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Feudal Europe,800-1300: communal
discourseand conflictualpractices
MarkusFischer
11. Ruggie, "Continuityand Transformation in the World Polity,"p. 274. In this passage,
Ruggie is citingfromJ. R. Strayerand D. C. Munro, The Middle Ages, 4th ed. (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts,1959), p. 115; and PerryAnderson,Lineages of theAbsolutistState
(London: New LeftBooks, 1974),pp. 37-38.
12. Ruggie,"Continuityand Transformation in theWorldPolity,"p. 280.
Feudal Europe 433
The discourse of the feudal age derived fromtwo principal sources, the
customsof Germanictribesand the legal traditionof the Roman Empire,
Feudal Europe 435
28. On feudal fragmentation and its causes, see Bloch, Feudal Society,pp. 238, 376-79, and
394-401; Boutruche, Seigneurieet feodalite,vol. 2, pp. 31-39; Guy Fourquin, Lordshipand
Feudalismin theMiddleAges,trans.Iris Sells and A. L. LyttonSells (New York: Pica Press,1976),
pp. 93-94; Mitteis,The Statein theMiddleAges,p. 92; Mundy,Europein theHighMiddleAges,pp.
politiquesde lOccidentmedieval,pp. 116-32; Painter,
56, 226-27, and 421; Pacaut, Les structures
MedievalSociety,pp. 19-20 and 26; Poly and Bournazel,La mutation feodale,pp. 81-87 and 129;
Strayer,WestemEuropein theMiddleAges,pp. 57-66; and R. Van Caenegem,"Government,Law
and Society,"in Burns,TheCambridge History ofMedievalPoliticalThought, pp. 175-85.
29. Fourquin,Lordshipand Feudalismin theMiddleAges,p. 93; and FrancoisLouis Ganshof,
Le moyenage (Historyof internationalrelations:The middle
Histoiredes relationsintemationales:
ages) (Paris: Hachette,1953),pp. 139-40.
30. See JanDhondt,"Medieval 'Solidarities':FlemishSocietyin Transition,1127-1128,"trans.
FredricL. Cheyette,in Cheyette,Lordshipand Community in MedievalEurope,pp. 274-75; and
Van Caenegem,"Government, Law and Society,"pp. 179-80.
440 InternationalOrganization
Scale
10 miles
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~ Snncey,&
Mont-St-VincentA elf A
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A Formerlypublicfortress Boundaryofcastellany
A Castle River
0 Town
FIGURE 1. ThecastellaniesoftheMaconnaisaroundtheyear1150
Source.GeorgesDuby,La societeauxXIe etXIIe sieclesdans la regionmacdnnaise(Paris: Ecole
Pratiquedes Hautes Etudes, 1971),pp. 518-19; modifiedand reproducedwithpermissionof
Editionsde l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris.
Feudal Europe 443
43. On the subjugationof the peasantry,see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 171 and 241-74; Duby,
The ThreeOrders,pp. 152-53;Otto Hintze,"The NatureofFeudalism,"trans.FredricL. Cheyette,
in Cheyette,Lordshipand Community in MedievalEurope,p. 27; Poly and Bournazel,La mutation
feodale,p. 92; Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in Westem Europe,p. 105; and Van Caenegem,
"Government,Law and Society,"p. 196.
44. On the belligerentoriginsof towns,see NorbertElias, The Historyof Manners,trans.
Edmund Jephcott(New York: PantheonBooks, 1982), p. 198; Hay, The MedievalCenturies, pp.
110-11; Mundy,Europe in theHighMiddleAges,p. 154; Painter,MedievalSociety,pp. 72-74 and
78-79; Pirenne,MedievalCities,pp. 118-21, 134-35, 148-51, and 170-83; and Fritz Rorig, The
MedievalTown(Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress,1967),pp. 19-20,41, 155, 159,and 164.
45. Pirenne,MedievalCities,p. 150.
Feudal Europe 447
In discussingfeudaldiscourseon legitimaterelationsbetweenindividuals,it is
usefulto distinguishtwo types:(1) relationsof heteronomoussubordination,
46. Duby, The ChivalrousSociety,p. 49. See also Duby,La societeaux XIe etXIIe sieclesdans la
regionmdconnaise,p. 168.
448 InternationalOrganization
50. See Bloch, Feudal Society,pp. 211-12; Ganshof,Feudalism,pp. 49-50 and 102-3; and
Luscombe,"Introduction,"pp. 160-62.
