considering that "Cogaed at that time was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor was shown that he was about to do so or that had just done so. He just alighted
from the passenger jeepney and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest."47 Since the arrest was
illegal, the warrantless search should also be considered illegal.48 However, the trial court stated that
notwithstanding the illegality of the arrest, Cogaed "waiv ed his right to object to such irregularity " when "he did
not protest when SPO1 Taracatac, after identify ing himself, asked him to open his bag."Cogaed appealed the
decision but was denied by the CA. CA found that Cogaed waived his right when he voluntarily opened his bag.

Issue:

WON there was a valid search and seizure against the respondent.

WON ev idence obtained through the search should be admitted

Ruling:

NO. The right to priv acy is a fundamental right enshrined by implication in our Constitution. This prov ision
requires that the court ex amine with care and diligence whether searches and seizures are "reasonable." As a
general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that m eets all the requirements of this provision are reasonable.
However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. One of these jurisprudential
exceptions to search warrants is "stop and frisk". The search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk"
search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution. "Stop and
frisk" searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches6) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law
enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
 67

Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of"suspiciousness" present in the situation where the police officer
finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Ex perienced
police officers hav e personal ex perience dealing with criminals and criminal behavior. Hence, they should have
the ability to discern — based on facts that they themselves observ e — whether an individual is acting in a
suspicious manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the police officer, with his or her personal knowledge ,
must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act. In the case at bar Cogaed was simply a passenger
carrying a bag and trav eling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a
jeepney or carry ing a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney
driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious." The jeepney driver had to point
toCogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers otherwise. It is the police officer who should
observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer should not adopt
the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the per son suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one’s basic right to security of one’s
person and effects.

No. The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in
Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension,
Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. Considering that the
prosecution and conv ictio n of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of
that search means that there is no ev idence left to convict Cogaed. . Ev idence obtained through unlawful seizures
should be excluded as ev idence because it is "the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizures." It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses,
papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld.
 68

48. People v s Edano

Doctrine:

 "For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, tw o requisites must
concur: (1 ) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer."

Facts:

Defendant was arrested through an entrapment operation. It was alleged that respondent arrived on board a space
wagon driven by Siochi. The informant approached the defendant and talked to him. Afterward the informant
signalled the police officers wherein they approached the defendant. The defendant allegedly ran away but was
caught by the police officers. Thereafter, they were brought to the police station for investigation. Forensic
Chemical Officer examined the seized items and found them positive for shabu. RTC found the defendant guilty
for illegal possession of shabu. CA affirmed RTC’s decision in toto. The CA also found the appellant’s warrantless
arrest to be valid; it explained that the appellant’s act of running when PO3 Corbe was approaching him
reinforced the latter’s suspicion that "something was amiss."

Issue:

WON the arrest of defendant is lawful

Ruling:

No. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a priv ate person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto. "For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be v alid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must ex ecute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the v iew of the arresting officer." In the
present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the
appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the
informant were just talking with each other when he approached them. That the appellant attempted to run away
when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the police
officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting
to engage in criminal activ ity. In other words, try ing to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and
without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
 69

49. People vs Ng

Doctrine:

 when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby,
and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest w ithout a w arrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is dee med committed in his presence or w ithin his view .

Facts:

Capt. Ibon if Task Force Aduana received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of
contrabands in Quezon Prov ince. Ibon formed a team in coordination with PNP for the operat ion. The members
of the team were able to observe the going-ons at the resort form a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six
Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white v an. Capt. Ibon asked one of the
accussed-appellant what they were loading on the van which the latter replied that it was shabu. A total of 17 2
bags of shabu were confiscated. An information for v iolation of Sec. 16 Article III of RA 6425 was filed against the
accused-appellant. RTC conv icted the accussed-appellant of the crime charged. In questioning the RTC Decision
before the CA, accused-appellants raised the lone issue of: whether the trial court erred in ruling that there was a
valid search and arrest despite the absence of a warrant. The CA ruled t hat, contrary to accused-appellants
assertion, they were first arrested before the seizure of the contraband was made. The CA held that accused -
appellants were caught in flagrante delicto loading transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substa nce
into an L-300 v an which, thus, justified their arrests and the seizure of the contraband. Accussed -appellant filed a
petition to the SC raising the same issue.

Issue:

WON the arrest was v alid

Ruling:

Yes. Bill of Rights under the present Constitution prov ides in part:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
ex amination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted prov ision is that of an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant.Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and
valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may , without a warrant, arrest a
person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (Emphasis supplied.)
 70

The foregoing prov iso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case, contrary to accused -appellants
contention, there was indeed a v alid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances
immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1 ) the police officers received information
from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded
to V illa V icenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariay a, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from
a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused -appellants loading transparent bags
containing a white substance into a white L-300 v an. Ev idently , the arresting police officers had probable cause to
suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being
accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of
accused-appellants who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L -300
van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended is valid.

In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distanc e, or hears the
disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the
basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his
v iew. In the instant case, it can plausibly be argued that accused -appellants were committing the offense of
possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van when the police officers arrested them. As
aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the police officers with the
contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain v iew and duly observed by the arresting officers.
 71

Topic: Election Law; 1 year residency requirement

50. Sabili v . Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193261, April 24, 2012

Facts:

At the heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one -year residency requirement
for local elective officials.

When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been a
resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he had been twice elected
(in 1 995 and in 1 998) as Prov incial Board Member representing the 4th District of Batang as. During the 2007
elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District
of Batangas includes Lipa City. However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007
elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Priv ate respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification against
him before the COMELEC. COMELEC ruled that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa
City for at least one year prior to the May 2010 elections

Issue/s: Whether COMELEC is correct in ruling against Petitioner

Ruling:

Y ES. COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because an indiv idual income tax return may only be filed
either in the legal residence OR the principal place of business, as prescribed under the la w, the fact that Sabili
was filing his Income Tax Returns in Lipa City notwithstanding that he had no business therein showed that he
had actively elected to establish his residence in that city. In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v . Lianga
Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative, Inc., we explained that the following three (3) requisites must
concur for entries in official records to be admissible in ev idence:

(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so;

(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in the performance
of a duty specially enjoined by law; and

(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which facts must have
been acquired by him personally or through official information.

As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to keep an updated
record of all inhabitants of the barangay. Regarding the second requisite, we have ex plicitly recognized in Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, that it is the business of a punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own
barangay. Anent the third requisite, the Barangay Captains exercise of powers and duties concomitant to his
position requires him to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.

Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrades Certification on the sole
ground that it was initially no t notarized.
 72

We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate compliance with
the one-year residency requirement for local electiv e officials under the law.

Topic: Election law; Residency requirement

51. Jalover v . Osm ena, G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014

Facts:

On October 3, 2012, Osmeña filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor, Toledo City, Cebu.
In his COC, Osmeña indicated that he had been a resident of Toledo City for fifteen (15) y ears prior to the May
2013 elections. Before running for the mayoralty position, Osmeña also served as the representative of the 3rd
Congressional District of the Province of Cebu from 1995 -1998, which incidentally includes the City of Toledo.

Soon thereafter, the petitioners filed before the COMELEC a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. The
petitioners claimed that Osmeña falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of
Toledo City fifteen (15) years prior to the scheduled May 13, 2013 local elections since Osmeña was "hardly seen"
in Toledo City. Petitioners relied on sworn statements of some Toledo City reside nts attesting that they never saw
Osmeña in Toledo City and the fact that Osmeña has no registered property under his name in the city. In
addition, petitioners contend that the dilapidated house in Ibo, Toledo City, could not serve as Osmeña’s residence
in v iew of the latter’s stature.

The COMELEC en banc stated that it is not required that a candidate should hav e his own house in order to
establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he should live in the locality even in a rented house
or that of a friend or a relative.

Issue/s: Whether it is necessary for a candidate to have his own house in order to establish his residence or
domicile in a place

Ruling:

NO. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative
of this intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared and probable intent to
make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode.

The law does not require a person to be in his home twe nty -four (24) hours a day, seven (7 ) days a week, tofulfill
the residency requirement. In Fernandez v. House Electoral Tribunal, we ruled that the "fact that a few barangay
health workers attested that they had failed to see petitioner whenever they allegedly made the rounds in V illa de
Toledo is of no moment, especially considering that there were witnesses (including petitioner's neighbors in V illa
de Toledo) that were in turn presented by petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of V illa de To ledo, in
the address he stated in his COC. x x x It may be that whenev er these health workers do their rounds petitioner
was out of the house to attend to his own employment or business."

Under the circumstances, the ev idence submitted by the petitioners do not conclusively prove that Osmeña did
not in fact reside in Toledo City for at least the year before
 73

election day ; most especially since the sworn statements of some Toledo City residents attesting that they never
saw Osmeña in Toledo City were controve rted by similar sworn statements by other Toledo City residents who
claimed that Osmeña resided in Toledo City .

Similarly, the fact that Osmeña has no registered property under his name does not belie his actual residence in
Toledo City because property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local election.
It is enough that he should livein the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative. To use
ownership of property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence
implies that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. In Perez v. COMELEC, we
sustained the COMELEC when it considered as ev idence tending to establish a candidate’s domicile of choice the
mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the
position of governor.

We cannot accord credence either to the petitioners’ contention that the dilapidated house in Ibo, Toledo City,
could not serve as Osmeña’s residence in view of the latter’s stature. At the outset, the photographs submitted by
Osmeña in ev idence show that the house is modestly furnished and contains the comforts of a simple abode.
Moreover, the petitioners’ speculation inv olves the use of subjective non-legal standards, which we previously
condemned in the case of Mitra v . Commission on Elections.
 74

Topic: Appointive Office; Elective Office; Equal Protection Clause

52. Quinto v . Comelec, 22 February 2010

Facts:

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 867 8, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and
Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National
and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 867 8 prov ide:

SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy .

b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs,
petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and
who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the
declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 867 8 as null and void.

The Court ruled that there is no v alid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones.
The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure
encapsulated in the second prov iso of the thir d paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the
OEC v iolates the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 867 8 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Due to the adverse decision, COMELEC filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue/s: Whether there is a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions

Ruling:

Y ES. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons
or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equa lity among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four
requisites:

(1 ) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;

(3) It is not limited to ex isting conditions only ; and

 75

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed -resigned prov isions satisfy the first, third and
fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointiv e officials v is-à-vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds
an appointive office or an elective one, the ev ils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."

In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? There is.

An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected
officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded
from the ambit of the deemed resigned prov isions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sov ereign will. In other
words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the
end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such ex pectation insofar as appointed officials
are concerned.

The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law.
For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public serv ice; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sov ereign will.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLV ES to GRANT the respondent’s and the intervenors’ Motions for
Reconsideration; REV ERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s December 1 , 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and
ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1 ) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No.
867 8, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
 76

Topic: Election law; prem ature campaigning

53. Penera v . Comelec, G.R. No. 181613, 25 Nov ember 2009

Facts:

Petitioner Rosalinda Penera (Penera) as mayoralty candidate in Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte, was charged for
engaging in election campaign outside the campaign period, in v iolation of Section 80 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
(the Omnibus Election Code).

Penera argued arguing that she was not yet a candidate at the time of the supposed premature campaigning.
Considering that one is not officially a candidate until the start of the campaign period, no v iolation of the election
laws was committed.

According to the Decision of the Court, a candidate may already be liable for premature campaigning after the
filing of the certificate of candidacy but even before the start of the campaign period. From the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, even long before the start of the campaign period, the Decision considers the partisan
political acts of a person so filing a certificate of candidacy "as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate."
Thus, such person can be disqualified for premature campaigning for acts done before the start of the campaign
period. In short, the Decision considers a person who files a certificate of candidacy already a "cand idate" even
before the start of the campaign period.

Penera filed a motion for reconsideration.

Issue/s: Whether Penera engaged in premature campaigning

Ruling:

NO. Motion for Reconsideration is granted. The assailed Decision is contrary to the clear inten t and letter of the
law is a basic principle of law that any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. This is especially
true to expression or speech, which Congress cannot outlaw except on very narrow grounds involving clear,
present and imminent danger to the State. The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto
means that the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15 of RA 8436, as amended
by RA 9369, that political partisan activities before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for
Congress to state that "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start
of the campaign period." The only inescapable and logical res ult is that the same acts, if done before the start of
the campaign period, are lawful.

This means that a candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not
before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any
election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that Penera is liable for
premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the ass ailed Decision
ignores the clear and ex press provision of the law.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner Rosalinda A. Penera’s Motion for Reconsideration. We SET ASIDE the
Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 181 613 promulgated on 11 September 2009, as well as the Resolutions dated 24
July 2007 and 30 January 2008 of the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc, respectively, in
SPA No. 07 -224. Rosalinda A. Penera shall continue as Mayor of Sta. Monica, Surigao del Norte.
 77

Topic: Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy

54. Ara T ea v . Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012

Facts:

Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) were candidates for May or of San Antonio,
Zambales in the May 2010 National and Local Elections. Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1
December 2009. On 8 December 2009, Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition under Section 7 8 of the
Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s cer tificate of
candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales for four
(4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May 2010 elections. Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida
made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he
was eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the
Local Government Code6 both prohibit a local elective official from being elected and serv ing for more than three
consecutive terms for the same position.

COMELEC 2nd Div ision issued a Resolution cancelling Lonzanida's CoC and striking out his name from the
official list of candidates for mayor on the ground that he had already served for three consecutive terms.

Aratea asserted that Antipolo, as the candidate who received the second highest number of votes, could not be
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Since Lonzanida’s disqualification was not y et final during election day, the
votes cast in his favor could not be declared stray. Lonzanida’s subsequent disqualification resulted in a
permanent vacancy in the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly -elected V ice-Mayor, was mandated by Section
44 of the Local Government Code to succeed as Mayor.

Issue/s: Whether it is Antipolo who is entitled to the position of Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales due to the
inherent defect of Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy

Ruling:

Y ES. We hold that Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanida’s
certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida
were stray votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for
the position of Mayor.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

Section 65 of the Omnibus Election Code points to the Local Government Code for the qualifications of elective
local officials. Paragraphs (a) and (c) of Section 39 and Section 40 of the Local Government Code prov ide in
pertinent part:

Sec. 39. Qualifications. ‒ (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city or province x x x ; a resident therein for at least one (1 ) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

xxxx
 78

(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or v ice -mayor of independent component cities, component cities, or
municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) y ears of age on election day.

xxxx

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) y ear or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serv ing sentence;

(b) Xxx

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Sec. 12. Disqualification. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a c rime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been giv en plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
Xxx

Section 7 8 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when
there is false material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy

The conv iction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually
from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took
effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy.

Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for
Mayor.1âwphi1 Whether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because
the cancellation on such ground means he was nev er a candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of
candidacy being void ab initio. There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections -
Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 2 February 2011 and the Order d ated 12 January
2011 of the COMELEC En Bane in SPA No. 09 -158 (DC) are AFFIRMED. The COMELEC En Bane is DIRECTED
to constitute a Special Municipal Board of Canv assers to proclaim Estela D. Antipolo as the duly elected Mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales. Petitioner Efren Racel Aratea is ORDERED to cease and desist from discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales.
 79

Topic: Election Law; Material Misrepresentation; Deceptive Nam e/Nickname

55. Villafuerte v . Comelec, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014

Facts:

Former Camarines Sur Gov . and former Rep. Luis V illafuerte contesting the v ictory of his 25 -year-old grandson
and incumbent Gov. Miguel Luis V illafuerte.

The elder Villafuerte had sought the cancellation of his grandson's certificate of candidacy (COC) for allegedly
"intentionally and materially misrepresenting a false and deceptive name/nickname" during the 201 3 elections.

The grandfather said Miguel tried to "mislead" voters when he declared under oath in his COC that "L -Ray Jr-
Migz" was his nickname, and that the name he wanted to appear on the official ballot was "V illafuerte, L -Ray Jr.-
Migz NP. "

According to petitioner, his grandson deliberately omitted his first name "Miguel" and inserted, instead "L -Ray
Jr," which is the nickname of Miguel's father, the then incumbent Governor L-Ray V illafuerte Jr.

Issue/s: The main issue for resolution is whether respondent committed a material misrepresentation under
Section 7 8 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancel lation of his COC

Ruling:

NO. Petitioner filed the petition under Section 7 8 of the Omnibus Election Code claiming that respondent
committed material misrepresentation when the latter declared in his COC that his name/nickname to be printed
in the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR.–MIGZ instead of his baptismal name, V ILLAFUERTE,
MIGUEL–MIGZ; that such declaration made under oath constitutes material misrepresentation even if the
material misrepresentation did not refer to his qualifications but referred to his

eligibility to be v alidly voted for as a candidate and, consequently, to his eligibility to assume office.

We find no merit in the argument.

Section 7 8 states that the false representation in the contents of the COC required under Section 7 4 mu st refer to
material matters in order to justify the cancellation of the COC. What then constitutes a material
misrepresentation?

For the petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of one candidate to prosper, the candidate must have made
a material misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such
as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office
as prov ided in the Local Government Code.15 Hence, petitioner’s allegation that respondent’s nickname “LRAY
JR. MIGZ” written in his COC is a material misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent’s nickname written
in the COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus qualification to run for
public office.

Moreover, the false representation under Section 7 8 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. As we said, respondent’s nickname is not
considered a material fact, and there is no substantial ev idence showing that in writing the nickname “LRAY JR.
 80

MIGZ” in his COC, respondent had the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his
eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.

Considering that respondent’s name is VILLAFUERTE, LRAY JR. – MIGZ, his name would indeed be ahead of
petitioner’s name, VILLAFUERTE, LUIS, in the official ballot which contains the alphabetic al listing of the
candidates for the gubernatorial position of the Prov ince of Camarines Sur. However, petitioner’s claim that such
listing would lead to confusion as to put him to undue disadvantage is merely speculative and without basis as the
voters can identify the candidate they want to vote for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated April 1, 2013, of the Commission on Elections En
Banc, is hereby AFFIRMED.
 81

Topic: Effect of use of foreign passport after oath of renunciation: Recant ation of oath of
renunciation

56. Maquiling v . Com elec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013

Facts:

Respondent Rommel Cagoco Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, born to Filipino parents on July 22, 1 957 at
Iligan City , Lanao del Norte. In 1 985, he immigrated to the United States for job purposes. He was deemed to have
lost his Filipino citizenship by operation of law when he became a naturalized citizen of the United States of
America while in America.

Respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to
cancel his certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of

Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national elections

Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as "USA -American." To further bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua presented
in his Memorandum a computer-generated travel record dated 03 December 2009 indicating that Arnado has
been using his US Passport No. 0577 827 00 in entering and departing the Philippines.

The COMELEC First Div ision granted Balua’s petition and annulled Arnado’s proclamation. The COMELEC First
Div ision stated that "Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong indication that Arnado had no real
intention to renounce his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affid av it of Renunciation to enable him to
run for office."

Issue/s: Whether the use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship affect one’s qualification
to run for public office

Ruling:

YES.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.

The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number
of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of
the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the
sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
 82

With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy i s thus rendered void from
the beginning. It could not have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect
his disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner.

To hold that such proclamation is v alid is to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed ev en prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmati on of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the

elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in
the May 201 0 elections.

Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor should not have been counted.
 83

TOPIC: Election Law; House of Representative; House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal

(HRET); Jurisdiction.

57 . Rey es v s. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

The Joseph Tan filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy (COC) of Regina Reyes (petitioner) on the ground that it contained material misrepresentations. On
27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Div isio n issued a Resolution cancelling petitioner’s COC. On 1 4 May 2013,
the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. Four days thereafter or on 1 8 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections. On
5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality declaring the 1 4 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc final and executory , considering that more than twenty -one (21 ) day s have elapsed from the
date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining its execution. On same day, petitioner took her
oath of office before Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives. Petitioner has yet to
assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon of 30 June 201 3.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has
already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque.

HELD:
YES. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons: First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction
over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is
duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action. Second, the jurisdiction of
the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House of Representativ es, as stated in
Section 17 , Article V I of the 1 987 Constitution:

Section 17 . The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x

As held in Marcos v. COMELEC, the HRET does not have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of
the House of Representatives, to wit:

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1 995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obv ious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

The nex t inquiry, then, is when is a candidate consid ered a Member of the House of Representatives? In V inzons-
Chato v. COMELEC, citing Aggabao v. COMELEC and Guerrero v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that:

The Court has inv ariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assum ed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. This pronouncement was
reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v. COMELEC, wherein the Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC vis-à-vis the HRET, held that:

The Court has inv ariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed
office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. This was again affirmed in
Gonzalez v. COMELEC, to wit:
 84

After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his
qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of election and contested returns —were transferred to
the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same.

From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be
a concurrence of the following requisites: (1 ) a v alid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the
doctrinal pronouncement was made in the contex t of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of
office, but who had also assumed office. For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC, the Court upheld the
jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed, taken his
oath of office before the Speaker of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007 ,
or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007 , to w it:

On October 8, 2007 , priv ate respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which he brought to Our attention that on
September 26, 2007 , even before the issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had already been
proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives of the First Congressional
District of Lanao del Norte. On that v ery same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de
Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly. In light of this dev elopment, jurisdiction over this case has
already been transferred to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the que stioned candidate had already assumed office, and hence,
was already considered a Member of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case. Here, the petitioner
cannot be considered a Member of the House of Representatives because, primarily , she has not y et assumed
office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins
only “at noon on the thirtieth day ofJune next follow ing their election .” Thus, until such time, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction. In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a purported Oath
Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is not the oath of office which
confers membership to the House of Repre sentatives. Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House
of Representatives prov ides:

Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members.—Members shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or
indiv idually before the Speaker in open session.

Consequently, before there is a v alid or official taking of the oath it must be made (1 ) before the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte,
there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the
required oath of office was indeed complied with.
 85

TOPIC: Election Law; Commission on Elections; Certiorari; The Court has no power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Div ision of the COMELEC.

58. Cagas v s. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

The petitioner and respondent Claude P. Bautista contested the position of Governor of the Province of Dav ao del
Sur in the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. The fast transmission of the results led to the
completion by May 1 4, 2010 of the canvassing of votes cast for Governor of Dav ao del Sur, and the petitioner was
proclaimed the winner (with 163,440 votes), with Bautista garnering 159,527 votes. Alleging fraud, anomalies,
irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws, rules and resolutions, Bautista filed an electoral protest
on May 24, 2010. The protest was raffled to the COMEL EC First Div ision. In his answer submitted on June 22,
2010, the petitioner averred as his special affirmative defenses that Bautista did not make the requisite cash
deposit on time; and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of.
On August 13, 2010, the COMELEC First Div ision issued the first assailed order denying the special affirmative
defenses of the petitioner. On October 7 , 2010, The petitioner mov ed to reconsider but the COMELEC First
Div ision issued its second assailed order, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for failing to show
that the first order was contrary to law. Not satisfied, the petitioner commenced this special civil action directly to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON the Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari.

HELD:

NO. The gov erning prov ision is Section 7 , Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which prov ides:

“Section 7 . Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before
it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed
submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise prov ided by this Constitution or by law,
any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.”

This provision, although it confers on the Court the power to rev iew any decision, order or ruling of the
COMELEC, limits such power to a final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not ex tend to
an interlocutory order issued by a Div ision of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to review
on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Div ision of the COMELEC. The following
cogent observations made in Ambil v. Commission on Elections are enlightening, viz.:

To begin with, the power of the Supreme Court to rev iew decisions of the Comelec is prescribed in the
Constitution, as follows: “Section 7 . Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum
required by the rules of the commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be brought to the Su preme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” [emphasis supplied]

“We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the
ex ercise of its adjudic atory or quasi-judicial powers.” This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Div ision of the Commission
on Elections. The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the Comelec en banc may be elev ated to the
Supreme Court is by the special civ il action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964 Rev ised Rules of Court, now
ex pressly provided in Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civ il Procedure, as amended. Rule 65, Section 1, 1 997 Rules of Civ il
 86

Procedure, as amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy provided by law . Failure to
abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the petition.

