Dennis v. United States 341 u.

s 494

Facts. The Smith Act (the Act) made it a criminal offense for a person to knowingly or willfully
advocate the overthrowing of any government in the United States by force or to attempt to
commit or conspire to commit the crime the same. The Petitioners were brought up on charges
under the Act for allegedly (1) willfully and knowingly conspiring to organize as the Communist
Party of the United States, a group whose members advocated the overthrow of the United States
government by force and (2) willfully and knowingly advocating and teaching the duty to do the
same. It was clear from the record that the leaders of the Communist Party intended to initiate a
revolution when the opportunity came. The Trial Court found the Petitioners guilty. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. The constitutionality of the statute under which the Petitioners were convicted
was challenged.

Issue. Was the statute invalid by its own terms because it prohibited academic discussions on
topics such as that of the merits of Marxism-Leninism?
Held. No. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Chief Justice Fred Vinson (J. Vinson) We must apply the “clear and present danger” test.
Accordingly, we note that the overthrow of the Government by force is certainly a substantial
enough interest for the Government to limit speech. Obviously, “clear and present danger” does
not mean the government may not act until the Putsch has been plotted and on is the verge of
being executed.
On the facts, the court was convinced that the requisite danger to act existed here: (1) the
formation by the Petitioners of a highly organized conspiracy with rigidly disciplined members
subject to call when the leaders (the Petitioners) felt it was time for action; (2) the inflammable
nature of world conditions; (3) similar uprisings in other countries; and (4) the touch and go
nature of our relations with other countries with whom the Petitioners were ideologically aligned.
Thus, the convictions of the Petitioners were justified.
Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA 647 (1985)

FACTS: The petitioners filed this action to compel respondent government officials to allow the
reopening of Radio Station DYRE after it had been closed for allegedly having been used to
incite the people to sedition. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process because no
hearing was held and no proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure.
However, before the Court could promulgate its decision the petitioner filed a motion to
withdraw its action on the ground that it had sold the radio station to Manuel Pastrana and that
the National Telecommunications Commission had expressed its willingness to grant the
requisite license.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contention that he didn’t violate any law or provisions
that he only exercise the freedom of speech ?

RULING: The case has been moot and academic. However, for the guidance of the inferior
courts and administrative bodies, the following guidelines must be observed: 1) The cardinal
primary requirements in administrative proceedings as laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR should be
followed before a broadcast station may be closed; 2) All forms of communication are entitled to
the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, the freedom of television
and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and
print media. This limitation derives from the fact the broadcast media have a uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Filipinos; 3) The government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite listeners to violently overthrow it; and 4) Broadcast stations deserve the
special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution.
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229

Facts:Feeling aggrieved by laws of South Carolina which allegedly "prohibited Negro

privileges," petitioners, 187 Negro high school and college students, peacefully assembled at the
site of the State Government and there peacefully expressed their grievances "to the citizens of
South Carolina, along with the Legislative Bodies of South Carolina." When told by police
officials that they must disperse within 15 minutes on pain of arrest, they failed to do so, and
sang patriotic and religious songs after one of their leaders had delivered a "religious harangue."
There was no violence or threat of violence on their part or on the part of any member of the
crowd watching them, but petitioners were arrested and convicted of the common law crime of
breach of the peace, which the State Supreme Court said "is not susceptible of exact definition."

Issue: Whether or not South Carolina violate some provisions on the Constitution specifically
the provisions on Bill of Rights when they arrested the petitioner?

Held: In arresting, convicting and punishing petitioners under the circumstances disclosed by this
record, South Carolina infringed their rights of free speech, free assembly and freedom to
petition for a redress of grievances -- rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315

Facts:Petitioner made an inflammatory speech to a mixed crowd of 75 or 80 Negroes and white

people on a city street. He made derogatory remarks about President Truman, the American
Legion, and local political officials, endeavored to arouse the Negroes against the whites, and
urged that Negroes rise up in arms and fight for equal rights. The crowd, which blocked the
sidewalk and overflowed into the street, became restless; its feelings for and against the speaker
were rising, and there was at least one threat of violence. After observing the situation for some
time without interference, police officers, in order to prevent a fight, thrice requested petitioner
to get off the box and stop speaking. After his third refusal, and after he had been speaking over
30 minutes, they arrested him, and he was convicted of violating § 722 of the Penal Code of New
York, which, in effect, forbids incitement of a breach of the peace. The conviction was affirmed
by two New York courts on review.

Issue: Did the petitioner only exercise the freedom of speech?

