Manderson, Desmond. http://www.austlii.edu.au/au!

journals/ Hegel and Nietzsche on Modernity, History,

UNSWLawJl/2005/42.html. Proximity: The Law of Ethics and
the Ethics of Law. Accessed: 15 November 2009. and Metaphysics
(Some Notes on Elective Affinities)
D. Unpublished Works/Thesis
Arce, Romel C. "Emmanuel Levinas on the Third Party". Unpublished
Master's Thesis, Faculty of Philosophy and The Graduate School.
University of Santo Tomas, Manila, 2010. Paolo A. Bolanos, Ph.D.
University of Santo Tomas
Garcia, Leovino Ma., Ph.D., "Responsibility for the Other's Rights:
Fraternity as Foundation for Equality and Freedom", UNESCO
celebration of International Philosophy Day, 20 November 2008.
Manila: Ateneo de Manila University, 2008.
The Hegel-Nietzsche Relation (Ironic Bedfellows?)
Gauthier, David J. Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and The Politics
of Dwelling. Unpublished Dissertation. Graduate Faculty of
~., the Louisiana State University and Agriculture and Mechanical n recent decades, there seems to be renewed attention
IJ
~ College, 1997.
I given to Friedrich Nietzsche's relation to G.W.F. llcuel .'
The Hegel-Nietzsche relation is, however, a problem that could lw
traced as far back as Karl Joel's Nietzsche und die Romantik (I<)())) .~
The common view is that there is a fundamental tension be!Wl'lm
Hegel and Nietzsche, especially the latter's disagreement with

1
See, inter alia, Daniel Breazeale, "The Hegel-Nietzsche Problem," in N!l'l ''"' '
Studien, 4 ( 1975), 146-164; Stephen Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Crilici,\'111 of Al1'111
physics, Cambridge University Press, 1986); Yirmiyahu Yovel, "Sublimity and Rl'SSl'lllt
ment: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Jews," in Jewish Social Studies, 3:3 ( 1997), I 25 ; Willtttllt
Desmond, "Rethinking the Origin: Nietzsche and Hegel," in Hegel, Histoty, all(/lnlt'lfllo '
tation (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 71-96; PaulS . Miklowtll ,
Metaphysics to Metafictions: Hegel, Nietzsche, and the End of Philosophy (New Y01k
State University of New York Press, 1998); Jurist L. Elliot, Hegel and Nielzsclte: l'hllo\'11
phy, Culture, and Agency (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2002); Wi II I>udll•y,
Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy: Thinking Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge UniVl'IStly
Press, 2002); Rober! Sinncrbrink, "Violence and Subjectivity: Domination und Suhll'\
tion in liege! und Nt\'1/Sl'hc," in Analomies of Violence: An Interdisciplinary lnvcsi/WII/n/1
(Sydney: Poslgnul!llllt• /\ti N l{ l·scnreh Centre and Rcscurch lnstilule fi1r llumnniltcs und
Socia l SciL:m' l'~ , lltii \TtNtly nl Sydney, 2000), 17 'iO; nnd Kuk Woll, "l ll·gl!lnnd Nkl,rst'ltl'
rrom In /ltl.lll/11' .. Ill lnlcmolionol SludWI' ill l'fllln\11!1111 ', I~ ) ( l()() 1). I ()l) I I• I
IIL:Iil'IIINIII
'S1·1 l·.11tl lilo.! l, \//t/ '11/w llllllt/1(• NIII/111/IIIA (h'1111 lll! ·,lt 111 h ~ . 1 1 >0~) /\I Nn Nl'll
llil'll/l'llll•, "'' o'il
) ~, ')
 the former's teleological view of history. This view is, of course,
not invalid at all; and in fact some well-known Nietzscheans, like
Gilles Deleuze, provide us with contentious arguments against the
Hegelian dialectic. 3 Stephen Houlgate, meanwhile, builds a very
valid case in insisting that there is more in the Hegel-Nietzsche
relation than what the common view provides. 4 While the position
taken by De leuze might, at first, appear convincing (especially if
one is aware of the idiosyncratic manner through which Deleuze
understands the implications of Hegelian dialectics), I do agree
with some commentators that Deleuze has a reductionist reading
of Hegel. 5 I particularly agree with Houlgate that there is enough
~
'-'!
~ reason for us to at least indulge in a comparative study of Nietzsche
~
Si
and Hegel.
Houlgate's Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism ofMetaphysics
features a comparative study between Hegel and Nietzsche's critiques
of metaphysical thinking. Houlgate mentions three categories in
relation to the Hegel-Nietzsche debate: 1) commentators who use
Nietzsche to criticize Hegel, 2) commentators who simply compare
the two philosophers, and 3) those who use Hegel to criticize
3 Deleuze writes: "History progresses not by negation and the negation of nega-
tion, but by deciding problems and affirming differences." Difference and Repetition, trans.
by Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 268.
4 See Houlgate, Hegel, Nietzsche and the Crilicism of Metaphysics, 1-3. On a
similar note, Kirk Wolf also mentions three significant traits that both Hegel and Nietzsche
shared: "concern for the chronic ills of modern culture, devotion to Greek antiquity, and
deep interest in the theory and practi ce of edul:Uiion" " lll'p,t• l und Nietzsche from Helle-
nism to Bildung," 109. I will devote u p1111 m y pupt•t lollu· ln sl stunificant trait that Wolf
mentions, however with a sli ght 1u111 olt•ntpliit~l
See lloulga tc, 11< ·~1'1. N/1'1 11 ;,, . '"'" r/io l ,~, /1/o 11111 o/ Alt•lttflltvsics, 7. Also,
5
Robert Sinnerbrink, "Acl iw SlitVI'N 1111d Ht:IH iivlll\ lit!!I•JtN'/ I,,'''' t''H Anlt l>iulecticu l Ni
etzsche," in Sodul S!'mllltln , 7 1 ( 111'1 /) 1•1?-II,IJ ftnd llillllllt llltll ~dt·n . " llclt:u;.e, ll egt:l
und the Trnn s i(H illlllllllt ol Su htttll \l lv i11 1/tit l'hilo.HtJ•hi(',,// 11111/tt , 11 l ('002), Ill'
I~X
Nietzsche. 6 Houlgate, hi msel r, tends towards the third position. My
aim in this paper is not to discuss in detail the three categories or
the debate, but to simply outline some elective affinities between
Hegel and Nietzsche: their relation to Modernity and their views on
History and Metaphysics. To a certain extent, therefore, I am doino
something similar to, but not as in-depth as, Houlagate's project or
presenting a comparative study between the philosophers. Both
Hegel and Nietzsche directed their critiques to a peculiar way or
foundationalist thinking characteristic ofModemity. My own view
is that they present similar critiques ofModem thinking, which can b"
understood in context with their musings on traditional metaphysics.
Admittedly, it would be misleading to suppose that Hegel and
Nietzsche have identical views on History and Metaphysics. My
goal, therefore, is simply to argue that there are some elt:el iw
affinities between Hegel and Nietzsche. Nevertheless, I am l11ll
aware that by laying down these affinities, an obvious divorce i:-: nl:-:n
laid bare. Despite this, it is not my aim to reconcile the di ITef'l'IH'l'.
between these two ironic bedfellows.
In ord~r to carry out my task, I will attempt to do three thill g!'~
in this paper. Firstly, I will discuss the context in which llcgel and
Nietzsche are related to Modernity. Secondly, 1 will argue that hoth
Hegel and Nietzsche are historical philosophers, in the sense that
they acknowledge the role ofhistory in the development or concepts/
discourses; that both or them incorporate historical philosophi:.r.inp
in their nwtlwd w "di <llcetics" for llegcl and "genealogy" I(H
Nietzsrlu: And th11dl y, I wi ll outline soml' ol'lkl!.l~ l - and Nict:.r.sl' ht• 's
1. Ni,·t 1ol11 · wultlll' c 'u''' ' /1//1 ,f (11,,,,,,,1/, ·l·tiw, o1
 misgivings of traditional metaphysics in order to argue that they are as an intellectual discourse, the Postmodern stance is a critical