In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a div ision o f the Comelec must be rev iewed by the Comelec en
banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari. The prerequisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. xxx”

There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Div ision of the special affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The
proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the COMELEC First Div ision to first decide the protest on its merits,
and if the result should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC en
banc along with the other errors committed by the Div ision u pon the merits.

It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on
Elections. In that case, the protestant assailed the order of the COMELEC First Div ision admitting an answer w ith
counter-protest belatedly filed in an election protest by filing a petition for certiorari directly in this Court on the
ground that the order constituted grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC First Div ision. The Court
granted the petition and nullified the assailed order for being issued without jurisdiction.

Under the exception, therefore, the Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review
an interlocutory order issued by a Div ision of the COMELEC on the ground of the issua nce being made without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it does not appear to be specifically prov ided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one
that the COMELEC en banc may sit and consider, or a Div ision is not authorized to act, or the members of the
Div ision unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort
to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in which the matter concerning the assailed
interlocutory order can be rev iewed.

However, the Kho v. Commission on Elections exception has no application herein, because the COMELEC First
Div ision had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained
of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, and whether such lack called for the
outright dismissal of the protest. For sure, the 1987 Constitution vested i n the COMELEC broad powers involv ing
not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections but
also the resolution and determination of election controversies. The breadth of such powers encompasses the
authority to determine the sufficiency of allegations contained in every election protest
and to decide based on such allegations whether to admit the protest and proceed with the hearing or to outrightly
dismiss the protest in accordance with Section 9, Rule 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804.
 87

TOPIC: Election Law; Commission on Elections; Adm inistrative Law; The Commission on
Elections possesses the power to conduct inv estigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws.

59. Bedol v s. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

As Chair of the Prov incial Board of Canv assers (PBOC) for the prov ince of Maguindanao, the petitioner discharged
his official functions and was able to ensure the PBOC’s performance of its ministerial duty to canv ass the
Certificates of Canv ass coming from the twenty two (22) city and municipalities in the province. On June 4, 2007 ,
Celia B. Romero, issued a certification that as of even date, the canvassing documents for all municipalities of the
prov ince of Maguindanao in connection with the May 1 4, 2007 elections were not transmitted by the Prov incial
Election Superv isor of said province nor the respective Board of Canv assers. Thus the Commission created the
Task Force Maguindanao, headed by Commissioner Nicodemo Ferrer, which was tasked to conduct a fact-finding
inv estigation on the conduct of elections and certificates of canv ass from the city and municipalities in
Maguindanao. The petitioner was inv ited to shed a light on what happened during the elections but the petitioner
failed to appear before the task force and even questioned the jurisdiction. Thus the COMELEC issued a Contempt
Charge and Show Cause Order against petitioner citing various v iolations of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction to initiate or prosecute the contempt proceedings against Bedol.

HELD:

YES. The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by v irtue of the ex plicit prov isions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads:

“Article IXC, Section 2.

Xxx
(6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.”

The abov e-quoted prov ision should be construed broadly to give effect to the COMELEC’s constitutional mandate
as enunciated in Loong v. Commission on Elections, which held:

“xxx. Section 2(1 ) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power “to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall.” Undoubtedly, the tex t and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent
to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the c onduct
of our elections.”

The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election
Code, may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the
COMELEC embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be
the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to implement the election
laws and to exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its administrative
function refers to the enforcement and administration of el ection laws. In the exercise of such power, the
Constitution (Section 6, Article IXA) and the Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to
issue rules and regulations to implement the prov isions of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to
which the legislative policy is to apply , and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself
 88

in enforcing and administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-
judicial power in the following manner, viz.:

“Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the administrative agency
to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing
and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such
manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to
inv estigate facts or ascertain the ex istence of facts, hold hearings, weigh ev idence, and draw conclusions from
them as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons
are affected, it is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in
the conduct of the proceedings.”

The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud and irregularities attending the
conduct of elections in the province of Maguindanao and the non -transmittal of the canvassing documents for all
municipalities of said province. Task Force Maguindanao’s fact -finding investigation—to probe into the veracity of
the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said prov ince; and consequently, to determine whether the
certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election offense had possibly been committed —
could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function. The COMELEC, through the
Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of
massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings
and required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them t he opportunity to argue and
support their respective positions. The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law on a government
institution hinges on its authority to compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or
proceedings. As enunciated in Arnault v. Nazareno

“Ex perience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unav ailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what
is needed.” In the same v ein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish indiv iduals who refuse to
appear during a fact-finding investigation, despite a prev ious notice and order to attend, would render nugatory
the COMELEC’s inv estigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was however derailed when
petitioner obstinately refused to appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding the va rious
election documents which, he claimed, were stolen while they were in his possession and custody. Undoubtedly,
the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.

Ev en assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required
petitioner to appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are not
purely ministerial. The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the function and duty to determine
whether the papers transmitted to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper officers. When the
results of the elections in the province of Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for v arious candidates
posited numerous questions on the certificates of canv ass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC asked
petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on the issue of whether the election documents coming from
Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted
within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the assailed resolutions. In Santiago, Jr. v. Bautista, the Court
held:

“xxx. The exercise of judicial functions may involve the perform ance of legislative or administrative duties, and
the performance of and administrative or ministerial duties, may , in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial
functions. It may be said generally that the ex ercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what
the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that
authority, and undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially .”
 89

On the procedure adopted by the COMELEC in proceeding with the indirect contempt charges against petitioner,
Section 52 (e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code pertinently provides:

“Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on

Elections.
xxx
(e) Punish contempts prov ided for in the Rules of Court in the same procedure and with the same penalties
prov ided therein. Any violation of any final and executory decision, order or ruling of the Commission shall
constitute contempt thereof.”

The aforecited prov ision of law is implemented by Rule 29 of COMELEC’s Rules of Procedure, Section 2 of which
states:

Rule 29—Contempt
Sec. 1. xxx
Sec. 2. Indirect Contempt.—After charge in writing has been filed with the Commission or Div ision, as the case
may be, and an opportunity given to the respondent to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehav ior of the responsible officer of the Commission in the performance of his official duties or in his
official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment or command of the Commission or any
of its Div isions, or injunction or restraining order granted by it;
(c) Any abuse of or any in lawful interference with the process or proceedings of the Commission or any of its
Div isions not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rules;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly , to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice by the Commission or any of its Div isions;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without authority; and
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served.
SEC. 3 Penalty for Indirect Contempt.—If adjudged guilty, the accused may be punished by a fine not exceeding
one thousand (P1 ,000.00) pesos or imprisonment for not more than six(6) months, or both, at the discretion of
the Commission or Div ision.”

The language of the Omnibus Election Code and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is broad enough to allow the
initiation of indirect contempt proceedings by the COMELEC motu proprio. Furthermore, the above-quoted
prov ision of Section 52(e), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code ex plicitly adopts the procedure and penalties
prov ided by the Rules of Court. Under Section 4, Rule 7 1, said proceedings may be initiated motu proprio by the
COMELEC, viz.:

“SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced.—Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the
court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent
to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall
be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents o r papers
inv olved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in
the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court,
the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately,
unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint
hearing and decision.”

Hence, the COMELEC properly assumed jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceedings which were initiated
by its Task Force Maguindanao, through a Contempt Charge and Show Cause Order, notwithstanding the
absence of any complaint filed by a priv ate party.
 90

TOPIC: Election Law; Party-List Sy stem.

60. Atong Paglaum, Inc. v s. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7 941 and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531,
approximately 280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May
2013 party -list elections. The COMELEC, however, denied the petitions for registration.

ISSUE/S:

I. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in disqualify ing petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party -list elections, either by denial
of their new petitions for registration under the party -list system, or by cancellation of their existing
registration and accreditation as party -list organizations;
1.
II. WON the criteria for participating in the party -list sy stem laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party -list elections.

HELD:

I. NO. We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grav e abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions of this Court in disqualify ing petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013
party -list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the
qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party -list sy stem, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualify ing petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified
to register under the party -list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party -list
elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
2.
I. NO. We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prev ailing jurisprudence in disqualify ing
petitioners. In following prev ailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave
abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 1 3 May 2013 party -list elections, we must now impose
and mandate the party-list sy stem actually envisioned and authorized under the 1 987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 7 941. In BANAT, this Court dev ised a new formula in the allocation of party -list seats,
reversing the COMELEC’s allocation which followed the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong
Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7 941 to
apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule that a party may
appeal to this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion. Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining
who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party -list elections, the COMELEC
shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party -list system: (1 ) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along
sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections prov ided they register under the party -list sy stem
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
 91

sectoral wing that can separately register under the party -list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party , and is linked to a political party through a coalit ion.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in “well -
defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest
and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor,
peasant, fisher-folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well -defined political
constituencies” must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented,” o r that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, prov ided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
 92

TOPIC: Election Law; Three-Term Limit Rule; Preventiv e Suspension.

61. Aldovino, Jr. v s. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998 -
2001, 2001 -2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004 -2007 term of office,
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. The
Supreme Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed
performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 electio n, Asilo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position. The petitioners sought to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of candidacy or to
cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a four th term
therefore v iolated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7 160. The COMELEC ruled against the petitioners and in Asilo’s fav our in its
Resolution of November 28, 2007 . It reasoned out that t he three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to
render complete serv ice for the 20042007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

ISSUE:

I. WON prev entive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule;
and
3.
II. WON preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b)
of RA 7 160
4.
HELD:

I. NO. The “interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three -term limit rule is one
that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
inv oluntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.
This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully
served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecut ive
terms, using “voluntary renunciation” as an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption. Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of serv ice within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary
inability or disqualification to ex ercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary , should
not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to
office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply
barred from ex ercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law. An interruption occurs
when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be
equated with the failure to render serv ice. The latter occurs during an office holder’s term when he
retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course,
the term “failure to serve” cannot be used once the right to office is lost; without the right to hold
office or to serve, then no serv ice can be rendered so that none is really lost. To put it differently
although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X—both by structure and substance— fix es an
elective official’s term of office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflex ible
rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as an example of a circumvention. The
prov ision should be read in the contex t of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the
full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The “voluntary renunciation” it
speaks of refers only to the elective official’s voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this
office. It does not speak of the temporary “cessation of the exercise of power or authority” that may
occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one o f them. To quote Latasa v.
Comelec
5.
 93

6. “Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps dow n
from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial
jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.”

II. NO. Strict adherence to the intent of the three -term limit rule demands that preventive suspension
should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective official’s stay in office beyond three
terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office
is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists. To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited
term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by
equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that
the constitutional prov ision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons ex ist, volun tary or involuntary —
some of them personal and some of them by operation of law —that may temporarily prevent an
elective office holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that preventive suspension
does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension
as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the
functions of his office for a time without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different
because it disrupts actual delivery of serv ice for a time within a term. Adopting such interruption of
actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three -term rule
raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and
occasions when actual service may be interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The
standard may reduce the enforcement of the three -term limit rule to a case to case and possibly
seesawing determination of what an effective interruption is.
7.
8. Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act
on the part of the suspended official, except in the indirect sense that he may hav e voluntarily
committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From this perspective, preventive
suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither
does it contain the element of renunciation or loss of tit le to office as it merely involves the temporary
incapacity to perform the service that an elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension
is—by its very nature—the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary,
and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion
therefore is that they are, by nature, different and non -comparable. But beyond the obv ious
comparison of their respective natures is the more important consider ation of how they affect the
three-term limit rule. Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to
render serv ice, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effectiv e interruption of a term. It is therefore
not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three -term limit rule. Preventive suspension, by its
nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to
av oid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, howev er, if we shall disregard its nature and
consider it an effectiv e interruption of a term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to
undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of office even for
the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed
soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive
suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a circumventio n more potent than the
voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.

TOPIC: Election Law; Party-List Sy stem.

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62. Aksyon Magsasaka Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMAPTM) v s. Commission on Elections

FACTS:

Petitioner was among the accredited candidates for party -list representative during the national and local
elections held on May 13, 2013. On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of
Canv assers (NBOC), under NBOC Resolution No. 000613, proclaimed fourteen (1 4) party-list groups, which
obtained at least 2% of the total votes cast for the party -list sy stem and were thus entitled to one (1 ) guaranteed
seat each, pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7 941. On May 28, 2013, COMELEC promulgated the
assailed NBOC Resolution No. 000813. Thus a petition was filed with this Court on May 30, 2013. Petitioner
argues that the allocation of additional seats did not conform to Section 11 of R.A. No. 7 941 and this Court’s ruling
in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC. It points out that
the product of the percentage of votes obtained by the party -list group multiplied by the additional seats available
is not an integer, such as the following figures found in the Table of party-list groups allocated with additional
seats: 0.961 , 0.932, 0.89, etc. Consequently, COMELEC seriously erred in computing the values and interpreting
the results in the second round leading to the inv alid and unjust alloc ation of additional seats to the two -
percenters to the prejudice of other party-list groups such as petitioner.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats for the 38 party -list
candidates proclaimed as winners in the May 1 3, 2013 elections.

HELD:

NO. Section 1 2 of R.A. No. 7 941 provides for the procedure in allocating seats for the party -list sy stem:

SEC. 1 2. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives.—The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for
the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of v otes
received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of v otes obtained by
each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party -list system.

In BANAT v. COMELEC, we laid down the following procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party -list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7 941 :

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiv ing at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

As to the allocation of additional seats on the second round, after deducting the guaranteed one seat each, for
those who obtained 2% of the total votes cast for party -list, from the number of available party-list seats, we
further held in BANAT that

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two -percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party -List Sy stem less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a prov ision in R.A. No. 7 941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats. In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats to the Two -percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party -list candidate is arrived at
by div iding the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the
remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 max imum seats reserved under the Party -
List Sy stem and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two -percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage
 95

and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party ’s share in the remaining av ailable seats. Second, we
assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat
cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party -list candidate is entitled.

It is clear from the foregoing that party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party - list votes may yet qualify
for a seat in the allocation of additional seats depending on their ranking in the second round. This conflicts with
the interpretation of petitioner that those party -list groups with product of the percentage less than one, and
hence not an integer, are not entitled to one seat in the allocation of additional seats. Indeed, following petitioner’s
interpretation would result in the remaining party-list seats not being filled up. For that same reason, BANAT
declared unconstitutional the continued operation of the two -percent threshold, as it was deemed “an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of the ‘broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.’” Apparently, petitioner mistakenly assumed that the statement in BANAT disallowing fractional
seats insofar as the additional seats for the two -percenters in the second round should also apply to those party -
list groups with less than 2% votes. But as demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share in representation may never be
filled up if the 2% threshold is maintained. In the same vein, the max imum representation will not be achieved if
those party-list groups obtaining less than one percentage are disqualified from even one additional seat in the
second round. In sum, we hold that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in allocating the party -
list seats in the 2013 elections and proclaiming the winners after distributing the guaranteed and additional seats
in accordance with our ruling in BANAT.
 96

TOPIC: Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy

63. T agolino v s. House of Representatives Electoral T ribunal

FACTS:

Richard Gomez filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the COMELEC, seeking congressional office as
Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Ley te. Subsequently, one of the opposing candidates,
Buenav entura Juntilla, filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of Colgate
Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910 Carlota
Hills, Canadieng, Ormoc City . In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1 ) year
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1 987 Philippine Constitution and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due
course and/or cancelled. On February 17 , 2010, the COMELEC First Div ision rendered a Resolution granting
Juntilla’s petition without any qualification. On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez filed her CoC together
with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official
substitute candidate v ice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In response to various letter -
requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department, the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its
administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 8890 on May 8, 2010, approving the recommendation of the said
department to allow the substitution of private respondent.

ISSUE: WON Richard was v alidly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative in
v iew of the former’s failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of
the Constitution.

HELD:

NO. Section 77 of the OEC prov ides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file
a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. It states that:

Sec. 77 . Candidates in case of death, disqualification or w ithdraw al of another. —If after the last day for the filing
of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. (Em phasis supplied)

Ev idently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official candidate” before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus,
whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section
unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. As
defined under Section 7 9(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must have v alidly filed a CoC in order to be
considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC obtains evengreater importance if one considers its
nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a person’s public declaration to run for office but ev idences as well
his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula, the Court has illumined:

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political
creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he
announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political
party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any , and his post office address for all election purposes being as well
stated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate. In other
words, absent a v alid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation. As held in Talaga: greater
importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a person’s public declaration to run
 97

for office but ev idences as well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula, the
Court has illumined:

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political
creed or lack of political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he
announces his candidacy for the office mentio ned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political
party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any , and his post office address for all election purposes being as well
stated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In this regard, the Co C is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate. In other
words, absent a v alid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation. As held in Talaga:
ex istence of a v alid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be v alidly substituted.

Proceeding from the foregoing discourse, it is ev ident that there lies a clear cut distinction between a
disqualification case under Section 68 and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC case under Section
7 8 v is-à-v is their respective effects on candidate substitution under Section 77 . As ex plained in the case of
Miranda v. Abaya (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be v alidly substituted
pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied
due course to and/or cancelled under Section 7 8 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate.
Stated differently , since there would be no candid ate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted; the same does not obtain, however,
in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, al though his or her candidacy is
discontinued. On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where
substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party “dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause.” Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the
said section and therefore, cannot be a v alid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to
comply with the one y ear residency requirement. The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word
“disqualified” in the February 17 , 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC First Div ision, which was adopted by the
COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of priv ate respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET
in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified —and not that his
CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled—would mean that he could have been validly substituted by
private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy. Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Div ision’s February
17 , 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC
should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s
substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s “disq ualification” is his
failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground
for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a CoC under Section 7 8 of the OEC, not for disqualification. As
earlier mentioned, the material misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 7 8 petition refers to statements
affecting one’s qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural
born Filipino status. There is therefore no legal basis to support a finding, of disqualification within the ambit of
election laws. Accordingly, given Richard’s noncompliance with that the COMELEC First Division’s unqualified
grant of Juntilla’s “Verified Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification”―which prayed that the
COMELEC declare Richard “DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the House of
Representatives” and “x x x that [his] Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE COURSE and/or
CANCELLED”―carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC pursuant to
Section 7 8.
 98

64. Jalosjos v . Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 193237 , October 9, 2012

FACTS:

Petitioners Domindor Jaloslos and Agapito Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del
Norte in the May 2010 elections. Cardino filed a petition to deny due course and to cancel candidacy of Jalosjos on
the grounds that Jalosjos made false representation in his certificate for candidacy when Jaloslos declared under
oath that he was elegible to run for the office of the Mayor. Cardino claimed that long before Jaloslos filed his
candidacy, Jaloslos had already been convicted for final judgement for robbery and sentenced to prision mayor.
Jaloslos admitted the conv iction but asserted that he has been granted probation. The COMELEC granted
Cardinos petition and cancelled Jaloslos certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC concluded that he has indeed
committed material representation when he declared under oath that he is eligible for office he seeks to be elected
when in fact he is not by reason of final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which has not yet served.

ISSUE: WON Jaloslos is qualified to run on May 2010 elections.

HELD: NO. The perpetual disqualification against Jaloslos arising from his criminal conviction by final
judgement is a material fact involving elegibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Sec. 7 8 of the
Omnibus Election Code. A sentence of prsion mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Sec.
40 of the Local Gov ernment Code and under Sec. 1 2 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact
inv olv ing the elegibilty of a candidate under Sec. 7 4 and 7 8 of the Omnibus Election Code. Both temporary
absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public
office. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold or to run for any elective public office from
the time his judgement of conviction became final.
 99

65. Timbol v . Comelec, G.R. No. 206004, February 24, 2015

FACTS: On October 5, 2012, Timbol filed a certificate of candidacy for councilor of the Second District of
Caloocan City .

On January 15, 201 3, Timbol was ordered to appear before the Comelec for a clarificatory hearing in connection
with his certificate of candidacy.

Timbol, together with his counsel, appeared before Election Officer V alencia. During the clarificatory hearing,
Timbol argued that he was not a nuisance candidate and contended that in the 2010 elections, he ranked eight
among all the candidates who ran for councilors in the second district. He allegedly had sufficient resources to
sustain his campaign.

The clarificatory panel assured him that his name would be deleted from the list of nuisance candidates and that
his certificate of candidacy would be given due course.Despite Election Officer Valencia’s favorable
recommendation, Timbol’s name was not remov ed from the list of nuisance candidates posted in the Comelec
website. With the printing of ballots for the automated elections set on February 4, 2013, Timbol filed on February
2, 2013, a petition praying that his name be included in the certified list of candidates.

ISSUE: WON Timbol was denied due process for being considered a nuisance candidate.

HELD:

Y ES. The opportunity to be heard is a chance “to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. In election cases, d ue process requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversyat hand.

To minimize the logistical confusion caused by nuisance candidates, their certificate of candidacy may be denied
due course or cancelled by Comelec. This denial or cancellation may be “moto propio or upon a verified petition of
an interested party subject to an opportunity to be heard.
 100

66. OLIVIA DA SILVA CERAFICA v . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 205136

FACTS:

On October 2012, Kimberly filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for Councilor, City of Taguig for the 2013
Elections. Her COC stated that she was born on 29 October 1 992, or that she will be twenty (20) years of age on
the day of the elections, in contravention of the requirement that one must be at least twenty -three (23) years of
age on the day of the elections. As such, Kimberly was summoned to a clarificatory hearing due to the age
qualification. Instead of attending the hearing, Kimberly op ted to file a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of COC.
Simultaneously, Oliv ia filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly. The COMELEC rendered a decision
ordering the cancellation of Kimberly ’s COC, and the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Oliv ia. COMELEC
argued that Oliv ia cannot substitute Kimberly as the latter was never an official candidate because she was not
eligible for the post by reason of her age, and that; moreover, the COC that Kimberly filed was inv alid because it
contained a material misrepresentation relating to her eligibility for the office she seeks to be elected to. Oliv ia
countered that although Kimberly may not be qualified to run for election because of her age, it cannot be denied
that she still filed a valid COC and was, thus, an official candidate who may be substituted. Oliv ia also claimed that
there was no ground to cancel or deny Kimberly’s COC on the ground of lack of qualification and material
misrepresentation because she did not misrepresent her birth date to qualify for the position of councilor, and as
there was no deliberate attempt to mislead the electorate, which is precisely why she withdrew her COC upon
learning that she was not qualified.

ISSUE: Was there a valid substitution?

RULING:

Yes, in declaring that Kimberly , being under age, could not be considered to have filed a v alid COC and, thus,
could not be validly substituted by Olivia, we find that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion. Firstly, subject
to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs under Sec. 7 8, Batas
Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 881 , the COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs.
The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual a nd proper cognizance of the
COMELEC.

The nex t question then is whether Oliv ia complied with all of the requirements for a v alid substitution; we answer
in the affirmative. First, there was a valid withdrawal of Kimberly’s COC after the last day for the fi ling of COCs;
second, Oliv ia belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs; and third,
Oliv ia filed her COC not later than mid-day of election day.

COMELEC has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs. The question of eligibility or
ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC.
 101

67 . ERIGUEL vs COMELEC G.R. No. 190526 February 26, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner Eriguel and priv ate respondent Dumpit were mayoralty candidates inAgoo, La Union during the May
14, 2007 elections .On May 1 8, 2007 , after the canv assing and counting of votes, Eriguel was proclaimed as the
duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Agoo. Eriguel received 11,803 votes against Dumpit’s 7 ,899 votes,
translating to a margin of 3,904 votes. On May 28, 2007 , Dumpit filed an Election Protest before the RTC of
Agoo, La Union contesting the appreciation and counting of ballots in 152 precincts in Agoo because some of
the ballots cast in favor of Eriguel were erroneously counted and appreciated in the latter’s favor despite
containing markings and identical symbols.

