Preliminary Considerations Cases

1.
PEOPLE VS. MARTI

[193 SCRA 57; G.R. NO. 81561; 18 JAN 1991]

Facts:

Accused-appellant went to a forwarding agency to send four packages to a friend in Zurich. Initially, the
accused was asked by the proprietress if the packages can be examined. However, he refused. Before
delivering said packages to the Bureau of Customs and the Bureau of Posts, the husband of the proprietress
opened said boxes for final inspection. From that inspection, included in the standard operating procedure
and out of curiosity, he took several grams of its contents.

He brought a letter and the said sample to the National Bureau of Investigation. When the NBI was informed
that the rest of the shipment was still in his office, three agents went back with him. In their presence, the
husband totally opened the packages. Afterwards, the NBI took custody of said packages. The contents ,
after examination by forensic chemists, were found to be marijuana flowering tops.

The appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the agents for questioning.
Later on, the trial court found him guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Issue:

Whether or Not the items admitted in the searched illegally searched and seized.

Whether or Not custodial investigation properly applied.

Whether or Not the trial court not give credence to the explanation of the appellant on how said packages
came to his possession.

Held:

No. “The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and
participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated. Stated otherwise, may
an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against
the State. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State. It was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure
on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs
or the Bureau of Posts. Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe
and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no
trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search.”
No. “The law enforcers testified that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is
presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131) and their testimonies should
be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary.”
No. “Appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption
that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j],
Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to claim otherwise.”

2.

People vs. Domasian G.R.No. 95322 March 1, 1993

Facts :
The accused were Pablito Domasian and Samson Tan, the latter then a resident physician in the hospital of the victim's
parents. The victim was 8-year old Enrico Agra, who was detained by Domasian and brought to a far place. While they were
boarding a tricycle, Domasian was firmly holding Enrico and the boy continued crying. This aroused the suspicion of the
driver, and brought about the recovery of the boy even before the ransom notes reached the boy's parents.
Upon perusal of the note, Agra's father thought the handwriting was familiar so he compared it with some records in the
hospital. It turned out that it was written by Dr. Tan. Both accused were convicted of conspiracy in kidnapping Agra.
Constitutional Issues :
1. Domasian contends that he was arrested without warrant, tortured and held incommunicado to extort a confession.
2. Dr. Tan raised that the hospital documents which was compared to the ransom notes were seized without a search
warrant.
Ruling :
1. Domasian never made a confession.
2. The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against acts of private individuals, being directed only against the government and its
law-enforcement agencies and limitation on official action.

3.
PBM EMPLOYEES VS. PBM

[51 SCRA 189; G.R. NO. L-31195; 5 JUN 1993]

Facts:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin
Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on
March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and
stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company
personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed
by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the
normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the
Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing
CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members
numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that
the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the
second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969,
filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of
Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held:

Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense
of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity
as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the
local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of
petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer
that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning
to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by
the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard
the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from
employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound
on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one
of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members
will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and
abet continued alleged police persecution.

4.
GONZALES VS. COMELEC

[27 SCRA 835; G.R. L-27833; 18 APR 1969]

Facts:

RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting
the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More
precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association
are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent
councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila
to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a
private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his co-petitioner. There
was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign
are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by
and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation
and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and present
danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect.
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could
indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of
association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being
the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by
unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only
of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union,
the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions.
Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue:

Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the “clear and present danger” rule and the
'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must
be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished.
The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of
establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as
to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that “If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable.” It is
not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is
sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be
reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative
body seeks to prevent.

The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely
delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present
danger doctrine. As the author Tañada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative
body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present
danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty
and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan
political activities in this country.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the
case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or
against the election of any party or candidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or
distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly,
or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is
repugnant to a constitutional command.

5.
PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO

[198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]

Facts:

Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed
before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts
alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court
has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that
the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942
and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187
repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail,
which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two
months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support
thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of
his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a
Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and
address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered
and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue:

Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held:

Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense,
therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right
becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K
without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime
of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made
therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction
of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law.
 6.

People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion
(tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its
members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed
by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man
defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his
house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly
issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being
involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept
ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made
only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his
arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the
search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7.

Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a
firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon
the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—
in wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs
Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his
haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome
and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s
house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to

commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under
the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual
possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any
“subversive” act—he was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a
warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact
or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have
been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the
arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go
through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground
to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was
a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is
no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents,
assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional
rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and
thus inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by
counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the
alleged subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the
aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with
which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been
disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a
rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should continue to
repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means
at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken
must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.”

