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Byzantine Sorrow and Venetian Joy: The Failure of Byzantine Diplomacy and the
by
Daniel Echebarria
December, 2013
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
DANIEL ECHEBARRIA
entitled
Byzantine Sorrow And Venetian Joy: The Failure Of Byzantine Diplomacy And
The Expansion Of Trade In The Mediterranean, 700-1200
MASTER OF ARTS
December, 2013
i
Abstract
From the seventh century to the twelfth century, the Byzantine Empire faced the
threat of invasion and trading competition from allies in the West. In order to address
these problems, the emperors used a variety of diplomatic strategies that stood in contrast
to those employed by Western European polities. These strategies included: gifts and
However, the diplomatic relationship between Venice and Constantinople shows the
limitations of these strategies and their failure to stop Venetian economic dominance. By
describing each feature in turn, it can be shown how Byzantine diplomacy helped create
expanded trade in Western Europe as well as weaken the Empire against the rise of
Table of Contents
Abstract……………………………………………………………………..………..….i
Dedication…………………………………………………………………………….…ii
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………..1-16
Historiography……………………………………...………………………..8-16
Chapter 2…………………………………………………………………………...17-42
Venice as a Possession……………………………………………………..18-25
Venice as an Equal…………………………………………………………25-32
Chapter 3…………………………………………………………………………...43-65
Chapter 4…………………………………………………………………………...66-78
Time Line…………………………………………………………………………79-80
Bibliography………………………………………………………………………81-83
1
Introduction
[I set a doctrine upon thee] first, in what each nation has power to advantage the Romans, and in
what to hurt, and how and by what other nation each severally may be encountered in arms and
subdued; then, concerning their ravenous and insatiate temper and the gifts they demand
inordinately; next, concerning also the difference between other nations, their origins and customs
and manner of life.
These things have I discovered of my own wisdom, and have decreed that they shall be made
known unto thee, my beloved son, in order that thou mayest know the difference between each of
these nations, and how either to treat with and conciliate them, or make war upon and oppose. 1
During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, trade concessions from Constantinople
to Venice weakened the Byzantine Empire and helped create a strong Venetian Republic.
The resourcefulness of these Byzantine diplomatic strategies against other powers would
indicate continued success with Venice, yet, the limitations of Byzantine diplomacy
rely on failed diplomatic policies, proving the eventual futility of these measures against
Diplomacy, for the Byzantine emperors was regarded as a powerful tool and was
1
Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus, De Adminstrando Imperio trans. R.J.H. Jenkins and Gyula
Moravcsik (Washington D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 1966), 45-47.
2
power and was used in lieu of continual warfare. Warfare, due to its costly nature, was a
consideration of last resort.3 The emperors used specific strategies in negotiations with
(DAI), an empirical treatise written by the Emperor Constantine VII which was intended
to guide his son and future emperors in their interactions with rival powers.
of John and Manuel Comnenus by John Kinnamos, the methods used by the emperors
stress diplomatic placation of antagonistic rival powers. While the Empire was not
diplomatic strategies. This strategy in this form is distinctly Byzantine in nature and is
unique in the ways that it was implemented. Strategies used by the emperors consisted
of: the granting of titles and tributes, Christian conversion, the offer of porphyrogenitus,
prolong the power of the Byzantine Empire until the late eleventh century due to
2
Steven Runciman, Byzantine Civilisation (London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd., 1933), 155.
3
John Haldon, “’Blood and ink’: some observations on Byzantine attitudes towards warfare and
diplomacy,” in Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine
Studies, Cambridge, March 1990 ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Hampshire, UK: Variorum,
1992), 282. Haldon is paraphrasing research done by the sociologist Michael Mann in his examples for
reasons against war. Haldon states that an empire such as one constructed by the Byzantines which was
built upon agricultural labor and overseas trade, would seek secondary methods to avert crisis and not
necessarily resort to war.
4
Jonathan Harris, Constantinople: Capital of Byzantium (London: Continuum UK, 2007), 63-64.
The Great Palace of Constantinople(Boukoleon) was comprised of several buildings. One of the buildings
contained the Purple Room or Porphyra. “Since the eighth century, it had been reserved for the lying-in of
Byzantine empresses, so that it could be said that the heir of a reigning emperor was ‘porphyrogenitus,’
3
continued conflict with the Normans. In 1082, concessions made by the Emperor
Alexius I to the Venetians proved too great and created a massive shift in the political and
during low points in the Empire’s history, emperors were able to utilize vast resources
and this allowed the generous granting of titles and tribute. This tribute also came in the
form of land. Large sums of gold and other precious objects were given to adversaries as
conciliatory gestures.5 These payments helped prevent full-scale war in the very areas
which produced the riches. In Chapters II and III, I discuss the use of titles and tribute
The Byzantine Empire required integration into the Christian community in order
for outside, political entities to gain the benefits of a relationship with Constantinople.
Constantinople, the new Rome in the east, was founded in order to be the imperial capital
of not only Rome, but also of Christianity.6 In the early centuries of the Empire warring,
barbarian tribes gained the benefits of the Empire, namely, protection, trade,
Christianity. As such, baptism was often used as a diplomatic tool.7 While this was a
very effective diplomatic tactic in the early centuries, by the late eleventh century
A presumptive heir born ‘in the purple,’ signified a major political tool used by
emperors trying to consolidate power. These children, namely royal princesses, were
considered to be ordained by Christ and purple was symbolically associated with the
imperial persona. The rarity of porphyrogenitae and the conditions of their birth
determined that these children were major factors in Byzantine diplomatic strategy.
Porphyrogenitae and those connected directly to them through family stood closest to the
imperial throne and succession.8 The Princess Anna Comnena described her
porphyrogenita birth as, “he [Alexius I] found his wife in the pangs of childbirth in the
room which had of old been set apart for the Empresses’ confinements, our forefathers
called it the ‘purple’ room, and from it the name ‘Porphyrogeniti’ had become current in
the world.”9 Until the tenth century, marriage alliances between imperial family
7
Jonathan Shepard, “The Uses of ‘History’ in Byzantine Diplomacy: Observations and
Comparisons,” in Porphyrogenita: Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in
Honour of Julian Chrysostomides ed. Charalambos Dendrinos et al. (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing
Company, 2003), 92. Shepard argues that the antiquity of the Byzantine Empire added to its diplomatic
recourse in talks with other powers. A fundamental set of Christian principles combined with the awe
inspiring nature of imperial understanding of its well established and enduring role in the world, meant that
Byzantine propaganda and diplomatic relations were built upon time-honored and “Christ tested” ideals.
The ancientness [my emphasis] of the Byzantine Empire meant that any diplomatic mission abroad brought
with it the power of a millennia of history to back up its claims.
8
Warren Treadgold, A History of the Byzantine State and Society (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1997), 487. Treadgold is speaking directly of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus.
9
Comnena, The Alexiad, 150-151.
5
members and foreign powers were uncommon and remained a crucial, diplomatic
strategy rarely employed.10 Marriage alliances between Venice and lesser imperial
family members did occasionally occur but a union between a Venetian noble and a
diplomacy was subtle, far-sighted and somewhat unscrupulous.”11 Court etiquette and
the role of the imperial ceremony was a carefully orchestrated method of showmanship
and statecraft. When visiting dignitaries were brought forward, court ceremony
demonstrated the power that emperors had at their disposal.12 Encounters with the
emperor were orchestrated to enhance his dignity in front of the visiting envoy. The
dignitaries. Even in times of political chaos, the emperor exuded an aura of majesty.
invincibility on the emperor.13 By the tenth and eleventh centuries, subterfuge diplomacy
10
Ruth Macrides, “Dynastic marriages and political kinship” in Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers
from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990 ed. Jonathan
Shepard and Simon Franklin (Hampshire, UK: Variorum, 1992), 299. Macrides states that marriages
between foreigners and the imperial family up until the mid tenth century ‘can be counted on the fingers of
one hand.’
11
Runciman, Byzantine Civilisation, 158.
12
Jonathan Shepard, “Byzantine diplomacy, A.D. 800-1204: means and ends,” in Byzantine
Diplomacy: Papers from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March
1990 ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Hampshire, UK: Variorum, 1992), 49-52.
13
Michael McCormick, “Emperors,” in The Byzantines ed. Guglielmo Cavallo (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 165. When foreign diplomats entered into the imperial court,
6
had little effect on a Venetian culture which was not awed by mechanical trinkets and
used to reinforce the political standing of kingdoms, subject to the Empire’s control. The
emperor also played the role of father over his own people as well as the guiding figure
over his subjects’ spiritual needs. Father-figure diplomacy formed to place the emperor
over “a complicated hierarchy of states that developed with the ruler in Constantinople as
Roman emperor and head of Christendom.”14 Byzantine diplomacy made it clear that
friendly kingdoms, though allied, were beholden to guidance from the father-figure
authority in Constantinople. To the emperors, these kingdoms were allied but not equal.
As Alexander Kazhdan stated, “the Christian world had been conceived of as a complex
hierarchy of states and at the top of which stood the emperor surrounded by a family of
princes.”15 These princes were expected to adhere to the spiritual and political decisions
mechanical lions roared and mechanical birds sang. The emperor’s throne even raised into the air.
McCormick explains that, “the Byzantines were ingenious makers of mechanical devices that profoundly
impressed and mystified in a pretechnological culture.” As part of Byzantine diplomacy, mechanical
devices were used to create an elaborate show with sound and sights to throw off the visiting diplomat and
to convince him that the emperor was God’s Anointed. McCormick also tells us, “tenth-century
descriptions show that the sights and sounds that accompanied the emperor’s self-manifestation to foreign
diplomats were geared to produce a disorienting psychological impact: [the din and distance engulfing the
participants obviated any discussion.]”
14
Ostrogorsky, History of, 28.
15
Alexander Kazhdan, “The notion of Byzantine Diplomacy,” in Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers
from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990 ed. Jonathan
Shepard and Simon Franklin (Hampshire, UK: Variorum, 1992), 10.
7
of the emperor.16 Father-figure diplomacy worked for a long time in the history between
Venice and Constantinople yet Venice, a de facto, political entity as early as the ninth
further detail, with special attention given to the Chrysobull of 1082. This charter,
drafted with the permission of Emperor Alexius I, granted generous trade concessions in
Constantinople to the Venetians. This was done to gain Venetian help in the ongoing war
against Norman invaders. The chrysobull was the culmination of centuries of Byzantine
thought and was generated as a weapon of negotiation against a formidable enemy.17 The
trade rights granted to the Venetians in the chrysobull, gave them overwhelming control
steadily saw the power of Venice rise while the Empire remained static. The specific
clauses of the chrysobull are discussed in detail. I also discuss the political relationship
between Venice and Constantinople, showing how Venice began as a colony of the
Empire and eventually rose to become a formidable competitor for trade in the
16
Dimitri Obolensky, “Nationalism in Eastern Europe in the Middle Ages,” in The Byzantine
Inheritance of Eastern Europe (London: Variorum Reprints, 1982), 131. Originally published in Papers
given at the 12th Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Birmingham 1978. Athens, 1979. 13. “There is
evidence to suggest that, even when they were in practice fully sovereign in their respective realms, they
[Byzantine client states] usually subscribed to the belief that the emperor was the overlord of all Orthodox
Christians and that some, like Boris of Bulgaria and Vladimir of Russia, publically acknowledged at their
baptism that the Emperor was their spiritual father.”
17
Donald M. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 62. Nicol states, “as in all Byzantine documents of
state the terminology is taken from the past.”
8
Chapter III describes the major problems associated with the excessive trade
apparent as trade and economic power were gradually siphoned from the control of the
emperors and into the hands of Venetian merchants. Over the twelfth century, Venetian
trading power eventually stifled any competition from Byzantine merchants and the role
of Venice as a major trading and political power in the Mediterranean came to fruition.
Their diplomatic strategies having failed, the emperors were left with no other options but
to allow for more concessions to take place. These were implemented to return trading
hegemony back to Constantinople yet these efforts only exacerbated the problem.18
Historiography
into theme of general diplomacy; certain historians include and discuss the relationship
yet do not often separate it as a defining feature in the two powers’ history. Historians
18
Treadgold, A History, 641 “[Emperor]Manuel’s main concern was the Sicilian Normans’
invasion. To stop them, he built a large fleet and asked for help from the Venetians. He confirmed their
previous trading privileges and allowed them to expand their trading quarter in Constantinople.”
9
describe trade between Venice and the Eastern Empire yet the discussion is often
centered on the increases and stagnation of the Byzantine economy over a large period.
Agriculture and the taxes raised on the land worked by farming communities
brought in the lion’s share gold in the imperial treasury.19 Trade and merchant taxation
were a form of economic supply yet were very minimal in comparison to the empire’s
agrarian output.20 Historians point out the importance of Byzantine trade over the
centuries but tend to stress the diplomatic relationship between Venice and
between the cities are discussed in a larger context. They often use this context to
explain the ebbing of relations between the two. They also discuss trade as a method of
explaining the relationship of the market economy on the pivotal decisions enacted by
The historian Steven Runciman dedicated a large section of his book Byzantine
Civilisation to the effects of commerce on the economy and relationships of the Eastern
Empire yet the relationship between Venice and Constantinople is only given a few pages
19
Warren Treadgold, The Byzantine Revival,780-842 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1988), 36. Treadgold states, “the empire’s economy was overwhelmingly agricultural, and agriculture is
hard to destroy.” His description explains how the central government continued to support itself even
after habitual invasions which damaged local, agrarian communities.