On December 7 , 2007 , the trial court issued a decision upholding Eriguel’s proclamation
because ev idences presented by the Protestant are not substantial enough to persuade the Judge of this Court to
rule in favor of Protestant. Unsatisfied with the findings, Dumpit appealed to the COMELEC. The case was
initially assigned to the Special Second Div ision composed of Presiding Commissioner Rene V.Sarmiento and
Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer. Commissioner Ferrer, howev er, decided to inhibit himself. This prompted
Presiding Commissioner Sarmiento to issue an Order dated July22, 2009 elevating the appeal to the Commission
en banc.

The transfer of the case to the Commission en banc was apparently made pursuant to COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Thereafter, the Commission en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of the contested
ballots. On December 9, 2009, after an ex haustive appreciation of all the contested ballots, the Commission en
banc promulgated a resolution nullify ing 3,7 11 ballots cast in favor of Eriguel after finding the same to have been
written by only one (1 )or two (2) persons.On this note, the Commission en banc set aside the RTC’s decision and
declared Dumpit as the duly elected mayor of Agoo, La Union, for hav ing garnered 1 67 more votes than
Eriguel.Aggrieved, Eriguel petitioned v ia certiorari.

ISSUES:

1.Procedurally, whether the Special Second Div ision of the COMELEC gravely abused its authority when it
automatically elev ated Dumpits appeal to the Commission en banc after only one commissioner was left to deal
with the case; and

2. Substantively, whether the COMELEC en bancs fresh appreciation of the contested b allots without first
ascertaining the integrity thereof is v alid.

HELD:

1.Y ES. The COMELEC, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions, is bound to follow the prov ision set forth in
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution, which reads: “SEC. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in two div isions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to ex pedite disposition of election
cases, including pre-proclamation controversies.All such election cases shall be heard and decided in div ision,
prov ided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en banc.”

It therefore follows that when the COMELEC is ex ercising its quasi-judicial powers such as in the present case, the
Commission is constitutionally mandated to decide the case first in division, and en banc only upon motion for
reconsideration.
 102

Indeed, it is a basic doctrine in procedural law that the jurisdiction of a court or an agency exercising quasi-
judicial functions (such as the COMELEC) over the subject-matter of an action is conferred only by the
Constitution or by law. Jurisdiction cannot be fix ed by the agreement of the parties; it cannot be acquired through,
or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the parties. Neither can it be conferred by the
acquiescence of the court, more particularly so in election cases where the interest involved transcends those of
the contending parties.

This being so, the Special Second Div ision of the COMELEC clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
immediately transferred to the Commission en banc a case that ought to be heard and decided by a division. Such
action cannot be done without running afoul of Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. Instead of
peremptorily transferring the case to the Commission en banc, the Special Second Div ision of COMELEC, should
hav e instead assigned another Commissioner as additional member of its Special Second Div ision, not only to fill
in the seat temporarily vacated by Commissioner Ferrer, but more importantly so that the required quorum may
be attained.

2.Y ES. The records of the case indicate that the COMELEC en banc proceeded to conduct a fresh appreciation of
the contested ballots without first ascertaining whether the ballots to be recounted had been kept inv iolate. The
COMELEC cannot proceed to conduct a fresh appreciation of ballots without first ascertaining the integrity
thereof.
 103

68. Abayon v . House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 189466, February 11, 2010

FACTS:

In G.R. 189466 petitioner Dary l Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party -list organization
that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition
for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not
eligible for a party -list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being
the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative.

It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its
nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat
Tayo.

In G.R.1 89506, petitioner Jov ito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party -list group that won a seat
in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party -list nominee because he did not belong to
the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the v ictims of communist rebels,
Civ ilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.

Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party -
list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan
claimed that he was just Bantay ’s nominee. Consequently, any question involv ing his eligibility as first nominee
was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before
the HRET.

ISSUE: WON respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan.

HELD:

Y ES. Although it is the party -list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as
and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.

Section 17 , Article VI of the Constitution 9 prov ides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to,
among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are “elected m embers” of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the
cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party -list nominee has been proclaimed and
the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representativ es, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
 104

69. Hayudini v . Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207900

FACTS:

On October 5, 201 2, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Municipal Mayor of South
Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. Ten days after, or on October 15, 2012, Mustapha J. Omar filed a Petition to Deny Due Course o r
Cancel Hayudini’s CoC, entitled Mustapha J. Omar v. Gamal S. Hay udini, Omar basically asserted that Hay udini
should be disqualified for making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared
in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.
Thereafter, on November 30, 2012, Hay udini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Tri al Court . Despite the opposition of Ignacio
Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition on January 31, 2013. On that same day, the COMELEC’s First
Div ision dismissed. Omar’s earlier petition to cancel Hay udini’s CoC for lack of substantial ev idenc e that
Hay udini committed false representation as to his residency. Hay udini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian,
Tawi-Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office. On June 20, 2013, the COMELEC
Second Div ision issued a Resolution granting Omar’s second petition to cancel Hay udini’s CoC.

ISSUE:WON, COMELEC committed grav e abuse of discretion when it resolved to cancel petitioners CoC and
declare his proclamation as null and void.

HELD:

NO. Had the COMELEC not given due course to Omar’s petition solely based on procedural deficiencies, South
Ubian would hav e a mayor who is not even a registered voter in the locality he is supposed to govern, thereby
creating a ridiculously absurd and outrageous situation. Hence, the COMELEC was a ccurate in cancelling
Hay udini’s certificate of candidacy. Hayudini likewise protests that it was a grave error on the part of the
COMELEC to hav e declared his proclamation null and void when no petition for annulment of his proclamation
was ever filed. What petitioner seems to miss, however, is that the nullification of his proclamation as a winning
candidate is also a legitimate outcome − a necessary legal consequence − of the cancellation of his CoC pursuant
to Section 7 8. A CoC cancellation proceeding e ssentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification case. The
cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the votes cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled as stray votes. If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or de nial case is not resolved before the election
day , the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner.
 105

70. GMA NET WORK, INC., v s. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 205357

FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Co urt put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for
national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty
(1 80) minutes, respectively . They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time v iolates
freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relativ e to the
ex ercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the prev ious “per station” airtime for political
campaigns or adv ertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approv al for candidates’ television and radio
guestings and appearances.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits v iolates freedom of
ex pression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with
the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the play ing
field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive
measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate -based time limits on broadcast time
when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages
and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach
out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he convey s his message through
his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add
all of these airtimes in different dialects wo uld greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself –
a form of suppression of his political speech.
 106

TOPIC: THREE-TERM LIMIT

7 1. ANGEL G. NAVAL v s. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. JULIA

FACTS:

From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Nav al had been elected and served as a member of the Sanggunian, Second
District, Camarines Sur.

On October 1 2, 2009, the President approved Republic Act No. 97 16, which reapportioned the legislative districts
in Camarines Sur. In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
District. He served until 2013. In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anew and was re -elected as Member of the
Sanggunian, Third District. Julia filed before the COMELEC a V erified Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval. Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire Prov ince of Camarines
Sur for three consecutive terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective of the district he had been elected
from.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal mayor, hav ing been elected and had already served for three (3) consecutive
terms, can run as city mayor in light of the conversion of the municipality to a city

RULING:

No. In apply ing the three-term limit rule, the Court pointed out that the conversion of the municipality into a city
did not conv ert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the office of the city
mayor. The Court took into account the following circumstances: (1 ) That the territorial jurisdiction of the city was
the same as that of the municipality ; (2) That the inhabitants were the same group of voters who elected the
municipal mayor for three (3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the inhabitants were the same grou p of voters
whom he held power and authority as their chief ex ecutive for nine y ears.

Anchoring from the said case, it is therefore clear that the position to which Naval has filed his candidacy for the
13 May 2013 Elections is the same position for which he had been elected and had served for the past nine (9)
years. A prov incial board member’s election to the same position for the third and fourth time, but now in
representation of the renamed district, is a v iolation of the three -term limit rule.
 107

TOPIC: BIOMET RICS REGIST RATION

72. KABATAAN PARTY -LIST VS COMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law RA 10367 , which mandates the COMELEC to implement a
mandatory biometrics registration system for new voters in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent, and
updated list of voters through the adoption of biometric technology. Likewise said law directs that registered
voters whose biometrics has not been captured shall submit themselves for validation. Voters who fa il to submit
for validation on or before the last day of filing of application for registration for purposes of the May 2016
Elections shall be deactiv ated.

After, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 97 21 which serves as the implementing rules and regulations of RA
10367 , thus, prescribing the procedure for validation, deactiv ation, and reactivation of voters’ registration records.
Another Resolution No. 9863 which amended certain portions of Resolution No. 9853 dated February 19, 2014
was passed, by stating that ERBs shall deactiv ate the V RRs of those who failed to submit for v alidation despite
notice on or before October 31, 2015. A month later, or in May 2014, the COMELEC launched the NoBio -NoBoto
public information campaign which ran concurrently with the period of continuing registration. The COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 10013 which prov ides for the procedures in the deactivation of V RRs who do not have
biometrics data in the V RRs after the October 31, 2015 deadline of registration and validation

Herein petitioners filed the instant petition with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics v alidation requirement
imposed under RA 10367 , as well as COMELEC Resolution Nos. 97 21, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto. They
contend that: (a) biometrics validation rises to the level of an additional, substantial qualification where there is
penalty of deactiv ation; (b) biometrics deactiv ation is not the disqualification by law contemplated by the 1 987
Constitution; (c) biometrics v alidation gravely v iolates the Constitution, considering that, apply ing the strict
scrutiny test, it is not poised with a compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an unreasonable depriv ation
of the right to suffrage; (d) voters to be deactiv ated are not afforded due process; and (e) poor experience with
biometrics should serve as warning against ex acting adherence to the system.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 10367 , as well as COMELEC Reso lution Nos. 97 21, 9863, and 10013, all re lated
thereto, unconstitutional

RULING:

NO, it is constitutional. The biometrics registration requirement is not a "qualification" to the exercise of the right
of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State has the right to reasonably regulate.
Unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the level of a literacy, property or other substantive
requirement as contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution - that is, one which propagates a socio -economic
standard which is bereft of any rational basis to a person's ability to intelligently cast his vote and to further the
public good - the same cannot be struck down as unconstitutional. The assailed biometrics registration regulation
on the right to suffrage was sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling state
interest of establishing a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was demonstrably the least
restrictive means in promoting that interest.
 108

TOPIC: Tests of Valid Ordinance and Requisites of ex ercise of police power

73. City of Manila v s. Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio Jr.

FACTS:

Priv ate respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporatio n engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened V ictoria Court in Malate which was
licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. MTDC filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order before
the RTC as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila. They prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

The City of Manila enacted an ordinance disallowing any persons or business establishments to be allowed or
authorized to contract and engage in, any business prov iding certain forms of amusement , entertainment, services
and facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy
the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community one of which enumerated
therein in the business of priv ate respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the City Ordinance is constitutional and v alid exercise of police power

RULING:

No. The tests of a v alid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be
valid it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1 ) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory ;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council
acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general
welfare clause. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carry ing on their
business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property th at it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose goes beyond the regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is an exercise of police power that is v iolativ e of the priv ate property rights of individuals.
 109

TOPIC: QUALIFICATION OF LGBT TO BE QUALIFIED AS PARTY -LIST

74. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gay s, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered indiv iduals. Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006 as a party -list organization under Republic Act 7 941 (Party -List Sy stem Act). The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. In 2009, Ang
Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the COMELEC upon which it was dismissed because it had no
concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that based on moral grounds. A ng Ladlad
sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that “the party -list system is a tool
for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner qualifies for registration as a party -list organization under RA 7 941

RULING:

Yes. The court ruled that the application for registration as party -list should be granted. Ang Ladlad has
sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Nowhere in the records has
the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party -list organization under any
of the requisites under RA 7 941.

Our Constitution prov ides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non -establishment clause calls for is
“gov ernment neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”

Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party -
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under -represented sectors. The principle of non-
discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to elections be applied to all persons, regardless of
sex ual orientation.
 110

TOPIC: JUST COMPENSATION

75. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS. SPOUSE S ZABALA

FACTS:

Plaintiff National Power Corporation filed a complaint for Eminent Domain against defendants -Sps. R. Zabala &
L. Bay lon, before the RTC, Balanga City, Bataan alleging that Spouses Zabala and Bay lon own parcels of land
located in Balanga City , Bataan and that it urgently needed an easement of right of way over the affected areas for
its 230 KV Limay -Hermosa Transmission Lines. The Commissioners submitted their Report/Recommendation
fix ing the just compensation at P150.00 per square meter. Napocor prayed that the report be recommitted to the
commissioners for the modification of the report and the substantiation of the same with reliable and competent
documentary ev idence based on the value of the property at the time of its taking. The Commissioners submitted
their Final Report fixing the just compensation at P500.00 per square meter. On June 28, 2004, the RTC
rendered its Partial Decision and ordered Napocor to pay Php150.00 per square meter for the 6,820 square
meters determined as of the date of the taking of the property. Napocor appealed to the CA arguing that the
Commissioners reports are not supported by documentary evidence. Napocor argued that the RTC did not apply
Section 3A of R.A. No. 6395 which limits its liability to easement fee of not more than 10% of the market value of
the property traversed by its transmission lines. CA affirmed the RTCs Partial Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the Court erred in fix ing the amount of Php 150 per square meter as the fair market
value of the property subject of the easement right of way of Napocor

RULING:

Yes. It appears that the Commissioners’ Nov ember 28, 1997 Report/Recommendation is not supported by any
documentary ev idence. There is nothing therein which would show that before arriv ing at the recommended just
compensation of P150.00. Sec. 3A of RA No. 6395 cannot restrict the constitutional power of the courts to
determine just compensation. The pay ment of just compensation for private property taken for public use is
guaranteed no less by our Constitutio n and is included in the Bill of Rights. As such, no legislative enactments or
ex ecutive issuances can prevent the courts from determining whether the right of the property owners to just
compensation has been violated. It is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by any other branch or official of
the government. Statutes and ex ecutive issuances fix ing or providing for the method of computing just
compensation are not binding on courts and, at best, are treated as mere guidelines in asc ertaining the amount
thereof.

The Supreme Court has held in a long line of cases that since the high - tension electric current passing through the
transmission lines will perpetually deprive the property owners of the normal use of their land, it is only just and
proper to require Napocor to recompense them for the full market value of their property. Lastly, it should be
borne in mind that just compensation should be computed based on the fair v alue of the subject property at the
time of its taking or the filing of the co mplaint, whichever came first. Since in this case the filing of the eminent
domain case came ahead of the taking, just compensation should be based on the fair market value of spouses
Zabala’s property at the time of the filing of Napocor’s Complaint on Oc tober 27 , 1994 or thereabouts.
 111

TOPIC: CITY ORDINANCE AS VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

76. HON. MA. LOURDES C. FE RNANDO (City Mayor of Marikina) v s. St. Scholastica’s College and
St. Scholastica Academy -Marikina

FACTS:

Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in
Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title (TCT) No. 91537 . This property is covered by a wall.
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of Marikina. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina
City enacted Ordinance No. 192, entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls i n the Municipality of
Marikina.

The City Gov ernment of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish and replace the fence
of their Marikina property to make it 80% see -thru, and, at the same time, to mov e it back about six meters to
prov ide parking space for vehicles to park. On April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for an ex tension of time
to comply with the directive. In response, the petitioners, through then City Mayor Bay ani F. Fernando, insisted
on the enforcement of the subject ordinance.

Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an application for a writ of prel iminary
injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court, Marikina. RTC ruled in favour of
respondents. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the ordinance is a v alid exercise of police power by the city government of Marikina

RULING:

No. The case of Social Justice Society v s. Atienza Jr. has been applied in this case. It is mentioned in this case that
local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1 ) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its ex ercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon indiv iduals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
method. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights and a v iolation of the due process clause.

Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their
property .

It also appears that requiring the ex posure of their property via a see -thru fence is violative of their right to
privacy , considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property . The right to
privacy has long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that must be protected from
intrusion or constraint. The right to priv acy is essentially the right to be let alone,37 as governmental powers
should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens.38 It is inherent in the concept of
liberty, enshrined in the Bill of Rights (Article III) in Sections 1 , 2, 3(1 ), 6, 8, and 17 , Article III of the 1 987
Constitution.
 112

TOPIC: DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION

77. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS. SPS STA. ROMANA

FACTS:

Respondents, , represented by Aurora Sta. Romana, are the owners of a 27 .5307 -ha of an agricultural land
situated in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. Petitioner, the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), compulsorily acquired a 21 .2192 -ha. Portion of respondents’ property acquired by the
latter pursuant to the gov ernment’s Operation Land Transfer Program under Presidential Decree No. 27 , known
as "Tenants Emancipation Decree," as amended. On Nov ember 29, 1995, the DAR caused the generation of
emancipation patents in favor of the farmer -beneficiaries, and, in 1 996, the LBP fix ed the value of the subject land
at P361 ,181 .87 10 (LBP valuation) using the formula11 under Ex ecutive Order No. 22812 and DAR Administrative
Order No. 1 3, series of 1994.

Dissatisfied with the LBP v aluation, respondents filed a Petition for Approv al and Appraisal of Just Compensation
before the RTC, the just compensation was inadequate. RTC rejected the LBP v aluation and fix ing the just
compensation of the subject land at P2,57 6,829.94 or P121,438.60/ha. CA affirmed the latter court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land was properly valued in accordance with the factors set forth in Sectio n 17
of RA 6657 , as amended.

RULING:

No. The case was remanded to the RTC for further reception of ev idence on the issue of just compensation in
accordance with the guidelines set in this Decision.

For purposes of determining just compensation, the fair market v alue of an expropriated property is determined
by its character and its price at the time of taking. In addition, the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA
6657 , i.e., (a) the acquisition cost of the land, (b) the current value of like proper ties, (c) the nature and actual use
of the property, and the income therefrom, (d) the owner's sworn valuation, (e) the tax declarations, (f) the
assessment made by gov ernment assessors, (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and
the farmworkers, and by the government to the property, and (h) the non -pay ment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institution on the said land, if any , must be equally considered.
 113

EQUAL PROT ECTION

85. Central Bank Employ ees Association, Inc. v s. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004

Facts:

After the effectiv ity of R.A. No. 7 653 which abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, petitioner Central
Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Ex ecutive
Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last proviso in
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7 653, on the ground that it is unconstitutiona l. The thrust of petitioner's
challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the
BSP, viz: (1 ) the BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL)
(ex empt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 1 9 and below), or those not exempted from the
coverage of the SSL (non-ex empt class). It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class
legislation," allegedly not based on substantial dist inctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of
the BSP personnel's position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7 653, the most important of which is to establish professiona lism and excellence at all levels in the
BSP.

Issue:

Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7 653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate
that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."

Ruling:
No. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose of
the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class. In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative
deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's
lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executiv es. It was not intended to
discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the
officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational
basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.
 114

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

86. Gamboa v s. Chan

G.R. No. 193636, July 24, 2012

Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued A.O. 27 5, "Creating an Independent Commission to Address
the Alleged Ex istence of Priv ate Armies in the Country." The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa
Commission, was formed to investigate the ex istence of priv ate army groups (PAGs) in the country with a v iew to
eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them permanently in the future. Upon the
conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a
confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Armies’
Report to the President" (the Report). Gamboa allege d that the PNP–Ilocos Norte conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides, and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.

Issue: Whether Gamboa should be granted the priv ilege of the writ of habeas data by reason of respondent’s
v iolation of her right to priv acy.

Ruling:
No. Although it is expressly recognized in section 3 (1 ) of the Bill of Rights that, “the privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inv iolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order
requires otherwise as prescribed by law”, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective,
the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right
to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and
compelling.

The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, priv acy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an indiv idual, and to prov ide a forum to enforce one’s right to the
truth and to informational priv acy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected throug h unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a
nex us between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the ot her.
 115

RIGHT TO PRIVACY

87 . Spouses Hing vs. Choachuy

G.R. No. 17 9736, June 26, 2013

Facts:

Petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of a parcel of land while respondents are the owners of Aldo
Dev elopment & Resources, Inc. (Aldo) adjace nt to the property of petitioners. Aldo claimed that petitioners were
constructing a fence without a v alid permit and that the said construction would destroy the wall of its building. In
order to get evidence to support the said case, respondents illegally set-up and installed on the building of Aldo
Goodyear Servitec two v ideo surveillance cameras facing petitioners’ property. Choachuy, through their employees
and without the consent of petitioners, also took pictures of petitioners’ on -going construction. Thus, petitioners
prayed that respondents be ordered to remove the v ideo surveillance cameras and enjoined from conducting
illegal surv eillance.

Issue: Whether there is a v iolation of petitioners’ right to privacy.

Ruling:
Yes. The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. In ascertaining whether there is a v iolation of the right to
privacy , courts use the "reasonable expectation of privacy " test. This test determines whether a person has a
reasonable expectation of priv acy and whether the expectat ion has been violated. In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated
that "the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy depends on a two -part test: (1 ) whether, by his
conduct, the indiv idual has exhibited an expectation of privacy ; and (2) this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable." Customs, community norms, and practices may , therefore, limit or ex tend an
indiv idual’s "reasonable expectation of privacy." Hence, the reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy
must be determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.

In this day and age, v ideo surveillance cameras are installed practically everywhere for the protection and safety of
ev eryone. The installation of these cameras, however, should not cover places where there is reasonable
ex pectation of priv acy, unless the consent of the individual, whose right to privacy would be affected, was
obtained. Nor should these cameras be used to pry into the privacy of another’s residence or business office as it
would be no different from eavesdropping, which is a crime under Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti -Wiretapping
Law.
 116

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA and RIGHT TO PRIVACY

88. Viv ares vs. St. Theresa’s College

G.R. No. 202666, September 29, 2014

Facts:
Nenita Julia V . Daluz (Julia) and Julienne V ida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were graduating high school
students at St. Theresa's College. Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves
clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her
Facebook profile. My lene Rheza T. Escudero, a computer teacher at STC’s high school department, learned from
her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed
only in brassieres. Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students. Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day
that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises.

Issue:

1. Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued.

2. Whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened v iolation of the right to p rivacy in the life,
liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.

Ruling:

1. No. In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational priv acy. A comparative law scholar has defined habeas data as "a procedure designed to
safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." Without an actionable entitlement in
the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper. V iewed from
the perspectiv e of the case at bar, this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social
network (OSN) ––(1 ) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions,
of users, sans the spatial barriers, bridging the gap creat ed by physical space; and (2) that any information
uploaded in OSNs leaves an indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of
the end-users.

2. No. The concept of priv acy has, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements hav ing an
influential part. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech,
The Common Right to Priv acy, where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy , viz: (1 )
locational or situational privacy ; (2) informational privacy ; and (3) decisional privacy. It is well to
emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s priv acy to "Friends" is no assurance that it
can no longer be v iewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. It is,
thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activ ities and
must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the v igilant. Demanding relief from the
courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they
allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confin es of their priv ate zone. OSN users must be
mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the av ailable privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.
 117

CY BERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012

89. Disini v s. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014

Facts:
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. A person can connect to the internet, a
sy stem that links him to other computers. However, there are also those who would want, like v andals, to wreak or
cause havoc to the computer sy stems and networks of indispensable or highly use ful institutions as well as to the
laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent indiv iduals. The government certainly has the duty and
the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cy bercrime
Prevention Act. But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activ ities v iolate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law
merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activ ities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks
on the system.

Issue: Whether Section 4 (a) (1 ), (3), (6), Section 4 (b) (3), Section 4 (c) (1 ), (2), (3), (4), Section 5, Section 6,
Section 7 , Section 8, Section 1 2, Section 1 3, Section 14, Section 15, Section 17 , Section 1 9, Section 20, Section 24,
Section 26 (a) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 and Articles 353, 354, 361 , and 362 of the RPC on the
crime of libel are unconstitutional.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the following provisions are V OID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(c)(3) that penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial communications.