both staunch critiques of foundationalist thinking. engagement with, or a " mode of experience" 8 of, the follies of
Modernity. Robert Pippin informs us that Modernity is essentially

Modernity and Historical Philosophizing a bourgeois experience; and it is this rise of bourgeois morality

The present status ofthe discourse on knowledge (especially that Postmodernism is critical of (ala Karl Marx). 9 But to be more

m the areas of philosophy, theology, literary theory, sociology, precise, it is the complexification of bourgeois morality in tlw

and politics) is now referred to as "postmodern," but what body of late capitalism, as described by Fredric Jameson. 10 llencl.\

Postmodernity means, however, is largely informed by Modernity. Modernism stretches further in connotation and the rise of bourgeoi s

Both Modernity and Postmodernity, in the first instance, are periods morality is only one of its symptoms. My focus, however, is reall y

in the development of Western thought. 7 The "post" in postmodern not an elaboration of the critical character of the postmodern stan c~..:,

means the end of a period- that is modern (of the present). but, rather, to discuss a more fundamental problem associated with
~
'-'!
~ Further, Postmodernism is characterized by a radical critique of Modernism as a philosophical stance. Let us just say, for the time
~
~
Modern ideals. We cannot, therefore, understand the Postmodern being, that Modernism is a way of thinking- and, arguabl y, it is u

stance apart from Modernity. Every period is characterized by kind of metaphysical thinking- associated with a certain kind ol

some predominant socio-cultural-political practices, that is to say, foundationalism. As a kind of metaphysical thinking, Modetnt snt

patterns of normative activity executed by a collectivity. Included has a very long history. In fact both Hegel and Nietzsche assess tt ,

in postmodern cultural expressions are theoretical discourses (e.g. first and foremost, as a historical phenomenon. I would, th t.: rl'llll l'.

philosophy) which are critical descriptions, or problematizations, of propose that both Hegel and Nietzsche's readings of Modern istn nt L'

the experience ofPostmodernity, which, I would like to argue, is the to be considered dialectical and genealogical, respective ly. I wi ll

very condition of the consequences of Modernity. In other words, talk about this in detail in the next part of the paper.