20
Treadgold, The Byzantine, 36. Treadgold discusses the relationship between taxation and the
Empire’s economy by the eighth century. “The empire had never had much private trade or manufacturing
to lose; [whatever had disappeared would have been an insignificant part of the whole economy.]”
10
in his discussion. Runciman ties up his chapter on trade and describes the role that Italian
merchants played. Their involvement in eastern markets first lessened then signaled the
death knell of trade as a source of income for the emperors. According to Runciman,
Venetian and Italian control over Constantinople’s warehouses and quays “humbled” the
Empire.21 Runciman discusses the diplomatic strengths and weaknesses of the Empire in
another section yet never really tied the important nature of trade into the larger
framework with it. George Ostrogorsky’s descriptions of the trade relationship between
Venice and the Empire are very sparse. He mentions the Chrysobull of 1082 and details
Venetian help against the Normans yet his descriptions are shown in the context of the
some of the ramifications of trade concessions and Emperor Manuel I’s attempt to
counter them.22
These historians describe numerous treaties and diplomatic episodes in the history
of the Empire and attempted to detail each aspect of the empire as it related to the period
in which they were describing. The unique nature of Byzantine diplomacy and the
strategies used by the emperors is generally missing from the overall framework of their
with Venice are stated in passing as a way to discuss the aspects of the chronological
21
Runciman, Byzantine Civilisation,178. He states, “the tragedy of the long death of Byzantium
us above all a financial tragedy.”
22
Ostrogorsky, A History, 389. Ostrogorsky’s limited descriptions of these events fit into the
larger context of his narrative; the rise and fall of the Byzantine state.
11
presented but lessened the opportunity to describe in detail the effects of specific and
Historians such as Frederic Lane and Thomas Madden focus their attention on the
rise of Venice and the roles that the Empire had in the city’s trading economic and
both the Adriatic and eventually the Mediterranean. He details their willingness to keep a
close trading and military association with the Eastern Empire as well as their remarkable
ability to use their navy both as a powerful military force and as a tool for lucrative
piracy against rivals. Lane also distinguishes the role that Venice played as the
middleman between the Holy Roman Empire and the Eastern Empire; using its powerful
navy as a way to disrupt or promote trade between both powers. In any case, each
mission carried out by successive doges had the continued prosperity of Venetian trade
on the forefront of their plans. By the tenth century, Venice was the supreme power in
the Gulf of Venice and by the eleventh century Venetian ships were firmly in control of
trade and military operations in the entire Adriatic.23 Madden describes the efforts of
Doge Enrico Dandolo and his efforts to create a lasting and dramatic trading empire in
the eastern Mediterranean. Both of these historians point out a specific and important
date in the history of both Venice and Constantinople and that is 1204; the Sack of
Constantinople and the taking of the Eastern Empire by the Latins. According to these
23
Frederic Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1973), 26-27.
12
historians, this date more so then ratification of the Chrysobull of 1082, truly begins the
Madden touch upon the treaty briefly yet their emphasis rests upon the rise of Venice as
the preeminent trading power in the Mediterranean after the Sack of Constantinople in
1204. Lane’s accounts of the rise of Venice’s naval power correlate to the research
presented further on yet I feel that the leading role played by Chrysobull of 1082 in the
Later historians such as Donald Nicol, Warren Treadgold, Angeliki Laiou and
Cécile Morrisson have dedicated greater emphasis on the effects of Byzantine diplomacy
and trade. Much of their research details specifically the impacts made on the Byzantine
state and the overall economy of the Empire before, during and after Italian dominance
over trade. More importantly, they take into consideration descriptions of the Chrysobull
of 1082 as well as other trade treaties in their discussions of the Empire’s history after the
These historians stress the importance of other factors in the Byzantine cultural
history. They focus on factors such as: the build-up of the economy, religion as a
motivator and the creation of ceremonial artifacts as catalysts for Byzantine power and
In this regard, Nicol, Laiou and Morrisson pay particular attention to the
underlying cultural themes which were paramount in the continued political history of the
24
Treadgold, A History of, 558-579.
13
Empire. In their work, The Byzantine Economy, Laiou and Morrisson emphasize the
working conditions and cultural impact that the merchant and working class as well as the
peasantry had on the Byzantine state. They describe the roles that these people played in
overseer of the landlords. These landlords made sure that resources from the countryside
found their way back to the imperial capital. They also detail the nature of the Byzantine
state; an entity which exacted tight control over its resources and ensured a limited, free-
trade economy.25 Nicol describes in detail the strong bond between Venice and
Nicol, Laiou and Morrisson all place emphasis on a more detailed and accurate
depiction of Byzantine history. Treadgold’s works do this to a lesser extent. They stress
the importance of the emperors’ actions, politically and militarily, through the use of
concepts of culture and economy. Yet these authors do not specify distinct Byzantine
diplomatic strategies even though many of them make references to the uniqueness of
these diplomatic stratagems.26 Also, most of them describe the opening of the west to
Greek ideas with imported Greek, cultural theories as the main culminating point of
25
Angeliki E. Laiou and Cécile Morrisson, The Byzantine Economy (Cambridge, UK. Cambridge
University Press, 2007), 33
26
Nicol, Byzantium, 65-67. Nicol describes the Pala d’Oro, a magnificent altarpiece created by
Byzantine craftsman in 1105, which was ordered as a wealthy purchase by the Doge. In 1105, relations
were still on sound footing between the two powers yet the cracks were starting to show. Nicol states, “it
was a partnership in which the senior partner and giver of good things was Byzantium.”
14
interaction between the Eastern Empire and Western Europe. I feel that these authors
gloss over or disregard two main points of the relationship between Venice and
Constantinople. One, by using the evidence discovered in the historiography a clear case
can be made that there were unique, Byzantine, diplomatic strategies which were
culturally, economically and militaristically different from the rest of Europe. Two, that
the diplomatic relationships that evolved between Venice and Constantinople succeeded
in opening the west to trade from the east and allowed for a vast expansion in material
perspective into the cultural foundations of Byzantine, political history. Medieval Greek
and Latin sources should not be used as guidebooks since accountability and perspective
are clouded by stereotypes and cultural biases. Yet, there is a much to be gained from
found which greatly expands the themes discussed in this thesis. The uniqueness of
Byzantine culture and its effects on Byzantine diplomatic strategies are observed by
Primary material used defines the role that Byzantine culture had in the
27
Porphyrogenitus, Constantine VII, De Administrando Imperio Subheading 29. Of Dalmatia and
the adjacent nations to it, 123. One example of Christian conversion policy is expressed in the following
example by the Emperor Constantine VII who described a diplomatic interaction between the Emperor
Basil I and Slavic tribes. “In the time of Basil, the Christ-loving emperor, they [Slavs] sent diplomatic
agents, begging and praying him that those of them who were unbaptized might receive baptism and that
they might be, as they had originally been, subject to the empire of the Romans…”
15
used from Princess Anna’s The Alexiad, The Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus by
John Kinnamos and the previously introduced De Administrando Imperio help shape the
context of the chapters in this thesis. These chapters follow the natural progression of
Byzantine diplomatic strategies; their benefits and eventual failure at the negotiating
table. Usage of these sources helps determine factors instrumental in the relationship
Emperor Alexius I and the Crusaders give the reader insight on the cultural exchanges
between two foreign and inherently opposite cultures. Her personal involvement most
certainly clouded her statements and created less than perfect characterizations of her
father’s enemies but her primary and secondary accounts of the events used in the
following chapters are expressive and a necessary inclusion. Her narratives allow the
reader to benefit from her contemporary knowledge of important dates that occurred
during Alexius’ reign; the 1st Crusade’s passage through Constantinople, the Normans’
first attacks against the Empire and the role of the Venetians as allies of the imperial
throne.28
provide a specific and insightful glimpse into the mental framework which comprised
Byzantine diplomatic and cultural history from the perspective of the imperial authority
28
Comnena, The Alexiad, 26-31. Anna portrays the Norman Robert Guiscard and the rest of his
countrymen as western barbarians, intent on plunder and slaughter. However, she places much of the
blame on Byzantine troubles with them on the political moves of the Byzantines themselves, namely an
emperor who preceded her father; Emperor Michael VII Ducas.
16
in charge of it all: the emperor. Constantine’s descriptions are laced with words of
encouragement and the hope that his son, the future Romanus II, would benefit from his
The primary sources utilized in the following chapters portray various institutions
of the Eastern Empire and project their prominence through economic, militaristic,
cultural and diplomatic means. The reader is unable to determine how much of the
29
Porphyrogenitus, Constantine VII, De Adminsitrando Imperio Preface, 45. “A wise son maketh
glad a father, and an affectionate father taketh delight in a prudent son.” Constantine VII’s heartfelt plea to
his son begins the DAI and establishes its context.
17
II
Two Powers
Now when this king Atilla had devastated all the country of the mainland and had advanced as far
Rome and Calabria and had left Venice behind, those who had fled for refuge to the islands of
Venice, having obtained breathing-space and, as it were, shaken off their faintness of heart, took
counsel jointly to settle there, which they did, and have been settled there till this day.
The Venetians assailed them with arrows and javelins, and stopped them from crossing over to the
island. So then king Pippin [Pepin, King of the Franks], at a loss, said to the Venetians: “You are
beneath my hand and my providence, since you are of my country and domain.” But the
Venetians answered him: “We want to be servants of the emperor of the Romans, and not of
you.”30
chronological history of Venice from a Byzantine colony into a major political rival must
secured their control over Mediterranean trade and greatly weakened Byzantine economic
30
Porphyrogenitus, Constantine VII, De Administrando Imperio Subheading 28. Story of the
settlement of what is now called Venice, 121.
18
Venice as a Possession
Venice began its history as a backwater of the Eastern Empire. Over the
centuries, it slowly gained a stronger prominence in the economic and political world of
the medieval Mediterranean. This settlement on the lagoon gradually became more and
more important to the geopolitics of the region and capitalized on the lessening of
Byzantine influence and power in the Adriatic. The small area of Venice in the northern
Adriatic saw the continuous ebb and flow of invaders who swept down from central and
eastern Europe and who were in their turn, invaded by other barbarian tribes. Because of
this, sometime during the sixth century Venetians who lived and worked on the mainland
took refuge on the sandbars and islands which formed the Rialto. This area gradually
became the permanent home for these people.31 The political foundation and autonomy
dates. This is notable because the election of doges (duke) and their dates in office did
The early political, economic and military histories of the Eastern Empire and
Venice were inextricably intertwined from the fall of the Western Empire to the eventual
well as economic/military assistance came into play between Constantinople and its
31
Nicol, Byzantium, 4. Nicol describes the Venetian tradition as overstating the ‘facts’ of history.
Much of Venetian tradition states that by as early as the seventh century, Venice enjoyed autonomy, free
from Byzantine control which bends the truth. “In 639 the Provencia Venetiarum was still Byzantine
territory governed by a master of soldier answerable to the Exarch of Ravenna.” 7
19
former vassal. These two policies were to mark dramatic events as they occurred in the
history of both powers. Both aspects occur in the early and later history between them.
The first policy involved the role of the Eastern Empire as the suzerain of former
force in the 730s, in the wake of the first Lombard occupation of Ravenna,” while “the
dynamic center of gravity, unmistakably, lies at the head of the Adriatic, Venice.”32 In
the seventh through ninth centuries Venice still remained politically and economically
possession and as a source for the majority of the goods traded to the West. A large
percentage of Venetian trade goods flowed from the Black Sea back to trading centers in
Western Europe and Africa. Using a specific industry, silk, Robert Lopez discusses the
relationship between the West and how this industry relied on the continued necessity of
a middleman. Venice and other maritime city-states gained prominence in this capacity
while still staying under the control and forced obligation of their overlord, the eastern
emperor. “The lack of a commercial modus vivendi was one of the main causes of
economic isolation of Western Europe, and contributed to making the fortune of Venice
and other Italian cities, nominally subject of the Byzantine Empire.”33 Venice’s early
32
Michael McCormick, The Origins of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce,
A.D 300-900. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 526.
33
Robert S. Lopez, “Silk Industry in the Byzantine Empire,” in Byzantium and the World around
it: Economic and Institutional Relations. Section III (London: Variorum Reprints, 1978), 36. Originally
published in Speculum XX (Cambridge, MA, 1945). Lopez brings up an interesting point which can be
touched on briefly. The intransigence between the Holy Roman Empire and the Eastern Empire as to who
carried the mantle of former Roman glory prevented a cohesive union from ever emerging between the two
powers. Thus, trade was weakened as it happened directly between them and so smaller powers acting as
20
economic successes did not translate to full political self-rule even though Venetian
tradition stresses a very early autonomy due to their role in the politics of the Adriatic and
eventually took control and subverted the authority of the former leading partner. Nicol
uses a dialogue from a primary source, John the Deacon (secretary to Doge Pietro II),
writing about events which occurred in the early eighth century. “All the Venetians,
together with the patriarch and the bishops in common council, determined that
henceforth it would be more dignified to live under duces then other tribunes; and after
much deliberation the nominated the illustrious Paulicius and set him up as dux at
Heraclea.”34 This is an interesting idea which guides the reader into believing that
Venice was a self-controlled power well before the tenth century, but Nicol states that
“Paulicius” was a Byzantine official and was duly appointed by the Exarch of Ravenna.35
Nevertheless, Venetian maritime expeditions further from traditional trade routes slowly
expanded Venetian presence in the Mediterranean. The former backwater slowly became
a lucrative trading partner with most Mediterranean powers including the Holy Roman
Empire.
middlemen gained from their stubbornness and acted as intermediaries on the geographic boundaries of the
empires. (my emphasis)
34
Nicol, Byzantium, 9.