The abov e penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as "spam." One
who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam." People, before the arriv al of the age
of computers, have already been receiv ing such unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as
nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. Their recipients alway s have the option to delete or not to
read them. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails.
Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that
giv en to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of traffic data in real-tim e.

Two categories of priv acy: decisional privacy and informational priv acy. Decisional privacy involves the right
to independence in making certain important decisions, while informational priv acy refers to the interest in
av oiding disclosure of personal matters. It is the latter right —the right to informational privacy —that those who
oppose government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have priv ate information disclosed, and the right to live
freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to
privacy , this Court has laid down a two -fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must
hav e an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where his
or her ex pectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as object ively reasonable.

Section 1 2, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with specified communications."
But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would
specify the target communications. The power is v irtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to
 118

engage in "fishing ex pedition," choosing whatever specified communication they want. This ev idently threatens
the right of individuals to priv acy.

c. Section 1 9 of the same Act that authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to
suspected Com puter Data.

The Government, in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its control and disposition without
a warrant. The Department of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant. The content of the
computer data can also constitute speech. Therefore, the Court ruled that it is being v iolative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of ex pression and against unreasonab le searches and seizures.

The Court ruled that the following provisions are VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:

a. Section 4(a)(1 ) that penalizes accessing a computer sy stem without right .

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1 ) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny standard
since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act –
accessing the computer sy stem of another without right. It is a univ ersally condemned conduct. Ethical hackers
ev aluate the target sy stem’s security and report back to the owners the v ulnerabilities they found in it and give
instructions for how these can be remedied.

Ethical hackers are the equiv alent of independent auditors who come into an organization to verify its
bookkeeping records. A client’s engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between them as to the
ex tent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be test ed. This is referred to as the "get out of jail
free card." Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client, such permission would
insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1 ).

b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of v iruses.

Under the Ov erbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area
of protected freedoms. The Court ruled that Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply
punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of willfully destroying without right the things that
belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act has
no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer sy stems and
private documents.

c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in bad faith to
the prejudice of others.

The law is reasonable in penalizing the person for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to profit,
mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-motiv ated of the rightful opportunity of registering
the same. The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is
baseless.

d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the use or misuse of identify ing information belonging
to another.

The law punishes those who acquire or use such identifying information without right, implicitly to cause
damage. Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer -related identity theft v iolates the
right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due process of law. Clearly , what this section regulates
are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of personal identify ing data of another. There is no
fundamental right to acquire another’s personal data.
 119

e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sex ual activity for favor
or consideration.

The element of "engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal cybersex. The Act actually
seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor and consideration. This includes
interactive prostitution and pornography , i.e., by webcam. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1)
unconstitutional where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of
maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sex ual
activ ity with the aid of a computer system as Congress has intended.

f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child pornography.

It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA) to
cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPA’s definition of child
pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other m eans."
Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular
piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined under the Rev ised Penal Code are
committed with the use of inform ation and communications technologies.

Section 6 merely makes commission of ex isting crimes through the internet a qualify ing circumstance. As
the Solicitor General points out, there ex ists a substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use
of information and communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the
technology in question, the offender often ev ades identification and i s able to reach far more v ictims or cause
greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for cybercrimes.

The matter of fix ing penalties for the commission of crime s is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear
proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offens es is not diluted or
improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an element of another offense
or might just have been connected with another crime.

i. Section 1 3 that permits law enforcem ent authorities to require serv ice providers to preserve traffic
data and subscriber information as well as specified content data for six months.

The contents of materials sent or receiv ed through the internet belong to their authors or recipients and
are to be considered priv ate c ommunications. At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data
that serv ice providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by
reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserv ing data will not unduly hamper the normal
transmission or use of the same.

j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of com puter data under a court -issued warrant.

Such is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of
law enforcers to enable them to carry out their ex ecutive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would
not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it v iolate the privacy of communications and
correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention.
 120

k. Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and ex amination of com puter data under a court -
issued warrant.

The Court ruled that it merely enumerates the duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the
proper collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by v irtue of a court
warrant. The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were
taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede ex isting search and seizure rules but merely supplements them.

l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of prev iously preserv ed com puter data after the ex piration of
the prescribed holding periods.

The Court ruled that the Solicitor General justifies this as necessary to clear up the service prov ider’s
storage systems and prevent overload. It would also ensure that investigations are quickly concluded.

m . Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation to cybercrime investigations.

The act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must
still be a judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications
for non-compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is v alid insofar as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV
which are not struck down by the Court.

n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC).

The cybercrime law is co mplete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cyber security plan. Also, contrary to the position of the petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC
to follow when it provided a definition of cyber security.

Cy ber security refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management approaches, actions, training,
best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber environment and organization and
user’s assets.104 This definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating the cyber
security plan.

o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and Functions.

The formulation of the cyber security plan is consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat
such cyber offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and
international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." This policy is
clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard.

p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.

But the Court’s acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article. The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything -goes writing style. In a
sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the reader’s reaction to defamatory statements posted in
cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which
such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users.
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, OF SPEECH, AND OF PRESS

90. GMA Network v s. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 205357 , September 2, 2014

Facts:

The fiv e (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for
national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundre d eighty
(1 80) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast
time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information
relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the prev ious “per station” airtime for political
campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approv al for candi dates’ television and radio
guestings and appearances.

Issue: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits v iolates freedom of
ex pression, of speech and of the press.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it
unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with
the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate -based” airtime limits – leveling the play ing
field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of
government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear -cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive
measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time
when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages
and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach
out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he convey s his message through
his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all
of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the abil ity of such candidate to express himself – a
form of suppression of his political speech.
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH and SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND ST ATE

91. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

Facts:
Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public v iew. The
first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law " referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or
Republic Act No. 1 0354. The second tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience V ote" and lists candidates as
either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay " with a check mark, or "(Pro -RH) Team Patay " with an "X" mark. The electoral
candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of
the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team
Buhay ". Respondent, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City , issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials. Concerned about the imminent prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this
case.

Issue:

1. Whether the tarpaulins are form or expression (protected speech), or election propaganda or political
advertisement.

2. Whether the action of the petitioners in posting its tarpaulin v iolates the constitutional principle of Separation
of Church and State.

Ruling:

1. Yes. Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons
who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what
is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate
only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
ex pression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictiv e me ans to achieve that object. The regulation must only be
with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be
prohibited or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made
with or on priv ate property.

This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the
twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a social advocacy.

Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of
Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass
the test of reasonability . A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any relation to the distance from the
intended av erage audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be
read by the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It wi ll amount to the abridgement of
speech with political consequences.

2. No. Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the ex ercise of civ il or political rights.

There are two aspects of this prov ision. The first is the non-establishment clause. Second is the free exercise and
enjoy ment of religious profession and worship.
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Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, imams, or any other religious make such act immune
from any secular regulation. 324 The religious also have a secular ex istence. They ex ist within a society that is
regulated by law. The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the
ex pression on the tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church
doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion in the
Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any
doubt as to its nature as speech with political consequences and not r eligious speech.
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TOPICS: RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF T HE LAW; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; FREEDOM

OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION; VITAL ROLE OF T HE Y OUTH IN NATION BUILDING

92. SORIANO v s. LAGUARDIA

FACTS:

Petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37 , made the following remarks: Lehitimong
anak ng demonyo; sinungaling; Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang
babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masa hol
pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga
demonyong ito. x x x

Before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidav it -complaints were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven
other priv ate respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in connection with the
above broadcast. Respondent Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioners remark, was then a minister of
INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. In Adm. Case No. 01 -04, the MTRCB issued a
decision, finding respondent Soriano liable for his utterances and thereby imposing on him a penalty of three (3)
months suspension from his program, Ang Dating Daan.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not the MTRCB denies petitioner’s right to equal protection of the law, arguing that,
owing to the preventive suspension order, he was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the
INC ministers.
II. Whether or not petitioner’s utterances was religious speech.
III. Whether or not the preventive suspension violates petitioner’s freedom of speech and expression.
IV . Whether or not petitioner’s utterances must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent and such danger must be grave and
imminent.
V. Whether or not the State is mandated to recognize and support the v ital role of the youth in nation
building.
VI. Whether or not the three (3)-month suspension is a prior restraint.

RULING:

I. NO. The equal protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the priv ileges conferred and liabilities imposed.
It guards against undue favor and individual priv ilege as well as hostile discrimin ation.

In the case ate bar, petitioner cannot place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for one, are
not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in
their TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own, necessitating the MTRCBs disciplinary
action. If the immediate result of the preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged
and is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a depriv ation of the equal protection guarantee. The
Court need not belabor the fact that the circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and
the INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the purvi ew of this case, simply too
different to even consider whether or not there is a prima facie indication of oppressiv e inequality.
 125

II. NO. Sec. 5, Article III of the 1 987 Constitution on religious freedom provides that no law shall be
made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
ex ercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of c ivil or political rights.

In the case at bar, there is nothing in petitioners statements subject of the complaints expressing any particular
religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements
in a telev ised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious discourse.
Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even
petitioners attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek
retribution, not by any religious conv iction. His claim, assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted
his statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used
in retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his statements in defense of his
reputation and religion, as they constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a
riv al religious group.

III. NO. It is settled that expressions by means of newspapers, radio, television, and motion pictures come
within the broad protection of the free speech and expression clause. Each method though, because of
its dissimilar presence in the lives of people and accessibility to children, tends to present its own
problems in the area of free speech protection, with broadcast media, of all forms of communication,
enjoy ing a lesser degree of protection. The freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not
grant one the license to v ilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments must be
ex pressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights of others. It has been
established in this jurisdiction that unprotected speech or low -value expression refers to libelous
statements, obscenity or pornography, false or misleading adv ertisement, insulting or fighting words,
i.e., those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of peace
and expression endangering national security.

In the case at bar, petitioners statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the av erage child.
Hence, it is, in that context, unprotected speech. A patently offensive utterance would come within the pale of the
term obscenity should it appeal to the prurient interest of an average listener applying contemporary standards. A
cursory examination of the utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an average
adult, may not constitute obscene but merely indecent utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or
merely a play on words. In the contex t they were used, they may not appeal to the prurient interests of an adult.
However, the problem with the challenged statements is that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated G or
for general v iewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children. Without
parental guidance, the unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast could corrupt
impressionable young minds. In this particular case, where children had the opportunity to hear petitioners
words, when speaking of the average person in the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the
av erage adult. The average child may not have the adults grasp of figures of speech, and may lack the
understanding that language may be colorful, and words may convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably
the subject speech is v ery suggestive of a female sex ual or gan and its function as such. In this sense, we find
petitioners utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under the umbrella of freedom of speech.

The Court in Chavez elucidated on the distinction between regulation or restriction of protected speech
that is content-based and that which is content-neutral. A content-based restraint is aimed at the
contents or idea of the ex pression, whereas a content-neutral restraint intends to regulate the time,
place, and manner of the expression under well-defined standards tailored to serv e a compelling state
interest, without restraint on the message of the ex pression. Courts subject content-based restraint
to strict scrutiny.

In the case at bar, the suspension MTRCB imposed under the premises was, in one perspectiv e, permissible
restriction. We make this disposition against the backdrop of the following interplay ing factors: First, the
indecent speech was made via telev ision, a pervasive medium that, easily reaches every home where there is a set
and where children will likely be among the av id v iewers of the programs therein shown; second, the broadcast
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was aired at the time of the day when there was a reasonable risk that children might be in the audience; and
third, petitioner uttered his speech on a G or for general patronage rated program. The words petitioner used
were, by any civ ilized norm, clearly not suitable for children. Where a language is categorized as indecent, as in
petitioners utterances on a general-patronage rated TV program, it may be readily proscribed as unprotected
speech.

IV . NO. The clear and present danger doctrine accords protection for utterances so that the printed
or spoken words may not be subject to prior restraint or subsequent pun ishment unless its expression
creates a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantial evil which the government has the
power to prohibit. Under the doctrine, freedom of speech and of press is susceptible of restriction
when and only when necessary to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
government may lawfully protect. As it were, said doctrine evolved in the context of prosecutions for
rebellion and other crimes involv ing the overthrow of government. It was originally desig ned to
determine the latitude which should be giv en to speech that espouses anti -government action, or to
hav e serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public order of the
community. The clear and present danger rule has been ap plied to this jurisdiction. As a standard of
limitation on free speech and press, however, the clear and present danger test is not a magic
incantation that wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the testing of
the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to release a defendant from liability
the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. The clear and
present danger test does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embrac ing interpretation applicable to
all utterances in all forums.

Where the legislation under constitutional attack interferes with the freedom of speech and assembly
in a more generalized way and where the effect of the speech and assembly in terms of the probability
of realization of a specific danger is not susceptible even of impressionistic calculation, then the
balancing of interests test can be applied. The said test apply when particular conduct is regulated
in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of the two conflicting interests
demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.

Although the urgency of the public interest sought to be secured by Congressional power restricting
the individuals freedom, and the social importance and v alue of the freedom so restricted, are to be
judged in the concrete, not on the basis of abstractions, a wide range of factors are necessarily
relev ant in ascertaining the point or line of equilibrium:

a. the social value and importance of the specific aspect of the particular freedom restricted by the
legislation;
b. the specific thrust of the restriction, i.e., whether the restriction is direct or indirect, whether or not the
persons affected are few;
c. the value and importance of the public interest sought to be secured by the legislation the reference here
is to the nature and grav ity of the evil which Congress seeks to prevent;
d. whether the specific restriction decreed by Congress is reasonably appropriate and necessary for the
protection of such public interest; and
e. whether the necessary safeguarding of the public interest involved may be achieved by some other
measure less restric tive of the protected freedom.

This balancing of interest test, rests on the theory that it is the courts function in a case before it when it finds
public interests served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free ex pression clause affected by it, on the other,
to balance one against the other and arriv e at a judgment where the greater weight shall be placed. If, on balance,
it appears that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of such nature that it outweighs the
abridgment of freedom, then the court will find the legislation v alid. In short, the balance -of-interests theory rests
on the basis that constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those stated in the free speech and expression
clause, and that they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests. To the mind of
the Court, the balancing of interest doctrine is the more appropriate test to follow.
 127

In the case at bar, petitioner used indecent and obscene language and a three (3)-month suspension was
slapped on him for breach of MTRCB rules. In this setting, the assertion by petitioner of his enjoyment of his
freedom of speech is ranged against the duty of the government to protect and promote the development and
welfare of the youth.

V. Y ES. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect.
Moreover, the State is also mandated to recognize and support the v ital role of the youth in nation
building as laid down in Sec. 1 3, Art. II of the 1 987 Constitution. The Constitution has, therefore,
imposed the sacred obligation and responsibility on the State to provide protection to the youth
against illegal or improper ac tivities which may prejudice their general well-being. The Article on
youth, approved on second reading by the Constitutional Commission, ex plained that the State shall
ex tend social protection to minors against all forms of neglect, cruelty, exploitation, immorality, and
practices which may foster racial, religious or other forms of discrimination.

In the case at bar, petitioners offensive and obscene language uttered in a telev ision broadcast, without doubt,
was easily accessible to the children. His statements could hav e exposed children to a language that is
unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children and the States mandate to protect and care for
them, as parens patriae, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating petitioners
utterances in TV broadcast as prov ided in PD 1 986. The compelling need to protect the young impels us to sustain
the regulatory action MTRCB took in the narrow confines of the case. It is the kind of speech that PD 1 986
proscribes necessitating the exercise by MTRCB of statutory disciplinary powers. It is the kind of speech that the
State has the inherent prerogative, nay duty, to regulate and prevent should such action served and further
compelling state interests.

VI. NO. The statutes imposing prior restraints on speech are generally illegal and presumed
unconstitutional breaches of the freedom of speech. The exceptions to prior restraint are movies,
telev ision, and radio broadcast censorship in v iew of its access to numerous people, including the
young who must be insulated from the prejudicial effects of unprotected speech. PD 1 986 was passed
creating the Board of Rev iew for Motion Pictures and Television (now MTRCB) and which requires
prior permit or license before showing a motion picture or broadcasting a TV program. The Board can
classify movies and television programs and can cancel permits for ex hibition of films or telev ision
broadcast. Power of rev iew and prior approval of MTRCB extends to all television programs and is
valid despite the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, all broadcast networks are
regulated by the MTRCB since they are required to get a permit before they air their telev ision
programs. Consequently, their right to enjoy their freedom of sp eech is subject to that requirement.
Gov ernment regulations through the MTRCB became a necessary evil with the government taking the
role of assigning bandwidth to indiv idual broadcasters. The stations explicitly agreed to this
regulatory scheme; otherwise, chaos would result in the television broadcast industry as competing
broadcasters will interfere or co -opt each others signals. In this scheme, station owners and
broadcasters in effect waiv ed their right to the full enjoyment of their right to freedom o f speech in
radio and telev ision programs and impliedly agreed that said right may be subject to prior
restraintdenial of permit or subsequent punishment, like suspension or cancellation of permit, among
others.

In the case at bar, the three (3) months suspension in this case is not a prior restraint on the right of petitioner
to continue with the broadcast of Ang Dating Daan as a permit was already issued to him by MTRCB for such
broadcast. Rather, the suspension is in the form of permissible administrativ e sanction or subsequent punishment
for the offensive and obscene remarks he uttered. It is a sanction that the MTRCB may validly impose under its
charter without running afoul of the free speech clause. More importantly, petitioner is deemed to have y ielded his
right to his full enjoy ment of his freedom of speech to regulation under PD 1986 and its IRR as telev ision station
owners, program producers, and hosts have impliedly accepted the power of MTRCB to regulate the broadcast
industry. Neither can petitioners virtual inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be
plausibly treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper perspective, the suspension is in the
 128

nature of an intermediate penalty for uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment
than the permissible cancellation of ex hibition or broadcast permit or license.
 129

TOPIC: RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRE SSION AND ASSEMBLY

93. IBP v s. ATIENZA

FACTS:

The IBP, through its then National President Cadiz, filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter
application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be
participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations. Respondent issued a
permit dated June 1 6, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as
the v enue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. Aggrieved, petitioners
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition hav ing been unresolved within 24 hours
from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court a petition for certiorari which assailed the appellate court’s
inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985. The
Court, denied the petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits
and denied the motion for reconsideration. The rally pushed through on at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed
with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred
petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants v oluntarily dispersed after the
peaceful conduct of the program. The MPD thereupon instituted a criminal action against Cadiz for v iolating the
Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a v enue not indicated in the permit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and v iolates
their constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.

RULING:

Y ES. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present
danger of a substantive ev il that the state has a right to prevent . The sole justification for a limitation on the
ex ercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character
both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate
public interest.

The public official concerned shall appraise whether there may be v alid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the v iew that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive ev il, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his
decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity . Thus if so
minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

In the case at bar, in modify ing the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the v enue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the
action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the
permit.1 avvphi1 Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modify ing the terms of the permit against the
standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such
modification. Nothing in the issued permit adv erts to an imminent and grav e danger of a substantive ev il, which
 130

"blank" denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render
illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or
not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a
realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relev ant
circumstances, still the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is
that the permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice
Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "a bridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place.
 131

TOPIC: RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES & SEIZURE

94. CASTILLO v s. PEOPLE

FACTS:

The police operatives went petitioner’s residence to serve the search warrant to petitioner. But before they can
search the area, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front
of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail. They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and
closely guarded the place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to get a barangay
tanod. In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder sister of petitioner named Dolly
del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner includ ing the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for
cover. His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was
able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs co ntaining white crystalline
substance. Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner. The defense, on the other hand, the
small structure, 20 meters away from his house where they found the confiscated items, was owned by his older
brother and was used as a storage place by his father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the nipa hut located about 20 meters away from his house is within the permissible area
that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that the search warrant did not include the
same nipa hut as one of the places to be searched.

RULING:

NO. A search warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized
in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of
all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of
definiteness.

In the present case, Search Warrant No. 57 0-9-1197 -24 specifically designates or describes the residence of the
petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally , the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20
meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than
the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the
presentation of which as an evidence is a v iolation of petitioner's constitutional gua ranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure. The police officers, as well as the barangay tanods were acting as agents of a person in
authority during the conduct of the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the confiscated
items are inadmissible in ev idence.
 132

TOPICS: ARREST ; WARANTLESS SEARCH & SEIZURE

95 & 98. LUZ v s. PEOPLE

FACTS:

PO2 Alteza saw the accused driv ing a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted him to flag down the
accused for violating a municipal ordinance; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub -station since the
place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub -station; that while he and SPO1
Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for v iolation of municipal ordinance , he noticed that the accused was
uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to take out
the contents of the pocket of his jacket; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the po cket of
his jacket which was a metal container; that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that
after the accused opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4)
plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not there was a valid arrest.

II. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search.

RULING:

I. NO. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by
that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or phy sical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the
parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is no t the arrest of the offender,
but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.

In Berkemer v. McCarty , the United States Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside
questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered custodial
interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the
officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted. Since the motorist therein was only subjected to modest
questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed under custody (such that he
should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as
the functional equiv alent of a formal arrest. Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered under arrest at
the time that his traffic citation was being made.

In the case at bar, at he time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not
be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of
his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at
 133

the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza
himself testified that the only reason they we nt to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged
down almost in front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there.
There was no intention to take petitioner into custody. This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a
traffic v iolation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of
liberty, or to take the latter into custody , the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the
same violation.

II. NO. The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv)
consented warrantless search; (v ) customs search; (v i) a stop and frisk search; and (vii) ex igent and
emergency circumstances.

Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances. Relev ant to this determination are the following characteristics of the
person giving consent and the env ironment in which consent is given: (1 ) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating ev idence would be found; (7 )
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
prov ing, by clear and positive testimony , that the necessary consent was obtained, and was freely and
voluntarily given

In Knowles v. Iow a, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a stop and frisk is when a police officer stops a
person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure
does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that there was no
justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers
may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a
patdown

In the case at bar, it must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered,
was not in plain v iew. It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly, the
ev idence was not immediately apparent. Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and conv incing ev idence. It must be voluntary in order to
validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction
of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found
that petitioner was merely told to take out the contents of his pocket. In this case, all that was alleged was that
petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
circumstances weigh heav ily against a finding of valid cons ent to a warrantless search. Neither does the search
qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious
or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the st op and frisk is merely a
limited protectiv e search of outer clothing for weapons. The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted.
While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal
warrantless arrest does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of ev idence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.
 134

TOPIC: WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE

96. SALES vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Petitioner arrived at the old Manila Domestic Airport. Petitioner passed through the Walk-Thru Metal Detector
Machine and immediately thereafter was subjected to a body search by a male frisker on duty . While frisking
petitioner, Soriano felt something slightly bulging inside the right pocket of his short p ants. When Soriano asked
petitioner to bring the item out, petitioner obliged but refused to open his hands. When petitioner finally opened
his right hand revealing two rolled paper sticks with dried marijuana leaves/fruiting tops. After informing
petitioner of his constitutional rights, PO1 Bartolome brought petitioner and the seized evidence to the 2nd Police
Center for Aviation Security .

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a v alid warrantless search.

