G.R. No.

167147 August 3, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ, Appellant.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez was sentenced to death by the

RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311, for rape committed
against six-year-old Alpha Jane Bertiz.1

Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994,2 and the eldest among the six children of Conrado and
Metchie Bertiz.3 She was six years and nine months old when the rape was committed on August 7,
2001.

On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home in Manlunas St., Lagoon Area, Villamor
Airbase, PasayCity, taking care of her younger siblings. Her mother went to buy kerosene, while her
father was out. On the guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant went to the victim's house and asked
her to lie down on her father's bed. When she refused, appellant removed her clothes and his own
clothes, then forced her to lie down on the bed and laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina. Alpha Jane shouted in pain which startled the appellant who sprayed her with tear gas and
left.4

Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly thereafter and Alpha Jane told her what had happened. She
immediately reported the incident to the barangay officials and brought Alpha Jane to the Philippine
Air Force General Hospital for medical examination. She also sought assistance from the police at
the 521st Air Police Squadron who, after gathering information from the victim, arrested the
appellant at his house.5 Alpha Jane was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at CampCrame the
following day,6 and on August 10, 2001, to the Child Protection Unit (CPU) at UP-PGH7 for further
medical examinations, which both found hymenal abrasions and lacerations, respectively, on the
victim's genitalia.8

On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape before the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity in
an Information that reads:

That on or about the 07th day of August 2001, in Pasay City, Metro , Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, GENARO CAYABYAB Y
FERNANDEZ, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously by means of force and
intimidation have carnal knowledge of ALPHA JEAN BERTIS Y JONGCO, a minor six (6) years of
age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.9

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that on August 7, 2001, he was plying
his normal route inside the Villamor Airbase as a tricycle driver from 6:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.10 After
returning the tricycle to its owner Roberto Gabo at the corner of 14th and 15th Sts., Villamor Airbase,
he reached home at around 7:30 p.m and went to sleep after eating dinner.11 At around 9:30 p.m., he
woke up to urinate at the back of their house when three (3) policemen arrested and mauled
him.12 At the headquarters, he was forced to admit the rape13while the victim's father asked for
money in exchange for his release, which he refused.14

The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's
testimony consistent with the medical findings of the doctors from the PNP Crime Laboratory and
CPU, UP-PGH. Moreover, it applied the rule that an unsubstantiated defense of denial and alibi
cannot prevail over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor victim. Finally, it appreciated the
qualifying circumstance of minority and imposed the penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads:

In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused
Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez beyond reasonable doubt for rape as defined and penalized under
Article 335, paragraph 3 and 4 as the victim herein is only six (6) years old and hereby sentence
accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez to DEATH and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php
75,000.00 and moral and exemplary damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.15

The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic review. However, pursuant to our decision
in People v. Mateo16 modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
insofar as direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals,17 which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of
death is AFFIRMED intoto, and accordingly certifies the case and elevate the entire records to the
Supreme Court for review pursuant to Rule124, Section 13[a] of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

SO ORDERED.18

We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court. There is no doubt that appellant raped Alpha Jane
on August 7, 2001 inside their house at Villamor Airbase, PasayCity. This credibility given by the trial
court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence19 which appellate courts can rely on
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct,
and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsel.

On direct examination, Alpha Jane narrated the incident and positively identified appellant as her
assailant, thus:

Fiscal Barrera:

Now at around 6:00 p.m. of August 7, 2001 where were you?

A. I was inside our house.

Q. You mean your house at lagoon area, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What about you mother and father where were they on that date and time?

A. My mother bought gas while my father was 'naglalakad ng spray gun for painting.

Q. Who were left in your house on August 7, 2001 at 6:00 p.m. while your mother bought gas and
your father was walking with his spray gun used for painting?

A. My brothers and sisters.

Q. While in your house on said date and time do you know of any unusual incident that happened to
you?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What was that unusual incident that happened to you?

A. Kuya Jimmy entered our house.

Q. After Kuya Jimmy entered your house, what happened next?

A. Kuya Jimmy called for me inside our house.

Q. What did you do when Kuya Jimmy called for you?

A. He asked me one plus one and I answered two.

Q. After that what else happened?

A. He asked me to lie down on my father's bed.

Q. Did you follow him?

A. No, sir, I did not follow.

Q. And so what else happened?

A. He removed my clothes 'hinubaran niya ako; he removed my shorts and panty.

Q. After Kuya Jimmy removed your shorts and panty, what happened?

A. 'Pinatungan po niya ako', he laid on top of me.

Q. What happened when he laid on top of you?

A. He inserted his penis inside my private part.

Fiscal Barrera:
What did you do when this Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis to your private part?

A. I shouted, sir.

Q. After Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis inside your vagina and you shouted, what happened?

A. 'Pinakawalan niya ako', he released me.

Q. Then what happened?

A. 'Tinergas niya ako.

Q. After Kuya Jimmy teargas you, what happened?

A. I run away.

Q. Regarding what Kuya Jimmy did to you, did you report it to your mother?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. This Kuya Jimmy whom you said went inside your house and removed your shorts and panty and
thereafter inserted his penis inside your vagina on August 7, 2001 can you point at him if you see
him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. If this Kuya Jimmy Cayabyab is inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is he inside the courtroom?

Interpreter:

Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Genaro Cayabyab.20

Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting extortion by the victim's father, Alpha
Jane remained steadfast and consistent that it was appellant who raped her. The victim's testimony
was supported by the medico-legal report of the medico-legal experts from the PNP Crime
Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH, to wit:

ANO-GENITAL

EXAMINATION

Hymen: Tanner Stage 2, hymenal transection at 5 oclock, Type of Hymen: Anullar

...

IMPRESSIONS
 Evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma.

(Exh. 'L', p. 8, Records)

Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal transection at 5 oclock and laceration
at 5 oclock are synonymous (TSN, November 20, 2001, p. 6). Dr. Baluyut further explained that
there was prior injury to the victim's hymen which might have been caused by the insertion of a blunt
object such as an erected penis which was compatible with the victim's claim that she had been
raped (TSN, November 20, 2001, pp. 6-7).21

The trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.

Rape, such as committed against a 'child below seven (7) years old', is a dastardly and repulsive
crime which merit no less than the penalty of death pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code. This special qualifying circumstance of age must be specifically pleaded or alleged with
certainty in the information and proven during the trial; otherwise the penalty of death cannot be
imposed.