Postmodernism is an intellectualization, especially in philosophy,

8 Cf. Fredric Jameson, Pas/modernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late ( 'afUia lt'lll
of the problems of Modernity. What this means ultimately is that, (Durham : Duke U niversity Press, 2003).
9
7 Robert Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem (Ox ford : Basil llllll'kwl·ll .
Simon Malpas, for instance, traces one of the ftrsl uses of the term " postm o-
1991 ), 9.
demity'' in Arnold Toynbee's A Study of !Iiston '. Till' M odl•rn " is un epoch of gradual
10 " Th e l'Oncept of postm oderni sm .. . Is a hi storica l ra ther th an a llll' l l'l y ~ l y
emancipation from superstiti on and mystil·islll us til l· i'rilr phl l'llllll'llt , w hich became cen-
tral to philosophi ca l thought during tlw Sl'Vl'llh'l' Jilh ll rul l' iphll·l·nth centuri es, sought to listi e on e. I l'IIIIIHll s 1r 1~s s loo greatl y the radica l distin cti on betwee n a view li1r w h1dr I ill•
provide a rati onal and scientifiL' hus rs lw "'"' " "' n 1"' 11 1' 1111 " 1111' l 'os1111odern (Lon don: postm odl'"' r ~ IIIH' (11pl111r11 rl ) sty le among many o th ~: r s and lllll' whrl'lr Sl'l'ks to ~-'· ' "~ P rt 11
Routledge, 2005), JJ . A si rnd ur vr1·w 11(1(11'1 11 1 111 ,h• '" lt .lllllll ~ I yot. 11 d, pos tmodemism the cullu11rl """""" "' 111 llil' lof• rc of late ca pitali snr '' P,l'll llllll'ly drull'l'lrru l ull l'lltpl 111
as an " incredulity town rd s llH'IIIIIIIII II II \1 1 ·w1J 'IJ,,, l 'u.\1111•••1• 111 c 'u111llftu11 A l? c'fllll'l 011 think 0111 (111 ' ~1 1111111 11 111 ll r ~ t11 r y. . . Th e pol iti l'll llill lll 11 1 p11 ~ 1 111 11dr 11 11~ 1 11 w rlll urw 11 ~
KIIOIVh •dg(', tru ns. hy ( il·o ll llr lllllll j• lllll (I!iii ll!i llll M l@!l lill i ( Mlillll'SOIII l Jnr vcrsrlyor its VOL'II IIIIIill ll 111 11 11 111111 11111 ll llllll'l l1 01l 01' 11 plohll l lllp llill \1 ll ll l(l(l lllp , 111111 \Ol l ll l l l ~ Wl' ll
M llllll'Slllll l'r l·~s. 111K•I ) "' spilll ii l •.o .do." ltlllll'"''"• /'"''"'"'" '1111111/ 111 , t/1< • C ol/111otl I"·'''' 11/l "'' I ·,,,,,,,t/1\111, · 1 ~.
I II )
 To contextualize my discussion, it is best to specify what it
is that both Hegel and Nietzsche are wary about in Modem thinking.
Further, it is important to note that I am dealing here with two
philosophers who come from the Modem period. Much of Hegel-
and Nietzsche's criticisms of Modem thinking are largely informed
by their very own milieu. I would argue that both philosophers are
key figures in post-Kantian thought who emphasized the importance
of "historical thinking" or "historical philosophizing."'' Generally
speaking, philosophical activity from the pre-Platonists up until
Kant is construed to be a-historical. The ancient shift from mythos
to logos introduced the idea that the way we speak about the world
or reality could be "rational." This tendency to come up with a
rational explanation of reality has led the first philosophers to search
for the underlying principle which governs all of reality (the arche
or the Urstoff). Aside from being rational, this principle according
to these philosophers (with the possible exception of Heraclitus)
is said to be "permanent" and thus a-historical. The Sophists'
skepticism toward pre-Platonic philosophy was overshadowed by
the idealism of Socrates, who embarked on a philosophical search
for the Good, and Plato, who prioritizes a world of the eidos (idea)
over the empirical world. Aristotle, for his part, tries to go beyond
his master but cannot, despite his hylemorphic doctrine, abandon
the notion of morphe (form) or substance. Moreover, in his Physics,
he argued for the existence of a "Prime Mover" which , all in one, is
11
Perhaps, after Immanuel Knnt , 11 wuq tlu- lii "IIIH"IH'IIII I'II I tradition, champi-
oned by Friedri ch Schl cicrma cher, whil'11 p.IIVl' p11111111 y 111 IIIHlllll lll l th inking, that is, the
historica lity o f understand ing. Sl"\" l l' lllill~ ~ 111111io- ~~ ~ 1111 il u1d I I'HIIlll" r, llenneneutics
(Evanston: Norlh weslem Uni w rs11 y 1'1 1"~~. 1'11 •' '1 " ' ' ·t (lild l·1111 Ml ll' lll'l Vo llmer, " lntro
du et in n," in '1'/w // ,•m w ll i' lll ll '' u,.,,k•t' I N~'~' \ " ' k I_ ' •i i i! 111 1111111 100 '), I 'i \
II
the efficient, formal, and flnall:att 8\' .-,r tli tl utll vt'l 1111 Ill th
1273, Thomas Aquinas would writ(~ in lr iu Sulllllltl I II III I
the Prime Mover is nothing el sl' httl IIH· ( 'l11 "''' '"' UtHL11
We also find the sanll" sr tnl:ll lnt ' tl11.1 ll • lll ~ li• t kttl l11
Rene Descartes' obsession with clear· 1111d di:-. IIIH I ttk.t ~ .t1ul hr t~
superimposition of res cogilans over r es c'.\/c •nsu . Mt.:t lllwliik, ''""''
sets out to critique pure reason, and by hi s usc of" " pure" I would
take it to be a-historical reason. Indeed, thanks to Kant, we an:
taken to the very heart of the problem, that we "are burdened by
questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason ilse lr,
it is not able to ignore ... it is also not able to answcr." 14 Thi s
means that we are burdened by questions of metaphysics; question s
which, from time immemorial, burdened us and have corm: to
be the focus of philosophical thinking. There arc two point s to
be made here: first, philosophers before Kant always thought ol
metaphysical principles to be a-historical concepts; and second , tli11t
they ignore the fact that these seemingly a-historical concept s tin'
informed by the philosophical tradition itself. One thing is l'l'rt tllll
though, as mentioned, both Hegel and Nietzsche arc philosophi ztn"
within the context of the same philosophical tradition which tlll"y
seek to criticize. Nonetheless, they would differ largely l"rom
12
Aristotle, Physics, trans. by Philip H. Wicksteed and Francis M. Co111i o1d
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), Book VIII, VII.
13
Thomas Aquinas writes: " .. . seeing that subsequent movers move onl y IIIIl S
much as they arc put in motion by the first move; as the sta ff moves onl y beca use it is p111
in motion by the hand . Therefore, it is necessary to arri ve at a first mover, put in motion hy
no other; und tlli ~ l'Vl"l yo nl" understands to be God." Thonw ~ 1\quinus, S llllllllll 'l'lll'(ll(/gfl'u ,
tran s. by F111hl·1•1 nl tlw 1:11gli sh Dominican Fathers (Nnv Yo1k lll"llllll)!.l'l 1\rolh ~ I S, lm·.
1946), Pill I II , I) I i\ I
11 1111111•11 1111'1 1·.1 11 11, ( 'rtl ittll<' of 11111 '<' N l'l ll tl /1 , 1 11 111 ~ li,y N1111111111 1\ i'II IP S1111ll1
(London MitcMi ll ll11l11 11 li '"II 'Pii ii Y, 1%1 ), 7
1 '1/
 traditional philosophy in lhe sense lhal thcit' l'tttiqucs of Lhe history
of philosophy are precisely directed to the oblivious attitude of
philosophers toward the role of history in philosophical discourse. 15
Hegel, for instance, speaks of Aujhebung as mainly characteristic
of the movement of history. Nietzsche, on the other hand, proposes
a genealogical method of reading history. In both cases, we find a
reading of history which reveals the historical, and I should also say
most dominant, of course, is our notion of God. The suppo
that there is an all-encompassing principle that governs, or at
overlooks, reality permeates the most basic and guarded assum1
of philosophy and religion. Although formalisms change in
throughout history (Urstojffor the Greeks, God for the Ml·dt
and Reason for the Moderns), the fact that they are forma I isn ts
they are presupposed over and above surface phenomena 11