Held: The conviction is sustained against a claim that it violated petitioner's right of free speech
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
(a) Petitioner was neither arrested nor convicted for the making or the content of his speech, but
for the reaction which it actually engendered.
(b) The police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views; but, when
a speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, the
police are not powerless to prevent a breach of the peace.
Gitlow v. New York - 268 U.S. 652,

FACTS:
Benjamin Gitlow was indicted in the Supreme Court of New York, with three others, for the
statutory crime of criminal anarchy. New York Penal Laws, §§ 160, 161. He was separately
tried, convicted, and sentenced to imprisonment. Defendant appealed, alleging that N.Y. Penal
Law §§ 160 and 161 violated U.S. Const. amend. XIV. On appeal, the Court affirmed the
decisions of the lower courts because the statutes as construed and applied did not violate U.S.
Const. amend. XIV. The statutes did not penalize the utterance or publication of abstract doctrine
having no quality of incitement to concrete action, but instead prohibited language advocating
the overthrow of the government by unlawful means. The Court held that freedom of speech and
of the press were not absolute rights, but were subject to reasonable limitations by the states.
ISSUE:
Whether the statute, as construed and applied in this case by the state courts, deprived the
defendant of his liberty of expression in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
RULING
No. Freedom of speech and of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states.
The statute does not penalize the utterance or publication of abstract "doctrine" or academic
discussion having no quality of incitement to any concrete action. It is not aimed against mere
historical or philosophical essays. It does not restrain the advocacy of changes in the form of
government by constitutional and lawful means. What it prohibits is language advocating,
advising or teaching [*665] the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means. These
words imply urging to action. Advocacy is defined in the Century Dictionary as: "1. The act of
pleading for, supporting, or recommending; active espousal." It is not the abstract "doctrine" of
overthrowing organized government by unlawful means which is denounced by the statute, but
the advocacy of action for the accomplishment of that purpose. It was so construed and applied
by the trial judge, who specifically charged the jury that: "A mere grouping of historical events
and a prophetic deduction from them would neither constitute advocacy, advice or teaching of a
doctrine for the overthrow of government by force, violence or unlawful means. [And] if it were
a mere essay on the subject, as suggested by counsel, based upon deductions from alleged
historical events, with no teaching, advice or advocacy of action, it would not constitute a
violation of the statute. . . ."
Thus, the Court affirmed defendant's conviction because New York's criminal anarchy statute did
not violate the Due Process Clause. The statute was a proper exercise of the State's police power.
Gonzales Vs katigbak

Facts : In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to

exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes
and deletions enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners
stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. 4 Then on
November 12, 1984, respondent Board released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion
for Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the Board, after a review of the resolution of the
sub-committee and an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-
committee. Considering, however, certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further
Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance of the Permit to exhibit
until these deficiencies are supplied

Issue : Whether or not the rating made with grave abuse of discretion

Held : Roth- Sex and obscenity are not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals
with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature
and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection
of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has
indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the
vital problems of human interest and public concern. In the Philippine context, E.O. 876 applied
contemporary Filipino cultural values as a standard. Moreover, as far as the question of sex and
obscenity are concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the
patronage of the State. Given this constitutional mandate, It will be less than true to its function
if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys.
There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine
what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal
primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by
an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully
may be considered obscene. On the question of obscenity, therefore, such standard set forth in
Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of
unconstitutionality. To repeat, what was stated in a recent decision in Trinidad- an elementary, a
fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied when considering constitutional
questions, that when a law is susceptible of two constructions' one of which will maintain and the
other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. There can be no valid objection to the
controlling standard. There was really a grave abuse of discretion when the Board and its
perception of what obscenity is is very restrictive. But, sadly, THERE WERE NOT ENOUGH
VOTES TO MAINTAIN THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The
supporting evidence was in the fact that some scenes were not for young people. They might
misunderstand the scenes. The respondents offered to make it GP if the petitioners would remove
the lesbian and sex scenes. But they refused. The ruling is to be limited to the concept of
obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of this Court that where television is
concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures
where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. It is
hardly the concern of the law to deal with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. It cannot
be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring
for the welfare of the young.

In Re: Column of Ramon Tulfo

Facts:In Oct. 13, 1989, Tulfo wrote an article in his column in PDI 'On Target' stating that the
Supreme Court rendered an idiotic decision in legalizing checkpoints, and again on Oct. 16,
1989, where he called the Supreme Court stupid and "sangkatutak na mga bobo justices of the
Philippine Supreme Court". Tulfo was required to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt. Tulfo said that he was just reacting emotionally because he had been a victim of
harassmen in the checkpoints, and "idiotic" meant illogical and unwise, and "bobo" was just
quoted from other attorneys, and since the case had been decided and terminated, there was not
contempts. Lastly, the article does not pose any clear and present danger to the Supreme court.
Issue:Wheter or not Tulfo is in contempt
Ruling:Yes.
1. At the time Tulfo wrote the article, the checkpoints case had not yet been decided upon, and
the Supreme Court was still acting on an MR filed from the CA.
2. Power to punish is inherent as it is essential for self-preservation. Contempt of court is
defiance of the authority, justice and dignity of the courts. It brings disrepute to the court. There
are two kinds of publications which can be punished for contempt:
a. those whose object is to affect the decision in a pending case.
b. those whose object is to bring courts to discredit.
Tulfo's article constituted both.
3. It should have been okay to criticize if respectful language was used, but if its object is only to
degrade and ridicule, then it is clearly an obstruction of justice. Nothing constructive can be
gained from them. Being emotional is no excuse for being insulting. Quoting is not an excuse
also, because at the end of his article, Tulfo said, "So you bobo justices, watch out!" Also, he
said he was not sorry for having written the articles.
Tulfo is found in contempt of court and is gravely censured.