In the case of People v. Pruna,22 this Court took note of conflicting pronouncements concerning the
appreciation of minority, either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. There
were a number of cases where no birth certificate was presented where the Court ruled that the age
of the victim was not duly proved.23On the other hand, there were also several cases where we ruled
that the age of the rape victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to
present the birth certificate of the offended party to prove her age.24 Thus, in order to remove any
confusion, we set in Pruna the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the
crime or as a qualifying circumstance.

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the
family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree
such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the
Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is
less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's
mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that
it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.78
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the
accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.25

To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate
or certified true copy thereof; in their absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such
as baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy of the birth
certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may
be sufficient under certain circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other
authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other qualified relative are
unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and
clearly admitted by the accused.

In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as the baptismal certificate
of the victim was presented to prove her age. The trial court based its finding that Lizette was 3
years old when she was raped on the Medico-Legal Report, and the fact that the defense did not
contest her age and questioned her qualification to testify because of her tender age. It was however
noted that the Medico-Legal Report never mentioned her age and only the testimony of her mother
was presented to establish Lizette's age. The Court found that there was uncertainty as to the
victim's exact age, hence, it required that corroborative evidence, such as her birth certificate,
baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that
the qualifying circumstance of 'below seven (7) years old is appreciated.

Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical finding that Alpha Jane was only 6
years old at the time she was raped, based not only on the testimonies of the complainant and her
mother, but also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's birth certificate. It is well to note
that the defense did not object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted
the same 'as to fact of birth.

We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis26 that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate,
in the absence of any showing that the original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable,
without the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the victim's minority, for said photocopy does not
qualify as competent evidence for that purpose.

However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section
3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. ' When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office. [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who
is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of
Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of the original may
be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent does not
bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.27

In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact
it admitted the same. Having failed to raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of
this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed admitted and the other
party is bound thereby.28

In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being
born on November 26, 1994, when the rape incident happened on August 7, 2001.

Anent the award of damages, we sustain the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent with
the prevailing jurisprudence that if the crime is qualified by circumstances which warrant the
imposition of the death penalty by applicable amendatory laws, the accused should be ordered to
pay the complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.

The Court notes that the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Moral
damages is distinct from exemplary damages, hence must be awarded separately. The award of
moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the
commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries
entitling her to such award.29 However, the award of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00 in
accord with prevailing jurisprudence.30 As regards exemplary damages, we held in People v.
Catubig31 that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Conformably, we award the amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.32

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case
No. 01-1311, as affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00258, finding
appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
imposing the penalty of DEATH33 isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is further
ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.

GAMBOA, RODRIGUEZ, RIVERA & CO., INC., CIFRA & COMPANY,

INC., AND ARCA & COMPANY, INC.,petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of the Court of [1]

Appeals dated September 29, 1993 and its resolution denying petitioners’ [2]

motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 28808.

 The uncontroverted facts of the case follow.

During the 1971-1972 crop year, the Pampanga Sugar Mills (PASUMIL) issued
negotiable sugar quedans to several planters, who had their sugar milled, representing
their share in the physical sugar. The planters negotiated/sold their quedans to several
traders, among which were plaintiffs-appellees GARORICO, CIFRA and ARCA.

In 1972, plaintiffs-appellees, upon presentation of the quedans to PASUMIL,

discovered that the quedans were issued without any physical sugar to back them up.

To solve the problem and to preserve the sanctity of sugar quedans, the Sugar Quota
Administration conducted a conference with PASUMIL and sugar traders holding
1971-1972 outstanding quedans. It was agreed that no quedans covering the mill’s
production share of the 1972-1973 crop will be issued, and that the sugar shall be
made available to service said outstanding quedans.

Out of the physical sugar set aside and earmarked to service the unserviced quedans,
plaintiffs-appellees were able to make partial withdrawals. During the crop year 1973-
1974, physical sugar representing PASUMIL’s mill share for said crop year was again
set aside and earmarked to service the outstanding balance of the quedans.

Plaintiffs-appellees, however, were not able to withdraw their respective shares in the
earmarked physical sugar. On May 25, 1974, pursuant to Letter of Instructions No.
189-A and 311, PNB took over the management, control, operation and assets of
PASUMIL. Consequently, the physical sugar earmarked from the mill share of
PASUMIL for crop year 1973-1974 was not distributed to the creditors of PASUMIL
(including herein plaintiffs-appellees).
[3]

On October 19, 1981, petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of

proceeds of the sale before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, Manila.
In the complaint, petitioners sought to recover the following amounts:
GARORICO – P1,601,283.20 for 10,008.02 piculs class A (export) sugar;
[4]

CIFRA - P1,083,811.20 for 6,773.82 piculs class A (export) sugar; and

[5]

ARCA - P1,577,265.60 for 9,857.91 piculs class B (domestic) sugar. The

[6]

amounts were computed based on the price of P160 per picul.

The petitioners also sought to recover from PNB P500,000 for actual
damages incurred when they were compelled to purchase sugar from other
sources and moral damages also in the amount of P500,000.
The trial court rendered a decision on October 12, 1988: [7]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Philippine
National Bank to pay the plaintiffs as follows:

1. To plaintiff GARORICO the sum of SIX HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND FIVE

HUNDRED TWENTY-NINE PESOS and THIRTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P660,529.32),
with 14% interest thereon per annum from October 19, 1981 (date of the filing of the
complaint) until fully paid;
2. To pay plaintiff CIFRA the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-SEVEN THOUSAND
SEVENTY-TWO PESOS and TWELVE CENTAVOS (P447,072.12), with 14%
interest thereon per annum from October 19, 1981 until fully paid;
3. To pay plaintiff ARCA the sum of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO THOUSAND
FORTY-TWO PESOS and NINETY SIX CENTAVOS (P552,042.96), with 14%
interest thereon per annum from October 19, 1981 until fully paid;
4. To pay all the plaintiffs the sum of equivalent to TEN PERCENT (10%) of the total
amount due as and for attorney’s fees; and
5. The cost of suit.

In so ruling, the trial court stated:

The computation should be revised, considering that during the conference attended
by PNB representatives it was agreed that in the event PASUMIL opts for cash
payment, the price per picul shall be P56.00 for domestic sugar and P66.00 for export
sugar, with interest at 14% per annum. [8]

On appeal by both parties, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision in toto. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by
the appellate court.
Hence, the instant petition.
The issues raised before us are:

1) whether or not petitioners were able to establish that the liability of PNB
should be computed at P160 per picul of sugar (instead of P56 and P66 per
picul);

2) whether actual and moral damages were duly proved and

3) whether the trial court was correct in ruling that the interest due petitioners
should commence from the filing of the action in the trial court on October 19,
1981.

