Barcelona v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 130087, 24 September 2003
FACTS:

Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married union begot
five children. On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a
Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona. Petition
further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations
of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition
allegedthe non-complied marital obligations. During their marriage, they had
frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich
family, wasa disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She
would go to her sister‘s house or would play tennis the whole day. When the family
had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of
a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her
husband.

On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with
Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner,
requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to
keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent‘s pregnancy, the
petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling. The respondent at the
time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted
up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the
petitioner and the respondent Diana claims that petitioner falls short of the
guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause for action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner stated a cause of action against Diana.

RULING:

YES, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative obligation of

Diana, and her act or omission as seen infacts FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND
GRAVE NATURE OF ILLNESS. Sec 2 of rules of declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage – petition does not need to show root cause sinceonly experts can
determine it b the physical manifestations of physical incapacity.PETITION IS
DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION.
 ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity should refer to a

mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants such as those enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must
be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability.

The elements of Psychological incapacity are:

(a) Grave – It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;

(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history of the party

antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and

(c) Incurable and Permanent – It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner v. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent

G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on

March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner
left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later
separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the
petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to
marry again, he filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological
incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the petitioner was already
residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was
residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her.
Nevertheless substituted service was rendered to their son at his residence in
Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for failing to answer the said
petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition
and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.

Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab
initio her marriage with respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction over her person, among others. She alleged that the respondent lied
on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on the case,
hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her
petition so she now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid.

HELD:

NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code
and Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). A grant of annulment of marriage or legal
separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion, says the Court.
“Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of
the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to
take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.”

“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare
him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal
may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious
and fabricated.”

Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-
parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner “without a whimper of
protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to
declare petitioner in default.”

The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable

social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-
forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one
as well.”

Petition is GRANTED.

Ocampo v. Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553, 23 February 1960

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They

begot several children who are not living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter
discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to
Manila in June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again
plaintiff discovered that the wife was going out with several other men other than
Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she left plaintiff and since then
they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of
having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a
petition for legal separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided
she is not charged with adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed
a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE:
Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of
judgment disallowed by the Family Code.

RULING:
Florenciano’s admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed
adultery, in the existence of evidence of adultery other than such confession, is
not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article 48 of the Family Code. What
is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or through a
pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of
separation should be granted since it would not be based on the confession but
upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a
judgment based exclusively on defendant’s confession. The petition should be
granted based on the second adultery, which has not yet prescribed.
 JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS
February 16, 1989 (G.R. No. L-55322)

FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first
intestate then the husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children.
Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed
by Emilio Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by
sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his
properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner
Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and
void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and
Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.

Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the
unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which
the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the name of
“Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.

ISSUE:
WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete” is conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this
presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired during
the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a
condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption
under Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were
acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The
certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson,
married to Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired
during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the
properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a
bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which
explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that
the properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so
because the words “married to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely
descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same
having been registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra
Poblete.

ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner,

vs.
DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 155043, September 30, 2004

FACTS:

Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land
with improvements located at Azucena St., Makati City.
Armed with a SPA issued by Esther, Arthuro’s wife, he executed a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) in favour of Macatangay, binding himself
to sell to latter the subject property and not to offer the same to any other party
within 30 days from date. Full payment would also be effected as soon as
possession of the property shall have been turned over to Macatangay.
Macatangay gave an earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be deducted
from the purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses. Subsequently,
Esther executed a SPA appointing her sister, Bernadette Ramos, to act for and in
her behalf relative to the transfer of the property to the respondent. After, Arturo
and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time and Macatangay, to
protect his interest, made an annotation in the title of the property. He then sent
a letter informing the spouses of his readiness to pay the full amount of the
purchase price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of Macatangay, a
Contract to sell the property to the extent of her conjugal interest for the sum of
P650,000 less the sum already received by her and Arturo. She agreed to surrender
the property to Macatangay within 20 days along with the deed of absolute sale
upon full payment, while he promised to pay the balance of the purchase price
for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in possession of the property. Macatangay
informed them that he was ready to pay and set aside the amount of P
1,290,000.00 as evidence by Citibank Check No.278107 as full payment. The
couple failed to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC): Petitioner: Macatangay, Respondent: Abalos

Ruling: RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have authorized
Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay as it was falsified.

