Comparative Political Studies

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The Foreign Policy of Zambia: An Events Analysis of a New State

Timothy M. Shaw
Comparative Political Studies 1978 11: 181
DOI: 10.1177/001041407801100203

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 THE FOREIGN POLICY
O F ZAMBIA
An Events Analysis of
a New State

TIMOTHY M. S H A W
Dalhousie University

S tudies in the foreign policies of new states have reached a turning

point. We now have several examinations of individual new states
in world politics (Butwell, 1969; Schou, 1971; Vital, 1968), but the
majority of these are methodologically unsophisticated. Moreover,
comparative foreign policy analysis for such countries remains prob-
lematic because of the multiplicity of different assumptions and ap-
proaches. Clearly we need a common, collective “paradigm” within
which to work so that both comparisons, replication and testing can be
undertaken (McGowan and Shapiro, 1973). Meanwhile, further
insights may be generated through the use of events data. This essay
uses events data on the foreign policy of one African state-Zambia-
in an attempt to describe, explain, understand, and, perhaps, predict
its foreign policy. Such an approach to analysis may help studies of new
states’ foreign policies to turn the corner and become more rigorous,
sophisticated, and comparative.

AUTHORS NOTE n2e author is very grateful for the research assislaace of Diane
Pothier and Paul Burdett, made possible by a grant from the Research Development
Fund of the Faculty of Graduate Studies. Dalhousie University. He is also appreciative of
the encouragement and stimulation of Douglas Anglin. Robert Molteno. and Don
Munton, and for the critical comments of Patrick AfcGowan. Don Munton, and Jona-
than Wilkenfeld. This article was originally presented at the annual conference of the
Canadian Political Science Association at Edmonton in June 1975.
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES,Vol. 1 I No. 2, July 1978
0 1978 Sage Publications. Inc.
[I821 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

This collection and analysis of Zambian events data, then, has three
main objectives. First, these data provide a quantitative overview of
Zambia’s foreign relations; they indicate what Zambia was doing and
with whom over what issues. Second, these events data can be used to
either support or challenge orthodox assumptions and generalizations,
based on more traditional modes of analysis, about the nature of
Zambia’s foreign relations. And finally, Zambian events data may
contribute to the generation of both global and local events data
sources and so advance the debate over the validity, reliability, and
drawbacks of this method of inquiry (Shaw and Anglin, forthcoming).
Therefore, this work is primarily a case study of the foreign relations
of one new African state; but such a study invariably raises, and relates
to, other empirical, theoretical, methodological, and even political
questions.
We are particularly concerned here, then, with discovering the
content of Zambia’s external relations, comparing our findings with
the established wisdom about Zambia’s foreign policy, and also with
reinforcing the trend within the events data “movement” toward the use
of local rather than “universal” data sources. We agree with East
(1974: 22), that the former are rich and “that significant advances could
be made in both our knowledge of Africa and our theories of foreign
policy analysis by undertaking further events data research on African
and other small, less modern states.” Indeed, as he and others point out,
relatively simple descriptive and analytic work on African international
relations using events data on particular African states may be more
appropriate and useful at this time than the more sophisticated manipu-
lation of other varieties of empirical data (East, 1975; Kegley et al.,
1975). Certainly, the limited data presented here and their modest
statistical manipulation indicate that our findings are only tentative.
Nevertheless, this article may point up the utility of events data for
the study of new state foreign policies. Such research a t least creates
the potential for later comparative and sophisticated analysis.

ZAMBIA EVENTS DATA

The data presented in this article are based on clippings taken from
the two daily newspapers published in Zambia during the period
October 1, 1973 to July 31, 1974. One of the two, the Zambia Daily
 Shaw / ZAMBIA [I831

Mail, is owned by the government of the Republic of Zambia, while the

Times of Zambia was then owned by the Lonrho corporation and other
private interests; in 1975 it was nationalized and ownership trans-
ferred to the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP).
Both papers are of a distinctly high quality compared to most African
dailies, in terms of reporting and production. Although both, of course,
operate under constraints, they were (and are) more free and critical
than most papers on the continent. They provide an unusually compre-
hensive source for events data as most papers elsewhere in Africa are
less reliable in terms of coverage and appearance. The two Zambian
dailies are certainly treated as authoritative by both bureaucrats and
attentive publics within and concerned with Zambia; and compared
with other national, regional or global sources they seem to capture
most Zambian events. They both appeared six times each week, with
the Times being published as the only Sunday paper, The Sunday
Times of Zambia.
These newspaper reports yielded 1,383 events for the 10-month
period, almost four events per day.’ The Zambia Events Data (ZED)
file was created by coding events following the rules of our “Zambia
Events Data (ZED) Coding Manual” (Shaw and Burdett, 1975) which
was largely based on the established World Events Interaction Survey
procedures; some 18 items of information were coded for each event.2
Although the period covered is quite short, it yielded a rich collection of
events data, especially when compared to the fewer Zambian events
captured by other files. Over three years (1964-1966), the AFRICA
project found 969 Zambian events, but CREON yielded only 173events
over 120 months while WEIS records just 99 events for Zambia over
42 months (Shaw and Anglin, forthcoming). Moreover, although the
period was characterized by an absence of crises in the region (unlike
the November 1965 and January 1973 crises over Rhodesia), the distri-
bution of targets, behavior, issue areas, and actors is characteristic
of Zambia’s foreign policy since its independence in October 1964.
Zambia has been a remarkable stable polity and society in its first
decade (Tordoff, 1974), despite the problems of southern Africa, its
dependence on copper, and internal inequalities (Shaw, 1976~).We can
therefore take this period to be reasonably representative of Zambia’s
foreign relations over time; the relative shortness of the period covered
is compensated for by the richness of the local data (Shaw and Anglin,
forthcoming). Given the persistence of dependence and underdevelop-
[I841 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

ment, most external interactions of new states are quite stable, despite
apparent shifts in rhetoric (Shaw, 1976d).
These ZED data have been manipulated using cross-tabulations to
both describe and analyze the foreign policy of Zambia. They have also
been processed to evaluate the utility of, on the one hand, general
approaches to the international behavior of new statesand, on the other
hand, the conclusions of scholars using orthodox methods about the
foreign policy of Zambia. The present case study is essentially con-
cerned with Zambia in world politics, but it may also be of some rele-
vance to broader issues of material and method. This research has, in
particular, been stimulated by the innovative work of East (1973 and
1974) on both small countries and the foreign policies of the East
African states, and also by McGowan( l973a, b) on the foreign relations
of African states.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ZAMBIA:

DEPENDENCE OR INTERDEPENDENCE?