RULING:

Y ES. In People v. Johnson, which also involved seizure of a dangerous drug from a passenger during a routine
frisk at the airport, this Court ruled that such evidence obtained in a warrantless search was acquired
legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures, thus: Persons may lose the protection of the search and
seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
ex pectation of privacy, which ex pectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recog nition is
implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their c arry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x -ray scans. Should
these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what
the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the
grav ity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced priv acy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed,
travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against
warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

In the case at bar, the search of the contents of petitioner’s short pants pockets being a valid search pursuant to
routine airport security procedure, the illegal substance (m arijuana) seized from him was therefore admissible in
ev idence. Petitioner’s reluctance to show the contents of his short pants pocket after the frisker’s hand felt the
rolled papers containing marijuana, and his nervous demeanor aroused the suspicion of t he arresting officers that
he was indeed carry ing an item or material subject to confiscation by the said authorities. The trial and appellate
courts correctly gave credence to the straightforward and candid testimonies of PO1 Trota -Bartolome and NUP
Soriano on the frisking of petitioner at the pre -departure area, during which the two rolled papers containing
dried marijuana fruiting tops were found in his possession, and on petitioner’s immediate arrest and investigation
by police officers from the 2nd PCA S and PDEA teams stationed at the airport. As a matter of settled
jurisprudence on illegal possession of drug cases, credence is usually accorded the narration of the incident by the
apprehending police officers who are presumed to have performed their dut ies in a regular manner.
 135

TOPIC: WARANTLESS SEARCH & SEIZURE

97 . SANCHEZ vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Police officers acting on the information that Jacinta Marciano was selling drugs to tricycle drivers. The group
waited for a tricycle going to, and coming from, the house of Jacinta. After a few minutes, they spotted a tricycle
carrying Rizaldy Sanchez coming out of the house. The group chased the tricycle. After catching up with it, they
requested Rizaldy to alight. It was then that they noticed Rizaldy holding a match box. SPO1 Amposta asked
Rizaldy if he could see the contents of the match box . Rizaldy agreed. While ex amining it, SPO1 Amposta found a
small transparent plastic sachet which contained a white crystalline substance. Suspecting that the substance was
a regulated drug, the group accosted Rizaldy and the tricycle driver. The group brought the two to the police
station.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not there was a valid warrantless search.

II. Whether or not petitioner was flagrante delicto arrested or he was arrested under hot pursuit.
III. Whether or not there was a valid stop and frisk search.
IV . Whether or not plain v iew doctrine is applicable.

RULING:

I. NO. A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It bears emphasis
that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a
lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.

In the case at bench, the search preceded the arrest of Sanchez. There was no arrest prior to the conduct of the
search. SPO1 Amposta that after they caught up with the tricycle, its driver and the passenger, Sanchez, alighted
from it; that he noticed Sanchez holding a match box; and that he requested Sanchez if h e could see the contents
of the match box , to which the petitioner acceded and handed it over to him. The arrest of Sanchez was made only
after the discovery by SPO1 Amposta of the shabu inside the match box. Ev idently, what happened in this case was
that a search was first undertaken and then later an arrest was effected based on the evidence produced by the
search.

II. NO. For warrantless arrest under flagrante delicto arrest to operate, two elements must concur: (1 )
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the v iew of the arresting officer. On the other hand, arrest effected in hot pursuit requires for
its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense has in fact just been committed and the
arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be apprehended has
committed it. These elements would be lacking in the case at bench.

In the case at bar, the ev idence on record reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to
Sanchez as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the police operatives that he had just committed, was committing,
or was about to commit a crime. Sanchez was merely seen by the police operatives leaving the residence of a
 136

known drug peddler, and boarding a tricycle that proceeded towards the direction of Kawit, Cav ite. Such acts
cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact , even if Sanchez had ex hibited unusual or strange acts, or at
the very least appeared suspicious, the same would not hav e been considered overt acts in order for the police
officers to effect flagrante delicto arrest. Neither hot pursuit was effected, whe n the police officers chased the
tricycle, they had no personal knowledge to believe that Sanchez bought shabu from the notorious drug dealer and
actually possessed the illegal drug when he boarded the tricycle. Probable cause has been held to signify a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. The police officers in this
case had no inkling whatsoever as to what Sanchez did inside the house of the known drug dealer. Besides,
nowhere in the prosecution ev idence does it show that the drug dealer was conducting her nefarious drug
activ ities inside her house so as to warrant the police officers to draw a reasonable suspicion that Sanchez must
hav e gotten shabu from her and possessed the illegal drug when he came out of the house. In other words, there
was no overt manifestation on the part of Sanchez that he had just engaged in, was actually engaging in o r was
attempting to engage in the criminal activity of illegal possession of shabu.

III. NO. A stop and frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapons or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce
himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and
suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The
apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s
ex perience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has
weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and
seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop -and-frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not v alidate a "stop -and-frisk." A genuine reason must
ex ist, in light of the police officer's ex perience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop -and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1 ) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating
possible criminal behav ior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-
preserv ation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fata lly be used against the police officer.

In the case at bar, the Court does not find the totality of the circumstances described by SPO1 Amposta as
sufficient to incite a reasonable suspicion that would justify a stop -and-frisk search on Sanchez. Coming out from
the house of a drug pusher and boarding a tricycle, without more, were innocuous movements, and by themselv es
alone could not give rise in the mind of an ex perienced and prudent police officer of any belief that he had shabu
in his possession, or that he was probably committing a crime in the presence of the officer. There was even no
allegation that Sanchez left the house of the drug dealer in haste or that he acted in any other suspicious manner.
There was no showing either that he tried to ev ade o r out maneuver his pursuers or that he attempted to flee when
the police officers approached him. Truly, his acts and the surrounding circumstances could not hav e engendered
any reasonable suspicion on the part of the police officers that a criminal activ ity had taken place or was afoot.

IV . NO. Under the plain v iew doctrine, objects falling in the plain v iew of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that v iew are subject to seizure and may be presented as ev idence. 34 The
plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
v iew a particular area; (2) the discovery of the ev idence in plain v iew is inadvertent; and (3) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure.

In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that the seizure of the subject shabu does not fall within the plain view
exception. First, there was no v alid intrusion. As already discussed, Sanchez was illegally arrested. Second, s ubject
shabu was not inadvertently discovered, and third, it was not plainly exposed to sight. Here, the subject shabu was
 137

allegedly inside a match box being thenheld by Sanchez and was not readily apparent or transparent to the police
officers. In fact, SPO1 Amposta had to demand from Sanchez the possession of the match box in order for him to
open it and examine its content. The shabu was not in plain v iew and its seizure without the requisite search
warrant is in v iolation of the law and the Constitution. In the light of the foregoing, there being no lawful
warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure, the shabu purportedly seized from Sanchez is inadmissible
in ev idence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti
of the crime charged, the accused must be acquitted and exonerated from the criminal charge of v iolation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 91 65.
 138

TOPIC: WARRANTLESS ARREST

99. COMERCIANTE v s. PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

Around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Radan of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Calag were
aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to v isit a friend at, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City.
Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later
identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla (Dasilla) - standing and showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu,
they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around fiv e (5) meters, P03
Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory ex amination later confirmed that said
sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.

After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer t o ev idence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his
acquittal.

Comerciante's fail to file his own demurrer to ev idence. In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was
looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who
were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the
police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them

ISSUE: Whether or not P03 Calag had probable cause to effect the warrantless arrest of Comerciante.

HELD:

NO. One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be
reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful
warrantless arrests, as follows:

SEC.5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, w ithout a w arrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to beli eve based on personal know ledge
of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place w here he
is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined w hile his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be
arrested must execute an ov ert act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the v iew of the arresting officer. On the
other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been
committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it.
 139

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely
required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section (b), he knows for a fact that
a crime has just been committed.

It also reveals that there could have been no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. P03 Calag himself
admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw
Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them
handing plastic sachets to the other.

The Court finds it highly implausible that P03 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect v ision, would be able to
identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2)
very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante.

The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in
the mind of P03 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.
Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing ov er something to the latter cannot in any way
be considered criminal acts.

Neither has the prosecution established that the rigorous conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113, have been
complied. In this relation, the Court finds respondent's assertion that there was a v alid "stop and frisk" searc h
made on Comerciante untenable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of the RTC and the Resolution Court of
Appeals are hereby REV ERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alv in Comerciante is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of v iolating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 91 65..
 140

TOPIC: REST RAINT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION; RIGHT T O PRIVACY

100. CHAVEZ vs. GONZALES, February 15, 2008

FACTS:

As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involv ing a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner V irgilio
Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those
broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti -Wiretapping Act. He also stated that
persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody.
Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to hav e caused the spread,
the play ing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations
that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said media
establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales an d the
NTC directly with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

(1 ) Will a purported v iolation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press?

(2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Sec retary and the NTC constitute a form of content-based
prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

HELD:

(1 ) NO. A purported v iolation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing the exercise
of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based
on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government hav ing the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger r ule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and
of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer
proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech
and free press. There is no showing that the feared v iolation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the
national security of the State.

(2) YES. The mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content -
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements m ade by
respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a
speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint.
The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already conv erted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of
the prohibition on prior restraint.
 141

TOPIC: RIGHT TO PRIVACY

101. POLLO v s. CONSTANTINO-DAVID, October 18, 2011

FACTS:

On January 3, 2007 , an anony mous letter-complaint was received by the respondent Civ il Serv ice Commission
(CSC) Chairperson alleging that the “chief of the Mamamay an muna hindi mamaya na div ision” of Civ il Serv ice
Commission Regional Office No. IV (CSC-ROIV ) has been lawyering for public officials with pending cases in the
CSC. Chairperson Dav id immediately formed a team with background in information technology and issued a
memorandum directing them “to back up all the files in the computers found in the [CSC-ROIV ] Mamamayan
Muna (PALD) and Legal div isions.”

The team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office and backed up all files in the hard disk of computers at the
Public Assistance and Liaison Div ision (PALD) and the Legal Serv ices Div ision. This was witnessed by several
employees. At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating team finished their task. The next day, all the
computers in the PALD were sealed and secured. The diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the
hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were then turned over to Chairperson Dav i d. It was found that most of the
files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner,
numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrativ e cases i n
the CSC and other tribunals. Chairperson David thus issued a Show -Cause Order requiring the petitioner to
submit his ex planation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint. He
asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter
dated January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo of CSC-ROIV that the files in his computer were his
personal files and those of his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their
sealing, copying, duplicating and printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection
against self-incrimination and warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property ,
the temporary use and ownership of the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt is ceded to the
employee who may exercise all attributes of ownership, including its use for personal purposes. In v iew of the
illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without his consent [are] thus inadmissible as
ev idence, being “fruits of a poisonous tree.”

The CSC found prima facie case against the petitioner and charged him with Dishonesty, Grav e
Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Serv ice and Violation of R.A. No.
67 13 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees ). Petitioner then filed an
Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis
hav ing proceeded from an illegal search, which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power
pertaining solely to the court. The CSC denied this omnibus motion.

On March 1 4, 2007 , petitioner filed an Urgent Petition before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing both the
January 11, 2007 Show-Cause Order and February 26, 2007 Resolution as hav ing been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or total absence of jurisdiction. On July 24, 2007 , the CSC issued a Resolution
finding petitioner GUILTY of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Serv ice and Violation of Republic Act 67 13. He is meted the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM T HE
SERVICE with all its accessory penalties. This Resolution was also brought to the CA by herein petitioner.

By a Decision dated October 11 , 2007 , the CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition for certiorari after finding no
grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents CSC officials. His motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the CA, petitioner brought this appeal before the Supreme Court
 142

ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted on petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files
without his knowledge and consent – alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to priv acy – lawful?

HELD:

NO. The search on petitioner’s office computer and the copy ing of his personal files were both lawful and did not
v iolate his constitutional right to privacy .

The right to priv acy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1 987 Constitution. The
constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of “unreasonable” searches and
seizures.

That the Fourth Amendment [of the U.S. Constitution] equally applies to a government workplace w as
addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v. Ortega.In O’Connor the [U.S. Supreme] Court recognized that “special
needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public employees for work-related reasons. The [U.S. Supreme]
Court thus laid dow n a balancing test under which government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant
requirement, which are related to law enforcement.

O’Connor was applied in subsequent cases raising issues on employees’ privacy rights in the workplace. One of
these cases involved a government employer’s search of an office computer, United States v. Mark L.
Simons where the defendant Simons, an employee of a division of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), w as
convicted of receiving and possessing materials containing child pornography. In this case, the US Supreme
Court held that the search remains valid under the O’Connor exception to the w arrant requirement because
evidence of the crime was discovered in the course of an otherw ise proper administrative inspection. Simons’
violation of the agency’s Internet policy happened also to be a violation of criminal law ; this does not mean that
said employer lost the capacity and interests of an employer. The w arrantless entry into Simons’ office was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment standard announced in O’Connor because at the inception of the
search, the employer had “reasonable grounds for suspecting” that the hard drive would yield evidence of
misconduct, as the employer was already aware that Simons had misused his Internet access to dow nload over
a thousand pornographic images. The retrieval of the hard drive was reasonably related to the objective of the
search, and the search was not excessively intrusive. Thus, while Simons had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office, he did not have such legitimate expectation of privacy w ith regard to the files in his
computer.]

Apply ing the analysis and principles announced in O’Connor and Simons to the case at bar, we now address the
following questions: (1 ) Did petitioner have a reasonable expectation of priv acy in his office and computer files?;
and (2) Was the search authorized by the CSC Chair, [which involved] the copy ing of the contents of the hard
drive on petitioner’s computer, reasonable in its inception and scope?

(1 ) NO, the petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files.

Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) ex pectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate
enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other
employees or v isitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prev ent other
employees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance
office of the CSC-ROIV , he normally would have v isitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown
people, whom he even allowed to use his computer which to him seemed a triv ial request. He described his office
as “full of people, his friends, unknown people” and that in the past 22 y ears he had been discharging his functions
at the PALD, he is “personally assisting incoming clients, receiv ing documents, drafting cases on appeals, in
charge of accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name,
accreditation of service, and hardly had any time for himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying
 143

customer.” Under this scenario, it can hardly be deduced that petitioner had such expectation of privacy that
society would recognize as reasonable.

Moreover, ev en assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjectiv e ex pectation of privacy in his computer as he claims, such is
negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers [CSC Office Memorandum No. 10, S. 2002
“Computer Use Policy (CUP)”], as in Simons. The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its
employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in any thing they create, store, send or receive on the
office computers, and that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or
human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were
used only for such legitimate business purposes.

(2) Y ES, the search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair, which involved the copying of the contents of the
hard drive on petitioner’s computer, was reasonable in its inception and scope.

The search of petitioner’s computer files was conducted in connection with investigation of work-related
misconduct prompted by an anonymous letter-complaint addressed to Chairperson David regarding anomalies in
the CSC-ROIV where the head of the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na division is supposedly “lawyering”
for individuals with pending cases in the CSC. A search by a government employer of an employee’s office
is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up ev idence that the
employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and
scope. We quote with approv al the CSC’s discussio n on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were
with the guidelines established by O’Connor:

Ev en conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the
Commission that the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless
searches in the workplace as enunciated in the above -discussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the
Commission pursued the search in its capacity as a gov ernment employ er and that it was undertaken in
connection with an investigation involv ing a work-related misconduct, one of the circumstances ex empted from
the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was receiv ed recounting that a certain
div ision chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for parties hav ing pending cases with the said regional office
or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a CSC
employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the
Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It
would undeniably cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial
agency, and in the process, render it less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser
of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or an administrativ e tribunal must not only be actually impartial
but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any
possible adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was
forthwith conducted involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the
computers that were subjected to the search was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee
to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers would be a likely starting point in ferreting out
incriminating ev idence. Concomitantly , the ephemeral nature of computer files, that is , they could easily be
destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the need to
comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok -related investigation.

Thus, petitioner’s claim of v iolation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument
inv oking the privacy of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1 ), Article III of the 1 987
Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the
privacy of employees in the government workplace under the aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit
in his contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant because the present case does not involve a criminal
 144

offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the search of petitioner’s computer was justified there
being reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored therein would y ield incriminating evidence relevant to
the investigation being conducted by CSC as gov ernment employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception to the warrantless requirement in administrative
searches defined in O’Connor.
 145

TOPIC: WARRANTLESS ARREST

102. T HE PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES v s. VICTOR COGAED y ROMANA,, July 30, 2014

FACTS:

At about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Bay an received a tex t message from an
unidentified civilian informer that one Marv in Buy a would be transporting marijuana.

PSI Bay an organized checkpoints. PSI Bay an ordered SPO1 Taracatac to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of
passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City. A passenger jeepney arrived at SPO1 Taracatac’s
checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers
who were carry ing marijuana. SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as
appellant V ictor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Day ao. Cogaed was carrying a blue bag and a sack while
Day ao was holding a yellow bag.

SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Day ao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Day ao told SPO1 Taracatac
that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barrio mate named Marvin. After
this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. Cogaed. SPO1
Taracatac arrested Cogaed and Dayao and brought them to the police station.

While at the police station, Cogaed and Day ao were requested to empty their bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was four
(4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, and inside Day ao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected
marijuana.

The case was dismissed against Day ao because he was only 14 years old at that time and was ex empt from
criminal liability.

The RTC finds accused V ictor Cogaed guilty beyond reasonable doubt for V iolation of Section 11 , Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not (1 ) whether there was a v alid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant; (2) whether
the ev idence obtained through the search should be admitted.

HELD:

(1) NO. In this case appellant Cogaed was simply a passenger carrying a bag and trav eling aboard a jeepney.
There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The
assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driv er. It was the driver who
signalled to the police that Cogaed was suspicious. The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would
not have been identified by the police officers otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person.
The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the
 146

person suspected be stopped and reasonably se arched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon
one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approx imation for the probable
cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the
informant. The informant gave the name of Marv in Buy a, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it
was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buy a, this still remained
only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without
a valid search warrant.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension,
Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime.

There were no ov ert acts within plain v iew of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of
drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not hav e qualified for the
last allowable warrantless arrest.

(2) NO. Any evidence obtained in v iolation of [the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Considering that the prosecution and conviction of
Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means
that there is no ev idence left to conv ict Cogaed.

WHEREFORE, the decisions of the RTC and of the CA in are hereby REV ERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of
ev idence to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused -appellant VICTOR COGAED is hereby
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED.
 147

TOPIC: WARRANTLESS ARREST

103. PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES vs. OLIVER RENAT O EDAÑO, July 7 , 2014

FACTS:

The prosecution charged the appellant and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
91 65.

On the ev ening of August 6, 2002, Oliv er Edano (appellant) arrived on board a space wagon driven by Godofredo
Siochi. The informant approached the appellant and talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant
wav ed at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the latter went out of the vehicle and ran
away. PO3 Corbe, PO3 Padpad and PO3 Alcancia chased the ap pellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab the appellant,
causing the latter to fall on the ground. PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot -tied" transparent plastic bag from the
appellant’s right hand, while PO3 Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the appellant’s waist. The other members of the
police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police
station for investigation. The two were found positive for the presence of shabu.

The RTC, however, acquitted Siochi on the ground of reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a v alid warrantless arrest against appellant Edano

HELD:

NO. The warrantless arrest invalid, seized items were inadmissible.

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto.

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be v alid, two requisites must concur: (1 ) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actu ally committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such ov ert act is done in the presence or within the v iew of the arresting
officer.

In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attribu ted to
the appellant to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the
informant were just talking with each other when he approached them.

As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other; there was no
exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car.

That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in,
was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activ ity. In other words, try ing to run away when
no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot be evidence of guilt.
 148

Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized from him is
inadmissible in evidence, hav ing comefrom an inv alid search and seizure.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we REV ERSE and SET ASIDE the decision and the resolution of the Court of
Appeals. Appellant Oliver Renato Edaño y Ebdane is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 149

TOPIC: WARRANTLESS ARREST

104. PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES v s. NG YIK BUN, January 10, 2011

FACTS:

On August 24, 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., Capt. Danilo Ibon received information from an operativ e that there
was an ongoing shipment of contraband. Capt. Ibon formed a team in coordination with PNP; the team then
proceeded to V illa V icenta Resort.

The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters.
They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white v an. Having been
noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were
loading on the v an. Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed, when probed further, to accused -appellant
Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 17 2 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated. Bundles of noodles
(bihon) were also found on the premises.

On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for v iolation of Sec. 1 6, Article III of RA 6425 was filed against
accused-appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty upon re -arraignment, accused-appellants all maintained their
innocence.

The RTC conv icted accused-appellants of the crime charged. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a v alid search and arrest due to absence of a warrant against accused-
appellants Bun, Cheng, Shi, Min, and Tan.

HELD:

YES. There was indeed a valid warrantless arrest

On the issue of warrantless arrest, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search w arrant or
w arrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personal ly by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the w itnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted prov ision is that of an arrest made during the
commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and
valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person :

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

The foregoing prov iso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’
contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto . Considering t circumstances
immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1 ) the police officers received information
 150

from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded
to V illa V icenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariay a, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from
a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused -appellants loading transparent bags
containing a white substance into a white L-300 van.

Ev idently, the arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and
transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading
shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused -appellants––who were caught in flagrante
delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as
amended––is v alid.

Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1 ) the accused is in
possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug. Accused-appellants were positively
identified in court as the indiv iduals caught loading and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in
possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly authorized by law to possess them. Hav ing been
caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on the part of accused-
appellants. There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was needed to arrest accused -
appellants.
 151

TOPIC: MIRANDA RIGHT S

105. PEOPLE vs. LARA

FACTS:

RTC conv icted Lara of the crime of robbery with homicide. Lara appeal before the CA. Lara pointed out several
errors that supposedly attended his conv iction. First, that he was arrested without a warrant under circumstances
that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all proceedings including those that led to his conv iction.
Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in a line -up to be identified by the witnesses
for the prosecution in v iolation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line -up is part of custodial
inv estigation and his right to counsel had already attached. The CA affirmed Lara’s conv iction.

ISSUES: Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line-up is inadmissible
because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel;

RULING:

NO. The guarantees of Sec. 1 2 (1 ), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so -called Miranda rights, may be
inv oked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police
inv estigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit
incriminating statements. Police line -up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This is because during a police line-up, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line -up.
 152

TOPIC: PLAIN VIEW DOCT RINE

106. CRESCENCIO vs. PEOPLE

FACTS:

Acting on an information that there was a stockpile of lumber or forest products in the v icinity of the house of the
petitioner, Eufemio Abaniel, DENR went to the petitioner’s house. Upon arriv ing thereat, they saw forest products
ly ing under the house of the petitioner and at the shoreline about two meters away from the petitioner’s house. As
the DENR personnel tried to investigate from the neighborhood as to who was the owner of the lumber, the
petitioner admitted its ownership. Thereafter, the DENR personnel entered the premises of the petitioner’s house
without a search warrant.

When the DENR personnel asked for documents to support the petitioner’s claim of ownership, the latter showed
to them Official Receipt No. 35053 issued by Pengavitor Enter prises where she allegedly bought the said lumber.
However, when the DENR personnel scaled the lumber, they found out that the dimensions and the species of the
lumber did not tally with the items mentioned in the receipt. Since the petitioner could not pr esent any other
receipt, Abaniel ordered the confiscation of the lumber.

ISSUE: Whether the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the DENR personnel was illegal and the items
seized should not have been admitted in evidence against her.

RULING:

NO. The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless
searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain v iew. Under the
plain v iew doctrine, objects falling in the "plain v iew" of an officer, who has a right to be in the position to have
that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as ev idence.

In the case at bar, when the DENR personnel arrived at the petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under
the latter’s house and at the shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It is clear,
therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the lumber outside the petitioner’s
house falls within the purview of the plain v iew doctrine.
 153

TOPIC: WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE

107 . PEOPLE v s. COGAED

FACTS:

PSI Bay an received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer that Marv in Bugat would be
transporting marijuana from Barangay LunOy , San Gabriel, La Union to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
PSI Bay an organized checkpoints. A passenger jeepney from arrived at checkpoint. The jeepney driver
disembarked and signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana.
SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Day ao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed and Day ao told SPO1 Taracatac
that they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After
this exchange, Cogaed opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.

