Case
Duero vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 131282, January 4,
2002
Donato vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129638, December 8,
2003
Gonzaga vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 144025, December
27, 2002
Escobal vs. Garchitorena
G.R. No. 124644, February 5,
2004.
Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine
International Air Terminals
Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 155001, January 21,
2004.
Doctrine
The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot
be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their
express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action
at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. Even if private respondent actively
participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be
properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised
at anytime and at any stage of the action. Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the
jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue
of conferment as a matter of law. Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer
jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction,
and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-
judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctible only by the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.
While an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court which rendered
the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its jurisdiction. As held in the
leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy:
“A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by
laches.
“It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question
that same jurisdiction x x x x [T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the
subject matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is
barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive
as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated—obviously for
reasons of public policy.”
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed by public
officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the intimate
relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the
crime charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would
be a conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the
petitioner does not contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his
office and the discharge of his duties.
Moreover, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but
occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below “27,” the proper Regional
Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade
“23.” He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC
had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged.
The rule on hierarchy of courts in cases falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
trial courts and appellate courts generally applies to cases involving warring factual
allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first
instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts.
 It goes without saying that when cases brought before the appellate courts do not
involve factual but legal questions, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts
is not necessary.

Liga ng mga Barangay
National vs. Atienza, Jr.
G.R. No. 154599. January 21,
2004.
The Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari (as well as of
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive,
but is concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals in certain
cases. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefore will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That
hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with
the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further
overcrowding of the Court’s docket.

Manila Bankers Life Where a party failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the
Insurance Corporation vs. appellate court, it, in effect, confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over the
Ng Kok Wei case and is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court’s jurisdiction. —
G.R. No. 139791. December While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioner’s
12, 2003 active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We
have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings
and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. Here, petitioner failed to raise the
question of jurisdiction before the trial court and the Appellate Court. In effect,
petitioner confirmed and ratified the trial court’s jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it
is now in estoppel and can no longer question the trial court’s jurisdiction.

Office of the Court As manda ted by the Constitution, the Court exercises the exclusive power to discipline
Administrator vs. Sardido administratively justice of appellate courts and judges of lower courts. However, Rule
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1370, April 139-B refers to Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys which is administrative and not
25, 2003 criminal in nature. The cases referred to in Circular No. 3-89 are administrative cases for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys, including justices of appellate courts
and judges of the lower courts.

Circular No. 3-89 does not refer to criminal cases against erring justices of appellate
courts or judges of lower courts. Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect
of offenses committed by justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts.

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr. Residual prerogative vs. Residual jurisdiction

G.R. No. 151149. September
7, 2004 Residual prerogative are the general residual powers of the courts to dismiss an action
motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Sec.1, Rule 9 and under authority of Sec.
2, Rule 1.

Under Sec. 1, Rule 9, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss
or in the answer are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the
pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instance, the court shall motu
proprio dismiss the claim or action.

Figueroa vs. People
G.R. No. 147406. July 14, 2008
Serana vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 162059. January 22,
2008.
Pat-og, Sr. vs. Civil Service
Commission G.R. No.
198755. June 5, 2013
On the other hand, residual jurisdiction is embodied in Rule 41, Sec. 9. The residual
jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed
to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This
stage is reached upon the perfection of appeals by the parties or upon the approval of
the records of appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or records on
appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants,
order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.
The general rule should be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by
estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court’s absence or lack
of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy. Indeed, the fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over
the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of
the parties. This is especially true where the person seeking to invoke unauthorized
jurisdiction of the court does not thereby secure any advantage or the adverse party does
not suffer any harm.
Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied
rarely—only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. The doctrine
must be applied with great care and the equity must be strong in its favor.
Plainly, estafa is one of those felonies within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
subject to the twin requirements that
(a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
(b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
Sec. 4(A)(1)(g) explicitly vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents,
directors or trustees, or managers of government owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner, as Student
Regern, falls under this category. The Board of Regents performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of the law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated in PD No. 1606, as amended.
Concurrent Jurisdiction:
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter
at the same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a
government body the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it
is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved that another
body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which case, both bodies have
concurrent jurisdiction over the matter.
Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in several tribunals, the body that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.
Estoppel:
Although the rule states that a jurisdictional question may be raised at any time, such
rule admits of the exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened. Here,
instead of opposing the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction, the petitioner invoked the same
by actively participating in the proceedings before the CSC-CAR and by even filing his
appeal before the CSC itself; only raising the issue of jurisdiction later in his motion for
reconsideration after the CSC denied his appeal. This Court has time and again frowned
upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for decision and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when
adverse.
Boston Equity Resources,
Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 173946. June 19,
2013.
People of the Philippines
vs. Henry Go. G.R. No.
168539. March 25, 2014
City of Manila vs. Judge
Cuerdo G.R. No. 175723
February 4, 2014
St. Mary Crusade
Foundation vs. Riel G.R.
No. 176508, January 12, 2015
Duncano vs.
Sandiganbayan G.R. No.
191894. July 15, 2015.
CE Casecnan Water and
Energy Co. Inc. vs. Province
of Nueva Ecija G.R. No.
196278. June 17, 2015.
The aspect of jurisdiction which may be barred from being assailed as a result of estoppel
by laches is jurisdiction over the subject matter. Here, what respondent was questioning
in her motion to dismiss before the trial court was that court’s jurisdiction over the
person of defendant Manuel. Thus, the principle of estoppel by laches finds no
application in this case. Instead, the principles relating to jurisdiction over the person of
the parties are pertinent herein.
Since the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of a party to a case is not one of
those defenses which are not deemed waived under Section 1 of Rule 9, such defense
must be invoked when an answer or a motion to dismiss is filed in order to prevent a
waiver of the defense. If the objection is not raised either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff or the defendant
is deemed waived by virtue of the first sentence of the above-quoted Section 1 of Rule 9
of the Rules of Court.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person
must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist
where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where
the public officer has already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
The exercise of two judicial bodies over basically the same subject matter is precisely the
split-jurisdiction situation which is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the pronounced judicial
abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude that the intention of the law is to divide the
authority over a local tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory orders of the RTC but giving
to the CTA the jurisdiction over the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the
same case.
Although the [Supreme] Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals in
issuing the writ of certiorari, direct resort is allowed only when there are special, extra-
ordinary or compelling reasons that justify the same. The Court enforces the observance
of the hierarchy of courts in order to free itself from unnecessary, frivolous and
impertinent cases and thus afford time for it to deal with the more fundamental and
more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it.
Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of
the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. While the first
part of Section 4(A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions
may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he
hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4(A)(1)(a) to (g).
With respect to the CTA, its jurisdiction was expanded and its rank elevated to that of a
collegiate court with special jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 9282. This
expanded jurisdiction of the CTA includes its exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review
by appeal the decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTC in local tax cases originally
decided or resolved by the RTC in the exercise of its original or appellate jurisdiction.
 Ferrer vs. Bautista
 G.R.
No. 210551. June 30, 2015
Lomondot vs. Balindong
G.R. No. 192463. July 13,
2015.
Municipality of Tangkal vs.
Balindong
G.R. No. 193340, January 11,
2017
Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG)
vs. Dumayas
G.R. No. 209447. August 11,
2015.
Regulus Development, Inc.
vs. Dela Cruz G.R. No.
198172. January 25, 2016.
Rules 1-5
Aside from presenting a novel question of law, this case calls for immediate resolution
since the challenged ordinances adversely affect the property interests of all paying
constituents of Quezon City. As well, this petition serves as a test case for the guidance
of other local government units (LGUs). Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental
importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Citing Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp., the Court said:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for
prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at
bar. x x x This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always
be eschewed.
The Shari’a Appellate Court has yet to be organized with the appointment of a Presiding
Justice and two Associate Justices. Until such time that the Shari’a Appellate Court shall
have been organized, however, appeals or petitions from final orders or decisions of the
SDC filed with the CA shall be referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of
the CA stations preferably composed of Muslim CA Justices.
In determining whether the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the
threshold question is whether both parties are Muslims. It is clear from the title and the
averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was impleaded only in a
representative capacity, as chief executive of the local government of Tangkal. When an
action is defended by a representative, that representative is not-and neither does he
become-a real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the real party in
interest; the representative remains to be a third party to the action. That Mayor
Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for purposes of complying with the
jurisdictional requirement under Article 143(2)(b) that both parties be Muslims. To
satisfy the requirement, it is the real party defendant, the Municipality of Tangkal, who
must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a legal impossibility. A juridical
person exercises no religion. As a government instrumentality, the Municipality of
Tangkal can only act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects35-consistent with the non-establishment clause. Hence, even if it is assumed that
juridical persons are capable of practicing religion, the Municipality of Tangkal is
constitutionally proscribed from adopting, much less exercising, any religion, including
Islam.
Under Section 2 of the President’s Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all
cases of the Commission regarding “the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally
Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies,
Agents, or Nominees” whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the “exclusive and
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan” and all incidents arising from, incidental to,
or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive
and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme
Court.
Equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a
resulting legal inflexibility when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of
the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others, is to prevent unjust enrichment and to
ensure restitution.
1. Commencement of Actions
Case
Alday vs. FGU Insurance
Corp.
G.R. No. 138822, January 23,
2001
Korea Technologies Corp.
vs. Lerma
G.R. No. 143581 January 7,
2008
Mercado vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 169576 October 17,
2008
Proton Pilipinas vs. Banque
Nationale de Paris
G.R. No. 151242, June 15,
2005
Ruby Shelter Builders vs.
Formaran
G.R. No. 175914, February
10, 2009
Doctrine
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that may be
used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized
as follows: 1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely
the same? 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule? 3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute
plaintiffs claim as well as defendant’s counter-claim? 4. Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim? Another test, applied in the more recent case
of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which
requires “a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.”
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the
payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the
subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not
accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period. 2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been
left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a
lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
[abandoned doctrine]
Docket fees are required to be paid in compulsory counterclaims and cross-claims.
The court ruled that a counterclaim that (1) arises out of (or is necessarily connected
with) the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s
claim; (2) falls within the jurisdiction of the court and (3) does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction, is compulsory.
Being compulsory in nature, the payment of docket fees was not necessary for the court
to acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
While the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its
non-payment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case,
as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, more
so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing
such payment.
Doctrine of leniency in filing fees.
The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee.” Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also
jurisdictional.
 St. Louis University vs. The payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory,
Cobarrubias but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without which, the decision
G.R. No. 187104, August 3, appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal has been filed.
2010