The study of foreign policy in Africa is underdeveloped: most analy-

ses have concentrated either on the values of the characteristically
charismatic leader or on the formal structures of foreign policy-making
(Zartman, 1966: 47-85; Kaplan, 1974: 237). However, the elusiveness of
development and the availability of new techniques of analysis have
led to two novel and apparently divergent approaches-to explanations
based on theories of dependence and imperialism on the one hand, and
to quantitative analyses of events, transactions, and national attributes
on the other. This essay suggests that these two contemporary concerns
may be more compatible than they appear at first: events data can be
used to examine, among other propositions, hypotheses about de-
pendence and the impact of international inequality, while a political
economy perspective can, in turn, inform events data and transaction
surveys (McGowan, 1976; Shaw, 1975).
This research is based on the assumption that no single mode of
analysis will yield exhaustive results, but rather that several different
methods of inquiry are needed to achieve a comprehensive perspective
and understanding. Other analyses of the foreign policy ofZambia have
used a variety of techniques and approaches; here we evaluate their
descriptiveness and accuracy through the use of events data.
 Shaw / ZAhlBIA [I851

The case of Zambia has already received significant attention. The

diversity of approaches used to examine and explain its foreign policy
include historical description (Bone, 1973a, b; Hall, 1973; Pettman,
1974), dyadic studies (Anglin, 1970, 1971; Hill, 1973; Mutukwa, 1975;
Shaw, 1977a, b), transaction analysis (Ballance, 1971; Anglin, 1973,
1976), decision-making (Lubetsky, 1967; Martin, 1975; Mtshali, 1971,
1975; Shaw, 1976b), geo-politics, especially its role in southern Africa
(Anglin, 1975, 1977; Mtshali, 1972, 1973; Mwaanga, 1972; Ostrander,
1967; Shaw, 1976c; Shaw and Mugomba, 1977; Sklar, 1968 and 1974;
Sutcliffe, 1967). the ideology of foreign policy (Mtshali, 1970; Mujaya,
1970; Shaw, 1976a), economic constraints and imperatives (Bostock
and Harvey, 1972; Elliott, 1971; Faberand Potter, 1971; Fortman, 1969;
Markakis and Curry, 1975; Seidman, 1974; Shaw and Mugomba, forth-
coming; Sklar, 1975; Young, 1974) and dependence(Shaw, 1976c, d). In
this article we focus on many of the same phenomena considered
through these other methods, especially on those factors most amenable
to events data research-internal actors, types and patterns of inter-
national behavior, issue areas, and channels of diplomacy.
Our focus on Zambia is both coincidental and fortuitous, not only
because Zambia has been the center for the diplomacy of detente in
southern Africa, but also because it is fairly typical ofa group of"rnidd1e
powers" in the Third World. Its influential role in Africa is one indi-
cation of the growth of inequalities on the continent (Shaw, 1975). So,
findings based on the foreign policy of Zambia may help us explain the
behavior of several leading states in Africa. AFRICA data indicate
that between 1964 and 1966 Zambia was among the most participatory
states in Africa (McGowan and Gottwald, 1975: 485); this activeness
continues and is captured by ZED. Moreover, Zambia also displays a
variety of characteristics typical of an important group of African
states:

the small, less-modern states of black Africa that follow a par-

ticipatory style of promotive foreign policy are relatively large for
their type and they have charismatic leaders who have reduced
cultural linkages with the former metropole [McGowan and
Gottwald, 1975: 4931.
the small, less-modern African state that engaged in relatively high
levels of conflict-type promotive behavior between 1964 and 1966
had some capability for conflict (size plus modernization), it was
[ 1861 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

led by military or socialist leaders, and it had achieved a measure

of cultural independence from its former metropole [McGowan
and Gottwald, 1975: 4951.

Zambia has both a temporal and analytic importance: “Zambia’s

strategic significance in African international relations is considerable”
(Pettman, 1974:7). It has not only been central to the detente coalition
advocating peaceful change in the region (Anglin, 1975; Shaw and
Mugomba, 1977). it has also provided consistent, if somewhat am-
bivalent, support for the liberation movements active in southern Africa
(Anglin, 1977). This assessment of the significance and character of its
foreign policy considers both regional conflict (Collins, 1973;Copson,
1973) and continental diplomacy (Johns, 1972 and 1975). It describes
and analyses the foreign policy of Zambia which is set in an increasingly
unequal continental system (Johns, 1977;Zartman, 1976), as well as in
a global hierarchy of growing complexities, discontinuities, and ine-
qualities (Robertson and Tudor, 1968; Singer, 1972; Spiegel, 1972).
The foreign policy actions of Zambia constitute one of several
simultaneous strategies followed by the regime in an attempt to reduce
the impact of its inheritance of dependence and underdevelopment. The
national goals of independence, development, and regional liberation
have been elusive because of the paucity of power attributes possessed
by this new state. Nevertheless, its essentially promotive foreign policy
style portrayed by these events data can be seen as a continuing struggle
to overcome the constraints and dilemmas of its relative smallness,
poverty, and weakness (East and Hermann, I974), and to establish its
autonomy and identity in international politics. Certainly its foreign
policy is neither passive nor cautious; like many new states it is prepared
to be conflictual in deeds and is particularly concerned with economic
issues (East, 1973).
In this analysis of Zambia’s foreign policy we present findings based
on several of the indicators abstracted, identified, and coded for the
ZED file, and compare these results to the literature on both Zambia’s
external relations and new states in world politics. We turn initially
to the activities of the President and other internal actors in Zambia’s
foreign relations; we then examine Zambia’s role in the region and its
nonalignment in world politics; and we conclude with an analysis of its
use of diplomacy and its ability to take the initiative over both its
national development and the continuing confrontation in southern
Africa.
 Shaw / ZAMBIA [It??]

