6

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
vs.
PRISCILLA G. CAMPOSANO, ENRIQUE L. PEREZ, and IMELDA Q. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 157684
April 27, 2005

FACTS: Respondents are former employees of the DOH-NCR, holding various positions. In 1996 some
concerned DOH-NCR employees filed a complaint before the DOH Resident Ombudsman against Majarais,
Cabrera, and the respondents, arising out of an alleged anomalous purchase by DOH-NCR of certain medicines
worth ₱330k.

Resident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Secretary of Health recommending the filing of
a formal administrative charge of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct against [respondents] and their co-
respondents. PCAGC took over the investigation from the DOH and issued a penalty of dismissal from the
government service be imposed thereon.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the Secretary of Health. Respondents
appealed to the CSC where the same was denied by the CSC, except for Cabrera who was exonerated of the
administrative charges against him.

Upon appeal to the CA, the CA nonetheless used the same legal bases for annulling the CSC’s Resolution
against respondents. It held that the PCAGC’s jurisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to
presidential appointees. Thus, the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents.
Moreover, in simply and completely relying on the PCAGC’s findings, the secretary of health failed to comply
with administrative due process. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate anomalous transactions involving the
respondents. YES.

HELD: EO No. 151 granted the PCAGC the jurisdiction to investigate administrative complaints against
presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption. From a cursory reading of its provisions, it is
evident that EO 151 authorizes the PCAGC to investigate charges against presidential, not non-presidential,
appointees. In its Preamble, specifically in its "Whereas" clauses, the EO "specifically tasked [the PCAGC] to x
x x investigate presidential appointees charged with graft and corruption x x x." More pointedly, Section 3
states that the "Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving graft and
corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees x x x."

"Section 3. Jurisdiction. – The Commission shall have jurisdiction over all administrative complaints involving
graft and corruption filed in any form or manner against presidential appointees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations." (emphasis supplied)

"Section 4. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Commission shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:

"(a) Investigation – The Commission shall have the power to investigate administrative complaints
against presidential appointees in the executive department of the government, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, charged with graft and corruption. x x x x”
On the basis of the foregoing verba legis approach, respondents claim that the PCAGC did not have jurisdiction
over them, because they were not presidential appointees.The Court notes, however, that respondents were
not investigated pursuant to EO 151. The investigation was authorized under Administrative Order No. 298
dated October 25, 1996, which had created an Ad Hoc Committee to look into the administrative charges filed
against Director Rosalinda U. Majarais, Priscilla G. Camposano, Horacio D. Cabrera, Imelda Q. Agustin and
Enrique L. Perez. The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee cannot be
doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply
with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is sustained.

As to the validity of the Secretary’s decision, it is patently void for want of due process. The
Administrative Code of 1987 vests department secretaries with the authority to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary actions for officers and employees under the former’s jurisdiction. Thus, the health
secretary had disciplinary authority over respondents. As a matter of administrative procedure, a department
secretary may utilize other officials to investigate and report the facts from which a decision may be based. In
the present case, the secretary effectively delegated the power to investigate to the PCAGC.

Neither the PCAGC under EO 151 nor the Ad Hoc Investigating Committee created under AO 298 had the
power to impose any administrative sanctions directly. Their authority was limited to conducting investigations
and preparing their findings and recommendations. The power to impose sanctions belonged to the
disciplining authority, who had to observe due process prior to imposing penalties.

In this case, the CA correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present
factual milieu. The secretary simply and blindly relied on the dispositive portion of the Commission’s
Resolution. The actual exercise of the disciplining authority’s prerogative requires a
prior independent consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an
invalid decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator’s
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered.
 7

MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR.

vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, EVANGELINE URSAL, HON. JOSE E. LINA, JR., in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), and HON. FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as City Mayor of Quezon City,
G.R. No. 153155
September 30, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Laxina, Sr. (Barangay Chairman) In 1998, Ursal (Barangay Clerk) filed with the NBI a
complaint for attempted rape against petitioner. Petitioner was subsequently charged with sexual harassment
before the RTC. Ursal brought before the DILG a complaint-affidavit charging petitioner with grave misconduct
for the alleged attempted rape. However, the DILG referred the complaint to the Quezon City Council for
appropriate action.

In 2000, Ursal filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a similar complaint-affidavit charging petitioner with
grave misconduct. Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and attached thereto the affidavits of two witnesses.
The Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman exonerated petitioner from the
charge, dismissing the complaint for lack of substantial evidence. However, upon review, and with the
approval of the Ombudsman, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty of
dismissal, with forfeiture of material benefits.

Petitioner sought the review of the Ombudsman’s Memorandum Order before the CA, arguing that: (i) the
Office of the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction over the administrative complaint; (ii) Ursal’s filing of the
same administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman and the City Council through the DILG
warranted the dismissal of both cases; and (iii) petitioner was denied due process in the proceedings before
the Ombudsman.

CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case since the City Council had earlier
acquired jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUES: 1) WON the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case.

2) WON the petitioner wasdeprived of his right to administrative due process.

HELD: 1) No. The Court is not convinced.

The mandate of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints against erring public officials, derived from both the
Constitution and the law gives it jurisdiction over the complaint against petitioner. The Constitution has named
the Ombudsman and his Deputies as the protectors of the people who shall act promptly on complaints filed in
any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government. To fulfill this mandate, R.A. No.
6770, or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, was enacted, giving the Ombudsman or his Deputies jurisdiction over
complaints on all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance against officers or employees of the
government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality therefor, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and the disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, except those who may be
removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciar. On the other hand, under R.A.
No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary
authority over any elective barangay official. Without a doubt, the Office of the Ombudsman has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Quezon City Council over administrative cases against elective officials such as petitioner.
2) Another submission made by petitioner is that he was deprived of his right to administrative due process
when he was dismissed from service without substantial evidence and without consideration of the evidence
he proffered.