Gipa vs. Southern Luzon Payment of the full amount of docket fees within the prescribed period is not a mere
Institute technicality of law or procedure but a jurisdictional requirement
G.R. No. 177425, June 18,
2014
Reyes vs. People In appealed cases, failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the prescribed
period warrants only discretionary as opposed to automatic dismissal of the appeal and
that the court shall exercise its power to dismiss in accordance with the tenets of justice
and fair play, and with great deal of circumspection considering all attendant
circumstances.
NTC vs. Ebesa The payment of appeal docket fees is both mandatory and jurisdictional. It is mandatory
G.R. No. 186102, February as it is required in all appealed cases, otherwise, the Court does not acquire the authority
24, 2016 to hear and decide the appeal. The failure to pay or even the partial payment of the
appeal fees does not toll the running of the prescriptive period, hence, will not prevent
the judgment from becoming final and executory.

NTC, being a GOCC, is not exempt from filing docket/appeal fees.

Vargas vs. Estate of Ogsos
G.R. No. 221062, October 5,
2016
Essentially, the nature of a counterclaim is determinative of whether or not the
counterclaimant is required to pay docket fees. The rule in permissive counterclaims is
that for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. On the other hand, the prevailing rule with respect to
compulsory counterclaims is that no filing fees are required for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Camaso vs. TSM Shipping, Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides that in original actions filed before the
Inc. CA, such as a petition for certiorari, the payment of the corresponding docket fees is
G.R. No. 223290, November required, and that the failure to comply with the same shall be sufficient ground for the
7, 2016 dismissal of such action.

While the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fees, its nonpayment at the time of filing of the initiatory pleading
does not automatically cause its dismissal provided that: (a) the fees are paid within a
reasonable period; and (b) there was no intention on the part of the claimant to defraud
the government.

2. Causes of Action
Rule 2, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that “[a] party may not institute more
Dynamic Builders vs. than one suit for a single cause of action.” Moreover, Section 4 discusses the splitting of
Presbitero a single cause of action in that “if two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the
G.R. No. 174202, April 7, same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
2015 available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.” The splitting of a cause of action
“violate[s] the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective [is] to avoid
unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.”

3. Parties
Relucio vs. Lopez A real party in interest is one who stands “to be benefited or injured by the judgment of
G.R. No. 138497, January 16, the suit. In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in Special
2002 Proceedings M-3630.
If petitioner is not a real party-in-interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An
indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination of an
action.

De Castro vs. Court of
Appeals
Urquiola vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 141463. August 6,
2002
China Banking Corp. vs.
Oliver
G.R. No. 135796, October 3,
2002.
Lotte Phils. Co. Inc. vs Dela
Cruz
G.R. No. 166302, July 28,
2005
Carabeo vs. Dingco
G.R. No. 190823, April 4,
2011
Dela Cruz vs. Joaquin
G.R. No. 162788, July 28,
2005
Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in Special Proceedings M-3630. A necessary
party as one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as party if complete
relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or
settlement of the claim subject of the action.
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the
litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The joinder
of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without their presence.
Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable
party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and order the
inclusion of such party.
However, a solidary obligation does not make a solidary obligor an indispensable party.
When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability of co-
principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation. The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the co-
principals, as in this case.
No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to
a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner, a writ
of execution can be issued only against a party and not against one who did not have
his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action are bound by the judgment
therein and by writs of execution and demolition issued pursuant thereto.
An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final determination can
be had of an action. It is true that mortgagor Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will
be affected by the outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage
is declared valid, or injured in case her title is declared fake. However, mortgagor Oliver
Ones absence from the case does not hamper the trial court in resolving the dispute
between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner.
The mortgagee is merely a necessary party, not an indispensable one.
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The
joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is
necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and
determine a cause, the right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable
parties to a suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action
and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained
[of] affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the
injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being
incidental.
The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a
Notice of Appeal, petitioner’s counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of
the already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party
after his death. The trial court’s decision had thereby become final and executory, no
appeal having been perfected.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of
Court require a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by
Section 16 of Rule 3.
 The rule on the substitution of parties was crafted to protect every party’s right to due
process. The estate of the deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the
suit through the duly appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be
made against the successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is
denied.