35
Nicol, Byzantium, 9.
21
The changing fortunes of the Byzantine Empire and the geographic location of
Venice meant that over time, the principle of control gradually grew weaker and weaker
with each successive generation. For Constantinople, facing direct and legitimate threats
at home and closer to the main heartland of the Empire was of far greater importance than
making sure that a possession such as Venice stayed firmly under imperial control. By
the early tenth century, the Venetians still considered themselves friends and allies of the
Empire but the relationship had changed; from supplicant, to lower-ranked peer. The
superior, gradually shifted to a more equal balance. The Empire in the tenth century did
not have the resources to launch a full scale expedition to bring Venice and the
surrounding areas to heel as Justinian had done in his re-conquest of the West.36
Venice gradually pulled away from Byzantine hegemony and forged its path
using trading power as its main weapon. Venice’s creation as an economic and maritime
community, separate from Byzantine control, was helped by numerous factors. Frederic
Lane states that “its earliest notable naval exploits were in defense of the peaceful
exchange of commodities, of the trade which had developed under Byzantine protection,”
but “at the same time, the Venetians unhesitatingly resorted to violence to maintain and
enlarge their own part in that trade, collecting the process considerable booty.”37 One of
these factors was the continued efforts of each successive doge to push farther and farther
into unknown and lucrative markets in the Levant; territory still held, controlled and
36
Runciman, Byzantine Civilisation, 35-36.
37
Lane, Venice, 23-24
22
taxed by Constantinople. Another factor was overland trade which permeated between
the upstart city and Western Europe. “Early on, the Franks expanded Venice’s economic
hinterland by promoting links across the Alps to the Rhineland.”38 Yet another example
of continued Venetian economic expansion is the slave trade which was fostered and
expanded with Venetian help. Slaves were captured in central and eastern Europe and
sold in markets to both Frankish and Arab buyers. The trade was very lucrative and Arab
gold which normally would have gone through Constantinople to be taxed was instead
siphoned off by enterprising Venetian traders.39 Exporting slaves from central and
territory expanded the role of Venetian commerce in Italy and Western Europe. This
economic activity built up over time creating further opportunities for Venetian
merchants. The slave trade and other exotic wares became so lucrative that even when
pirate activity increased and the routes between the Adriatic and the Constantinople grew
increasingly dangerous, new sea routes were opened to keep the flow of materials
unchecked.40 Venetian autonomy was also correlated to their growing maritime power
and their political and economic cooperation with the Frankish Kingdoms in Western
Europe. By the late ninth century, successive Carolingians had effectually used Venetian
38
McCormick, The Origins, 793.
39
McCormick, The Origins, 792. McCormick states that as the Carolingian expanded eastward
and southward towards Italy, the rise of new economic capabilities greatly increased and new markets were
expanded into and realized. These new markets offered exotic and unique commodities which were rarely
seen in Western Europe. Expertly, the rising Venetians saw this as opportunity to grow their trade
activities using their lucrative trade routes as political clout. McCormick puts it succinctly as “the
Venetians perhaps were the first to figure this out.”
40
McCormick, The Origins, 795.
23
trade as a bulwark against Byzantine hegemony in Italy and the Adriatic. Good relations
opened up between Venice and the Holy Roman Empire and commerce continued
factored into the rate of Venice’s pulling away from Byzantine rule by the late ninth
century. This was not so much an inevitability but an end result to a process which had
power and trading partner of Western Europe to the point where it undertook treaty
city-state. This type of authority had previously been reserved for the emperor and had
been implemented by the exarchs in his stead.41 This practice was unheard of in any of
the administrative centers closer to Constantinople and directly regulated by the imperial
government but distance dictated that Venice could and would be able to guide its own
affairs. With the extinction of the Exarch in Ravenna in 751, Venice enjoyed a
specialized role in the political structure of the Empire and the imperial throne was quite
powerless to do anything about it. Nicol describes treaties ratified between Venice and
41
Ostrogorsky, A History of, 80. Byzantine power in the West rested with the exarchs, the leading
one in Ravenna. The exarch or Byzantine governor was the mouthpiece for the emperor and exacted and
doled out imperial law and administration set down to him by the central government in Constantinople.
The exarchs became weaker over successive generations as Byzantine power waned in the West until the
final Exarch in Ravenna was killed fighting the Lombard invasion of 751(170).
24
the Franks during the ninth century, stating, “the Franks accepted that Venice was free to
The gradual separation of Venice from under the control of the imperial East did
not signify a strategic and aggressive breakdown between the two powers. Likewise,
Venetian limited independence did not mean that Venice had forsaken its close history
and strong relations with its former master. In fact, Venice continued to play the role of
subjugate to Byzantine authority in Southern Italy once the Eastern Empire’s gaze turned
towards its last possessions there. Well into the tenth century, Venice still contributed
ships, men and materials to help Byzantine military efforts. They did this first against
Frankish aggression and then against Norman invaders intent upon expansion and
conquest. The relationship between Venice and Constantinople was a special partnership
between a powerful and older veteran and its upstart and innovative younger protégé.
Good relations were maintained for a long period of time and both parties took advantage
of the others’ strengths. Eastern goods continued to flow to a multitude of ports through
Venetian shipping and Venice was still counted upon to help in military expeditions
undertaken by various emperors in southern Italy and the east coast of the Adriatic.
According to tradition, Venetian city-state status came into being sometime around 880-
915 and yet Venice continued its close link to the Byzantine court doing so out of an
imparted tradition.43 It is clear that before the turn of the first millennium; Venice was
42
Nicol, Byzantium, 33.
43
Nicol, Byzantium, 36 Mentioned before, Nicol uses documentation from John the Deacon as a
way to show dates that correspond to Venice’s rise to power and to pinpoint the chronology of Venetian
economic and political expansion. “Tribuno (Doge Pietro II) and his successors continued to respect the
25
well beyond looking towards Constantinople for guidance in military, economic, and
political matters.
Venice as an Equal
By the first decade of the eleventh century, two major political events occurred
which document the continued rise of Venice as a powerful and autonomous regional
player. Both of these events had dramatic and specific connections with Byzantine
diplomacy; how they were envisioned and how they were instituted.
The first event occurred in 879 and its political implications involved titles and
crafty statecraft. The Emperor Basil I extended diplomatic overtures towards the
Venetians and the West since assuming the role of emperor in 867. Talks were held
between both the Eastern Empire and the Holy Roman Empire. These negotiations were
instituted in order to form a pact of cooperation between East and West. This was begun
in an effort to combat both empires’ mutual foe; the Arabs.44 These talks of combined
cooperation eventually came to nothing and the unification of the two empires stayed a
political dream. In addition, it is important to note that no Venetian ships were sent down
to assist the Byzantines in their military maneuvers against the Arabs in Southern Italy.
In fact, Nicol states that, “there is no evidence that they [Venetians] were alerted or
traditional contact with Byzantium. It must be assumed that they did so willingly and not under duress,
since the emperors could hardly have enforced even a nominal subjection upon them.”
44
Treadgold, A History of, 456.
26
invited to send ships to Bari.”45 Invited in this context shows the perceived relationship
between the Empire and Venice. As a suzerain under the direction of Constantinople,
Venice was obligated to send ships to help in the battle against the Arabs but as an
independent city-state that was guided by their own conditions and terms, their
cooperation and involvement in the war was entirely of their own choosing.
recognized the importance of friendship with the rising city-state. In 879 he sent a
diplomatic delegation helps shed light on how far Venice had risen in the political world
complete Venetian cooperation and they would have taken place in Constantinople. By
the late ninth century, political fortunes had changed to a sufficient degree with the
implications that Venice was no longer a trivial power to be coerced into action. Military
actions undertaken by the city were carefully determined to see how the resulting changes
The Byzantine envoys that arrived in Venice in 879 were seeking to accomplish
the following goals: to form a stronger relationship with Venice, to reconnect the city to
Constantinople, and to bolster their previous history together much like the relationship
45
Nicol, Byzantium, 33. Nicol makes an important and telling claim here based upon the lack of
evidence of Venetian help in the assault on Bari. “What evidence there is suggests, on the contrary, that
they had now decided to pursue their own policies, conduct their own wars and make their own treaties
with Arabs and Slavs without feeling obliged to follow the lead of their Byzantine masters.”
27
Byzantine diplomacy are seen in the treaty’s stipulations. First, Basil did not demand the
Venetians’ presence in the imperial capital instead, he sent his envoys to Venice. This
shows that Basil was willing to forgo previously held tenets of Byzantine diplomacy
including the Byzantine tradition of forcing subservient rulers to come when commanded
before the seat of imperial power. Bringing the Venetians to the capital served as a way
to awe them into submission and this was the normal intention of the practice yet Basil
recognized that the Empire was not in a politically or militarily strong enough position to
demand too much from an ally especially one whom he desperately wanted good
relations with in that region. Second, the Byzantine envoys did not come empty handed.
“The ambassadors presented valuable presents from the emperor,” and gave the gifts over
to the Venetians as a father would hand them over to a cherished son.46 Third, the envoys
presented other gifts from the emperor: titles bestowed upon the Doge and the leading
members of the city. Nicol tells us that “they conferred upon the doge the imperial title
of protospatharios. The enhanced status of the dignity did not pass unnoticed. Previous
doges had accepted the humbler titles of spatharios or hypatos. Orso had been promoted
in the ranks of the Byzantine family.”47 These titles were largely honorific and conferred
46
Nicol, Byzantium, 33. Nicol does not state what the gifts were but based upon previous
discussions, the emperor no doubt sent gold, valuable spices and perhaps even rare silk in an effort to win
over the Doge Orso I. For further reading on silk used a diplomatic tool, see Anna Muthesius’ “Silken
diplomacy,” in Byzantine Diplomacy: Papers from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine
Studies, Cambridge, March 1990, ed. Jonathan Shepard and Simon Franklin (Hampshire, UK: Variorum,
1992), 315-316.
47
Nicol, Byzantium, 33. For a further explanation of Byzantine titles and honorifics, see both
Michael McCormick’s Eternal Victory: Triumphal rulership in late antiquity, Byzantium, and the early
medieval West. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986),21 “Like the triumph itself, such titles
soon came to be restricted to the emperors,” and Ostrogorsky’s History of the Byzantine State “Basil I and
Leo VI,” 248-252.
28
upon political allies of the Empire. Handed down through the Eastern Empire since their
origins in the original Roman Empire, these titles conveyed several aspects of power
upon their bearers. Most of these Byzantine titles carried little political weight but they
still extended to the bearer the representation of power. The titles also held sway across
regions in contact with the Empire. A leader fortunate enough to be assigned a title was
held in high esteem with the emperor and the power involved linked any aggression
against that titled person directly to action against the Empire itself.
The Treaty of 879, besides the granting of gifts and the conferring of titles, also
granted Venice a stronger role in the family structure of the Empire. Venice, solidified
its presence as an ally and partner of the Byzantines and looked to keep close connections
retained a firm belief, inherent in their Roman imperial tradition, that the granting of
court titles to foreign powers domesticated them and made them feel what they would be
The second major event which occurred a few years after the turn of eleventh
century involves a marriage. This marriage was not an ordinary one though and its very
existence shows just how far Venice had come as a major power. In 1005 the Emperor
Basil II, in close cooperation with Doge Pietro Orseolo II recommended that the doge
send his eldest son to Constantinople. In a dramatic and politically charged arrangement,
48
Nicol, Byzantium, 34. Nicol continues by stating that the embassy to Venice signified that it
“was in some sense still a member of their family.”
29
Giovanni, the son of Pietro, was married to Maria Argyropoulos, a member of the royal
porphyrogenitus were out of the question at such an early period in Byzantine diplomatic
history. Maria was not an immediate family member of Basil II yet her family was part
of the cadet branch of the royal household. Quoting John the Deacon, Nicol states that,
“[Maria] was one of the sisters of the future Emperor Romanus III,” and of “imperial
stock.”49 The marriage was celebrated throughout Venice and Constantinople and the
happy couple soon returned to Venice with “the holy relics of St. Barbara,” in tow.50
marriages were rare occurrences and this one was no different. The doge’s son did not
marry directly into the imperial family. The Byzantine emperor saw the necessity of
strengthening the bond between the two cities and used a valuable strategy of Byzantine
diplomacy to gain a stronger footing with an ally. Maria was one step under the imperial
household and her marriage to the doge’s son was a dramatic and resounding success for
Venetian politics at home and abroad. The marriage was a resounding success for
Byzantine diplomacy as well because it strengthened the bond between Venice and the
imperial throne and placed Venice solidly on the side of Byzantine politics in the Adriatic
and Italy. For Basil II, the marriage was a way for him to cement a political and military
49
Nicol, Byzantium, 46. John the Deacon also states that she was a sister of Basil II but Nicol
disputes this. However, she was directly related to the emperor but through a distant branch of the family.
50
Nicol, Byzantium, 46. In a tragic piece of history, the couple did not survive long. Maria,
Giovanni and their infant son were killed by the plague in 1007.