material, conditions through which a concept deemed as epistemic them one and the same. I would also like to emphasize tlt:l
guarantor, like God, becomes possible. milieu wherein Hegel and Nietzsche lived is characterized ptl'l'
Although a more detailed account of Hegel- and Nietzsche's by this formalistic tendency in thinking, of which they SOli"

reading of history immediately succeeds this part, it is important at overcome. Hence, we find in Hegel and Nietzsche a pivotal pol
j this point to at least mention that they are key figures in the tradition the history of thought, through their iconoclastic thinking and 1
~
~ ofwhat we call postmodern, as pointed out earlier, today is inlo1
of historical philosophizing. As such, it is also important to note that
what they seek to criticize is a bias in metaphysical thinking, which by their critiques.
is only revealed through Aujheben (in Hegel's case) or genealogy
Hegel and Nietzsche on Historical Philosophizing
(in Nietzsche's case). I have outlined above a sort of historical
Herbert Marcuse remarks that we learn front lll:)tl
development of the bias in metaphysical thinking which results in
mental faculty which is in danger of being obliterah:d : thl· I"
the search for permanence behind the apparent world. Modernism
of negative thinking." 16 This notion of negative thinking Jll'IIII C
is, thus, marked by the emphasis on formalistic principles and the
Hegel's dialectical method. Negative thinking is not thL' ohw~
capacity of man (Reason) to gain access to these principles. As
historical dialectics, but it is its fuel. Marcuse gives us n Hlltlll
been pointed out, these formalisms are construed to be a-historical.
of Hegelian dialectical thinking:
Formalism has taken various forms in the history of thought; the
Dialectical thought starts with the
15
Richard Schacht, however, writes that Nietzsche "rejects the tendency to view experience that the world is unfree; that is
the world historically, and with it both the idea that histmiral development will eventuate to say, man and nature exist in conditions
in the emergence of a world of enduring and compll'l1' lu11nlo11 y nnd perfection (as Hegel or alienation, exist as 'other thun they lll'l' ,
and Marx hold), and also the idea that uny hi Nhlltl'lli I'VI'rll ~~ ol IIIIHJIIC und ultimate im- Any mode of thought which excludes thi s
portance and that the world has bcginniiiH 111111 wtll hnw 1111nul (II~ 1\IL'tkcguard and other nllllllldlrlion from its logtl' IS 11 tlutlly logtl' .
Christians believe)." Hegel and A./it'l Stutltn 111 I Pllltlt• 'llf,l/ I '111/o.IOflht • lwftl '<'<'ll Ka11f and lltoupltt 'rotrespo nds' to n·ultty only us
Sartre (Pittsburgh: University of Ptlhh111ph l'11 : ~!i , t•)7 ~ ), I I , .... rl1111 hi\ l'llllllllent is, none-
1'1 lli)rl11•!1 1\1.11111~1!, No'll\011 tllltl u,.,.,J/ttflllll ,' I l··~rd ,,,;~Ill!! Ni11 1' .•(Soo'/otl
theless, misleading because he dm·~ 11111 dt•.linuni ~ l' 1•.:11\'un io·l•"l'lf'H'id und genen logu:u l
history. My point will becomt: rk.urt .1~ llt•J P•ll";l' pif•L'' ((hli•lll UlliV( i NII Y l't (J~II. N•;W Yilt~ . J%0) ., \II
 it transforms reality by comprehending its
contradictory nature. 17
From the above it is obvious that, in his emphasis on human
experience, Hegel, as intimated by Marcuse, is thinking historically.
For him, thought is a process of apprehending the contradictions of
reality. Moreover, thought is the process of"self-realization" which
is the very basis of historical development. Hegel's Phenomenology
of the Spirit is a study of the evolution of human consciousness; in
this book, Hegel presents an analysis of appearances, images, and
illusions that transpired throughout the history of consciousness.
It is in the Phenomenology that we find, according to Marcuse, "a
portrayal ofthe process whereby 'the individual becomes universal'
and whereby 'the construction of universality' takes place. 18 The
process of the self-realization of the individual is carried out through
the process of Aujhebung. To quote Hegel:
.. . we should note the double meaning of
the German word aujheben (to out by, or set
aside) . We mean by it (I) to clear away, or
annul : thus, we say, a law or a regulation is
set aside; (2) to keep, or preserve: in which
sense we use it when we say: something is
well put by. This double usage of language,
which gives to the same word a positive and
negative meaning, is not an accident, and
gives no ground for reproaching language
as a cause of confusion. We should rather
recognize in it the speculative spirit of our
language rising above the mere 'either- or '
of understanding. 19
17
Ibid., ix .
18
Ibid., 90.
19
Ci .W.F. lll'ge l , lo~-:h:, 111111 ~ . ">' \\dlt ollll
197'i }, *96
The process of Aujhebung is characteristic of historical
dialectics. Hegel lays down in the Phenomenology a philosophy
which has already annulled or negated previous philosophies,
and has preserved them, as well, by absorbing all their truths; in
addition, the accumulation of human experience is also absorbed in
the process. 20 The general structure of the work is laid down is such
a manner that a series of Aujhebungen takes place in history thai il
is through the very process of negation-preservation that historic:~ I
progress becomes possible. For Hegel, all facets of human activity
and understanding inform the dialectical process. Hegel writes:
The immediate existence of Spirit,
consciousness, contains the two moments
of knowing and the objectivity negative
to knowing. Since it is in this element [of