This general rule notwithstanding, a formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when
they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in
defense of the deceased. These actions negate any claim that the right to due process
was violated.
Navarro vs. Escobido In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However,
G.R. No. 153788, November pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence, any one of them
27, 2009 may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the
recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-
owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is
presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.

Since the husband is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover
possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro forma party to
the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states:
“Section 4. Spouses as parties.—Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided
by law.”

Landbank vs. Cacayuran An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court’s action in the
G.R. No. 191667, April 22, litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party’s
2015 interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably
intertwined with the other parties’ that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the
parties before the court which is effective, complete, or equitable.” Thus, the absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void, for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

The nonjoinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action.
At any stage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be
added on the motion of a party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that
court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the order. The
remedy is to implead the nonparty claimed to be indispensable.

Divinagracia vs. Parilla All the coheirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties;
G.R. No. 196750, March 11, as such, an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties.
2015

4. Venue

Pacific Consultants The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue is that while they are considered valid
International Asia vs. and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general
Schonfeld rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
G.R. No. 166920. February restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional
19, 2007. forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather
permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be
accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design
that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. In the instant
case, no restrictive words like “only,” “solely,” “exclusively in this court,” “in no other
court save—,” “particularly,” “nowhere else but/except—,” or words of equal import

Biaco vs. Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank
G.R. No. 161417, February 8,
2007.
BPI Family Savings Bank,
Inc. vs. Spouses Yujuico
G.R. No. 175796, July 22,
2015.
 proper court having jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a
Rule 6-9
1. Counterclaims
Alba vs. Malapajo
G.R. No. 198752. January 13,
2016
were stated in the contract. It cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an
exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.
The question of whether the trial court has jurisdiction depends on the nature of the
action, i.e., whether the action is in personam, in rem, or quasi in rem. The rules on
service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court likewise apply according to the
nature of the action.
An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability.
An action in rem is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An
action quasi in rem is one wherein an individual is named as defendant and the purpose
of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the
property.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for
the court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction
on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Nonetheless,
summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court
with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.
While the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its jurisdiction is limited to a
rendition of judgment on the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond the res and
issue a judgment enforcing petitioner’s personal liability.
It is basic that the venue of an action depends on whether it is a real or a personal action.
Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession
of real property, or an interest therein. Real action is to be commenced and tried in the
portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a local
action. In contrast, the venue of a personal action is the place where the plaintiff or any
of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides, or in the case of a nonresident defendant where he may be found, at
the election of the plaintiff, for which reason the action is considered a transitory one.
Deficiency action is a personal action.
A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing
party. A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts
of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. Such a
counterclaim must be within the jurisdiction of the court both as to the amount and the
nature thereof, except that in an original action before the Regional Trial Court,
necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim or even
where there is such a connection, the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim or
it requires for adjudication the presence of third persons over whom the court acquire
jurisdiction. A counterclaim is permissive if it does not arise out of or is not necessarily
connected with the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, the following tests
are used:
(a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the
same?
(b) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants’ claims, absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs’ claim as well as the
defendants’ counterclaim?; and
 (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
Lim Teck Chuan vs. Uy Where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his complaint to which a counterclaim has
G.R. No. 155701, March 11, been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
2015 without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a
separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the
first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving
his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his
counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed,
he must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from notice to him of
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available
to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.
Metrobank vs. CPR It is elementary that a defending party’s compulsory counterclaim should be interposed
Promotions at the time he files his Answer, and that failure to do so shall effectively bar such claim.
G.R. No. 200567, June 22, As it appears from the records, what respondents initially claimed herein were moral
2015 and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. Then, realizing, based on its
computation, that it should have sought the recovery of the excess bid price,
respondents set up another counterclaim, this time in their Appellant’s Brief filed before
the CA. Unfortunately, respondents’ belated assertion proved fatal to their cause as it
did not cure their failure to timely raise such claim in their Answer. Consequently,
respondents’ claim for the excess, if any, is already barred.

2. Answers

Valdez vs. Dabon A negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation
A.C. No. 7353. November 16, or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. Where a fact is
2015 alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so
qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying
circumstance alone is denied while the fact itself is admitted.
Republic vs. Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on
Sandiganbayan pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the
G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003 substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in
effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative
pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least
an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with
an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone
are denied while the fact itself is admitted.

Caneland Sugar Corp. vs. Petitioner does not dispute its loan obligation with respondent. Petitioner’s bone of
Alon contention before the RTC is that the promissory notes are silent as to whether they were
G.R. No. 142896 September covered by the Mortgage Trust Indenture and Mortgage Participation on its property
12, 2007 covered by TCT No. T-11292. It does not categorically deny that these promissory notes
are covered by the security documents. These vague assertions are, in fact, negative
pregnants, i.e., denials pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the
pleading responded to which are not squarely denied.

3. Verification and Certification

Jose vs. Javellana
Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more pending cases, there is identity of
parties, identity of rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs sought. Where the
elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, there is forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a
ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least
such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the identity in the
two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
 regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. For forum
shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same transaction, same essential facts
and circumstances and must raise identical causes of action, subject matter and issues.
Clearly, it does not exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes
of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.

Medado vs. Heirs of There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present, i.e., between
Consing actions pending before the courts, there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such
G.R. No. 186720, February 8, parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and
2012 relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (3) and the identity of the
two proceeding particulars is such that judgment rendered in the other action will
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration; said requisites are also constitutive of the requisites for auter action
pendant or lis pendens. Applying the foregoing, there was clearly a violation of the rule
against non-forum shopping when spouses Medado instituted Civil Case No. 797-C for
injunction notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 00- 11320 for rescission of
contract and damages.

The general rule is that the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the
plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient.

In any case, the Court reiterate that where the petitioners are immediate relatives, who
share a common interest in the property subject of the action, the fact that only one of
the petitioners executed the verification or certification of forum shopping will not deter
the court from proceeding with the action.

Commission on The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a government entity
Appointment vs. Paler created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There was no need for the
G.R. No. 172623, March 3, Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative, lawyer or any person who
2010 personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition could sign the verification.
With regard, however, to the certification of non-forum shopping, the established
rule is that it must be executed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not
by counsel. In this case, Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by
the Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file the petition
in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such authority.

Basan vs. Coca-Cola While the general rule is that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping
Bottlers, Phils. must be signed by all the petitioners in a case, the signature of only one (1) of them,
G.R. Nos. 174365-66, petitioner Basan in this case, appearing thereon may be deemed substantial compliance
February 4, 2015 with the procedural requirement. The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently held that
when under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, as when all the petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, as in this case, the
signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially
complies with the certification requirement.
Uy vs. Court of Appeals A certification against forum shopping is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the
G.R. No. 173186. September party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending
16, 2015. cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action. It must be
executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or
justifiable reasons, the party- pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

The general rule is that non-compliance or a defect in the certification is not curable by
its subsequent submission or correction. However, there are cases where we exercised
leniency and relaxed the rules on the ground of substantial compliance, the presence of
special circumstances or compelling reasons. The rules on forum-shopping are designed
to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and "should not be
 interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate
objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.