30
commitment from Venice. This arrangement was necessitated by the Empire’s struggles
with Croatia and the Slavic peoples as well as his situations in regards to Byzantine
claims in both Sicily and southern Italy. Venice provided a strong navy that the emperor
could rely upon to help with these major, regional problems. In return, the emperor
parted with a distant relative accompanied by valuable gifts which sweetened the deal.
Those gifts along with the promotion of Giovanni Orseolo to a patrician fostered a
Both the marriage of Maria Argyropoulos and the Byzantine diplomatic mission
to Venice in 879 attest to the resounding success that was Byzantine diplomacy. In each
instance, usages of Byzantine diplomatic strategies paved the way for a continued
Byzantine presence in the Adriatic and on the Italian mainland as well as Sicily. As early
as the ninth century, without these treaties and the specific, diplomatic strategies used to
ensure their success, the presence of the Eastern Empire in the regions west of Greece
appears dismal. The emperors needed their Venetian partners to act as a military and
economical presence for them in a region which was far removed from the strength of the
Empire’s heartland in the east. With Venetian assistance, Constantinople was assured a
continued existence in Italy and that part of the Mediterranean well into the twelfth
century.
These two major events employed all necessary diplomatic strategies used by the
Byzantines throughout their history and each event was achieved to further the
51
Nicol, Byzantium, 46.
31
prerogative of the imperial throne. Concessions were made, tribute was paid and titles
were granted. A marriage alliance was accomplished and Venice was brought tighter
under the protection of the imperial family. By the time Venice was recognized as a
rising power in the Mediterranean, Byzantine diplomatic strategies had already been in
use for at least 300 years. The reliance on diplomacy to work in conjunction or as a
direct replacement for military expenditures was standard fare for the Eastern Empire
when the time came to treat Venice as an equal. By the eleventh century, Constantinople
still considered Venice somewhat less than an equal, but the economic and military
necessities of the time made the city-state considerably more than that. The Byzantine
Empire was forced to use all aspects of diplomatic strategies to assure its cooperation.
Referencing the marriage of Maria and Giovanni, the historian Louis Bréhier described
the alliance and stated, “the consequences of these events were manifold: above all a new
Events over time and the continuous rising of new enemies against the Empire
ensured that Byzantine diplomatic strategies had to be used repeatedly as a stop gap
measure against the usage of armed intervention. The diplomatic concessions made to
Venice before the eleventh century, helped continue its struggle against the onslaught of
Muslim advances, Slavic incursions, and eventually Norman invaders. This same
reliance on diplomacy helped transform Venice from a backwater of the Empire into a
rival power. The Venetians cooperated for many years with Constantinople and this
52
Louis Bréhier, The Life and Death of Byzantium (Le Vie et mort de Byzance Vol. 1 Le Monde
Byzantine) trans. Margaret Vaughan (New York: North Holland Publishing, 1977), 162.
32
cooperation was structured upon Byzantine strategy yet this same strategy eventually
“The content of the document [Byzantine-Venetian Chrysobull of 1082], however, is rather more
important than its date, for it was by far the most comprehensive and detailed charter of privileges
hitherto granted to Venice by a Byzantine Emperor. It was also the most consequential, for it
became the corner-stone of the Venetian colonial empire in the eastern Mediterranean, the
prototype of a series of imperial chrysobulls for Venice in the next one hundred years.
Alexios[Alexius I] was in a generous mood.”53
By the turn of the eleventh century it was clear to both Byzantines and Venetians
that the former possession was subject to Byzantine control no longer. It was also clear
that any help made to the Byzantines by the Venetians was done for two reasons; a
symbolic sense of tradition and pride to a former controlling power and the understanding
that helping Constantinople in her fight against enemies was good for business. The
Europe that the once mighty Empire was forced to seek help from other powers to further
their goals.54 It also showed Western Europe how far the Venetian city-state had come in
53
Nicol, Byzantium, 60.
54
Thomas F. Madden, “The Chrysobull of Alexius I Comnenus to the Venetians: the date and the
debate.” Journal of Medieval History Vol.28 (2002):40. There is a debate as to the specific year of the
issuing of the chrysobull which is discussed at length by the medievalist historian Thomas F. Madden.
Madden’s own research supports the 1082 date. Madden describes the arguments made by certain
historians as to the timing of the chrysobull and against the year 1082. According to some, 1082 marks a
time which the treaty could not or would not have taken place since the important city of Dyrrhachium in
modern Albania had already fallen to the Norman invaders. Evidence to this belief is seen in Anna
33
marked a turning point in the history of the Eastern Empire and signaled the end of
Byzantine domination once and for all in Italy and the West. This lessening of power did
not mean a downward trajectory militarily for the Empire yet it did signify that
Constantinople had to rely on its diplomatic history to a large extent to help save it from
a powerful adversary with whom it had never been encountered before; the Normans.
In her discussion of events, Princess Anna briefly describes the treaty and her
words read like an afterthought. She states, “by promises and bribes, he [Alexius I] also
solicited the aid of the Venetians,” “and if they carried out his request, and by God’s help
gained the victory or (as may always happen) they were defeated, even then they would
receive all he had promised, just the same as if they had conquered.” She continues, “he
received them with great honor, as was natural, bestowed many benefactions upon them,
and then dismissed them with a large gift of money for the Doge of Venice and his
subordinate magistrates.”55
Comnena’s own assessment that the treaty would occur after the Normans would be defeated as well as
conflicting accounts written by Doge Andrea Dandolo almost two hundred years after the fact in his
Chronica per extensum descripta. However, the Byzantine historian Peter Frankopan has come to the
conclusion that the chrysobull could not have occurred any time before 1092. See Peter Frankopan,
“Byzantine trade privileges to Venice in the eleventh century: the chrysobull of 1092,” Journal of Medieval
History Vol.30 (2004):158-160.
55
Comnena, The Alexiad, 100-101. Princess Anna describes what seems like a casual military
treaty that promised the Venetians riches if they helped the Byzantines. Interestingly, by this period of
Byzantine-Venetian relations it is clear that the Emperor asks the Venetians for help instead of demands.
In return, he grants them privileges and gold. More importantly, Venice jumps at the opportunity to help
and Anna, ever politic, shows how her father was as good as his word.
34
The Chrysobull of 1082 was anything but a simple military treaty and the
implications of its creation and implementation provide direct examples that Venice had
chrysobull was not the first major pact between the two powers but it was the catalyst
which intertwined the two cities inextricably for the rest of their history. The beginning
excerpt from Nicol shows how powerful a document the treaty was and what dramatic
repercussions such a far reaching and economically, all-encompassing pact had on the
political and economic landscape. Descriptions of the chrysobull and the specific terms
of the treaty provide striking evidence of Byzantine diplomatic strategies in action. The
major terms of the treaty set out and provide a strengthening of Venetian economic
hegemony in the east and allow for the Venetians to play a major role in the remaining
history of the Byzantine Empire. The treaty’s main points cover the expansion and
consolidation of Venetian trading rights within Constantinople and the East in return for
Historians see the chrysobull as a method for viewing and understanding the
reorganization of the Empire under the Emperor Alexius I. This understanding of the
document is extremely important in but the treaty and the defining points made in the
clauses are often glossed over in an effort to continue the narrative and progress the
chronology towards events which took place a short time after its creation. Events such
as Alexius I and the Empire’s reactions against the coming of the First Crusade take
much of the impetus of this period. George Ostrogorsky discusses the treaty in a small
35
paragraph.56 He stated “from now onwards, the Italian maritime republic was a
along with another chrysobull of 992 noting that, “Byzantium concluded commercial
treaties with quite a number of other peoples, notably with Moslem[sic] and Russian
princes.”57 Steven Runciman states, “certain nations, such as the Russians and later the
Italians, won special privileges and freedom from tolls, in return for political services.”58
diplomatic strategies had become in the continued success of the Byzantine world. Each
clause emanated from a strategy discussed previously but only a few of the most
important will be evaluated individually. The main clauses have been bulleted as they
are seen in Donald Nicol’s Byzantium and Venice. Each clause has been abridged in an
1. An annual grant of twenty pounds (of gold coins) is to be made for the
56
Ostrogorsky, History of, 359.
57
Francois L. Ganshof, The Middle Ages: A History of International Relations (Le Moyen âge:
Histoire des relations internationals) trans. Rémy Inglis Hall (New York: Harper & Row Publishers,
1970(reprint), 131-142.
58
Runciman, Byzantine Civilisation, 172.
36
Constantinople in the market area or Perama, with free access to and egress
emperor who have provided their goodwill towards him and have promised to
serve him and his heirs with all their might forever more.
5. The emperor grants to Venetian merchants the right to trade in all manner of
merchandise in all parts of his empire free of any charge, tax, or duty payable
to his treasury.59
The major terms of this treaty are structured in such a way to show the
several of the main strategies discussed previously. In Clause 1, “an annual grant of gold
is made to the churches in Venice as they see fit.” The grant is tribute being paid to
Venice in return for loyal service against the Empire’s enemies; namely the Normans. As
we have seen, it was much easier for emperors to buy off their enemies. It was also
easier to pay someone to help with the war effort than to wage a protracted war which
siphoned off valuable resources. Venice was already connected to Byzantium in history,
trade and politics as well as in marriage. Paying tribute to an ally in exchange for help
59
Nicol, Byzantium, 60-61 (my emphasis)
37
In Clause 2, “the Doge is to be honored with the title protosebastos and granted a
stipend,” furthermore, the title is perpetual and passes on to his successors.” The
motivation for granting a title is evident but the last part of the clause is important in that
the title carries on to the next doge and so on. Titles in the Empire were granted by the
emperor yet were not passed on to successive generations of that noble household.
“Titles were for sale, usually at a standard price.”60 The granting of the title to the doge
can be seen as a re-solidifying of relations between Venice and Constantinople. Both the
title that was granted in perpetuity and the salary which accompanied it demonstrated
Byzantine diplomacy at its best. The doge would be honored with an imperial title, his
family would be enriched by the stipend granted by the throne and Constantinople would
have a solid ally connected to the throne with the use of a majestic sounding title. The
title itself was largely honorific as most Byzantine titles were yet they conveyed a
powerful sense of authority upon the person to whom they were given.
the market area of Perama” shows the paying of tribute and the granting of gifts in an
extremely important and new way. Granting Venice the lucrative trade rights to the
aforementioned areas as well as properties in the heart of the Empire was a historical act
which fostered dramatic, unsurpassed and irreversible consequences for both parties.
Granting the Venetians these shops, factories and houses was the culmination of
60
Mark Whittow, The Making of Byzantium, 600-1025. (Los Angeles: The University of
California Press, 1996), 111. Byzantine historian Mark Whittow explains that along with the title there was
also conferred a salary which was taxed by the Byzantine state. Granting the titles allowed for nobility to
pursue parts in the government and increase their prestige but it also was a money-making endeavor by the
imperial throne.
38
allowing the Venetians such important parts of the city in return for their efforts against
the Norman aggressors, the imperial throne had taken Byzantine diplomacy to a new
level. Gifts, titles, lands and lesser brides were given to would-be allies in the past yet
Venice had taken a spot among the most exalted and permanent of Byzantine allies.
Treaties struck with potential allies would benefit the Empire in either the short-term or
long term but by granting these lucrative trading rights, the throne was essentially stating
that potential long term problems with the Venetians were negligible in the face of
present dangers.
Clause 4, stipulating that “the Venetians are true servants of the emperor,” “and
have promised to serve him and his heirs” corresponds to the symbolic and historical
relationships between the emperor and his supplicants. As has been shown, the
relationship between the Empire and Venice was a strong collusion of tradition,
diplomacy, geography and trade. Even at this late stage of the Empire, the emperor saw
the Venetians as his subjects, beholden to him and entitled to his love, friendship and
generations of emperors, the Venetians were coaxed into helping Constantinople against
a mutual enemy.
Clause 5, the last major clause, is also the most important in regards to the future
the Chrysobull and its importance in establishing Venetian prominence in Eastern Empire
39
superiority among the Italians trading in Constantinople; competition with her became
futile and thus laid the roots of that bitter jealousy which Genoa, and probably Pisa and
Amalfi, subsequently displayed.”61 The creation of the Chrysobull gained the Empire the
one weapon which it always seemed to require; time. By offering Venice carte blanche
in regards to economic freedom in the east, the Empire ensured the continued support of a
military which it desperately needed against a foe which threatened to overwhelm it.
This treaty took into account the short-term consequences of granting Venice increased
economic power in the very heart of the Empire. Alexius I created a treaty with the
subtle tendency of Byzantine diplomacy well understood; give up power now and
reconcile that sacrifice at a later time and work to re-strengthen his position. A multitude
of honorific titles could be given, huge sums of gold could be presented as gifts and the
key to the economic treasure chest that was the trading port of Constantinople could be
granted all in an effort to ensure that Byzantine diplomacy granted the Empire time to
It is understandable that in the long history of the Eastern Empire, the use of these
safeguards and the inclinations behind their methods sometimes overshot their desired
intentions. In 1082, Alexius I was facing a new and entirely militaristic threat far from
his base of operations and on the periphery of his Empire. He needed help and the logical
choice was the loyal and one time subject of Constantinople; Venice. Byzantine history
61
Horatio F. Brown, “The Venetians and the Venetian Quarter in Constantinople to the Close of
the Twelfth Century,” The Journal for Hellenic Studies Vol.40 (1920):72.