CHARISMA A N D CONTROL:
THE ROLE OF PRESIDENT KAUNDA
In many new states the successful nationalist leader is also the pri-
mary symbol of the nation. In Zambia, Dr. Kenneth D. Kaundaemerged
as the leader of the dominant nationalist faction (UNIP) during the
struggle for freedom from both the British empire and the settler-
dominated Central African Federation; he is the first and only President
of the new state and led it into a one-party Second Republic in 1973
(Tordoff, 1974). He is also President of UNIP and Commander-in-Chief
of the armed forces; clearly he takes many initiatives on his own(Martin,
1975: 156) and few decisions in Zambia are made without his approval.
His roles as mediator among sectional factions (Hall, 1973) and as the
most visible representative of his country have led to the common
assumption that he dominates the making of Zambia’s foreign policy
(Kaplan, 1974: 237; Pettman, 1974: 37-44).
The characteristic approach to presidential dominance over the
foreign policy of new states is reflected in two generalizations made
by Bone (1973a: 148), that “Kaunda is the dominant figure” and that
“Foreign policy is almost entirely identified with him” (1973a: 131).
These assumptions are also reflected by East and Hermann (1974: 278),
who assert that over significant issues a less developed country “may
resort to head of state involvement more often” than a rich, industrial-
ized state, In Table 1 we present our data on the frequency with which
internal actors participate in Zambia’s foreign policy.3 They serve to
support the proposition of Bone and others (e.g., Zartman, 1966) that
the President dominates the making of foreign policy in Zambia, with
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the parastatals? and the Party also
playing active roles. The primacy of the President is limited, therefore,
pointing to the growing complexities of foreign policy-making in
Africa (Shaw, 1976b).

FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING IN ZAMBIA

COORDINATION A N D PENETRATION
The ranking of internal actors may differ according to issue area.
Students of foreign policy generally suggest that national leaders are
most involved with ”high politics,” whereas routine interactions are
[l88] COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

TABLE 1
Ranking of Internal Actors in Zambia’s Foreign Policy
Actor Specified
Nmber of Times
Responsible for Event ’
Prceident Kaunda 231 3a 1
Minister of Foreign Affairs 117 19 2
Parastatal organisations a7 14 3
President’s Office I State &use 70 12 4
United National Independence Party 57 9 5
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 26 4 6
Economic Ministry 13 2 7

Security Ministry 1 0 8

processed by government ministries and other less central actors.

Rosenau (1966: 149) proposes that the ranking of actors differs some-
what for a “small country, under-developed economy, open polity,
penetrated” according to issue area; in general after systemic variables
the ordering of potency among factors is individual, role, societal and
governmental, with the individual factor being consistently second
in potency and the other three variables differing according to issue
area. Using the ZED categorization of internal actors, a distinction is
made between individual and role variables: that is, between the Presi-
dent and his office. However, we are more interested here in the roles
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries, UNIP and
the burgeoning parastatal sector. In general, analyses of African foreign
policies suggest that the President is most dominant in security and
regional issues and that other government agencies handle “low poli-
tics”; for example, Shaw (1976b: 32-33) proposes that President
Kaunda is most active in the military and political issues of southern
and eastern Africa.
Table 2 presents data on the relative involvement of domestic actors
in Zambia in different external issue areas; it indicates the need for
refinement in treating the dominance of the President, especially in
economic issues. In the increasingly complex Zambian foreign policy
system a division of labor between institutions appears to have been
established based on their respective interests. The President is most
 Shaw / ZAMBIA [I893

TABLE 2
The Involvement of Zambian Actors in International Issue Areas
(row percentages)
Foreip Eccrom.c Para-
Issue Areas PreSidmt Affair3 Pinistq statal UXP Totals

Conventional military 60 37
(N-26) (N-16)
Guerilla varfare 57 30 13 100
(8-54) (N-28) (N-12) (N-94)
Trade and investment 27 22 10 I00
(N-11) (N-9) (L-4) (N-41)
Economic assistance 32 13 - 100
(N-17) (N-7) (N.53)
Technical and scientific 32 13 11 101
(X-15) (N.6) (N-5) (N-47)
Sociacultural 56 20 18 101
(1-34) (X-12) (N-11) (N-61)
Regional cooperation 43 35 - 100
(N.16) “-13) (N-37)
International organisation 56 31 - 100
(N-9) (N-5) (N-16)
Di p lo- tic 65 25 9 100
(N-88) (L.33) (X-12) (a-136)

dominant in security (conventional and guerilla), diplomatic (including

international organization), and sociocultural issue areas. However,
in the three economic issue areas, the parastatals are dominant and
economic ministries most active. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs
seems to be most concerned with military questions and regional and
universal organizations while the party concentrates on sociocultural,
guerilla, and diplomatic issues. This growing complexity highlights
the problems of coordination of a new state’s foreign policy; incom-
patible statements and actions serve to undermine its credibility.
New states often have different priorities from those of older, richer
countries. Their major concerns are reflected not only in the activities
of particular domestic institutions, but also in the overall direction of
behavior. Further, they lack the experience and capabilities of estab-
lished states and so tend to concentrate their activities in particular
issue areas: “those international issues which are directly related to
their economic growth and development will be most salient for small
states” (East, 1973: 560). Because of the scarcity of resources, new
states cannot either monitor or respond to all global issues like major
(1901 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

world actors, so “certain functional and geographic areas must be

emphasized while others are ignored” (East, 1973: 559). Table 3 presents
data on the concentration of Zambia’s behavior in particular issue
areas, and Table 4 looks at the concentration of Zambia’s foreign
policy targets according to region. These two tables provide support
for those propositions which suggest that new state concerns will be
limited to questions of diplomacy, development, and independence,
and that the objects of their actions will be primarily at the regional
level or centers of economic exchange: most of Zambia’s foreign policy
is directed at Africa and Europe. These data help to further substantiate
the assumptions made by students of subordinate state systems (Zart-
man, 1976), as well as those held by proponents of theeconomicimpera-
tives of statecraft (Shaw and Mugomba, 1977, forthcoming). There
is inevitably a tension between the possibilities of regional integration
and the necessities of continued exchange with industrialized countries;
this dilemma is reflected in the concentration of Zambia’s foreign
policy according to both issue and region.
Table 3 provides partial support for East’s proposition about the
economic imperatives of new states, but tends to disconfirm his sug-
gestion that small states “have a higher proportion of events involving
economic bureaucracies than do large states” (1973: 574). In Zambia,