7.

CASE DIGEST : Legaspi Vs Civil Serv. Comm.

G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
respondent.

FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in
this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service
Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These
government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves
as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.

ISSUE : WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service
eligibilities of the Health Department employees

HELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does
not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers,
etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" The law may therefore exempt certain types of
information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security It follows that, in every case, the
availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information
sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted
by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or
not the information sought is of public interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the
government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does
not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the
government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or,
if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To
hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an
advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review
1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency
concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ
of Mandamus Public office being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that
government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles.
Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective
positions. In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has
failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are,
and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who
pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various
professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if
actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in
this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any
citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service
eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law
upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent
Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes
imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies

8.

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon Case Digest August 29,

1975
TOPIC: ARTICLE 32 OF THE CIVIL CODE/ SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

FACTS:Taha sold to a certain Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch named M/L "SAN RAFAEL".
A year later or on April 9, 1962 Alberto Timbangcaya filed a complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil Taha forcibly took away the motor
launch from him.

Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon, upon being informed that the motor launch was in Balabac,
Palawan, wrote the Provincial Commander of Palawan requesting him to direct the detachment
commander-in Balabac to impound and take custody of the motor launch.

On June 26, 1962, Fiscal Ponce de Leon reiterated his request to the Provincial Commander
to impound the motor launch, explaining that its subsequent sale to a third party, plaintiff-
appellant Delfin Lim, cannot prevent the court from taking custody of the same. 2 So, on July
6, 1962 upon order of the Provincial Commander, defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela,
Detachment Commander of Balabac, Palawan, seized the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL" from
plaintiff-appellant Delfin Lim and impounded it.
Delfin Lim and Jikil Taha filed a case against Fiscal Francisco Ponce de Leon and Orlando
Maddela, alleging that on July 6, 1962 Orlando Maddela entered the premises of Delfin Lim
without a search warrant and then and there took away the hull of the motor launch without
his consent; that he effected the seizure upon order of Fiscal Ponce de Leon who knew fully
well that his office was not vested with authority to order the seizure of a private property;
that said motor launch was purchased by Delfin Lim from Jikil Taha in consideration of Three
Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00), Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) of which has been given to
Jikil Taha as advance payment; that as a consequence of the unlawful seizure of the motor
launch, its sale did not materialize; and that since July 6, 1962, the said motor launch had
been moored at the Balabac Bay, Palawan and because of exposure to the elements it had
become worthless and beyond repair.

In their answer, defendants-appellees denied the material allegations of the complaint and as
affirmative defenses alleged that the motor launch in question which was sold by Jikil Taha to
Alberto Timbangcaya on April 29, 1961 was sometime in April 1962, forcibly taken with
violence upon persons and with intent to gain by Jikil Taha from Alfredo Timbangcaya without
the latter's knowledge and consent, thus giving rise to the filing of a criminal charge of robbery
against Jikil Taha; that Fiscal Ponce de Leon, in his capacity as Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Palawan ordered Orlando Maddela to seize and impound the motor launch "SAN RAFAEL", for
being the corpus delicti of the robbery; and that Orlando Maddela merely obeyed the orders
of his superior officer to impound said launch. By way of counterclaim, defendants-appellees
alleged that because of the malicious and groundless filing of the complaint by plaintiffs-
appellants, they were constrained to engage the services of lawyers, each of them paying
P500.00 as attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00
each and actual damages in the amount of P500.00 each. They also prayed that each of
them awarded exemplary damages in the amount of P1,000.00.

ISSUES/HELD:

whether or not defendant-appellee Fiscal Ponce de Leon had the power to order the seizure
of the motor launch in question without a warrant of search and seizure even if the same was
admittedly the corpus delicti of the crime.

ANSWER: NEGATIVE. the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or magistrate
and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper warrant

whether or not defendants-appellees are civilly liable to plaintiffs-appellants for damages

allegedly suffered by them granting that the seizure of the motor launch was unlawful.

ANSWER. AFFIRMATIVE. To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that
there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that
defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith. Except for Madella who was merely
acting under orders.