40
was littered with the strengths and weaknesses of a continued diplomatic policy which
saw short-term conditions take precedence over long-term ones. Hindsight could only
serve the Empire as far as the successive emperor was concerned. This policy set the bar
for each successive emperor. The Chrysobull of 1082 was another page in the diplomatic
affairs of an Empire which had used the same tricks and strategies continuously. The
treaty was written on the terms of an Empire that, while not reneging on its promises,
could always come back to the terms at a later date and revaluate them as needed. This
Byzantine understanding of diplomacy is summed up by Nicol who says “it was a form
of charter which emanated from him [Alexius] alone, could be withdrawn at any moment
for all its protestations of perpetuity. At the time he badly needed the continuing help
and friendship of Venice. When order had been restored in the world he could modify the
militaristic and political world of the eastern Mediterranean, a change which Alexius I
and years of Byzantine diplomatic policy could never have foreseen. The give and take
relationship which the Eastern Empire had enjoyed in the political world around them
had sufficed for centuries previous to the Chrysobull. The same scenarios of invasion,
power struggles and changing demographics around the Empire had occurred numerous
times. The only thing that changed were the players who bumped against Byzantine
authority and who challenged them for political, economic and military supremacy. Each
successive foreign problem was dealt with on an as needed basis. For Byzantine
diplomacy, the changing of the map was a typical outcome. The one constant which
41
Byzantine diplomatic strategies could not envision a solution to was the inevitable
failures of those same diplomatic strategies when placed up against a problem from
which they had no recourse. As we shall see, the limitations of Byzantine diplomatic
strategies against the encroachment of Venetian economic power relegated the Empire
The Chrysobull of 1082 did not seal the fate of the Byzantine Empire nor did it
suddenly and irrevocably change the power structure of the eastern Mediterranean. By
the turn of the twelfth century, the Empire was a more solidified and stronger power than
in the previous fifty years of its gradual decline. In fact, after the reign of Alexius I had
ended and the reign of his son John II started, the Empire was in a very strong position to
continue its role as sole and ultimate power in the eastern Mediterranean. Its position
remained as the director of political and economic considerations in all facets of rule in
the region.62
Three consequences of Byzantine diplomacy did change the future of the Empire
and these changes slowly relegated the emperors’ position in the political hierarchy from
sole leader to senior partner to struggling survivor. First, the invasion of the Normans
signaled the permanent loss of previously held Byzantine possessions in Italy; a loss
which ensured that the Empire never again permanently controlled former imperial lands
in Italy. Manuel I regained a few southern Italian cities in the early twelfth century but
they too were lost forever after a short time. Documented Byzantine diplomacy with the
62
Brown, “The Venetians,” 77.
42
Normans is rare. Second, the inability of the Empire to deal with the massive threat of
Norman invasion without the help of the Venice signaled the rise of a dominant Venetian
presence in the eastern Mediterranean and the slow decay of Byzantine hegemony.
Third, the Chrysobull of 1082 granted concessions to the Venetians which at the time of
its creation, seemed a small enough price to pay to counteract a much bigger threat in the
Normans. The Chrysobull (for whatever Alexius’ intentions in the long term were)
granted the Venetians unprecedented economic and geographic power against their rivals
III
Europe
It is clear that toward the end of the twelfth century the condition of the Byzantine merchants of
Constantinople had become critical because of competition from the Italians. There had been
repeated attempts to get rid of them, either by using state-supported violence or with direct action.
Nothing yielded the anticipated results. The economic region of the Constantinople continued to
be the most coveted market, but the control of Byzantine businessmen managed to exercise over it
continued to diminish.63
of the Chrysobull of 1082 are discussed. The major differences between Venetian and
Byzantine merchants are explained in greater detail. A case by case basis is made
describing how Byzantine governmental interference and over regulation of the merchant
which only served to exacerbate the problem and were created to check the Venetian
stranglehold over trade, are also discussed. The ascension of Venice as the dominating,
strategies. The Chrysobull of 1082 and the inability of time-tested, Byzantine strategies
63
Nicolas Oikonomides, “Entrepreneurs,” in The Byzantines ed. Guglielmo Cavallo (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 165.
44
of diplomacy ensured that Venice would never again relinquish control of the lucrative
By the tenth century, Byzantine merchants had largely settled into their roles as
speculators. They were businessmen who were content to reside in the confines of
Constantinople and let others come to them.64 As we have also seen, the events of the
last years of the eleventh century created vast opportunities which the Venetians and
other maritime Italian city-states had in opening and expanding trade with
Constantinople. Trade at this level with the East had not ever been fully realized. The
Chrysobull of 1082 decisively and irrevocably opened a flow of economic traffic which
accelerated into the twelfth century. This economic surge helped in the creation of
trading fortunes and unbridled power for Venice. To a lesser degree, this trading power
was assumed by Genoa and Pisa as well. The core stipulations of the chrysobull, devised
and ratified in a time of duress for the Empire, were continually re-ratified and re-issued
with each successive emperor. By 1119, less than ten years into his reign, Alexis I’s
successor John II attempted to curtail Venetian trade aggression hoping to limit the power
activity after the ratifying of the treaty.65 He did this by expelling many Venetians from
64
Oikonomides, “Entrprenuers,” 157-160.
65
Treadgold, A History of, 630.
45
Constantinople and then refusing to re-ratify the treaty. The move backfired when
Venice, entirely unwilling to give up its lucrative monopoly in the Imperial capital,
attacked several Byzantine islands in the Aegean and demanded the treaty be re-signed.
Not wanting to face another enemy and unwilling to make an adversary out of a
dwindling supply of allies, “the emperor was forced to ratify all privileges in a fresh
treaty (1126).”66 Even with its trading power slowly ebbing away to Venice and other
Italian merchants, the Empire was still the more formidable of the two yet the days of
Byzantium forcing subjugation upon the fledgling power in the Adriatic were long over.
These circumstances set the precedence for the continued, dominant Venetian trade
relations between itself and the Empire. The relationship between Constantinople and
Venice, which started in friendship, was soon reconciled as a constant struggle for
supremacy between the two powers. This struggle often turned to bitter animosity as
described by the biographer of both John II and his son Manuel I, John Kinnamos. “At
this time [Manuel] committed the Venetians who lived in Byzantion and anywhere else in
the Romans’ land to public prisons and caused their property to be registered in the state
66
Ostrogorsky, History of, 377.
67
John Kinnamos Deeds of John and Manuel Comnenus trans. Charles Brand (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1976), 209. Kinnamos (mid to late twelth century) was a court biographer and
historian of both Emperors John II and Manuel I, the son and grandson of Alexius I respectively. His
personal, written accounts of the emperors’ military expeditions shows a political world which the
Byzantine emperor was very much in the middle of diplomatic policy making. He explains that a major
spark for this excessive and incredibly brazen decision by the emperor was the attack against Genoese and
Pisan merchants by Venetian merchants in Constantinople in 1170. Manuel I, unrelenting his anti-Venetian
politics had signed chrysobulls with both the Genoese and Pisans allowing them to set up trading districts
in Constantinople. This was an act which the Venetians saw as threatening to their stranglehold on trade
from the East. See Nicol Byzantium, 96-97
46
states, “angered therat[sic], emperor John expelled them from the Romans’ state,” in
response to this, “the wretches pursued a course of piracy by sea and had no mercy for
mankind.”68 The previous policy of friendship through mutual association had changed.
Venice grew into a powerful and self-assured economic rival. The strategies of
Byzantine diplomacy had little effect in bringing the city back under the immediate
By the mid twelfth century it was clear that the lucrative trading activities in
expanded quarter in the city. Byzantine merchants suffered the most from a loosely
regulated and non-taxed, Venetian trade policy in Constantinople, the basis of which had
originated in the original Chrysobull of 1082. That treaty along with subsequent treaties
added fuel to the flames and created a trading situation against which Byzantine
merchants could not hope to stand on an equal footing. “In the long run, the logic of the
situation [Venetian merchants not paying the 10 per cent duty (Clause 5 in the Chrysobull
of 1082)] gave the Italians a larger share of domestic trade, thus creating a situation
trading activity that increased year after year and served to benefit Venetian merchants.
Venice and her Italian rivals experienced a new role as the main traders between eastern
markets and the trading houses in Italy. These veins of trade, expanded, lengthened and
68
Kinnamos, Deeds of John, 210.
69
Laiou and Morrisson, The Byzantine, 146
47
grew to enormous economic proportions. With each passing year, newer and previously
rare goods made their way in ever increasing quantities back to Italy for dispersal to
hegemony had taken power from Byzantine traders’ hands and had expanded the avenues
from which goods could be acquired by Italian merchants. By the mid to late twelfth
century, the Crusades had opened up new and untapped trading opportunities between
Western Europe and the east. The Christian kings of the Kingdom of Jerusalem had no
qualms about allowing Venetian and other Italian merchants to conduct business in their
territory and even went so far as to ally with them in their struggles against the
Muslims.70 The relationship between the Eastern Empire and the Crusaders was chilly at
best and Jerusalem saw nothing wrong with tweaking the nose of its Christian rival.
Venetian centers of trade grew to much larger and active proportions in areas both in and
outside of Byzantine control even if Venetian commerce with Muslim nations was
extremely limited.71 This led to an extreme and irrevocable split between the two by the
70
Nicol, Byzantium, 79. Less than a quarter of a century after the Fall of Jerusalem, the crusaders
in the Levant needed all the help they could get. “They [Venice] were moved to action by a desperate plea
for help addressed to them in 1120 by Baldwin II of Jerusalem.” After crushing the Egyptian navy off the
shores of Ascalon, “[a treaty was drawn up] in return for their services the Venetians were to be given,
among other rewards, a street, a church, baths and a bakery in every town in the kingdom of Jerusalem and
to be exempted from all taxes and dues.” Just as Venice had played the role of military savior to the
Byzantines, their saving of the Christian Kingdom in Jerusalem brought with it more power and more
trading opportunities in regions still up for grabs.
71
Thomas F. Madden, Enrico Dandolo & the Rise of Venice (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2003), 121. Madden shows how cooperating with papal restrictions on trade with the
“infidel” hindered Venetian economic expansion into market dominated by Muslim merchants especially
Egypt and North Africa. Backing up his claim, Madden states that when the “Third Lateran Council in
1179 forbade Christians to traffic in strategic goods with Muslims it was simply duplicating existing
Venetian law.”
48
latter half of the twelfth century. In fact, contrary to the terms of the first chrysobull,
Venice went so far as to make peace with the Empire’s mortal enemies, the Normans and
ratified a trade treaty with them in 1179.72 By the twelfth century, Venice had firmly laid
claim to multiple trading regions under Byzantine suzerainty and actively participated in
lucrative trading deals with both local and foreign merchants found there. “It was an
impressive list [Clause 5 all parts of his empire] stretching from Laodikeia (Beirut) and
Antioch in the east to Durazzo and Valona in Albania and the island of Corfu in the
west.”73
Regardless of this, Constantinople was still the top priority for Venice and its
trading empire. Each treaty ratified between the two ended with the same results; more
lucrative subsidies granted to Venetian merchants and more limitations optioned to the
Byzantine merchant class. Venetian merchants were not constrained by political and
merchants went on business voyages only in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean and
the Black Sea, but the large west European markets were closed to them by their Italian
72
Brown, “The Venetians,” 83. Brown states this as major turning point in Byzantine-Venetian
relations. By the end of the twelfth century, Venice had almost indefatigably come to the aid of the Empire
whenever the Normans showed aggression. After almost two centuries of conflict, Venice had decided that
war cost money while trade made money. Venice consolidation in the Adriatic as a major sea power had
reached the point that they would not be a willing participant in continued conflict between Southern Italy
and Constantinople. They would choose what options were in the best interest of the city. It was hardly
surprising that the Byzantines would take the treaty as an ultimate betrayal.
73
Nicol, Byzantium, 91.
49
markets. This flourishing trade network which had begun centuries earlier saw the rise of
the Mediterranean as the major source of luxury and surplus items which flowed to
burgeoning European markets. The creation of the chrysobulls and the continued usage
the likes of which the Empire had never encountered in that capacity. Each measure
enacted to control the influx of Venetian merchants and the money flowing out of the
Empire’s cities presented the imperial throne with economic and political problems that
were out of its control. Vast sums of money were lost on un-taxed trade goods entering
and leaving Constantinople and its other cities due to the generous concessions granted in
the chrysobulls. The situation proved lucrative for Venice and equally debilitating for the
Eastern Empire’s economy. Taxes and duties which normally had been levied on all
goods were gradually pulled into a deeper Venetian field of control and taken out of the
hands of the emperor’s tax collectors. After a century of increased Venetian trading
power, Byzantine diplomacy had successfully created a problem from which there was no
way out. Over time, Venice had gone from a fledgling supplicant to an active and
dominating partner and director of Mediterranean trading power. The increased presence
of Italian merchants in Constantinople generated power for Venice which helped create a
As we have noted the rise of Venice as a competitor for Byzantine trade angered
successive emperors who tried unsuccessfully to counteract the lasting and detrimental
effects of the chrysobulls on the Byzantine economy. What were these effects and how
could they have been so debilitating for the Empire and yet so economically
In regards to the Greek entrepreneurial class, there was “a division of the empire
into two economic regions: the developed region of the capital and the less developed
region of the provinces.”74 Overland trading was slow, time-consuming and not cost
effective. The bulk of this trade involved goods which had less worth than rarer goods
that had to be shipped from great distances. The time and money it took to travel
hundreds of miles overland from distant parts gave competitors who reached the markets
faster a distinct advantage. Besides being cheaper, sea travel was preferred for these
reasons and but it had its own set of problems notably the loss of both ships and goods to
Arab pirates along shipping routes.75 Because of its status as the Empire’s capital and the
seat of its wealth, Constantinople received the bulk of trade and the largest influx of
merchants. Consequentially, the greater portion of levies and dues to the Byzantine state
74
Oikonomides, “Entrepreneurs,”152.