51. Van Caenegem,"Government,Law and Society,"p. 201. See also Bloch,Feudal Society,p.
235; Boutruche,Seigneurieetfodali, vol. 1, p. 222; and Polyand Bournazel,La mutation
feodale,
pp. 137-42.
52. Hallam, CapetianFrance,p. 27.
53. Lemarignier,"Politicaland MonasticStructuresin France at the End of theTenthand the
Beginningof the EleventhCentury,"p. 110.
450 InternationalOrganization
58. On the enserfmentof the peasantry,see Bloch, Feudal Society,pp. 255-74; Boutruche,
Seigneurieetfeodalite,vol. 2, pp. 53-82; Hintze, "The Nature of Feudalism,"pp. 27-28; Mundy,
Europein theHighMiddleAges,p. 224; Polyand Bournazel,La mutation feodale,pp. 193-219; and
Van Caenegem,"Government, Law and Society,"pp. 196-97.
59. Thietmarof Merseburg,citedbyBloch inFeudal Society,p. 160.
60. Philip of Remi, lord of Beaumanoir,cited by Mundyin Europe in theHigh MiddleAges,
p. 224.
61. On communitarian beliefsand theirpracticalmanifestations,see Black,"The Individualand
Society,"pp. 588-97; Gurevich,Categories ofMedievalCulture,pp. 81-82, 163-64,178-79,185-90,
and 273; AronJ.Gurevich,MedievalPopularCulture:ProblemsofBeliefand Perception, trans.Janos
M. Bak and Paul A. Hollingsworth(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1988), pp. 55-56;
Quillet, "Community,Counsel, and Representation,"pp. 520-26; and Reynolds,Kingdomsand
Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 1-11,67-78, 90-100, 148-54,and 168-214.
452 InternationalOrganization
65. Ibid.,pp.lOO0andl113.
66. dans la regionmaconnaise,p. 199.
Duby,La societeauxXle etXIIe sh?cles
67. Ibid.,p. 163.
68. Ibid.,p. 160,fn.51.
454 InternationalOrganization
any man who could affordto pay a warriorto fightin his stead, spawninga
regularprofessionofjudicial championsforhire.
Damages were assessed intuitupersonae-that is, in considerationof the
social statusof the injuredparty-ratherthan on the basis of the amountof
damage suffered.72 Social rank, however,was a direct functionof combat
strengthand wealth,the wordnobilisbeing used forthe strongmenwho had
come to dominate locally and the principal social distinctionbeing made
betweenpotens (powerful) and pauper (weak). As a result,feudal courts
accorded damages in proportionto the powerof the litigant,forinstance,by
countingthenumberofhismilitary vassals.The procedureofarbitration meant
inpracticethatinfringement was rewardedbecause it accordedtheperpetrator
a shareofthe disputedobject,abandoningtheidea ofobjectiverightor law. In
southernand westernFrance,the arbitersusuallytriedto dividetheobjectsin
litigationso thatno one leftempty-handed, since it was customarythatboth
partiesshould be satisfied.While thissharingmayindeed reflecta heterono-
mous view of justice,it clearlyencouragedunjustclaimsbecause it promised
theplaintiffto reap at least some rewardfromhistransgression. Moreover,the
arbiterswereusuallypeople withvestedinterests, suchas friends,relatives,and
associates,who exertedvariouspressureson thelitigants.
Unwrittenand applied ad hoc, the customarylaw thatpeer courtsapplied
favoredthe strongerbecause it reflectedthe structureof power.73 Believingto
live underthe same "good old law," whichin realitychangedrapidly,feudal
people quicklyaccorded traditionalstatusto recentdeviationsfromcustom.
Accordingto Bloch, "Every act, especiallyif it was repeated three or four
times,was likelyto be transformedinto a precedent-even if in the first
instanceithad been exceptionalor evenfrankly unlawful";thus,"the principle
ofcustomary law ... in thelongrunresultedin thelegalizationofalmostevery
usurpation."74 Such usurpationwas oftenlegitimizedby the conceptof seisin,
wherebya personcouldprovea property rightbysheerpossessionregardlessof
theoriginaltitle.Likewise,thelordlyexactionsimposedon thepeasantrywere
called consuetudines, or customs,since nobodycould remembertheirillegiti-
mateorigins.
72. On intuitu
personaeand arbitration, see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 129-30,288, and 332-35;
Karl Bosl, "Ruler and Ruled in theGermanEmpirefromtheTenthto theTwelfthCentury,"trans.
MiriamSambursky, in Cheyette,Lordshipand Community in MedievalEurope,p. 361; FredricL.