Should PNB’s Liability Be Based on P160 or P56/P66 per Picul?

 Petitioners presented Francisco Gamboa, President of Gamboa,
Rodriguez, Rivera and Co., and Ernesto Santos, Vice-President of Cifra and
Co., Inc. as witnesses. Both stated that the sugar was sold for P160 per
picul. But because no receipts or other transactional documents were
presented to prove their claim of P160 per picul, the trial court gave little
credence to their testimonies.
We agree. Allegations in the complaint must be duly proven by competent
evidence and the burden of proof is on the party making the allegation.
Petitioners could have easily moved for the production or inspection of
documents and papers pertaining to the sale under Section 1, Rule 27 of the
Revised Rules of Court. They chose not to.
[9]

On the other hand, what carried more weight was the memorandum of
then Sugar Quota Administrator Jose Unson, which embodied the agreement
between the parties pegging the sugar price at P56 (domestic) and P66
(export) per picul, plus interest of 14% per annum.
The agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of
the parties’ rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the
intention of the parties. Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been
[10]

reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon

and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. [11]

Their agreement therefore bound the parties and P56/P66 per picul should
be the basis of PNB’s liability.

Were Actual and Moral Damages Proven?

We affirm the ruling of the trial court that there was no proof to support the
award of actual and moral damages. No evidence was presented as to how
much petitioners lost.
Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides:

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate

compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved.
Such compensation is referred to as actual or compensatory damages.

The law does not require a definite degree of certainty when proving the
amount of damages claimed. It is necessary, however, to establish evidence
to substantiate the claim. To justify an award for actual damages, there must
be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence can be given only
to claims which are duly supported by receipts. [12]

The trial court was also correct in not granting moral damages to
petitioners. In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, this Court held that, in the case of moral damages, recovery is
[13]

more an exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are not punitive in
nature. They are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar harm unjustly caused to a
person. In order that an award for moral damages can be justified, the
claimant must be able to satisfactorily prove that he underwent such suffering
and that the injury causing it sprang from any of the cases listed in Articles
2219 and 2220.
[14] [15]

Although petitioners alleged that they were prevented from honoring their
contractual obligations, thus impairing their good business reputation and
good will, there was no evidence to support the same.

When Should the 14% p.a. Interest Commence to Run?

This Court holds that the stipulated 14% p.a. interest should start from the
time the complaint was filed on October 19, 1981 until finality of this decision.
In the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this [16]

Court, through the Honorable Justice Jose C. Vitug, suggested the following
rules of thumb:

I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-

contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be held liable for
damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on “Damages” of the Civil Code govern
in determining the measure of recoverable damages.

II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual or

compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed,
as follows:

1. When an obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum

of money, i.e. a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be
that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest
due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded.
 In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to
be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand
under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is

breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed
at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest,
however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except
when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty,
the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or
extrajudicially (Article 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty cannot
be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at
which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been
reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal
interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final
and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under
paragraph 1 or 2 above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until
its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

PASUMIL reneged on its obligation when it failed to fully honor the

quedans. However, the parties gave PASUMIL an extension of the period
within which to comply with its obligation. This was crop year 1972-1973 (and
the succeeding crop years) until the quedans were paid. In the interim, no
interest accrued.
But when PNB sold the sugar already earmarked for petitioners, there was
a breach of the agreement, thus entitling petitioners to payment of the
stipulated interest of 14% per annum. From then on, demand became
necessary. The filing of the complaint, being a judicial demand, reckoned the
start of the accrual of interest, until finality of this decision.
Finally, as held in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the legal interest of 12%
per annum shall be imposed from the time this judgment becomes final and
executory, until full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The
CA decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with the following
modifications: (1) the stipulated interest of 14% per annum shall be reckoned
from October 19, 1981 until finality of this decision; and (2) PNB shall pay
legal interest of 12% per annum from the time this judgment becomes final
and executory, until full satisfaction.
Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. MAJOR EMILIO

COMILING, GIL SALAGUBANG (acquitted), MARIO CLOTARIO
(acquitted), GERALDO GALINGAN, EDDIE CALDERON (at large),
BALOT CABOTAJE (at large) and RICKY MENDOZA (at
large), accused.
MAJOR EMILIO COMILING and GERALDO GALINGAN, appellants.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision dated September 1, 1999 of

[1]

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Tayug, Pangasinan, convicting Maj.
Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan alias “Bong” and Ricky Mendoza alias
“Leo” of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing them to suffer the
extreme penalty of death.
The three accused were charged under an information which alleged:

The undersigned hereby accuses MAJOR EMILIO COMILING, GIL

SALAGUBANG, BONG CLOTARIO, GERALDO GALINGAN, EDDIE
CALDERON, BALOT CABOTAJE and RICKY MENDOZA @ Leo of the crime of
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE and PHYSICAL INJURIES, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 1995, in the evening, inside the Masterline
Grocery located at Bonifacio Street corner Quezon Blvd., municipality of Tayug,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused including certain JOE, REY and PAUL, whose
family names have not yet been known, armed with firearms and handgrenade, aboard
an owner-type stainless jeep and motorized tricycle, with intent to gain and with the
use of violence against or intimidations upon persons, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the
Masterline Grocery pretending to be customers and once inside, poked their guns and
intimidated the owner of said grocery, MR. INCIONG CO, and his worker to open the
drawers of the tables of said grocery and when opened, took and carried away
EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P81,000.00) and three (3) pieces of Chinese
gold necklace worth TWENTY SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P26,000.00), and
afterwhich the above-named accused on their way out to escape with their loot, shot
and hit a responding Tayug Policeman, PO3 ERWIL V. PASTOR, mortally wounding
him on his face that subsequently led to his untimely death, and when said accused
were cornered by other responding policemen, ran and passed to an adjacent store
(Good Taste Bakery) and used it as their exit and while there also shot, hit and
mortally wounded MRS. CONCHING CO, the owner of said bakery causing her
injuries, the accused having thus performed the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it
by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, and that is due to the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said MRS. CONCHING CO, to her
damage and prejudice and also to the heirs of PO3 ERWIL V. PASTOR.