TABLE 3
The Concentration of Zambia’s Foreign Relations in Issue Areas
Issue Area Number of Events X Ranking

Diplomatic 217 17 1

Technical and Scientific 209 16 2

Guerilla warfare 183 14 3

Socfo-cultural 172 13 4
Economic assistance 142 11 5

Trade and.investment 133 11 6

Regional cooperation 130 10 7
Conventional military 62 5 a
International organisation 52 4 9
 Shaw / ZAMBIA [I911

economic ministries and parastatals account for a relatively small

proportion of its external behavior, although their concerns are con-
centrated in economic issue areas. Table 4 serves to reinforce the
ambiguous results obtained by East and Hermann (1974: 279,297) on
the propensity of small states to engage in collective, cooperative
behavior through international coalitions and organizations. Never-
theless, despite the lag in implementation, Zambia has used its inter-
national associations in an attempt to diversify its relations and so
reduce the impact of its inherited dependence.

NONALIGNMENT AND DEPENDENCE:

ZAMBIA IN WORLD POLITICS

Zambia, in common with most new states, claims to be nonaligned;

however, it inherited an economy and society which were dependent
both on the former metropole, Britain, and on the Western economic
system. It has attempted to diversify its pattern of external linkages,
if not its commodity exports which remain dominated by copper
(Martin, 1975; Shaw, 1976d). In particular, Zambia has eliminated
trade and other relations with Rhodesia since UDI (Anglin, 1976;
Sklar, 1974). However, there has been a conflict, at least in the medium
term, between its policies toward southern Africa and its general con-
cern for nonalignment: "Disengagement is beginning to conflict with
the aims of diversification" (Anglin, 1973: 102). To maintain the
profitability of its crucial copper industry, Zambia has increased its
TABLE 4
The Concentration of Zambia's Foreign Relations
in International Regions
T a r g e t s by Region Nmber of E v e n t s X Ranking

Africa 956 45 1
Europe 452 21 2
Non-regiona1,groups 278 13 3

Asia 169 8 4
Western Hemisphere 154 7 5

Mfddle East 117 6 6

[192] COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

dependence on South Africa and Europe and only marginally increased

its trade and other relations with the socialist states (Sklar, 1975; Shaw,
1976d). Most analyses of Zambia’s international relations suggest
that its extracontinental linkages have grown since independence with
a select group of states including Italy, Yugoslavia, Scandinavia,
Canada, and China (Anglin, 1973; Bone, 1973b; Mtshali, 1972; Pett-
man, 1974; Shaw, 1977a, b). Using events data, we can discover whether
its behavior has been directed more at this group of states than other
non-African countries and whether it has achieved a position of non-
alignment, or of impartiality or balance, between the two dominant
international coalitions centered on the United States and the Sovict
Union.
Data presented in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that most of Zambia’s
international relations continue to be with Western rather than Eastern
TABLE 5
The Ideology of States with Which Zambia Interacts
in Different Issue Areas (row percentages)
Ideology of Target
Issue Area Western Eastern Nonaligned Totala

Conventional military 29 4 67 100

(N-29) (N-4) (N-66) (N=99)
Guerilla warfare 20 2 78 100
(N-69) (N-7) (N-271) (11-347)
Trade and investment 41 4 55 100
(N=72) (N-7) (N-95) (N-174)
Economic assistance 40 12 40 100
(N-66) (N-19) (N-77) (N-162)
Technical and scientific 50 14 36 100
(N-122) (N-35) (Nx88) (N-245)
Socio-cultural 35 11 54 100
(N-77) “-24) “-117) (N-218)
Regional cooperation 3 2 95 100
04-6) (N-3) (N-175) (N-189)
International organisation 24 4 71 99
(N-17) “-3) (N-50) (N-70)
Diplomatic 29 15 56 100
(N-87) “-46) “-167) (N-300)
 Shaw / ZAhlBIA [I931

TABLE 6
Numbers of Actions by Zambia Directed a t Selected
Target States and Organizations

United Kingdom 128 China 56

United States 81 Soviet Union 24

South Africa 63 Portugal 67

Italy 16 Canada 34
Yugoslavia 28 Sweden 34
Tanzania 104 Zaire 72
Botswana 31 Malawi 46

United Nations 13 Commonwea 1th 20

Organisation for 52 World Bank 13
African Unity

MPLA 30 FRELIMO 40
UNLTA 17

states, and that its “nonalignment” is limited to contacts with China

rather than with the Soviet Union or other Warsaw Pact countries. In
part this reflects China’s benificence, especially in building the Tanzania-
Zambia “Uhuru” Railroad; but it is also indicative of Zambia’s own
perceptions of China as a relevant Third World model, whereas the
Soviet Union is seen as another industrialized state in the northern
hemisphere. As indicated in Table 6, the ex-metropole, Britain, con-
tinues to be the target of most Zambian behavior, with Tanzania being
of increasing importance along with the neighboring white states
(Kaplan, 1974 241). Table 5 reveals the unimportance of the Eastern
bloc in most issue areas, except the economic and diplomatic, whereas
relations with the West are spread throughout all issue areas other than
regional cooperation. The importance of links with the group of non-
aligned states varies between issue areas, but they are concentrated
over select issues such as regional cooperation, security (guerrilla and
conventional), and collective activity in international organizations.
As shown in Table 6, Zambia does have considerable ties with a small
group of relatively disinterested middle powers in the international
system: with Sweden, Canada, and Yugoslavia, as well as with China.
Zambia is also more active in the continental institution-the Organi-
[I941 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

