DNA EVIDENCE CASES: results in accordance with the rules of evidence, which shall be assessed by RTC in keeping with
results in accordance with the rules of evidence, which shall be assessed by RTC in keeping with Sections 7
A. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITO
26 Oct 2007 / Tinga / Appeal from a CA decision
Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types > With a search warrant > Things that may be
seized > Rules on DNA evidence [AM No. 06-11-5-SC (2007)]
FACTS: Around 9PM, private complainant AAA was accosted by a young male (whom she later knew as
Umanito). He waited for her by the creek, and he pointed as knife at her abdomen. He dragged her into the
Home Economics Building of Daramuangan Elementary School. He undressed her while still holding the knife.
He set her down on a bench, put down the knife, and had sex with her. He dressed up and threatened to kill her
if she reported the incident. Six months later, AAA ’ s mother noticed the prominence on her stomach, and it
was then that she divulged to her mother the alleged rape. Her mother brought her to the police station.
(Umanito’ s alibi: He was at home all day. Re: AAA, he admitted that he courted her but she spurned him. He
conjectured that she had a crush on him since she frequently visited him.)
RTC rendered judgment against Umanito and sentenced him to suffer reclusion perpetua. Umanito ’s
appeal was transferred to the CA for intermediate review (as per Mateo ruling), and CA affirmed
RTC. Umanito seeks acquittal on reasonable doubt, with the belated filing of the case and AAA ’ s
questionable credibility as grounds. He also said that AAA filed the complaint only upon her mother ’s
insistence; this supports his claim that AAA had sex with another (a married man). Also, he claimed that there
were several inconsistencies in her assertions.
CASE IS REMANDED TO THE RTC FOR RECEPTION OF DNA EVIDENCE
RATIO
The fact that AAA bore a child because of the purported rape may provide the definitive key to Umanito ’ s
absolution, since it can now be determined with reasonable certainty WON he is the father of her child. AAA
and her child are directed to submit themselves to DNA testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA
Evidence (AM No. 06-11-5-SC) which took effect on 15 Oct 2007 (a few days before promulgation of this
case).
DNA print / identification technology is now recognized as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect
to a crime, or to absolve one erroneously accused, where biological evidence is available. The groundwork for
acknowledging the strong weight of DNA testing was first laid out in Tijing v. CA . Herrera v. Alba discussed
DNA analysis as evidence and traced the development of its admissibility in our jurisdiction. Tecson v.
COMELEC said that in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to establish, DNA testing could
be resorted to.
The determination of WON Umanito is the father (through DNA testing) is material to the fair and
correct adjudication of his appeal. Under Sec. 4 of AM No. 06-11-5-SC, the courts are authorized, after due
hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, since SC is not a trier of facts, it would be
more appropriate that the case be remanded to RTC for reception of evidence.
The hearing should be confined to ascertaining the feasibility of DNA testing with due regard to the
standards set. RTC should order the DNA testing if it finds it to be feasible in this case. RTC shall determine
the institution to undertake the testing, and the parties are free to manifest their comments on the choice. After
the DNA analysis is obtained, it shall be incumbent upon the parties who wish to avail of the same to offer the
(Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence) and 8 (Reliability of DNA testing methodology). RTC is
also enjoined to observe confidentiality and preservation of DNA evidence.
To facilitate the execution of this resolution, although the parties are primarily bound to bear the
expenses for DNA testing, such costs may be advanced by SC if needed.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITO
G.R. No. 172607 April 16, 2009
FACTS: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child
hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the
Court deemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB.
With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed
to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test
results.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other
information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the
accused has been acquitted or served his sentence.
The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and
Umanito, to determine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a
Complete Match in all of the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above
findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological father of BBB. The defense
admitted that if the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
presumption of paternity.
ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].
RULING: Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNA
Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA,
Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she was
raped by Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).The disputable presumption that was established as a result
of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not
object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor
presented evidence to rebut the same.
By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.
Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts,
and that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to
deny Umanito’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal.
The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED.
B. ROSENDO HERRERA VS ROSENDO ALBA
FACTS: In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in
order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armi’s allegations.
In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to
establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned
the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any
result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right
against self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.
RULING: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing
doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA
test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case of People
vs Vallejo (2002).
In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand,
as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which is
now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data:
how the samples were collected,
how they were handled,
the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence (Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts before admitting
scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:
Whether the theory or technique can be tested,
Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance
In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA
test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological father.
However, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result
in the DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically become a
conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such
result is still disputable or refutable evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not
complied with.
What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological
father?
Then the evidence is merely corroborative.
Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of the right against self-
incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of evidence
taken from his body when it may be material. There is no “testimonial compulsion” in the getting of DNA
sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.