RATIO DICIDENDI:

since in the present case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant,
they have violated the constitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search
and seizure.
Under the old Constitution 7 the power to issue a search warrant is vested in a judge or
magistrate and in no other officer and no search and seizure can be made without a proper
warrant. At the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that
recognized the authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. In his vain attempt to
justify the seizure of the motor launch in question without a warrant Fiscal Ponce de Leon
invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 732, which amended Sections 1674 and 1687 of
the Revised Administrative Code. But there is nothing in said law which confers upon the
provincial fiscal; the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the
seizure of a personal property even if it is the corpusdelicti of a crime. True, Republic Act No.
732 has broadened the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigations, but
said law did not divest the judge or magistrate of its power to determine, before issuing the
corresponding warrant, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. 8

We are not prepared to sustain his defense of good faith. To be liable under Article 32 of the
New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with malice or bad faith.

But defendant-appellee Orlando Maddela cannot be held accountable because he impounded

the motor launch upon the order of his superior officer. While a subordinate officer may be
held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there are certain circumstances
which would warrant Maddela's exculpation from liability. The records show that after Fiscal
Ponce de Leon made his first request to the Provincial Commander on June 15, 1962 Maddela
was reluctant to impound the motor launch despite repeated orders from his superior
officer. 21 It was only after he was furnished a copy of the reply of Fiscal Ponce de Leon, dated
June 26, 1962, to the letter of the Provincial Commander, justifying the necessity of the
seizure of the motor launch on the ground that the subsequent sale of the launch to Delfin
Lim could not prevent the court from taking custody of the same, 22 that he impounded the
motor launch on July 6, 1962. With said letter coming from the legal officer of the province,
Maddela was led to believe that there was a legal basis and authority to impound the launch.
Then came the order of his superior officer to explain for the delay in the seizure of the motor
launch. 23 Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his Commander, Maddela was left
with no alternative but to seize the vessel. In the light of the above circumstances. We are
not disposed to hold Maddela answerable for damages.

9.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILLIPINES v. BENNY GO 411 SCRA 81 (2003)

A raiding team armed with a warrant entered the home of appelant Benny Go in search
of evidence for the violation of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), otherwise know
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 . Upon their entry, they met Jack Go,
son of the Go and restrained him. As the former was the only one present at the time they
then called on two barangay kagawad to act as witnesses on the said search. They then
seized properties and objects even those which were not included in the warrant. When
they were almost finished with their search Go arrived and immediately together with the
two witnesses was made to sign the inventory receipt. Based on the evidence taken from
the search Go was charged for violation of R.A. 6425. Upon hearing, testimonies as well
as evidenceswere presented by the prosecution against Go. However, the two witnesses
questioned the validity of some of the evidence presented such as the inventoryreceipt as
well as the illegal drugs said to have been seized from the search. The Regional Trial Court
of Manila convicted Go for violation of the offense charged. On appeal, Go assails the
decision of the RTC as well the validity of the search performed by the raiding team and
the admissibility of the evidence taken therefrom. Go also asks for the return of the
properties seized that were not included in the search warrant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the properties not included in the search warrant may be returned to go.

HELD:

It bears reiterating that the purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to
be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things to be seized to
those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant – to leave the officers
of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize. At the same time,
the raiding team characterized the seizure of the assorted documents, passports,
bankbooks, checks, check writer, typewriter, dry seals and stamp pads as ―seizure of
evidence in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the ―plain view‖
of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence. To be sure, the policemen also filed a complaint against
Go for alleged possession of instruments or implements intended for the commission of
falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of
dry seals and rubber stamps also found in appellant‘s residence. The counterfeit nature
of the seals and stamps was in fact not established until after they had been turned over
to the Chinese embassy and Bureau of Immigration and Deportation for verification. It is,
therefore, incredible that SPO1 Fernandez could make such determination from a ―plain
view of the items from his vantage point in the sala. In sum, the circumstances attendant
to the case at bar do not warrant the application of the ―plain view doctrine to justify the
seizure and retention of the questioned seized items. The things belonging
to appellant not specifically mentioned in the warrants, like those not particularly
described, must thus be ordered returned to him. Be that as it may, considering that the
two (2) dry seals and eight (8) of the rubber stamps have been certified to
be counterfeit by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, they may not be returned
and are hereby declared confiscated in favor of the State to be disposed of according to
law. Moreover, the various bankbooks and passports not belonging to appellant may not
be ordered returned in the instant proceedings. The legality of a seizure can be contested
only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.

DUE PROCESS
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

ANG TIBAY VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (CIR)

[69 PHIL 635; G.R. NO. 46496; 27 FEB 1940]

Facts:

There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that
the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved
by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and
elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed
a motion for opposing the said motion.

