1. A Year is understood to be “twelve calendar months.

” Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether

it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar
months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. There obviously
exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987. Hence, the Supreme Court recognized the existence of implied repeal and declared that the provision
of Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, now governs the
computation of legal periods with respect to counting “a year.” Hence, a “year” now means 12 calendar months. [CIR
v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., 531 SCRA 436, 444 (2007); reiterated in CIR vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc.,
632 SCRA 422 (2010) and Co vs. New Prosperity Plastic Products, 727 SCRA 503 (2014)]

2. An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on
contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of positive
law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie. Hence, if the delivery is by
reason of mistake, the action must be based on the quasi-contract of solutio indebiti and not under in rem verso. In
solutio indebiti, mistake is an essential element; but in the accion in rem verso, it is not necessary that there should
be mistake in the payment. [UP vs. Philab Industries, Inc., G.R. No. 152411, Sep. 29, 2004; see also Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Ong, 636 SCRA 266 (2010)]

3. The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28 of the NCC is very much broader than that covered by
intellectual property laws. In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must
involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to
good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public
injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by
unconscionable means. [Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp., 734 SCRA 238 (2014)]

4. The Mercado ruling (Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122) applies only where a marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken
place, although later declared void ab initio, as when the first marriage is void by reason of lack of marriage license.
But if no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer, there is no marriage that
took place, even ostensibly. Hence, there is no need to comply with the requirements of Article 40 of the FC. Recall
the case of Morigo vs. People. In Republic vs. Olaybar (G.R. No. 189538, Feb. 10, 2014, 715 SCRA 605), involving a case
of identity theft, the Court allowed the correction of an entry in the civil registry by cancelling the wife portion in the
subject marriage contract without need of a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage, on the ground that there
was no marriage to speak of. In that case, Melinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years.
Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. It
turned out that someone made use of her identity. This is another situation where a judicial declaration of nullity of
a void marriage is no longer required.

5. Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage
must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. Thus, if the second
marriage is void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes, such as lack of license, the
crime of bigamy is not committed. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage was contracted without
the necessary license and thus void, no liability for the crime of bigamy can attach [People vs. De Lara, CA, 51 O.G.,
4079; Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, 700 SCRA 702 (2013)]. BUT if the reason for the absence of a marriage license during
the celebration of the marriage was because the parties falsified the Affidavit of Cohabitation to make it appear that
the marriage is exempt from the license requirement pursuant to Article 34 of the Family Code, the parties to the
subsequent marriage are liable for bigamy and the absence of the marriage license in this situation is not considered
a defense [Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015]