COURT OF APPEALS (CA): by respondent

Ruling: CA reversed the decision, ruling the SPA in favor of Arturo,assuming it was
void, cannot affect the transaction between Estherand Macatangay. On the
other hand, the CA considered the RMOAexecuted by Arturo valid to effect the
sale of his conjugal share in the property. Dissatisfied with the appellate court’s
disposition, Abalos seeks a reversal of its disposition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo Abalos and Galicano
Macatangay. Whether or not the subsequent agreement between Galicano
Macatangay and Esther Abalos is binding and that it cured the defect of the
earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano.

RULING:

No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the
Family Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a different
property regime, their property relations would automatically be governed by the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The subject land which had been
admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part of their
conjugal partnership.

Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership.
This right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the
sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal
partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose
of any property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of
the husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does
not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result
of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial ) resulting from the
liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the
marriage, when itis finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal
obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses
or their respective heirs.

The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the
administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law provides that the
administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the
husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership,
the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power
of administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property
belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically
requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.

Inescapably, herein Arturo’s action for specific performance must fail. Even on
the supposition that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the
property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is still void for as previously stated, the
right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet . No
one can give what he has not.

The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier
transaction between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.
 HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner
vs.
MIGUELA C. DAILO, respondent
GR NO. 153802, Mar 11, 2005

FACTS:
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8,
1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot in San Pablo
City, registered in the name of Marcelino Dailo to the exclusion of his wife.

In 1993, through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth Osmundo,

Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank,
secured by the property in San Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate
Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the
knowledge and consent of respondent. The loan matured and remained
outstanding which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage.

In 1993, Marcelino died.

Respondent found out later about the mortgage and claimed that she had no
knowledge of it. She further claims that the property was conjugal in nature and
so she consequently filed for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate
of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance
with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property
of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The Court of appeals favored Miguela. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the mortgage entered into by respondent’s husband without
her knowledge was valid.
2.) Whether or not the property may be held liable for the obligation obtained by
the late Marcelino Dailo.

HELD:

The court held that the property relations of respondent and her late husband
shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of
the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil
Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions
on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

Marcelino and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family
Code. In the absence of a marriage settlement, their properties were governed
by the system of Conjugal Partnership of gains, which was made also made
applicable after the effectivity of the Code.

Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void. The Court ruled that the mortgage entered into by
Marcelino without his wife’s consent and, thus, was void.

As to the issue of liability of the property for the obligation obtained by Marcelino,
the court held that for failure to present clear proof that the said obligation
redounded to the benefit of the family which under Article 121 of the Family
Code, the subject property could not be held liable.

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MARGARITA QUINTOS E YPARRAGUIRRE and ANGEL A. ANSALSO, defendants-
appellants.
Angel A. Ansaldo for appellants.
Roman J. Lacson for appellee.
G.R. No. L-22383, October 6, 1924

Facts:

On June 20, 1918, PNB granted the defendants a credit to the amount of P31,284
to which defendants mortgaged stocks from BPI, Compania Naviera, Davao
Agriculture and Commercial Company, etc. In the document, it did not clearly
show that they were husband and wife, except in their civil statuses. On April 2,
1921/July 22, 1921 a complaint was filed requiring Mr. Ansalso to pay his debt.

The SC 1st trial, the defendants claim that their debt is not of a solidary nature and
should thus only bind one to the extent of their share in the obligation thus should
not be charged to their conjugal partnership. However, Art. 1408 of NCC provides
that all debts incurred by both husband and wife during the marriage are
chargeable to the conjugal partnership, thus, Margarita, the wife, is part of the
obligation as her husband as the legal manager of the conjugal partnership is
liable for the debt. SC first decision held that conjugal partnership should be used
to pay for the debt incurred as well as private property of each of them since they
are both obligated.

The SC 2nd trial (Decision upon Motion for Reconsideration), reasserts that conjugal
property is liable for the debt they incurred as husband and wife. Conjugal
partnership begins existing at celebration of marriage as confined to properties
stated in Article 1401 of the Civil Code. Conjugal partnership does not merge the
properties they acquired before. The rest of the property that the spouse acquired
before their marriage is separate from the conjugal partnership. Guaranteed by
the absolute separation of capitals.

Issue:

W/N they are jointly liable for the debts incurred through conjugal partnership.

