018 Cruz v.
Castillo (BRUZON) Issue: W/N the child is entitled to support from the date of the filing of the
30 June 1969 | Capistrano, J. | Support
PETITIONER: Belen Cruz
RESPONDENTS: Exequiel Castillo
SUMMARY: From Oct 4 to Nov 13, 1959, Cruz lived as housemaid for
the Anselma de leon, the mother of the defendant and the defendant also
live there. They were both single. On Oct. 5, 1959, the defendant father had
sexual intercourse with Cruz throught by force and threat that he would kill
her if she did not accede to his wishes. They also had sexual intercourse on
Oct. 12, 21, and 23, 1959 but these were done without force. On July 11,
1960, Cruz gave birth to a child which was baptized Anselma Armi Castillo.
When Anselma de Leon, the mother of the defendant, noticed that she was
conceiving, she drove Cruz away. She was asked at first to go to the market
'to sell' (to attend to the store of defendant's mother) and during her absence
one of the sons of the mother of the defendant was ordered to bring all her
belongings to the house of the brother of the defendant's mother. The
baptismal certificate of the child shows that Edgardo Castillo, who is the
brother of the defendant, stood as one of the sponsors. She demanded from
the defendant father the support for her child in the amount of P40.00 a
month but the defendant refused to give support to her child. To maintain
her child, she used to sell assorted goods in the market. Defendant father is
now married and they own a big store in the public market with a car of
their own and a television set. Cruz’s poorly drafted complaint stated a
cause of action by the mother representing her recognized natural child for
compulsory recognition and support of the child by the defendant father.
The acknowledging parent who exercises parental authority over the
acknowledged natural child (Article 311, Civil Code) has the duty to
represent the child in all actions which may redound to the child's benefit
(Article 316[1]). Code Commission: “The duty of the parents to represent
their unemancipated children in all actions which may redound to their
benefit was revived by the Code Commission in order to maintain the
principle of family solidarity consecrated in the new Code." The father’s
answer denied paternity of the child and liability to support said child. Trial
Court gave credence to the evidence of Cruz declaring Anselma Armi
Castillo the natural child of defendant Exequiel Castillo and ordering
Castillo to pay P30.00 per month as support for the child from the date of
filing of the complaint. Castillo contends that the lower court erred in
ordering him to give support to the child from date of the filing of the
complaint.
complaint? NO. The fact of the child being natural is distinct from the fact
of the child's recognition. A natural child not recognized by the father has
no rights whatever, not even to support. It is the fact of recognition,
voluntary (Article 278) or compulsory (Article 283), that gives the natural
child the rights of support and succession. The defendant father not having
voluntarily recognized his natural child by any of the means specified in
Article 278 of the Civil Code, he had no obligation to support said child
until after judgment was rendered by the lower court declaring that he was
the father of the child.
The distinct effects of voluntary recognition and compulsory recognition
may be further clarified with examples:
1. The birth certificate giving the names of the unmarried father and mother
of the newly born child was sworn to by both parents. The father refused to
support the child. An action for support (not for recognition) of the child
may be brought against the father founded upon his voluntary act of having
recognized the child in the record of birth.
2. If the father refused to support his natural child and did not recognized
the child in the record of birth then, the child is not entitled to support. A
combined action for compulsory recognition and for support may be
brought against the father, and the court may render judgment ordering the
defendant father to recognize the child as his natural child and to give
support to the child from the date of the judgment. The support should
commence from the date of the judgment because it is the judgment
compelling recognition that gives rights to the child
It is admitted that Anselma Armi Castillo is Castillo's natural child. Navarro
vs. Bacalla: once the fact of paternity of a natural child is found to have
been established by evidence and is no longer disputed by the father, he
should be compelled to recognize the child as his own
The appealed judgment merely declared Anselma Armi Castillo the natural
child of defendant Exequiel Castillo. It should be modified by ordering said
defendant to recognize the child as his natural child and to give the child
support in the sum of P100.00 per month, considering that the child is now
of school age and that the defendant father has the means, from July 27,
1964, the date the lower court's judgment was promulgated
DOCTRINE: If the father did not recognize the child in the record of
birth and the court ordered the father to give suppot, the support
should commence from the date of the judgment because it is the
 judgment compelling recognition that gives rights to the child.