CONTRARY to Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code. [2]

Accused Eddie Calderon and Balot Cabotaje have remained at large to

this day. The remaining accused (Comiling, Galingan, Mendoza, Salagubang
and Clotario) pleaded not guilty during their arraignment. Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter.
On March 28, 1997, Mendoza escaped from detention and was thus
tried in absentia.
The records show that at sundown on September 2, 1995, Ysiong Chua,
the owner of Masterline Grocery and his helper Mario were about to close the
store when someone knocked on the door to buy some cigarettes. Masterline
was located at the corner of Quezon Blvd. and Bonifacio St. in Tayug,
Pangasinan.
As soon as Mario opened the door, three masked, armed men suddenly
barged into the store and announced a hold-up. One of the robbers shoved
Ysiong into the recesses of the grocery where he threatened to kill him if he
did not give them his earnings. Ysiong retorted that he only had a small
amount, which remark apparently irked the robber who then hit Ysiong’s
thumb with the butt of his gun. A simultaneous kick made the grocer fall down
in pain.
As Ysiong lay prostrate on the floor, he saw the two other intruders, and a
little later the robber who hit him, ransacking the drawers of his desk.
Fortunately, he was able to quickly recover from the blows; whereupon he
darted to the adjacent Good Taste Bakery and out to the Tayug Police Station
farther west along Quezon Blvd. to report the incident.
 SPO1 Rolando Torio, PO3 Erwil Pastor and SPO4 Emilio Nagui of the
Tayug Police Station rushed to the crime scene where SPO1 Torio chanced
upon Sonny Rimas, a barangay councilman, and his friend Jessie Batalla at
the grocery entrance. He asked them if they knew what was going on inside
the store but the two did not answer. While SPO1 Torio was standing outside
the store’s door, he heard three gunshots coming from inside the store, all
directed towards Bonifacio Street. PO3 Pastor was then on the street while
Nagui was some 50 meters away. PO3 Pastor ran and hid behind a concrete
marker, then moved westward as if to return to the police headquarters.
Unfortunately, in his attempt to flee, PO3 Pastor was shot in the face. He was
rushed to the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital. On September 6, 1995,
PO3 Pastor died from the injury he suffered.
Meanwhile, Ysiong discovered that he lost three gold necklaces
worth P26,000 and cash amounting to P81,000.
On September 26, 1995, bothered by her conscience, prosecution witness
Naty Panimbaan decided to reveal to police authorities what she knew about
the case. During the trial, she testified that she was present in all the four
meetings in which the plan to rob the Masterline Grocery was hatched.
The first meeting was on June 30, 1995 at the Zariza Inn in Tayug,
Pangasinan. Among those present were Comiling, Galingan, Salagubang,
Calderon, Clotario and Mendoza, along with two other persons known only as
Paul and Rey. Another meeting was held by the group in July 1995 in the
house of a certain Lani Galingan also in Tayug, Pangasinan. There were two
other meetings in August 1995. Finally, on September 2, 1995, the group met
at Lani’s house where they received their final instructions and the firearms
they were to use from Comiling and Galingan. The entire group headed for
Masterline Grocery at around 4:00 p.m. except for Naty who stayed behind in
Lani’s house.
At around 8:00 p.m., she met the group in the house of a person named
Joe. Galingan blamed a companion for shooting the policeman. The group
planned to escape to Manila. She and Lani were given $50 by Galingan for
their fare to Manila. Upon arrival there on September 3, 1995, they, together
with Galingan, proceeded to Comiling’s house in Parañaque. They discussed
where she and Lani should stay as Comiling did not want them around.
Comiling decided that the two of them should stay in Makati. It was while she
was hiding in Makati that she was able to reflect on the events that transpired,
gathering enough courage to confess the robbery to the police authorities. [3]

On the other hand, all the accused denied culpability for the felony. Each
of them claimed to be somewhere else at the time the crime happened on
September 2, 1995. The witnesses for the defense also tried to impugn the
credibility of the lead witness for the prosecution, Naty Panimbaan.
On September 1, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which read:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having failed to establish their alleged guilt beyond
moral certainty, a judgment of ACQUITTAL is hereby rendered in favor of the
accused Gil Salagubang and Mario Clotario alias “Bong,” and their respective bail
bonds are hereby ordered released.

However, on the basis of the evidence the prosecution has adduced, which in the
Court’s perception satisfies the requisite proof beyond reasonable doubt as mandated
by Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, the Court hereby renders a judgment, as
to the accused MAJ. EMILIO COMILING of Block 18, Lot 3, Camella Classic Phase
II, Bicutan, Parañaque, Metro Manila, GERALDO GALINGAN alias “Bong” of Iris,
Brgy. “B,” Tayug, Pangasinan and RICKY MENDOZA, said to be a resident of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, as per records of the BJMP district jail, Balugnao,
Pangasinan, finding them GUILTY of the special complex crime of ROBBERY
WITH HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, and pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 63, same Code,
hereby sentences them to each suffer the penalty of DEATH, and in solidum to
restitute, when possible, to private complainant Ysiong Chua his lost valuables,
otherwise to make reparation therefor and pay to him their value of P26,000.00, plus
the cash amount aggregating P81,000.00, and the heirs of PO3 Erwil
Pastor, P50,000.00 for his death, and P100,000.00 for consequential damages as
naturally must have arisen therefrom; and, to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. [4]

Appellants Comiling and Galingan filed separate appeal briefs.

Appellant Comiling, who was a major in the Philippine Army, assails his
conviction by asserting that the killing of PO3 Erwil Pastor happened after the
robbery took place, hence the “homicide” could not have been a necessary
means of committing the robbery. Neither could it be said that the robbery
produced another offense.
The argument is specious. As correctly stressed by the Solicitor General,
robbery with homicide is a “special complex crime.” It is enough that in order
to sustain a conviction for this crime, the killing, which is designated as
“homicide,” has a direct relation to the robbery, regardless of whether the
latter takes place before or after the killing. For as long as the killing occurs
during or because of the heist, even if the killing is merely accidental, robbery
with homicide is committed.
Comiling also questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
particularly Naty Panimbaan, who was supposedly a polluted source since
she was one of the conspirators. The reasoning is out of line. This Court is
not a trier of facts. All we have to discern from the records to believe the trial
court’s findings is a reasonable basis for its method of examining the
credibility of witnesses and its assessment thereof. We do not second-guess
the court a quo for as long as it does not gravely abuse such power.
In the case at bar, there is nothing to suggest that the trial court was
whimsical or capricious in the performance of its tasks. Thus we have no
recourse but to uphold its findings on the credibility of Naty Panimbaan and of
the other prosecution witnesses. In any event, as correctly stated by the
Solicitor General, Naty Panimbaan was examined three times not only under
the close scrutiny of two defense counsels but also, in some instances, under
the abrasive tirades of the trial judge who called her a “whore.” Yet, despite
the trial court’s apparent misgivings about her character, it still gave full
credence to her testimony:

None of their dark attributes dissuades the Court from giving credence to their
respective narratives, however. The Court agrees that Panimbaan knew too much, for
her open-court testimony was abundantly detailed, generally consistent,
straightforward and credible.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court believes Panimbaan’s testimony that finally, at around 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of September 2, 1995 the accused Comiling, Galingan, Calderon, Clotario
and Mendoza, together with Rimas, Paul, Rey and Jose left Lani’s place, while she
stayed behind.