75
Warren Treadgold, The Byzantine, 365. Treadgold downplays the effects of Arab piracy on the
trading networks. Most networks were connected to “secure bases” which made piracy a very dangerous
game. Besides, “the fact that ship-owners kept up regular trade in the face of the Arab danger confirms that
there was a good deal of money to be made in commerce at the time.”
51
The Byzantine state controlled markets and Greek merchants plied their trade
understanding that the officials of the emperor could and would direct affairs for them. A
free market system of unobstructed trade was not unheard of yet state control over the
business practices of the merchant class grew more stringent the more the individual
merchant came into contact with Constantinople. This was done for varying reasons
namely the lucrative source of profit that it generated for the emperor. Money lending
was seen as a disreputable profession and an unworthy practice by the majority of the
Byzantine aristocracy and so it fell to the authority of the state to extend loans to
businessmen and merchants.76 These loans were structured to facilitate the return of the
larger portion of revenue to the state coffers; a very profitable business for the emperor.
While merchants were allowed to spend their money freely on investments those
investments were curtailed by the rules and stipulations directed upon them by tax
collectors and state officials in accordance with the limits of their trade.77
upon them. This was true except in the cases of very wealthy merchants or the
76
Oikonomides, “Entrepreneurs,” 152.
77
Oikonomides, “Entrepreneurs,” 154.
78
Alan Harvey, Economic Expansion in the Byzantine Empire 900-1200. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press,1989), 238. Harvey discusses the rise of the aristocracy as a key player in the rise of trade
through shipping and the increased role that trading privileges played on the Byzantine economy.
52
Byzantine shipping in conjunction with trade due to ship building and ship owning being
viewed as a dishonorable endeavor.79 While trade was not the exclusive money maker of
the Empire, the rise of a vigorous and expanded trade economy in the Mediterranean in
the ninth century assured the Eastern Empire great wealth which flowed to it from the
As we have seen with the granting of titles, the influence granted by the
aristocracy and the emperor to certain merchants did not pass to the next generation. This
meant that each merchant regardless of his background or beginnings had to lobby
constantly in order to be granted the sponsorship that he needed to gain success among
the bitter world of trade in Constantinople. Each of these defining characteristics of the
Byzantine merchant class obstructed their continued success and the success of the
were only remotely controlled by the central government. Much like the example of
However, this rise started to occur by the elevnth century, well late after the surging Venetian maritime
trading monopoly has taken effect. Also the task of owning a ship carried its own hardships as the emperor
could confiscate it in times of war.
79
Oikonomides, “Entrepreneuers,” 149. “The important ship owners of Constantinople-they were,
in fact, merely sailors who owned their ships-had no special social prestige.” Oikonomides describes a
story involving Emperor Theophilos who discovered that his wife, the Empress Theodora owned a ship
used to import wheat. The Emperor “ordered the ship burned with its cargo, for that trade brought dishonor
to him.”
53
Venice’s remote location from Constantinople, the Empire’s most distant cities in Italy
and the Adriatic coast created a climate of autonomy among the merchants living there.
In his book on Mediterranean trade, the historian Robert Lopez describes the contents of
a treaty which occurred between the magister militum “Master of the Soldiers” in Naples
and the Lombard prince Sicard.80 In the treaty, a strict code of guest rights are reaffirmed
and adhered to. Merchants visiting in each party’s territory are not to be mistreated, the
contents of shipwrecks are to be returned to the original parties and Lombard citizens are
not to be sold into slavery.81 The adherence of these distant trading centers to Byzantine
customs and rules continued but a clear distinction was drawn between Constantinople
and these trading centers beyond immediate reach of the emperor and his tax collectors.
Distance allowed for more leeway. The treaty concluded a war between the two parties,
a war which Constantinople “stood aloof.”82 Lopez states, “they [towns still under
Byzantine control after the Lombard invasion in the sixth century] maintained political
and commercial ties with the Byzantine Empire, but they had won sufficient autonomy to
deal with their Lombard-dominated hinterland and later with the Carolingian and
Ottonian empires.”83
80
Robert S. Lopez, “The Meeting of East and West in Southern Italy” in Medieval Trade in the
Mediterranean World trans. by Robert Lopez and Irving W. Raymond (New York: Colombia University
Press, 1969), 33.
81
Lopez, “The Meeting of East,” 34-35.
82
Lopez, “The Meeting of East,” 33.
83
Lopez, “The Meeting of East,” 33. Lopez also specifies, “these towns had remained Byzantine
islands in a Western world.”
54
The rise of guild membership expanded Byzantine trade for a time. Yet, the guild
system, like so many other parts to Byzantine state control, was retarded in its efforts to
stay competitive with its Italian contemporaries. The Byzantine guild system was a
strictly urban phenomenon and did not play out in the rural areas.84 It had “lent stability
and legitimacy to trade, which the Byzantines had always regarded, sometimes with
reason, as a risky and slightly disreputable way of making a living.”85 The Byzantine
guild system was limited in its capacity to ensure a lucrative and active merchant class as
do business.
The regulation of the guilds was “controlled by the eparch of Constantinople and,
as is shown by the so-called Book of the Eparch, in the tenth century, [this control was
far-reaching in the extreme.]”86 The eparch or the Prefect of Constantinople, was a high
ranking official, who directed the economy under the watchful eyes of the central
authorities.87 In his translation of the Book of the Eparch, the Byzantine historian A.E.R.
84
Laiou and Morrisson, The Byzantine, 129. Laiou and Morrisson, using research conducted by
Oikonomides state that, “there is no evidence that strict controls or such a guild structure (encountered by
the Book of the Eparch) existed in the provincial industry.” See N. Oikonomides Social and Economic Life
in Byzantium ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou (Aldershot,UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2004).
85
Treadgold, The Byzantine, 42.
86
Ostrogorsky, History of, 253.
87
A.E.R. Boak, “The Book of the Eparch,” Journal of Economic and Business History Vol.1
(1929):598. The Prefect was top-economic regulator in the Byzantine Empire and controlled all aspects of
guild determination and trading in the City. All economic activities were mandated by his authority.
55
Boak describes the role of the Eparch and the reasons behind the crafting of the Book.
Boak is quick to point out that the Book was not representative of each guild but only the
ones which dealt with the most important and lucrative trading in the city. Boak also
states that “these ordinances were issued by the state for the guilds and not by the guilds
modern businessmen.”89 He also states that membership in the guilds “had some
privileges, but most of those advantages were simply penalties for outsiders.”90 On the
other hand, Laiou and Morrisson have a brighter regard for the stringent role of the
provided the framework for the functioning of the economy as a whole, thus making it
possible for us to speak of the Byzantine [their emphasis] economy, that is, the economy
The role of the central Byzantine government thus performed a major inhibiting
role in its own trading revenue collecting and expansion of the markets around the
Mediterranean. These facts combined with the geographic distances encountered in such
88
Boak, “The Book,” 598. Boak also discusses what we have understood up to this point in
regards to the strict control of the emperor and his government over the economic apparatus of the Empire.
“The reasons for the interference of the state in such matters are, first, that the state assumed the
responsibility for maintaining the economic welfare of the city and providing the needs of the people and
the court, and, secondly, that the guilds were under the obligation of performing certain services (munera or
liturgies) for the court and state.”
89
Treadgold, The Byzantine, 42.
90
Treadgold, A History of, 574.
91
Laiou and Morrisson, The Byzantine, 54
56
a large empire meant that proliferation of trading that should have been dominated by
Venice and the rest of the Italian maritime traders are wide reaching. Venice and its
trading rivals Genoa, Pisa and Amalfi were under no strict regulations in trade by the sea.
In fact, their entire existence revolved around building up a maritime empire through
their use of trade routes back and forth along the Mediterranean trading hubs. Venetian
sea trade could be found in every corner of the Eastern Empire and eventually, it could be
found in parts further south among the cities of the Latin crusader kingdom. As we have
seen, Venetian sea merchants and their continued deferment to papal authority prohibited
them from trading with Muslim partners but this prohibition was easily countered by
trading with partners who were hostile to Constantinople regardless of how many clauses
State control over Byzantine merchants and their merchandise did not affect
Venetian traders or their Italian opponents. While Byzantine merchants struggled against
oppressive levies and regulations forced upon them by their own government, Venetian
merchants had successfully exempted themselves from these trading penalties over
centuries of service to the imperial throne. Thus the fantastic wealth and exotic goods
57
pouring into Constantinople were able to be purchased and traded at fantastic profit
more often than not, it was the government and the aristocracy which provided loans to
Byzantine merchants. The government found that by lending money at higher rates it
was assured of a steady and valuable cash flow from the rate of trade which continuously
moved through Constantinople to the West. “This tendency toward an increase [in rates]
was already vaguely apparent at the end of the ninth century: the ceiling on interest rates
increased officially by 4.1 percent; by the eleventh century, rates changed to a different,
much higher scale, 16.66 percent for maritime loans.”92 While maritime trade was
lucrative and the Empire made great wealth from this activity, the continued steep rates
of loans prohibited a flourishing Byzantine merchant class from exercising real authority
until well into the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This was in contrast to the
Venetians understanding that economic dominance did not come from debilitating
interest rates. Money lending was considered an act of sin in the eyes of Roman Catholic
Church yet that formality did not dissuade traders from getting the loans they needed.
Jews were often the targets of persecution but money lending was one of the few methods
of business open to them. The Jewish populations, though small, were often the sole
money lenders in an area and the Venetians used their services like most others. This
situation worked out well for them in contrast to money loaned to Byzantine merchants,
which had to be returned at a higher interest rate. A shipwreck or poor investment could
92
Oikonomides, “Entrepreneurs,” 152.
58
sink a Byzantine trader for good. A loan from a Jew in Venice or elsewhere was the best
of both worlds; lower rate loans and the knowledge that repayment was never a foregone
the Jewish moneylender. Jews involved in trading “tended to confine their financial
activities to petty money lending,” even if, “they [native merchants] grouped them [Jews]
together and excluded them from many areas of business; their rates of interest
Venice itself was not above seeking a good deal and establishing loans in return
for future dividends. In the beginning years of the thirteenth century, the large force
comprising the bulk of the Fourth Crusade required a huge number of ships and massive
amounts of provisions for their journey to the Holy Land. Venice was willing to provide
these things at a price. “The cost would be four silver marks for each knight and each
horse and two marks for each squire and foot soldier, for a total of 94,000 silver marks.
This was a reasonable price, well in keeping with the ongoing rate at other ports.”94 The
Venetians received their payment in full and then some at the expense of the Eastern
Empire. It is clear that with the rate of interest on loans and the hardships that Byzantine
merchants encountered when seeking them, Byzantine trade was not able to fully counter
Venetian and Italian maritime trading at a level which was required to avoid complete
93
Robert S. Lopez, “Jews and Christians in Trade and Money Lending” in Medieval Trade in the
Mediterranean World trans. by Robert Lopez and Irving W. Raymond (New York: Colombia University
Press, 1969), 103-104.
94
Madden, Enrico Dandolo, 124.
59
The rise of Venice and its merchants directly correlated to its command of
shipping routes and the supply of valuable goods that it brought back to Western Europe.
Merchants and their shipping formed the core facets of Venetian culture well into the post
medieval age in Europe. By the late twelfth century, Venetian merchants had
economy. They had also developed, strengthened, maintained and enhanced their
previous and current trade treaties with the other powerful empires in the region
including and most importantly, with Byzantium. In just under 500 years, the merchant
culture of Venice and their sea-faring forefathers had carved out an economic empire to
rival that of the two major empires it found itself between geographically. Venice as a
land controlling empire never came close to the domains of the Holy Roman or Eastern
Empires yet its trading mastery put it into a position of extreme importance politically,
militarily and economically. The merchant class of Venice in the Middle Ages was the
class.
Venetian traders were able to partake in loans which were readily available from
numerous sources. These sources: bankers, other wealthy merchants, the Jewish
population and others were united in the cultural investment of things that continued the
expansion of Venetian trading power and money making. Rates were set and duties were
levied on all merchandise yet the windfall of profit that accompanied the return of exotic
goods from the east to the rest of Europe ensured that the risks involved were well worth
the price of sea trading. The Venetians had no cultural stigma about money lending and
the causes for making money and expanding trade were good ones. Venetian merchants
60
did not have to rely solely upon one class with extravagant wealth in order to embark on
trading ventures. Byzantine merchants were constrained by a social stigma as well as the
inability to receive preemptive and easily repayable loans at non-profitable rates. Due to
the lack of banking opportunities for Byzantine merchants by the mid fourteenth century,
the availability of affordable and easy to obtain loans; a problem that did not affect the
Ship building and the role of ships as a powerful tool in warfare and trade was an
integral element in the cultural composition of Venice. Venetians had escaped the
collapse of the Western Roman Empire and the barbarian invasions by seeking refuge on
their small chain of islands. Belonging to the sea and seeking a future from seafaring had
always been a vital element in Venice’s prosperity and the continued survival of the city.