FACTS:
1. On October 4 up to November 13 1959, the Cruz lived as housemaid
in the house of Anselma de Leon, mother of the defendant father, in
the City of Cabanatuan wherein the defendant father also lived.
2. Both Cruz and Castillo are single
3. On October 5, 1959, the defendant father embraced her and by force
and threat she surrendered her womanhood because he would kill her
if she did not accede to the wishes of the defendant; that she had sexual
intercourse with the defendant father on October 5, 12, 21, and 23,
1959
4. On July 11, 1960 Cruz gave birth to a child which was baptized
Anselma Armi Castillo; she gave that name to her child because that
was the name of the baby's grandmother, Anselma de Leon, who is the
mother of the defendant; that when Anselma de Leon, the mother of
the defendant, noticed that she was conceiving, she drove the Cruz
away
5. Cruz was asked at first to go to the market 'to sell' (to attend to the
store of defendant's mother) and during her absence one of the sons of
the mother of the defendant was ordered to bring all her belongings to
the house of the brother of the defendant's mother
6. Exhibit A is the baptismal certificate of the child Anselma Armi
Castillo wherein it appears that Edgardo Castillo, who is the brother
of the defendant, stood as one of the sponsors, that she demanded from
the defendant support for her child in the amount of P40.00 a month
but the defendant refused to give support to her child;
7. To maintain her child she used to sell assorted goods in the market;
8. Defendant is now married and they own a big store in the public
market with a car of their own and a television set;
9. Cruz’s poorly drafted complaint stated a cause of action by the mother
representing her recognized natural child for compulsory recognition
and support of the child by the defendant father.
10. The acknowledging parent who exercises parental authority over the
acknowledged natural child (Article 311, Civil Code) has the duty to
represent the child in all actions which may redound to the child's
benefit (Article 316[1])
11. The reason for the law is stated by a member of the Code Commission
that drafted the New Civil Code in his comment on Article 316 thus:
“The duty of the parents to represent their unemancipated children in
all actions which may redound to their benefit (which had been held
impliedly repealed by Section 553, Act 190 in Palet vs. Aldecoa, 15
Phil. 232) was revived by the Code Commission in order to maintain
the principle of family solidarity consecrated in the new Code."
12. The father’s answer denied paternity of the child and liability to
support said child.
13. Trial Court gave credence to the evidence of Cruz declaring Anselma
Armi Castillo the natural child of defendant Exequiel Castillo and
ordering Castillo to pay P30.00 per month as support for the child from
the date of filing of the complaint
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not the child is entitled to support from the date of the
filing of the complaint? NO – It should be from the date of lower
court’s judgment
RULING: PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed judgment is modified so
as to read as follows:
(a) Declaring Anselma Armi Castillo the natural child of defendant-appellant
Exequiel Castillo, and ordering said appellant to recognize said child as his
natural child and to give her support in the amount of P100.00 per month from
July 27, 1964; and
(b) Ordering defendant-appellant to pay plaintiff-appellee the sum of P500.00
as counsel fee.
RATIO:
Issue 1
1. Castillo contends that the lower court erred in ordering him to give
support to the child from date of the filing of the complaint.
2. The fact of the child being natural is distinct from the fact of the child's
recognition. A natural child not recognized by the father has no rights
whatever, not even to support.
3. It is the fact of recognition, voluntary (by any of the four means
specified in Article 278, Civil Code) or compulsory (in any of the
cases mentioned in Article 283), that gives the natural child the rights
of support and succession.
4. The defendant father not having voluntarily recognized his natural
child by any of the means specified in Article 278 of the Civil Code,
he had no obligation to support said child until after judgment was
rendered by the lower court declaring that he was the father of the
child.
5. The distinct effects of voluntary recognition and compulsory
recognition may be further clarified with examples:
a. The birth certificate giving the names of the unmarried father
 and mother of the newly born child was sworn to by both
parents. Subsequently, the father refused to support the child.