Issue:

Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted.

Held:

To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is
more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to
be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant,
the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic.
It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes
arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-
laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
CA 103.

As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly
constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard
to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may
inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does
not mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration
of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and
the reason for the decision rendered.

The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case
receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements
set forth. So ordered.

12.

13.
14.
TAÑADA VS TUVERA
Facts: (No facts were stated)
Tanada et al., invoke due process in demanding the
disclosure of several presidential decrees which were not
published as required by law. The government argues that
publication is necessary as a general rule. The exception
is when it is “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees
declare that they shall be effective immediately upon
approval.
SC already decided this case declaring the
necessity for the publication of these decrees (only 3
justices concurred). This present case is an MR
Tanada et al., suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general application and those
which are not; publication means complete publication and
that the publication should be in the official gazette.
SolGen claims that “unless other provided” under
art2 of Civil Code means that publication is not always
required, and when required publication need not be in the
OG. Additional contention was that since the original of
this case was concurred in only by 3justices then it is not
binding.
Issue: Whether the phrase, “unless it is otherwise
provided,” refers to the date of effectivity or publication?
Held: Effectivity!!!
Art2 of the Civil Code provide: “laws shall take effect after
15days following the completion of their publication in the
OG, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.”
Publication is indispensable in any case however,
the legislature may provide for a period shorter or longer
than the 15days under art2. The general rules that laws
will take effect after 15days will not apply because it was
otherwise provided (ex: Civil Code took effect 1year after
publication because it was otherwise provided).
Publication is indispensable. If not, such omission
[to publish] would offend due process since it denies the
public knowledge of the laws. If the legislature could
validly provide that a law takes effect immediately without
publication, it is likely that persons who are not aware of
the existence of such laws will be prejudiced. They will be
prejudices not because of a failure to comply with the law,
but because they didn’t know the law existed. This is true
even for non-penal laws.
For the presumption - that every person is
deemed to know the law - to take effect, it is necessary
that the law has been published. Otherwise, the
presumption won’t have any legal justification.
The term “laws” should refer to ALL LAWS and
not only to those of general application. Strictly speaking,
all laws relate to the people in general although there are
some laws that do not apply to them directly. (ex: law
granting citizenship. Directly applies to 1 but it still affects
the public). Therefore, ALL STATUTES, even those of
local application and private laws shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity.
This publication requirement covers PDs, EOs
and administrative rules and regulations that enforce or
implement existing laws pursuant to a valid delegation.
However, interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature need not be published (LOIs also). ---
Municipal ordinances are covered by the Local Gov’t
Code.
Publication must be in full otherwise it is
considered as if there was no publication to begin with.
The purpose is to inform the people of the contents of the
law. Merely reading the number of the PD, its title,
supposed date of effectivity in a mere supplement of the
OG does not satisfy the publication requirement.
It is true that the OGs erratic releases and limited
readership make publication ineffective. Undoubtedly,
newspapers of general circulation could better perform the
function of communication the laws to the people since
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership and come out regularly. HOWEVER, the
problem is that publication in a newspaper is not one
required or authorized by existing laws. No amendment
has been made on art2.

SC merely interprets and applies the law as such,

it has no choice but to hold that under art2, publication of
laws must be made in the OG and not elsewhere.
(NB: This isn’t in the case anymore but so you’re not
confused --- EO200 of Aquino allowed for the publication
in a newspaper of general circulation. That EO was issued
pursuant to Aquino’s legislative function so it sort of
amended art2)

15.
U.S. V. TORIBIO
FACTS: A carabao was slaughtered without a permit in
violation of the provisions of sections 30 and 33 of Act No.
1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of large cattle.
It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the
Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered
there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for
appellant contends that under such circumstances the
provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the
slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal
treasure. Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as
follows:
SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or
killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except
upon permit secured from the municipal treasure. Before
issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for
human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall require
for branded cattle the production of the original certificate
of ownership and certificates of transfer showing title in the
person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle
such evidence as may satisfy said treasurer as to the
ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has
been requested.
SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to
be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food
at the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except
upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more
than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than
six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court.
It appears that the defendant applied for a permit
to slaughter his carabao, and that it was denied him on the
ground that the animal was not unfit “for agricultural work
or for draft purposes.” Counsel for appellant contends that