ISSUES:

I. Whether there was a v alid search and seizure of marijuana as against the appellant;

II. Whether the ev idence obtained through the search should be admitted;

III. Whether there was enough evidence to sustain the conviction of the accused.

RULING:
I. NO. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be committed in flagrante delicto, and
the search conducted within the v icinity and within reach by the person arrested is done to ensure that there
are no weapons, as well as to preserve the evidence. On the other hand, stop and frisk searches are
conducted to prevent the occurrence of a crime. This court stated that the stop and frisk search should be
used when dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where
unarguably there is no time to secure a search warrant.

In the case at bar, the search involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk" search, but it did not comply
with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution. Stop and frisk searches (sometimes
referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the
privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

The balance lies in the concept of suspiciousness present in the situation where the police officer finds
himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. Ex perienced police
officers have personal experience dealing with criminals and criminal behav ior. Hence, they should have the
ability to discern based on facts that they themselves observe whether an indiv idual is acting in a suspicious
manner. Clearly, a basic criterion would be that the polic e officer, with his or her personal knowledge, must
observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act.

In the case at bar, he was simply a passenger carry ing a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing
suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not
made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signalled to the police that Cogaed was
"suspicious." The jeepney driver had to point toCogaed. He wo uld not have been identified by the police officers
otherwise. It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a
person. The police officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify
that the person suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement
upon one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it
nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
 154

ex ist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warr ant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him.

In the case at bar, there was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approx imation
for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person
mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buy a, and the person searched was V ictor
Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marv in Buya, this
still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his
belongings without a valid search warrant.

II. NO. There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object
when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to
such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at
all within the purv iew of the constitutional guarantee.

In the case at bar, Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
env ironment brought about by the police officer’s excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and
the police carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing, intelligent,
and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

For a valid waiver by the accused of his or her constitutional right, the police officer must also inform the person
to be searched that any inaction on his or her part will amount to a waiver of any of his or her objections that the
circumstances do not amount to a reasonable search. The police officer must communicate this clearly and in a
language known to the person who is about to waive his or her constitutional rights. There must be an assurance
giv en to the police officer that the accused fully understands his or her rights. The fundamental nature of a
person’s constitutional right to priv acy requires no less.

III. NONE. The Constitution provides that any ev idence obtained in v iolation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise
known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine that prohibits the
issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditio ns. Ev idence
obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as ev idence because it is the only practical means
of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. It ensures that the
fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are
upheld.

In the case at bar, considering that the prosecution and conv iction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his
bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means tha t there is no evidence left to conv ict Cogaed. Drugs
and its illegal traffic are a scourge to our society. In the fight to eradicate this menace, law enforcers should be
equipped with the resources to be able to perform their duties better. However, we can not, in any way,
compromise our society’s fundamental v alues enshrined in our Constitution. Otherwise, we will be seen as slowly
dismantling the very foundations of the society that we seek to protect.
 155

TOPIC: RIGHT AGAINST SEARCHES AND SEIZURE

108. POLLO v s. CONSTANTINO - DAVID

FACTS:

An unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino -Dav id which was
marked Confidential and sent through a courier serv ice (LBC) from a certain Alan San Pascual. Chairperson Dav id
immediately formed a team of four personnel and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and
specifically to back up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamay an Muna (PALD) and Legal div isions.
Director Unite sent tex t messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time,
informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their div isions upon orders of the CSC Chair.
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leav ing the matter to Director Unite and that he will just get a
lawyer. The contents of the diskettes were ex amine and it was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or letters in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search conducted on his office computer and the copy ing of his personal files without his
knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.

RULING:

NO. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the
efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public
employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected priv acy interests
of government employees for non – investigatory , work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-
related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this
reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:
Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a two – fold inquiry: first, one must consider whether
the action was justified at its inception; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justifie d the interference in the first place. The search will
be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and
not excessively intrusive in light of the nature of the misconduct.

In the case at bar, the CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have
no expectation of priv acy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that the
CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This implies that on-
the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such legitimate
business purposes. The computer from which the personal files of herein petitioner were retrieved is a
government-issued computer, hence government property the use of which the CSC has absolute right to regulate
and monitor. Such relationship of the petitioner with the item seized (office computer) and other relev ant factors
and circumstances under American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, notably the existence of CSC MO 1 0, S.
2007 on Computer Use Policy, failed to establish that petitioner had a reasonable ex pectation of privacy in the
office computer assigned to him. Hav ing determined that the personal files copied from the office computer of
petitioner are admissible in the administrative case against him.
 156

TOPIC: WARRANTLESS ARREST

109. PESTILLOS v s. GENEROSO

FACTS:

An altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Generoso at Kasiyahan Street, Barangay Holy Spirit,
Quezon City where the petitioners and Atty. Generoso reside. Atty . Generoso called the Central Police District,
Station 6 to report the incident. SP02 Javier, together with augmentation personnel from the Airforce, A 2C Alano
Say son and Airman Ruel Galvez, arrived at the scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged
altercation and they saw Atty . Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who
mauled him. This prompted the police officers to invite the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for
inv estigation. The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station. 9 At the inquest
proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed
weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were lawfully arrested.

RULING:

YES. The clincher in the element of personal knowledge of facts or circum stances is the required element
of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a
safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a v ery
limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause
finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an ex haustive investigation. The reason for the element of the
immediacy is this - as the time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of
information gathered are prone to become contaminated and subjected to ex ternal factors, interpretations and
hearsay. On the other hand, the police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to
raw or uncontaminated facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time.

In the case at bar, the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from
the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the
petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception
and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation,
which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.
 157

TOPIC: EXT RAJUDICIAL CONFESSION; RIGHT TO HAVE A COUNSEL; RIGHT TO SPEEDY

DISPOSITION OF CASES

110. LUMANOG v s. PEOPLE

FACTS:

SPO2 Ortiz answered a telephone call from a male person who reported a shooting incident along Katipunan
Avenue. Susan Abadilla was pronounced dead on arriv al at the hospital. As a result of follow -up operations, Joel
de Jesus, was apprehended on at his house. He ex ecuted his SinumpaangSalaysay and Karagdagang
Sinumpaang Salaysay, he narrated that Larry told him they were going to kill a big-time personality , whose name
was Abadilla, and that they were going to ambush the latter at Katipunan Avenue.

In defense, Joel de Jesus testified that they were brought to a certain house where they were boxed, kicked and
slammed on the wall. When his blindfold was removed, the police officers were forcing him to adm it that he killed
Abadilla. He was asked to sign by Lt. Castillo a seven (7 )-page document, torturing him if he refused to do so. He
denied the contents of this statement but admitted that he was brought to the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall. He
was then made to board a vehicle and was taken to the Quezon City Hall where a man wearing barong tagalog was
waiting, asking if he was Joel de Jesus. When Lt. Castillo answered in the affirmative, the Atty. Sansano just
signed the document.

Appellants further aver that there was, insofar as the eight (8)-year delay in the disposition of their appeal in the
CA was concerned. It prov ides that in the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled, as among the minimum guarantees prov ided therein, to be tried without undue delay.

ISSUE:

I. Whether or not Joel de Jesus’ confession is valid.

II. Whether or not Atty. Sansano was an independent and competent counsel.

III. Whether or not their right to speedy disposition of cases was v iolate d.

RULING:

I. NO. The right to counsel has been written into our Constitution in order to prevent the use of duress
and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime. The lawyers’ role cannot be
reduced to being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared confession, ev en if it indicated compliance
with the constitutional rights of the accused. The accused is entitled to effective, v igilant and independent counsel.
Where the prosecution failed to discharge the States burden of prov ing with clear and conv incing evidence that
the accused had enjoyed effectiv e and v igilant counsel before he ex trajudicially admitted his guilt, the ex trajudicial
confession cannot be given any probative value.

In the case at bar, police officers claimed that upon arresting Joel, they informed him of his constitutional
rights to remain silent, that any information he would give could be used against him, and that he had the right to
a competent and independent counsel, preferably , o f his own choice, and if he cannot afford the serv ices of
counsel he will be prov ided with one. However, since these rights can only be waived in writing and with the
assistance of counsel, there could not have been such a v alid waiver by Joel, who was presented to Atty. Sansano
at the IBP Office, Quezon City Hall only the following day and stayed overnight at the police station before he was
brought to said counsel.

Settled is the rule that the moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain
information from a suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right
in writing and in the presence of counsel. The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
inv estigation is to curb the police-state practice of extracting a confession that leads appellant to make self-
 158

incriminating statements. Even assuming that custodial investigation started only during Joels execution of his
statement before Atty. Sansano on June 20, 1996, still the said confession must be invalidated. To be acceptable,
ex trajudicial confessions must conform to constitutional requirements. A confession is not valid and not
admissible in evidence when it is obtained in v iolation of any of the rights of persons under custodial
inv estigation.

II. NO. An effective and v igilant counsel necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and
able to adv ise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
inv estigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that
the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully understands the nature and the
consequence of his ex trajudicial confession in relation to his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.

In the case at bar, Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interv iewed Joel and assisted the latter while responding to
questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia, Jr., did not testify on whether he had properly discharged his duties to
said client.

III. NO. Section 16, Article III of the 1 987 Constitution provides that all persons shal l have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This protection
ex tends to all citizens and covers the periods before, during and after trial, affording broader protection than
Section 14(2), which guarantees merely the right to a speedy trial. Howev er, just like the constitutional guarantee
of speedy trial, speedy disposition of cases is a flex ible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the
circumstances. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delay s, which render
rights nugatory. In this case, it must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy
disposition of cases has been v iolated, particular regard must be t aken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to
each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances,
we hold that the delay of (4) four years during which the case remained pending with the CA and this Court was
not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressiv e.

In several cases where it was manifest that due process of law or other rights guaranteed by the
Constitution or statutes have been denied, this Court has not faltered to accord the so -called radical relief to keep
accused from enduring the rigors and ex pense of a full-blown trial. In this case, however, appellants are not
entitled to the same relief in the absence of clear and conv incing showing that the delay in the resolution of their
appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.

TOPIC/S: Right to Counsel

 159

Subject: Perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory; Right to
counsel is not imperative in administrativ e investigations; Dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal

111. Carbonell v s Civ il Serv ice Commission, G.R. 187 689, September 7 , 2010

FACTS:
Petitioner Clarita J. Carbonel was an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, Makati City. She
went to the CSCRO IV to secure a copy of the result of the Computer Assisted Test (CATS) Career Serv ice
Professional Ex amination given on March 1 4, 1999, because she lost the original copy of her Certificate of Rating.
The office noticed that petitioner's personal and physical appearance was entirely different from the picture of the
ex aminee attached to the application form and the picture seat plan. It was also discov ered that the signature
affixed on the application form was different from that appearing on the verification slip. In the course of the
inv estigation, petitioner voluntarily made a statement before Atty. Gepigon, admitting that she accepted the
proposal of a certain Bettina J. Nav arro for the latter to obtain for her a Career Service Professional Eligibility by
merely accomplishing an application form and paying the amount of P1 0,000. Petitioner was formally charged
with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Falsification of Official Documents by the Civ il Service Commission
(CSC). Petitioner questioned the use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her
inasmuch as the same was made without the assistance of counsel. The CSC Regional Office IV (CSCRO IV ) issued
a decision finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsi fication of official documents. The
penalty of dismissal from the service, with all its accessory penalties, was imposed on her. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not right to counsel is imperativ e in administrative investigatons

RULING:
NO. The right to counsel under Section 1 2 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial
inv estigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 1 2 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. While
inv estigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains that, under ex isting laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of petitioner's capacity to represent herself, and no duty rests on such
body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. The right to counsel is not always imperative in
administrative investigation because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts
that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose
of maintaining the dignity of government serv ice. As such, the admissions made by petitioner during the
inv estigation may be used as evidence to justify her dismissal. Besides, petitioner's written statement was not the
only basis of her dismissal from the serv ice. Records show that the CSCRO IV 's conclusion was reached after
consideration of all the documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the parties during the formal
inv estigation.
 160

TOPIC/S: Adm issibility of adm ission or confession of guilt

112. T anenggee v s People, G.R. No. 17 9448, June 26, 2013

FACTS:
On March 27 , 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were
filed against petitioner. In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the
Commercio Branch for more than a week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elv ira Ong -
Chan, senior v ice president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day. When appellant
arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven (7 ) other people present: two (2) senior branch
officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform and the other in plain clothes), and a
representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, V alentino Elevado. Appellant claimed that Elevado asked
him to sign a paper (Ex hibit “N”) in connection with the audit investigation; that he inquired what he was made to
sign but was not offered any ex planation; that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he
will be brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not
apprised of the purpose of the meeting; [and] that “just to get it over with” he signed the paper which turned out
to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the latter.
He also tried to phone him but to no av ail.

ISSUE/S: Whether the signed document is inadmissible in ev idence in v iolation for Sec 1 2 Art. III of the
Constitution

RULING:
NO. The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in
v iolation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable
only in custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the
commencement thereof, v iz: (1 ) to remain silent, (2) to hav e competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. In the prese nt case, while it is undisputed that
petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed,
the following are clear: (1 ) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an
internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any
significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation
and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement
 161

TOPIC/S: Right to counsel

113. Manila Water Company v s Rosario, G.R. No. 1887 47 , January 29, 2014

FACTS:
Sometime in May 2000, Manila Water Company discovered that 24 water meters were missing in its stockroom.
Upon initial investigation, it appeared that Carlito Del Rosario and his co -employee, Danilo Manguera, were
inv olved in the pilferage and the sale of water meters to the company ’s contractor. In his letter -explanation, Del
Rosario confessed his involvement in the act charged and pleaded for forgiveness, promising not to commit
similar acts in the future. During the formal investigation Del Rosario was found responsible for the loss of the
water meters and therefore liable for violating Section 11.1 of the Company’s Code of Conduct. Manila Water
proceeded to dismiss Del Rosario from employ ment. Del Rosario filed an action for illegal dismissal claiming that
his severance from employment is without just cause. Del Rosario averred that his admission to the misconduct
charged was not voluntary but was coerced by the company. Such admission therefore, made without the
assistance of a counsel, could not be made basis in terminating his employment. Hence, this petition for rev iew by
Manila Waters reiterating that an employee terminated for serious misconduct is not entitled to separation pay.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not right to counsel applies in administrative investigations

RULING:
NO. Del Rosario argues that the absence of his counsel when he admitted the charge against him diminished the
ev identiary v alue of such admission. Nonetheless, it may be mentioned that the constitutional right to counsel is
av ailable only during custodial investigation. If the investigation is mere ly administrative conducted by the
employer and not a criminal investigation, the admission made during such inv estigation may be used as ev idence
to justify dismissal.
 162

TOPIC/S: Right of a person under investigation

114. People v s Chaves G.R. No. 207 950, September 22, 2014

FACTS:
In the information dated November 8, 2006, Mark Jason Chavez y Bitancor (Chavez) was charged with the crime
of robbery with homicide. Accompanied by his mother, Chavez voluntarily surrendered on November 5, 2006 to
SPO3 Casimiro at the police station. Chavez was then 22 years old. His mother told the police that she wanted to
help her son who might be involved in Barbie’s death. SPO3 Casimiro informed them of the consequences in
ex ecuting a written statement without the assistance of a lawyer. However, Chavez’s mother still gave her
statement, subscribed by Administrative Officer Alex Francisco. She also surrendered two cellular phones owned
by Barbie and a baseball cap owned by Chavez.

ISSUE/S: Whether the surrender of Chavez forms part of the custodial investigation.

RULING:
Yes. The booking sheet and arrest report states that “when the accused was appraised of his constitutional rights
and nature of charges imputed against him, accused opted to remain silent. This booking sheet and arrest report is
also dated November 7 , 2006, or two days after Chav ez, accompanied by his mother, had voluntarily gone to the
police station. The right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of the Miranda
rights, which require that: . . . (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b)
any thing he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney
before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be prov ided before any questioning if he so desires. The Miranda rights were incorporated in
our Constitution but were modified to include the statement that any wa iver of the right to counsel must be made
“in writing and in the presence of counsel.” The invocation of these rights applies during custodial investigation,
which begins “when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements.” It may appear that the Miranda rights only apply when
one is “taken into custody by the police,” such as during an arrest. These rights are intended to protect ordinary
citizens from the pressures of a custodial setting:

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the “inherently compelling pressures” “generated by the custodial
setting itself,” “which work to undermine the individual’s w ill to resist,” and as much as possible to free courts
from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine, after the fact, w hether particular confessions
were voluntary. Those purposes are implicated as much by in -custody questioning of persons suspected of
misdemeanours as they are by questioning of persons suspected of fe lonies.

Republic Act No. 7 438 ex panded the definition of custodial investigation to “include the practice of issuing an
‘inv itation’ to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have committed,
without prejudice to the liability of the ‘inviting’ officer for any v iolation of law.”

This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda
rights. For one, the same pressures of a custodial setting exist in this scenar io. Chavez is also being questioned by
an investigating officer in a police station. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by
his mother who accompanied him to the police station.
 163

TOPIC/S: Right to counsel

115. Philcom sat Holdings vs Senate, G.R. 180308, June 19 2012

FACTS:
On February 20, 2006, in view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its
interests in POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular
Session of the Thirteenth Congress of the Philippines, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455
directing the conduct of an inquiry , in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC,
PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors. PSR No. 455
was referred to respondent Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, which conducted
eleven (11 ) public hearings on various dates. Petitioners Locsin and Andal were inv ited to attend these hearings as
“resource persons.”

ISSUE/S: Whether they are entitled to right to counsel in such public hearing.

RULING:
No. Corollarily, petitioners Locsin and Andal's allegation that their constitutionally -guaranteed right to counsel
was v iolated during the hearings held in furtherance of PSR No. 455 is specious. The right to be assisted by
counsel can only be invoked by a person under custodial investigation suspected for the commission of a crime,
and therefore attaches only during such custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and Andal were inv ited to
the public hearings as resource persons, they cannot therefore v alidly invoke their right to counsel.
 164

TOPIC/S: Right to counsel

116. People v s Lara G.R. No. 199877, August 13, 2012

FACTS:
Lara was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he was earlier told where he was investigated
for robbery with homicide; (h) when he told the police that he was at home when the subject incident took place,
the police challenged him to produce witnesses; (i) when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police
officers told them to come back the following day ; (j) while he was at the police line -up holding a name plate, a
police officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and (k) when his witnesses arrived the
following day , they were told that he will be subjected to an inquest.

ISSUE/S: Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in the police line -up is inadmissible
because Lara stood therein without the assistance of counsel

RULING:
No. Contrary to Lara's claim, that he was not prov ided with counsel when he was placed in a police line -up did not
inv alidate the proceedings leading to his conv iction. That he stood at th e police line-up without the assistance of
counsel did not render Sumulong's identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have
arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line -up is not the
starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled in People v . Amestuzo:

The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 1 2 (1 ), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so -called
Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation
starts when the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus
on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to
the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line -up is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of
People vs. Lamsing and in the more recent case of People vs. Salv atierra. The right to be assisted by counsel
attaches only during custodial inv estigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identific ation in a police
line-up because it is not part of the custodial inv estigation process. This is because during a police line -up, the
process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant
who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line -up.
 165

RIGHT TO LIFE; FREEDOM OF RELIGION; FREE SPEECH; RIGHT TO PRIVACY ; DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROT ECTION CLAUSE; JUDICIAL REVIEW

117 . JAMES M. IMBONG, et. al vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA

FACTS:

The consolidated cases arose in connection with the constitutionality of the Republic Act. No. 10354
[Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law)].

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court can exercise its power of judicial rev iew over the controversy.

II

Whether or not RH Law is unconstitutional for v iolating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy
5. Due Process and Equal Protection clause

RULING:

The Court can ex ercise its power of judicial review. It is of the Court’s v iew that an actual controversy ex ists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law hav e already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controv ersy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical prov iders are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for v ague violations thereof, particularly public hea lth
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They
must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

II

Right to life

The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law is in
line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient [Se ction
 166

4(a)], the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce
abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the
fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.

However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient by
using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abort ion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01 (a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This v iolates Section 1 2, Article II of the
Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec 3.01 (j)), which also uses the
term “primarily”, must be struck down.

Right to health

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
prov isions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides: Section
15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among
them.

A portion of Articles XIII and XVI also specifically prov ides for the States' duty to prov ide for the health of the
people.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these prov isions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly
ex press the contrary, the prov isions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for
legislation to implement these self-executing prov isions.

This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception
and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 47 29, the sale
and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed
by a physician - be maintained.

The Court agrees with the observ ation of respondent Lagman that the effectiv ity of the RH Law will not lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and dev ices will still require the prescription of a licensed phy sician. With R.A. No. 47 29 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public.

Freedom of Religion and Right to Free Speech

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief.
However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one religion.
To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law even
if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an
ex ternalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to indiv iduals in communicating
 167

their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of
the indiv idual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. While the RH Law
seeks to prov ide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the
religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burd en, whether direct or indirect, in the practice
of one's religion.

Right to Privacy

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes int o martial priv acy and autonomy and goes
against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article
XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family i n accordance with
their religious conv ictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right of families or family
associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them. The RH
Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 1 2 of the Constitution,
which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Gov ernment.” In addition, the portion of
Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian or, in their
absence, persons ex ercising parental authority or nex t -of-kin shall be required only in elective sur gical
procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is “non -surgical
procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents are
not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life -
threatening procedures.

Due Process and Equal Protection Clause

The RH Law does not v iolate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms as
observed by the petitioners are not v ague.

The definition of “private health care service prov ider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7 should
be seen as sy nonymous to “private health care serv ice provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are ex empted from rendering RH serv ice and
modern family planning methods (as prov ided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1 ), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to
the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a v iolation of the equal
protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State
 168

shall prioritize the needs of the underpriv ileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall
endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have a nd does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 1 4 is
valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect
to religious instruction and to consider their sensitiv ity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
 169

RIGHT TO PRIVACY ; RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONA BLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE; EQUAL
PROT ECTION CLAUSE; UNDUE DELAGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER

118. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v s. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD

FACTS:

The consolidated cases arose in connection with the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and priv ate offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

ISSUE:

I
Whether or not Section 36 of RA 9165 v iolate (1) the right to privacy , (2) the right against unreasonable searches
and seizure, and (3) the equal protection clause of the students, and employees of public and private
offices.

II
Whether or not Section 36 of RA 9165 v iolate (1) the right to privacy , (2) the right against unreasonable searches
and seizure, and (3) the equal protection clause of persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with
certain offenses.

III
Whether or not Section 36 of RA 91 65 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power by expanding the
qualifications of candidates for public office, such as a Sentaor.

RULING:

Right to privacy and right against unreasonable searches and seizure : Guided by Vernonia and
Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the prov isions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.

Giv en that the drug-testing policy for employees and students for that matter under RA 9165 is in the nature
of adm inistrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary
procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should
focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

II

The provision is unconstitutional. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to
harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug
testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. II I of the
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
 170

III

The prov ision is unconstitutional. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall
be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed.

Thus, legislative power rem ains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and
constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects
of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rig hts and other
prov isions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the
1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
 171

HABEAS CORPUS

119. IN MATTER OF T HE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT . GARY ALEJANO, PN; CAPT .
NICANOR FAELDON, PN; CAPT . GERARDO GAMBALA, PA; LT . SG GAMES LAY UG, PN; CAPT .
MILO MAEST RECAMPO, PA; LT. SG ANT ONIO T RILLANES IV, PN; HOMOBONO ADAZA and
ROBERT O RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO

FACTS:

The petition emanated from the Oakwood incident when the armed soldiers, led by the now detained officers. The
soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The
government prosecutors filed an information for coup d’ etat against the soldiers involved. The trial court later
issued the Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers to the Commanding Officers o f ISAFP. The
petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus and the court issued a resolution for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the remedy of habeas corpus is available in case the condition of the detainees is legal

RULING:

The Court ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to address the
detainees complaint against the regulations and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The
remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If the inquiry reveals that the
detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceeding terminate. The use of habeas corpu s is thus very
limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can it substitute for an appeal.