Bandillon vs. La Filipina Rules on the non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective,
Uygongco Corporation verification and certification against forum shopping:
(LFUC) 1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or
G.R. No. 202446. September submission of defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or
16, 2015 submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily
render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order its submission or correction
or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with
the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or
are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect
therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or
correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the
case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when
all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of
action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum
shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-
pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-
pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

People vs. Arojado An information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a person with
G.R. No. 207041. November an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a plaintiff’s
9, 2015 cause or cause of action.

The Court said that the rule has been revised to the effect that instead of dismissing the
complaint, the lawyer would now be subject to disciplinary action; failure of a lawyer to
indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and
expunction of the pleadings from the records. The trial court should not have dismissed
the information but it should have simply required the investigating prosecutor to
indicate therein the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance.

4. Allegations in Pleadings
Fernando Medical
Enterprises, Inc. vs. The answer admits the material allegations of ultimate facts of the adverse party’s
Wesleyan University pleadings not only when it expressly confesses the truth of such allegations but also
G.R. No. 207970. January 20, when it omits to deal with them at all. The controversion of the ultimate facts must only
2016 be by specific denial. Section 10, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court recognizes only three modes
by which the denial in the answer raises an issue of fact. The first is by the defending
party specifying each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit
and, whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters upon which he
relies to support his denial. The second applies to the defending party who desires to
deny only a part of an averment, and the denial is done by the defending party

Go Tong Electrical Supply
vs. BPI Family Savings
Bank
G.R. No. 187487. June 29,
2015
Benguet Exploration, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 117434 February 9,
2001
Asian Construction
Development Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 160242
 May 17,
2005
5. Effect of Failure to Plead
Salvador vs. Rabaja
G.R. No. 199990
February 4, 2015
specifying so much of the material allegation of ultimate facts as is true and material and
denying only the remainder. The third is done by the defending party who is without
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material
averment made in the complaint by stating so in the answer. Any material averment in
the complaint not so specifically denied are deemed admitted except an averment of the
amount of unliquidated damages.
In the case of a written instrument or document upon which an action or defense is
based, which is also known as the actionable document, the pleader of such document
is required either to set forth the substance of such instrument or document in the
pleading, and to attach the original or a copy thereof to the pleading as an exhibit, which
shall then be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or to set forth a copy in the pleading.
The adverse party is deemed to admit the genuineness and due execution of the
actionable document unless he specifically denies them under oath, and sets forth what
he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order
for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.
The mere statement in paragraph 4 of their Answer, i.e., that they “specifically deny”
the pertinent allegations of the Complaint “for being self-serving and pure conclusions
intended to suit plaintiff’s purposes,” does not constitute an effective specific denial as
contemplated by law. Verily, a denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by
the defendant. Stated otherwise, a general denial does not become specific by the use of
the word “specifically.” Neither does it become so by the simple expedient of coupling
the same with a broad conclusion of law that the allegations contested are “self-serving”
or are intended “to suit plaintiff’s purposes.
The admission of the due execution and genuineness of a document simply means that
the party whose signature it bears admits that he signed it or that it was signed by
another for him with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and
figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document
was delivered; and that any formal requisites required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. In another case,
the Court held that when the law makes use of the phrase genuineness and due
execution of the instrument it means nothing more than that the instrument is not
spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face from the one executed.
It is equally true, however, that execution can only refer to the actual making and
delivery, but it cannot involve other matters without enlarging its meaning beyond
reason. The only object of the rule was to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie,
not a conclusive case, and it cannot preclude a defendant from introducing any defense
on the merits which does not contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in
evidence.
The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant (a) on an allegation of
liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the
plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the
defendant. There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his
complaint and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant
against the third-party defendant.
The failure to attend the pre-trial conference does not result in the default of an absent
party. Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant is only declared in default
if he fails to file his Answer within the reglementary period. On the other hand, if a
 defendant fails to attend the pre-trial conference, the plaintiff can present his evidence
ex parte. Still, the non-appearance of the defendant bears the same effect as that of the
declaration of default for failure to file an answer within the prescribed period.

BDO vs. Tansipek The proper remedy against an Order of Default is a Motion to Lift Order of Default,
G.R. No. 181235 July 22, and not a Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Section 3(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of
2009
 Court.

Bitte vs. Jonas The rule is that “right to appeal from the judgment by default is not lost and can be done
GR No. 212256, December 9, on grounds that the amount of the judgment is excessive or is different in kind from that
2015 prayed for, or that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of his complaint,
or that the decision is contrary to law.” If a party who has been declared in default has
in his arsenal the remedy of appeal from the judgment of default on the basis of the
decision having been issued against the evidence or the law, that person cannot be
denied the remedy and opportunity to assail the judgment in the appellate court.
Despite being burdened by the circumstances of default, the petitioners may still use all
other remedies available to question not only the judgment of default but also the
judgment on appeal before this Court. Those remedies necessarily include an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 10-13
1. Amendment and Supplemental Pleadings
Yujuico vs. United Our rules of procedure allow a party in a civil action to amend his pleading as a matter
Resources Asset of right, so long as the pleading is amended only once and before a responsive pleading
Management Corp. is served (or, if the pleading sought to be amended is a reply, within ten days after it is
GR No. 211113, June 29, served). Otherwise, a party can only amend his pleading upon prior leave of court.
2015
 As a matter of judicial policy, courts are impelled to treat motions for leave to file
amended pleadings with liberality. Hence, as long as it does not appear that the motion
for leave was made with bad faith or with intent to delay the proceedings, courts are
justified to grant leave and allow the filing of an amended pleading. Once a court grants
leave to file an amended pleading, the same becomes binding and will not be disturbed
on appeal unless it appears that the court had abused its discretion.

Lisam Enterprises vs. Banco A responsive pleading having been filed, amendments to the complaint may, therefore,
De Oro be made only by leave of court and no longer as a matter of right. The courts should be
G.R. No. 143264, April 23, liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid a multiplicity of suits and in
2012
 order that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights
determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This
liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in this case where the
amendment was made before the trial of the case, thereby giving the petitioners all
the time allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.

Furthermore, amendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally

allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case, may so far as possible, be
determined on its real facts and in order to speed up the trial of the case or prevent the
circuitry of action and unnecessary expense. That is, unless there are circumstances
such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like,
which might justify a refusal of permission to amend.

Tiu vs. Philippine Bank of
Communications
G.R. No. 151932. August 19,
2009.
The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the
limitations that the amendments should not substantially change the cause of action or
alter the theory of the case, or that it was not made to delay the action. Nevertheless, as
enunciated in Valenzuela, even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action
or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher

Remington Industrial Sales
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133657. May 29,
2002
2. Modes of Filing/Service
Palileo vs. Planters
Development Bank
G.R. No. 193650. October 8,
2014.
Heirs of Numeriano
Miranda, Sr. vs. Miranda
G.R. No. 179638. July 8,
2013
 In this case, however, the counsel for petitioners filed the Notice of Appeal via a private
3. Proof of Service
Fortune Life Insuranc Co.
vs. COA
G.R. No. 213525, January 27,
2015
interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of actions and proceedings.
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may be
amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means
that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The reason
for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision,
substantial amendment of the complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an
answer has been served, because any material change in the allegations contained in the
complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense
in the answer. Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant’s rights have been
violated by changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such
an event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or affected by
the amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10.
The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before
an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any
other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to
amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual,
since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the
adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.
Here, the fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint
does not bar petitioner’s right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed,
where some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its
complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the non-
answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other defendants.
Service and filing of pleadings by courier service is a mode not provided in the Rules.
Under Section 3, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, pleadings may be filed in court either
personally or by registered mail. In the first case, the date of filing is the date of receipt.
In the second case, the date of mailing is the date of receipt.
courier, a mode of filing not provided in the Rules. Though not prohibited by the Rules,
it cannot be considered the filing of petitioners’ Notice of Appeal via LBC timely filed.
It is established jurisprudence that “the date of delivery of pleadings to a private letter-
forwarding agency is not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in court”; instead,
“the date of actual receipt by the court x x x is deemed the date of filing of that pleading.”
Records show that the Notice of Appeal was mailed on the 15th day and was received
by the court on the 16th day or one day beyond the reglementary period. Thus, the CA
correctly ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed out of time.
Section 13, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court concerns two types of proof of service,
namely: the affidavit and the registry receipt.
Section 13 thus requires that if the service is done by registered mail, proof of service
shall consist of the affidavit of the person effecting the mailing and the registry receipt,
 both of which must be appended to the paper being served. A compliance with the rule
is mandatory, such that there is no proof of service if either or both are not submitted.

Rule 14
Valmonte vs. Court of Substituted service may not be availed of if the defendant is a non-resident.
Appeals
G.R. No. 131724, February The defendant is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons
28, 2000 on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, Section 17. Such service, to be effective
outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication
in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the court may
order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner
which the court may deem sufficient.
Millenium Industrial [abandoned doctrine]
Commercial Corp. vs. Tan
G.R. No. 131724 Although the service of summons was made on a person not enumerated in Rule 14,
February 28, 2000 Section 13, if it appears that the summons and complaint were in fact received by the
corporation, there is substantial compliance with the rule as its purpose has been
attained.
E.B. Villarosa vs. Benito
G.R. No. 136426
 August 6,
1999
Mason vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 144662 October 13,
2003
Jose vs. Boyon
G.R. No. 147369 October 23,
2003
 personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of
Manotoc vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 130974 August 16,
2006
 Indeed, "compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a
domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states general manager
instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of secretary; and treasurer instead
of cashier. The phrase agent, or any of its directors is conspicuously deleted in the new
rule.
A strict compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the
court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one who is
named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient
Absent a manifest intent to liberalize the rule, strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is stressed.
Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service
may be done by
Rule 14.
Personal service of summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former
cannot be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof
of service of summons must:
(a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time;
(b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and,
(c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of
business, of the defendant.
As to the Service of Summons by Publication or Extraterritorial Service of Summons, it
applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. In the instant case, what was filed
before the trial court was an action for specific performance directed against
respondents. And this Court has consistently declared that an action for specific
performance is an action in personam.
While substituted service of summons is permitted, "it is extraordinary in character and
in derogation of the usual method of service." Hence, it must faithfully and strictly
comply with the prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules.
important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction."
• Requirements for Substituted Service
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court which applies to this case provides:
SEC. 8. Substituted service. – If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
We can break down this section into the following requirements to effect a valid
substituted service:
(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service
The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot
be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14
provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the
summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned.
"Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessary under the circumstances
for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty
requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if
any[,] to the other party."

To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff,
"reasonable time" means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice
for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons
assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk of
Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office
of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus,
one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" with
regard to personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care,
utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the
expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to
accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is
expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful,
persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For
substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the
sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month]
which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service.
"Several attempts" means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different
dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only
then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and
the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date
and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant,
the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other
acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the
Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on
Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine
Judicial Academy and the SC Administrative Circular No. 5 (1989) require a narration
of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be
left with a person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein."
A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal
capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of a summons.
"Discretion" is defined as "the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible
choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be
presupposed".
Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand
English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver
the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person
to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation of confidence" to
the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt
of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with
the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt

DOLE Philippines vs.
Quilala
G.R. No. 168723, July 9,
2008
 is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and
Santos vs. PNOC
G. R. No. 170943, September
23, 2008
Ong vs. Co
G.R. No. 206653, February
25, 2015
 of the defendant because of invalid service of summons.
Nation Petroleum Gas vs.
RCBC
of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify
the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically
described in the Return of Summons.
(4) A Competent Person in Charge
If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business,
then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person
on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or
business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must
have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the
summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the
summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.
Considering that the service of summons was made on a legal assistant, not employed
by herein petitioner and who is not one of the designated persons under Section 11,
Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner. Well-settled
exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, following the rule in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio
alterius. Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
HOWEVER, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendant’s voluntary appearance in
the action is equivalent to service of summons. Note that on May 5, 2003, petitioner
filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time. It was not a conditional
appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but an
appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the receipt
of the alias summons and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading.
Consequently, petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also
having invoked the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion
for additional time, petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of
the RTC.
In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry,
service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order. Since
petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate
his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect service of
summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus,
petitioner was properly served with summons by publication.
Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in personam
and claims that service by publication may be availed of only in an action in rem.
Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old
rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable.
Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the old rule to in rem actions
only. This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies “[i]n any
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever
his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry.” Thus, it
now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is the proper remedy to assail the executory
decision of the RTC when the court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the person
On the corporation:
G.R. No. 183370. August 17,
2015
Green Star Express vs.
Nissin Universal Robina
Corp.
G.R. No. 181517 July 6,
2015

Guy vs. Gacott
G.R. No. 206147. January 13,
2016
Sunrise Garden vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 158836. September
30, 2015.
 authority.
When the defendant is a domestic corporation like herein petitioner, service of summons
may be made only upon the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules. The
foregoing notwithstanding, there was a valid and effective service of summons upon
petitioner corporation through its liaison officer who acted as the agent of the corporate
secretary. Abante, in so receiving the summons, did so in representation of Ang who, as
corporate secretary, is one of the officers competent under the Rules of Court to receive
summons on behalf of a private juridical person.
On the officers of the corporation:
Despite improper service of summons upon their persons, the individual petitioners are
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court through their voluntary
appearance. The second sentence of Section 20 Rule 14 of the Rules that “[t]he inclusion
in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance” clearly refers to affirmative defenses,
not affirmative reliefs.
It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a domestic private
juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the court cannot be said to
have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Service must, be made only
on the person expressly listed in the rules.
On the corporation:
Although there was defect in the service of summons, this may be cured by the
defendant’s subsequent voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction through his
filing a responsive pleading such as an answer. In this case, it is not disputed that QSC
filed its Answer despite the defective summons. Thus, jurisdiction over its person was
acquired through voluntary appearance.
On the owner/partner:
Although the trial court acquired jurisdiction over QSC, this did not extend to the person
of Guy insofar as holding him solidarily liable with the partnership. A suit against the
partnership is not necessarily a suit impleading each and every partner. A partnership
is a juridical entity that has a distinct and separate personality from the persons
composing it. Since Guy was not impleaded in the case, the judgment rendered cannot
bind nor prejudice him. Therefore, it was improper to levy upon his property. Moreover,
even if he was properly impleaded, his liability is only subsidiary pursuant to Art. 1816
of the NCC.
Voluntary appearance in court may not always result in submission to the jurisdiction
of a court. When a party makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court’s jurisdiction over his person, he cannot be considered to have submitted to its
Rules:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary
appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.
The appearance of First Alliance and K-9 Security Agency should not be deemed as a
voluntary appearance because it was for the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of
the trial court .
Rule 15

Acampado vs. Cosmilla The Motion for Reconsideration is a contentious motion that needs to comply with the
G.R. No. 198531. September required notice and hearing and service to the adverse party. Every written motion
28, 2015 required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a
manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date
of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of
the Rules of Court is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to
receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.