Held:

Under the NCC 1698 that partners are not solidarity liable with respect to the debt
of the partnership; NCC 1137 that solidarity will exist only when it is expressly
determined. Meaning, partner cannot be solidarity liable for the debts of the
partnership, because there is no legal provision imposing such burden up on one.

And it is now held that properties of the conjugal partnership of the defendants
are liable fro the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable
for the payment thereof. It is being understood that the judgment appealed from
is modified in the sense above stated and the motion of the appellants is denied.

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. and ABELARDO MAGSAJO,

petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ALFREDO & ENCARNACION CHING,
respondents.
G.R. No. 118305, February 12, 1998

Facts:

Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained P50,300.00 loan from petitioner Ayala
Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). Respondent Alfredo Ching
EVP of PBM, executed security agreements on December 1980 and March 1981
making him jointly and severally answerable with PBM’s indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan hence filing of complaint against PBM and Ching. The
RTC rendered judgment ordering PBM and Ching to jointly and severally pays
AIDC the principal amount with interests. Pending the appeal of the judgment,
RTC issued writ of execution. Thereafter, Magsajo, appointed deputy sheriff,
caused the issuance and service upon respondent spouses of the notice of sheriff
sale on 3 of their conjugal properties on May 1982. Respondent spouses filed
injunction against petitioners on the ground that subject load did not redound to
the benefit of the said conjugal properties. CA issued a TRP enjoining lower court
from enforcing its order paving the way for the scheduled auction sale of
respondent spouse’s conjugal properties. A certificate of sale was issued to AIDC,
being the only bidder and was registered on July 1982.

Issue:

W/N the debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone is considered
“for the benefit of the conjugal partnership” and is it chargeable.

Held:

The loan procured from AIDC was the advancement and benefit of PBM and not
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching. Furthermore, AIDC failed to
prove that Ching contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gains. PBM has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching
despite the fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity.
Clearly, the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is
only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.

Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, “if the money or
services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a
surety or guarantor, that contrat cannot, but itself, alone be categorized as falling
within the context of obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The
contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and
not for the surety of his family. Ching only signed as surety for the loan contracted
with AIDC in behalf of PBM. Signing as surety is certainly not an exercise of an
industry or profession; it is not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal
partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly
for the benefit of PBM.

The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for the
family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Ching’s
employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must be
one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a spin off
of the loan itself.
 ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner,
vs.
DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 155043, September 30, 2004

FACTS:

Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land
with improvements. Arturo made a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in
favor of Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not
to offer the same to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment would
also be effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned
over to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an earnest money amounting to
P5,000.00 to be deducted from the purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the
spouses.

Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time and
Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an annotation in the title of the
property. He then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to pay the full
amount of the purchase price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of
Macatangay, a Contract to sell the property to the extent of her conjugal interest
for the sum of P650,000 less the sum already received by her and Arturo. She
agreed to surrender the property to Macatangay within 20 days along with the
deed of absolute sale upon full payment, while he promised to pay the balance
of the purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in possession of the
property. Macatangay informed them that he was ready to pay the amount in
full. The couple failed to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.

RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have authorized Arturo
to sell the property to Macatangay as it was falsified. CA reversed the decision,
ruling the SPA in favor of Arturo, assuming it was void, cannot affect the
transaction between Esther and Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA
considered the RMOA executed by Arturo valid to effect the sale of his conjugal
share in the property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of property is valid.

RULING:
No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the
Family Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a different
property regime, their property relations would automatically be governed by the
regime of conjugal partnership of gains. The subject land which had been
admittedly acquired during the marriage of the spouses forms part of their
conjugal partnership.

Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. This right is clearly granted to him by law. More, the husband is the
sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to joint administration.

The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the conjugal

partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. Similarly, the wife cannot dispose
of any property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of
the husband. The law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership
without the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.

More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere
expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does
not ripen into title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result
of the liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net
remainder or “remanente liquido” (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation
of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the husband
or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when
it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net
assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

The Family Code has introduced some changes particularly on the aspect of the
administration of the conjugal partnership. The new law provides that the
administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the
husband and the wife. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of
administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property
belonging to the conjugal partnership. In all instances, the present law specifically
requires the written consent of the other spouse, or authority of the court for the
disposition or encumbrance of conjugal partnership property without which, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Inescapably, herein Arturo’s action for specific performance must fail. Even on
the supposition that the parties only disposed of their respective shares in the
property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is still void for as previously stated, the
right of the husband or the wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest
until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No
one can give what he has not.

