LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner vs COURT OF APPEALS, defendant

GR No. 112019. January 4, 1995

Facts:

Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the
couple when quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s
parents into their marital affairs. On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States.
Leouel was then unable to communicate with her for a period of five years and she had
then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help
and support. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated
and must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological
incapacity on the part of Julia.
 178. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
FACTS: Right against cruel and unusual punishment
Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray was charged and convicted for the crime of raping his ten-year old daughter. The
crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during which time Republic Act No. 7659, commonly known
as the Death Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted out the supreme penalty
of death.

In appealing the conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law as being severe and excessive,
cruel and unusual in violation of the constitution. He invokes the ruling in Furman vs. Georgia wherein the US
Supreme Court categorically ruled that death penalty is cruel and degrading. He also argues that death is an
excessive and cruel punishment for a crime of rape because there is no taking of life in rape. He invokes the ruling
in Coker vs. Georgia which said that while rape deserves serious punishment, it should not involve the taking of
human life. In rape, life is not over for the victim. Death penalty should only be imposed where the crime was murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel and unusual punishment.

HELD: NO. The penalty is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In the US case of Kemmler, it was held that
punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It implies there something inhuman,
barbarous, something more than the extinguishment of life. It is degrading if it involves public humiliation. The
severity is not sufficient, but must be disproportionate to the crime committed. Excessiveness is measured by 1)
seriousness of the crime, 2) policy of the legislative, 3) perversity of the accused.

The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so much the death penalty itself, but the arbitrariness pervading the
procedures by which the death penalty was imposed by the jury. It was nullified because the discretion in which the
statute vested in trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters, guidelines, or
standards.

With regard to the case of Coker vs. Georgia, the SC held that this case has no bearing on Philippine experience and
culture. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a
tooth for a tooth". But, the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence of the death
penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous
crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual
threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing
so.

RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are heinous crimes – crimes punished with death are those that are
grievous, odious, and hateful by reason of inherent viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those that are repugnant
and outrageous to common standards of norms and decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society.
They also include crimes which are despicable because life is callously taken, or the victim is treated as an animal or
dehumanized.
PEOPLE vs. GENOSA, G.R. No. 135981, January 15
2004.
1. People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa, appellant
herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter, Ben
changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant
testified that every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes beat
her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial.
On the night of the killing, appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant.
However, appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with
the use of a gun. The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of
death of the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and
defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed
the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION
praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of
the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the
inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review
or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists
and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the
appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on
the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the
trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting
self defense.
2. Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense and in defense of her fetus; and

3. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling:

1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered
woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to
do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate
relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must
go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship
with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence,”
which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the battered
woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in
the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,
based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present
case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing
the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but
appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through
a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the
cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right
of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-
defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face a
real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-defense must
concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden
and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the
present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom. During that
time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the
danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken
in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the
batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her
psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power
without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is
committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts
or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this circumstance, the
following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a
condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity.
 2. No.
The Revised Penal Code provides the following requisites of self-defense, to wit: 1) unlawful
aggression; 2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and 3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the
most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack — or
an imminent danger thereof — on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, and
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw
from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently
ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had
ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or
safety.

3. No.

It is a rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be

appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to
appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously
and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk
from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. There is no showing, though, that
the present appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully attacking her husband
without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it
appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when
she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. In the absence of any convincing proof that she
consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to
ensure its execution, this Court resolves the doubt in her favor.
 Calalang v. Williams

Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July17, 1940, resolved to

recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the
following for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to
traffic:

1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street from
7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and

2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street toEchague
Street from 7 am to 11pmThe Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18,
1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in
pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said
Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and Communication
to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and traffic on
national roads. On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the
approval of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the
recommendations on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of
Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As
a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.

Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the
provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with
legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of
locomotion?

2)Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people?

Held:

1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid
obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting
said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience
and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a
menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the
said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which
should not be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy.
Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preserving.

2) No. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,
but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored
principles of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice must be founded on the
recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers and diverse units of a
society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups
as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number.

ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor
atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to
insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the
maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the
existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema
lex. Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of
interdependence among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social
and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the
greatest good to the greatest number."
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The
first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila),
of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant
(respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources
(DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further
asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the
ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the
court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal
right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The
Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of
the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the
DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title
XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code
of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and
have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and
all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty
to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to
respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain
that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded
jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the
wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid
for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the
non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated
by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit

by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC
decision is SET ASIDE.
Facts:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic

Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional
and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
The cyberspace is a boon to the need of a current generation for greater
information and facility of communication. But all is not well with the
system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would
want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them
can, for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation
of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements against him
that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communication

from others, the ill-motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft
by hacking into or surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card
or defrauding him through false representations.

The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet.

For these reasons, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use
of cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings. The government
certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from
happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention
Act.

But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their
constitutional rights.
 Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on
February 5, 2013, the Court extended the original 120-day temporary
restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining
respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law
until further orders.