The motion becomes pro-forma.

Laude vs. Ginez-Jabalde Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court clearly makes it a mandatory rule that the adverse
G.R. No. 217456. November party be given notice of hearing on the motion at least three days prior. Failure to comply
24, 2015 with this notice requirement renders the motion defective consistent with protecting the
adverse party’s right to procedural due process.

While the general rule is that a motion that fails to comply with the requirements of Rule
15 is a mere scrap of paper, an exception may be made and the motion may still be acted
upon by the court, provided doing so will neither cause prejudice to the other party nor
violate his or her due process rights. The adverse party must be given time to study the
motion in order to enable him or her to prepare properly and engage the arguments of
the movant. In this case, the general rule must apply because Pemberton was not given
sufficient time to study petitioners’ Motion, thereby depriving him of his right to
procedural due process.

Rule 16
De Guzman vs. Ochoa An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates
G.R. No. 169292. April 13, the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done by the court before
2011 the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a
motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action for certiorari which is a
remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.

An order denying a motion to dismiss may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of
law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed
in such cases is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the
issue on appeal from the final judgment.

A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the
complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must
raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion because
under Section 8, “all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.”

Rule 17

Lim Teck Chuan vs. Uy A dismissal of an action is different from a mere dismissal of the complaint. For this
G.R. No. 155701, March 11, reason, since only the complaint and not the action is dismissed, the defendant in spite
2015 of said dismissal may still prosecute his counterclaim in the same action.

Where the plaintiff moves for the dismissal of his complaint to which a counterclaim has
been interposed, the dismissal shall be limited to the complaint. Such dismissal shall be
without prejudice to the right of the defendant to either prosecute his counterclaim in a

Ching vs. Cheng
G.R. No. 175507. October 8,
2014
Rule 18
People vs. Perez
G.R. No. 142556. February 5,
2003
Rule 19
Office of the Ombudsman
vs. Sison
G.R. No. 185954 February 16,
2010
Ombudsman vs. Chavez
G.R. No. 172206 July 3, 2013
separate action or to have the same resolved in the same action. Should he opt for the
first alternative, the court should render the corresponding order granting and reserving
his right to prosecute his claim in a separate complaint. Should he choose to have his
counterclaim disposed of in the same action wherein the complaint had been dismissed,
he must manifest such preference to the trial court within 15 days from notice to him of
plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. These alternative remedies of the defendant are available
to him regardless of whether his counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.
The two dismissal rule will not operate if the first dismissal was at the instance of the
defendants.
As a general rule, dismissals under Section 1 of Rule 17 are without prejudice except
when it is the second time that the plaintiff caused its dismissal. Accordingly, for a
dismissal to operate as an adjudication upon the merits, i.e., with prejudice to the re-
filing of the same claim, the following requisites must be present: (1) There was a
previous case that was dismissed by a competent court; (2) Both cases were based on or
include the same claim; (3) Both notices for dismissal were filed by the plaintiff; and (4)
When the motion to dismiss filed by the plaintiff was consented to by the defendant on
the ground that the latter paid and satisfied all the claims of the former. The purpose of
the “two-dismissal rule” is “to avoid vexatious litigation.” When a complaint is
dismissed a second time, the plaintiff is now barred from seeking relief on the same
claim.
Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the parties. Section 4, Rule
118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: “SEC. 4. Pre-trial order.—After
the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken, the facts
stipulated, and evidence marked. Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to
matters not disposed of, and control the course of the action during the trial, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur:
(1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must
not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should
the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate
proceeding. The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in
litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
The Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the instant
case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be mindful of its
role as an adjudicator, not an advocate. When judges actively participate in the appeal
of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have become adversarial
instead.
Furthermore, the Rules provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any
time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus
Motion for Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was
promulgated on June 26, 2008.
The CA should have allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in the appeal
pending with the lower court. As held in the case of Office of the Ombudsman v.
Samaniego, the Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash, delay
or dismiss investigations directed against them. Its function is critical because public
interest (in the accountability of public officers and employees) is at stake.

Anonuevo vs. Intestrate of
Jalandoni
G.R. No. 178221 December
1, 2010
Fernandez vs. Court of
Appeals
A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-
CA-J. February 19, 2013
Rodriguez vs. Court of
Appeals G.R. No. 184589,
June 13, 2013
Yao vs. Perello
G.R. No. 153828, October 24,
2003
Both the CA and respondent likened the Office of the Ombudsman to a judge whose decision was
in question. This was a tad too simplistic (or perhaps even rather disdainful) of the power, duties
and functions of the Office of the Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman cannot be detached,
disinterested and neutral specially when defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative
cases against government personnel, the offense is committed against the government and public
interest.
Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and Supplemental
Resolution is in danger of being impaired, the Office of the Ombudsman had a clear
legal interest in defending its right to have its judgment carried out.
NOTE: Difference between the two Ombudsman cases according to Atty. Brondial:
The first case was to be implemented by the Ombudsman itself while the second one
will not be implemented by Ombudsman directly.
A court’s power to allow or deny intervention, albeit discretionary in nature, is
circumscribed by the basic demand of sound judicial procedure that only a person with
interest in an action or proceeding may be allowed to intervene. Otherwise stated, a
court has no authority to allow a person, who has no interest in an action or proceeding,
to intervene therein.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court,
be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in the
main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction. Indeed,
he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger. Moreover, a person
not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the petition for
certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the injurious
writ. Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain
an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated
differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party
in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.
Although Rule 19 is explicit on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the
Court allowed exceptions in several
cases, viz:
This rule, however, is not inflexible. Interventions have been allowed even beyond the
period prescribed in the Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice.
Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial
court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for
decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already
become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing, the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury
and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
To allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to
whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenor’s rights may be protected in a separate proceeding
or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the right
to intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within the

