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White Gold Marine Services Inc. v. Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp.

GR no. 154514 RULING


July 28, 2005
The test to determine if a contract is an insurance contract or not, depends on the
Quisumbing, J.
nature of the promise, the act required to be performed, and the exact nature of the
FACTS agreement in the light of the occurrence, contingency, or circumstances under which the
performance becomes requisite. It is not by what it is called.
White Gold Marine Services, Inc. procured a protection and indemnity coverage for
its vessels from The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association Limited through Pioneer Basically, an insurance contract is a contract of indemnity. In it, one undertakes for a
Insurance and Surety Corporation. White Gold was issued a Certificate of Entry and consideration to indemnify another against loss, damage or liability arising from an unknown
Acceptance. Pioneer also issued receipts evidencing payments for the coverage. When White or contingent event.
Gold failed to fully pay its accounts, Steamship Mutual refused to renew the coverage. In particular, a marine insurance undertakes to indemnify the assured against marine losses,
such as the losses incident to a marine adventure. Section 99 of the Insurance Code
Steamship Mutual thereafter filed a case against White Gold for collection of sum enumerates the coverage of marine insurance.
of money to recover the latter’s unpaid balance. White Gold on the other hand, filed a
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complaint before the Insurance Commission claiming that Steamship Mutual violated A P & I Club is “a form of insurance against third party liability, where the third party is
Sections 186 and 187, while Pioneer violated Sections 299, to 301 of the Insurance Code. anyone other than the P & I Club and the members. By definition then, Steamship Mutual as
a P & I Club is a mutual insurance association engaged in the marine insurance business.
The Insurance Commission dismissed the complaint. It said that there was no need
for Steamship Mutual to secure a license because it was not engaged in the insurance The records reveal Steamship Mutual is doing business in the country albeit without
business. It explained that Steamship Mutual was a Protection and Indemnity Club. Likewise, the requisite certificate of authority mandated by Section 187 of the Insurance Code. It
Pioneer need not obtain another license as insurance agent and/or a broker for Steamship maintains a resident agent in the Philippines to solicit insurance and to collect payments in its
Mutual because Steamship Mutual was not engaged in the insurance business. Moreover, behalf. We note that Steamship Mutual even renewed its P & I Club cover until it was
Pioneer was already licensed; hence, a separate license solely as agent/broker of Steamship cancelled due to no-payment of the calls. Thus, to continue doing business here, Steamship
Mutual was already superfluous. Mutual or through its agent Pioneer, must secure a license from the Insurance Commission.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Insurance Commissioner. In its Since a contract of insurance involves public interest, regulation by the State is
decision, the appellate court distinguished between P & I Clubs vis-à-vis conventional necessary. Thus, no insurer or insurance company is allowed to engage in the insurance
insurance. The appellate court also held that Pioneer merely acted as a collection agent of business without a license or a certificate of authority from the Insurance Commission.
Steamship Mutual.
On the second issue, Pioneer is the resident agent of Steamship Mutual as evidenced
ISSUES
by the certificate of registration issued by the Insurance Commission. It has been licensed to
do or transact insurance business by virtue of the certificate of authority issued by the same
Whether or not Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda) Ltd. Is engaged in an
agency. However, a Certification from the Commission states that Pioneer does not have a
insurance business.
separate license to be an agent/broker of Steamship Mutual. Although Pioneer is already
licensed as an insurance company, it needs a separate license to act as insurance agent for
Whether or not Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. needs a license to operate as the
Steamship Mutual.
insurance agent/broker of Steamship Mutual?
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
GR no. 167330 RULING
September 18, 2009
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and granted the motion for
Corona, J. reconsideration. The Court ruled that the health care agreement between the petitioner’s
and its beneficiaries is not a contract of insurance.
FACTS
The Court based its decision on the fact that the HMO agreement does not qualify as
This is based on a Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner. an insurance business based on the “principal object and purpose test.” The test is based on
Section 2 (2) of the Insurance Code. Accordingly, an enterprise is considered engaged in an
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in insurance business when the principal object of the enterprise is the assumption of risk and
the business of providing prepaid group practice health care delivery system. On January 27, the indemnification of loss. If the enterprise assumes risk and indemnifies beneficiaries for
2000, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue sent an assessment letter to the petitioner losses, then it is an insurance company.
informing it and demanding payment of P224, 702, 614. 18 in back taxes, surcharge, and 2
interests. The deficiency is composed mostly of unpaid documentary stamp tax (DST) American courts have pointed out that the main difference between an HMO and an
imposed on the petitioner’s agreement with its members. insurance company is that HMOs undertake to provide or arrange for the provision of
medical services through participating physicians while insurance companies simply
Petitioner protested before the CIR but due to the latter’s inaction; it filed a petition for undertake to indemnify the insured for medical expenses incurred up to a pre-agreed limit.
review before the Court of Tax Appeals. The CTA rendered a decision partially granting the
petition for review. The petitioner was ordered to pay P53M instead of the original P225M. A substantial portion of petitioner’s services covers preventive and diagnostic medical
Furthermore, the CIR was ordered to desist from collecting DST tax services intended to keep members from developing medical conditions or diseases.  As an
HMO, it is its obligation to maintain the good health of its members.  Accordingly, its health
Respondent CIR appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals. According to him, care programs are designed to prevent or to minimize the possibility of any assumption of
the petitioner’s healthcare agreement is a contract of insurance and as such, is subject to DST risk on its part. Thus, its undertaking under its agreements is not to indemnify its members
under Section 185 of the 1997 Tax Code. The CA rendered a decision reversing the earlier against any loss or damage arising from a medical condition but, on the contrary, to provide
decision of the CTA. It ordered the petitioner to pay P123M in DST. the health and medical services needed to prevent such loss or damage.

