EFFECTS OF PROCLAMATION/ POWER ADDED TO THE PRESIDENT

a) Extraordinary powers of the President distinguished.

Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the most benign and involves ordinary police
action.114 The President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully discretionary to the President;"115 the only
limitations being that he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a manner not constituting grave abuse
of discretion.116 In fact, "the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is x x x not subject to judicial
review."

The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may
be exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution
imposed the following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible
revocation by Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the Supreme Court."118

The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection, and the phrase "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law.119 They perceived the phrase
"imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;"120 besides, the calling out power of the President "is
sufficient for handling imminent danger.

The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and
suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens
that the Executive Department has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while
the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it
more difficult to restore order and enforce the law.122 As such, their exercise requires more stringent safeguards by
the Congress, and review by the Court.

b) What really happens during martial law?

During the oral argument, the following questions cropped up: What really happens during the imposition of martial
law? What powers could the President exercise during martial law that he could not exercise if there is no martial law?
Interestingly, these questions were also discussed by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:

FR. BERNAS. That same question was asked during the meetings of the Committee: What precisely does martial law
add to the power of the President to call on the armed forces? The first and second lines in this provision state:

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies...

The provision is put there, precisely, to reverse the doctrine of the Supreme Court. I think it is the case of Aquino v.
COMELEC where the Supreme Court said that in times of martial law, the President automatically has legislative
power. So these two clauses denied that. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution;
therefore, it does not suspend the principle of separation of powers.

The question now is: During martial law, can the President issue decrees? The answer we gave to that question in the
Committee was: During martial law, the President may have the powers of a commanding general in a theatre of war.
In actual war when there is fighting in an area, the President as the commanding general has the authority to issue
orders which have the effect of law but strictly in a theater of war, not in the situation we had during the period of
martial law. In other words, there is an effort here to return to the traditional concept of martial law as it was developed
especially in American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the theater of war.124
xxxx

FR. BERNAS. This phrase was precisely put here because we have clarified the meaning of martial law; meaning,
limiting it to martial law as it has existed in the jurisprudence in international law, that it is a law for the theater of war.
In a theater of war, civil courts are unable to function. If in the actual theater of war civil courts, in fact, are unable to
function, then the military commander is authorized to give jurisdiction even over civilians to military courts precisely
because the civil courts are closed in that area. But in the general area where the civil courts are open then in no case
can the military courts be given jurisdiction over civilians. This is in reference to a theater of war where the civil courts,
in fact, are unable to function.

MR. FOZ. It is a state of things brought about by the realities of the situation in that specified critical area.

FR. BERNAS. That is correct.

MR. FOZ. And it is not something that is brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief.

FR. BERNAS. It is not brought about by a declaration of the Commander-in-Chief. The understanding here is that the
phrase 'nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians' has reference to the
practice under the Marcos regime where military courts were given jurisdiction over civilians. We say here that we will
never allow that except in areas where civil courts are, in fact, unable to function and it becomes necessary for some
kind of court to function.125

A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at such a time, exercises police power, which is normally a
function of the Legislature. In particular, the President exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to ensure
public safety and in place of government agencies which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition in a
locality, which remains under the control of the State.126

In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo,127 the Court, quoting Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza)
Statement before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006, stated that under a valid declaration of martial
law, the President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban
on public assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential
Decrees x x x".128

Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion
to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This is because martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the
guarantees under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency. And in such instance where the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to those judicially charged with rebellion or
offenses connected with invasion.129

Clearly, from the foregoing, while martial law poses the most severe threat to civil liberties,130 the Constitution has
safeguards against the President's prerogative to declare a state of martial law.

c) "Graduation" of powers refers to hierarchy based on scope and effect; it does not refer to a sequence, order, or
arrangement by which the Commander-in-Chief must adhere to.

Indeed, the 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated power[s]'. From
the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, and the power to declare martial law."131 It must be stressed, however, that the graduation refers only to
hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by
which the President decides which power to choose.
These extraordinary powers are conferred by the Constitution with the President as Commander-in-Chief; it therefore
necessarily follows that the power and prerogative to determine whether the situation warrants a mere exercise of the
calling out power; or whether the situation demands suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; or
whether it calls for the declaration of martial law, also lies, at least initially, with the President. The power to choose,
initially, which among these extraordinary powers to wield in a given set of conditions is a judgment call on the part
of the President. As Commander-in-Chief, his powers are broad enough to include his prerogative to address
exigencies or threats that endanger the government, and the very integrity of the State.132

It is thus beyond doubt that the power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's decision
pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail given a set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount to
an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least
initially, lies with the President.