In such case an action for support (not for recognition) of the
child may be brought against the father founded upon his
voluntary act of having recognized the child in the record of
birth.
b. If the father who has refused to support his natural child did
not recognized the child in the record of birth then, the child
is not entitled to support. A combined action for compulsory
recognition and for support may be brought against the father,
and the court may render judgment ordering the defendant
father to recognize the child as his natural child and to give
support to the child from the date of the judgment. The support
should commence from the date of the judgment because it is
the judgment compelling recognition that gives rights to the
child
6. The father contends that the lower court erred in declaring that he is
the father of the natural child on the ground of physical resemblance
between him and the child. The contention is unmeritorious. The
finding of close resemblance between the child and the defendant was
a minor one.
7. It is admitted that Anselma Armi Castillo is Castillo's natural child.
Navarro vs. Bacalla: once the fact of paternity of a natural child is
found to have been established by evidence and is no longer disputed
by the father, he should be compelled to recognize the child as his own
8. The appealed judgment merely declared Anselma Armi Castillo the
natural child of defendant Exequiel Castillo. It should be modiAed by
ordering said defendant to recognize the child as his natural child and
to give the child support in the sum of P100.00 per month, considering
that the child is now of school age and that the defendant father has
the means, from July 27, 1964, the date the lower court's judgment
was promulgated
 002 Advincula v. Advincula (BURGOS)
31 January 1964 | Paredes, J. | Support
PLAINTIFF: Manuela Advincula
DEFENDANT: Manuel Advincula
SUMMARY: Sometime in 1956, Manuela Advincula filed a civil case (case 1) in
the CFI of Iloilo, against Manuel Advincula, for acknowledgment and support. On
motion of both parties, said case was dismissed. On January 16, 1961, Manuela
Advincula filed the complaint (case 2) under consideration against the same Manuel
Advincula, also for acknowledgment and support in the same court. Instead of filing
his answer, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the dismissal of
case 1 barred the filing of the second complaint. The trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground that as the dismissal of case 1 was without reservation, the
same was with prejudice. The case was brought to this Court on appeal. ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of case 1 was with prejudice. NO — The lower court
in its order did not state that the dismissal was "with prejudice", and in omitting that
expression, said lower court might not have want to dismiss the case with prejudice.
In both case 1 and case 2, the action of the plaintiff was for acknowledgment and
support. Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is of such
nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire period that
needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in
accordance with his increase or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver.
It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is provisional
because the amount may be increased or decreased depending upon the means
of the giver and the needs of the recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive
support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can
it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor (Art. 301). Furthermore,
the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future
support cannot be the subject of compromise. This being true, it is indisputable that
the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact that the
previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also
appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication
upon the merits, the right of Manuela to reiterate her suit for support and
acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise,
she has the right to bring the action for support, for it is only then that her cause of
action accrues.
Manuel argues that because in the motion the expression "with prejudice" appear,
the corresponding order granting the dismissal necessarily constituted a dismiss
with prejudice. While it is conceded that the parties had placed the expression "with
prejudice" in the motion which may be interpreted as expressive of a desire to have
the dismissal with prejudice, still it is a fact that the lower court in its order, did not
state at that the dismissal was "with prejudice", and in omitting that expression, said
lower court might not have want to dismiss the case with prejudice.
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise.
Acknowledgment, affecting as it does civil status of persons and future
support, cannot be subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code).
Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing
of another action, asking the same relief against the same defendant.
DOCTRINE: Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support is
of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for during the entire
period that needy party is entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified
or altered, in accordance with his increase or decreased needs, and with the means
of the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
FACTS:
14. Sometime in 1956, Manuela Advincula filed Civil Case No. 3553 (case 1) in
the CFI of Iloilo, against Manuel Advincula, for acknowledgment and
support. On motion of both parties, said case was dismissed.
15. On January 16, 1961, Manuela Advincula filed the complaint for Civil Case
No. 5659 (case 2) against the same Manuel Advincula, also for
acknowledgment and support in the same court.