ISSUEs:

1. The petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny
standard required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the
people. Is Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access unconstitutional?
2. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while
is seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected
speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these
guaranteed freedoms.
3. Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal
protection clause in that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user
using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take
the name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary device.
4. Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due
process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of
the press.
5. Petitioners claim that cybersex violates the freedom of expression clause of
the Constitution.
6. Petitioners are wary that a person who merely doodles on paper and
imagines a sexual abuse of a 16-year old is not criminally liable for
producing child pornography but one who formulates the idea on his laptop
would be.
7. Is Section 4(c)(3) unconstitutional for penalizing the transmission of
unsolicited commercial communications?
8. Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on
libel as well as Section4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on
cyberlibel.
9. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally
liable any person who wilfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts
 to commit any of the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.
10. Is Section 6 on the penalty of one degree higher constitutional?
11. Is Section 7 on the prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) and RA 10175 constitutional?
12. Is Section 8 valid and constitutional?
13. Is Section 12 on Real-Time collection of traffic data valid and
constitutional?
14. Is Section 13 on preservation of computer data valid and
constitutional?
15. Is Section 14 on disclosure of computer data valid and constitutional?
16. Is Section 15 on search, seizure and examination of computer data
valid and constitutional?
17. Is Section 17 on destruction of computer data valid and constitutional?
18. Is Section 19 on restricting or blocking access to computer data valid
and constitutional?
19. Is Section 20 on obstruction of justice valid and constitutional?
20. Is Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC) valid and constitutional?
21. Is Section 26(a) on CICC’s power and functions valid and
constitutional?

Held

1. No. The strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, is

useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class
of things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative classification
that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or
operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the
application of the strict scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like
speech, is involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act –
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is a universally
condemnable act.
2. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means
that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected speech. Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all.
It simply punishes what essentially is a form of vandalism, the act of wilfully
destroying without right the things that belong to others, in this case their
computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such act
has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. Ergo, there is no freedom to
destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. All penal
laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an inherent chilling effect,
an in terrorem effect, or the fear of possible prosecution that hangs on the
heads of citizens who are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is
proper. But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they
instil such kind of fear is to render the state powerless in addressing and
penalizing socially harmful conduct.
3. No, the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(6) is baseless. The
law is reasonable in penalizing the act of acquiring the domain name in bad
faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-
motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. It is the evil
purpose for which one uses the name that the law condemns.
4. No. In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into
these zones of privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that
expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The
law punishes those who acquire or use identifying information without right,
implicitly to cause damage. Petitioners fail to show how government effort
to curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and
correspondence as well as the right to due process. There is no fundamental
right to acquire another’s personal right. The Court has defined intent to gain
as an internal act which can be established through overt acts of the offender,
and it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining
to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part
of the perpetrator. As such, the press, whether in the quest of news reporting
or social investigation, has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is
present to negate intent to gain which is required by this Section.
5. The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands
a construction that makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business
of maintaining, controlling, or operating, directly or indirectly, the
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a
computer system as Congress has intended.
6. The constitutionality of Section 4(c)(3) is not successfully challenged. The
law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of
penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a rational basis for such
higher penalty.
7. Yes, because to prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a
person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of speech which
us not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other
constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled
to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Thus, unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
8. Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel
against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter
standard of malice to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the
offended party is a public figure. The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation
of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.There
is actual malice or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory
statement with the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard used here
required a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published.
Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to establish actual malice.
The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the statement turns out
to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a
public figure. But, where the offended party is a private individual, the
prosecution need not prove the presence of actual malice. For his defense,
 the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the defamatory
statement even if it was in fact true.
9. A governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of cyberspace
communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of
mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep,
invading the area of protected freedoms. If such means are adopted, self-
inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments await internet users
will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues. Democracy will
be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide reasonably
clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The terms “aiding or abetting”
constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express
themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes “aiding or abetting”
libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
10. Yes, because there exists a substantial distinction between crimes
committed through the use of information and communication technology
and similar crimes committed using other means. In using the technology in
question, the offender often evades identification and is able to reach far
more victims or cause greater harm.
11. The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct
application of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under
both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, with
the exception of the crimes of:
1.
1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal
Code constitutes a violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy; as well as
2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and
Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also
constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to
these, is void and unconstitutional.
12. Valid and constitutional, because the matter of fixing penalties for the
commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative.
13. Void and unconstitutional, because Section 12 does not permit law
enforcement authorities to look into the contents of the messages and
uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient. Thus, the authority that
Section 12 gives law enforcement agencies is too sweeping and lacks
restraint.
14. Valid and constitutional, because the user ought to have kept a copy
of that data when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. There was no
undue deprivation of property since the data that service providers preserve
on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made accessible to users by
reasons of the issuance of such orders.
15. Valid and constitutional, because what Section 14 envisions is merely
the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant. Disclosure can be made only
after judicial intervention.
16. Valid and constitutional, because Section 15 merely enumerates the
duties of law enforcement authorities that would ensure proper collection,
preservation, and use of computer system or data that have been seized by
virtue of a court warrant.
17. Valid and constitutional, because it is unclear that the user has a
demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of data
saved indefinitely for him in its storage system.
18. Void and unconstitutional, because Section 19 not only precludes any
judicial intervention but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines
established to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
19. Valid and constitutional insofar as it applies to the provisions of
Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.
20. and 21. Valid and constitutional, because cybercrime law is complete
in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. The law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow
when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.