LIMITATIONS

ARTICLE VII SEC. 18 4TH PAR.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

“OPEN COURT” DOCTRINE

On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144),
vacating the sentence rendered on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against Olaguer, et al. and
declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over
civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and
functioning as they did during the period of martial law. This Court declared unconstitutional the creation of the
military commissions to try civilians, and annulled all their proceedings as follows:

Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his
liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the
Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process,
Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the Philippine judicial
system. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and are simply instrumentalities
of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the President as Commander in-Chief to aid him in properly
commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his
authorized military representatives. Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing
constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws (as
when an individual should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not,
and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the civil
courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period of
martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed
by them and which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the
constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned. (Olaguer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA
144, 158-160.)
11. OLAGUER VS MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 34

FACTS:

In 1979, Olaguer and some others were detained by military personnel and they were placed in Camp Bagong Diwa.
Logauer and his group are all civilians. They were charged with (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary
devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan
Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and Vicente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and
Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and
Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion.
On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to the SC and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus be granted.

HELD: The petition for habeas corpus has become moot and academic because by the time the case reached the SC
Olaguer and his companions were already released from military confinement. “When the release of the persons in
whose behalf the application for a writ of habeas corpus was filed is effected, the Petition for the issuance of the writ
becomes moot and academic. 18 Inasmuch as the herein petitioners have been released from their confinement in
military detention centers, the instant Petitions for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed for
having become moot and academic.” But the military court created to try the case of Olaguer (and the decision it
rendered) still continues to subsist.

ISSUE2: The issue is then shifted to: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the
civil courts are open and functioning.

HELD: The SC nullified for lack of jurisdiction all decisions rendered by the military courts or tribunals during the
period of martial law in all cases involving civilian defendants. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as
long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian
is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY

The Supreme Court in the case of Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (G.R. 183533, February 25, 2012) has already laid down
the rule on the command responsibility of the president. The court said that the following element must obtain to hold
someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility:

1. The existence of superior-subordinate relationship between him and the perpetrator of the act of omission;

2. The superior knew or had reason to know that the act or omission was about to be or had been committed or omitted;

3. The superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the act or omission or punish the
perpetrator.

The president being the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces qualifies him as a superior within the purview of
command responsibility.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that… in the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and
superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order
No. 226 otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of “Command Responsibility” in all Government
Offices, particularly at all levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies.
Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command
responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed or has been
committed by his subordinates or by others within the area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not
take preventive or corrective action either before, during or immediately after its commission.

As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as commander-in-chief of the armed forces
the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline them.

16. ARROYO VS. PEOPLE

FACTS:

The Court resolves the consolidated petitions for certiorariseparately filed by former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo and Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) Budget and Accounts Manager Benigno B. Aguas.

On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
and PCSO Budget and Accounts Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit whose
charges were later dismissed by the Sandiganbayan after their respective demurrers to evidence were granted, except
for Uriarte and Valdes who were at large) for conspiracy to commit plunder, as defined by, and penalized under Section
2 (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

The information reads: That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto
xxx accused Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the then President of the Philippines xxx Benigno Aguas, then PCSO Budget
and Accounts Manager, all public officers committing the offense in relation to their respective offices and taking undue
advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence, conniving, conspiring
and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and/or
acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of PHP365,997,915.00, more or
less, [by raiding the public treasury].

Thereafter, accused GMA and Aguas separately filed their respective petitions for bail which were denied by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the evidence of guilt against them was strong.

After the Prosecution rested its case, accused GMA and Aguas then separately filed their demurrers to evidence
asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against them. The same were denied by the
Sandiganbayan, holding that there was sufficient evidence to show that they had conspired to commit plunder. After
the respective motions for reconsideration filed by GMA and Aguas were likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan, they
filed their respective petitions for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Substantive:

Whether or not the State sufficiently established the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas, and Uriarte ;

Whether or not the State sufficiently established all the elements of the crime of plunder: (a) Was there evidence of
amassing, accumulating or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the total amount of not less than P50,000,000.00? (b) Was the
predicate act of raiding the public treasury alleged in the information proved by the Prosecution?
RULLING:

Re first substantive issue: The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA,
Aguas and Uriarte.