The Court believes Panimbaan’s testimony that all throughout the four meetings
conducted before September 2, the accused Comiling and Galingan presided, gave
instructions and provided firearms and explosives.[5]

We find no compelling reason to disturb the factual findings and

conclusions of the trial court. Indeed, prosecution witness Naty Panimbaan
proved credible during the trial. She never wavered in her testimony on the
details of the crime:
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Since when was Geraldo Galingan your boyfriend, if you can still remember?
A Since September 1994, sir.
Q You mentioned a while ago that they are going to talk (sic) their plan to rob the
Masterline Grocery, who are these people whom you refer as they?
A Maj. Comiling, Gil Salagubang, Eddie Calderon, certain Paul, Leo, Rey and Eddy,
Bong Clotario and Sonny Rimas.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q How about your boyfriend Geraldo Galingan?
Would he or would he not participate?
A He was there, sir. He was one.
Q And so Madam Witness, when you were there at Zariza Village Inn, who were the
persons whom you saw there, if any?
A We were inside the hotel. When we arrived I saw the group of Maj. Comiling.
Q You refer to a group of Maj. Comiling, will you be kind enough to enumerate their
names?
A Maj. Emilio Comiling, Bong Galingan, Eddie Calderon, Gil Salagubang, Sonny
Rimas, Bong Clotario, Rey and Paul.
Q Madam Witness, when you said that you saw this group when you arrived there,
what did you do upon arrival there?
COURT:
When you said you whom you were (sic) referring to? He or a bigger number?
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q What did you do? Specifically you, sir.
A I sat beside them.
Q Will you tell the Honorable Court your distance from the members of the group
when you sat beside them?
COURT:
That will be very difficult to answer, counsel. Since this was a group you will have
to measure the distance from one person to another and up to the last member of
the group. Why don’t you refer to the group as a whole? And probably establish
who was nearest to her.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Madam Witness, when you said you went and sat beside the group, will you then
describe the physical arrangement of the group when you went and sat beside
them?
A I was beside Bong Galingan and the group was in a circle formation.
Q And so what transpired when you were there within the group, Madam Witness?
A Since I was beside them I overheard their conversation.
Q And what was the conversation all about, Madam Witness?
A That they are going to stage a hold-up at the Masterline Grocery, sir.
Q What was the result of that conversation?
A The others left.
Q Who specifically left?
A Eddie Calderon, Sonny Rimas.
Q Who else, if any?
A Bong Clotario.
Q And do you know the reason why these three persons left?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell the reasons to the Court?
A They observed the Masterline Grocery if there are policemen or people around
and when they came back they said it is not possible.
COURT:
Q How did you come to the conclusion that the three persons left in order to observe
because you told that you stayed behind?
WITNESS:
A We were all there, sir, when Maj. Comiling ordered that they must go to the
Masterline Grocery.
COURT:
Q For what purpose, if any?
A To stage a hold-up.
Q You mean Galingan and Comiling ordered them to go and hold-up Masterline at
that time when they were about to leave?
A Bong Galingan and Maj. Comiling ordered these men because they were the
brains of that hold-up.
Q And whom did they order?
A Their men, sir.
Q Who?
A Clotario, Calderon and Rimas.
Q I am referring to the three whom (sic) according to you left. Were they ordered by
Galingan and Comiling to leave?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know what for?
A Yes, sir.
Q What?
A They will observe the Masterline grocery.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Madam Witness, you said that when the three persons you just named came back
and said it is not yet possible, what was the consensus of the group, if any?
A They drank again.
COURT:
That was the consensus.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Madam Witness, you mentioned that the three left to haze (sic) the Masterline
grocery and when they came back they said it is not yet possible. With respect to
that plan what was the consensus or decision of the group then?
ATTY. STA. MARIA:
Objection, your Honor. Already answered.
COURT:
The objection is sustained not on that ground but on the ground that there is still
no premise. You are referring to a consensus when there was still no evidence that
a consensus was being set up. Lay the basis.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Madam Witness, when the three persons arrived or came back and they said that
it was not yet possible was there any reply from the group that was left?
A None, sir.
Q How about a decision or a consensus from the group was there any Madam
Witness after they learned that it is not yet possible?
ATTY. DANCEL:
Objection, your Honor. Leading.
COURT:
Sustain (sic).
Q What happened after the three allegedly reported back?
A When the three reported that it was not yet possible to stage such plan because
there were many policemen, Maj. Comiling decided to forego.
COURT:
Q To forego what?
A Not to stage the hold-up yet because there were many policemen.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q So what happened next Madam Witness after Comiling said that?
A We just tarried along but they kept on planning.
Q You said that they kept on planning how did you know that they kept on planning
after that meeting in June 1995?
A Because I was always with them whenever they talk with each other.
Q You said that you were always with them whenever they plan. Are you telling the
Honorable Court that it was not only once that they planned, Madam Witness?
A Yes, sir. They planned several times.
COURT:
Q What did they plan?
A They kept on planning about the hold-up but it was not continued.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q How many times did this group plan in your presence?
A Many times, sir.
Q Could you please give your estimate?
A Four times.
Q If you said that they planned for four times when was the second time?
A July, but I cannot remember the date.
COURT:
Q What year?
A 1995, sir.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Where was this that the group planned sometime in July 1995?
A At the house of Lani Galingan at Iris, Tayug, Pangasinan.
Q And who were present at that second meeting at the place of Lani Galingan?
A Sonny Rimas, Eddie Calderon, Bong Clotario, Eddie Tangkad, Rey, Paul, Leo, Gil
Salagubang, Maj. Comiling and Bong Galingan.
Q You just mentioned several persons whom you claimed to be present at that
second meeting at the house of Lani Galingan. Why do you know that they were
the persons who were there, Madam Witness?
A Because I was fetched by Bong Galingan and I overheard their plan to stage a
hold-up at the Masterline.
Q In short you are saying that you were there?
A Yes, sir. I was there.
Q And did the plan materialize at that time, Madam Witness?
A No, sir.
Q And what was the reason, Madam Witness, if you know?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the reason?
A Because there were many people at the Masterline grocery.
Q And how did the group came (sic) to know that there were a lot of people at the
Masterline grocery?
ATTY. STA. MARIA:
Incompetent, your Honor.
COURT:
If you know.
WITNESS:
A Because that was being told after Comiling and Bong Galingan ordered
somebody.
COURT:
Q And who said that?
A Eddie Calderon and Bong Clotario.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q If you said that the plan did not materialize at that second meeting when was the
third meeting then, if you know?