consciousness] that Spirit develops itself
and explicates its moments, these moments
contain that antithesis, and they all appear
as shapes of consciousness. The Science of
this pathway is the Science of the experience
which consciousness goes through . .. .21
Hegel calls his Science the Science of the experience, and this is
not without qualification. I take experience here to mean human
experience, that is to say, the "materiality" or "normativity" of'
human struggles. Human experience, therefore, is the starting point
of Hegel's historical philosophizing. The Phenomenology is a study
of the development of consciousness through the struggles of human
beings, i.e., human experience. Hegel speaks of consciousness (as
opposed to the non-conscious: the natural tendencies or processes
'II <:' I', M ill <11 \ 1', lkmon and Revo/u/HJ/1 //c ·~-:c ·/,utlllw Niw of Stwtnl '1'111'1111 ', WI
WtdLt•• (!h(llld ( '!m endon Press,
1
f i WY ll q;~: I , /'/J• ·IIIIIIII '//O/ogl' ll/1/w ,\/•111/ , lr.tn ~ . hy A V Mlllt·r (Nt•w York
Ox<rud I lrr iV\.Ji't!l iV l'r l'll~, 11,1'/1), § \(,
';J :,
of the body-or nature itself) 22 in the context of the self-realization
of the Spirit, and that history for him is only possible through the
self-reflection of consciousness-that is consciousness conscious of
itselfY Since only consciousness, as opposed to nature, has a "past"
to reflect upon and a "future" to anticipate, hence it is only through
consciousness that history is possible. 24
The section on "Self-Consciousness" of the Phenomenology
is, to my mind, the best example of how Hegel applies the dialectical
process in history. It is in this section where Hegel discusses what
I would call "pathologies" 25 of freedom or what Alexandre Kojeve
would call "ideologies of freedom. " 26 The development of self-
consciousness begins with the struggle for recognition- that is a
22
Hegel writes: "But the movement which the individual has in his liver, heart,
and so on, cannot be regarded as wholly reflected into itself; rather it is present in such a
manner that it has already taken on a corporeal aspect in him and has an animal existence
turning outwards to external reality." ibid., §326.
23
For a more detailed discussion of the development of self-consciousness, see
Paolo A. Bolanos, "Hegel and the Pathologies of Freedom," in Cogito, 4: I (New Series
2006-2007), 37-43.
24
Jean Hyppolite remarks, "Only spirit has a history, that is, a development of
itself by itself such that it retains its identity in each of its particularizations, and when it
negates them, which is the very movement of the concept, it simultaneously preserves them
in order to raise them to a higher form . Only spirit has a past which it internalizes (Erin-
nerung) and a future which it projects ahead of itself because it must become for-itselfwhat
it is in-itself." Genesis and Structure ofHegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit, trans. by Samuel
Cherniak and John Heckman (Evanston : Northwestern University Press, 1974), 33. We are
also reminded here by Martin Heidegger's self-realizing Dasein, as a being in anticipation
of the future, as a being that is its own most possibility. See Being and Time, trans. by John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
25
I refer to them as " pathologies" in the sense that I sec in this particular section
of the Phenomenology Hegel's own version a genea logy, simi lar to Nietzsche. Nietzsche
uses the term "pathos" to describe the nature of the will lo power ngainst being and be-
coming. See The Will to Power, trans. by W. Krnillllltllll 1111d I{ I ll o llin gdu lc (New York:
Vintage, 1968), §635. Also sec llolu l'los, " 11\-p,· l und lh,•l'ulhulugt,•s oi'Ftccdom ."
Sec Alcxandtc Koll'Vl', lnt~r~dllttt••ntu t/11 /1, ·,1,1111!' ••f/1,·;.:,·1 l .l'c 'tllr<'s on the
26
Ph<'nmm•nolo;.:\' llf.\inrll, l ntn s hy l n tlll ' ~ II Ni.:lud M, It llilt.uu < 'uttu•llllntVl'tsity Press,
1969), ~'
struggle for freedom (Marcuse already mentioned that the dialectics
begins with the experience that the world is unfree)- between
two "self-consciousnesses," an example of which is between the
Master and the Slave. The struggle between the Master and Slave
evolves into the pathological clamor for freedom of the Stoic, the
Skeptic, and the Unhappy Consciousness. 27 Hegel shows us the
phenomenological development of consciousness through these
~~
pathologies of freedom; and in so doing he uses the three instances
~
m history (Stoicism, Skepticism, and Unhappy Consciousness) ~
to illustrate how the Master-Slave schema plays out in history. ~
~
Thus, we are shown that, through the Master-Slave struggle for ;,:
recognition, self-consciousness manifestly evolves and begins to !
1.-'l
appear to consciousness. It is through the Stoic-Skeptic-Unhappy
Consciousness triad that the Hegelian dialectic is at its best, and that
a "notion" of freedom is attained. From the Stoics rationalization
of a world which seems to be devoid of freedom, to the Skeptic's
renunciation of the Stoic's passivity, we find in the Unhappy
Consciousness an appropriation of the two previous modes; and for
Hegel: This new form is, therefore, one which
knows that it is the dual consciousness of
itself, as self-liberating, unchangeable, and
self-identical, and as bewildering and self-
perverting, and it is the awareness of this
self-contradictory nature itself.2 8
27 See liege!, Phenomenology of the Spirit, §§ 166-230. Hyppo litc provides u
very good summury : ''SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, which is desire, can reach its truth onl y
