G.R. No.

140954 April 12, 2005

HEIRS OF BERTULDO1 HINOG: Petitioners,

vs.
HON. ACHILLES MELICOR, Respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

On May 21, 1991, private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed Balane, filed a complaint for "Recovery of
Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and Damages" against Bertuldo Hinog. They alleged that: they own a 1,399-
square meter parcel of land situated in Malayo Norte, Cortes, Bohol; sometime in March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo to use a
portion of the said property for a period of ten years and construct thereon a small house of light materials at a nominal annual
rental of ₱100.00 only, considering the close relations of the parties; after the expiration of the ten-year period, they demanded
the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed
ownership of the entire property.

Accordingly, private respondents sought to oust Bertuldo from the premises of the subject property and restore upon themselves
the ownership and possession thereof.

Bertuldo alleged ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by one Tomas Pahac with the
knowledge and conformity of private respondents. After the pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Private respondents rested their
case. Thereupon, Bertuldo started his direct examination. However, on June 24, 1998, Bertuldo died without completing his
evidence.

On August 4, 1998, Atty. Sulpicio A. Tinampay withdrew as counsel for Bertuldo as his services were terminated by petitioner
Bertuldo Hinog III. Atty. Veronico G. Petalcorin then entered his appearance as new counsel for Bertuldo.4

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Petalcorin has complied with Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which provides that the death of the original
defendant requires a substitution of parties before a lawyer can have legal personality to represent a litigant

RULING:

No formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from date of death of Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party
to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representative of his estate. Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and
judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquires no jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the
heirs on whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.

The list of names and addresses of the heirs was submitted sixteen months after the death of Bertuldo and only when the trial
court directed Atty. Petalcorin to comply with the provisions of Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Strictly speaking therefore,
before said compliance, Atty. Petalcorin had no standing in the court a quo when he filed his pleadings. Be that as it may, the
matter has been duly corrected by the Order of the trial court dated October 15, 1999.
G.R. No. 141538 March 23, 2004

HERMANA R. CEREZO, petitioner,

vs.
DAVID TUAZON, respondent.

CARPIO, J.:

Facts

A Country Bus Lines passenger bus, without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, there being a "Slow Down" sign near the
scene of the incident,collided with a tricycle causing severe damage to the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff. Tricycle
driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo
("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda").

After considering Tuazon’s testimonial and documentary evidence, the trial court ruled in Tuazon’s favor. The trial court made no
pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because there was no service of summons on him. The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed
before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Section 1 of Rule 65. The petition questioned whether the trial court
acquired jurisdiction over the case considering there was no service of summons on Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed
was an indispensable party. The Court of Appeals denied Cerezo spouses’ motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Court of Appeals stated:

A distinction should be made between a court’s jurisdiction over a person and its jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case. The former is acquired by the proper service of summons or by the parties’ voluntary appearance; while the latter is
conferred by law.

The lower court admits the fact that no summons was served on defendant Foronda. Thus, jurisdiction over the person of
defendant Foronda was not acquired, for which reason he was not held liable in this case. However, it has been proven
that jurisdiction over the other defendants was validly acquired by the court a quo.

Issues

Did the Court of Appeals ignored the allegation that defendant-driver Danilo A. Foronda whose negligence is the main
issue is an indispensable party whose presence is compulsory but [whom] the lower court did not summon?

Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs.
Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda. Mrs. Cerezo’s contention proceeds from the point of view of
criminal law and not of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not delict
under the Revised Penal Code.

Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. In his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, "without
exercising due care and diligence in the supervision and management of her employees and buses," hired Foronda as her driver.
Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s "recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence," aggravated by Mrs. Cerezo’s "lack
of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly Foronda."

The trial court thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Article 2180 states in part:

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable party is one whose interest
is affected by the court’s action in the litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs.
Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not an
indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.40 Where there is a solidary obligation on the
part of debtors, as in this case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire
obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation. 41 Where the obligation of the parties
is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available
from either.Thus, there is no need in this case for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The trial court’s acquisition of
jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case on the merits.
G.R. No. 148606 June 30, 2008

CHARLES LIMBAUAN, petitioner,

vs.
FAUSTINO ACOSTA, respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in 1938, the Government acquired the Tala Estate consisting of 808 hectares, located in Kalookan, primarily for a
leprosarium. The State utilized only one-fifth of the property for the purpose. Under Republic Act 4085, it was no longer mandatory
for the segregation of hansenites. On April 26, 1971, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 843 allocating the
property to the Department of Health, the National Housing Corporation, the PHHC and Department of Social Welfare and
Development xxx.