However, the jurisprudence has ex panded the writs application to circumstances where there is deprivation of a
person’s constitutional rights. The writ is av ailable where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of
one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary , and where a deprivation of freedom
originally valid has later become arbitrary.

A mere allegation of a v iolation of one’s constitutional right is not sufficient. The Courts will extend the scope of
the writ only if any of the following circumstances is present: a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; b) the Court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or c) an
excessive penalty is imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess. Pre -trial detainees do not forfeit their
constitutional rights upon confinement. Howev er, the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more
limited than those of the public. The ISAFP officials did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees right to
counsel. The purpose of the regulation is no t to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to secure the safety and
security of all detainees.

The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and conv icted prisoners from petitioning
the courts for the redress of grievances. Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that v iolate
the Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the courts on a case -by -case basis. The
courts could afford injunctive relief or damages to the det ainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and
inhumane conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question conditions of confinement. The
writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.
 172

RIGHT S OF T HE ACCUSSED DURING CUST ODIAL INVESTIGATION; EXT RAJUDICIAL

CONFESSION; SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES

120. LUMANOG v s. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

The consolidated cases arose in connection with the killing of former Chief of the Metropolitan Command
Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police, Colonel
Rolando N. Abadilla, who was ambushed in broad daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon
City.

The principal witness for the prosecution is a security guard (Freddie Alejo) in the establishment where the
ambush-slay happened. All the accused raised the defense of alibi, highlighting the negative findings of ballistic
and fingerprint ex aminations. Likewise they also allege d that the police officers tortured them and denied their
constitutional rights during custodial investigation.

ISSUE:

I
Whether or not the extra-judicial confession during custodial investigation is v alid.

II
Whether or not the speedy disposition clause enshrined in the Constitution has been v iolated.

III
Whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals v iolated the Constitutional standard that “[n]o decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based.”

RULING:

No. The ex tra-judicial confession of the accused Joel de Jesus taken during the custodial investigation is invalid.

A confession is not v alid and inadmissible in ev idence when it is obtained in v iolation of any o f the rights of
persons under custodial investigation. Atty. Sansano, who supposedly interviewed Joel and assisted the latter
while responding to questions propounded by SPO2 Garcia Jr,, did not testify on whether he had properly
discharged his duties to said client.

II

No. The right to speedy disposition of cases of the accused was not violated. It must be stressed that in the
determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of cases has been v iolated, particular regard must be
taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved
would not be sufficient. Under the circumstances, the Court held that the delay of four (4) years during which the
case remained pending with the Court of Appeals, a nd the Supreme Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive.
 173

III

The Court held that it cannot be deemed constitutionally infirm, as it clearly stated the facts and law on which the
ruling was based, and while it did not specifically address each an d ev ery assigned error raised by appellants, it
cannot be said that the appellants were left in the dark as to how the Court of Appeals reached its ruling affirming
the trial court’s judgement of conviction.
 174

RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN ADMINIST RATIVE PROCEEDINGS

121. CLARITA J. CARBONEL v s. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS:

Petitioner Carbonel is an employee of Bureau of Jail Management and Penology in Makati City . She was charged
by the Civ il Service Commission (CSC) Regional Office No. IV with Dishonesty, Grave Mi sconduct, and
Falsification of Official Documents. The charge stemmed from the time when Carbonel secured a copy of the
result of the Computer Assisted Test since she lost her original copy of her Certificate of Rating. Howev er, the
CSC’s Ex amination and Placement Div ision noticed that the petitioner and the person to purport to be in the
ex aminee in the application form is entirely different. Thus, the CSC RO IV Legal Affairs Div ision conducted an
inv estigation. During the investigation, the petitioner voluntarily made a statement to her counsel that she
accepted a proposal from certain Bettina Navaro to obtain an eligibility by merely accomplishing the form and
pay ing the amount of P 10,000. When the charge has been filed, petitioner denied her admission h er voluntary
statements. She questioned the use of her voluntary statement as the basis of the formal charge against her
inasmuch as the same was made without the assistance of counsel. The CSC found that she is guilty as charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the right to counsel under Section 1 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution applies to administrative
proceedings.

RULING:

No. The right to counsel under the Constitution is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. It
only applies to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not those made in an administrative investigation.

While inv estigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact
remains, under ex isting laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by
counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the petitioner’s capacity to represent
herself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.

The right to counsel is not alway s imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit the imposition of disciplinary measures.

Thus, an admission made by the petitioner during the inv estigation may be used as ev idence to justify her
dismissal.
 175

GRANT OF BAIL; BAIL BY A POT ENTIAL EXT RADITEE

122. GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINIST RATIVE REGION v s. HON. OLALIA, JR

FACTS:

The Republic of the Philippines entered into an agreement (Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and
Conv icted Persons) with the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong. After 2 years, Hong Kong was reverted
back to the People’s Republic of China. Munoz, was charged with different offense, i.e., accepting an adv a ntage as
agent and a conspiracy to defraud. Warrants of arrest were issued to him. A request for the prov isional arrest of
Munoz was received by the Department of Justice, and the same was forwarded to the National Bureau of
Investigation and filed to the Regional Trial Court. An order of arrest was issued and in the same day, he was
arrested and detained by the NBI agents.

Meanwhile, a petition for ex tradition was filed by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. In the same case,
a petition for bail was included, howev er, it was opposed by the petitioner. The judge allowed Munoz to post a bail,
subject to conditions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a potential extradite (Munoz) can av ail of the right established by Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution (Right to Bail).

RULING:

Yes. A potential extradite can post a bail as enshrined in the Constitution. Several jurisprudence has been cited by
the Court to support this case, to wit:

US vs Go-Sioco: To refuse a Chinese national to bail is to treat him as a person who has committed the most
serious crime known to law, and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the machinery of
criminal law. Thus, the prov isions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.

Mejoff vs. Director of Prisons and Chirskoff vs. Commission of Immigration: The foreign nationals against whom
no criminal charges have been filed may be relased on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. The
Court in Mejoff case relied upon the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in sustaining’s right to bail.

The right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the human liberty.

An extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A
potential extradite may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the
demanding state follow ing the proceedings.

While the Philippine’s Extradition Law does not provide for the grant of bail to and extradite, however, there is
no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process (presumption of
innocence of the accused) under the Constitution.
 176

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF T HE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

123. Canceran v . People, G.R. No. 206442, July 1, 2015.

FACTS:
Jov ito Canceran, together with two others, was charged with Frustrated Theft.

The prosecution presented Damalito Ompoc, security guard of Ororama Mega Center, as their witness, he then
stated that Canceran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for which he paid P1 ,423.00;
that Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had been checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the
packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 1 4 smaller boxes of
Ponds White Beauty Cream worth P28,627 .20. thereafter Canceran hurriedly left and upon reaching Don Mariano
gate, he tried to settle with the guards.

Canceran on his defense stated that on his way out, after buy ing medicine and mineral water, a male person of
around 20 years of age requested him to pay for the items in his cart at the cashier. That he did not know the
name of this man who gave him P1,440.00 for payment of two boxes labelled Magic Flakes. That he obliged with
the request of the unnamed person because he was struck by his conscience; that he denied knowing the contents
of the said two boxes. Canceran further claimed that an earlier Information for theft was already filed on October
9, 2002 which was ev entually dismissed. In January 2003, a second Information was filed for the same offense
over the same incident and became the subject of the present case

ISSUE/S:
Whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the information
Whether there was double jeopardy.

HELD:
Petition partially meritorious

I. Constitutional Right of the Accused to be Informed of the Nature and Cause of Accusation against Him .

No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. It is fundamental that every element of which the
offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information. The main purpose of requiring the various
elements of a crime to be set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.

Accused cannot be conv icted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the
information filed against him. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. As
held in Domingo vs, Rayala the real nature of the criminal charge is determined, not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specific ation of the law alleged to hav e been v iolated - these being
conclusions of law - but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

II. No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached

Double jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conv iction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be
charged with the same or identical offense.

To raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:

(1 ) A first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) The first jeopardy must have been v alidly terminated; and
 177

(3) The second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.

Legal jeopardy attaches only

(a) Upon a valid indictment,
(b) Before a competent court,
(c) After arraignment,
(d) A valid plea hav ing been entered; and
(e) The case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the ex press consent of the accused.
 178

RIGHT TO LIBERTY

124. Reyes v . Gonzales, G.R. No. 182161, December 3, 2009

FACTS:
The petitioner, Fr. Reyes, was among those who were arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November
30, 2007 and was charged with rebellion. Upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering
respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner in the interest of national security and public safety . Petitioner filed a
Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes. Upon Recognizance
asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any ev idence indicating his specific participation in the crime
charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a
judge. Despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO (Hold Departure Order) No. 45 still
subsists.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been v iolated or threatened with v iolation by the issuance of the
subject HDO, which would entitle him to the priv ilege of the writ of amparo.

HELD:
Petition must fail.

The right to liberty, as defined in the City of Manila et al. V . Hon. Laguio, Jr.

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from phy sical
restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with which
he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare.

Also, Right to Trav el refers to the right to move from one place to another, as held in the case of Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan, persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of
safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the
jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion.

Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed
against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to trav el was impaired in the
manner and to the ex tent that it amounted to a serious v iolation of his right to l ife, liberty and security , for which
there ex ists no readily av ailable legal recourse or remedy.
 179

RIGHT TO SECURITY

125. Secretary of National Defense v . Manalo, 07 October 2008, G.R. No. 180906

FACTS:
On February 14. 2006, Brothers Ray mond and Rey naldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the
New People’s Army. After eighteen (1 8) mo nths of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 1 3,
2007 .

Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Ex isting Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit
Supporting Affidav its, and to Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1 ) the petition be
considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ
commanding therein respondents to make a verified return within the period provided by law and conta ining the
specific matter required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all other
reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render
judgment as required in Sec. 1 8 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and equitable reliefs.

The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP also filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the right to security has been violated
Whether or not there is a continuing v iolation of respondents right to security

HELD:
The right to security or the right to security of person is found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is to prev ent violations of
private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy against such u surpation when attempted. (Adams
v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 7 6 Phil. 637 [1946]).

Right to security of persons would yield v arious permutations of the exercise of this right

First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas clauses, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III,
Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or inv aded
without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, phy sical
disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself
escalates. Notably , in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront
to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of ones rights by the government. In the context
of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section
1 of the 1 987 Constitution and the right to security of person under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of
person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under
Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.

On the second issue.

First, the v iolation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents life, liberty and security.
 180

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With t heir
escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific
officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to
hav e disappeared such as Sherly n Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.

Nex t, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government.

Apart from the failure of military elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the
abduction, detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of
respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col.
Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall o f the 7 th Infantry Div ision.

The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one -sided. He merely relied on
the Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation
for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn
statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their
credibility. He did not call for other witne sses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the
family or neighbors of the respondents. Hence, the respondents right to security as freedom from threat is v iolated
by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security is likewise v iolated by the
ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
 181

WRIT OF AMPARO

126. Mison v . Gallegos, G.R. No. 210759, June 23, 2015

FACTS:
The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice to Interpol
Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily
spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently , the Embassy of the Republic of
Korea wrote a Letter-Request to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau of Immigration (BI),
for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an undesirable alien. On January 16, 2014 BI
officers, with the assistance of the Manila Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon
arrival at the BI detention center, Ku was detained. Ku then filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amaparo .
The respondent Judge granted the Writ of Amparo.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the privilege of Writ of Amparo was properly granted in favor of Ku.

HELD:
We rule in the negative. Ku is ordered immediately released from petitioner’s custody without prejudice to the
institution of the proper remedy to extradition. Moreover, the petitioner and/or agents are ordered to cease and
desist from further v iolating the right to liberty of Ku and the members of his family by filing cases to legitimize
his detention.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) provides:

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
v iolated or threatened with v iolation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
indiv idual or entity.
The writ shall cover ex tralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

The writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats
thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. Pardico enumerated the elements
constituting "enforced disappearances" as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9851, to wit:
(a) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty ;
(b) That it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political
organization;
(c) That it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and
(d) That the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time.
 182

WRIT OF AMPARO

127 . Balao v . Arroyo, G.R. No. 186050, December 13, 2011

FACTS:
The witnesses testified that James was abducted by unidentified men, say ing they were policemen and were
arresting him for a drugs case and then made to ride a white v an.

Petitioners, Arthur Balao, Winston Balao, Nonette Balao and Jonilyn Balao -Strugar (siblings of James Balao) and
Beverly Longid, prayed for the issuance of a writ of amparo and likewise prayed for (1 ) an inspection order for the
inspection of at least 11 military and police facilities which have been prev iously reported as detention centers for
activ ists abducted by military and police operatives; (2) a production order for all documents that contain
ev idence relev ant to the petition, particularly the Order of Battle List and any record or dossier respondents have
on James; and (3) a witness protection order.

Respondents contended that the petition failed to meet the requirement in the Rule on the Writ of Amparo that
claims must be established by substantial evidence considering that: (1 ) petitioners allegations do not mention in
any way the manner, whether directly or indirectly, the alleged participation of respondents in the purported
abduction of James; (2) Petitioners do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the
abduction of James, hence, their statements are hearsay with no probative value; and (3) the allegations in the
petition do not show the materiality and relev ance of the places sought to be searched/inspected and documents
to be produced, specifically the requirement that the prayer for an inspection order shall be supported by
affidav its or testimonies of witnesses hav ing personal knowledge of the whereabouts of the aggrieved party.

ISSUE/S: Whether the totality of ev idence satisfies the degree of proof required by the Amparo Rule to establish
an enforced disappearance.

HELD:
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated on October 24, 2007 amidst rising incidence of ex tralegal
killings and enforced disappearances. It was formulated in the exercise of this Courts expanded rule -making
power for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights enshrin ed in the 1987 Constitution, albeit
limited to these two situations. Extralegal killings refer to killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.

On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention, or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or priv ate individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose t he fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such person outside the protection
of law.

The Supreme Court clarified that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an amparo
proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the
complained acts in the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. Commanders may
therefore be impleaded not actually on the basis of command responsibility but rather on the ground of their
responsibility, or at least accountability.

In order to effectively address thru the amparo remedy the violations of the constitutional rights to liberty and
security of James who remains missing to date, the Court deems it appropriate to refer this case back to the trial
court for further investigation by the PNP and CIDG and monitoring of their investigative activ ities that complies
with the standard of diligence required by the Amparo Rule. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 697 5, otherwise
known as the PNP Law specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate to [i]nv estigate and prev ent
crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution. The trial
court should further validate the results of such inv estigations and actions through hearings it may deem
necessary to conduct.
 183

PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT (WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABAES DATA)

128. Rodriguez v . Macapagal Arroyo, G.R. No. 19 1805, Nov ember 15, 2011

FACTS:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as
an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Lay a, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.

Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess his membership
in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data
with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties.
The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo
as party -respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.

ISSUE/S:
I. Whether or not the former President GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential
immunity from suit

II. Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.

III. Whether or not the president, as commander -in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable
for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

IV . Whether or not Rodriguez has proven through substantial ev idence that form er President Arroyo is
responsible or accountable for his abduction.

HELD:
The petition for Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data is GRANTED

I. No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civ il or criminal liability in Amparo
and Habeas Data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the
enforced disappearance or ex trajudicial killing

II. Yes. Command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domestic

III. Yes. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain:
(a.) the existence of a superior subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of
the crime as his subordinate;
(b.) the superior knew or had reason to know the crime was about to be or had been committed and;
(c) the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators.

IV . No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation and there is no piece of ev idence that could
establish Arroyo’s responsibility or accountability for the abduction.
 184

129. MARY NETTE R. GAMBOA VS CHAN

Facts.
President arroyo ordered for the investigation of alleged priv ate armies. Pnp ilocos norte conducted the said
inv estigation, among one of those investigated was gamboa.

After the investigation, a report was given and gambo was included in the list submitted, gamboa alleged that her
name was even published on the newspaper and televised news which caused her reputation besmirched.

Gamboa alleged that her right to priv acy and her reputation was maligned and destroy ed. Gamboa filed a case
praying for the issuance of habeas data and for the following reliefs : destruction of unverified reports from pnp
ilocos norte; withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher pnp officials; rectification of the damage one to her
honor; ordering respondent to refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her and restraining respondents
from making baseless reports.

Rtc issued the writ after finding the petitioner meritoriuos. It further instructed for the submission of all
information and reports forwarded as been used agains gamboa.

In the reutrn respondent alleged that they have acted within the bound of their mandate in conducting the said
inv estigation. Also, they asserted that the petition was incomplete for failing to comply with the requirements.

Rtc dismissed the petition. Despite the foregoing findings, nevertheless also dismissed the petition on the ground
that gamboa failed to prove that the subject information originated from the respondent and that they forwarded
the database to the zeñorosa commission without the benefit of prior verification. The trial court also ruled that
ev en before respondent assumed their official positions, information on her may have already been acquired..

Issue. Won the issuance of the writ is not sufficiently established ( the right to life, liberty or propery of the
petitioner was not violated)

Sc.
Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must
include privacy as well, if it is to be repository of freedom. However right to privacy is not absolute, as an
exception: the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over right
to privacy of ordinary financial institution, it is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest.

Employ ing the rational basis relationship test, there is no infringement of the right to privacy as the requirement
to disclose information is for a valid purpose. Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing
state objective, the courts are required to weight both motions. In this cases, although the right to privacy is
considered as a fundamental right, it may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or an overriding state interest
deemed legitimate and compelling.
 185

130. People v s fieldad

Defendants were charged for the crime of conspiracy and murder for killing 2 jailguards and carnapping.

One morning, on the routinary headcount, prison cells were opened and asked the inmates to proceed to the open
court for the said head count. While conducting the said headcount, the defendants killed two jailguard to obtain
the key to the premises and escaped on the same. A parked v ehicle outside the bjmp was used by the accused as
get away vehicle, however not too far from the crime scene, the defendants were caught by the police officers
During trial, the rtc found the accused guilty for the crime of conspiracy and murder and carnapping. Defendant
fieldad interposed a defense of uncontrollable fear, alleged that he was forced to drive the v ehicle and escape the
prison house on fear that he might be killed by hus co- accused if he will not join and accompany the perpetrators
on the said plan.

Rtc conv icted them for the said crime. On appeal the ca affirmed the decision with modification on the period of
penalties imposed by the lower courts.

Fieldad elevated the case to the sc.

Issue. Won defendant fieldad is guilty for the crime?

Sc.
Yes. A conspiracy ex ists when two or more persons come an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit. Conspiracy cN be inferred and established by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts
point to a joint purpose and design, concerted actionand community of interest. Once conspiracy is established,
the act of one is the act of the other conspirators. Contrary to the contention of fieldad, his acts before, during and
after the attacks on the v ictim, discloses the agreement with the joint purpose in and design in the commission of
the felony. The positive testimony of the witnesses corroborated by a web of circumstancial evidence that points to
no other conclusion than that fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail guards.
 186

131. Dela cruz v s people

Dela cruz, a duly appointed public officer, being appointed as police officer 2 of the pnp, assigned in the security
service group was charged for commission of a felony in v iolation of ra. 9165 or the comprehensiv e dangerous
drugs act after being caught in an entrapment operation and was found positive for the use of methampetamine
hy drochloride or shabu.

The complainants alleged that a certain person was picked up by police officers for allegedly selling drugs. They
were instructed to proceed to police office where they were demanded for an amount of 40k in exchange for the
release of the person. The police enforcers immediately comducted an entrapment operation and the defendant
was caught. After the laboratory exams, accused was required to submit his urine for drug testing. The result of
the ex ams, y ielded positive for presence of dangerous drugs as indicated in the confirmatory test result. IOn the
testimony of the accused, he alleged that he was abducted by police officers and was required to submit urine
sample, the former refused to submit the said sample and requested that he wanted it to be done in the pnp crime
lab and not by the nbi. His request was however denied. He also requested to be allowed to call his lawyer but to
no avail.

Rtc found him guilty, upon appeal ca affirmed the decision of the rtc.

Accused elevated the case to the sc, alleging that in a present jurisprudence that drug testing conducted under a
circumstantial similar to his would violate a persons right to priv acy.

Issue. Won drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal?

Sc.
No it is not legal. As said by the lower court, a suspect cannot invoke his right to counsel when he is required to
ex tract urine, because, while he is already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony
against himself. Extracting urine from one's body is merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of
a custodial investigation is devoid of merit.

To make the prov ision under the said law, the act must fall within the contex t of the said law, however, the
accused was arrested in the alleged act of extorsion. To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under the law is tantamount to unduly ex panding its meaning.
 187

132. People v s nazareno

Facts.
Pnp and beltran entered into a contract for the delivery of caliber .45 thomson brand pistol, defendant signed the
check signed the comtract. Allegations of irregularity or overpricing surrounded the procurement, leading to the
creation of a tri agency investigsting committee. The committee found no overpricing neither collusion among the
officers participationg unto the said contract. Upon a separate auditing conducted by COA it found overpricing
unto the said transaction. Special audit team filed a case in the sandiganbay an that while in the performance of
their offcisl functio, took adv antageof their position and committed a crime in relation to their offices, conspiring
with one another , enter in behalf of the said contract for the supply of caliber .45 gun.

Members of the special audit team testified during the trial that there was indeed overpricing in the procurement
of the said gun. They have presented a graphical comparison of the regular price of the unit against the purchase
price presented by the defendants.

In their defense, defendants alleged that such unit price cannot be the basis for the computation since the afp
purchase price were made under the foreign military sales program extended by the usa pursuant to the mutual
defense treaty and military assistance agreement of 1953.

Sandiganbay an acquitted the respondent after trial. They have based their decision by concluding that the afp
price did not offer sufficient basis for comparison to be able to establish firmly the alleged overpricing in the
purchase of the subject firearms by the pnp. Also to the conclusion that based on the tetimonies of the witnesses'
competence on was never questioned by the prosecution. And that the sandiganbayan observed that the audit
team followed a flawed procedure in reaching its ov erpricing conclusion.

Despite its negative conclusion on the overpricing charge, the sandiganbay an proceeded to discuss and reject the
allegation of conspiracybetween and among the respondent. Noting the respondents indiv idual participation in
the questioned transaction and ev identiary requirement that conspiracy must be proved by ev idence of a chain of
circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest, the sandiganbayan rejected allegations of conspiracy .

Issue. Won there was conspiracy.

Sc.
Petition is without merit. Under article3 sec . 21 that no person shall be pwice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense and under section 7 of rule 117 that when an accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his ex press consent by a court of competent
jurisdictio,upon a v alid complaint or information or other formal charges sufficient in form and substance to
sustain w conviction and after the accused had pleaded, the conviction or acquittal of the accused shall bar to
another for the offense charge.

A judgment of acquittal is final and ex ecutiry and is no longer rev iewable it is also immediately ex ecutoryand the
state may not seek its review.
 188

133. People v s nazareno

Facts.
Pnp and beltran entered into a contract for the delivery of caliber .45 thomson brand pistol, defendant signed the
check signed the comtract. Allegations of irregularity or overpricing surrounded the procurement, leading to the
creation of a tri agency investigsting committee. The committee found no overpricing neither collusion among the
officers participationg unto the said contract. Upon a separate auditing conducted by COA it found overpricing
unto the said transaction. Special audit team filed a case in the sandiganbay an that while in the performance of
their offcisl functio, took adv antageof their position and committed a crime in relation to their offices, conspiring
with one another , enter in behalf of the said contract for the supply of caliber .45 gun.

Members of the special audit team testified during the trial that there was indeed overpricing in the procurement
of the said gun. They have presented a graphical comparison of the regular price of the unit against the purchase
price presented by the defendants.

In their defense, defendants alleged that such unit price cannot be the basis for the computation since the afp
purchase price were made under the foreign military sales program extended by the usa pursuant to the mutual
defense treaty and military assistance agreement of 1953.