16. Instead of filing his answer, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that the dismissal of case 1 barred the filing of the second complaint.
17. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that as the dismissal of
case 1 was without reservation, the same was with prejudice.
18. The case was brought to this Court on appeal.
ISSUE/s:
2. Whether or not the dismissal of case 1 was with prejudice. NO — The lower
court in its order did not state that the dismissal was "with prejudice", and in
omitting that expression, said lower court might not have want to dismiss the
case with prejudice.
RULING: IN VIEW HEREOF, and of the further reason that the grounds for the order
of dismissal appealed from are indubitable, the said order is set aside and the case is
remanded to the court of origin, for further proceedings, with costs against the
defendant-appellee Manuel Advincula.
RATIO:
Issue 1
1. The order of dismissal dated June 1, 1956, in Civil Case No. 3553, recites:
A peticion de la demandante y su abogado, el Sr. Gellada, por las
razones alegadas en support mocion de fecha de hoy, que el Juzgado
encuentra atendibles, y no habiendo objection del abogado Sr. Moreno
en representation del demandado, se ordena el sobreseimiento tanto de
la demanda como de la reconvencion, sin costas.
2. The order of dismissal dated August 29, 1961, in Civil Case No. 5659, states:
 Acting upon said motion, the Hon. Judge F. Imperial Reyes dismissed
the case on June 1, 1956 without any reservation of "without
prejudice". Hence, the dismissal entered in this case was with
prejudice. Pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court, the
dismissal entered by Judge Imperial Reyes is definite and with
prejudice and, consequently, said case could not be revived presently.
3. There is no statement in the order of dismissal of the first case (Civil No.
3553) that the dismissal was without prejudice. In accordance, therefore, with
Section 2, Rule 30, such dismissal is without prejudice. Said rule provides:
Except as provided in the preceding section, as action shall not be
dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and
upon such terms and conditions as court deems proper. If a prior
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon
him of the plaintiffs motion, the action shall not be dismissed against
the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending
for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified
in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without
prejudice. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court.
4. Notwithstanding the above provision, Manuel and the lower court, are of the
impression that the rule which governs the dismissal of Case No. 3553 is
Section 4 of Rule 30, to wit:
Effect of dismissal on other grounds. - Unless otherwise ordered by
the court, any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an adjudication upon the
merits.
5. The above quoted section, however, applies only when the dismissal is based
on grounds "not provided for in this rule". Civil Case No. 3553, having been
dismissed precisely on the ground provided for in Section 2, Rule 30, said
Section 4 of Rule 30, finds no application to the present case.
6. Moreover, in both Civil Cases Nos. 3553 and 5659, the action of the plaintiff
was for acknowledgment and support. Judgment for support does not
become final. The right to support is of such nature that its allowance is
essentially provisional; for during the entire period that needy party is
entitled to support, his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in
accordance with his increase or decreased needs, and with the means of
the giver. It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination.
7. A judgment rendered in a suit by a wife for maintenance is not regarded as
final, but may be modified anytime for sufficient reasons upon the application
to the court (Gorayeb v. Hashim, 47 Phil. 87).
8. The amount of support depends upon the needs of party entitled as well as on
the capacity of the person bound to give support ... and any sum previously
fixed shall be reduced or increased proportionately in accordance with the
increased or decreased needs of the party entitled to, support and of the means
of the giver. (Gonzales v. Gonzales, 43 Off. Gaz. 4691).
9. The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is
provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased
depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the recipient
(Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can
it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it be compensated with what
the recipient owes the obligor (Art. 301). Furthermore, the right to support
can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be
the subject of compromise. This being true, it is indisputable that the present
action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact that the previous
case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing
that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the
merits, the right of Manuela to reiterate her suit for support and
acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff
arise, she has the right to bring the action for support, for it is only then that
her cause of action accrues. The right to ask support is demandable from the
date in which plaintiff was in need of the same (Marcelo v. Estacio, 70 Phil.
215).