In the meantime, Faustino Acosta took possession of a vacant portion of the Tala Estate and constructed his house thereon, and
executed a deed styled "Registration of Property”.

Faustino Acosta then constructed a fence around the perimeter of the property and planted vegetables thereon. However, in 1984,
Paulino Calanday took possession of the said property without the consent of Faustino, constructed a beerhouse. When Faustino
remonstrated, Paulino filed two (2) criminal complaints against Faustino with the Metropolitan Trial Court.

Paulino, in the meantime, conveyed the beerhouse to Juanita Roces. The latter and Faustino entered into an oral contract of lease
over the parcel of land for a monthly rental of P60.00. Juanita then conveyed the beerhouse to her nephew, Charles Limbauan,
who forthwith assumed the lease from his aunt and who, thenceforth, paid the monthly rentals for the property in the amount of
P60.00 to Faustino. However, in November, 1987, Charles stopped paying rentals to Faustino claiming that, since the property was
government property, Faustino had no right to lease the same and collect the rentals therefore.

On January 2, 1996, Faustino, through Law Interns in the office of Legal Aid of the University of the Philippines, sent a letter to
Charles demanding that the latter vacate the property within five (5) days from notice for his failure to pay the monthly rentals
since October, 1987. Charles Limbauan ignored the letter and refused to vacate the property.

Faustino, forthwith, filed, on February 7, 1996, a complaint for "Unlawful Detainer" against Charles

The Court promulgated a Decision in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant.

Faustino Acosta, passed away on October 22, 2000 while the case was pending appeal with the CA. On June 26, 2001, the CA
dismissed the aforementioned Petition for Review and affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON the death of respondent rendered the case moot and academic.

Ruling:

Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. – Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with
this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without first requiring the appointment of
an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

It is well settled that the failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the court of the death of his client
and no substitution of such party is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives
the death of such party. Moreover, the decision rendered shall bind his successor-in-interest.20The instant action for unlawful
detainer, like any action for recovery of real property, is a real action and as such survives the death of Faustino Acosta. His heirs
have taken his place and now represent his interests in the instant petition.21 Hence, the present case cannot be rendered moot
despite the death of respondent.
G.R. No. 157065 July 11, 2006

ELPIDIO S. UY, doing business under the name and style EDISON DEVELOPMENT & CONSTRUCTION, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the HERITAGE PARK MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (HPMC), respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

The Heritage Memorial Park is a flagship project of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA) in Fort Bonifacio. To
implement the project, the BCDA, entered into an agreement denominated as the Pool Formation Trust Agreement2 (PFTA) with
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Public Estates Authority (PEA). The BCDA was designated as the Project Owner; PEA,
the Project Manager; and PNB as the Trustee.

As project owner, the BCDA was tasked to sell the Heritage Park Investment Certificates to the public and buyers become
certificate holders. The certificate gives the PNB the absolute legal and beneficial title to Heritage Park in trust for the certificate
holders. PEA, as project manager, is tasked to implement and complete the various engineering works and improvements of
Heritage Park.

Pursuant to Section 11.01 of the PFTA, the certificate holders of the project organized themselves into a non-stock, non-profit
corporation, the Heritage Park Management Corporation (HPMC), now the private respondent herein.

In October 1999, alleging delay in the construction of the projects and huge discrepancy between the Accomplishment Report and
the actual physical accomplishment of petitioner's construction firm, the Heritage Park Executive Committee terminated the two
construction contracts namely, the landscaping and nursery works, and the construction of the terrasoleum.

On March 17, 2000, pursuant to the terms of the PFTA, HPMC assumed all the functions, duties and responsibilities of the PEA,
including those under an assailed contract.7
The petitioner filed a complaint8 against the PEA before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) where it sought
to recover payment for its progress billings on the said projects. CIAC promulgated its decision in favor of the Claimant Contractor
ELPIDIO S. UY

ISSUE:

(1) Is HPMC a real party-in-interest or an indispensable party?

RULING:

An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation, and without whom no final
determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. 16

Based on the Construction Agreement, PEA entered into it in its capacity as Project Manager, pursuant to the PFTA. According to
the provisions of the PFTA,17 upon the formation of the HPMC, the PEA would turn over to the HPMC all the contracts relating to
the Heritage Park. At the time of the filing of the CIAC Case on May 31, 2001, PEA ceased to be the Project Manager of the
Heritage Park Project, pursuant to Section 11 of the PFTA. Through a Deed of Assignment, 18 PEA assigned its interests in all the
existing contracts it entered into as the Project Manager for Heritage Park to HPMC. As early as March 17, 2000, PEA officially
turned over to HPMC all the documents and equipment in its possession related to the Heritage Park Project. Petitioner was duly
informed of these incidents through a letter dated March 13, 2000.19 Apparently, as of the date of the filing of the CIAC Case, PEA
is no longer a party-in-interest. Instead, it is now private respondent HPMC, as the assignee, who stands to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit. In its absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is
effective, complete or equitable.20 We thus reiterate that HPMC is an indispensable party.