The Court is not impressed.

Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was required to answer the formal charge and given
a chance to present evidence in his behalf. He was not denied due process. More importantly, the decision of
the Ombudsman is well supported by substantial evidence.

A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence that respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge.
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the degree of proof required in criminal proceedings,
which calls for a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner’s reliance on the rules on prosecution for
the crime of rape is therefore misplaced. What is at issue in the case before the Ombudsman is whether his
acts constitute grave misconduct, and not whether he is guilty of the crime of attempted rape. Also,there is no
basis for believing petitioner’s claim that the Ombudsman had refused to consider his evidence.
 8

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

vs.
FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC
G.R. No. 165416
January 22, 2008

FACTS: Respondent Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated Special School (DCISS) in
Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in the same school. In 1997,
respondents were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly
collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public funds.The complainants
were parents of children studying at the DCISS, namely, Cansino, Mojica, Mojica, and Mamparo.

In 1998, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
them. Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a
committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670, otherwise known as the "The
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." The motion was denied, as well as respondents’ motion for
reconsideration.

In 2000, the Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint decision finding respondent Masing is guilty of gross
misconduct, neglect of duty, and violation of RA 6713 and Tayactac guilty of gross misconduct, neglect of
duty, and violation of RA 6713 in relation to the collection of unauthorized fees, non-remittance of authorized
fees and failure to account for public funds. Tayactac is guilty of simple neglect of duty, and is hereby
suspended for a period of six (6) months.

Upon appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered their immediate reinstatement.

ISSUE: of whether the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees.

HELD: YES. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:

Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and
duties:

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee
at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution,
and ensure compliance therewith.

We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we emphasized that "the
Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not
merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory." Implementation of the order imposing the
penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer. Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Court of Appeals, we also held—

While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to "recommend x x x
removal, suspension, demotion x x x" of government officials and employees, the same Section 15(3)
also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of RA 6770.
 9

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

vs.
VICTORIO N. MEDRANO
G.R. No.177580
October 17, 2008

FACTS: Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog, a teacher filed before the petitioner Office of the Ombudsman a sworn letter-
complaint against her superior herein-respondent Victorio N. Medrano for violation of Republic Act No. 7877
(Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995) (criminal case), and grave misconduct (administrative case). While the
administrative case was pending investigation, Dumalaog filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive
Suspension, and was granted by the Ombudsman ordering the preventive suspension of Medrano for six
months without pay. Medrano moved for lifting the suspension but was denied. When Medrano filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, Ombudsman lifted the preventive suspension order.

The Ombudsman rendered its decision with the administrative case and found Medrano guilty of grave
misconduct. Medrano moved for reconsideration of the decision and assailed not only the factual findings
and conclusions of the Ombudsman, but for the first time, challenged its jurisdiction over the case. With
regard to the criminal case, Ombudsman found probable cause to indict Medrano and a criminal case was filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Biñan, Laguna against him. By joint order, the Ombudsman
affirmed its Resolution in the criminal case but modified its decision in the administrative case.

Medrano filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA), assailing Ombudsman‘s jurisdiction over
the administrative case. The CA annulled Ombudsman‘s decision in the administrative case and dismissed the
complaint on the sole ground that Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over it. The Ombudsman filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA‘s decision but was denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not Office of the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against
Medrano even if an affidavit of desistance has already been filed by Dumalaog.

HELD: The flaw in Medrano‘s argument that the execution of Dumalaog‘s Affidavit of Desistance and the
dismissal of the criminal case must result in the dismissal of the administrative case is that it ignores the whale
of a difference between those two remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel A. Mesa v. Sandiganbayan
and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman), the Court stressed the distinct
and independent character of the remedies available to an offended party against any impropriety or
wrongdoing committed by a public officer. It provides the three remedies available: 1.) civil, 2.) criminal, and
3.) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately, alternately, simultaneously or successively.
Sometimes, the same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.

At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a rule, viewed with suspicion and reservation
because it can easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for
monetary consideration. And there is always the probability that it would later be repudiated, and criminal
prosecution would thus be interminable. Hence, such desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the
dismissal of an action once it has been instituted in court.

With regard to whether Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the administrative complaint, Section 5, Article XI of
the Constitution “created the independent Office of the Ombudsman.” Hailed as the “protectors of the people,”
the Ombudsman and his Deputies are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers, functions, and duties to
act on complaints against public officials and employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13.

When an administrative charge is initiated against a public school teacher, however, Section 9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the same shall be heard initially by an investigating
committee composed of the school superintendent of the division, as chairman, a representative of the local
or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers‘ organization, and a supervisor of the division.
Thus, Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directsthat the petitioner “may refer certain complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings against erring
public officers or employees.”

In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public
school teacher is not an exclusive power but is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.

While Ombudsman should have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint against Medrano and
referred it to the proper DepEd committee, given that it had already concluded the proceedings and had
rendered a decision thereon, Medrano is now barred from assailing Ombudsman‘s acts under the principle of
estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative proceedings before the Ombudsman. In his
Counter-Affidavit, he asked Ombudsman for affirmative relief by seeking the dismissal of the administrative
complaint allegedly for being baseless. Verily, Medrano cannot be permitted to challenge Ombudsman‘s acts
belatedly.