Petitioner appealed the decision before the Supreme Court which affirmed the CA’s Overall, petitioner appears to provide insurance-type benefits to its members (with
decision. The SC held that the petioner’s health care agreement during the pertinent period respect to its curative medical services), but these are incidental to the principal activity of
was in the nature of non-life insurance which is a contact of indemnity. The Court further providing them medical care.  The “insurance-like” aspect of petitioner’s business is miniscule
ruled that contracts between companies like petitioner and its beneficiaries under their plans compared to its noninsurance activities.  Therefore, since it substantially provides health care
are treated as insurance contract. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. services rather than insurance services, it cannot be considered as being in the insurance
business.
ISSUE
Lastly, it is significant that petitioner, as an HMO, is not part of the insurance
Whether or not the health care agreement between petitioner and its beneficiaries is an industry.  This is evident from the fact that it is not supervised by the Insurance Commission
insurance contract. but by the Department of Health. In fact, in a letter dated September 3, 2000, the Insurance
Commissioner confirmed that petitioner is not engaged in the insurance business.  This
determination of the commissioner must be accorded great weight. It is well-settled that the
interpretation of an administrative agency which is tasked to implement a statute is accorded On July 24, 1990, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
great respect and ordinarily controls the interpretation of laws by the courts. 44, an action for damages against petitioner and its president, Dr. Benito Reverente, which
Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. v. Court of Appeals was docketed as Civil Case No. 90-53795. She asked for reimbursement of her expenses plus
GR no. 125678 moral damages and attorney’s fees. After trial, the lower court ruled against petitioners.
March 18, 2002
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but deleted
Ynares-Santiago, J. all awards for damages and absolved petitioner Reverente. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, petitioner brought the instant petition for review, raising
FACTS the primary argument that a health care agreement is not an insurance contract; hence the
"incontestability clause" under the Insurance Code does not apply.

Ernani Trinos, deceased husband of respondent Julita Trinos, applied for a health
ISSUE
care coverage with petitioner Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. In the standard application
form, he answered no to the following question:
Whether or not a healthcare agreement is not an insurance contract.
Have you or any of your family members ever consulted or been 3
treated for high blood pressure, heart trouble, diabetes, cancer, RULING
liver disease, asthma or peptic ulcer? (If Yes, give details).
 The Supreme Court ruled that there is a valid insurance contract, after all, all the
The application was approved for a period of one year from March 1, 1988 to elements for an insurance contract are contract are present and alleged concealment
March 1, 1989. Accordingly, he was issued Health Care Agreement No. P010194. Under the answers made in good faith and without intent to deceive will not avoid the policy. The
agreement, respondent’s husband was entitled to avail of hospitalization benefits, whether insurer, in case of material fact, is not justified in relying upon such statement, but obligated
ordinary or emergency, listed therein. He was also entitled to avail of "out-patient benefits" to make further inquiry.
such as annual physical examinations, preventive health care and other out-patient services.