A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit
plunder among all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to, during and after the implied
agreement. It is notable that the Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the accused was by express
agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a chain conspiracy.

We are not unmindful of the holding in Estrada v. Sandiganabayan [G.R. No. 148965, February 26, 2002, 377 SCRA 538,
556] to the effect that an information alleging conspiracy is sufficient if the information alleges conspiracy either: (1)
with the use of the word conspire, or its derivatives or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by
allegations of the basic facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding would
know what is being conveyed, and with such precision as would enable the accused to competently enter a plea to a
subsequent indictment based on the same facts. We are not talking about the sufficiency of the information as to the
allegation of conspiracy, however, but rather the identification of the main plunderer sought to be prosecuted under
R.A. No. 7080 as an element of the crime of plunder. Such identification of the main plunderer was not only necessary
because the law required such identification, but also because it was essential in safeguarding the rights of all of the
accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. The main purpose of requiring
the various elements of the crime charged to be set out in the information is to enable all the accused to suitably prepare
their defense because they are presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constituted the offense
charged.

Despite the silence of the information on who the main plunderer or the mastermind was, the Sandiganbayan readily
condemned GMA in its resolution dated September 10, 2015 as the mastermind despite the absence of the specific
allegation in the information to that effect. Even worse, there was no evidence that substantiated such sweeping
generalization.

In fine, the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State against
the petitioners for violating the rights of each accused to be informed of the charges against each of them.

Re second substantive issues:

(a) No proof of amassing, or accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth of at least Php50 Million was adduced against
GMA and Aguas.

The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not less than
Php50,000,000.00. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal prosecution.

As regards the element that the public officer must have amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth worth at
least P50,000,000.00, the Prosecution adduced no evidence showing that either GMA or Aguas or even Uriarte, for that
matter, had amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth of any amount. There was also no evidence, testimonial
or otherwise, presented by the Prosecution showing even the remotest possibility that the CIFs
[Confidential/Intelligence Funds] of the PCSO had been diverted to either GMA or Aguas, or Uriarte.
(b) The Prosecution failed to prove the predicate act of raiding the public treasury (under Section 2 (b) of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 7080, as amended)

To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying words:
misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds [See Sec. 1(d) of RA 7080]. This process is
conformable with the maxim of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct construction of a particular
word or phrase that is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made by considering
the company of the words in which the word or phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or phrase
in a statute is always used in association with other words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified or
restricted by the latter. To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s own;
to misappropriate means to own, to take something for one’s own benefit; misuse means “a good, substance, privilege,
or right used improperly, unforeseeably, or not as intended;” and malversation occurs when “any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take
or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially.” The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the
public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is in the company of the four other
terms that require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public treasury similarly requires such use of
the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the mere accumulation and
gathering constituted the forbidden act of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids
on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.

As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money went but, more importantly, that GMA and
Aguas had personally benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the predicate act of raids on the
public treasury beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the
petitioners’ respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate
release from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

 EMERGENCY POWERS

ARTICLE VI SEC. 23

SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately,
shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.

 GRANT OF EMERGENCY POWERS V COMMANDER IN CHIEF CLAUSE

17. SANLAKAS V EXEC. SECRETARY

421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085

February 3, 2004
FACTS:

During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting
upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in
Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the
government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts
constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers
went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.

In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA
VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require
the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a
circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to
submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the
presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any
such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary
Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?

Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?

HELD:

The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18,
Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-
in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion
that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there
was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the
functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since
the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding
of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section
23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether
there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
 ARTICLE XII (NAT. ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY)

Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the
emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

18. DAVID V MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and Delegate Emergency Power]

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section
18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . .
may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,― and in my capacity as their Commander-in-
Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and
to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a
State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the members of the AFP and PNP "to
immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism
and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged “direct injury” resulting
from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5 have factual basis, and
contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the
necessity of calling out the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: “by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII … do hereby command the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or rebellion”

Second provision: “and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated
by me personally or upon my direction;”

Third provision: “as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National
Emergency.”
PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.