by finding unolhct li ving sclfconsciousness. Three moments lhe two selr-conscious
nesscs posl·d 111 I ill· l'ktlll'lll or externa lity and ulso cxtc111n lity itself', the l)asein or lil'c
givl' tt Sl' 111 11 di itkllh whtdl k'uds l'romthe hallie I<H ll'l'll!J.II tltoll hi IIll' opposilion hctWl'l'll
nut~ll't 1111d ~ lt 1v1· und ltotll I hill opposilion lo lthl• tl y " ( ;, '111'111' 111111 Stllll'tllrt ' o/" III'JWI :1·
l 'ilt'IIIII/II"IIO/tll! \ ,, ,,,1(/tt , I%
'" ll l: l!G I, l'h• 'll•llllt 'llllill,l!l ' n/l!lt • St•lrlt , ~ 111•
1
'I
 The Unhappy Consciousness is a duplication of the master
and the slave in one- "the duplication which formerly was divided
between two individuals, the lord and the bondsman, is now lodged
29
in one. " Through the triad, Hegel shows how Aujhebung works,
how one mode is at the same time the negation and preservation of
two previous modes. Going back to Marcuses 's remark, it is through
negative thinking that this dialectical process becomes possible. It
is in the negative relationship, the "conflict," between the Master
and the Slave that the pathologies of freedom are rendered dynamic.
It is the task of the Phenomenology to illustrate the dynamic role of
history in the development of the Spirit.
Meanwhile, Nietzsche 's version of historical philosophizing
is far more radical than, but not as complex as, Hegel's. We find
in Nietzsche a sweeping critique of traditional historiography, and
Hegelianism, itself, cannot escape this critique. As a substitute for
traditional historiography, which is also characterized as Modern,
Nietzsche offers instead a genealogical reading of history. I documents that have been scratched over and
find Foucault's "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" very helpful m
explaining how genealogy should be taken into context. Foucault
considers Nietzsche 's The Genealogy of Morals to be a pivotal text
for the conception of a new historiography. To a large extent, the
French re-appropriation of Nietzsche owes so much to Foucault's
reading of The Genealogy of Morals . The basic thrust of the book
is a genealogical reading of our present moral valuations. Nietzsche
maps out how our moral concepts have arrived at their present state.
Inasmuch as it is a prognosis of thc hi stor y or morality, genealogy
2'1 lhul.
is also a critique or S<IC.:IiiSilll l' l lllltl'tilil I •H Nltll!!t Itt'. llllt tttl
valuations are sacred because.: thcy !Ill' lu1.,f:d ' "' 1111 ••'lt• lllilpl ill ll 11 11 11
an underlying divine ground (God) is gutd•n g lh l' lll Mw l· u v1·1,
these moral principles all spring/originate from the eternal goodncss
of God. Of course, Nietzsche 's whole point is to debunk the idea
that morality's credibility springs from a divine origin. Further,
our concepts of "good" and "evil" do not have static meanings.
Genealogy shows us how these concepts of good and evil evolve ~
~
and "occupy" various and unfixed meanings in history. The point ~...
here is to destroy any illusion of historical continuity. This dis-
~
~
continuity, therefore, deconstructs any form of moral absolutism.
~
Foucault takes on Nietzsche's genealogical method in the ~
J·
hope offreeing our minds from historical absolutism or determinism.
He gives us his definition of genealogy:
Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently
documentary. It operates on a field of
entangled and confused parchments, on
recopied many times. 30
A genealogist is someone who attends to details-even
perhaps the minutest and idiosyncratic details. In his search for
details, however, the genealogist must not expect an underlying
organizing principle or metaphysico-epistemic guarantor. For
Foucault, as for Nietzsche, genealogy is not concerned with formal
originary models. Rather, what they are after is not an "Origin"
(Ursprung ) but "origins"-a plurality of factors involved in the
111
MH hrl l ·ol ll' II Uit, "Nict.r.schc, (;c ncn logy, ll1stmy," in /,anguage, Counter-
M(' IItw 1'. , .,,, II•, Sl'l•·r·t•·tl fo.'l'.l'{li'.\' all(/ 111/(' l"l 'i ('W\' ( llh ill'l l ( '01111.:11 Univers ity Press,
1977), I 111,
';1!1
birthing of a concept. I would say that genealogy is anti-metaphysical
in the sense that it prioritizes history over the concept. This means
that there is no metaphysical origin to things, history is the mosh pit
of discursive practices which are the very basis of concepts, and thus
discourses. Foucault writes:
... if the genealogist refuses to extend his
faith in metaphysics, if he listens to history,
he finds that there is "something altogether
different" behind things: not a timeless and
essential secret, but the secret that they have
no essence or that their essence was fabricated
in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms. 31
This could very well speak of the arbitrariness of the
beginnings of concepts. Nietzsche saw this arbitrariness in our
concepts of good and evil. Foucault, for his part, saw this arbitrariness
in the development of discourses- knowledge. This means that with
the genealogical arsenal we could successfully destroy our illusions
of foundationalist metaphysics and epistemology; and further
emancipate ourselves from our old prejudice of basing our general
reception of the world on such metaphysics and epistemology.
Contrary to the foundationalist bias, what "is found at the historical
beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is
the dissension of other things. It is disparity . ... " 32 It is this type