Upon the termination of the agreement, the same was extended for another year
from March 1, 1989 to March 1, 1990, then from March 1, 1990 to June 1, 1990. The amount
of coverage was increased to a maximum sum of P75,000.00 per disability.

During the period of his coverage, Ernani suffered a heart attack and was confined
at the Manila Medical Center (MMC) for one month beginning March 9, 1990. While her
husband was in the hospital, respondent tried to claim the benefits under the health care
agreement. However, petitioner denied her claim saying that the Health Care Agreement was
void. According to petitioner, there was a concealment regarding Ernani’s medical history.
Doctors at the MMC allegedly discovered at the time of Ernani’s confinement that he was
hypertensive, diabetic and asthmatic, contrary to his answer in the application form. Thus,
respondent paid the hospitalization expenses herself, amounting to about P76,000.00.

After her husband was discharged from the MMC, he was attended by a physical
therapist at home. Later, he was admitted at the Chinese General Hospital. Due to financial
difficulties, however, respondent brought her husband home again. In the morning of April
13, 1990, Ernani had fever and was feeling very weak. Respondent was constrained to bring
him back to the Chinese General Hospital where he died on the same day.
The Court also ruled that the lessee, herein petitioner, had an insurable interest in
the items even if he was only a lessee. Section 17 of the Insurance Code provides that the
Vicente Ong Lim Sing, Jr. v. Feb Leasing and Finance Corp. measure of an insurable interest in property is the extent to which the insured might be
GR no. 168115 damnified by loss or injury thereof. It cannot be denied that JVL will be directly damnified in
June 8, 2007 case of loss, damage, or destruction of any of the properties leased.

Nachura, J.

FACTS

FEB Leasing and Finance Corp entered into a lease agreement of equipment and
motor vehicles with JVL Food Products. Vicente Ong Lim Sing, Jr. executed an Individual
Guarantee Agreement with FEB regarding faithful compliance with the terms of the lease
agreement.

JVL defaulted on its obligation. By 2000, the arrears of JVL amounted to


P3,414,468.75. Due to the continuous nonpayment despite numerous demands, FEB filed a 4
complaint for sum of money, damages, and replevin against JVL and Lim. JVL and Lim argued
before the court that the lease contract was actually a sale on installment basis. They further
argued that the contract was a contract of adhesion. The trial court rendered a ruling In favor
of Lim and JVL.

The trial court, through logic, ruled that Lim cannot be a mere lessee because of he
had an insurable interest over the items. It has also been held that the test of insurable
interest in property is whether the assured has a right, title or interest therein that he will be
benefited by its preservation and continued existence or suffer a direct pecuniary loss from
its destruction or injury by the peril insured against. If Lim and JVL were to be regarded as
only a lessee, logically the lessor who asserts ownership will be the one directly benefited or
injured and therefore the lessee is not supposed to be the assured as he has no insurable
interest.

FEB appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
rendered judgment in favor of FEB. It reversed the earlier decision of the RTC of Manila and
ordered Lim and JVL to pay FEB the amount due plus damages. Unsatisfied with the decision,
JVL and Lim appealed the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not a lease agreement was executed by JVL and FEB.

RULING

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition of Lim and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. According to the Court, the agreement was indeed a financial lease
agreement and not a sale by installment basis.
Simeon del Rosario v. The Equitable Insurance and Casualty Co., Inc. RULING
GR no. L-16215
June 29, 1963 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI of Rizal.