10. It is contended that because the parties had asked for the dismissal of the
former case, on the ground that "plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer
interested in continuing the case against the defendants, besides the plaintiff
has no further evidence to introduce in support of the complaint, with
prejudice", and because the order of the lower court had stated that, "por las
razones alegadas en support mocion de fecha de hoy que el Juzgado encuentra
atendibles, y no habiendo objection del abogado Sr. Moreno en representation
del demandado, so ordena el sobreseimiento tanto de la demanda como de la
reconvencion, sin costas", the dismissal was with prejudice. In other words,
it is argued that because in the motion the expression "with prejudice" appear,
the corresponding order granting the dismissal necessarily constituted a
dismiss with prejudice. While it is conceded that the parties had placed the
expression "with prejudice" in the motion which may be interpreted as
expressive of a desire to have the dismissal with prejudice, still it is a fact that
the lower court in its order reproduced above, did not state at that the
dismissal was "with prejudice", and in omitting that expression, said lower
court might not have want to dismiss the case with prejudice. The most that
could be said of such omission in the order, is that the lower court wanted to
keep silent about it. Moreover, the lower court ordered the dismissal of the
case on the grounds alleged in the said motion and the ground are the
"plaintiff has lost interest and is no longer interested in continuing the case
against the defendant", and "the plaintiff has no further evidence to introduce
in support of the complaint". The expression "with prejudice" is not a ground;
but it is an effect which movants had intended and/or wanted to produce, if
the court had granted it.
11. It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise.
Acknowledgment, affecting as it does civil status of persons and future
support, cannot be subject of compromise (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil
Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not
bar the filing of another action, asking the same relief against the same
defendant.
 003 CHUA v. CABANGBANG (CALLUENG)
28 March 1969 | Castro, J. | Parental Authority
PETITIONER: In the Matter of the Petition for Betty Chua Sy alias “Grace
Cabangbang” for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Pacita Chua
RESPONDENTS: Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang et. al
SUMMARY: Pacita Chua (Chua) supported herself by working in nightclubs
as a hostess since she was in her youth and she had sexual liaison with man
after man without benefit of marriage. She first lived with a certain Chua
Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who died in infancy. She afterwards
cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert
and Betty Chua Sy. Betty was born on December 15, 1957. Shortly after the
birth of Betty, Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated.
Chua lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met
Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960
another child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last child was still
an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support the said
child, Pacita Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu. Sometime in May
1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a childless couple, acquired the
custody of the child Betty who was then barely four months old. They have
since brought her up as their own. They had her christened as Grace
Cabangbang on September 12, 1958.
There is conflict in the testimonies. Chua avers that in October 1958, while
she and Villareal were still living together, the latter surreptitiously took
the child away and gave her to the Cabangbangs. She supposedly came to
know of the whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960 when the girl, who
was then about three years old, was brought to her by Villareal, who
shortly returned the child to the Cabangbangs allegedly thru threats
intimidation, fraud and deceit. However, the Cabangbang spouses assert
that Mrs. Cabangbang found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of
their residence; that she reared her as her own and grew very fond of her;
and that nobody ever molested them until the child was 5-½ years of age.
It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbang
spouses by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita Chua.By
letter addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy furnished to
Villareal, Chua thru counsel demanded the surrender to her of the custody
of the child. Failing to secure such custody, Pacita Chua filed a petition
for habeas corpus with the CFI of Rizal praying that the court grant her
custody of and recognize her parental authority over the girl. The lower
court dismissed the petition and ruled that it will be for the welfare of the
child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace Cabangbang to be under the
custody of Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang.
ISSUE/s: (1) WoN the lower court erred when it awarded the custody of
Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less than seven (7) years old,
in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. NO.
Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child, Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang, is an issue that is now moot and academic. Having
been born on December 15, 1957, the child is now 11 years of age. It is the
lower court's finding that the child was given to the Cabangbangs by
Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Chua. In support of this
finding, it cited the facts that Chua did not at all — not ever — report to
the authorities the alleged disappearance of her daughter, and had not
taken any step to see the child when she allegedly discovered that she was
in the custody of the Cabangbangs. Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides that
abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental
authority over their children.