HERRERA VS. ALBA
“Action to impugn Legitimacy: Biological or other scientific grounds”
FACTS:
• 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba before the trial
court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner (Rosendo Herrera)
• Rosendo Herrera denied that he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical
contact with respondent‘s mother
• Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity. respondent presented the testimony of
Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D who testified that the test is 99.99% accurate
• Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination
• trial court and CA granted the motion to conduct DNA paternity testing
ISSUE:
• Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation. If yes, what
are the conditions under which DNA technology may be integrated into our judicial system and the
prerequisites for the admissibility of DNA test results in a paternity suit
RULING:
1. Yes. By 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.
The Court moved from the issue of according ―official recognition‖ to DNA analysis as evidence to the
issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis - People v. Vallejo
2. It all boils down to evidence and it’s admissibility
• Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the fact in issue and is not otherwise excluded by
statute or the Rules of Court.[48] Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue
as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.[49] Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the
admissibility of expert testimony, provides as follows
• The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training
which he is shown to possess may be received in evidence
• This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed,
even evidence on collateral matters is allowed ―when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability or improbability of the fact in issue

3. The court goes on to discuss the Vallejo case on the caution with the method employed in the actual
testing DNA.
• In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other
things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility
of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the
analyst who conducted the tests
4. Nevertheless, the petition is dismissed.
C. JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother
Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which
include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college
diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology;
(d) his Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of
the Philippines, College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about
petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was
adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for
hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba
namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled
where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in
favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity
action had been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish
a prima facie case.
ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
RULING: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
RATIO: Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The
statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case
which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted
by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective evidence.
They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima
facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations
in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy
and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological
sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type
of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing
has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or
integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order,
at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This
does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the
said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein
the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered
a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding
the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in
paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily
undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima
facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.”
D. ANTONIO LEJANO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176389 14 December 2010
FACTS: On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at
their home in Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It
presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime. She
pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter
Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals.
Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the “darling” of the NBI because
of her contribution to its success. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Alfaro’s direct and
spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome cross-examination should be given a great weight in
the decision of the case.
In Alfaro’s story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at
their residence. After Webb was informed that Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became piqued
and thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied
all the accusations against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place, he was
staying in the United States. He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27
October 1992. As documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording
his entry and exit from both the Philippines and the US, Flight’s Passenger Manifest employment documents
in the US during his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the Philippine
DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough recount of his activities in the US
ISSUE: Whether or not Webb’s documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more credence by the
Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.
RULING: For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:
The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and
The witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria. She did not show
up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around the agency
for some time as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. And although
her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case.
She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible
acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example, just so she can accommodate the
crime scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence that:
He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb. This
alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the other
accused. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaro’s
testimony will not hold altogether. Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.
E. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB
FACTS: On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years old, and xxx, seven,
were brutally slain at their home in Parañaque City. Following an intense investigation, the police arrested a
group of suspects, some of whom gave detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and
eventually ordered them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery especially
to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what everybody referred to as the Vizconde
massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced that it had solved the crime.
It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime.
She pointed to accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and Joey Filart
as the culprits. She also tagged accused police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Relying
primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the public prosecutors filed an information for rape with
homicide against Webb, et al.
The Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, presided over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of
the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart remained at large.
The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with the others corroborating her testimony. These
included the medico-legal officer who autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan
Subdivision, the former laundrywoman of the Webb’s household, police officer Biong’s former girlfriend, and
Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita’s husband.
Webb’s alibi appeared the strongest since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of
America. He presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to prove this.
In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad reputation for truth and the incredible nature
of her testimony.
But impressed by Alfaro’s detailed narration of the crime and the events surrounding it, the trial court found a
credible witness in her. It noted her categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged
by grueling cross-examinations.
On January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial court rendered judgment, finding all the
accused guilty as charged and imposing on Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and
one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, modifying the penalty imposed on Biong
to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde.
The appellate court did not agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It
found sufficient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and Estrada equally
guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in executing her mother and sister.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court issued a Resolution granting the
request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela’s cadaver, which
specimen was then believed still under the safekeeping of the NBI.
The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence to give the accused and the
prosecution access to scientific evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct
decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has custody of the specimen,
the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial record shows, however, that the specimen was not
among the object evidence that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit on the ground that the government’s
failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the denial of his right to due process.
CONTROLLING ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Alfaro’s testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying Webb, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the persons who committed it, is entitled to
belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented sufficient evidence to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony that he
led the others in committing the crime.
OTHER ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the government’s failure to produce the semen
specimen that the NBI found on Carmela’s cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his
innocence; and
2. Whether or not Webb, acting in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez,
Ventura, and Filart, raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister.