of historiography that Foucault presents as a critique of traditional
historiography- Nietzsche would perhaps call this "historicizing
with a hammer! "
Genealogy is a deconstruction of the assumption that what
we have in the present is a logical product of a nobl e "cause" in the
31
!hie/. , 142 .
ll flllrf
''Ill
past. To quote Foucault:
We want hi storr urr Nto 1 ''""'"' '""I" lio fil i!li
the present rests upo n p1 o louud 11111 ll !l•llt
and immutabl e ncccss lll CN 11111 11 11 II II•J
historical sense confirms o ur ex 1 s l ~' '" ' ''"'"''I'
countless lost events, without a land111111 k 111 11
point of reference.33
Like Derrida, Foucault is wary of an "inaugural state" 111
history. Such inaugural state solidifies history, and becomes the
1~
sole reason why history is done. Foucault wants to go beyond
this prejudice, and wants to offer a new way of reading history
which includes reflexivity (self-criticism) as an integral part of its
~
~
very own self-understanding. As he points out in the Archeology
~
of Knowledge, even archeology is not exempted from its critique.
History "should become a differential knowledge of energies and
J.
failings, heights and degenerations, poisons and antidotes. Its
task is to become a curative science." 34 The purpose of history is,
therefore, the prognosis of the development of concepts/discourses,
stripped of any metaphysical and phenomenological bias.
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche writes: "0 my brothers,
break, break the old tablets! " 35 This is the inevitable gesture of the
historian who is sensitive to the meaning of God's death. The old
monolith of religion and knowledge is blown up into pieces- into
what Derrida calls "traces." Traces are all that is left. For Foucault,
the traces- the fragments--of history are all that is left.
II /h id., 155 .
II'"'"· I%.
,., l ill 'tli 11'11 N i ~·lrsc hc , Th us Spokt' Zamtlt n\'/11 , I mils hy Wu ll l'r Kaufman n (New
York 1111 ~ ' "'" lll l iiii JII Y, 199'i}, 12, ~ 1 0
II
 things." 36 It is obvious lh:tlllli!l iu fl ilifee i nlit!tk 11~11111111 1\tttll •· Wllh
The above discussion of two different forms of historical
this, Hegel criticizes the view llllll l(~ lllilv 'r t~ lt•l t ill v ilril! •iHh•lll ttlllh
philosophizing is done to argue that Hegel (whether he was aware of
mind. It is more likely that he COlll:l'l Vl~H nl II H 111 i i id 11
it or not) and Nietzsche broke from the Modern tradition by stressing
itself through its interaction with reality, inslcnd ul tlu l1111ll l i!l ilu
the role of history in the development of knowledge. Their genius
mind being "cut offfrom their connection. " 38 llcg<..:l a Iso ll' k1 H II' 1111
is found in their incorporation of history into their own methods,
predicates of metaphysics to be infinite principles (God, Soul, World)
dialectics for Hegel and genealogy for Nietzsche. In so doing, they
which are the bases of an "organized and systematically developed
show us that the development of concepts/discourses (e.g., freedom
~
universe of thought." 39 Hegel is, however, quick to dismiss this
and moral valuations) is made possible by the collision of two or more
metaphysical bias and reproaches the propensity of metaphysical
i:
~
things. Hegel has done this through his Master-Slave dialectics and
thinking towards dogmatism. He writes, almost echoing Kant's ~
~
Nietzsche, for his part, scrutinizes further the psychological tension ~
complaint in the Critique, "this system of metaphysic turned into ~
between the Master and the Slave. At this point it seems like Hegel ~
;J
Dogmatism."40 And indeed, Modem thinking is not exempted form ~·
and Nietzsche have the same thing in mind: that concepts/discourses
Hegel's admonition: "We moderns, too, by our whole upbringing,
result from material- that is "concrete"- struggles, as opposed
have been initiated into these ideas .... " 41 Another criticism which
to formal origins. For this, both of them are anti-tradition, anti-
Hegel makes is the tendency of metaphysical thinking to treat its
Modern. But we also have to guard ourselves from oversimplifying
subject matter in a positivistic manner, for example the tendency
the situation. We could not haphazardly put Hegel in the same plain
of pre-Kantian (Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes) philosophy to
as Nietzsche and vice-versa. I think that they part as soon as they
treat the soul as a thing. 42 Finally, Hegel also points out the tendency
meet- for Hegel's fixation with the Geist (Spirit) as the very motor
of metaphysics towards bi-polar oppositions; for example in the
of the dialectical process renders his thinking teleological, of which
Nietzsche, as pointed out, is very critical of. 36 Hegel, Logic, §28.
37 Kant remarks: "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must con-
form to objects .. .. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success
The Critique of Metaphysics in the tasks of metaphysics if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge."
As mentioned, my last task to discuss the anti-foundationalist Critique ofPure Reason, 22. Then Hegel retorts: "It assumed that to think a thing was the
means of finding its very self and nature: and to that extent it occupied higher ground than
tendency in Hegel and Nietzsche. It is best to find out first how the Critical Philosophy which succeeded it" Logic, §28.
38
Ibid.
these philosophers would understand metaphysical thinking. Let 39
/hid., *30.
me start with Hegel. ~()!hid.,* u .
11
Tn the Logic, llcgcl rcli.:rs lo nlcl:tphysics as taking "the //1/t/ ,q \1