the statute, in so far as it undertakes to penalize the

slaughter of carabaos for human consumption as food,
without first obtaining a permit which cannot be procured
in the event that the animal is not unfit “for agricultural
work or draft purposes,” is unconstitutional and in violation
of the terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill (Act of
Congress, July 1, 1902), which provides that “no law shall
be enacted which shall deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is unconstitutional violating
the constitutional protection against deprivation of property
without due process of law?
RULING: It is settled principle, growing out of the nature of
well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it
under the implied liability that his use of it may be so
regulated that is shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of
the community. . . . Rights of property, like all other social
and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable
limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from
being injurious, and to such reasonable restrain and
regulations establish by law, as the legislature, under the
governing and controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and expedient.
An examination of the general provisions of the
statute in relation to the public interest which it seeks to
safeguard and the public necessities for which it provides,
leaves no room for doubt that the limitations and restraints
imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the
particular provisions of the statute under consideration
were imposed not for private purposes but, strictly, in the
promotion of the “general welfare” and “the public interest”
in the exercise of the sovereign police power which every
State possesses for the general public welfare and which
“reaches to every species of property within the
commonwealth.”
For several years prior to the enactment of the
statute a virulent contagious or infectious disease had
threatened the total extinction of carabaos in these
Islands, in many sections sweeping away seventy, eighty,
and in some cases as much as ninety and even one
hundred per cent of these animals. Agriculture being the
principal occupation of the people, and the carabao being
the work animal almost exclusively in use in the fields as
well as for draft purposes, the ravages of the disease with
which they were infected struck an almost vital blow at the
material welfare of the country. large areas of productive
land lay waste for years, and the production of rice, the
staple food of the inhabitants of the Islands, fell off to such
an extent that the impoverished people were compelled to
spend many millions of pesos in its importation,
notwithstanding the fact that with sufficient work animals to
cultivate the fields the arable rice lands of the country
could easily be made to produce a supply more that
sufficient for its own needs. The drain upon the resources
of the Islands was such that famine soon began to make
itself felt, hope sank in the breast of the people, and in
many provinces the energies of the breadwinners seemed
to be paralyzed by the apparently hopeless struggle for
existence with which they were confronted.
To meet these conditions, large sums of money
were expended by the Government in relieving the
immediate needs of the starving people, three millions of
dollars were voted by the Congress of the United States
as a relief or famine fund, public works were undertaken to
furnish employment in the provinces where the need was
most pressing, and every effort made to alleviate the
suffering incident to the widespread failure of the crops
throughout the Islands, due in large measure to the lack of
animals fit for agricultural work and draft purposes.
Such measures, however, could only temporarily
relieve the situation, because in an agricultural community
material progress and permanent prosperity could hardly
be hoped for in the absence of the work animals upon
which such a community must necessarily rely for the
cultivation of the fields and the transportation of the
products of the fields to market. Accordingly efforts were
made by the Government to increase the supply of these
animals by importation, but, as appears from the official
reports on this subject, hope for the future depended
largely on the conservation of those animals which had
been spared from the ravages of the diseased, and their
redistribution throughout the Islands where the need for
them was greatest.
At large expense, the services of experts were
employed, with a view to the discovery and applications of
preventive and curative remedies, and it is hoped that
these measures have proved in some degree successful
in protecting the present inadequate supply of large cattle,
and that the gradual increase and redistribution of these
animals throughout the Archipelago, in response to the
operation of the laws of supply and demand, will ultimately
results in practically relieving those sections which
suffered most by the loss of their work animals.
As was to be expected under such conditions,
the price of carabaos rapidly increase from the three to
five fold or more, and it may fairly be presumed that even
if the conservative measures now adopted prove entirely
successful, the scant supply will keep the price of these
animals at a high figure until the natural increase shall
have more nearly equalized the supply to the demand.
Coincident with and probably intimately connected with
this sudden rise in the price of cattle, the crime of cattle
stealing became extremely prevalent throughout the
Islands, necessitating the enactment of a special law
penalizing with the severest penalties the theft of carabaos