HELD:
The Right to Acquittal Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of
his right to due process given the State’s failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willful
suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela.
When Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence did not yet exist, the country did not yet
have the technology for conducting the test, and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility
as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court rejected the motion for DNA
testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the
specimen in the meantime.
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb’s application for DNA testing, he allowed the proceeding to
move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to
challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken against him and the other accused.
They raised the DNA issue before the Court of Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in
rendering its decision in the case. None of the accused filed a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA
test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had in the meantime passed
the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused’s lack of interest in having such test done, the State cannot
be deemed put on reasonable notice that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future
time.
SUSPICIOUS DETAILS
Alfaro had been hanging around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her
handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of this information led to
the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro’s tip led to
the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo gang" that killed a police officer. Because of her talent, the task force
gave her "very special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending nights in one
of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about it and she was piqued. One
day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde
massacre. Sacaguing showed interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When
this did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as well assume the role
of her informant.
WEBB’S U.S. ALIBI
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two
immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn; (d) the second immigration check; and (e) alibi versus positive
identification; and (f) a documented alibi.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence that (a) he was present
at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the accuracy of travel documents
like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign records of departures and arrivals from airports. They
claim that it would not have been impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly
left it on March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the Philippines again on
October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said the lower courts took only about twelve
to fourteen hours.
EFFECT OF WEBB’S ALIBI TO OTHERS
Webb’s documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with respect to him, but also with
respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the
proposition that Webb was in the U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold together.
Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story. Without it, the evidence against the others must
necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court entertains doubts about the innocence
of the accused since an open mind is willing to explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable,
lingering doubt as to his guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such
kind of doubt hangs on to one’s inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the testimony of an NBI asset who
proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not
produce?
The Supreme Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution
dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez,
Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASED from detention unless
they are confined for another lawful cause.
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE CASES:
A. PEOPLE VS. NOEL ENOJAS
Police Officers Eduardo Gregorio and Francisco Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang
and Southmall when they chanced upon a suspiciously parked taxi driven by Noel. They approached the taxi
and asked the driver for his documents. Because they have serious doubts about the documents presented by
Noel, they invited him to the police station. leaving his taxi behind. On their way, they stopped at a 7-11 store
so Francisco can relieve himself. Francisco then chanced upon a robbery in progress, and shot it out with the
suspects. One suspect was shot dead by Francisco while the other one managed to escape. Eduardo gave chase
and fired at an armed man. Another man came out of the Jollibee outlet and fired at Gregorio, who returned
fire; all the men however managed to escape. Eduardo then sought the help of his colleagues. Meanwhile,
Noel, the taxi driver whom the two earlier arrested, disappeared. Ferjen, the Chief of Investigation of the Las
Pinas Police and two other police officers immediately responded to the call for help by Eduardo. Because they
suspected Noel, the taxi driver to be part of the attempted robbery, they searched his taxi and found his
cellphone. Ferjen instructed Joel, another police officer, to monitor all incoming messages therein. Subsequent
investigation identified the man shot by Francisco as Richard Mendoza, while another dead body was located
at a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. Joel testified that he monitored the incoming text messages on Noel’s cellphone,
and posing as the latter, communicated with the accused. An entrapment operation led to the arrest of the other
accused Fernando and Roger. Noel was also arrested later. At the trial, Franciso’s father also testified as to the
death of his son, as well as the expenses incurred by them because of their son’s death.
The accused opted not to testify. They averred that they are entitled to an acquittal because they were illegally
arrested and text messages used in evidence against them were inadmissible not having been properly
identified.
The lower court convicted them for murder, which was affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals,
thus the accused elevated their case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court:
2“The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez,
Santos, or Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This may be true but the prosecution could
prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in front
of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers were bringing him with them to the police station because of the
questionable documents he showed upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab yielded Enojas’ mobile
phone that contained messages which led to the entrapment and capture of the other accused who were also
taxicab drivers.
2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than remain in the cab to go to the police station where he was
about to be taken for questioning, tending to show that he had something to hide. He certainly did not go to the
police afterwards to clear up the matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez as one of the men he saw running away from the scene
of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified “Kua Justin” as one of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the shootout; the
messages also referred to “Kua Justin” as the one who was hit in such shootout and later died in a hospital in
Bacoor, Cavite. These messages linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police investigators succeeded in entrapping accused Santos, Jalandoni,
Enojas, and Gomez, who were all named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made references to the
7-11 shootout and to the wounding of “Kua Justin,” one of the gunmen, and his subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the accused were members of an organized group of taxicab drivers
engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found in possession of mobile phones with call numbers that
corresponded to the senders of the messages received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas left in his
taxicab.”
xxx
“As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had
personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this
was so, it cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged but for rejecting any evidence that may
have been taken from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an unlawful arrest, a point that is not
in issue here. At any rate, a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—and the investigating
police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had committed
it. The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong leads
on the participation and identities of the accused. Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this
knowledge.”
B. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM
SHIPPING, INCORPORATED, Respondents
FACTS: On april 20, 1996, M/V DibenaWinm being operated and owned by the herein private respondent
Bangpai shipping company under its hip agent Wallen shipping Inc., accidentally bumped the power barge of
the herein petitioner, NAPOCOR. The latter filed a complaint for damages on april 26, 1996 before the sala
of the herein public respondent judge. During the presentation of evidence, the petitioner presented as pieces
of evidence Xerox copies, to which such was admitted by the court. Hoever, a motion to strike out the evidence
was filed before the court to which the court ordered that such pieces of evidence be stricken out of the records
but has to be attached to the documents for proper disposition by the appellate in case of appeal before the
latter. The petitioner aver that such documents be admitted for the basic reason that such is within the purview
of the electronic evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not thepeices of evidence submitted by the petitioner be regarded within the purview of
the electronic evidence for the court be compelled to admit?
HELD: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following?
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols
or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an
obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and
any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document. For the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used
interchangeably with "electronic data message".
On the other hand, an "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is
established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.It includes digitally signed
documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data
message or electronic document.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant
only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in
evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based
document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an
electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the
contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded
or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be
considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an
electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic
Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that
the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not
be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. — There can be no evidence of a writing the
contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of which is made evidence by
law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the
whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof
of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses
in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss
or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a
fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy;
and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document
in the proper place or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies
as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as
enumerated under the abovequoted rule. Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying
admissibility of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.
Indeed the documents presented by the petitioner as evidence before the court were not within the purview
electronic document or electronic data message. It will be highly unacceptable to regard information manually
written down to be regarded as electronic message. The petitioner cannot aver now to submit the original
copies of the documents since they were given enough time to submit such but they refused to do so and insist
that the photocopies be admitted instead.
The high court denied such petition.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding
Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br. 19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING,
INCORPORATED, Respondents.
FACTS: On April 20, 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry owned and operated by private
respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner’s Power Badge 209 which was
then moored at the Cebu International Port. Subsequently, petitioner filed a complaint for damages against the
private respondent Bangspai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on their power barges.
Petitioner adduced evidence and made a formal offer thereof. The public respondent judge denied the
admission and excluded from the records some of the documents submitted by the petitioner as evidence
supporting their complaint on the ground that despite the opportunity given to them, they failed to present the
originals of the Xerox or photocopies of the documents it offered. NAPOCOR justified the admission by saying
that the “photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document” using the provisions of the
Electronic Evidence. The defendant’s objected this claim saying that Xerox copies do not constitute the
electronic evidence as defines in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Electronic Evidence. They assailed further
that the Xerox copies were not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically and required to be
authenticated when offered as evidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopies offered by the petitioner as formal evidence before the trial court are
the functional equivalent of their original based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence?
HELD: The Supreme Court found the arguments of the petitioner untenable.
Electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures or other models
of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation
extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved or affirmed which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored,
processed, retrieved or produced electronically. The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic
document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would
suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to
any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. Petitioner’s argument that since
the paper were produced through an electronic process, then it is deemed to be an electronic document is not
tenable as what differentiates an electronic document from a paper based document is the manner by which
the information is processed.
Further, the court is with the belief that the acceptance of the documents submitted by the petitioners will
violate the Best Evidence Rule under the Rules of Court. The petitioner did not provide any reason as to why
they cannot produce the originals of the photocopies. There is no attempt to justify the same using the
exceptions under the Best Evidence Rule.
Hence, the Supreme Court denied NAPOCOR’s petition and upheld the decision of the lower court.
ANTI-WIRETAPPING CASES:
A. FRANCISCO CHAVEZ VS. RAUL M. GONZALES AND NTC | G.R. NO. 168338 | FEBRUARY
15, 2008
FACTS: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had
copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-
Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing
offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media
organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false information
and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule
65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary
and the NTC constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
HELD: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify straitjacketing
the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or
of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to
all kinds of media, including broadcast media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do
not abridge freedom of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this
failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation
of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by
respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press
statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a
speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior
restraint. The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official
circular. Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ V. RAUL M. GONZALES AND NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, G.R. NO. 168338, FEBRUARY 15, 2008
I. THE FACTS
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes involving a
wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD
and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also
stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by
anybody. Finally, he stated that he had ordered the National Bureau of Investigation to go after media
organizations “found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.”