A August, sir. I cannot remember the date.
COURT:
Q What year?
A 1995.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Will it be first week, second week or third week or 4th week? I am referring to the
third meeting.
A First week, sir.
Q And where was this meeting held?
A At the house of Lani Galingan, sir.
Q And who were the persons who were present at that time, Madam Witness?
A The group of Maj. Comiling, sir.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Please enumerate them.
A Bong Galingan, Maj. Comiling, Sonny Rimas, Gil Salagubang, Eddie Calderon,
Leo, Paul and Rey.
Q And what was the result of this third meeting?
A It did not materialize yet.
COURT:
Q What did not materialize the meeting or what?
A The meeting was held but the schedule of the hold-up did not materialize.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q And when was the fourth meeting, Madam Witness?
A In the house of Lani Galingan.
Q When?
A I cannot remember the date.
Q How about the month?
A Last week of August, sir.
COURT:
Q What year?
A 1995, sir.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q And how do you know that this 4th meeting was held on the last week of August
1995 at the house of Lani Galingan?
A Because I was in the house of Lani Galingan, sir.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Why? Do you usually reside there or not?
A Bong Galingan made me resign at J-5 restaurant.
Q When was that?
A August 21, sir.
COURT:
Q How far was this J-5 from Lani Galingan’s place?
A Not too far.
Q In other words in response to the last question propounded by the private
prosecutor you were not actually residing at Lani Galingan’s place?
A I was residing there at the time because Bong Galingan made me resign.
Q You resigned from your job and your boyfriend lodged you at Lani Galingan’s
place. Is that what you are saying?
A Yes, sir.
Q Were you such a resident at Lani Galingan’s place throughout the four alleged
meetings that you testified on?
A Yes, sir.
Q From the first meeting to the fourth you were already residing or lodging at Lani
Galingan’s place?
A No, sir.
Q So when did you start residing at Lani’s place?
A August 21, 1995.
COURT:
Q What makes you remember that?
A Because that is when Bong Galingan lodged me.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Madam Witness, you enumerated some names of persons whom you claimed to
be present in the last week of August 21, 1995 at Lani Galingan’s residence. Why
do you know that these were the persons who were there at the time for the
4th meeting?
A Because we usually went together.
Q So that Madam Witness during that particular time of the 4th meeting where were
you?
A I was at the house of Lani Galingan.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q And what happened at that time Madam Witness?
A They were talking about the supposed hold-up at the Masterline.
Q And what else transpired, if any? I am referring to that 4th meeting?
A They were talking about the subject matter Masterline grocery.
Q What about the Masterline grocery?
A Their staging of a hold-up.
Q And what was the result of that 4th meeting?
A It did not yet materialize.
Q You mentioned a while ago that there were four meetings. You just mentioned
now that in that 4th meeting it resulted into the plan not pushing through. Was
there any other meeting, Madam Witness?
ATTY. STA. MARIA:
 Objection, your Honor.
COURT:
Sustain (sic).
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q That was in the last week of August 25, 1995. So what happened after that?
A The staging of the hold-up pushed through.
Q If you said that the plan of the hold-up of the Masterline grocery pushed through
when was that Madam Witness?
A September 2, 1995, sir.
COURT:
Q What time?
A At 4:00 they were still at the house. Maybe that was at 6:00.
Q You mentioned 4:00 and 6:00, what was that?
A In the afternoon, sir.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q You said that at around 4:00 in the afternoon of September 2, 1995 they were still
there. Whom are you referring to as the persons still there?
A Bong Galingan, Maj. Comiling, Sonny Rimas, Eddie Calderon, Bong Clotario, Joe,
Gil Salagubang.
Q And what were these people doing there? By the way Madam Witness, where is
this place that you are referring to?
A Lani Galingan’s place.
Q What were these people doing there at 4:00 in the afternoon?
A They were just there waiting for the persons being sent by Maj. Comiling.
COURT:
Q You have mentioned of four alleged meetings and you even enumerated names.
Could you tell the Court if there was anybody who presided?
A Bong Galingan and Comiling.
Q How did you know that?
A I have known that and he said that all the orders of Bong are being followed.
Q The orders of who?
A Bong, sir.
COURT:
Q I am asking you who presided, if any?
A Bong Galingan and Maj. Comiling.
Q How did you know that?
A Because all the orders of Maj. Comiling and Bong Galingan are being followed by
their men.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q And what time did these people leave Lani Galingan’s place?
A 4:00 o’clock.
Q Where did they go?
A They proceeded towards Masterline.
Q How about you Madam Witness, what did you do?
A I was just there at the house of Lani.
Q So after they left at 4:00, what happened next? What happened next as far as you
are concerned?
A After some time there were shots at the town.
Q Around what time would that be when you heard gunshots?
A 6:00 o’clock.
COURT:
Q And where were you then at 6:00 o’clock?
A I was at the house of Lani.
Q Did you ever stay put at Lani’s place at 6:00 o’clock?
A No, sir.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q Did you personally see those people leave Lani’s place before the gunshots?
Before you heard the gunshots?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q About how many minutes or hours passed from the time you allegedly saw the
people leave Lani’s place from the time you allegedly heard shots in town?
A I heard the gun fire at 6:30.
Q So are you saying that it was almost 2-1/2 hours?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q If you say Madam Witness that you saw them when they left Lani Galingan’s
house, did they take any ride with them or not?
 ATTYS. DANCEL & STA. MARIA:
Leading.
COURT:
Answer.
WITNESS:
A Yes, sir. There was.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q How many rides were there?
A Three rides, sir.
Q And what were these rides?
A One owner-type and two tricycles.
COURT:
Q Owner type plane or what?
A Owner-type jeep.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q And who were the persons who rode on the owner-type jeep, if you know?
A Bong Galingan, Leo, Paul and Rey.
Q And you said that there were two tricycles who rode on the two tricycles?
A Maj. Comiling and Joe.
COURT:
Q One tricycle each you mean?
A No, sir. The other tricycle were on board Sonny Rimas and Bong Clotario.
ATTY. CALPITO:
Q If I will add the persons whom you named there were 8 whom you said boarded
the three vehicles. Is that all, Madam Witness?
A Eddie Calderon and Gil Salagubang.
Q And how about them? Where did they ride?
A Tricycle.[6]

Naty’s tenacious insistence on the minute details of what happened

suggested nothing else except that she was telling the truth. We do not doubt
her credibility.
 The time-tested rule is that, between the positive assertions of prosecution
witnesses and the mere denials of the accused, the former undisputedly
deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary value. [7]

Appellant Comiling likewise contends that Naty’s testimony was

inadmissible against him to prove conspiracy because of the res inter alios
acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provides:

Admission by conspirator. – The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the

conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-
conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration.