laws and forms of thought lo lw IIH: lllrHlnrm~ nl:tl laws and forms of II'"'".~ .H
J;l
•('
way "Infinite" is predicated to the concept of God, this leads to the
assumption of its opposite "finite."43
Nietzsche's criticisms of metaphysics are not at all far from
Hegel's (some of which are already mentioned in my discussion
of genealogy). Like Hegel, Nietzsche is critical of metaphysic's
tendency to cut itself off from reality- from the concrete existing
world. For Nietzsche, metaphysics is hostile to the transient,
contradictory, and tragic nature ofreality. 44 Alienation from reality is
the metaphysicians' "lack of historical sense, their hatred of the very
idea of becoming .... " 45 For Nietzsche, alienation from becoming
means being dead-"Let us be philosophers! Let us be mummies!"46
Moreover, Nietzsche is also critical of the dogmatic tendency of
metaphysics. In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche applies, in a
sense, the will to power in the context of sincere philosophizing. He
challenges the future lovers of truth to exert more "strength, flight,
courage, and artistic power," because these lovers of truth want
47
to "rise- not retum!" These new lovers of truth want to break
away from the shackles of obscurantism and dogmatism prevalent
in tradition. Finally, Nietzsche is also critical of the positivistic
manner by which metaphysics conducts its treatment of its subject
matter. Like Hegel, he is also wary of bi-polar opposition, which, as
he points out in The Will to Power, resulting in "regulative articles
43
Ibid. , §28.
44
Nietzsche, The Will to Power, §579.
45
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight oflhe Idols ("Reason" in Philosophy), trans. by
Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nielzsche (New York : Penguin Books, 1959), §I.
46
Ibid.
47
Friedrich Nict.rst:hc, llt '!'Oml ( ,'ootltt11tf /I'll l'wlllllt • lou Philosophy of !he
Fu/ure, trans. by Wultcr Kuulm111111 ( N1·w Y111 ~ Vtlll.lpt I lou~ ~. 11)(>6), ~ I 0.
'1 ~1
of belief'48 like the principles of identity and 11011 l"lllll nul i~l t iu11 ,
These bi-polar oppositions of good-evil, (lod 1111111 , tnllntto•llntll
Being-non-being, soul-body are the very reasons why phtl111'111piHH
tended to prioritize an afterworld over the mundane wotld , lhl· so11l
over the body-they are chosen because they arc thought to he
hallow, where in fact they are hollow! For Nietzsche there is no
sense in distinguishing between a metaphysician and a theologian:
"The pathos of which develops out of this condition calls itself ~
~
faith: closing one's eyes to oneself once and for all .... This faulty
~
~
49
perspective on all things is elevated into a morality .... " And
~
ultimately, this results in the dualistic bias of metaphysical thinking
~
~
that Nietzsche loathes above anything else. :.1
Ji•
Concluding Remarks
To reiterate, my aim is not to reconcile the philosophies of
Hegel and Nietzsche, but simply to lay bare some elective affinities.
From the above discussion we gather three things about these
two philosophers. First, that they are both critical of the Modem
tradition and want to overcome it. Second, that they break away
from this tradition by their historical philosophizing. And third, that
they are both anti-foundationalist thinkers through their criticism
of metaphysics. By laying down these elective affinities, I have
nonetheless also touched on the immediate break between Hegel
and Nietzsche. r pointed above that they part ways as soon as they
meet; whereas llegel tends towards teleology, Nietzsche criticizes
~" Ntl"II 'Hhr , /1,. llilllol'mt•t•r, ~·no.
''' llil.dlitlt Nitl:~tiH'. 1'111' , lnlit ·lut.\'1, 111111 ~. hy Wul1t•1 t..lllllillllllll, 111 Thl' Thl'
l'mltthl• Nii'ltJt lw (Nr:ow ''"~ 1'1·11p11111 I look ~. 1'1~ 1 1) , §'I
this very teleology as the very bias of traditional historiography. In
Nietzsche's view, therefore, Hegel is still struggling with the shadow
of a dead God.
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~
1::.
Joel, Karl, Nietzsche und die Romantik (Jena: Diederichs, 1905). ~
!;;·
Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith ~
~
(London: MacMillan and Company, Ltd, 1961).
~
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1
Cornell University Press, 1969).
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' ·I
_ _ _ _, Twilight of the Idols ("Reason" in Philosophy), trans. by
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_____ , Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the
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_ _ _ _ , The Will to Power, trans. by W. Kaufmann and R. J.
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_ __ __ , "Violence and Subjectivity: Domination and Subjection
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Experience and D ia logue.
The East-West R elationsit ip i 11 lltt'
Missionary Journey of M atteo Ricci in Chill a
Pablito A. Baybado,Jr., M.A.
University of Santo Tomas
~
~­
Introduction: ~
M
atteo Ricci's missionary journey (1583-1610) to
China has been considered as a major breakthrough
in the East-West relationship. In the words of Pope John Paul II,
,
K
~
Ricci "succeeded in acquiring through determined, humble, and
respectful commitment such a vast and profound knowledge of
the classic Chinese culture as to make him a true 'bridge' between
European and Chinese civilizations."' The rediscovery2 of China
by Matteo Ricci has regenerated renewed interest in China studies 3,
1
Address of Pope John Paul II at the Gregorian University Session on October
25, 1982 of the Macerata Conference commemorating the 400'h anniversary of the arrival
in China ofMatteo Ricci, SJ (Rome, 1982), p. 4 .
2
Rediscovery means that prior to the Jesuit Mission, China has been known by
Marco Polo, and also through the early missionaries, namely the Nestorian a hundred years
earlier. Christianity, therefore, has reached China even before the coming of the Jesuits.
3
The philosophical surge of Chinese studies, specifically influenced by Leibniz
has prompted the interest to seriously study Chinese thoughts and Confucianism. Example
of such works are: Patrick Riley, "Leibniz's Political and Moral Philosophy in the Novis-
sima Sinica," 1699- 1999" Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 60 No. 2 (Apr 1999), pp.
217-249; Donald Lach, " Leibniz and China", Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 6, no.
4 (Oct 194 5), pp . 416-455; Donald Lach, "China and the Era of Enlightenment," The
Journul of th1· I~~ ~ ~~~~ y o l" ld t:as, vo l. 14, no. 2 (Jun 1942), pp 209-223; Richard Swiderski,
" Bouvet ll tHI I rrh11 11 A Sd 10larl y Corres pondence," Eighteenth Century Studies, vol.
14, no . } ( W11111 ·r I 'I HO I 11HI ), pp. 11 150; l)nnicl ( 'ook urul I knr y Rosemont, "The Pre-
t:s lnhli ~ h n lll.unr " " " lu l\\l't· n l l· rhn 11n nd ( ' hllll'~t· ll lll ll ft hl ~." lown ul of the lli story of
Jl )