SAN JUAN STRUCTURAL AND STEEL FABRICATORS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MOTORICH SALES CORPORATION, NENITA LEE GRUENBERG,
ACL DEVELOPMENT CORP. and JNM REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
respondent
September 29, 1998 (G.R. No. 129459)

FACTS:

San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators entered into an agreement with
Motorich Sales Corporation through Nenita Gruenberg, corporate treasurer of
Motorich, for the transfer to the former a parcel of land upon a P100,000 earnest
money, balance to be payable within March 2, 1989. Upon payment of the
earnest money, and on March 1, 1989, San Juan allegedly asked to be submitted
a computation of the balance due to Motorich. The latter, despite repeated
demands, refused to execute the Deed of Assignment of the land. San Juan
discovered that Motorich entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale of the land to ACL
Development Corporation.

Hence, San Juan filed a complaint with the RTC.

On the other hand, Motorich contends that since Nenita Gruenberg was only the
treasurer of said corporation, and that its president, Reynaldo Gruenberg, did not
sign the agreement entered into by San Juan and Motorich, the treasurer’s
signature was inadequate to bind Motorich to the agreement. Furthermore,
Nenita contended that since San Juan was not able to pay within the stipulated
period, no deed of assignment could be made. The deed was agreed to be
executed only after receipt of the cash payment, and since according to Nenita,
no cash payment was made on the due date, no deed could have been
executed.
RTC dismissed the case holding that Nenita Gruenberg was not authorized by
Motorich to enter into said contract with San Juan, and that a majority vote of
the BoD was necessary to sell assets of the corporation in accordance with Sec.
40 of the Corporation Code. CA affirmed this decision. Hence, this petition with
SC.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not there was a valid contract existing between San Juan and
Motorich.
(2) Whether or not the veil of corporate fiction could be pierced.

HELD:

(1) No. The contract entered into between Nenita and San Juan cannot bind
Motorich, because the latter never authorized nor ratified such sale. A
corporation is a juridical person separate and distinct from its stockholders or
members. Accordingly, the property of the corporation is not the property of its
stockholders and may not be sold by them without express authorization from the
corporation’s BoD. This is in accordance with Sec. 23 of the Corporation Code.

Indubitably, a corporation can only act through its BoD or, when authorized either
by its by laws or by its board resolution, through its officers or agents in the normal
course of business. The general principles of agency govern the relation between
the corporation and its officers or agents, subject to the AoI, by laws, or relevant
provisions of law. A corporate officer or agent may represent and bind the
corporation in transactions with 3rd persons to the extent that the authority to do
so has been conferred upon him, and this includes powers which have been
intentionally conferred, and also such powers as, in the usual course of the
particular business, are incidental to, or may be implied from, the powers
intentionally conferred, powers added by custom and usage, as usually
pertaining to the particular officer or agent, and such apparent powers as the
corporation has caused persons dealing with the officer or agent to believe that
it has conferred. Furthermore, persons dealing with an assumed agent, whether
the assumed agency be a general or special one, are bound at their peril, if they
would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also
the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden
of proof is upon them to establish it. Unless duly authorized, a treasurer, whose
powers are limited, cannot bind the corporation in a sale of its assets.

In the case at bar, San Juan had the responsibility of ascertaining the extent of
Nenita’s authority to represent the corporation. Selling is obviously foreign to a
corporate treasurer’s function. Neither was real estate sale shown to be a normal
business activity of Motorich. The primary purpose of said corporation is
marketing, distribution, import and export relating to a general merchandising
business. Unmistakably, its treasurer is not cloaked with actual or apparent
authority to buy or sell real property, an activity which falls way beyond the scope
of her general authority.

Acts of corporate officers within the scope of their authority are binding on the
corporation. But when these officers exceed their authority, their actions cannot
bind the corporation, unless it has ratified such acts or is estopped from
disclaiming them.

(2) No. San Juan argues that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced
because the spouses Reynaldo and Nenita Gruenberg own 99.96% of the
subscribed capital stock, they needed no authorization from the BoD to enter into
the said contract.