This rule prescribes that any declaration made by a conspirator relating to

the conspiracy is admissible against him alone but not against his co-
conspirators unless the conspiracy is first shown by other independent
evidence.
According to Comiling, Naty’s testimony showed that she was also a
conspirator, thus, the existence of conspiracy must be shown by evidence
other than Naty’s admission. As there was no independent proof of conspiracy
except the testimony of Naty, the latter’s testimony concerning appellant’s
participation in the conspiracy was inadmissible against him. This contention
is misplaced. The res inter alios acta rule refers only to extrajudicial
declarations or admissions and not to testimony given on the witness stand
where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. In the present case, Naty’s admission implicating appellant
[8]

Comiling was made in open court and therefore may be taken in evidence
against him.
Lastly, Comiling asserts that he cannot be held liable for robbery as he
was not physically present at the Masterline Grocery and had no ostensible
participation therein. The contention is off-tangent. Although Comiling was
never tagged as one of the three robbers who entered the store of Ysiong
Chua nor the one who mauled the victim or who shot PO3 Erwil Pastor to
death, his participation was his leadership in the conspiracy to commit robbery
with homicide and his inducement to his cohorts to perpetrate the same. As
held in People vs. Assad, one who plans the commission of a crime is a
[9]

principal by inducement. As testified to by Naty Panimbaan:

Q And what happened to this fourth meeting, Madam Witness?
A They talked about the projected robbery and Major Comiling decided that they will
push through on September 2.
 Q What else happened during that fourth meeting?
A Major Comiling gave their respective assignments.
Q You said Major Comiling gave their respective assignments to the members of this
group, what assignments if you know was given to Bong Galingan?
A Bong Galingan should be in front of the LBC.
Q How about Sonny Rimas?
COURT:
Your answer should be one at a time.
WITNESS:
A Sonny Rimas and Bong Clotario should be at the tricycle.
ATTY. ESTRADA:
Q What about Gil Salagubang?
A Gil Salagubang and Eddie Calderon should be in front of the Masterline Grocery.
Q What about Major Comiling?
A Major Comiling should be posted at the back of the bakery including Joe.[10]
Naty’s testimony showed that Comiling was determined to commit the
crime as early as June 1995. The fact that the heist was finally executed only
on September 2, 1995 indicated that Comiling had indomitably clung to his
determination. Principalship by inducement (or by induction) presupposes
that the offender himself is determined to commit the felony and must have
persistently clung to his determination. In all the meetings prior to the
[11]

commission of the crime, Comiling was seen and heard presiding over and
leading the group. He was even the one who assigned each of his men his
specific role in the robbery. Then, in the house where the perpetrators
regrouped after the commission of the crime, Comiling was handed the money
and jewelry stolen from the grocery store. It was also Comiling who instructed
Naty and Lani to hide in Makati after the incident. He paid for the monthly
rental of the room where Naty and Lani stayed. All this can only prove that
Comiling was the acknowledged leader of the group.
Moreover, another witness for the prosecution, Sonny Rimas, testified that
while serving beer to the accused at Zariza Inn, he heard that Comiling was
planning the robbery of Masterline. He even heard Comiling say, “We will
enter the place of Isko,” referring to Ysiong Chua’s store. Indeed, appellant
Comiling was the undisputable mastermind. The judgment of conviction of
Emilio Comiling must therefore be affirmed.
For his part, appellant Galingan interposed the defense of alibi. He
claimed that he was in the house of his uncle in Novaliches, Metro Manila
when the incident happened on September 2, 1995. He was in Manila
because his wife was scheduled to arrive from Hong Kong on September 4,
1995.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was in
another place for such period of time that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission. [12]

In this case, Galingan did not meet the settled requirements of time and
place. He failed to prove that he was indeed in Novaliches at the time of the
commission of the crime; his alleged presence therein was not established by
a positive declaration from an independent witness. Likewise, the place
where he claimed to be on the night of the crime was not of such distance that
it was impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission considering that either place could be reached in just about four
hours by land. The fact that he met his wife upon arrival on September 4,
1995 was likewise inconsequential as it was two days after September 2,
1995, the date material to this case. Alibi, in order to be given full faith and
credit, must be clearly established and must not leave any room for doubt as
to its plausibility and verity.
[13]

It should also be noted that Rimas testified that, while he was standing
near the door of Masterline Grocery at around 6:30 p.m. on September 2,
1995, he noticed the arrival of an owner-type jeep. Rimas positively identified
appellant Galingan as the driver thereof.
Galingan’s invocation of alibi should be disregarded not only because of
its inherent weakness but also because of the circumstances pointing to its
contrived nature and his positive identification by prosecution witness Rimas
as one of those present during the Masterline Grocery robbery on September
2, 1995.
Appellant Galingan also impugns the credibility of prosecution witness
Naty Panimbaan. He denies Naty’s claim that they were lovers. He maintains
that Naty was a woman of ill-repute whom he paid P700 everytime they had
sex. Galingan insists that the only reason why Naty implicated him in the
offense was because she wanted him to leave his wife which he did not want
to do. Furthermore, according to Galingan, Naty was a drug user and this
supposedly tainted her credibility.
These attacks on Naty’s character and reputation are too flimsy and
irrelevant to deserve serious consideration. The fact that a witness is a person
of unchaste character or even a drug dependent does not per se affect her
credibility. Character is frequently used to refer to one’s reputation in the
neighborhood. It means the estimate attached to the individual by the
community and not the qualities of the individual as conceived by one
person. With respect to a witness in both criminal and civil cases, evidence
[14]

of his character, in order to affect his credibility, must refer to his “general
reputation for truth, honesty or integrity.” Thus, testimonies attacking the
[15]

character of a witness for the purpose of impugning his credibility must relate
and be confined to the general reputation which such witness has in the
community or neighborhood where he lives or has lived. Personal opinions on
the moral character of a witness, being usually too general, sweeping or
subjective, are excluded.
Measured against the foregoing standard, appellant Galingan’s testimony
on the alleged bad character and unreliability as a witness of Naty Panimbaan
deserves no merit. Other than his adverse testimony, Galingan never credibly
established that Naty was reputed in the community or neighborhood to be a
woman of loose morals or a drug user. Clearly, Galingan’s testimony and
evidence concerning Naty’s character was based solely on his own self-
serving claim or private opinion, and did not at all reflect the general
reputation by which Naty was held by the community. We therefore remain
convinced of Naty’s credibility as a witness.
Besides, the credibility of a witness is left primarily to the judgment of the
trial judge. Given the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand,
the trial judge is in a vantage position to assess the witness’ demeanor,
conduct and attitude under grueling examination. [16]

