COMMON INTENTION

When more than one person is involved in the criminal act, when their intention is common to do
that particular act, and it is not necessary, all must do that act. However, if anyone is doing that act
alone, then every person who shares their intention is liable for that act in the same manner.1

Section 34 of IPC talks about that ‘Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common
intention’. The wording of Section 34 is “when a criminal act is done by several persons, in
furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same
manner as if it were done by him alone”.

This section based on the principle of ‘Joint liability in the doing of a criminal act’. Section 34
does not create any substantive or distinct offence and also not a penal provision, but this section
consider as only a rule of evidence.

The term ‘common intention’ refers to ‘meeting of minds’; people participated commit an offence
and also participated in commission in furtherance of that common intention.

This section provides that in order to constitute a constructive liability against others, then a
particular criminal act must be done by an individual in furtherance of a common intention, which
creates a link in the chain of acts, all originating out of the common intention.

It is not necessary that the physical presence of everyone is required or any injury sustain. Physical
presence at the very spot is not always a necessary ingredient to attract this section.

The Supreme Court in the case ‘Shrekaniah Ramayya v. State of Bombay’, stated that “he need
not be present in the actual room; he can, for instance, stand guard by a gate outside ready to warn
his companions about any approach of danger or wait in a car on a nearby road ready to facilitate
their escape”.

Here, there are two types of people who defined as principal. The first person is the person who
commits the crime-known as principal in the first degree, and the second person is that who help
or aid in the actual commission, they are known as principal in second degree. This section talks
about the doing of an act by several persons as principals and not as principals and agents.2

1
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King-Emperor, AIR 1925 PC 1.
2
R A Nelson’s, Indian Penal Code, LexisNexis, 11th ed., 2016, Vol 1, pg. 163.
  Applicability of this section

Section 34 of IPC based on the principle of vicarious liability. This section could be analyzed as
follows:

(i). Criminal act is done by several persons;

(ii). Such act is done in furtherance of the common intention of all; and
(iii). Each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him
alone.

This section talks about the term ‘criminal act’ and not ‘offence’. As a “Criminal act means that
unity of criminal behavior, which results in something for which an individual would be
permissible if it were all done by himself alone, that is, is a criminal offence”3.

This section itself does not create any penal provision, and this section can invoke only when there
is a substantive charge of an offence having been committed.

Section 34 prefers the term ‘pre-arranged plan or meeting of mind’, so it is not necessary that there
must be a long interval of time between the formations of the common intention or there should
be a conference where resolution passed and the doing of the act. Common intention may develop
on the spot.

 Condition behind the application of this section

There are the two main conditions that are required to fulfil before invoking this section. These
conditions are considered as a dominant feature of this section
The conditions are:
(a) Intention or Mental element to commit the criminal act with others (pre-arranged plan)
(b) Actual participation in the commission of the offence. (Participate in some manner in the
act).

3
RatanLal & Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, LexisNexis, 33 rd ed., 2016, pg.200.
  Non-Applicability4 of Section 34 of IPC
(a) in case of sudden fight
(b) In mob/group fight (every person is liable for the individual act),
(c) in case of exceeding the Right of Private Defence,
(d) no. of persons are doing a lawful act,
(e) for offence u/s 397 of IPC (section 34 not applicable on those member of group dacoits who
did not use any deadly weapon),
(f) This section does not applicable to section which is limited by their nature to personal acts
(e.g. Sec. 307, 458, 497 & 498).

 Effect of acquittal

When all the accused acquitted except one, then that one cannot be convicted for the offence read
with Section 34 of IPC.

The Supreme Court examine the effect of acquittal in the ‘Krishna Case’5, here the High Court had
acquitted three out of the four accused charged for an offence under section 302, read with Section
34 on the principle of benefit of doubt as their identity had not been established, but convicted the
fourth accused under section 302 r/w section 34 by holding that he had committed the offence.
Here, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the fourth accused and observed that the effect
of an acquittal of the three accused was that they did not conjointly act with the fourth accused in
committing the murder. So, the Supreme Court held that the fourth accused could not be convicted
under Section 302 r/w section 34 for having committed the offence jointly with the acquitted
persons.

 Distinction between Similar intention and common intention

The common intention is different from a similar intention. Common intention is based on a pre-
arranged plan, and an act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention. However,
in the case of similar intention, all the persons acted independently to do a particular act without a

4
Hari Singh Gour’s, Indian Penal Code, Law Publishers (India) Pvt. Ltd., 14 th ed., 2013, Vol. 1, pg. 94 to 133; Ratanlal
& Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, LexisNexis, 33rd ed., 2016, pg.188- 210.
5
AIR 1957 SC 465.
pre-arranged plan. Common intention does not mean the similar intention of several persons. For
Exa. Several people, each acting independently of the other, intend to commit a crime, and all of
them choose the same moment and commit the crime, which each of them intended separately;
there would be no common intention in such a case. The partition which divides their bounds is
often very thin.

In the Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad6 case, here, deceased was with his wife’s sister went
to the field, when deceased was near the riverside, that time five-person including Pandurang
attacked him. Three of the accused were holding the axes. The deceased died on the spot, and here
every witness told a different version of the story. Trial Court convicted all the accused under
section 302 r/w section 34. High Court in appeal maintained the conviction of the three-person,
including Pandurang, but the sentence of two accused was reduced to life imprisonment.

Here, the Supreme Court held that each person is liable for the act done by him. Here, the Supreme
Court held that “In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he
caused, but none would be vicariously convicted for the acts of any of the others; if the prosecution
cannot prove that his separate blow was a fatal one, he cannot be convicted of the murder, however
clearly an intention to kill could be proved in this case.” The Supreme Court convicted the
Pandurang under section 326 and sentenced for ten years of rigorous punishment and also reduced
the punishment of two other accused into life imprisonment.

In the case of ‘Mehbub Shah v. King Emperor’7, here, accused Mehbub shah convicted for the
offence under section 302 r/w section 34. The Session Court gives the punishment to accused of
death, which was later also confirmed by the High Court. The Lordship quashed the death sentence
in appeal. Here, when the deceased was running to save his life, that time accused and his friend
came in front of him and fired shots. No evidence shows that common intention was formed at the
spur of the moment. The mere presence of the accused together is not sufficient to hold that they
shared the common intention to commit the offence.

6
AIR 1955 SC 216.
7
AIR 1945 PC 148.
  Distinction between Sections 34 and 1498

Section 34 talks about ‘Common intention’ & Section 149 of the IPC talk about ‘Common object’.
Both sections cannot be considered on the same footing. As for common intention, the previous
meeting of mind and the pre-arranged plan is required, but in the case of the common object, there
is no need for prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the commission of the crime.

(a) Section 34 is merely declaratory of a rule of criminal liability, and create a distinct offence,
but section 149 is not a merely a declaratory rule but also creates a distinct offence,
(b) Active participation is acquired under section 34, but under section 149, a mere member of
unlawful assembly is sufficient,
(c) Section 34 does not fix a number who must share the common intention (at least two people
is required to share the common intention); but in section 149, it requires at least five people
who have the common object,
(d) Scope of section 149 is wider in nature then section 34,
(e) Section 34 talks about the principle of liability but creates no offence; section 149 creates
a specific offence.

8
R A Nelson’s, Indian Penal Code, LexisNexis, 11th ed., 2016, Vol 1, pg. 178-180.