Paredes, J. “We believe that under the proven facts and circumstances, the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, are well taken, for they are supported by the generally
FACTS accepted principles or rulings on insurance, which enunciate that where there is an ambiguity
with respect to the terms and conditions of the policy, the same will be resolved against the
On February 7, 1957, the defendant Equitable Insurance and Casualty Co., Inc., one responsible thereof. It should be recalled in this connection, that generally, the insured,
issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario, alias Paquito has little, if any, participation in the preparation of the policy, together with the drafting of its
Bolero, son of herein plaintiff-appellee, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000.00 to terms and Conditions. The interpretation of obscure stipulations in a contract should not
P3,000.00, as indemnity for the death of the insured. favor the party who cause the obscurity (Art. 1377, N.C.C.), which, in the case at bar, is the
insurance company.”
It is stipulated under Part VI (h) of the contract that the insurance does not cover 5
death caused by drowning except as a consequence of the wrecking or disablement in “. . . . And so it has been generally held that the "terms in an insurance policy,
Philippine waters of a passenger steam or motor vessel in which the insured is travelling as a which are ambiguous, equivocal or uncertain . . . are to be construed strictly against, the
fare paying passenger. There is, however, a rider in the contract stating that the provisions of insurer, and liberally in favor of the insured so as to effect the dominant purpose of
Part VI (h) are waived. indemnity or payment to the insured, especially where a forfeiture is involved," (29 Am. Jur.
181) and the reason for this rule is that the "insured usually has no voice in the selection or
On February 24, 1957, the insured Francisco del Rosario,  alias Paquito Bolero, arrangement of the words employed and that the language of the contract is selected with
while on board the motor launch "ISLAMA" together with 33 others, including his beneficiary great care and deliberation by expert and legal advisers employed by, and acting exclusively
in the Policy, Remedios Jayme, were forced to jump off said launch on account of fire which in the interest of, the insurance company" (44 C.J.S. 1174). Calanoc v. Court of Appeals, et al.,
broke out on said vessel, resulting in the death of drowning, of the insured and beneficiary in G.R. No. L-8151, Dec. 16, 1955.”
the waters of Jolo.

Simeon del Rosario, father and sole heir of the insured, filed a claim for payment
with the insurance company. The company issued to del Rosario P1,000. The counsel of del
Rosario, however, wrote to the company and informed them that del Rosario should get
P1,500 instead of P1,000.

The company referred the issue to the Insurance Commissioner who ruled in favor
of the company. Unhappy with the decision of the IC, del Rosario appealed the decision
before the CFI of Rizal (Pasay City). The CFI issued a decision in favor of del Rosario.
According to the court, the policy covers drowning but does not specify the amount to be
paid in case of drowning. Since the company promised to pay between P1000 and P3000 and
insurance policies should be construed in favor of the insured, the company should pay del
Rosario P3,000.

The case was elevated on appeal before the Court of Appeals but was affirmed by
the appellate court.

ISSUE

Whether or not the company should pay P3,000 instead of P1,000.