By the ninth century, Venice had secured itself as the main proponent of seafaring power
in the Adriatic and to a lesser extent, the region around southern Italy and western
Greece. By the 860s, “the Venetians alone connected fully to all four of the main trading
regions of early medieval Italy, even as they sailed to the Muslim world.”96 As we have
95
Laiou and Morrisson, The Byzantine, 199. The period is obviously well past the timeline that
has been discussed. However, it shows that by this point in the Empire’s history (after the Fall of
Constantinople in 1204) its people were still trying to regain a foothold of its former economic glory. By
the 1350s, the relaxing of the state controlled economy was just “too little, too late.” The Empire only had
a century left to exist.
96
McCormick, The Origins, 637.
61
a partner in all regards whether militarily or economically. The Byzantines had to make
use of Venetian navies as early as the ninth century and, as we have seen, Emperor
Alexius I desperately sought their help against the Normans in the late eleventh century.
By the first years of the thirteenth century, Venetian shipping signaled the end of the
Byzantine Empire as a true economic and military power in the Mediterranean. Venice
relied on their naval power as an extension of its economic and political will and entered
into wars for the purpose of establishing, sustaining and dominating the sources of the
Mediterranean, maritime economy. As Lane states, “the Venetians sought sea power, not
territorial possessions from which to draw their tribute.”97 By the late twelfth century,
the idea of solidifying, maintaining or expanding into any regions bordering the
Mediterranean region was unthinkable without direct participation by ships from Venice.
“Worse disintegration set in [of the Empire by the late twelfth century], Manuel I was
attracted to Western ideas, and he began to rely upon Western arms, particularly on the
ships of the Italian republics but this naval support meant more commercial concession;
and concessions given to Venice were demanded and secured by Genoa and Pisa.”98
By the last part of the eleventh century, the Byzantines were in the habit of being
generous with title delegation.99 As stipulated, titles did not pass on from generation to
97
Lane, Venice, 27.
98
Runciman, Byzantine Civilisation, 55.
99
Ostrogorsky, History of, 367. Alexius I was in a precarious position early in his reign. The
rewarding of titles and the raising of members of ruling families to the level of aristocracy meant that
62
generation and this was evident in the low regards to which Byzantine merchants were
held. The wealth and attractive trappings of government passed on in Venetian society
and sons benefited greatly from their fathers’ past economical and political exploits.
Venice established a republic as early as the seventh century yet nepotism and familial
connection ensured that prominent families kept positions of power. Since power in
Venice was tied to the sea, merchant families grew to fill roles in all of the parts of
Venetian government including that of doge. The conferring of titles and the wealth and
power which accompanied them signified a stark contrast between the merchant classes
hand in trading activities due to the concessions granted in the treaties. More merchants
led to greater profits. The creation of guilds and their benefit in the expansion of trade
gave Venice and her Italian rivals a leg-up in the trade competition against Byzantine
government under the direct supervision of the Prefect. As the twelfth century wore on,
Byzantine authority. They were, in effect, a separate trading power in a foreign land,
controlled by their own laws and duties. As time went on, they found themselves
decreasingly under the authority of the Eastern Empire. The Venetian Quarter granted to
the Venetians after the Chrysobull of 1082, was created along an avenue running close to
Alexius had supporters in his consolidation of power as well as help in which to combat first the Norman
and then the Crusader menace. Titles ensured support.
63
the Golden Horn. It was a small piece of land yet from such an inauspicious start the
Venetians prospered and their guilds, shops, quays and warehouses began to spring up all
along the area.100 By 1203, one year before the fateful conquest of the city by Latin
Crusaders and Venetian forces, the Quarter had expanded to territory outside of the sea-
walls and the length of the Quarter had been extended.101 The Venetians and their Italian
counterparts had a direct influence on the Byzantine merchants and their style of business
especially in the way they organized and conducted their guilds. “Each trade seems to
have been organized into a western-styled guild, with a leader who was empowered to
represent all the members before the authorities.”102 Guilds were present in
Constantinople and Venice yet the constrictive nature of government regulation against
Byzantine guilds and not their Venetian counterparts ensured a continued dominance of
By the eleventh century, Venetian sea routes had expanded to all centers of major
trading regions. Their ships could be found in every primary and secondary economic
hub along the Eastern Mediterranean as well as in the Black Sea. Cairo, Antioch,
100
Brown, “The Venetians,” 75. Brown describes the length of the Quarter as being very small
“only 385 paces, or about a third of a mile.”
101
Madden, Enrico Dandolo, 162. “Half of the Venetian Quarter in 1203 was outside of the city’s
sea walls, where residences and shops fronted a central road, and farther toward the shore stood landing
stages for merchant vessels.” Madden describes the joy of the Venetian Quarter “most of the Venetian
residents of the city loved there” upon the arrival of the crusading army in 1203. Many still remembered
the debacle of Manuel I’s arrest of the Venetian citizenry in 1171 and the mass slaughter perpetrated by the
Byzantines against all Latin residents in 1182.
102
Oikonomides, “Entrepreneurs,” 169.
64
Constantinople were all frequented and to a large degree, dominated by Venetian trading
authority. The distances and geographic extremes of these places were not an obstacle
for Venetian sea travel and by the eleventh and into the twelfth century, Venetian trading
power had in effect gained control over all of the aforementioned areas; cornering the
markets on goods and shipping them back to trading centers in Italy and Western Europe.
“The large, west European markets were closed to them [Byzantine merchants] by their
Italian competitors,” and “long-distance Byzantine trade was thus limited and played a
subsidiary role as compared to that of the Italians.”103 Loss of their Italian possessions
and the domination of Arab lands in the south, combined with the untrusting nature of the
Crusader states along the Levant towards them, Byzantine overseas traders were forced to
reconcile themselves with Black Sea and localized Greek island trading. The Venetian
economy was thrived by importing and shipping vast amounts of previously unknown
goods back to Western European markets. There was no port or stretch of water where
Venetian influence could not be found. Their continued political role as the
transportation for major military endeavors and supplier for Western Europe gave Venice
from a minority Genoese and Pisan merchant system but their impact was minimal. Most
geographic possessions of any trading value which once belonged to the Empire were
103
Oikonomides, “Entrepreneurs,” 169.
65
by simply being given away by the emperors as last ditch efforts to prolong the dying
Empire.
The permanent loss of Italy to the Eastern Empire cut out a lucrative market for
distances were just too great and, as ever, successive emperors had other problems to deal
with. In the years immediately preceding the turn of the thirteenth century, the Empire
was no longer in no position to make another play at recovering their former possessions.
Other powers had stepped into the vacuum that the Normans had opened in southern Italy
and from then onward; they guided the direction of the region. The days of Byzantine
hegemony in the region were past and the former, tiny island possession of the Empire on
the Rialto had stepped in to forever change the economic future of Italy and Western
Europe.
66
IV
Protracted Weakness
For the tragedy was final. On May the twenty-ninth, 1453, a civilization was wiped out
irrevocably. It had left a glorious legacy in learning and in art; it had raised whole countries from
barbarism and had given refinement to others; its strength and its intelligence for centuries had been the
protection of Christendom. For eleven centuries Constantinople had been the centre of the world of light.
The quick brilliance, the interest and the ætheticism of the Greek, the proud stability and the administrative
competence of the Roman, the transcendental intensity of the Christian from the East, welded together into
a fluid mass, were put now to sleep.104
The final chapter documents the inherent weaknesses and strengths of Byzantine
diplomatic strategies. Successive emperors had attempted to use the tricks and time-
and mistrust clouded cooperation between themselves and Western Europe. The chapter
describes how the Chrysobull of 1082 opened up a trading empire for Venice whose
Byzantine diplomacy against the strong kingdoms in Western Europe are detailed as is
the opening of Western Europe to a flourishing trade from the East. This trade was
provided by Venice and the other maritime Italian city-states. The chapter concludes
with Byzantine diplomatic strategies as having played an integral role in the cultural
history of the Empire yet failed it with the granting of the Chrysobull of 1082.
67
Relations between Western Europe and the Eastern Empire were often stressed
and at times, hostility arose between the them. The schism of the Greek Orthodox and
Roman Catholic Churches in 1054 exacerbated feelings of cultural mistrust. The First
Crusade was the start of legitimate militaristic, cultural, economic and geo-political
contact between the majority of Western Europe and the Eastern Empire. Past relations
between the two were fleeting and limited exchanges had occurred, yet the First Crusade
began the dramatic shift of contact between the two. This event, in conjunction with the
later crusades, accentuated an animosity which had slowly built up over the preceding
centuries. After it had been undertaken, the situation continued to spiral out of control.
The meeting of these two sets of people with vastly different and competing cultures
signaled a new era in European politics; one that saw the flourishing of Western Europe
as the Middle Ages came to an end and another that saw its ancient customs and old
glories eventually decay. The First Crusade introduced two cultures to one another who
shared a belief in Christ yet could not cooperate on how that belief should be interpreted.
The interplay between the Byzantine Empire and the West was a confrontation
marked in mistrust, animosity and cultural misunderstandings. Even as early as the sixth
century, misgivings about hostility between the two led the Emperor Maurice to make
mention of the Latins and how to properly defeat them in battle.105 The First Crusade, in
105
Maurice I Augustus, Strategikon trans. George T. Dennis (Philadelphia: University of
Philadelphia Press, 1984), 119-120. The Emperor Maurice advocates that full-scale contact should be
avoided with western armies due to their ferocity and brute force. Instead, hit and run tactics, ambushes
and sneak attacks should be implemented. His advice of “delay things and ruin opportunities,” and
68
the eyes of the West, was seen less as a joint religious undertaking and more as a pathway
to Heaven. Salvation and the return of the Holy Land was more of a forceful argument
for the Crusaders than was rescuing fellow Christians in the Eastern Empire from the
between the two Christian churches, his aim was also to “obtain facilities for levying
troops among the Western knights whose courage and warlike spirit he admired.”106 The
reaction to this request was sudden and extreme and the inherent disdain of the Eastern
Empire was universal. The Crusade that was preached was met with acclaim and
excitement and the Byzantines were made to look like an empire struggling in its
weakness to defend Christianity against the Muslim invasion. The appeal to all Christian
kingdoms was an “unprecedented movement” and Alexius I’s ambassadors were styled in
the west as “begging for the help of all Christians to assist him in defense of the Church
and in repelling the pagans established practically against the walls of Constantinople.”107
Alexius was looking for knights to act as mercenaries to help restore the “glory of
Byzantium,” not the multitude of Christian humanity which answered the call to restore
the Holy Land. “Thus between Byzantium and the crusaders there lay a gulf of
misunderstanding engendering hatred and irreconcilable hostility which did great damage
to Christianity.”108 As early as 1101, just two years after the Fall of Jerusalem to the
“pretend to come to agreements with them,” did little in the way of fostering a relationship of trust and
empathy for the relationship between the two peoples’.
106
Bréhier, The Life, 214.
107
Bréhier, The Life, 214.
108
Bréhier, The Life, 215.
69
crusaders, the fragile peace made between the two Christian powers had been ignored.
Alexius I’s main adversary, Bohemond traveled back to Europe to fund his campaign
against both the Turks and the Byzantines, all the while trumpeting the fight against both
Greek and Turk alike. “As he journeyed through Italy and France recruiting help he was
responsible more than anyone else for spreading the story that the Byzantine Emperor
The mistrust and dislike between the Latins and Byzantines was aggravated by the
misconception regarding one anothers’ cultures. Christianity, the one force which should
have been a symbol of unification between them, was a major point of contention and
enduring strife. Theological differences prevented each party from reconciling against
economic and cultural incursions of the West after the First Crusade was apparent. Up
until that date Byzantine diplomatic stratagems had been used on barbarians and against
cultures which understood the practicality of making peace and avoiding war when it best
suited their need. The western powers were driven by a culture bred on warfare, violence
and the undeniable idea that entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven could be obtained
through the forced conversion or slaughter of those who did not follow the teachings of
Christ as interpreted by Rome. Conversion was out of the question. Titles, tribute and
land only sufficed when the emperor saw a benefit from extending these generous grants
in accordance to his vision of the Empire’s ultimate course. Marriage alliances were
109
Ostrogorksy, History of, 365.
70
granted, yet the cultural distances between the two were too much to bridge in one
The Crusades created a long-lasting problem from which the Empire could not
truly recover. The militancy of Western Europe under the guiding hand of the Roman
Church forever opened the concept of the Holy Land to the West. The ideology of a
Byzantine Empire which was inherently weak, culturally bankrupt and hopelessly mired
encountered a problem which it could not manage or stop. Instead of unifying and
opening relations between east and west, the Crusades served to permanently sever the
only hope that the Eastern Empire had of surviving Islamic expansion. Cultural mistrust
and continued political backstabbing by both parties set in motion the events of the early
thirteenth century, as well as, the final dissolution of the Empire in 1453.