The record yields a host of circumstances which, in their totality,
unmistakably betray Chua's settled purpose and intention to completely
forego all parental response possibilities and forever relinquish all parental
claim in respect to the child. She surrendered the custody of her child to
the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a
period of five long years, before she brought action to recover custody.
Her claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because the
Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve any
modicum of credence. A mother who really loves her child would go to any
extent to be reunited with her.
It is a matter of record that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the
alleged father, would resume providing Chua the support which he
peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave the child away.
A woman scorned, she desires to recover the child as a means of
embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave her and altogether
stopped living with and supporting her. But the record likewise reveals that
at the pre-trial conducted by the court a quo, she expressed her willingness
that the child remain with the Cabangbangs provided the latter would in
exchange give her a jeep and some money.
Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child of her
own flesh and blood. She gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan
Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she could not support it. Thus,
we therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds cited by
it, but upon a ground which the court overlooked — i.e., abandonment by
the petitioner of her child.
(2) WoN Pacita Chua was illegally deprived of parental authority over her
daughter. NO.
The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone
cannot serve to bar the lower court from awarding her custody to them.
Indeed, the law provides that in certain cases the custody of a child may
be awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or the mother
or against both. Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose parents are
separated — either legally or de facto — and where it appears that both
parents are improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and
control of the child, "the court may either designate the paternal or
maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some
reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to
and suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society."
Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto." Chua has not proven that she is entitled
to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. Upon the
contrary, by wantonly and completely shunting aside her legal and moral
obligations toward her child, she must be deemed as having forfeited all
legitimate legal and moral claim to her custody.
DOCTRINE: Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving parents of
parental authority over their children.
The absence of any kinship between the child and another person alone
cannot serve to bar the lower court from awarding her custody to them.
FACTS:
1. Pacita Chua (Chua), when still in the prime of youth, supported
herself by working in nightclubs as a hostess and she had sexual
liaison with man after man without benefit of marriage. She first
lived with a certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child who
died in infancy. She afterwards cohabited with Sy Sia Lay by whom
she had two children named Robert and Betty Chua Sy. Betty was born
on December 15, 1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty, Chua and Sy
Sia Lay separated.
2. Finding no one to fall back on after their separation, Chua lingered in
and around nightclubs and gambling joints, until she met Victor Tan
Villareal. In due time she became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another
child, a girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last child was still an
infant, she and Villareal separated. Without means to support the said
child, Chua gave her away to a comadre in Cebu.
3. Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and his wife, a
childless couple, acquired the custody of the child Betty who was
then barely four months old. They have since brought her up as their
own. They had her christened as Grace Cabangbang on September 12,
1958.
4. There is conflict in the testimonies on how the Cabangbang spouses
acquired custody of the girl Betty (or Grace), Chua avers that in
October 1958, while she and Villareal were still living together, the
latter surreptitiously took the child away and gave her to the
Cabangbangs, allegedly in recompense for favors received. She
supposedly came to know of the whereabouts of her daughter, only in
1960 when the girl, who was then about three years old, was brought
to her by Villareal, who shortly thereafter returned the child to the
Cabangbangs allegedly thru threats intimidation, fraud and deceit.
5. The Cabangbang spouses assert in rebuttal that Mrs. Cabangbang
found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of their residence;
that she reared her as her own and grew very fond of her; and that
nobody ever molested them until the child was 5-½ years of age.
 6. It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the
Cabangbang spouses by Villareal with the knowledge and consent
of Chua.
7. By letter addressed to the Cabangbang spouses, with copy
furnished to Villareal, Chua thru counsel demanded the
surrender to her of the custody of the child.
8. Failing to secure such custody, Chua filed a petition for habeas
corpus with the CFI of Rizal praying that the court grant her custody
of and recognize her parental authority over the girl.
9. A writ was issued commanding the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any
of his deputies to produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang before the court. However, for reasons not stated in the
record, the child was not produced before the lower court as ordered.
10. Villareal filed his answer to the petition. The Cabangbangs filed their
answer the next day.