Pinlac vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 91486. September
10, 2003
Chipongian vs. Benitez-
Lirio
G.R. No. 162692. August 26,
2015
Modes of Discovery (Rule 23-29)
1. Deposition
Dasmariñas Garments vs.
Reyes
G.R. No. 108229 August 24,
1993
period prescribed therefor. As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for
intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.
Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in
the rules.
Intervention of the Republic was granted even if it was filed during the Motion for
Reconsideration of the case before the Supreme Court.
The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to make the powers
of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a
comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of
the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the Court has allowed intervention
notwithstanding the rendition of judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention
was allowed even when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already
submitted for decision in the Supreme Court. In Mago v. Court of Appeals, intervention
was granted even after the decision became final and executory.
The Motion to Intervene was granted BUT the Complaint-In-Intervention was
dismissed. He filed a Notice of Appeal (but of course, in specpro, it should be by record
on appeal).
Intervention is “a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a
right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings.” If an intervention makes
a third party a litigant in the main proceedings, his pleading-in-intervention should
form part of the main case. Accordingly, when the petitioner intervened in Special
Proceedings No. SP-797, his complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC,
became part of the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof subject to the rules
specifically applicable to special proceedings, including Rule 109 of the Rules of Court,
which deals with appeals in special proceedings.
Depositions are chiefly a mode of discovery. They are intended as a means to compel
disclosure of facts resting in the knowledge of a party or other person which are relevant
in some suit or proceeding in court. Depositions, and the other modes of discovery
(interrogatories to parties; requests for admission by adverse party; production or
inspection of documents or things; physical and mental examination of persons) are
meant to enable a party to learn all the material and relevant facts, not only known to
him and his witnesses but also those known to the adverse party and the latter’s own
witnesses. In fine, the object of discovery is to make it possible for all the parties to a case
to learn all the material and relevant facts, from whoever may have knowledge thereof,
to the end that their pleadings or motions may not suffer from inadequacy of factual
foundation, and all the relevant facts may be clearly and completely laid before the
Court, without omission or suppression.
It is apparent then that the deposition of any person may be taken wherever he may be,
in the Philippines or abroad. If the party or witness is in the Philippines, his deposition
“shall be taken before any judge, municipal or notary public” (Sec. 10, Rule 24, Rules of
Court). If in a foreign state or country, the deposition “shall be taken: (a) on notice before
a secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent
of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory”.

Go vs. People
G.R. No. 185527. July 18,
2012
Vda. de Manguerra vs. Risos
G.R. No. 152643, August 28,
2008
People vs. Webb
G.R. No. 132577. August 17,
1999
Disini vs. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 175730, July 5, 2010
2. Interrogatories to Parties
Where the deposition is to be taken in a foreign country where the Philippines has no
“secretary or embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular
agent,” then obviously it may be taken only “before such person or officer as may be
appointed by commission or under letters rogatory.
A commission may be defined as “(a)n instrument issued by a court of justice, or other
competent tribunal, to authorize a person to take depositions, or do any other act by
authority of such court or tribunal”. Letters rogatory, on the other hand, may be defined
as “(a)n instrument sent in the name and by the authority of a judge or court
to another, requesting the latter to cause to be examined, upon interrogatories filed in a
cause pending before the former, a witness who is within the jurisdiction of the judge or
court to whom such letters are addressed”.
Depositions in civil cases under Rule 23-24 cannot apply in criminal cases.
For purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a
prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial
examination should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
Depositions in civil cases under Rule 23-24 cannot apply in criminal cases.
Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if the
witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning. Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in
Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional examination
be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be
notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same
after reasonable notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be
conducted in the same manner as an examination during trial, that is, through question
and answer.
The use of discovery procedures is directed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
The deposition-taking can not be based nor can it be denied on flimsy reasons.
It need not be overemphasized that the factual circumstances only serves to underscore
the immutable fact that the depositions proposed to be taken from the five U.S. based
witnesses would be merely corroborative or cumulative in nature and in denying
respondent’s motion to take them, the trial court was but exercising its judgment on
what it perceived to be a superfluous exercise on the belief that the introduction thereof
will not reasonably add to the persuasiveness of the evidence already on record.
It is important to note that there are two instances when the defendant can take
depositions under Section 1 of Rule 23:
(1) after the court has acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or the property subject of
the action; and
(2) after an answer has been served. Both instances presuppose that the court has already
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant.
By seeking this relief (Motion for Leave To Take Deposition), petitioner is deemed to
have voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus,
petitioner may be held to have waived his objections regarding the lack of
jurisdiction over his person by seeking affirmative relief through the said provision.
 Afulugencia vs. Metro Bank Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides – Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written
G.R. No. 185145. February 5, interrogatories. Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a
2014. failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the
adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.

One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed
that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand
will most likely be unable to elicit FACTS useful to its case if it later opts to call the
adverse party to the witness stand as its witness.

3. Admission by Adverse Party

Allied Agri-Business Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless,
Development Co. vs. Court within a period designated in the request, which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days
of Appeals after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the
G.R. No. 118438. December party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party requesting the
4, 1998
 admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully
either admit or deny those matters.

The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of
documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which
will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable
inquiry. Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed
admitted unless within a period designated in the request which shall not be less than
fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further time as the court may allow
on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon the party
requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of
which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot
truthfully either admit or deny those matters. Upon service of request for admission, the
party served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of
which an admission is requested, in which case, he need not file an answer; (b) he may
admit the truth of the matters of which admission is requested by serving upon the party
requesting a written admission of such matters within the period stated in the request,
which must not be less than ten (10) days after service, or within such further time as
the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file a sworn statement denying
specifically the matter of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he may file a sworn
statement setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or
deny the matters of which an admission is requested.

4. Written interrogatories and Production or Inspection of Documents or Things

Philippine Health Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the adverse party or parties any
Insurance Corporation vs. facts or matter that are not privileged and are material and relevant to the subject of the
Our Lady of Lourdes pending action. Like other modes of discovery authorized by the Rules, the purpose of
Hospital written interrogatories is to assist the parties in clarifying the issues and in ascertaining
G.R. No. 193158, November the facts involved in a case. On the other hand, the provision on production and
11, 2015 inspection of documents is to enable not only the parties but also the court (in this case,
the PHIC Arbitration Department) to discover all the relevant and material facts in
connection with the case pending before it. It must be shown, therefore, that the
documents sought to be produced, inspected and/or copied/photographed are material
or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in the action.

In this case, the questions contained in the written interrogatories filed and received on
July 28, 2009 sought to elicit facts that could already be seen from the allegations as well
as attachments of the Complaint and the Verified Answer. Specifically, the entries in the

Rule 30
People vs. Bustamante
G.R. No. 189836, June 5, 2013
Rule 31
Metrobank vs. Sandoval
G.R. No. 169677 February 18,
2013
Republic vs. Heirs of
Enrique Oribello
G.R. No. 199501 March 6,
2013
three (3) Validation Report that OLLH sought to be identified and/or explained by
PHIC are either immaterial or irrelevant (to the issue of whether OLLH is guilty of filing
multiple claims and OLLH’s defense that it inadvertently attached a second copy of the
subject PhilHealth Claim Form 2 to the Transmittal Letter filed on June 19, 2007) or, even
if material or relevant, are self-explanatory and need no further elaboration from PHIC.
Thus, the interrogatories were frivolous and need not be answered. Aside from this, the
PHIC Arbitration Department correctly observed that the written interrogatories were
mistakenly addressed to the President and CEO of PHIC, who could not competently
answer, either based on his job description or firsthand experience, issues that arose
from and related to the filing and processing of claims. We likewise find as self-serving
the allegation of OLLH that its representatives were denied access to the documents
pertaining to the subject PhilHealth claim and, at the same time, were not allowed to
talk to any of the PhilHealth personnel. No iota of evidence, documentary or testimonial,
was submitted to substantiate this convenient excuse.
The case illustrated the order in the examination of witness (direct, cross, redirect,
recross) under Rule 132. This is different in the order of trial (in civil cases, Section 5,
Rule 30 and in criminal cases, Sec. 11, Rule 119)
The general rule is that all the issues in every case should be tried at one time. Exceptions
to the general rule are permitted only when there are extraordinary grounds for
conducting separate trials on different issues raised in the same case, or when separate
trials of the issues will avoid prejudice, or when separate trials of the issues will further
convenience, or when separate trials of the issues will promote justice, or when separate
trials of the issues will give a fair trial to all parties. Otherwise, the general rule must
apply.
Generally speaking, a lawsuit should not be tried piecemeal, or at least such a trial
should be undertaken only with great caution and sparingly.
In the context of legal procedure, the term “consolidation” is used in three different
senses:
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation
but is referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)
(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become
a single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation
where several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might
have been set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate
character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does
not merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to
the other. (consolidation for trial)
In the present case, the complaint for reversion filed by petitioner (Civil Case No. 225-0-