and other personal property by roving bands; and it must

be assumed from the legislative authority found that the
general welfare of the Islands necessitated the enactment
of special and somewhat burdensome provisions for the
branding and registration of large cattle, and supervision
and restriction of their slaughter for food. It will hardly be
questioned that the provisions of the statute touching the
branding and registration of such cattle, and prohibiting
and penalizing the slaughter of diseased cattle for food
were enacted in the due and proper exercise of the police
power of the State; and we are of opinion that, under all
the circumstances, the provision of the statute prohibiting
and penalizing the slaughter for human consumption of
carabaos fit for work were in like manner enacted in the
due and proper exercise of that power, justified by the
exigent necessities of existing conditions, and the right of
the State to protect itself against the overwhelming
disaster incident to the further reduction of the supply of
animals fit for agricultural work or draft purposes.
It is, we think, a fact of common knowledge in
these Islands, and disclosed by the official reports and
records of the administrative and legislative departments
of the Government, that not merely the material welfare
and future prosperity of this agricultural community were
threatened by the ravages of the disease which swept
away the work animals during the years prior to the
enactment of the law under consideration, but that the
very life and existence of the inhabitants of these Islands
as a civilized people would be more or less imperiled by
the continued destruction of large cattle by disease or
otherwise.
Confronted by such conditions, there can be no
doubt of the right of the Legislature to adopt reasonable
measures for the preservation of work animals, even to
the extent of prohibiting and penalizing what would, under
ordinary conditions, be a perfectly legitimate and proper
exercise of rights of ownership and control of the private
property of the citizen. The police power rests upon
necessity and the right of self-protection and if ever the
invasion of private property by police regulation can be
justified, we think that the reasonable restriction placed
upon the use of carabaos by the provision of the law under
discussion must be held to be authorized as a reasonable
and proper exercise of that power.
The provision of the statute in question being a
proper exercise of that power is not in violation of the
terms of section 5 of the Philippine Bill, which provide that
“no law shall be enacted which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” a
provision which itself is adopted from the Constitution of
the United States, and is found in substance in the
constitution of most if not all of the States of the Union.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence
imposed by the trial court should be affirmed with the
costs of this instance against the appellant

16.
YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
FACTS: EO 626 prohibited the interprovincial movement
of carabaos. Since violators circumvent the law, EO 626-A
was issued, and it provided: No carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef
shall be transported from one province to another. The
carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this EO shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat
Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers as the Director of
Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos.
Ynot transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo, which were confiscated. He sued to recover the
carabaos. RTC issued him a write of replevin upon his
filing of a supersedeas bond. After trial, however, the court
sustained the confiscation of the bond. Ynot raised the
constitutionality of EO 626-A, but the trial court declined to
rule on this.
Ynot appealed to the IAC, denied. Hence this. He
argues that the law is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef, and that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard
before a competent court.
Issue: Does EO 626-A deny due process? YES. Carabao
owner’s defense not heard.
Ruling: The due process clause was kept intentionally
vague so it would remain conveniently resilient, to make it
adapt to every situation. Even courts hesitate to adopt a
specific description of due process, and they leave it openended. Simply put, due process is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play.
The minimum requirements of due process are
notice and hearing. Every person is entitled to a law which
hears before it condemns, and renders judgment only after
trial. This is not to say however that notice and hearing are
imperative in every case. Ex: summary abatement of
nuisance per se like pornographic materials, contaminated
meat, narcotic drugs; passport of a person sought for a
criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, etc.
Police power is a power that restrains, but is restrained by
due process. It is this power that is invoked by the
government in issuing EO 626, which aims at the
conservation of carabaos for the benefit of small farmers
who rely on them. Note US v. Toribio where the SC ruled
that regulation of carabao was a valid exercise of police
power. In the same case, the ff are necessary for a valid
exercise of police power: (1) it must appear that the
interests of public generally require state interference (2)
the means used are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.
Applying the same in this case, the carabao has
a direct relevance to public welfare (note discussion udner
Toribio), hence it is a lawful subject of the EO. However,
E0 626-A in imposing an absolute ban, not on the
slaughter of the carabaos, but on their movement does not
meet the reasonable measure requirement. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved is missing. The
prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos
cannot possibly prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere. Retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there.
Moreover, the penalty is outright confiscation of
the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In
Toribio, the statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by
the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under
the EO no such trial is prescribed, and the property being
transported is immediately impounded by the police and
declared forfeited to the government.
Here, the EO defined the prohibition, convicted
the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance
to be heard, thus denying him the guaranty of elementary
fair play.
While it is true that there are cases when notice
and hearing may be validly dispensed with (like in
summary abatement of nuisance per se), it does not apply
here. In the exceptional cases, there is a justification for
the omission of the right to a hearing, which is
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and
the urgency of the need to correct it. Not same as this
case.
Finally, EO 626-A is penal in nature, the violation
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police
only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had
the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.