Indispensable parties must be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.23 Whenever it appears to the court in the course of a
proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and to order the inclusion of
such party.24 The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present. 25
G.R. No. 157163 June 25, 2014

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO
BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Antecedents

On May 22, 2001, respondents Spouses Silverio and Zosima Borbon, Spouses Xerxes and Erlinda Facultad,and XM Facultad and
Development Corporation commenced Civil Case to seek the declaration of the nullity of the promissory notes,real estate and
chattel mortgages and continuing surety agreement they had executed in favor of the petitioner.

The complaint alleged that the respondents had obtained a loan from the petitioner, and had executed promissory notes binding
themselves, jointly and severally, to pay the sum borrowed; that as security for the payment of the loan, they had constituted real
estate mortgages on several parcels of land in favor of the petitioner; and that they had been made to sign a continuing surety
agreement and a chattel mortgage on their Mitsubishi Pajero.

It appears that the respondents’obligation to the petitioner had reached ₱17,983,191.49, but they had only been able to pay ₱13
Million because they had been adversely affected by the economic turmoil in Asia in 1997.

the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss reiterating its affirmative defenses THAT THE COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED
BECAUSE VENUE IS IMPROPERLY LAID.

Issues

1. Whether or not Civil Case No. CEB-26468 should be dismissed for improper venue;

Ruling:

Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was a personal action; hence, venue was properly laid

The determinants of whether an action is of a real or a personal nature have been fixed by the Rules of Court and relevant
jurisprudence. According to Section 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, a real action is one that affects title to or possession of real
property, or an interest therein. Such action is to be commenced and tried in the proper court having jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated, which explains why the action is also referred to as a
localaction. In contrast, the Rules of Court declares all other actions as personal actions. 15 Such actions may include those brought
for the recovery of personal property, or for the enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the
recovery of damages for the commission of an injury to the person or property.16 The venue of a personal action is the place
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides,or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in
the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff,17 for which reason the action is
considered a transitory one.

The Court of Appeals finds that Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc.provides the proper precedent in this case. In Hernandez,
appellants contended that the action of the Hernandez spouses for the cancellation of the mortgage on their lots was a real action
affecting title to real property, which should have been filed in the place where the mortgaged lots were situated. Rule 4, Section 2
(a), of the then Rules of Court, was applied.

The Court pointed out in the Hernandez case that with respect to mortgage, the rule on real actions only mentions an action for
foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. It does not include an action for the cancellation of a real estate mortgage.
Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. The latter thus falls under the catch-all provision on personal actions under paragraph (b) of the
above-cited section, to wit:

SEC. 2 (b) Personal actions. – All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides
or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.

Being a personal action, therefore, Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was properly brought in the RTC in Cebu City, where respondent XM
Facultad and Development Corporation, a principal plaintiff, had its address.
G.R. No. 166920 February 19, 2007

PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER HENRICHSEN, Petitioners,
vs.
KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, Respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The antecedent facts are as follows:

FACTS

Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of environmental
engineering and water supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a corporation duly established and incorporated
in accordance with the laws of the Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI was to engage in the business of providing specialty
and technical services both in and out of the Philippines. It is a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ).
On January 7, 1998, Henrichsen transmitted a letter of employment to respondent in Canada, requesting him to accept the
same and affix his conformity thereto. Respondent made some revisions in the letter of employment and signed the contract.
He then sent a copy to Henrichsen. The letter of employment contains among others a stipulation which states:

“ Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the conditions of employment, as well as any question arising
between the Employee and the Company which is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company
and which can not be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to both parties through written submissions, by the
Court of Arbitration in London.

Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI Sector Manager. He was accorded the status of a
resident alien.

On May 5, 1999, respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his employment had been terminated
effective August 4, 1999 for the reason that PCIJ and PPI had not been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the
Philippines.

Respondent filed with PPI several money claims, including unpaid salary, leave pay, air fare from Manila to Canada, and cost
of shipment of goods to Canada. PPI partially settled some of his claims, but refused to pay the rest.