As has been argued, tenants of Byzantine diplomacy were based upon the use of
strategies that effectively delayed problems which could be dealt with more effectually at
later dates. The culture which helped shape Byzantine diplomacy understood the
necessities of encountering enemies on beneficial terms. Created from the glories of the
original Roman Empire, the Eastern Empire and the men (and a few women) who ruled it
71
depended upon the diplomatic stratagems which had successfully worked for centuries.
inherently Greek (not Latin) culture dealt with other cultures that were essentially
foreign, hostile and outside of the Byzantine cultural sphere of influence. Byzantine
diplomacy, in its numerous meetings with the other was forced to envelop and master a
problem using quick thinking, policy making. Byzantine diplomatic policy grew to fulfill
a role which placed it squarely at odds with the Romanized, Latin cultures in the West.
Over the centuries, Byzantine culture itself, in the eyes of Western Europe slowly
transformed into the other; representing to the West exactly what the Byzantines had
combated against for almost a millennia. The oikoumene of which the Byzantines had so
long found themselves a part was seen as foreign and sinful in the eyes of the West.110
The Byzantines considered themselves as maintaining the central role in the oikoumene
with all others occupying its periphery. To the Latin west, the Greeks were the archetype
have seen, diplomacy in Byzantine politics was a major weapon in dealing with enemies
which beset the Empire on all sides. Byzantine diplomacy, in all of its facets, ensured the
continued survival of the Empire upon encountering all types of threats. The one threat
110
Ostrogorsky, History of, 28. Ostrogorsky is referencing the gradual yet consistent viewpoint
accepted by first Romans living in the Eastern Empire then Byzantines that their cultural sphere of
influence was the, in essence , the world. Outside peoples and uneducated barbarian tribes were part of the
darkness of uncultured otherness. Ostrogorsky describes a post fourth century, Roman world guided and
constructed under Christian motifs. The cultural xenophobia remained the same while the integral
reasoning behind it slowly changed. The apexes of cultural dominance were found in both Rome and
Constantinople because of Greek and Roman cultural hegemony and because these were the centers of
Christian political and theological power.
72
which Byzantine diplomatic strategies could not successfully defeat was time.
Throughout the periods previously detailed, Byzantine diplomacy had thwarted each
Byzantine diplomacy. By the twelfth century, Western Europe and Venice, were wholly
unlike anything the Byzantines had encountered in their ancient past. Western Europe,
for all of its incessant, petty warfare and inescapable violence was not a simple
confederation of barbarian tribes. It was formed into numerous yet culturally connected
kingdoms which were molded from the remaining vestiges of Roman imperial law,
including Latin custom and a Christian religion based upon Catholic principles. The
kingdoms of Western Europe were connected and dominated by a distinct and powerful
location, united around a solidified and powerful Church under the guiding hand of papal
authority. By the ninth century the Byzantines found themselves dealing, not with a
horde of barbarians that could be placated with trinkets but with members of a distinct
cultural ethos centered around warfare, feudal right and Rome. Centuries of geographic
isolation for the majority of the Empire destined Constantinople to problems with their
former Christian brethren. The culture of Constantinople was Greek and not Latin.
Warfare was not encouraged and the Byzantine aristocracy did not mold itself along the
lines of continuous martial conflict and redemption through religious violence as did its
Latin counterparts.
One of the great methods of Byzantine diplomacy, Christian conversion, was thus
lost in negotiations with the Latins and more importantly, the Venetians. The strategy
73
was completely ineffectual as the Venetians and the west were already members of the
Christian faith. The problems which Alexius I and successive emperors experienced with
the crusaders and the west were only temporarily and unsatisfactorily concluded through
the use of titles, tribute and land. This feature of Byzantine diplomacy was
predetermined on the context of having something to offer an enemy that had not
experienced its like before. It had worked against multitudes of barbarian hordes but
meant little against organized Latins who had their own series of titles. The crusaders
were happy to take gold from Constantinople and accept baseless titles and lands under
nominal Muslim control granted to them by the emperors. They added these to others
they already possessed but it did not stop them from countering Byzantine efforts to re-
take the Levant. It also did not dissuade them from actively campaigning against the
that could not be easily manipulated. Byzantine emperors could play an active role as a
father to the Latins but the crusaders only begrudgingly accepted Alexius I as a titular
head of the household and ignored the relationships entirely with his successors.111
Imperial marriages between porphyrogenitus and the West were still rare by the eleventh
and twelfth centuries but even an important marriage between a ruling Latin and a
member of the Byzantine aristocracy did not dissuade the West (especially Venice) from
111
Bréhier, The Life, 216.
74
By the late twelfth century, Venice had become the de facto senior partner in its
relationship with the Empire. Its position as chief rival to Byzantine trade autonomy had
been created along a hard and dangerous road. This road had involved subservience to
Byzantine political authority which had lasted for centuries, but had seen a role reversal
by the time of the Byzantine-Norman Wars in the late eleventh century. With the
Chrysobull of 1082 and the exorbitant trade concessions made, Alexius I had performed
the emperor’s role in Byzantine diplomacy in the same manner as his predecessors. With
that treaty promised and concluded, Alexius had purchased two valuable things to help
him defeat his enemies; time and a powerful ally. This agreement and the relationship to
Byzantine diplomacy from which it was created was in keeping with what countless
Eastern emperors had done through the empire’s history; buy time and allies to deal with
the problems at hand using promises to be kept at a later date. What the emperor could
never have fathomed was the steep price the Empire would have to pay in order to
purchase that help. Ostrogorsky paints a vivid picture of Venice as a greedy and
nothing to consolidate its power and monopolize all trade flowing from the east to
Western Europe. His synopsis of the role that Venice played in the downfall of
Constantinople to the western crusaders in 1204 was based upon the increased demands
and unfulfilled treaty obligations given to Venice by successive emperors and their
chrysobulls. To Ostrogorsky, Venice was a defiant power and their long connected
history of cooperation and rapprochement with the Empire had faded into obscurity. By
continued agreements, Venice had completely taken control of and dominated Byzantine
75
trade, cutting off a vital source of revenue and weakening an already feeble Empire by
the late twelfth century. He states, “the Byzantines had allowed Venice to seize their
maritime supremacy, and now were to lose their Empire to it.”112 For both Lane and
Madden, the Sack of Constantinople in 1204 led by the crusaders and the Venetians is the
key date in the climatic rise and consolidation of authority by Venice as the preeminent
trading power in the Mediterranean. Both historians end chapters in their books on the
rise of Venice with the declaration that the capture of Constantinople was the turning
point in Venice rise to power. With the privileges afforded to them as allies to the
crusaders, Lane states that, “the Fourth Crusade gave the Venetians undisputed maritime
preeminence in the eastern Mediterranean.”113 Madden also echoes this statement in his
final descriptions of the period after 1204; a time which saw Venice gain more trading
territory that formerly belonged to the Eastern Empire. He ends his book on the greatness
of Enrico Dandolo and the rise of Venice with, “Venice’s maritime empire had been
born.”114
Europe and the rise of Venice as a leading power yet I believe that I have shown how the
failure of Byzantine diplomatic theory coinciding with the creation of the Chrysobull in
1082 was a driving factor in the rise of Venice as a economic power. The Chrysobull of
112
Ostrogorsky, History of, 414.
113
Lane, Venice, 43.
114
Madden, Enrico Dandolo, 200.
76
appeasement. It was an act of diplomacy which had unparalleled consequences which the
Empire had never encountered nor could understand. Each re-affirmation of the original
trade agreement with the Venetians slowly paralyzed and gradually siphoned off revenue
from the struggling Empire; revenue which it could not afford to lose against growing
opposition in the form of the crusader kingdoms and the rising power of the Turks.
Byzantine diplomacy had trapped the Empire in a vortex of concessions which damaged
it militarily and economically past the point of recovery. Efforts to counteract Venetian
trade dominance only exacerbated the problems when successive emperors granted
generous trade treaties to other Italian merchants such as Genoa and Pisa. Granting these
rivals of Venice lucrative trade monopolies did little to stunt the continued Venetian trade
cartel and only further sapped the Empire’s trade resources. Instead of one dominating
The Chrysobull of 1082 and the subsequent trade treaties which followed were a
bloodletting enacted on the Empire through the failed use of Byzantine diplomacy. It
weakened the economic strength of Constantinople so that, little over a century after the
first chrysobull, the Empire had been partitioned and forever changed; made subservient
The gradual crumbling of Byzantine power and the rise of Venice as a major
trading and economic power had important and far-reaching effects on the history of
Western Europe. Trade had existed between Western Europe and the east since the time
of the original Roman Empire, yet the two spheres of civilization were disconnected by
large distances. A vigorous sea trade (especially in slaves) existed between Sicily and
77
North Africa after the Muslim conquest of that island in the early ninth century.115 The
expansion of Venice and other Italian maritime states as Mediterranean trading powers
helped to promote the idea of permanently connecting the resources of the east to Europe.
Standing apart from most accounts of the lessening of Byzantine trading power, the
historians Laiou and Morrisson describe the twelfth through fourteenth centuries as a
time of continued Byzantine trading prowess. They explain that even though Venetian
trading privileges hurt Byzantine traders, a trading network still existed which was large
enough to satisfactorily encompass all parties involved. Yet, even they state that, “in this
Europe, the Byzantine economy occupied a peripheral position,” and “in the meantime,
As we have seen, trade was tightly regulated and controlled by the Byzantine state
and was not allowed to operate under free market conditions. This prevented a powerful
counter to Venetian and Italian maritime expansion. In the world of international trade,
the Byzantines were hopelessly outmatched in the face of their Italian rivals. In the ninth
century, when trade had expanded by Venetian traders to all points in the eastern and
southern Mediterranean, the Byzantines were still relying on agriculture as their main
revenue generator. “As always in the Byzantine economy, trade was much less important
than agriculture, and the state, rather than commerce, dominated monetary
transactions.”117 While Venice expanded outward and ventured into uncharted territory
115
McCormick, The Origins, 768.
116
Laiou and Morrisson, The Byzantine, 246.
117
Treadgold, The Byzantine, 366.
78
to tap into unlimited supplies of trading wealth, the Byzantines relied on their vast land
area and taxation to fill the royal coffers. “Agriculture appears to have expanded rather
more quickly than trade at this time (ninth century),” and “overregulation of Byzantine
commerce was surely one reason that freer merchants from Venice, Naples, and Amalfi
began to dominate the Empire’s overseas trade with Italy, and to take over much of its
trade with the caliphate.”118 Thus when the eleventh and twelfth centuries arrived and the
problems associated with them confronted the Eastern Empire, their trading networks
were ill prepared to challenge the robust trading capabilities of the Italian cities.
the rise of Venice and the west. Diplomacy that had served the emperors over the
centuries had created problems which further diplomacy could only exacerbate.
Stratagems such as placation, subterfuge and father-figure diplomacy had helped create
the groundwork for the Chrysobull of 1082 which in turn, set the foundation for the rise
of Venice and the expansion of the west into the east. All major treaties thereafter were
unable to stop the slow decay of Byzantine power and the rise of Italian trading. Alexius
I and successive emperors could never have foreseen the dramatic shift in economic
power which the Chrysobull of 1082 and Byzantine diplomacy had created. Byzantine
diplomacy was a means to an end but it was never intended to eventually signify the end
118
Treadgold, The Byzantine, 574.
79
mid sixth The first Venetians settle along the sandbars which comprise the Rialto fleeing
century barbarian incursions into former Western Roman Empire territory
seventh-ninth
Venice is politically and economically answerable to Constantinople
centuries
ninth century Increased trade between Western Europe and Constantinople facilitated by
Venetian merchants expanding markets further into lucrative resource areas
late ninth Venice dramatically expands trading operations in the Adriatic and Eastern
century Mediterranean
ninth-tenth The Book of the Eparch, a manual on Byzantine trading theories, rules and
centuries regulations is complied which stipulates the roles that guilds and the merchant
class in Constantinople are expected to adhere to
1005 Emperor Basil II forms a close bond with Doge Pietro Orseolo II of Venice
and offers a member of the royal household in marriage to his son
1054 Schism between the Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox Churches
mid tenth Emperor Constantine VII ‘Porphyrogenitus’ dedicates to his son, Emperor
century Romanus II, the sum of Byzantine diplomatic and cultural history in the
manual De Administrando Imperio
1096-1099 Emperor Alexius I entertains and ushers the armies of Western Europe through
the Empire as they journey to recover the Holy Land. The First Crusade
culminates with the Conquest of Jerusalem in 1099.
1101 The fragile peace made in 1098 between Emperor Alexius I and the members
of the First Crusade is largely ignored
mid to late Court biographer John Kinnamos writes the Deeds of John and Manuel
twelfth Comnenus describing the problems encountered by both emperors in dealing
80
1126 Emperor John II attempts but fails in his efforts to check aggressive, Venetian
expansion into Constantinople. This expansion is a major after effect created
by the limitations of Byzantine diplomatic strategy and the Chrysobull of 1082
mid twelfth Princess Anna Comnena, daughter of Alexius I, writes The Alexiad detailing
century the exploits of her father in his dealings with the Normans, the Crusaders and
the Venetians
mid twelfth Emperor Manuel I regains former Italian possessions of the Byzantine Empire
century but they are soon lost
1179 Venice ratifies a treaty with the arch rivals of the Byzantine Empire; the
Normans in Southern Italy
late twelfth Venice successfully established partnerships and trading rights with most
century participants in the Mediterranean trading economy
1204 The Fourth Crusade comprised of western crusaders and their Venetian allies
sack Constantinople
1453 The Fall of Constantinople and the end of the Byzantine Empire
81
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