zation of African Unity (0AU)-than in other international organ-

izations
Nonaligned states, despite their characteristic dependence on a few
dominant actors in the international system, may also be less con-
strained by specific external relationships than states which belong to
blocs such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact. East (1973: 557) suggests that
the foreign relations of small states usually include “avoidance of
behavior and policies which tend to alienate the more powerful states
in the system.” The case of Zambia, amongst others, suggests two
modifications to this generalization. First, the “nonalignment” of new
states contains different emphases or “tilts”: the balance of conflictual
and cooperative words and deeds directed at the superpowers varies
depending on the general foreign policy direction of any new state. And
second, although such states are concerned not to alienate the power-
ful, they are nevertheless able to express criticism on occasion, espe-
cially when particular Third World interests are threatened. So, for
instance, they may be highly critical of a particular superpower inter-
vention while in general maintiining a cooperative stance. Such out-
bursts d o not appear t o disturb the overall dyadic relationship; perhaps
the great powers have become able to shrug off the complaints of the
weak.
Zambia’s occasional criticisms of the superpowers do not appear to
disrupt its characteristically cooperative relationship with them.
However, as indicated in Table 7, it does exhibit more frequent and
TABLE 7
Ideology of Target According to Type of WElS Action
(row percentages)

Ideology of Target
Type of WEIS Action Western Eastern Nona tigned Tota 1E

Verbal conflict 36 62 100

(W148) (N=255) (N.412)

Conflictual deeds 50 47 100

(*15) (N=14) (N-30)

Verbal cooperation 2a 62 100

(N-383) (N-863) “-1392)

Cooperative deeds 27 59 100

(H.14) (N-30) (N=51)
 Shaw / ZAMBIA [I951

more conflictual interaction with the Western states than with the
Eastern group. Further, most of its foreign relations seem to consist
of verbal statements rather than actual deeds, although it did make
almost as many conflictual as cooperative deeds. Zambia interacts most
frequently with other Third World states, although the degree of
conflict, both words and deeds, within the nonalignment movement
is surprisingly high. This finding serves to reinforce our skepticism
about the nature and salience of the contemporary nonaligned grouping
except as an expression of general Third World frustrations and
poverty.
We may expect the degree ofdependence or nonalignment ofZambia
in international politics to vary according to issue area. Zambia depends
on the Western states, especially the EEC, for markets, imports, tech-
nology, and investment; it has received some aid and investment from
the socialist states; and it exchanges politkal support within the non-
aligned states’ caucus. It has advocated the development of international
organization and has concentrated its diplomatic resources in Africa
and centers of diplomacy, aid, and trade (Shaw, 1976a, b). It continues
to be dependent on the economies of the Western capitalist system,
so its nonalignment is only partial.
In Table 8 we present ZED data on the distribution of its targets in
different issue areas. They suggest a mixed result: over trade and tech-
nological issues Zambia is dependent on the West; over economic
assistance issues it is more nonaligned to maximize its resources; its
concerns for international organization are divided between the global
and continental levels; and its diplomatic behavior, mainly focused on
southern Africa, again reveals its interest in the maximization of
support for the region’s liberation by adopting a nonaligned, equidistant
stance. Zambia is particularly active in Africa over guerrilla conflict,
regional cooperation, and diplomacy, especially in black Africa rather
than among the Arab states of the Middle East; and its seeks economic
assistance from international organizations as well as from Europe. It
is infrequently concerned with targets in either Asia, the Middle East
or the Western hemisphere; its major focus remains Africa and Europe.
 TABLE 8
Targets of Zambia’s Foreign Policy According to Issue Area (row percentages)
Region of Targct
Western Middle Non-regional
Issuc Area Hemisphere Europc Africa East Asia Groupings Totals
Conventional m i l i t a r y 4 17 50 3 12 101
(N=4) (Nile) (N=53) (N=3) (Nn13) (N1107)

G u e r i l l a warfare 1 18 70 1 8 100
(Nm3) (N=70) (N=266) (N=2) (E=32) (N=381)

Trade and investment 12 17 35 10 14 100

(N-125) (N=34) (N=71) (N=20) (N-29) (N-204)

Economic a s s i s t a n c e 12 33 21 6 22 99
(N=25) (N=66) (N-42) (N=12) (Nn45) “1201)
Technical and s c i e n t i f i c 17 33 17 15 17 100
(Nu481 (N=92) (N=48) (N=41) (Nu471 (N-280)

Socio-cultural 8 28 34 12 10 100
(N=19) (N=64) (Nn78) (Nm27) (N=23) (N=230)

Regional cooperation 1 2 81 2 12 101

(N=1) (NP4) (Na174) (N-4) (Nm25) (N=214)

I nt e r na t i ona l organisation 3 11 37 10 35 100

(N=3) (N=10) (N-35) (N=9) (N-33) (Nn94)

Diplomatic 7 24 42 13 7 100
(N=22) (Nm74) (N-131) (N-39) (N-2 2 ) (Nu3091
 Shaw / ZAMBIA 11971

ZAMBIA AS A ”MIDDLE POWER”

IN CENTRAL AFRICA

The rends oward inequalities and regionahation in world politics

mean that most states are regional rather than global actors; that is,
much of their external interaction is concentrated in a subordinate
state system which includes their neighbors. Zambia has been par-
ticularly involved in providing support for the liberation movements of
southern Africa (Anglin, 1977; Hall, 1973), and in disengagement from
southern Africa and integration with eastern Africa (Anglin, 1976;
Ballance, 1971; Mtshali, 1973; Pettman, 1974). It has thus played two
important roles-that of “host” state, providing facilities for national-
ists from minority-ruled states, and that of “core” for advancing infra-
structural and industrial integration in central Africa (Shaw, 1976a, e).
Zambia is one of several “middle” (or “minor”) powers,

which play leading roles in the international relations of their

own subordinate systems, either through regional activities or
independent policies. . . [they] attempt to alter, in their own favor,
the direction of domestic and foreign policies in some countries
within their region [Spiegel, 1972: 1051.