In People vs. De Guzman, we held that:

In the resolution of the factual issues, the Court relies heavily on the trial court for its
evaluation of the witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe
them on the stand, the trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between
fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That
line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal record by the
reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the
truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the
forthright tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in
evasion or looked down in confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has
nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were shed in anger, or
in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying the
case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and
reasoned verdict. (italics ours)
[17]
 Moreover, Galingan failed to substantiate his claim that Naty was driven
by ill will or false motive in testifying against him. His vain attempt to portray
Naty as a “woman scorned by her lover” certainly did not constitute sufficient
reason for Naty to accuse him of a very serious crime where the possible
penalty could either be death or life imprisonment. In fact, the trial court did
not perceive such improper motivation on the part of Naty and the other
prosecution witnesses as would make them falsely implicate appellants in the
commission of the very serious crime. To us, the only plausible motivation for
Naty was her honest desire to speak the truth.
Our established doctrine is that the witness’ testimony deserves full faith
and credit where there exists no evidence to show any dubious reason or
improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why he
should implicate the accused in a serious offense. [18]

More importantly, PO3 Erwil Pastor identified Galingan as the robber who
shot him. In the emergency room of the Eastern Pangasinan District Hospital,
at around 7:00 p.m. on September 2, 1995, Pastor moaned “I might die. I
might die.” in the presence of SPO1 Conrado Hidalgo and SPO4 Emilio
Nagui. Hence, PO3 Pastor’s statements were taken down by SPO1 Hidalgo
who assisted PO3 Pastor in affixing his thumbmark with his own blood:
Q Who shot you?
A Bong Galingan, x x x [19]

Under Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, the declaration of a

dying person with the consciousness of impending death may be received in
any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause
and the surrounding circumstances of such death. There are four requisites
which must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible:
(1) it must concern the crime and surrounding circumstances of the
declarant’s death; (2) at the time it was made, the declarant was under the
consciousness of an impending death; (3) the declarant was competent as a
witness; and (4) the declaration is offered in any criminal case for homicide,
murder or parricide in which the declarant was the victim. [20]

(1) The first requisite is present in the ante-mortem statements of

deceased PO3 Pastor. Certainly, the narration made by Pastor at the
hospital’s emergency room before SPO1 Hidalgo and SPO4 Nagui concerned
the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death. The two
policemen heard from the declarant’s own lips his utterance of the name
“Bong Galingan” as his assailant. This fact was even testified to by these
policemen.
 (2) The declarant, at the time he gave the dying declaration, was
conscious of his impending death. PO3 Pastor knew at the time he was being
questioned that his chances of recovery were nil. In fact, he uttered the words,
“I might die. I might die.” to signify his perception that death was forthcoming.
(3) PO3 Pastor, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was
competent as a witness. This fact is too obvious to warrant further discussion.
(4) The dying declaration of PO3 Pastor was offered as evidence in a
criminal case for robbery with homicide in which the declarant was the victim.
Indubitably, PO3 Pastor’s dying declaration is complete in the sense that it
was a full expression of all that he wanted to say with regard to the
circumstances of his death. An ante-mortem statement is evidence of the
highest order. It is doctrinal that, when a person is at the point of death,
[21]

every motive of falsehood is silenced. The mind is induced by the strongest

[22]

of reasons to speak the truth – the declarant’s impending meeting with his
Creator.
Insofar as Ricky Mendoza is concerned, the evidence likewise confirms
his responsibility for the offense. He was positively identified by prosecution
witness Rimas as one of the men who alighted from the jeep, barged into the
Masterline Grocery and shot his way out therefrom. Naty Panimbaan also
positively confirmed his participation in the crime. More than that, as shown
by the records, Mendoza flew the coop after he was arraigned and remains at
large up to the present. Flight from justice is evidence of guilt.
The existence of conspiracy in this case cannot be doubted. The rule is,
whenever homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who take part as principals in the robbery will also be held
guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.[23]

While we are convinced that appellants are guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of robbery with homicide, we cannot impose the penalty of death on
them. Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery
[24]

carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In imposing the death

penalty, the trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of band,
evident premeditation, craft and disguise against appellants. However, these
circumstances were not specifically alleged in the information as required
under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Hence, inasmuch as no aggravating and mitigating circumstances can be
deemed to have attended the commission of the offense, the lower penalty
of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on them.
 On the award of damages, this Court modifies the amounts as well as the
designations thereof. Thus, appellants Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan
alias “Bong” and accused Ricky Mendoza alias “Leo” must in solidum restore
to Ysiong Chua his lost valuables, and if impossible to do so, must pay him as
reparation the amount of P26,000, plus the P81,000 in cash he lost, as actual
damages. They should also pay the heirs of PO3 Erwil Pastor P50,000 as civil
indemnity for his death as this is in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. In
[25]

addition, the heirs of PO3 Pastor are entitled to P25,000 as temperate

damages in lieu of actual damages, pursuant to the case of People vs.
Abrazaldo. However, we cannot award moral damages to the heirs of PO3
[26]

Pastor because of their failure to present any proof or testimony that they
suffered anguish and distress as a result of his death.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Appellants Emilio Comiling, Geraldo Galingan and accused
Ricky Mendoza are hereby found guilty of robbery with homicide and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
They are also ordered to return to Ysiong Chua his lost valuables, and if
this cannot be done, to pay him in solidum its value of P26,000 as
reparation, plus P81,000 which was the amount of the cash stolen, as actual
damages, and to pay the heirs of PO3 Erwil Pastor P50,000 as civil indemnity
and P25,000 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.