Maraño vs. Pryce Gases, Inc.
G.R. No. 196592. April 6,
2015
Rule 33
Republic vs. Gimenez
G.R. No. 174673, January 11,
2016
Bernardo vs. Court of
Appeals
G.R. No. 119010 September
5, 1997
Radiowealth Financa Co. vs.
Del Rosario
G.R. No. 138739 July 6,
2000

Cabador vs. People
G.R. No. 186001, October 2,
2009
92) was consolidated with the complaint for recovery of possession filed by Oribello
(Civil Case No. 223-0-91). While these two cases involve common questions of law and
fact, each action retains its separate and distinct character. The reversion suit settles
whether the subject land will be reverted to the State, while the recovery of possession
case determines which private party has the better right of possession over the subject
property. These cases, involving different issues and seeking different remedies, require
the rendition and entry of separate judgments. The consolidation is merely for joint trial
of the cases. Notably, the complaint for recovery of possession proceeded independently
of the reversion case, and was disposed of accordingly by the trial court.
Instead of ordering the dismissal of the respondent’s complaint for cancellation of
certificate of title, we find that the consolidation of the reivindicatory action and the
cancellation of certificate of title case to be the appropriate remedy in the present
situation. Consolidation is proper when two or more actions pending, not necessarily,
before the same court involve a common question of law or fact. In such cases, the court
may: order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions, order
all the actions consolidated, and make such orders concerning the proceedings therein
for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary costs and delay.
The order granting the demurrer to evidence was improper.
To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer
documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process. Weighing the
amount of time spent in litigating the case against the number of delays petitioner
incurred in submitting its Formal Offer of Evidence and the state’s policy on recovering
ill-gotten wealth, this court is of the belief that it is but only just that the Rules be relaxed
and petitioner be allowed to submit its written Formal Offer of Evidence.
An oral motion for leave to file demurrer is NOT allowed.
This doctrine may have been rendered moot by the Rule on Continuous Trial
Under the new rule on demurrer to evidence, the accused has the right to file a demurrer
to evidence after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave
of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is
denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave
is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on
the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to
file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to
determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings.
When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the
reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should
render judgment on the basis of the evidence proffered by the plaintiff.
To determine whether the pleading filed is a demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss,
the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it made in good faith; (2) the stage of the
proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary objective of the party filing it.

Cladio vs. Saraza
G.R. No. 213286, August 26,
2015
Felipe vs. MGM Motor
Trading Corporation
GR No. 191849, September
23, 2015

Hun Hyung Park vs. Choi
G.R. No. 165496, February
12, 2007
Sumingwa vs. People
G.R. No. 183619, October 13,
2009
Rule 34-35.
The Motion filed by the accused is a Motion to Dismiss, not a Demurrer to Evidence for
two reasons:
1. It was filed even before the prosecution has rested its case.
The prosecution filed its formal offer of exhibits the same day Cabador filed his motion
to dismiss, the trial court still needed to give him an opportunity to object to the
admission of those exhibits. It also needed to rule on the formal offer. And only after
such a ruling could the prosecution be deemed to have rested its case. Since Cabador
filed his motion to dismiss before he could object to the prosecution’s formal offer, before
the trial court could act on the offer, and before the prosecution could rest its case, it
could not be said that he had intended his motion to dismiss to serve as a demurrer to
evidence.
2. The ground relied upon is the violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial. A
demurrer to evidence is based only on the sole ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The demurrer to evidence was granted by the RTC and the CA, only to be reversed by
the Supreme Court. However, instead of deciding the case, the SC remanded the case
back to the RTC for further proceedings. Thus, we can infer that if the reversal was made
by the SC, the defendant does not lose its right to present evidence. Compare with
Radiowealth case.
The demurrer to evidence was properly granted as the plaintiff was only able to adduce
two pieces of evidence which were not sufficient to support his allegations.
In criminal cases, appeal as to the civil aspect of the action is permitted despite the grant
of the demurrer to evidence.
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted
for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed
to have waived the right to present evidence. At that juncture, the court is called upon
to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability
by a separate civil action has been waived or reserved.
If the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does
not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of
evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case
generally proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries
with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as
to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist
The order granting appellants demurrer to evidence was a resolution of the case on the
merits, and it amounted to an acquittal. Any further prosecution of the accused after an
acquittal would violate the proscription on double jeopardy.
Republic vs. Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corp.
Comglas Corp. vs. Santos
Car Check Center
G.R. No. 202989. March 25,
2015.
Philippine Bank of
Communications vs. Go
G.R. No. 175514. February
14, 2011.
Adolfo vs. Adolfo
G.R. No. 201427. March 18,
2015.
Summary judgment is not proper.
For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the
issue posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. Genuine issue
means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from
an issue which is fictitious or contrived.
Remedy in case summary judgment was rendered? Petition for Review under Rule 45
because it would not involve an evaluation of the probative value of any evidence, but
would only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the
facts and these supporting documents.
Comglasco must be deemed to have admitted the material allegations in the complaint.
Thus, judgment on the pleadings is proper.
A judgment on the pleadings is a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based
exclusively upon the allegations appearing in the pleadings of the parties and the
accompanying annexes. It is settled that the trial court has the discretion to grant a
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a party if there is no controverted matter
in the case after the answer is filed.
Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, except as to the amount of damages, when
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. Summary or
accelerated judgment is a procedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or
defenses at an early stage of litigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time
involved in a trial.
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues
of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full- blown trial. Even if on their
face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions and
admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor,
therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a genuine
issue as to any material fact.
A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. When the facts as pleaded
appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or question as
to he facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of
fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to
constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render
summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to
any material fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial.
Atty. Brondial: Judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment is not applicable if
there is pending appeal.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper “where an answer fails to tender an issue, or
otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.” Summary
judgment, on the other hand, will be granted “if the pleadings, supporting affidavits,
depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.
The existence or appearance of ostensible issues in the pleadings, on the one hand, and
their sham or fictitious character, on the other, are what distinguish a proper case for
summary judgment from one for a judgment on the pleadings. In a proper case for
judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the
defending party’s answer to raise an issue. On the other hand, in the case of a summary
judgment, issues apparently exist — i.e., facts are asserted in the complaint regarding
which there is as yet no admission, disavowal or qualification; or specific denials or
affirmative defenses are in truth set out in the answer — but the issues thus arising from
the pleadings are sham, fictitious or not genuine, as shown by affidavits, depositions, or
admissions.

While it may appear that under Rules 34 and 35 of the 1997 Rules, he may file a motion
for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment as a result of the consequent
admission by respondent that the subject property is conjugal, this is not actually the
case. Quite the contrary, by invoking the proceedings and decision in Civil Case No.
MAN- 2683, petitioner is precluded from obtaining judgment while the appeal in said
case is pending, because the result thereof determines whether the subject property is
indeed conjugal or paraphernal. He may not preempt the appeal in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
78971.