Whilst we can accept Bone’s proposition that “Geography is perhaps

the most crucial determinant of Zambia’s foreign policies” (Bone,
1973a: 123), we question whether Zambia is at the same time“strategi-
a l l y insignificant” (p. 124). It has been an important, if somewhat
ambivalent, base territory for the freedom fighters and it was the center
for negotiations to end conflict and advance detente in southern Africa
(Shaw and Mugomba, 1977, forthcoming). In the future, it may become
the industrial and communications core for central Africa. In Table 9
we present our findings on the importance of regional interaction for
Zambia and on the distribution of regional events in each issue area.
ZED data indicate that Zambia is concerned mainly with guerrilla
warfare issues in its relations with the white regimes and the liberation
movements; it also acts in the diplomatic and conventional military
issue areas against Rhodesia and South Africa. By contrast, Zambia
concentrates on regional cooperation and economic issues in its rela-
tions with neighboring independent black states, especially with
Tanzania, Zaire, and Malawi.
(1981 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

TABLE 9
Targets of Zambia’s Actions in Africa in Different Issue Areas:
A Partial Listing

Ivory Coast - 1 - - 3 4
Liberia - 2 - 2 - 1 1 6 12
Nigeria
-
-
4
1
-
2
-
1
- 1
1 3
2
4
-
12
7
Congo (B)

Zaire
Uganda
1
6
2
9
1
2
-
9
7 4

1
-53 12
1
3 1 1
21
6
11
5
7
1
4
58
9
0
Kenya
Tanzania 4 9 IS 5 8 8 32 12 91
Wlaul - 2 7 2 4 1 1 2 1 2 4 0
Botswana - 9 4 - 1 9 6 2 7

Angola 2 12 -1 -
-
1
3
-
3
3
3
4
3
2
2
2
9
Horambique 1 1 5
Rhodesia I7 19 3 3 2 12 4 15 75
South Africa 9 20 5 2 2 12 3 10 61
Namibia 2 2 - 1 1 2 2 2 12

OAU
EAC
5
-1
1 3
1
7
4
-
4 1
1
1
2
2
--
9
6
-
1
1
-5 0
14
9
5

-- --
ZAPU
mv -1 11
27
1
-
- 11 3

-- --
HPLA 1 - 2 8
UNITA 14 - 1 2 1 7
FRELIUO 32 - 6 38

Totals for 50 192 67 28 34 61 149 98 679

African issue
areas

These data indicate that Zambia displays a high level of both eco-
nomic cooperation and political conflict in the region because of the
distinctive characteristics of the southern and central African sub-
systems, respectively. Relations with Tanzania have developed rapidly
and now cover several issues and institutions; ZED and other data
(Anglin, 1976; Shaw, 1976b) provide support for the proposition that
“Relations with Tanzania have been the most specific, wide-ranging
and friendly of all Zambia’s contacts” (Bone, 1973a: 141) and that
“Zambia’s strongest fraternal ties are to the United Republic of Tan-
zania” (Kaplan, 1974: 241). As indicated in Table 6, Tanzania is second
only to the United Kingdom as the most frequent target of Zambia’s
 Shaw / ZAMBIA [I991

foreign policy; Table 9 suggests that this dyadic relationship indeed

covers all issue areas.
However, because of its opposition to racism and to express its
own policy of Humanism (Hall, 1973; Mtshali, 1972; Shaw, 1976a, d),
Zambia has also been very conflictual in its immediate region. ZED
data for this period do not provide support for the proposition that
“small developing states have the lowest percentage of conflict be-
havior” (East, 1973: 571), other events data on Zambia would also
challenge this generalization (Shaw and Anglin, forthcoming). As
indicated in Table 10, most conflict is directed by Zambia at the white
regimes, whereas most cooperation is with neighboring black states,
although significantly there is also some cooperation with the white
states and some conflict with the black regimes. These ZED data
provide support for Sklar’s assertion that Zambia is concerned with
national interests as well as with regional liberation in determining
the “mixture of liberationist principle and realpolitik" (Sklar, 1974:
362) in its foreign relations.
The pattern of actor involvement also tends to be divided along this
cleavage between white- and black-ruled Africa. State House and
Foreign Affairs are most concerned with the confrontation in the south,
while UNIP, Foreign Affairs, and the parastatals concentrate on
regional cooperation with independent African states (Shaw, 1976b:
33; Shaw and Mugomba, 1977; Shaw and Anglin, forthcoming); these
assertions are confirmed by data presented in Table I 1. Further, these
ZED data support the conclusion that “Although southern Africa has
constituted the central focus of Zambian foreign policy, direct support
for liberation movements has formed only one element in a broader
strategy” (Anglin, 1977). This strategy includes active multilateral
diplomacy as well as the cajoling of those industrialized states with
significant interests in the white south (see Tables 5-8). ZED data
capture all of Zambia’s actions whether they express a particular
“national” or a general “African” interest.

ZAMBIA AS A NEW STATE:

MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

Rather than entering an alliance as protection against the white

regimes, Zambia has actively sought support from several international
[200] COMPARATlVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

TABLE 10
The Pattern of Zambia‘s Relations with Africa, According to WEIS
Categories of Action: A Partial Listing (column percentages)

Target State
WEIS Action Category Zaire TmzmiO Rhodesia South Afn’ca

a) Verbal conflict

Negative comment

Accuseldeny

Protest

Reject

Uarn

b) Conflictual deeds

c) Verbal cooperation

Positive comment

Consult

Approve

Positive requestlpropose

Promiselagree

d) Cooperative acts

Country totals 100 100 101 100

(N-67) (N-102) “-74) (N.63)

organizations. It is active in many multilateral institutions, both global

and continental, due t o diplomatic and financial imperatives: “Because
of the relative lack of resources available for foreign affairs, the small
state must seek methods of interaction that are less costly and more
economical” (East, 1973: 560).5 East (1973: 576) also proposes that
“Small states d o tend to minimize the costs ofconductingforeign policy
by initiating more joint actions and by directing influence attempts
 Shaw ZAhfBlA [201]