First Provision: Calling Out Power.

The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the President may
call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.” (Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora)

President Arroyo’s declaration of a “state of rebellion” was merely an act declaring a status or condition of public
moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such
declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases,
PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State’s extraordinary power to take over
privately-owned public utility and business affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an
awesome power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.

To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyo’s calling-out
power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. This is based
on Section 17, Article VII which reads:

SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.

This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate “decrees.” Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI
categorically states that “[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of
emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare“a state of national emergency” and to exercise
emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.

Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI
authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon
it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to
the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private
business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon
Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected
with public interest,” it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such
power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms
thereof.

Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules
that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.

Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without
legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor
can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has
no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the
President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence
of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence.” Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature,
such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

EXECUTIVE CLEMENCIES

ARTICLE VII Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress

LIMITATIONS

ARTICLE IX-C SEC. 5

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations
shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

THE PARDONING POWER

The President with his pardoning power may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. The President may also grant amnesty with the concurrence of a
majority of all the Members of the Congress.

Definitions
 PARDON is an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the punishment which the
law inflicts for the crime he has committed.

PAROLE is when a prisoner is released from imprisonment but his liberty is not fully restored because the parolee is
still considered in the custody of the law although he is not in confinement.

PROBATION" is a disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to
conditions imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer.

COMMUTATION is a reduction or mitigation of the penalty, e.g., when the death sentence is reduced to life
imprisonment.

REPRIEVE is merely a postponement of a sentence to a date certain, or a stay of execution. It may be ordered to
enable the government to secure additional evidence to ascertain the guilt of the convict or, in the case of the
execution of the death sentence upon a pregrant woman, to prevent the killing of her unborn child.

AMNESTY is an act of grace given with the concurrence of Congress. It is usually extended to groups of persons
who committed political offenses and it abolishes the offense itself.

Kinds of Pardon

 Pardon may be classified into

 absolute or conditional; and
 plenary or partial.

ABSOLUTE PARDON - is one given without any conditions attached. Whereas,

CONDITIONAL PARDON is one under which the convict is required to comply with certain requirements. In
conditional pardon, the offender has the right to reject the pardon if he feels that the conditions imposed are more
onerous than the penalty sought to be remitted. On the other hand, in case of absolute pardon, it is complied even
without the acceptance of the pardonee.

PLENARY PARDON - extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities,
whereas a partial pardon does not.

Limitations

 It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment.

 It cannot be granted in cases of violations of election laws without the favorable recommendation of the
Commission on Elections.
 It can be granted only after conviction of final judgment.
 It cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt or civil contempt.
 It cannot absolve the convict of civil liability.
 It cannot restore public offices forfeited.
19. ECHEGARAY VS SEC. OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998

LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO

vs.

THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS :

On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year old daughter and
was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 “ The Death Penalty Law”, and the
imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no reason to
declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its imposition.

RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of execution was
changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to
implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of
Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are
unconstitutional and void. The Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch
104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.

On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to mantain status quo .
Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.

The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is
unconstitutional and providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court
to Intervene and appear as Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing
applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how
some have become abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading
, inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by
granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.

HELD:

No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their
decisions after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused
after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our
government.

20. MONSATO VS FACTORAN

FACTS:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of
the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but
while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said
pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of Finance who
ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the
date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which
implies that her service in the government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her
reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the
entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate
her former position.

Issues:

1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws,
which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has
committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose
benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the
offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves forgiveness
and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what
has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation
for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been
done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no
satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to
receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-
apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of
sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence.
Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation
and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)

21. GARCIA V CHAIRMAN

PARTIES:

Petitioner: VICENTE GARCIA

Respondents: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE

MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV

FACTS:

Vicente Garcia was a Supervising Lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in
Lucena City. On 1 April 1975, Garcia was summarily dismissed from the service on the ground of dishonesty in
accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communications in
Administrative Case 975 for the loss of several

telegraph poles which were located at the Sariaya-Lucena City and Mauban-Sampaloc, Quezon, telecom lines.
Garcia did not appeal from the decision. Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal
case for qualified theft was filed against Garcia with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Quezon. On 23 January 1980, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting Garcia of the offense charged.
Consequently, Garcia sought reinstatement to his former position in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. In
an indorsement dated 7 April 1980, Garcia's request to be reinstated was denied by the Bureau of
Telecommunications. Hence, Garcia pleaded to the President of the Philippines for executive clemency. On 26
August 1981, acting on the favorable indorsements of the then Ministry of Transportation and Communications
and the Civil Service Commission, Deputy Presidential Executive Assistant Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., by authority of
the President, per Resolution No. O.P. 1800, granted executive clemency to Garcia. Garcia thereafter filed with the
Commission on Audit (COA) a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal
from the service. This was denied by the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 12 October 1982 on the ground that the
executive clemency granted to him did not provide for the payment of back salaries and that he has not been
reinstated in the service. It appears that Garcia was recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not
show whether Garcia's reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman. Garcia again filed a claim
to recover his back salaries for the period from 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal, to 12 March 1984, when he
was reinstated. In Decision 362 embodied in its 3rd Indorsement dated 23 July 1985, COA denied the claim stating
that the executive clemency was silent on the payment of back wages and that he had not rendered service during
the period of his claim. Aggrieved, Garcia appealed the COA decision of 23 July 1985 to the Office of the President.
On 21 April 1986, Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., by authority of the President, denied the
appeal "due to legal and constitutional constraint," holding that the Supreme Court is the proper forum to take
cognizance of the appeal on certiorari from the decision of the COA, citing Art. XII-(D), Sec. 2, par. 2, of the 1973
Constitution (now Art. IX-[A], Sec. 7, of the 1987 Constitution). Hence, Garcia filed the petition for review on
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant
of executive clemency.

HELD:

The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the
conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the
offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and
as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because
he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal
act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable
doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent
of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily,
petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the
favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford
relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his
unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed
and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March
12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,

(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R.
TORRES and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA,
MM., respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:

We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons,1 Sales v. Director of Prisons 2 Espuelas v. Provincial
Warden of Bohol3 and Torres v. Gonzales,4 that, where a conditional pardonee has allegedly breached a condition
of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime or for his conviction therefor by
final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee to prison. The grant of pardon, the
determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof,
and the proper sanctions for such breach, are purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
We have so ruled in the past, and we so rule now.
In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong Torres pray
for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's prerogative under Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a condition of a pardon
in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before 1979. These
convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2, 2000.
On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the Philippines on condition
that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines. 5" Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 6

On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and
convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled
the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by
authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned
the validity of the Order of Arrest and Recommitment in the aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled
that:

Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is alleged to have
breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed against him under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code . . . Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.9

Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. Unfortunately, there is
no adequate basis for us to oblige him.

A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the
convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not
comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence or an additional one.10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee
has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see
to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of
sentence." It is now a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond
judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon
upon the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11

It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases filed
against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for thirteen (13) years
in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.

Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or unlawful.
In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of
conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond
judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until November 2, 2000.

Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the conditional
pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own judgment, the
acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the same. Courts have no
authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted criminal. It has been our fortified
ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to
determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis
for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of
powers undisputedly solely and absolutely lodged in his office.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement
as to costs.

Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur

23. RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMELEC

FACTS:

In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the
period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada, explicitly stating
that he is restored to his civil and political rights.

In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification cases
against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.

In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying
for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that Estrada
is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).

The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office
has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest votes,
intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that
he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:

May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the crime of plunder
which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?

HELD:
Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally
includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of
the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President Estrada
does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President Arroyo did not
deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public office, orto otherwise
remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the contrary, the same cannot
be upheld based on the pardon’s text.

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive clemency, to
wit:

Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

xxxx

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and regulations shall be
granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.

It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final conviction;
and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable
recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of
statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states
that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12
of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter
provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment
of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national
position.

The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.

Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the pardon
conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to seek public
elective office have been restored.

This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble
is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the
enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute because,
strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue
is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned commitment
nor to limit the scope of the pardon.

Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or purposes.
It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the
preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.

If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek a
public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself. Since former
President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon extended to former President
Estrada.