Sandiganbay an acquitted the respondent after trial. They have based their decision by concluding that the afp
price did not offer sufficient basis for comparison to be able to establish firmly the alleged overpricing in the
purchase of the subject firearms by the pnp. Also to the conclusion that based on the tetimonies of the witnesses'
competence on was never questioned by the prosecution. And that the sandiganbayan observed that the audit
team followed a flawed procedure in reaching its ov erpricing conclusion.

Despite its negative conclusion on the overpricing charge, the sandiganbay an proceeded to discuss and reject the
allegation of conspiracybetween and among the respondent. Noting the respondents indiv idual participation in
the questioned transaction and ev identiary requirement that conspiracy must be proved by ev idence of a chain of
circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of
interest, the sandiganbayan rejected allegations of conspiracy .

Issue. Won there was conspiracy.

Sc.
Petition is without merit. Under article3 sec . 21 that no person shall be pwice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense and under section 7 of rule 117 that when an accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case
against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his ex press consent by a court of competent
jurisdictio,upon a v alid complaint or information or other formal charges sufficient in form and substance to
sustain w conviction and after the accused had pleaded, the conviction or acquittal of the accused shall bar to
another for the offense charge.

A judgment of acquittal is final and ex ecutiry and is no longer rev iewable it is also immediately ex ecutoryand the
state may not seek its review.
 189

134. Ocam po v s abando.

Facts.
A mass grave site was discovered and found therein a mass of skeletal remains. 1 2 complainants were one of the
relatives of the remains found on the site. The complainants alleged that their relatives were abducted by the
members of the cpp/npa and were never seen. Based on the letter and attachments sent by the relatives,
prosecutor issued subpoena requiring the petitioners to submit their counter affidav its. Prosecutor recommended
the filling of an information for 15 counts of murder against petitioners.

The information was filed before the rtc of leyte. Respondent judge found probable cause and issued warrants of
arrest with no recommended bail.

Petitioner filed certiorari seeking the annulment for the issuance of warrants and prayed for the unconditional
release of petitioner from pnp custody.

Petitioner also alleged that there was a pending case for rebellion and as such, case for murder will be absorbed
from the said crime

Issue.
Won rebellion will absorb the case for murder

Sc.
Under the doctrine of political doctrine common crimes perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are
div ested of their character as a common offense and assume the political complex ion of the main crime of which
they were ingredients and cosequently cannot be punished deparately from the principal offense or complexed
with the same to justify the imposition of a graver penalty

Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus when a killing is
committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide nor murther but rather assumes political
complex ion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.

When political offense doctrine is assreted as defense, it becomes crucial for the court to determine whether the
act of killing was dine in furtherance of a politicsl end and for political motive of the act to be conclusively
demonstrated.

Thus if it is shown that the proper charge against prtitioners have been simple rebellion, the trial court shall
dismiss the murder charges upon the filling of the information for simple rebellion, as long as petitioners would
not be placed in double jeopardy.

section 7 of rule 117 that when an accused has been conv icted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his ex press consent by a court of competent jurisdictio,upon a v alid complaint or
information or other formal charges sufficient in form and substance to sustain w conv iction and after the accused
had pleaded, the conviction or acquittal of the accused shall bar to another for the offense charge.
 190

135. P/SUPT . FELIXBERT O CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERT O

BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and GILBERTO
PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENT OR S. DELA CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L.
BORLONGAN, MR. ART EMIO ESGUERRA, "TISOY ," and JOHN DOES, Petitioners, v s. DR.
AMANDA T . CRUZ, NIXON T . CRUZ, and FERDINAND T . CRUZ, Respondents.

G.R. No. 182165, 25 Novem ber 2009

Topics:
A. Writ of Am paro
B. Writ of Habeas Data

Doctrinal and Constitutional Bases:

A. The coverage of the writs is lim ited to the protection of right to life, liberty and security .
It covers not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions.

To be covered by the privilege of the w rits, respondents must meet the threshold that their right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened w ith an unlaw ful act or omission. Absent any
evidence or allegation in the petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty
and/or that there exist threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in
their persons, the issuance of the w rit cannot be justified.

B. Petitions for writ of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot
be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property
dispute.

C. The v alidity of arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defen se that m aybe
set up during the trial and not before a petition for writs of am paro and habeas data.

The filing of the petitions should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them has
already commenced after they w ere arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded in accordance w ith
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. How ever, the reliefs offered by the w rits may be made
available to the aggrieved party in a criminal proceeding by motion.

FACTS:

Respondent spouses Francisco and Amanda Cr uz (the spouses) leased a parcel of land situated at Malolos,
Bulacan, refused to v acate the property despite demands by the lessor, the Provincial Government of Bulacan. The
prov ince filed an unlawful detainer case against the spouses before the MTC which rendered the judgment in favor
of the Prov ince, which became final and executory. Notwithstanding the finality of judgment, the spouses filed
cases against the province and the MTC judge who rendered the decision. The cases were all dismissed except for
the petition for annulment of judgment and injunction before the RTC. The RTC granted the injunction and
ordered that “the injunction is made permanent until the MTC resolves with finality the petition of the spouses for
determination of metes and bounds”. The MTC comply with the Order, approved the Geodetic Engineer’s Report
and issued a writ of demolition. The spouses filed a TRO upon the receipt of the notice. The TRO was set for
hearing; however, the demolition was implemented earlier than the hearing date. Nonetheless, the RTC granted
the TRO. The spouses entered the property and barricade themselves therein. By v irtue of a memorandum issued
by the governor, police officers were deployed in the area with the instruction to protect, secure and maintain
possession of the property . Due to the refusal of the spouses and their co -respondents to turn-over the property,
the police officer shoved, arrest and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light
threats. A petition for writ of habeas corpus and habeas data were filed before the RTC against the police officers.
The RTC granted the writ of amparo on the ground that the spouses and their co -respondents were subjected to
bodily harm, mental torture, degradation and debasement of human being despite the pending resolution of the
contempt case filed by spouses for the alleged violation of the injunction.
 191

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for writ of amparo and/or habeas data is av ailable remedy in cases involving property
rights. Whether or not an independent petition for writ of amparo and/or data maybe filed during the pendency of
a criminal action.

HELD:

The petition for writ of amparo is av ailable remedy to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
v iolated or threatened with v iolation of an unlawful act. On the other hand, a petition for writ of habeas data is a
remedy to a person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a priv ate indiv idual or entity engaged in the gathering, collection or
storing of data or information.

To be covered by the priv ilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold that their right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Absent any ev idence or allegation in the
petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty and/or that there ex ist threat or intimidation
that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

From the above, the coverage of the writs is limited for the protection of right to life, liberty and security. Amparo
was intended to address the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage in its present
form is confined to these two instances or threats. Ev idently, the present controversy arose out of property dispute
between the Prov incial Gov ernment and the respondents. Absent any evidence or eve n allegation in the petition
that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exist threat or intimidation that
destroys the efficacy of their right as a person, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

In any case, the filing of the petition should have been barred for the criminal proceedings against them has
already commenced after they were arrested. The v alidity of the arrest conducted cannot be raised in a petition for
amparo or writ of habeas data, it can be raised as a defense during the trial. The reliefs afforded by the writs can
be obtained during the pendency of the criminal proceedings upon motion of the accused.
 192

136. EDGARDO NAVIA,1 RUBEN DIO, and ANDREW BUISING, Petitioners, v s. VIRGINIA
PARDICO, for and in behalf and in representation of BENHUR V. PARDICO Respondent.

G.R. No. 184467 , 19 June 2012

Topics:
A. Writ of Am paro
B. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights

Doctrinal and Constitutional Bases:

A. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo or A.M. No. 07 -9-12-SC was promulgated to arrest the
ram pant extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances.

Its purpose is to provide an expeditious and effective relief to “any person w hose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlaw ful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of private individual or entity.

In a petition for writ of amparo, allegation and proof that the person subject thereof are missing is not
enough. The petitioner has to prove by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government or
State participation.

Although a writ of amparo covers private individual or entity, government or State involvement in the
disappearance remains an indispensable element. The hallmark of Stat e participation differentiates an
enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

B. Article 6 and Article 9 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
recognizes right to life and liberty which is also embodied in our fundamental law.

Article 6 of the Convention recognizes every human being’s inherent right to life while Article 9 ordains
that everyone has the right to liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law w hile the
right to liberty and security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance w ith
the law.

C. Section 3(g) of R.A. 9851 otherwise known as “AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING
CRIMES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, GENOCIDE AND OT HER
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY , ORGANIZING JURISDICTION, DESIGNATING SPECIAL
COURT S, AND FOR RELATED PURPOSE S” defines enforced or involuntary
disappearances.

Section 3(g) defines enforced or involuntary disappearance as “the arrest, detention, or abduction of
persons by, or with the authorization support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization
follow ed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time”.

Culled from the statutory definition, the follow ing elements constitute enforced or involuntary
disappearance; (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or political
organization; (c) that it be follow ed by the State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and (d) the
intention of such refusal is to remove such person from the protection of law for prolonged period of
time.
 193

FACTS:

Security personnel from Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) allegedly inv ited in the Security Office
(as per v ersion of the respondents, forcefully and unlawfully arrested) Enrique Lapore (Bong) and Benhur Pardico
(Ben) for the complaint that was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamp in the subdivision. They
were brought before petitioner Edgardo Navia (Navia). The petitioner alleged that after the invitation and
questioning ( as per version of the respondents, bodily harm is inflicted upon them in the security office) they let
go of the two, while the respondent insist that only Bong was let go since Nav ia was still talking to Ben when Bong
left. From then, Ben was never saw again. His wife, V irginia Pardico filed a petition for writ of amparo against the
security personnel and against Nav ia. The RTC granted the petition for writ of amparo.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the disappearance fall within the ambit of writ of amparo.

HELD:

The disappearance does not fall within the purview of the writ. In the present case, the disappearance of Ben in
unquestionable as proved in court a quo. However, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance is not enough. It
is essential that such disappearance was carried out with direct, indirect or acquiescence of the government or the
State. This indispensable element of State participation is lacking in this case. The petition for writ of amparo does
not contain any State involvement and none of the presented ev idence tends to show that such disappearance is
orchestrated by the State or any of its agents. In fact, none of its agents, officials or employees were impleaded in
the amparo petition. Thus, in the absence of allegation or proof that the State has a hand in the disappearance of
Ben or that they failed to exercise ex traordinary diligence in investigating the case, the Cou rt will not hold the
State or any of its agents as responsible or accountable.

To be covered by the priv ilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold that their right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Absent any ev idence or allegation in the
petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty and/or that there ex ist threat or intimidation
that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.

To be sure, even if the person sought to be held responsible is a private person or entity, State participation is
indispensable element. Rev iew of the amparo petition reveals that the respondents therein are security guards of
Asian Land, which is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing presented that would link
or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. The hallmark of State participation
differentiates an enforced disappearance from ordinary case of a missing person.

Section 3(g) defines enforced or involuntary disappearance as “the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by,
or with the authorization support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organiza tion followed by a refusal to
acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with
the intention of remov ing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time”.

Culled from the statutory definition, the following elements constitute enforced or involuntary disappearance; (a)
that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or
with authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or political organization; (c) that it be followed by the
State or political organization’s refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the
person subject of the amparo petition; and (d) the intention of such refu sal is to remove such person from the
protection of law for prolonged period of time.
 194

137 . HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission, Petitioner, vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO S. URRO, in his capacity as the new appointee vice herein petitioner HON.
LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, National Police Commission, Respondent.

G.R. No. 191560, 29 March 2011

Topics:
A. Appointm ents, Administrative Law
B. Quo Warranto

Doctrinal and Constitutional Bases:

A. Appointm ents are classified as to its (1) nature and as to (2) m anner to which it is created.
The power to appoint is vested to the President as authorized by the Rev ised
Administrative Code of 1987 . The condition of temporary (acting) appointee.

Under the first classification, appointments may either be (a) permanent or (b) temporary (acting). A
basic distinction is that a permanent appointee can only be removed from office for a cause; w hereas a
temporary (acting) appointment can be removed even w ithout a hearing or just cause. Under the
second classificatio n, an appointment may either be (a) regular or (b) ad interim. A regular
appointment is an appointment made w hile Congress is in session, w hile an ad interim appointment is
an appointment issued while Congress is in recess. Strictly speaking, appointments made by the
President which does not require the confirmation of Commission on Appointments cannot be classified
as either regular or an ad interim appointment.

Generally, the pow er to appoint includes the pow er to make temporary appointment, unless the
President is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution, law or where an acting appointment is
repugnant to the nature of the office.

The purpose of issuing a temporary appointment is to prevent interruption in the discharge of official
function by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection process. An acting
appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once is called by the
appointing authority. As such, his term is not fixed and serves only in the pleasure of appointing
authority.

B. Nature of petition for quo warranto under the Rules of Court

Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes w ith respect to the title to a public office. Quo w arranto may
be instituted by the Government as a party-plaintiff or, under Section 5 of Rule 66, an individual if he
claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another.

The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding must prove that his clear right over the said office for the
suit to succeed. Absence of such, the suit must fail.

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia P. de Guzman and
Eduardo U. Escueta (collectively, the respondents) as Commissioners of the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM), and to prohibit then Executive Secretary Leandro Mendoza and Department of Interior and Local
Gov ernment (DILG) Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno from enforcing the respondents’ oath of office. Particularly, the
petitioner asks that respo ndent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in
office.

PGMA appointed petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner due to death of Imelda Roces, NAPOLCOM
Commissioner. On even date, PGMA also appointed Escueta as NAPOLCOM Com missioner and designated him
as V ice-Chairman. Later PGMA, appointed Alejanro Urro, in place of the petitioner, de Guzman and Escueta as
permanent Commissioners. The appointment of Urro is dated as March 5, 2010 while that of De Guzman and
 195

Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010. In a letter dated march 1 9, 2010, the DILG Executive Assistant
congratulated the three. The petitioner then filed a petition for quo warranto on the ground that the appointment
v iolates the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointments.

Upon the assumption of the Aquino Administration, the President issued E.O No. 2, revoking, withdrawing and
recalling appointments issued by the prev ious administration in violation of the constitutional ban on midnight
appointments. Specifically, those of appointments dating March 11 , 2010.

The petitioner claims that he was supposed to serve the unexpired portion of the term of Roces, in accordance
with RA 697 5, DILG Act of 1990, hence, notwithstanding the temporary appointment in his paper, it must be
treated as regular appointment. Further, even if the appointment is temporary, the v alidity of his termination
depends upon the validity of the appointment of the person intended to replace him. Since the appointment of
Urro was done in violation o f the constitutional prohibition on midnight appointment, his appointment should
remain affective as no new and valid appointment is made. Such was also the case of Escueta and De Guzman.

The OSG, however, countered that the prohibition on midnight appointments pertains only to the making of an
appointment and not the acceptance of the appointee during the period. The prohibition pertains only to act of the
President and not of the appointee. Since their appointment bears the date before the effectiv ity of the ban, the
appointment is valid. Lastly, the OSG claimed that an appointment in an acting capacity cannot exceed one year.
Priv ate respondents claim that their appointments are valid since the petitioner failed to substantiate the claim
that their appointment were made only for the purpose of influencing the presidential elections or for partisan
reasons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner is actually a PERMANENT appointment since, as alleged, R.A.
697 5 does not allow an appointment of Commissioner in an acting capacity by staggering the term.

HELD:

The petitioner claims has no statutory basis. Given the wide latitude of the President’s appointing authority and
the strict construction against any limitation on such power, t he prohibition on the President’s from issuing an
acting appointment must either be specific, or there must be a clear repugnancy between the nature of the office
and the temporary appointment. No such limitation exist in R.A. 697 5.

Under the first classification, appointments may either be (a) permanent or (b) temporary (acting). A basic
distinction is that a permanent appointee can only be removed from office for a cause; whereas a temporary
(acting) appointment can be removed even without a hearing or just cause. Under the second classification, an
appointment may either be (a) regular or (b) ad interim. A regular appointment is an appointment made while
Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is an appointment issued while Congress is in recess.
Strictly speaking, appointments made by the President which does not require the confirmation of Commission on
Appointments cannot be classified as either regular or an ad interim appointment.

Generally, the power to appoint includes the power to make temporary appointment, unless the President is
otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution, law or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the
nature of the office.

The purpose of issuing a temporary appointment is to prevent interrupt ion in the discharge of official function by
authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection process. An acting appointee accepts the
position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once is called by the appointing authority. As such, his
term is not fix ed and serves only in the pleasure of appointing authority.

Furthermore, while the Court previously inquired as to the nature of a supposed acting appointment to determine
whether the appointing authority is abusing the principle of temporary appointment, petitioner has not pointed
any insight that would warrant a second look and the invalidation of his temporary appointment. Going further,
the petitioner is estopped from claiming that his nature of appointment is permane nt, since upon receipt of such
 196

appointment, he faithfully exercised the function of the office without any misgiv ings on the character of such
appointment.

Lastly, an acting appointee, has no cause of action for a quo warranto against the new appointee si nce the
petitioner only serves at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
 197

138. CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner, v s. PEOPLE OF T HE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 17 9448, 26 June 2013

Topics:
A. Custodial Investigation
B. Right to Counsel
C. Confession (adm ission)

Doctrinal and Constitutional Bases:

A. Custodial investigation m eans any questioning initiated by the law enforcement authorities
after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant m anner.

The constitutional prohibition against the admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of
Section 12, Article III, is applicable only in a custodial interrogation. A person under custodial
investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attaches upon commencement thereof; (1 ) to remain
silent; (2) to have a competent and independent counsel preferably of his ow n choice and (3) to be
informed of the two (2) above mentioned rights.
B. Applicability of right to counsel

The right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not in
administrative investigation. Section 1 2, Article III is meant for the protection of an accused during the
custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule found in Section 1 2 par. 2, Art. III ap plies only to
admissions made in criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

FACTS:

Tanengge is a bank manager of Metrobank – Commercio Branch. During an audit and internal investigation
conducted by the Metrobank Head Office, it was found out that Tanengge has forged the signature of Romeo Tan,
a client of the Bank which has substantial deposit in the Bank, to cause the preparation of promissory notes and
cashier’s check in the name of the latter. Once the said docume nts has been forged and falsified, Tanengge
released and obtained from Metrobank the proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same for his use
and benefit.

Tanengge was then summoned before the Head Office and in the presence of two senior bra nch officer, 2 bank
lawyers and 2 policemen, was asked to sign the paper in connection with the audit conducted. Subsequently,
complaint for fiv e counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents was filed before the RTC. The
RTC convicted him and the CA uphold the conv iction. Before the Court, Tanengge argued that the paper he signed
should not have been admitted as ev idence against him on the ground that the same was procure in v iolation of
Sec. 12 of Art. III and that the prosecution is guilty of suppressing its own evidence by not presenting Romeo Tan,
which when presented will released him from liability.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is already under custodial investigation when he was asked to sign the paper as to
call the applic ation of Sec 12, Art III.

HELD:

The constitutional prohibition against the admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section 1 2,
Article III, is applicable only in a custodial interrogation. A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed
certain rights which attaches upon commencement thereof; (1 ) to remain silent; (2) to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice and (3) to be informed of the two (2) above mentioned rights.
 198

The right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not in administrative
inv estigation. Section 12, Article III is meant for the protection of an accused during the custodial investigation.
Thus, the exclusionary rule found in Section 1 2 par. 2, Ar t. III applies only to admissions made in criminal
inv estigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.

Petitioner’s written statement is admissible as evidence and that he was not y et under custodial investigation. The
constitutional proscription under Section 12 is applicable only to custodial inv estigation. In the present case,
petitioner has given uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly in the branch that he managed.
Ev idently, the following matters are clear: (1 ) the que stioning was initiated not by the law enforcement authority
but by the internal affairs manager of the bank; (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor retrained of his liberty in
any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be sa id to be under custodial
inv estigation. Moreover, the right to counsel applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation not of
those administrative investigation. Here, the petitioner’s written admission was given during an administrative
inquiry.

It is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is prov ed and that the
confessant bears the burden of proof. In the case, the admission was replete of relev ant details that only the
perpetrator of the crime will know.
 199

139. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARK JASON CHAVEZ y BITANCOR
alias "NOY ", Accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 207 950, 22 September 2014

Topics:
A. Custodial Investigation
B. Miranda Rights

Doctrinal and Constitutional Bases:

A. Miranda rights and its invocation during custodial investigation

The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement
that any waiver of the right to counsel must be made “in w riting and in the presence of the counsel”. The
right to counsel upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of Miranda rights, w hich
requires that (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he
says can and will be used against him in a court of law ; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before
being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an
attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires.

The invocation of this rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins “when the police
investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police w ho starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incrimination statements.

B. Ex panding of Custodial Investigation under R.A. 7 438

R.A. 7438 expanded the definition of custodial investigation to “includes the practice of issuing an
invitation to a person who is investigated in connection w ith an offense he is suspected to have
committed, without prejudice to the liability of the inviting officer for any violation of law”.

This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their
Miranda rights.

FACTS:

Mark Chav ez was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide for killing and taking the personal property of
Elmer Duque (Barbie). During the investigation and prior to the charging, the mother of Chavez and Chavez
himself went to the Police Station and told the officers therein that she want to help her son who might be
inv olved in Barbie’s death. The Officer therein informed the mother about the consequence of ex ecuting a written
statement without the assistance of a lawyer. Nonetheless, the mother executed a written statement and
surrendered the two (2) cell phones of Barbie which was missing at the time of his death. Angelo Penamente, who
earlier saw Barbie and Chavez prior to the formers death, identified Chavez as the person who is with Barbie.
Subsequent investigation was made by the officers which produced the weapon used to kill Barbie. The RTC
conv icted Chav ez base on circumstantial ev idence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an accused who voluntarily surrendered is entitled for the invocation of Miranda rights.

HELD:

The accused is entitled. From the original cov erage it may appear that Miranda rights only apply when “one is
taken into custody by the police”, such as during an arrest. The rights are intended to protect ordinary citizens
from pressures of custodial setting.
 200

The Miranda rights were incorporated in our Constitution but were modified to include the statement that any
waiv er of the right to counsel must be made “in writing and in the presence of the counsel”. The right to counsel
upon being questioned for the commission of a crime is part of Miranda rights, which requires that (a) any person
under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) any thing he says can and will be used against him
in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present
when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be prov ided before any questioning if he
so desires.

The invocation of this rights applies during custodial investigation, which begins “when the police investigation is
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into
custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incrimination
statements.

However, the passing of R.A. 7 438 expanded the coverage of custodial investigation to include the practice of
issuing an inv itation. This means that a person who voluntarily surrendered to an investigating officer is entitled
to such rights. For one, the same custodial setting ex ist in this scenario. Chavez is also being questioned by an
inv estigating police officer. As an additional pressure, he may have been compelled to surrender by his mother
who accompanied him to the police station.
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140. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v s. CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and
EDGAR PIMENTEL, Appellants.

G.R. No. 196005, 1 October 2014

Topics:
A. Right Against Self-Incrimination

Doctrinal and Constitutional Bases:

A. Right against self-incrimination extends only to testimonial compulsion.

The right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose
confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have
a competent and independent counsel of his ow n choice. This constitutional right do not extend when the
body of the accused is proposed to be examined.

FACTS:

Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ry an Comista (Comista) and Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were charged in
conspiracy with others for the murder of two jail guards and for carnapping. During the trial, the counsel for the
accused manifested before the court that the par affin casting was performed without the assistance of the counsel,
contrary to the right of the accused. However, all the offered by the prosecution including the paraffin cast and
test results were admitted. They were convicted by the RTC which was affirmed by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the constitutional rights against self-incrimination applies to cases other than testimonies.

HELD:

The right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or
admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. This constitutional right do not extend when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined.

As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question that it was not conducted in
the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense whose confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and to
hav e competent and independent counsel of his own choice. His right against self-incrimination is not violated by
the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion and
not when the body of the accused is proposed to be ex amined as in this case.