TABLE 11
Pattern of Zambian Actor Involvement in African Relations

IVOrY COASC 2 - -
-
-- -
- - 2
12
LlbeKiA 9
-1 - - -1 1
Nigeria
congo (a)
1
I 5 1 - 1
1
1
-
3
11

Zaire
Uganda
13
3 -1 6
4
4
-2
1 3
2 -11 29
11
1 1 2 1 4 10
Kenya
3 - 2 2 48
Tanzania
Halavi
20
4
7
1
14
5 2 - 6 1 19
Botwalu 2 1 1 1 1 5 3 16

Angola 5 - 2 1
--- - 1 9
Icozambique 13 1 5 2 4 2s
RhodesiA
South Africa
5
16
9
5
11
3
3
- -- 3
-
5
2
6
33
35
Namibia 3 1 2 3 9

- 2
OAU 15 3 9 3
- -3 35
U C
ZAPU
2

-
--
3
2 -- - -2 3
7
5
WIU
mu 9
-- 3
4
-- -
-
-- 5
2
a
15
UNITA
FRELMO
6
15 1
2
7 1 - -.
2
5
10
29

at joint- or multiple-actor targets." In Table 12 we analyze the propor-

tion of Zambia's external events in different WEIS action categories.
These and other data-at least for the case of Zambia (Anglin, 1976;
Bone, 1973b; Pettman, 1974)-undermine East's generalization that
small states usually generate "less verbal behavior and more nonverbal
behavior" than other types of state (East, 1973: 567). In this and other
periods (Shaw and Anglin, 1977), Zambia has engaged in conflictual as
well as cooperative acts. This table also indicates that most of Zambia's
actions are initiated in "closed" or exclusive domestic forums, such
as the UNIP National Council or in local press conferences, rather than
in international arenas or in "open" meetings in Zambia. New states'
foreign policy, including the case of Zambia, is often as elitist as that
of older nations.
Finally, one indicator of a state's dependence or subordination in
world politics is the proportion of events it initiates rather than re-
 TABLE 12
Channels Used by Zambia According to WEIS Action Categories
(row percentages)

Type of WEIS Action

Channe Z VerbaZ Conflictua Z Verba I Cooperative TotaZs
conf t i c t Deeds Cooperation Deeds

Speech to international organisation 17 - 80 3 100

(N=6) (N128) (N=l) (N=35)

'Open' address in Zambia 45 - 55 - 100

(N=18) (N=22) (N-40)

'Closed' address in Zambia 18 2 78

(N=31) W3) (N1138)

Press conference 25 2 71 2 100

(N=104) (N=9) (N=298) (N-7) (N= 418)

Written domestic message 24 1 73 2 100

(N=29) (N=1) (Nu891 (N=3> (N-122)

Statement in National Assembly 33 - 67 - 100

(N-9) (N=18) (N=27)
 Shaw / ZAMBIA 12031

ceives; that is, to what extent its behavior is a response to external or

systemic demands. Table 13 provides support for the proposition that
“a small state with low economic development initiates fewer events
than does a small state with high economic development” (East, 1973:
564). However, the degree of adaptation vanes in the case of Zambia
according to internal actor and issue. The President and the Minister of
Foreign Affairs initiate more events than all other actors; further,
ZED data show that Zambia initiates a higher proportion of political
TABLE 13
Nature of Zambia‘s Response According to Issue Area and Actor

a) Response Related to Issue Area Not a Response Response

Issue Area

Conventional military 4 58

Guerilla varfare 4 179

Trade and investment 8 125
Economic assistance 3 139
Technical and scientific 9 200

Socio-cultural 13 159
Regional cooperation 6 124

International organisation 5 47
Diplomatic 7 210

b) Response Related to Internal Actor Not a Response Response

Actor Specified

President Kaunda 39 192

President’s Office 1 State House 2 68

Minister of Foreign Affairs 14 103

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2 24
Security Ministry - 1
Economic Ministry 13
Parastatal organisation 85
United National Independence Party 50
[204] COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

and security events than of economic events, again reflecting its eco-
nomic dependence and greater degree of political independence or
interdependence.
Most of Zambia’s actions are responses; its initiatives are confined
to four issues-sociocultural, trade and investment, diplomatic, and
regional and global organizations. Most of its immediate concerns-
the liberation of southern Africa, national development, nonalignment,
and regional integration-are concentrated in these issue areas. Its
responses, however, are mainly expressed in the more general or less
salient diplomatic, warfare, and economic issue areas. The President
and Minister of Foreign Affairs usually take initiatives in those areas
of greatest urgency for Zambia: they are less dominant in other areas
of more routine interaction which are characterized by a greater devolu-
tion of responsibility. So Zambia is capable of taking the initiative in
crises or in “high politics,” especially within southern Africa (Anglin,
1970, 1975; Mtshali, 1971; Shaw, 1976e); in regularized “low politics”
it is more dependent and subject to systemic constraints, especially
to those emanating from the rich, dominant, industrialized states.

NEW STATES A N D EVENTS ANALYSIS

This essay on the case of Zambian foreign policy suggests that estab-
lished propositions about new state behavior can usefully be evaluated
through events data. Local sources of such data are particularly rich
(Shaw and Anglin, forthcoming) and provide substantial, reliable,
and valid evidence by which to support or reject generalizations. Our
ZED file may also be used to compare coverage in the two Zambian
newspapers, to contrast local sources with continental (AFRICA) or
global (WEIS and CREON) data sets (Shaw and Anglin, forthcoming),
to prepare graphic illustrations of 2ambia’s“world map,” and to assess
changes in Zambian behavior over time. Hopefully, events data will
both complement and challenge traditional approaches to the study of
African international politics (Shaw, 1975) and so enhance our under-
standing of the foreign policies of new states.
The present very preliminary and tentative analysis of Zambia’s
foreign relations using events data suggests that this mode of quantita-
tive empirical analysis can be profitably employed to both supplement
and examine generalizations of new state behavior derived from more
 Shaw 1 ZAhfBIA [205]

orthodox modes of inquiry. It has yielded some new insights and under-
standing and seems to be an appropriate method of analysis for both
old and new states wherever competent and reliable newspaper cover-
age is available. This type of work also points to differences between
the foreign policies of states in Africa, (East, 1974; McGowan, 1969,
1973a; McGowan and Gottwald, 1975) and to the need for further
research in several traditions, ranging from political economy to
regional interactions. ZED data indicate that the foreign policy of a
new state such as Zambia has more complexity and subtlety than many
analysts would allow; that the targets, actions, and channels of its
external relations are multiple; and that its world role has reached a
definition and maturity to merit serious academic and political attention.