There is no question that majority of the stockholders of the respondent
corporation were German subjects. This being so, we have to rule that said respondent
became an enemy corporation upon the outbreak of the war between the United States and
Filipinas Compania de Seguros v. Christern, Huenefeld and Co., Inc. Germany. The English and American cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals have lost their
GR no. L-2294 force in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
May 25, 1951 Clark vs. Uebersee Finanz Korporation, decided on December 8, 1947, 92 Law. Ed. Advance
Opinions, No. 4, pp. 148-153, in which the controls test has been adopted. In "Enemy
Paras, CJ. Corporation" by Martin Domke, a paper presented to the Second International Conference of
the Legal Profession held at the Hague (Netherlands) in August. 1948 the following
enlightening passages appear:
On October 1, 1941, the respondent corporation, Christern Huenefeld, & Co., Inc.,
after payment of corresponding premium, obtained from the petitioner ,Filipinas Cia. de Since World War I, the determination of enemy nationality of corporations has
Seguros, fire policy No. 29333 in the sum of P1000,000, covering merchandise contained in a been discussion in many countries, belligerent and neutral. A corporation was
building located at No. 711 Roman Street, Binondo Manila. On February 27, 1942, or during subject to enemy legislation when it was controlled by enemies, namely managed
the Japanese military occupation, the building and insured merchandise were burned. In due under the influence of individuals or corporations, themselves considered as
time the respondent submitted to the petitioner its claim under the policy. The salvage goods enemies. It was the English courts which first the Daimler  case applied this new
were sold at public auction and, after deducting their value, the total loss suffered by the 6 concept of "piercing the corporate veil," which was adopted by the peace of
respondent was fixed at P92,650. The petitioner refused to pay the claim on the ground that Treaties of 1919 and the Mixed Arbitral established after the First World War.
the policy in favor of the respondent had ceased to be in force on the date the United States
declared war against Germany, the respondent Corporation (though organized under and by The United States of America did not adopt the control test during the First World
virtue of the laws of the Philippines) being controlled by the German subjects and the War. Courts refused to recognized the concept whereby American-registered
petitioner being a company under American jurisdiction when said policy was issued on corporations could be considered as enemies and thus subject to domestic
October 1, 1941. The petitioner, however, in pursuance of the order of the Director of legislation and administrative measures regarding enemy property.
Bureau of Financing, Philippine Executive Commission, dated April 9, 1943, paid to the
respondent the sum of P92,650 on April 19, 1943.
World War II revived the problem again. It was known that German and other
enemy interests were cloaked by domestic corporation structure. It was not only by
The present action was filed on August 6, 1946, in the Court of First Instance of legal ownership of shares that a material influence could be exercised on the
Manila for the purpose of recovering from the respondent the sum of P92,650 above management of the corporation but also by long term loans and other factual
mentioned. The theory of the petitioner is that the insured merchandise were burned up situations. For that reason, legislation on enemy property enacted in various
after the policy issued in 1941 in favor of the respondent corporation has ceased to be countries during World War II adopted by statutory provisions to the control test
effective because of the outbreak of the war between the United States and Germany on and determined, to various degrees, the incidents of control. Court decisions were
December 10, 1941, and that the payment made by the petitioner to the respondent rendered on the basis of such newly enacted statutory provisions in determining
corporation during the Japanese military occupation was under pressure. After trial, the enemy character of domestic corporation.
Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the action without pronouncement as to costs.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila
The United States did not, in the amendments of the Trading with the Enemy Act
was affirmed, with costs. The case is now before us on appeal by certiorari from the decision
during the last war, include as did other legislations the applications of the control
of the Court of Appeals.
test and again, as in World War I, courts refused to apply this concept whereby the
enemy character of an American or neutral-registered corporation is determined
The Court of Appeals overruled the contention of the petitioner that the respondent by the enemy nationality of the controlling stockholders.
corporation became an enemy when the United States declared war against Germany,
relying on English and American cases which held that a corporation is a citizen of the
Measures of blocking foreign funds, the so called freezing regulations, and other
country or state by and under the laws of which it was created or organized. It rejected the
administrative practice in the treatment of foreign-owned property in the United
theory that nationality of private corporation is determine by the character or citizenship of
States allowed to large degree the determination of enemy interest in domestic
its controlling stockholders.
corporations and thus the application of the control test. Court decisions
sanctioned such administrative practice enacted under the First War Powers Act of
1941, and more recently, on December 8, 1947, the Supreme Court of the United
States definitely approved of the control theory. In Clark vs. Uebersee Finanz The respondent having become an enemy corporation on December 10,
