215 People v.

Chaw Yaw Shun

No. L-19590 (1968)
J. Angeles/ Tita K
Subject Matter: Rule 130: XPN to Res Inter Alios Acta Rule - co-conspirator’s statements
Summary:
Hector Crisostomo was found dead in his car. Alvarez became a suspect when a bag containing a check issued by him to
the deceased was found in the car and his paraffin test returned positive. In one of his statements, Alvarez mentioned
the participation of Chua who allegedly gave him the go signal to shoot the deceased. Alvarez further declared that Chua
promised to pay him for killing Crisostomo and that Chua was engaged in the business of dollar smuggling. Chua was
interrogated twice: (1) in Camp Crame where he denied the allegations and (2) in the PC Headquarters, 20 km. away and
around midnight, where he finally made a written confession. Chua later gave a statement to the assistant provincial
fiscal of Bulacan to narrate how he was maltreated by the CIS agents and forced to sign the statement. Chua assailed the
admission of his confession, which he claimed was obtained thru force, threat and intimidation. The SC ruled in favor of
Chua finding that other than the confession, there is no other evidence which proves the truth of the facts stated
therein. There is no independent evidence establishing an overt act of appellant Chua connected to the crime.

Doctrines:
Although an exception to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule is the Co- conspirator’s statements, Rule 130 Section 30 requires
that such confession be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Conspiracy must be proven by
independent evidence other than the confession. The admissibility of a confession by one accused against the other
must relate to statements made during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise and in furtherance of its objects, and
not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. It must be proved as the
crime itself, independent from the confession.

Parties:
Petitioner PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent CHAW YAW SHUN @ GEORGE CHUA and VICTOR ALVAREZ
Facts:
The lifeless body of Hector Crisostomo was found in his car at Lias Road, Marilao, Bulacan, around 5 AM of July 15,
1959. Hector was an officer of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee charged with the apprehension of dollar
smugglers.
An autopsy of the corpse showed that the deceased suffered three gunshot wounds on the head. In the course of
the investigation, Capt. Dionisio Carasig, also a member of the Presidential Fact Finding Committee, intimated to the
PC authorities that the recent car deal of Crisostomo with Victorio Alvarez may possibly be connected with the
killing.
Upon examination of the car, no clear fingerprints could be detected but some specimen evidence were found
including a bag which contains a Philippine Trust Co.'s check in the amount of P1,000 drawn by Victorio Alvarez in
favor of Crisostomo, together with a receipt signed by the deceased acknowledging payment with a further
statement of an unpaid balance of P24,500.00.
Thereafter, Alvarez was taken in for fingerprinting and paraffin test for gun powder residue. The result were positive
so a complaint for murder was filed by Capt. Rafael Yapdiangco of the PC before the Justice of the Peace Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, against Victorio Alvarez and two John Does.
After Alvarez was arrested, he made various statements admitting that he was the only one who shot and killed
Crisostomo and tape-recorded a statement before Lt. Bautista and Major Santiago of the CIS at Camp Crame,
admitting the same.
However, in one of those statements, Alvarez mentioned the participation of one George Chua who allegedly gave
the go signal for Alvarez to shoot the deceased. Alvarez further declared that Chua promised to pay him P35,000.00
plus P400.00 a month for killing Crisostomo and that Chua was engaged in the business of dollar smuggling. 

 The complaint was amended to include Chaw Yaw Shun alias George Chua and Lim Bun Ping alias Johnny Yao. 

When Chua was taken to Camp Crame to be interrogated, the records of the investigation by the CIS agents were
destroyed because according to Capt. Yapdiangco’s testimony, they believed Chua (who consistently denied the
allegations) was not telling them the truth. Eventually, however, when Chua was brought to PC Headquarters, 20
km. away and around midnight, he made a written statement confessing that he ordered the killing. 

While detained, Chua gave a statement to the assistance provincial fiscal of Bulacan to narrate how he was
maltreated by the CIS agents and forced to sign a statement. Nevertheless, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an
information for murder them. Upon arraignment, Victorio Alvarez, Chaw Yaw Shun alias George Chua and Dionisio
Carasig entered a plea of not guilty. 

After trial, Carasig was acquitted on reasonable doubt but Alvarez and Chua were found guilty. Only Chua appealed,
assailing the admission of his confession, which he claimed to not be admissible because it was obtained thru force,
threat and intimidation 

Issue/s: WON Chua’s confession is admissible. — NO

Ratio:

No – Chua’s confession is inadmissible.