NOTES

1. These events are unwcighted. so two rather disparate events such as receiving a
diplomat’s credentials and complaining about aggression from thesouthare bothcounted
as one event each. Clearly these events are in some sense different, but weighting is in-
evitably an arbitrary procedure and our large N makes it rather unnecessary. In this essay,
as in most events data analyses, relative frequencies are used, although the division of
events into different issue areas m a y serve t o point up the relative importance or unim-
portance of events.
2. No formal scores were made of intercoder reliability, but at several times random
checks by the author have been made of the clippings and coding. T h e straightfonvard-
ness of newspaper reporting in Zambia should have helped reliability and the results
certainly agree in large measure with more informal and common sense analyses of
Zambia’s foreign policy.
3. The ZED data file records up t o three internal actorsand external targets. So totals
for these items may be less, or more, than 1,383 events. as, on the one hand, no particular
actor or target may have been identified or, o n the other hand, up to three of each may
have k e n coded.
4. Parastatal organizations in Zambia (and throughout Africa) are government
agencies which operate in a semi-autonomous manner akin to the nationalized industries
of Britain or the crown corporations in Canada. They may be fully or partially owned
by the state and in Zambia range from the Post Office, Zambia Railways, and Zambia
Airways to the National Commercial Bank, Indcco, and the copper companies (Martin,
1975; Shaw, 1976b, d; Sklar, 1975).
5. On the cost, organization, and problems of Zambia’s diplomatic service see
Mtshali, 1975, and Shaw, 1976b especially pp. 49-63.
I2061 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / JULY 1978

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SHAW. T. M. and P. BURDETT (1975) "Zambia events data (ZED) coding manual."
Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University. (mimeo)
SHAW, T. M. and A. T. MUGOMBA(forthcoming)"Zambia: dependenceanddetente,"
in J. Seiler (ed.) Southern Africa Since the Portuguese Coup.
-- (1977) "The political economy of regional detente: Zambia and southern Africa."
J. of African Studies 4 (Winter): 392-413.
SINGER. M. A. (1972) Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of Inter-
national Relationships. New Y o r k Free Press.
 Shaw / ZAhlBIA [209]

SKLAR, R. L. (1975) Corporate Power in a n African State: The Impact of hlultinational

Mining Companies in Zambia. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- (1974) "Zambia's response to the Rhodesian UDI." pp. 320-362 in W.Tordoff
(ed.) Politics in Zambia. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
- (1968) 'Zambia's response t o UDI." Mawazo 1 (June): 11-32.
SPIEGEL, S. L. (1972) Dominance and Diversity: The International Hierarchy. Boston:
Little, Brown.
SUTCLIFFE. R. B. (1967) "Zambia and the strains of UDI." World Today 23 (Dcccm-
bcr): 506-5 I 1.
TORDOFF. W. [ed.] (1974) Politics in Zambia. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
VITAL, D. (1968) The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International
Relations. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
YOUNG, A. (1973) Industrial Diversification in Zambia. New York Praeger.
ZARTMAN. 1. W. (1976) "Africa," pp- 569-594 in J. N. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson.
G. Boyd (eds.) World Politics: An Introduction. New York: Free Press.
- (1966) International Relations in the N e w Africa. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Timothy hf. Show b Associate Professor of Political Science at Dalhousie Uni-

versity where he is associated with the Centref o r Foreign Policy Srudies. He has
also served as Director of its Centrefor Afiican Studies and is currently Visiting
Associate Professor of Political Science at Carleton University. Dr. Shaw has
contributed journal articles and chapters in the fields of African foreign policy
and political economy, dependence and underdevelopment. Ire is coeditor of
Cooperation and Conflict in Southern Africa, Politics of Africa, Canada,
Scandinavia and Southern Africa, and Conflict and Change in Southern Africa.
 ANNOUNCEMENT
The British Politics Group intends t o issue the third edition of its Register of
Current Research in early 1979. The Research Register lists ongoing work on any
aspect of British politics. Scholars who are not members of the Group but who
wish t o be included in the Register should contact William D. Muller, Editor,
BPG Research Register. c / o Political Science Department, SUNY. Fredonia,
NY 14063 by early fall 1978. Copies of the Register will be sent t o members of the
British Politics Group in early 1979. Nonmembers may purchase a copy from
Jorgen Rasmusscn. Executive Secretary, BPG, c / o Political Science Department,
Iowa State University, Amcs. IA 5001 I.

ANNOUNCEMENT
The International Political Science Association Research Committee o n
Legislative Development will be sponsoring two panels at the next IPSA Congress
scheduled t o be convened in Moscow in August 1979. Proposals for papers are
hereby invited. However, those submitting proposals should be aware that there
can be only three papers presented at each panel. In addition t o the quality of the
proposal, the need for geographical representativeness o n the panels also will
be a criterion for selection.
The theme of one panel will be ”Legislative Proccsscs and Innovations in
Comparative Perspective.” Papers for this panel should be concerned with some
aspect of the internal workings of legislatures. Papers may analyze current pro-
cesses or structures. they may focus o n recent or contemplated reforms, or both.
The theme of the second panel will be “Legislatures and Societal Change in
comparative Perspective.” Papers for this panel should be concerned with the
relationships between legislative activities and change in their external environments
-social, political, and/or economic.
Proposals for papers should provide as much detail as possible and should be
forwarded t o the committee’s Chairman, Professor Allan Kornberg. Department
of Political Science, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706. Invitations to prepare
papers will be issued in the autumn of 1978.