Korporation, A. G., dealing with a Swiss corporation allegedly controlled by German 1941, the insurance policy issued in its favor on October 1, 1941, by the petitioner
interest, the Court: "The property of all foreign interest was placed within the reach (a Philippine corporation) had ceased to be valid and enforcible, and since the
of the vesting power (of the Alien Property Custodian) not to appropriate friendly insured goods were burned after December 10, 1941, and during the war, the
or neutral assets but to reach enemy interest which masqueraded under those respondent was not entitled to any indemnity under said policy from the
innocent fronts. . . . The power of seizure and vesting was extended to all property petitioner. However, elementary rules of justice (in the absence of specific
of any foreign country or national so that no innocent appearing device could provision in the Insurance Law) require that the premium paid by the respondent
become a Trojan horse." for the period covered by its policy from December 11, 1941, should be returned by
the petitioner.
It becomes unnecessary, therefore, to dwell at length on the authorities cited in
support of the appealed decision. However, we may add that, in Haw Pia vs. China Banking The Court of Appeals, in deciding the case, stated that the main issue hinges on the
Corporation,* 45 Off Gaz., (Supp. 9) 299, we already held that China Banking Corporation question of whether the policy in question became null and void upon the declaration of war
came within the meaning of the word "enemy" as used in the Trading with the Enemy Acts of between the United States and Germany on December 10, 1941, and its judgment in favor of
civilized countries not only because it was incorporated under the laws of an enemy country the respondent corporation was predicated on its conclusion that the policy did not cease to
but because it was controlled by enemies. be in force. The Court of Appeals necessarily assumed that, even if the payment by the
petitioner to the respondent was involuntary, its action is not tenable in view of the ruling on
7 the validity of the policy. As a matter of fact, the Court of Appeals held that "any intimidation
The Philippine Insurance Law (Act No. 2427, as amended,) in section 8, provides
that "anyone except a public enemy may be insured." It stands to reason that an insurance resorted to by the appellee was not unjust but the exercise of its lawful right to claim for and
policy ceases to be allowable as soon as an insured becomes a public enemy. received the payment of the insurance policy," and that the ruling of the Bureau of Financing
to the effect that "the appellee was entitled to payment from the appellant was, well
founded." Factually, there can be no doubt that the Director of the Bureau of Financing, in
Effect of war, generally. — All intercourse between citizens of belligerent
ordering the petitioner to pay the claim of the respondent, merely obeyed the instruction of
powers which is inconsistent with a state of war is prohibited by the law of nations.
the Japanese Military Administration, as may be seen from the following: "In view of the
Such prohibition includes all negotiations, commerce, or trading with the enemy;
findings and conclusion of this office contained in its decision on Administrative Case dated
all acts which will increase, or tend to increase, its income or resources; all acts of
February 9, 1943 copy of which was sent to your office and the concurrence therein of the
voluntary submission to it; or receiving its protection; also all acts concerning the
Financial Department of the Japanese Military Administration, and following the instruction
transmission of money or goods; and all contracts relating thereto are thereby
of said authority, you are hereby ordered to pay the claim of Messrs. Christern, Huenefeld &
nullified. It further prohibits insurance upon trade with or by the enemy, upon the
Co., Inc. The payment of said claim, however, should be made by means of crossed check."
life or lives of aliens engaged in service with the enemy; this for the reason that the
(Emphasis supplied.)
subjects of one country cannot be permitted to lend their assistance to protect by
insurance the commerce or property of belligerent, alien subjects, or to do
anything detrimental too their country's interest. The purpose of war is to cripple It results that the petitioner is entitled to recover what paid to the respondent
the power and exhaust the resources of the enemy, and it is inconsistent that one under the circumstances on this case. However, the petitioner will be entitled to recover only
country should destroy its enemy's property and repay in insurance the value of the equivalent, in actual Philippines currency of P92,650 paid on April 19, 1943, in
what has been so destroyed, or that it should in such manner increase the accordance with the rate fixed in the Ballantyne scale.
resources of the enemy, or render it aid, and the commencement of war
determines, for like reasons, all trading intercourse with the enemy, which prior Wherefore, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and the respondent
thereto may have been lawful. All individuals therefore, who compose the corporation is ordered to pay to the petitioner the sum of P77,208.33, Philippine currency,
belligerent powers, exist, as to each other, in a state of utter exclusion, and are less the amount of the premium, in Philippine currency, that should be returned by the
public enemies. (6 Couch, Cyc. of Ins. Law, pp. 5352-5353.) petitioner for the unexpired term of the policy in question, beginning December 11, 1941.
Without costs. So ordered.
In the case of an ordinary fire policy, which grants insurance only from
year, or for some other specified term it is plain that when the parties become
alien enemies, the contractual tie is broken and the contractual rights of the
parties, so far as not vested. lost. (Vance, the Law on Insurance, Sec. 44, p. 112.)
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