Cheyette,"Suum Cuique Tribuere," French HistoricalStudies 6 (Spring 1970), pp. 287-99;
Reynolds,Kingdomsand Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 26-27; StephenD. White,"Pactum
... Legem Vincit et Amor Judicium:The Settlementof Disputes by Compromisein Eleventh-
CenturyWesternFrance,"AmericanJoumalofLegal History22 (October 1978), pp. 281-308; and
Van Caenegem,"Government, Law and Society,"pp. 180-81.
73. On the legitimizingnatureof customarylaw, see Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 113-16; Duby,
TheChivalrousSociety,p. 4; Elias,Powerand Civility, p. 62; Gurevich,Categories
ofMedievalCulture,
pp. 181-85; Poly and Bournazel, La mutationfeodale, pp. 93-95; Reynolds,Kingdomsand
Communities in WestemEurope,pp. 12-14; and Van Caenegem,"Government,Law and Society,"
p. 182.
74. Bloch,Feudal Society,pp. 114 and 411. See also Brunner,Land undHerrschaft, pp. 138-39.
458 InternationalOrganization
effective overinvestiture
control totherulers.The sinofservingan excommu-
nicatedkingmayhavemattered toineffable
publicopinionamongthemasses,
butithardly theking'swarriors.
affected Otherwise, howcouldan excommuni-
cated Germankinghave musteredenoughmilitary vassalsto invadeItaly,
conquerRome,and evendethrone thepope? Overall,according to Mundy,
ofthe . . . allianceofthe Church
"papal politicalpowerwas largelya reflection
withEurope'saristocracies againsttheprinces," withtheendresultthat"the
effortsoftheChurchtowindirectdominion resulted eitherinmerely nominal
rewards orclearfailure."79
As longas theMaiconnais hadbeenundertheeffective authorityofthecount
of Macon,conflicts had been resolvedby publiccourtsinsteadof private
self-help,
making peopleindependent and theirproperty secure.Aroundthe
year1000,however, thecastellans ceasedtoappearatthecount'scourt, neither
submittingtoitssentences norserving asjurorsanylongerbutinsteadusurping
thedistrictcourtsneartheirfortresses. In Chalon,as inMacon,thejurisdiction
ofthecomitalcourtwasreducedtothesphereofa count'spersonalinfluence.
In eachcase,jurisdiction followed theconstraint ofthecastle,ifonlyoverthe
peasants,whiletheknights largelyfreedthemselves ofanyjudicialconstraint
during theeleventh century. As a result,
thenoblesresolvedconflict aboveall
byviolenceandcoercivebargaining. According toDuby,"In the11thcentury,
ifa chevalier suffered an injury,hisfirst
move[was]toseekvengeance against
the aggressor; ... often,however, thevictim, eitherwithouthope to obtain
satisfactionwithhisforcesor unwilling to engagein longand costlyaction,
[preferred] a settlement."80 Settlement was eithersoughtprivately orbyjoint
submission to thearbitration ofa castellan-ifthelatterlethimself be drawn
in.For instance, abouttheyear1100,all sessionsofthecourtofthecountof
Maconendedwithpeace treatiesand compensation agreements. Unableto
enforcedecisionsand composedof the litigants'kin,the courtsof the
Maconnaisreliedon oral testimony by local people withvestedinterests,
allowedbribesto arbiters andwitnesses, andpartitioned thecontested object
ratherthanfullycompensated thevictim.In short, justicein theMaconnais
favored thepowerful.
As theabovediscussion demonstrates, thefeudalnormprescribing conflict
resolutionaccording to immanent justiceeitherbycustomary or papal action
largelyfailedto engender a corresponding practice.Payingheedmerely to its
formsby callingfeudor diffidatio whatwas reallyarbitrary most
self-help,
peopleresorted directlytoforceandcoercive bargaining inordertosafeguard
theirindividual interests,favoring thestrong overtheweak.Evenwhenfeudal
actorsdidbringcomplaints tocourt,thestrong stillhadtheadvantage because
feudalcourtprocedureswere based on forceand on the applicationof
79. Mundy,Europein theHighMiddleAges,pp. 330 and 325. See also JanetNelson, "Kingship
and Empire,"p. 248.
80. Duby,La soci&tg
auxXIe etXIIe sieclesdans la regionmaconnaise,p. 169.
Feudal Europe 461
Conclusion
in theWorldPolity,"p. 275.
and Transformation
82. Ruggie,"Continuity
FeudalEurope 465