The veil can only be disregarded when it is utilized as a shield to commit fraud,
illegality or inequity, defeat public convenience, confuse legitimate issues, or
serve as a mere alter ego or business conduit of a person or an instrumentality,
agency or adjunct of another corporation. Hence, the question of piercing the
veil becomes a matter of proof. In the case at bar, SC found no reason to pierce
the veil. San Juan failed to establish that said corporation was formed for the
purpose of shielding any fraudulent act of its officers and stockholders.

PROCOPIO VILLANUEVA, NICOLAS RETUYA and PACITA VILLANUEVA, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE HEIRS OF EUSEBIA NAPISA RETUYA, respondent.
G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004

FACTS:

On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court
against her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with
Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and
Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her
conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant
Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock,
they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their
marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in
Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of
land situated in Mandaue City, which he inherited from his parents Esteban
Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of
approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the properties
earn income from coconuts leased to corporations
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate
son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the
properties. Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas,
has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she could derive
income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son
is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties

Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia
Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her
heirs. CA upheld trial court’s decision

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between
Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal

RULING:

YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed

The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations
between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of
Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.
Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement
that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the
marriage before they are presumed conjugal.

Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was
purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
 VICENTE G. VILLARANDA, petitioner
vs.
Spouses HONORIO G. VILLARANDA and ANA MARIA Y. VILLARANDA; and
COLORHOUSE LABORATORIES, INC., respondent
G.R. No. 153447, February 23, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Vicente and respondent Honorio Villaranda are brothers who inherited
land from their parents. In 1976, they executed a Deed of Exchange, wherein
Vicente agreed to convey his portion to Honorio in exchange for property in
Macasandig.

Honorio and his wife, Ana, brought an action for specific performance to compel
Vicente to fulfill his obligations under the Deed. Vicente never identified or
delineated his undivided portion of the property. Vicente claims both parties
revoked the Deed. RTC ruled in favor of Honorio and Ana.

On appeal, the CA held that the Civil Code was applicable since the Deed was
entered into in 1976. The absence of the wife’s signature made it voidable, not
void. In addition, Ana was aware of the Deed but never brought action for its
annulment within 10years from its execution. The prescriptive period for the cause
of action ran not from the execution of the Deed but from when Vicente refused
to transfer his title to Honorio, some 2 months before the filing of the case. CA
again ruled in favor of Honorio and Ana.

ISSUE:

WON the Deed is valid without the signature of Ana

HELD:

YES, The Deed was entered into on 1976, before the Family Code. The Civil Code
applies. The Macasandig lot was part of Honorio and Ana’s conjugal property.
Under the Civil Code 166 and 173, the husband cant alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. This is
voidable, not void. An action to annul such alienation may be instituted by the
wife during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction. The Deed is
valid until annulled.
There is no evidence that any action to annul the transfer was brought by Ana
within 10 years from the transaction. Her right to bring an action has prescribed.
The Deed is still valid and enforceable.

Hontiveros vs. RTC

GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages
against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The
petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that
they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the filing of the land
registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married
and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also
denied depriving petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the
contrary, according to the private respondents, the possession of the property in
question had already been transferred to petitioners by virtue of the writ of
possession. Trial court denied petitioner’s motion that while in the amended
complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made,
it was not verified as provided in Article 151.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts
exerted towards a compromise as stated in Article 151.
HELD:

SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and
Maria Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151.
Under this provision, the phrase “members of the same family” refers to the
husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants, and
brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and
relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora
and Maria as spouses of the Hontiveros’ are regarded as strangers to the
Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.
 DIANCIN v. CA and DECENA
GR No. 119991
November 20, 2000
Ponente: Justice Pardo

*Petition for review on Certiorari of a decision of the CA

FACTS:

 Dec. 30, 1933 – Tiburcio Estampador, Sr. and Matilde Gulmatico were
married in Iloilo; had the following children: Norma, Vevencia, Raul, Aurora,
Luz and Fe (all surnamed Estampador, herein respondents).
 April 9, 1940 – Matilde was granted Ordinary Fishpond Permit which
covered an area of 10.47 hectares situated in Barrio Jalaud, Iloilo. The
permit was last renewed on Feb. 24, 1972 to expire on Dec. 31, 1972.
 March 2, 1957 – Tiburcio, Sr. died, and almost one year after Tiburcio’s
death, Matilde initially sold the leasehold right on the fishpond to petitioner
Olimpia Diancin on August 7, 1967 which was fully sold to the latter for a
total amount of P31,000 by virtue of a deed of sale executed on June 28,
1969.
 January 3, 1989 – A complaint for declaration of nullity and recovery of one-
half conjugal share of the fishpond was filed by the children of Tiburcio
(herein respondents) against petitioner Olimpia Diancin and Matilde. On
March 16, 1989, Olimpia filed her answer alleging that the fishpond was
actually government owned. On August 13, 1990, the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of the private respondents and declaring the Deed of Sale
null and void and ordering Diancin to reconvey ½ of the Fishpond
Leasehold Right to the private respondents.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC and
considered the fishpond leasehold real property since it was acquired
during the subsistence of the marriage of Matilde and Tiburcio, is thus
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the fishpond leasehold right is part of the conjugal partnership of
gains.
RULING:
YES. The Court ruled that all property acquired by the spouses during the
marriage, regardless of in whose name the same is registered, is presumed to
belong to the conjugal property of gains, unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The fishpond lease right is not
paraphernal since it was acquired during the marriage between Matilde and
Tiburcio. The fact that the grant was solely in the name of Matilde did not make
the property paraphernal property; what was material is the time the fishpond
lease right was acquired by the grantee and that was during the lawful existence
of Matilde’s marriage to Tuburcio. With regard to the disposition of the entire
leasehold right made by Matilde after the death of her husband, the CA correctly
ruled that Matide did not have the authority to dispose of the it entirely, since the
death of Tiburcio dissolved the conjugal partnership making only one half of the
property right pertained to Matilde as her share in the conjugal partnership of
gains and another one seventh as her share from the estate of Tiburcio. Thus, their
children are entitled to the six seventh share in the other half which formed part
of the estate of Tiburcio.

Spouses Virgilio And Michelle Castro, Moises B. Miat And Alexander v. Miat,
Petitioners, Vs. Romeo V. Miat, Respondent.

G.R. No. 143297. February 11, 2003

FACTS: Father of two children, Moises, widower, originally intended his two
properties for his offspring but reverted to keeping the latter for himself while in
Dubai. He modified the original agreement upon return to the Philippines in 1984.
Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother, Cerefino Miat, who said testified the
original agreement that Paco would go to Moises’ sons. This was reiterated at the
death bed of Moises’ wife and affirmed upon Moises’ return to the Philippines.
Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the property with their wives.
Alexander and his wife, however, left the property in August 1985 for personal
reasons. On December 1, 1988, Romeo and Virgilio met in MTC Manila to discuss
status of Paco property. On the 16th, a letter from petitioner’s lawyer informed
Romeo that the Paco property had been sold to Virgilio by Moises. Virgilio
admitted that the title of the property was with Romeo but bought it anyway on
the assurance of Moises that he’d be able to retrieve it from his son.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Paco property is conjugal or capital.

RULING: Yes. Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by Moises and
at the time it was paid, the Supreme Court disagrees on the grounds of the new
Civil Code Art 153, Paragraph 1, “Those acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the
partnership, or for only one of the spouses.” Records show that property was
acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly
conjugal property. Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It
provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife.” This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. In the case at bar, Moises and
Concordia bought the Paco property during their marriage. Moises did not bring
it into their marriage, hence it must be considered as conjugal.

Josephine Wee, Petitioner, v. Felicidad Gonzalez, Respondent.

G.R. No. 202414, June 04, 2014

FACTS: Respondent Felicidad Gonzales, married to Leopoldo Mardo. On February

1, 1993, respondent allegedly conveyed to petitioner, Josephine Wee, through a
Deed of Absolute Sale, a portion of lot which was fully paid. Respondent,
however, refused to vacate and turn over the subject property claiming that the
alleged sale was falsified. On December 22, 1994, petitioner filed an Application
for Original Registration. On September 4, 2009, the RTC rendered a
Decision granting the application of petitioner. Respondent appealed the
decision before the CA. On June 26, 2012, the CA handed down a Judgment
reversing and setting aside the RTC decision. The CA held, among others, that
petitioner was not able to comply with the requirement of possession and
occupation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can exercise open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land.

RULING: No. The CA denied the application on the issue of open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land. P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as Property Registration Decree, governs the original registration
proceedings of unregistered land. The subject application for original registration
was filed pursuant to Sec. 14, Paragraph 1 of PD 1529, which provides the
condition necessary for registration. It was of the view that she could not have
complied with the requirement of possession and occupation. As she was not in
actual and physical possession, she could not have exercised any acts of
dominion over the subject property which was essential to the requirement of
possession and occupation.

ALIPIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 134100

Summary: A lease was executed by a husband and his wife together with
another couple. Then, the husband died. The lessor is suing the surviving wife as
a solidary debtor.

Rule of Law: Spouses sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by
them are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal
partnership and not as independent debtors such that the concept of joint or
solidary liability, as between them, does not apply.

Facts: Romeo Jaring (P) subleased a fishpond to spouses Alipio (D) and spouses
Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel for P485,600 payable in two installments. The
first installment was paid, but the second was only partly paid. Despite due
demand, the balance remain unpaid. Jaring (P) filed a case to collect the
balance from the spouses Alipio (D) and spouses Manuel with a prayer for the
alternative of rescission. Purita Alipio (D) moved to dismiss the case because her
husband died and thus, dissolving their conjugal partnership. Alipio (D)
contended that the proper action for Jaring (P) is to file a claim in the
settlement of the estate.

The trial court denied Alipio's (D) motion on the ground that since she was herself
a party to the sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the
suit together with spouses Manuel and that the death of her husband merely
resulted in his exclusion from the case.

On appeal, the court applied the ruling on Climaco vs. Siy Uy finding the
surviving spouse solidary liable.

Issues: Is the surviving spouse a solidary debtor for a lease she and her late
husband entered into?

Ruling: No. For marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains,
an obligation entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily bound for its
repayment. (Rules of Court, Rule 79, §2) Thus, when the spouses are sued for the
enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded
in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as
independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as
between them, does not apply.

A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary

proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the
conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to file a claim in the
settlement of estate of the decedent.

The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and
the same obligation does not imply that each one of the former has a right to
demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance
with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly
so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
—Article 1207, Civil Code

If from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does
not appear, an obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided
into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being considered
distinct from one another. (Article 1208, Civil Code)
However,
Should the lessees or sub-lessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the
expiration of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can
be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of
their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that
they have become joint tortfeasors.
—Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, GR 106029, Oct. 19, 1999.

Reading the pertinent portion of the contract, it is clear that the liability of the
sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is
chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance
should be divided into two.

CARLOS vs. ABELARDO

G.R. No. 146504

FACTS:

Honorio Carlos filed a petition against Manuel Abelardo, his son-in-law for
recovery of the $25,000 loan used to purchase a house and lot located at
Paranaque. It was in October 1989 when the petitioner issued a check worth as
such to assist the spouses in conducting their married life independently. The seller
of the property acknowledged receipt of the full payment. In July 1991, the
petitioner inquired from spouses status of the amount loaned from him, the
spouses pleaded that they were not yet in position to make a definite settlement.
Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to the extent of making
various death threats against petitioner. In 1994, petitioner made a formal
demand but the spouses failed to comply with the obligation. The spouses were
separated in fact for more than a year prior the filing of the complaint hence
spouses filed separate answers.

Abelardo contended that the amount was never intended as a loan but his share
of income on contracts obtained by him in the construction firm and that the
petitoner could have easily deducted the debt from his share in the profits. RTC
decision was in favor of the petitioner, however CA reversed and set aside trial
court’s decision for insufficiency of evidence. Evidently, there was a check issued
worth $25,000 paid to the owner of the Paranaque property which became the
conjugal dwelling of the spouses. The wife executed an instrument
acknowledging the loan but Abelardo did not sign.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be

charged against the conjugal partnership.

HELD:

Yes, as it has redounded to the benefit of the family. They did not deny that the
same served as their conjugal home thus benefiting the family. Hence, the
spouses are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Abelardo’s
contention that it is not a loan rather a profit share in the construction firm is
untenable since there was no proof that he was part of the stockholders that will
entitle him to the profits and income of the company.

Hence, the petition was granted and Abelardo is ordered to pay the petitioner in
the amount of $25,000 plus legal interest including moral and exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees.