11. The lower court dismissed the petition and ruled that it will be for
the welfare of the child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace
Cabangbang to be under the custody of Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome
Cabangbang.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the lower court erred when it awarded the custody of Betty Chua
Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less than seven (7) years old, in favor
of Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. NO, because there was
abandonment by Chua of her daughter. She surrendered the
custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until
1963, or after the lapse of a period of five long years, before she
brought action to recover custody.
2. WoN Pacita Chua was illegally deprived of parental authority over her
daughter. NO, because if it is for the best interest of the child, the
court may take the child away from its parents and commit it to a
benevolent person.
RULING: ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
Issue 1
1. Chua argues that under Article 363 of the Civil Code she cannot be
separated from her child who was less, seven years of age, and that
she cannot be deprived of her parental authority over the child because
it is not one of the grounds for the termination, loss, suspension or
deprivation of parental authority provided in article 332 of the same
Code.
2. Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from her child,
Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, is an issue that is now moot
and academic. Having been born on December 15, 1957, the child is
now 11 years of age. Consequently, the second paragraph of art. 363
of the Civil Code, which prohibits the separation of a child under
seven years of age from her mother, "unless the court finds compelling
reasons for such measure," has no immediate relevance.
3. Chua correctly argues, however, that the reasons relied upon by the
lower court — i.e., "Chua is not exactly an upright woman" and "it
will be for the welfare of the child" — are not strictly speaking, proper
grounds in law to deprive a mother of her inherent right to parental
authority over her child. It must be conceded that minor children —
be they legitimate, recognized natural, adopted, natural by legal fiction
or illegitimate, other than natural as specified in art. 269 of the Civil
Code — are by law under the parental authority of both the father and
the mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case may be.
4. But we take the view that on the basis of the aforecited seemingly
unpersuasive factual premises, Chua can be deprived of her parental
authority. For while in one breath art. 313 of the Civil Code lays down
the rule that "Parental authority cannot be renounced or transferred,
except in cases of guardianship or adoption approved by the courts, or
emancipation by concession," it indicates in the next that "The
courts may, in cases specified by law deprive parents of their
[parental] authority." And there are indeed valid reasons, as will
presently be expounded, for depriving Chua of parental authority
over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
5. It is the lower court's finding that the child was given to the
Cabangbangs by Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Chua.
In support of this finding, it cited the facts that Chua did not at all
— not ever — report to the authorities the alleged disappearance
of her daughter, and had not taken any step to see the child when
she allegedly discovered that she was in the custody of the
Cabangbangs.
6. Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia: The courts may deprive
the parents of their authority or suspend the exercise of the same if
they should treat their children with excessive harshness or should
give them corrupting orders, counsels, or examples, or should make
them beg or abandon them.
7. Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for depriving
parents of parental authority over their children.
8. Was the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by Villareal of her
child to the Cabangbangs tantamount to abandonment of the child? To
our mind, mere acquiescence — without more — is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment. But the record yields a host of
circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably betray
Chua's settled purpose and intention to completely forego all
parental response possibilities and forever relinquish all parental
claim in respect to the child.
9. She surrendered the custody of her child to the Cabangbangs in
1958. She waited until 1963, or after the lapse of a period of five
long years, before she brought action to recover custody. Her
claim that she did not take any step to recover her child because
the Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not deserve
any modicum of credence. A mother who really loves her child
would go to any extent to be reunited with her.
10. It is a matter of record that she wants the child back so that Sy Sia
Lay, the alleged father, would resume providing Chua the support
which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give when she gave
the child away. A woman scorned, she desires to recover the child as
a means of embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave her
and altogether stopped living with and supporting her. But the record
likewise reveals that at the pre-trial conducted by the court a quo,
she expressed her willingness that the child remain with the
Cabangbangs provided the latter would in exchange give her a
jeep and some money.
11. The Chua’s inconsistent demands in the course of the proceedings
below, reveal that her motives do not flow from the wellsprings of a
loving mother's heart. Upon the contrary, they are unmistakably
selfish — nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a leverage to
obtain concessions — financial and otherwise — either from the
alleged father or the Cabangbangs
12. Chua’s attitude does nothing but confirm her intention to
abandon the child — from the very outset when she allowed
Villareal to give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be noted that
the abandonment took place when the child, barely four months old,
was at the most fragile stage of life and needed the utmost care and
solicitude of her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did not
once move to recover the child.