 A confession which is induced or extorted by torturing the accused or by personal violence or abuse directed
against the accused for the purpose of obtaining a confession, is an involuntary one and is not admissible in
evidence against him, unless found to be true.
 The Court questioned the testimony of Capt. Yapdiangco because:

“What made Chua become a “dove”, when during all the time he was being investigated at Camp Crame, he had
demonstrated an attitude of belligerency by refusing to admit participation in the crime? Was the sudden
transformation the result of some spiritual persuasion that moved the conscience of the suspect to admit his
guilt, or was it due to an overbearing pressure which finally subdued his will power?”
 The Court agreed with the observation of Judge Mejia, the first trial judge, who found that the very act of CIS
agents taking Chua to the headquarters, approximately 20 kilometers away from Quezon City, puts to question
the voluntariness of the confession. Even if they were trying to avoid interference, the judge found that such
was a mere pretext because the witness himself, Capt. Yapdiangco, admitted that the newspapermen are not
always present in their office at Camp Crame.
 Furthermore, the Court noted the medical reports of the 3 doctors who examined Chua. Dr. Eustaquio found
that the injuries of Chua could not have been self-inflicted because of their location (on the left upper back,
nape of the neck, on the left and right legs). Dr. Anastacio found linear reddish marks (scratch marks) and Dr.
Zaragga reported a number of superficial abrasions of various sizes.
 Although Dr. Anastacio made a remark in his medical certificate that there is “no sign of physical injury
externally” and Dr. Zarraga declared that “the abdomen revealed no external manifestation of any injury, nor is
there any area of tenderness in the whole body” these do not detract from the fact that some forms of torture
do not usually manifest external injury. For instance, sitting on the stomach and the use of electric shock, do not
necessarily produce external physical injury.
 As to appellee’s argument that, conceding that the confession was involuntary, it is nevertheless admissible
because the facts stated in the confession have been corroborated by other evidence, the Court found that
other than the confession, there is no other evidence which proves the truth of the facts stated therein.
 Although an exception to the Res Inter Alios Acta Rule is the Co- conspirator’s statements, Rule 130 Section 30
requires that such confession be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
 Conspiracy must be proven by independent evidence other than the confession. The admissibility of a
confession by one accused against the other in the same case, must relate to statements made by one
 conspirator during the pendency of the unlawful enterprise (or during its existence) and in furtherance of its
objects, and not to a confession made, as in this case, long after the conspiracy had been brought to an end. It
must be proved as the crime itself, independent from the confession.
In this case, instead of supporting the co-conspirators statements, the confession of Chua is replete with
improbabilities and falsities in its material and substantial parts:
o That the order to kill was given to him by his partners in HongKong thru the overseas telephone but no
such telephone conversation was disclosed by the Bureau of Telecommunications.
o That the plot to kill Crisostomo was hatched up in Chua’s residence with Alvarez and Lim Bon Ping but
the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that Lim was not even in Manila at the time of said
meeting. 

o That Alvarez killed Crisostomo in consideration of P35,000.00 is illogical and unbelievable because if
Chua already paid Alvarez to kill Crisostomo, Chua did not have to accompany Alvarez in the actual
killing. In fact, Alvarez’s tape-recorded statement stated that his motive in killing the deceased was to
retrieve a rubber check which he had issued in connection with his purchase from the latter of a Ford
Fairlane car. 

o That Crisostomo was shot on the head while driving the car. This is incredible because in that situation,
the car would have gone out of control, which did not happen, and if was true, the authorities would
have found bloodstains in the car which were not present. 

o That Chua was with the group that killed Crisostomo is impeached by the testimony of Paulino Antonio,
a witness for the prosecution, who declared that it was only Alvarez whom he saw. 

 Alvarez’s confession is not binding on the appellant for being hearsay, aside from having been repudiated by
Alvarez himself during the trial. There is no inter-locking confession for there is no independent evidence
establishing an overt act of appellant Chua connected to the crime. Conspiracy must necessarily be discarded.
 In fact, proof was presented (the notebook of the one in charge of the clubhouse which lists the name of the
players) to support the statement of Chua that he was playing mahjong at Salud St. on the night of July 14, 1959.
Decision reversed and appellant acquitted.