PS. MANUEL AND SALVACION DEL CAMPO v. CA

GR No. 108228, 2001-02-01

Facts:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed
Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pontevedra, Capiz... the lot... was divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8)
co-owners
Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo.
Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land described above and
built a house thereon.
Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot
162 as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This... transaction was
evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage... three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162,
specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot
to Jose Regalado, Sr.
Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage
debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado,... Sr...
said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners,
the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No.
18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541 initially reflected the shares of the
original co-owners in Lot 162. However, title was transferred later to Jose
Regalado, Sr. who subdivided... the entire property into smaller lots, each covered
by a respective title in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C...
petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for
"repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of the now deceased
Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square
meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which... was erroneously included in TCT No.
14566 in the name of Regalado.
Antonio failed to present any evidence to refute the claim of petitioners.
the trial court deemed the case submitted for decision.
trial court... dismissing the complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate her
pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part thereof
by metes and bounds to Soledad... from whom petitioners derived... their title
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment
Issues:
Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held
in common be valid?
Ruling:
The mere fact that Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-
owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the
sale a nullity.
there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad
could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership... parties expressly
stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from
Salome's 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer
in whole or in part even without the consent... of the other co-owners. Salome's
right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of
his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage... it, and
substitute another person in its enjoyment
Salome's clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in
our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given
effect to the full extent.
this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a
physically... segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the
co-owner/vendor's undivided interest could properly be the object of the
contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such
a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as... co-owner, in an ideal share
equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction.
Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was
made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have
sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time,
the ideal shares held by... the three co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only
10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome
to Soledad.
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo... could not legally sell the shares pertaining to
Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-
ownership.
We have ruled many times that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his,
the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other... co-owners who
did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share,
a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said
co-owner to the buyer, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares
which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her
rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951.
It must be noted that 26 years had lapsed from the time petitioners bought and
took... possession of the property in 1951 until Regalado procured the issuance of
TCT... intervening years between the date of petitioners' purchase of the property
and 1987 when petitioners filed the instant complaint, comprise all of 36 years.
where the transferees of an undivided... portion of the land allowed a co-owner
of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the
same for a period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or
right than said transferees.
Such... undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co-
owned property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he
occupies.
petitioners are entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted
possession thereof for a total... of 49 years up to the present.
Principles:
The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of
the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle
that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally...
possible to do so.
principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-
owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners.
principle that "no one can give what he does not have,"
 G..R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006

SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ,

Petitioners,vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and
FRANCISCAFABELLA,
Respondents.

FACTS:
This case srcinated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio
andVenida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before theMunicipal
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:2. That plaintiffs are the
registered owner[s] of a piece of residential lot denominatedas Lot [N]o. 3 Blk 19 located at
Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo,Rizal which [they] acquired from Carolina
Realty, Inc. Sometime [i]n November 1992by virtue of Sales Contract, xerox copy of which is
hereto attached marked as Annex"A" and the xerox copy of the Torrens Certificate of Title in her
name marked as Annex "B";3. That defendants, without any color of title whatsoever occupy the
said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful
possession thereof;4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the herein defendants to
peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they
unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to the Barangay, defendants still
refused to heed the plea of the former to surrender the lot peacefully. In their answer, private
respondents contended that the complaint failed to state that petitioners had prior physical
possession of the property or that they were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private
respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous,
and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report
from the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.

MTC RULING
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering
private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of
the same plus attorney’s fees.

RTC RULING
Private respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The RTC, in a decision dated 8 January 1997, affirmed in toto the decision of the MTC.
 Martinez vs. Martinez Case Digest
Martinez vs. Martinez
G.R. No. 162084 June 28, 2005

Facts: The spouses Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed thereon.
Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament directing the subdivision of the property into three lots. He
then bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons, namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr. Manolo was
designated as the administrator of the estate.

Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his father, where the latter appears to have sold to
Manolo and his wife Lucila. Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale and cancellation of TCT
against his brother Manolo and his sister-in-law Lucila before the RTC. RTC dismissed the complaint for
annulment of deed of sale on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action since there
was no allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Martinez, Sr. had been admitted to probate.
Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.

In the meantime, the spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the
property. Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint
for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila. They alleged that they were the owners of the
property. The spouses Martinez alleged in their position paper that earnest efforts toward a compromise
had been made and/or exerted by them, but that the same proved futile. No amicable settlement was,
likewise, reached by the parties during the preliminary conference because of irreconcilable differences.

Issue: Whether or not the certification to file action and the allegations in the complaint that the case passed
through the barangay are sufficient compliance to prove that earnest efforts were made.

Ruling: The petition was granted. As pointed out by the Code Commission, it is difficult to imagine a sadder
and more tragic spectacle than litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a compromise before litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the
family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers.

Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code before filing a complaint against a
family member would render such complaint premature.