On December 5, 2000, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor
Arbiter.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter; and (2) venue was improperly laid. It averred that respondent was a Canadian citizen, a transient expatriate
who had left the Philippines. He was employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a foreign corporation with principal office in Tokyo,
Japan. Since respondent’s cause of action was based on his letter of employment executed in Tokyo, Japan dated January 7,
1998, under the principle of lex loci contractus, the complaint should have been filed in Tokyo, Japan. Petitioners claimed that
respondent did not offer any justification for filing his complaint against PPI before the NLRC in the Philippines. Moreover,
under Section 12 of the General Conditions of Employment appended to the letter of employment dated January 7, 1998,
complainant and PCIJ had agreed that any employment-related dispute should be brought before the London Court of
Arbitration. Since even the Supreme Court had already ruled that such an agreement on venue is valid, Philippine courts have
no jurisdiction.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss. Since the parties had agreed that any differences
regarding employer-employee relationship should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in London, this
agreement is controlling.

On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter and affirmed the latter’s decision in toto.

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA found the petition meritorious. Applying the
four-fold test of determining an employer-employee relationship, the CA declared that respondent was an employee of PPI.
On the issue of venue, the appellate court declared that, even under the January 7, 1998 contract of employment, the parties
were not precluded from bringing a case related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues
between the parties were to be resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no
stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines. It ordered the remand of the
case to the Labor Arbiter for disposition of the merits of the case.

ISSUE:
WON THE PROPER VENUE FOR THE PRESENT COMPLAINT IS THE ARBITRATION BRANCH OF THE NLRC AND NOT THE COURT
OF ARBITRATION IN LONDON.

RULING:

The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v.
Tensuan,31 is that while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the
general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be
considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but,
rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. 32

In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this court," "in no other court save —," "particularly,"
"nowhere else but/except —," or words of equal import were stated in the contract.33 It cannot be said that the court of arbitration
in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment contract.

Also, petitioners themselves admitted that the provision on venue in the employment contract is indeed merely permissive.

Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens must be rejected. The bare fact that respondent
is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following reasons:

First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the
complaint; and

In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,36 this Court held that:

x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are
met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a
position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power
to enforce its decision. x x x

Admittedly, all the foregoing requisites are present in this case.

G.R. No. 186979 August 11, 2010

SOCORRO LIMOS, ROSA DELOS REYES and SPOUSES ROLANDO DELOS REYES and EUGENE DELOS
REYES Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES FRANCISCO P. ODONES and ARWENIA R. ODONES, Respondents.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:

The complaint alleged that spouses Odones are the owners of a 940- square meter parcel of land located at Tarlac by virtue of an
Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale executed by the surviving grandchildren and heirs of Donata Lardizabal in whom the
original title to the land was registered. These heirs were Soledad Razalan Lagasca, Ceferina Razalan Cativo, Rogelio Lagasca
Razalan and Dominador Razalan. It took a while before respondents decided to register the document of conveyance; and when
they did, they found out that the land’s Original Certificate of Title (OCT) was cancelled on April 27, 2005 and replaced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 329427 in the name of herein petitioners.

Petitioners were able to secure TCT No. 329427 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by Donata Lardizabal and
her husband Francisco Razalan on April 18, 1972. Petitioners then subdivided the lot among themselves and had TCT No. 329427
cancelled. In lieu thereof, three new TCTs were issued: TCT No. 392428 in the names of Socorro Limos and spouses Rolando Delos
Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes, TCT No. 392429 in the names of Spouses delos Reyes and TCT No. 392430 in the name of Rosa
Delos Reyes.

Respondents sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground that the signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco
Razalan in the 1972 Deed of Absolute Sale were forgeries, because they died on June 30, 1926 and June 5, 1971, respectively. 7

In response, petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars8 claiming ambiguity in respondents’ claim that their vendors are the
only heirs of Donata Lardizabal. Finding no merit in the motion, the trial court denied the same and ordered petitioners to file their
answer to the complaint.9

ISSUES:

(1) WON respondents are not the real parties-in-interest to question the title of petitioners, because no transaction ever occurred
between them; and

(2) non-joinder of the other heirs of Donata Lardizabal as indispensable parties;

RULING:

In an action for annulment of title, the complaint must contain the following allegations: (1) that the contested land was privately
owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and (2) that the defendant
perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff. 28

Such action goes into the issue of ownership of the land covered by a Torrens title, hence, the relief generally prayed for by the
plaintiff is to be declared as the land’s true owner. Thus, the real party-in-interest is the person claiming title or ownership adverse
to that of the registered owner.

Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of
the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter may dismiss the complaint.31 In
this case, no such order was issued by the trial court.