13. Note that this was not the only instance when she gave away a child
of her own flesh and blood. She gave up her youngest child, named
Betty Tan Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she could not
support it.
14. Nowhere in the course of the petitioner's lengthy testimony did she
ever express a genuine desire to recover her child Betty Chua Sy or
Grace Cabangbang — or, for that matter, her other child Betty Tan
Villareal — because she loves her, cares for her, and wants to smother
her with motherly affection. Far from it. She wants Betty Chua Sy or
Grace Cabangbang back so that the alleged father would resume
giving her (the petitioner) support. She wants her back to humiliate
and embarrass the respondent Villareal who, with her knowledge and
consent, gave the child to the Cabangbangs. But — "most unkindest
cut of all"! — she nevertheless signified her readiness to give up the
child, in exchange for a jeep and some money.
15. We therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on the grounds
cited by it, but upon a ground which the court overlooked — i.e.,
abandonment by the petitioner of her child.
16. Contrast to Chua’s attitude, Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment
the child was given to them, took care of her as if she were her own
flesh and blood, had her baptized, and when she reached school age
enrolled her in a reputable exclusive school, for girls.
17. By her own admission, Chua has no regular source of income, and it
is doubtful that she can provide the child with the barest necessities of
life, let alone send her to school. There is no insurance at all that the
alleged father, Sy Sia Lay would resume giving Chua support once
she and the child are reunited.
18. This is not to say that with the Cabangbang spouses, a bright and
secure future is guaranteed for her. But the record indubitably
pictures the Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of
consequence in the community, who have given her their name
and are rearing her as their very own child, and with whom there
is every reason to hope she will have a fair chance of normal
growth and development into respectable womanhood.
Issue 2
1. Chua assails as illegal and without basis the award of the custody of
Grace Cabangbang or Betty Chua Sy to the Cabangbang spouses upon
the grounds, first, that the couple are not related by consanguinity or
affinity to the child, and second, because the answer of the spouses
contains no prayer for the custody of the child.
2. The absence of any kinship between the child and the
Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the lower court from
awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that in
certain cases the custody of a child may be awarded even to strangers,
as against either the father or the mother or against both.
3. Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose parents are separated — of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang. Upon the contrary, by
either legally or de facto — and where it appears that both parents are wantonly and completely shunting aside her legal and moral
improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and control of obligations toward her child, she must be deemed as having
the child, "the court may either designate the paternal or maternal forfeited all legitimate legal and moral claim to her custody.
grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some
reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit
it to and suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society."
4. Parenthetically, sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court belie
the Chua's contention that the first sentence of art. 363 of the Civil
Code, which states that: In all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount.
5. This applies only when the litigation involving a child is between the
father and the mother. That the policy enunciated, in the above-quoted
legal provision is of general application, is evident from the use of the,
adjective all — meaning, the whole extent or quantity of, the entire
number of, every one of.
6. It is, therefore, error to argue that if the suit involving a child's
custody is between a parent and a stranger, the law must
necessarily award such custody to the parent. Sec 7, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court, precisely contemplates, among others, a suit between
a parent and a stranger who, in the words of the provision, is "some
reputable resident of the province." And under the authority of the
said rule, the court — if it is for the best interest of the child —
may take the child away from its parents and commit it to, inter
alia, a benevolent person.
7. Chua’s contention that the answer of the spouses Cabangbang contains
no prayer for the retention by them of the custody of the child, is
equally devoid of merit. The several moves taken by them are clear
and definitive enough. First, they asked for her custody pendente
lite. Second, they sought the dismissal of the petition below for
lack of merit. Finally, they added a general prayer for other reliefs
just and equitable in the premises. Surely the above reliefs prayed
for are clearly indicative of the Cabangbangs' genuine desire to retain
the custody of Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
8. Lastly, Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that "Except
as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto."
9. The Chua has not proven that she is entitled to the rightful custody