Meanwhile, respondent NTC warned in a press release all radio stations and TV network owners/operators that
the conditions of the authorization and permits issued to them by government like the Provisional Authority
and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that they shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or
telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation. The NTC stated that the continuous airing or
broadcast of the “Hello Garci” taped conversations by radio and TV stations is a continuing violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority. It
warned that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just
cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said
media establishments.
Subsequently, a dialogue was held between the NTC and the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP)
which resulted in the issuance of a Joint Press Statement which stated, among others, that the supposed
wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly.
Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly
with the Supreme Court.
II. THE ISSUES
1. Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the exercise of
freedom of speech and of the press?
2. Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?
III. THE RULING
[The Court voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, Reyes and Tinga in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-
Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and Velasco in the minority) in granting the petition insofar as
respondent Secretary Gonzalez’s press statement was concerned. Likewise, it voted 10-5 (CJ Puno, joined by
JJ. Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio Morales, Azcuna,
Reyes and Velasco in the majority, as against JJ. Corona, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Leonardo-De Castro and
Tinga in the minority) in granting the same insofar as NTC’s press statement was concerned.]
1. NO, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will NOT justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest
scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear
and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press,
failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. [T]he great evil which government wants to prevent is the
airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar
however are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present
danger test. Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the
tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect. The Press Secretary showed
to the public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an “altered” version. Thirdly,
the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially
considering the tape’s different versions. The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and
other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.
We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of
the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which[,] even
if violated[,] have only an adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not endanger national security.
There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression
of free speech and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be
weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech and of the press. The totality of the injurious
effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status accorded
by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In
calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine
compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing
violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed
their own evil consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise
of free speech and free press, a preferred right whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option but to
uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-
wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
2. YES, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.
[I]t is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with
formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the
exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of
Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech
uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint.
The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention
of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they
constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.
B. GANAAN vs. IAC
G.R. No. L-69809 | October 16, 1986 | J. Gutierrez Jr.
FACTS: Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of
complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they
filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the
proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned
appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case
because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through
a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. Twenty minutes later,
complainant called again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered ‘Yes’.
Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the
Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for
the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant
for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation
without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200,
which prompted petitioner to appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term “device or arrangement” under Rep. Act No. 4200
HELD: No. The law refers to a “tap” of a wire or cable or the use of a “device or arrangement” for the purpose
of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear,
intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable
of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to
be there for ordinary office use.
GAANAN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [GR L-69809, 16 OCTOBER 1986]
FACTS: Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of
the complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico
after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension
as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was
subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty. Gaanan listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with
violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that
its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication
between two parties using a telephone line.
HELD: No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or
other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire
or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed
by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The telephone extension
in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus
in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device
or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through
punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing
devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in order to be punishable must
strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature.
C. SOCORRO RAMIREZ VS. CA AND GARCIA [G.R. NO. 93833. SEPTEMBER 28, 1995]
FACTS: Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary
to morals, good customs and public policy.”. Private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping
and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.” Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
the Information. The trial court granted the said motion. The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent
Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the trial court’s order as null and void, after subsequently
denied the motion for reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD: NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO: Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
ISSUE: Does the anti-wiretapping law, RA 4200, allow parties to a conversation to tape it without the consent
of all those involved?
WHAT WAS CONSTRUED: The word “any” in Sec. 1 of RA 4200: It shall be unlawful for ANY person,
not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
Facts of the case: Soccoro Ramirez was scolded by Ester Garcia inside Garcia’s office. Ramirez taped the
conversation and later filed charges against Garcia for insulting and humiliating her, using as evidence the
transcript of the conversation, based on the tape recording.
Garcia filed criminal charges against Ramirez for violating the anti-wire tapping act, because it was done
without her knowledge and consent. Ramirez claimed that what the law forbids is for other parties, who are
not part of the conversation, to record it using the instruments enumerated in the law (there was an earlier case
that was dismissed because the instrument used was not mentioned in the law).
The trial court ruled in favor of Ramirez, granting a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, but the Court of Appeals reversed it.
Ratio: First, the court noted that the provision makes it clear that it is illegal for any person to secretly record
a conversation, unless authorized by all parties involved.
“The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication.”
The congressional records also showed that the intent was that permission must be sought from all parties in
the conversation. “This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the authorization of all
the parties,” Sen. Tanada said during the deliberations.
“The provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.”
DECISION: Petition denied. Decision of CA affirmed. Costs against Ramirez.

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations
from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity.

RAMIREZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

RULE INVOLVED: Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. Where the law makes no
distinctions, one does not distinguish.